This Is an inquiry
into how the governments
of small and
militarily weak states can resist the strong pressure
of great
powers even in crisis periods. The continued existence and, in
deed, startling increase in the number of small states may seem
paradoxical in the age
of superpowers and the drastically altered
ratio of military strength between them and the rest of the
world. It is well known that the ability to use violence does
not alone determine the course of world politics. Some of the
other determinants can be observed with exceptional clarity in
the diplomacy of the small powers which were striving to stay
out of World War II. I have chosen to focus my attention on
certain small states situated on the periphery
of Europe. This
is not a history of the foreign policy
of these countries during
a selected period nor yet another inquiry
into neutrality. Never
theless, the events of the times, as they involved these states, and
the objectives of the five states' diplomacy
are the materials out
of which I have sought
to construct some propositions about
the power of small states.
My study grew out of an interest in the mounting
influence
of Turkey, the Cinderella of the eastern Mediterranean. Here
was a striking example of a small state which was no helpless
pawn in international politics. An outcast after World War I,
this poor and militarily weak country grew
in power
until it
was being actively wooed by
several great powers
in World War
II, and it later joined
the "Atlantic" states comprising NATO.
How could this have happened? The Turks were not alone in
the 1939-45 period
in having
to face a succession of demands
from the warring great powers and in wishing
to remain out
of war. Some of the small states were as successful as Turkey;
some were not. Some, like Turkey, were able to resist compliance
with great-power demands, or at any rate they could put
off with impunity complying
with some of them. Thus my purpose
to
analyze the power of small powers through
a study
of Turkey
was broadened to include four other states in somewhat similar
circumstances. It was simultaneously narrowed down to a specific
time period when the diplomacy
of several small states having
much in common could be compared fruitfully.
The period chosen, World War II,
is far enough in the past
so that much valuable documentary
material and numerous
memoirs have already appeared.
It is close enough
in time for
those participating in the major
decisions to be questioned about
them. Of course there are documents which mislead and re
porters who are too subjective
to be reliable. Nevertheless, for
the purposes of this study
it was sufficient to describe the broad
outlines of decision-making
in particular crises, and the available
evidence permitted me to draw these pictures without undue
risks of misjudgment.
It was not possible
to discover, precisely
and in detail, the motivations of the individual diplomatists;
fortunately, this was not necessary
to illustrate the main themes
of this analysis.
In any case, for those who care to read, the historical record
of this subject is now available. How the leaders behaved and
the effects of their behavior can be calculated without delving
deeply into their motives; it is sufficient to learn how they
esti
mated the future before embarking upon it. For an analysis of
the power of small states it is enough that the data should say:
This is how the situation looked to the decision-makers; this is
what they did about it; and this is the effect of their action.
Readers primarily
interested in straight diplomatic history
may care to skip the first and last chapters, which may be too
analytical for their tastes. On the other hand, political
scientists
may be able to draw from the case studies material for a dif
ferent kind of analysis from that which I have attempted.
In acknowledging my gratitude
to the many individuals who
aided me in this study,
I deeply regret
that I cannot name those
in the countries involved, both key participants and discrimi
nating observers, who were so useful in clarifying my perspective
on their governments' actions. I can only say
that without their
friendly help the analysis would be wider from the mark of
authenticity than it is. Fortunately,
I can be more specific,
if
unavoidably selective, in thanking some of those in the American academic world who kept me from making
more mistakes than
I have undoubtedly
committed.
First and foremost, for his dedicated attention to every word
in the unpublished manuscript,
I must mention William T. R.
Fox, my husband. The members of the Center of International
Studies as well as other members of the faculty
at Princeton
University have at one time or another assisted me in important
ways, but I would like to single out particularly Dr. William W.
Kaufmann (now at RAND), and Professors Percy
E. Corbett,
Dankwart A. Rustow, and Cyril E. Black. A special debt of
gratitude is owed to the director of the Center of International
Studies, Frederick S. Dunn, whose intellectual and moral en
couragement was indispensable
to this book. All shortcomings
in the work are of course my own responsibility.
The rich library resources of the Royal Institute of Interna
tional Affairs were generously made available to me. I should
also like to thank the officials in the Historical Division of the
Department of State for permitting me to confirm certain facts
and sequences of events. Professors Schuyler C. Wallace and
John H. Wuorinen of Columbia University pointed my way
to
those who could give me firsthand information about relevant
events. A similar service was performed by
Dr. Raymond
Dennett, President of the American-Scandinavian Foundation.
To Houghton Mifflin Company,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Wil
liam Collins Sons and Company, Ltd., and the Controller of Her
Britannic Majesty's Stationery
Office I am indebted for permission
to quote from works published by
them.
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