EU Digital Diplomacy: Geopolitical shift from focus on values to economic security 

Jovan Kurbalija

Author:   Jovan Kurbalija

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The new EU International Digital Strategy 2025 (published on 5 June 2025) pivots from EU’s values-based digital diplomacy (outlined in the 2023 Council Conclusions on Digital Diplomacy) toward a more geopolitical, security- and competitiveness‑driven approach.

The strategy is comprehensive in coverage, from digital infrastructure and security to economic issues and human rights. Yet, in a wide range of policy initiatives, it prioritises issues such as secure digital infrastructure around submarine cables and gives less prominence to, for example, the use of the ‘Brussels effect’ of spreading EU’s digital regulations worldwide. 

The strategy provides a multi-tier approach to the EU’s digital relations with the world, starting from global negotiations (the UN, G7, G20) via engagement with regional organisations (e.g. African Union, ASEAN) and specific countries. 

Lastly, the strategy leaves many questions open, especially regarding its practical implementation. 

This analysis dives deep into these and other aspects of the new EU international digital strategy, which will have a broader impact on tech developments worldwide. It compares the 2023 Council Conclusions on Digital Diplomacy with the 2025 EU International Digital Strategy. Both documents address the European Union’s international digital policy.

However, they differ significantly in form and drafting process. The 2023 Conclusions on EU Digital Diplomacy (The 2023 Conclusions) were adopted by the Council of the EU following negotiations among Member States. Conversely, the 2025 EU International Digital Strategy (The 2025 Strategy) was drafted by the European Commission and presented as a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament. 

This brief unpacks these shifts, contrasting 2025’s priorities with the 2023 outlook, and concludes with policy recommendations.

From values to geopolitics and geoeconomics

The 2023 Conclusions stressed a human-centric, rights-based framework. The 2025 Strategy frames digital issues chiefly as matters of systemic resilience, economic competition, and security. The EU will focus more on building trade and security partnerships for exporting EU’s AI and digital solutions than on ‘exporting’ norms (‘Brussels effect’).  

The Strategy repeatedly stresses that boosting EU technological capacity (AI, semiconductors, cloud, quantum) is essential for economic growth and security. Tech Commissioner Virkkunen has stated that ‘tech competitiveness is an economic and security imperative’ for Europe. 

Continued values, but subsumed

Although the Strategy still affirms support for human rights, it treats ‘values’ as subsidiary to strategic goals. In practice, issues like privacy and inclusivity are mentioned mostly in passing. By contrast, the 2023 Council Conclusions had foregrounded a ‘human-centric regulatory framework for an inclusive digital transformation’. The 2025 text incorporates those values under broader objectives of resilience and competitiveness.

Regulatory power de-emphasised

The EU’s traditional approach of using single‑market rules to set global standards (‘Brussels effect’) is notably downplayed. For example, the new strategy does not mention the AI Act – a flagship EU regulation. Instead, emphasis is on investment and cooperation (e.g. AI infrastructure) rather than the export of EU rules. This suggests the EU pragmatically recognises limits to unilateral rule-setting and focuses on building capabilities instead.

Team Europe approach

Both the 2023 Council Conclusions and the 2025 Strategy stress a coordinated EU approach. However, the Strategy focuses more on multilateral and bilateral alliances. It explicitly aims to deepen existing Digital Partnerships and Dialogues, and establish new ones. A new Digital Partnership Network is proposed to coordinate these efforts, signalling an organisational shift toward structured cooperation.

Table 1: Key shifts in EU digital diplomacy (2023 vs. 2025)

Criterion2023 Conclusions 2025 Strategy 
Primary focusValues-centred approach to digital diplomacyDigital geopolitics and geoeconomics (economic & security imperative)
Strategic framingEmphasis on norms, human rights, open internet principlesCompetitiveness, security, supply chains, trusted partnerships
View of tech leadershipShaping global norms via regulatory influence (‘Brussels Effect’)Economic and security imperative (boosting tech industry, securing infrastructure)
Global engagement approachUniversalist, promoting EU values globally, multilateralismInterest-based, strategic signalling to US/China, balancing bipolarity, focused partnerships

The 2025 Strategy introduces several priorities that were either absent or significantly less prominent in the 2023 Conclusions. These new focus areas illustrate the concrete manifestation of the EU’s intensified geopolitical and geoeconomic orientation.

Defence-linked technologies

For the first time, the EU links advanced digital tech to defence. It calls for efforts in cyber-defence, secure supply chains and countering hybrid threats alongside AI, chips, and quantum R&D. The aim is an industry able to design and produce strategic tech (AI, semiconductors, cloud, quantum) at scale for both civilian and defence use.

This represents a significant securitisation of digital policy, moving beyond traditional cybersecurity to integrate technology directly into defence doctrines and industrial policy.

Secure infrastructure and connectivity

The strategy highlights investments in secure networks – 5G/6G, undersea (submarine) cables, and satellite links. Notably, it builds on the Global Gateway initiative (the EU’s alternative to China’s Belt and Road), co‑funding a network of secure submarine cables (Arctic, BELLA, MEDUSA, Blue-Raman), creating physical links with strategic partners and Digital Public Infrastructure in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This addresses resilience against disruptions and foreign dependence in critical infrastructure.

Economic security – Trusted supply chains

The EU emphasises ‘resilient ICT supply chains’ and the use of trusted suppliers. In practice, this means diversifying away from over‑reliance on any one country or firm. The strategy also pushes digital trade frameworks: expanding digital trade agreements (e.g. with Singapore and South Korea) and promoting innovation in cooperation with ‘trusted partners’ to bolster EU leadership in emerging tech.

Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI)

There is a new focus on promoting EU-style DPIs abroad – for example, supporting partner countries to adopt secure digital IDs, e-services, data governance models, etc. The strategy calls for coordinated EU public-private investment in DPI and cybersecurity tools to aid partners’ digital transitions.

EU Tech Business Offer

This is a major new initiative – a public-private investment package (‘Tech Team Europe’) to help partners build digital capacity. Components include AI Factories (regional supercomputing/data centres), secure connectivity projects, digital skills and cyber capacity-building. The Strategy promises to roll out this dedicated Tech Business Offer globally, blending EU and member state resources to empower foreign markets with European tech (see Strategic Signals below).

Deepening partnerships and standards

The Strategy commits to expanding the Digital Partnerships and Dialogues established in 2023, and creating a new Digital Partnership Network to coordinate them. This means more joint R&D programmes (e.g., in quantum and semiconductors with Japan, Canada, and South Korea) and pushing for interoperable standards. The EU will continue to promote a rules-based digital order in line with its values, but through collaboration rather than just unilateral rules.

While new priorities emerge, some traditional EU themes recede in prominence within the 2025 Strategy, though most are still present, with less emphasis. This highlights strategic trade-offs and potential implications of these shifts.

Brussels effect

The strategy downplays the ‘Brussels effect’, the EU’s reliance on its regulatory power to shape global norms. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is mentioned only in passing, and the landmark AI Act is entirely absent. The Digital Services Act (DSA) is primarily discussed in an internal EU context, with little ambition to project its influence globally.

This signals a shift in the EU’s approach to ‘regulatory diplomacy,’ reflecting a broader reassessment of its approach to digital regulations.  At the 2025 Paris AI Summit, both Ursula von der Leyen and Emmanuel Macron signalled a move toward slowing down AI and digital regulation.

This change responds to a wide range of criticisms: that the EU may have moved too far and too fast with the AI Act (see next section); that its regulatory approach is creating friction with the Trump administration, which views such measures as a threat to the US tech sector; and internal concerns that an overemphasis on regulation could hinder the EU’s competitiveness in the AI race against China and the United States.

EU AI Act

The marginalisation of the EU AI Act in the strategy reflects a broader shift within the EU. Although the Act was negotiated and adopted during a ‘public tsunami’ of concern over long-term AI risks, other actors have since retreated from this approach.

Examples include the slowing down of the Bletchley AI initiative during the Paris AI Summit and the Trump administration’s recalibrated AI strategy. In contrast, the EU faces a unique challenge: its approach to the regulation of AI models, heavily influenced by long-termist thinking, is already codified into law through the AI Act.

The primary challenge now lies in implementing the AI Act. The Act’s provisions related to the top two layers of the AI regulatory pyramid (see image of AI governance pyramid) have been gaining in relevance: protecting data and knowledge from misuse by AI platforms, and safeguarding human rights, consumer interests, employment, and education from adverse AI impacts.

 Business Card, Paper, Text
AI governance Pyramide (2024, Jovan Kurbalija)

However, the provisions for regulating algorithms and long-term risks face practical and conceptual challenges. Some of these provisions, such as identifying the power of AI models mainly with the quantitative parameters of the number of FLOPs, are already outdated due to rapid technological advancements. There are criticisms that regulating algorithms may impact the competitiveness of the EU’s emerging AI industry.

Values-first framing

‘Human‑centric’ language still appears, but under resilience. Explicit human rights advocacy, such as protections for dissidents online or campaigns against censorship and surveillance, is barely mentioned in the strategy. In contrast, the 2023 Conclusions devoted numerous paragraphs to ‘vulnerable… groups’ (women, children, disabled) and digital literacy. 

The 2025 Strategy only briefly nods to ‘fundamental values’ in passing (e.g., promoting a rules-based order). Notably, it omits references to ‘internet shutdowns, online censorship and unlawful surveillance’, which were part of the 2023 document. 

Standalone cyber diplomacy

The Strategy blurs the line between digital and cyber policy. Whereas in the past the EU approaches treated cybersecurity and digital cooperation as distinct tracks, the new document integrates them. (As one example, the traditional ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ is now subsumed under broad tech partnerships.)

Focus on trade agreements

E-commerce policy has also shifted from a detailed 2023 focus on WTO e-commerce negotiations and the moratorium on customs duties towards highlighting the importance of bilateral/regional trade agreements as a primary tool for digital governance.

Table 2: Summary of prioritised and deprioritised issues in 2025 Strategy

Prioritised issues– Dual-use technologies & defence (AI, semiconductors, quantum linked to security)
– Submarine cables (resilience, cybersecurity focus)
– Economic & supply-chain security (resilient ICT, trusted suppliers)
– Tech competitiveness via trade & innovation (digital trade agreements)
– Digital infrastructure (5G/6G, DPI, AI factories, international cooperation)
– ‘EU Tech Business Offer’ (public-private investment abroad)
Deprioritised issues– ‘Brussels effect’ (downplaying regulatory power, GDPR, AI Act, DSA)
– Explicit human rights advocacy (protections for dissidents, anti-censorship campaigns)
– E-commerce negotiations (shift from focus on WTO solutions towards bilateral/regional agreements)
– Prominence of global digital policies (e.g. Global Digital Compact, WSIS)

The Strategy proposes multi-layered engagement combining bilateral arrangements (e.g. digital partnerships), regional framework (e.g. EU-LAC alliance) and global governance (GDC and WSIS) approach from the global via regional to national levels as summarised below.

Global level

The Strategy highlights the following initiatives and policy processes:

  • G7/G20/OECD: Coordination on AI safety, economic security standards, and semiconductors
  • UN: Implementation of Global Digital Compact (GDC), WSIS+20 Review
  • ITU: Rules-based radiofrequency allocation
  • Counter Ransomware Initiative: Joint operations against cybercrime
  • Clean Energy Ministerial: AI-energy collaboration

Regional level

Africa

AI– AI Hub for Sustainable Development (co-designed with UNDP)
– Collaboration with Smart Africa (Africa AI Council) under Global Gateway
– ‘AI for Public Good’ initiative (Generative AI solutions, capacity building)
Cybersecurity– Cyber capacity-building projects (strategic frameworks, incident management)
ASEAN
Security connectivity– Expansion of Copernicus mirror site to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand (EU-ASEAN Sustainable Connectivity Initiative)
Global digital governance– Regional events on human rights-based platform governance
Central America (SICA)
Digital identities/DPI– Mutual recognition of e-signatures (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama)
Latin America and the Caribbean

Security connectivity– BELLA submarine cable (EU-LAC)
– LAC Connectivity Toolbox development
– MEDUSA cable extension to West Africa
Quantum/HPCEU-LAC Supercomputing Network (federated HPC resources)
Cybersecurity– LAC4 cybersecurity education hub
– EU-LAC Cybersecurity Community of Practice
AI‘AI for Public Good’ initiative
Western Balkans

There is ambiguity in dealing with the Western Balkans. While the regional approach is used in the EU’s policies, including this strategy, the EU engages countries from the region individually. 

Security connectivity– Alignment with the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox
Digital identities/DPI– Preparation for integration with the EU Digital Identity Wallet
– Mutual recognition of e-signatures
– Onboarding to Single Digital Gateway
Online platforms– DSA/DMA alignment support

Country level

The Strategy’s linguistic statistics show India and Japan’s growing relevance for the EU’s digital diplomacy. 

Table 3: Frequency of country referencing in 2025 Strategy

COUNTRY20252023
India112
Japan92
Ukraine85
Brazil40
Egypt40
Singapore32
Canada21
United Kingdom30
United States23
Switzerland10

India: Strategic partnership

The relevance of India for the EU’s digital diplomacy has risen significantly. It reflects the overall EU geopolitical shift towards India as a democracy, a leading tech actor, and a country with the highest strategic capacity to connect various groups and blocs, including BRICS, G20, and G77.

EU-India cooperation initiatives
Security connectivity– Blue-Raman submarine cable (via India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor)
Semiconductors– Talent exchange programme for semiconductor skills (under EU-India TTC)
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues
– Exploration of Mutual Recognition Agreements (Cyber Resilience Act)
Digital identities/DPI– Cooperation on e-signatures and DPI interoperability
– Promotion of EU eID Wallet model
AI– AI safety cooperation (via AI Safety Institutes network)

Like-minded partners: Deepening alliances

The EU explicitly seeks deeper digital ties with like‑minded countries, including Japan, South Korea, Canada, India, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. A first Digital Partnership Network meeting (involving EU and partner states) is planned to coordinate tech cooperation. Joint research initiatives are slated (quantum, semiconductor programs with Japan, Canada, South Korea).

Australia
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues: Exploration of Mutual Recognition Agreements (Cyber Resilience Act)
AI– Administrative arrangement on AI safety (via AI Safety Institutes network)
Canada
Security connectivity– Arctic submarine cable projects (with EU/US/Japan)
Quantum/HPC– Joint quantum research projects (computing, sensing, communication)
AI– AI safety cooperation (via AI Safety Institutes network)
Japan
Security connectivity– Arctic submarine cable projects (with EU/US/Canada)
Quantum/HPC– Joint quantum-HPC research (biomedical/environmental sciences)
SemiconductorsJoint R&D projects (PFAS replacement, chiplets, sub-2nm processes)
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues
– Exploration of Mutual Recognition Agreements (Cyber Resilience Act)
Digital identities/DPI– Mutual recognition of e-signatures
– eID Wallet interoperability cooperation
AI– AI safety cooperation (via AI Safety Institutes network)
– Joint research on AI innovation
United Kingdom
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues
AI– AI safety cooperation (via AI Safety Institutes network)
Norway
Defence innovation– Synergies with Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI)
Republic of Korea
Semiconductors– Joint R&D projects (heterogeneous chip integration, neuromorphic computing)
Quantum/HPC– Joint quantum technology projects (computing, sensing, communication)
5G/6G– 6G R&D cooperation (AI-powered RAN)
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues
AI– AI safety cooperation (via AI Safety Institutes network)
Singapore
Cybersecurity-Promotion of the EU eID Wallet model
Digital identities/DPI– Promotion of the EU eID Wallet model
Taiwan
5G/6G– Potential 6G research cooperation (physical layers, antennas)
Semiconductors– Participation in the World Semiconductor Council (GAMS)

United States: Continue, wait and see

The uncertainty of EU-US digital relations is signalled by the lack of references in the strategy of the EU-US Trade Technology Council, which was the main mechanism for transatlantic digital cooperation. However, the EU signalled its readiness to cooperate, emphasising that it ‘remains a reliable and predictable partner’. 

Several ‘omissions’ in the strategy also underscore this readiness to engage. Notably, tech companies are not singled out for criticism, as they often are in the EU’s tech sovereignty approaches and numerous anti-monopoly and content policy initiatives. There is no explicit reference to digital services taxes for tech companies, which has historically been a strong card in the EU’s geoeconomic relations with the US. 

EU-USA cooperation initiatives
Security connectivity– Arctic submarine cable projects (with EU/Canada/Japan)
Semiconductors– Joint early warning mechanism for supply chains
– Transparency mechanism on semiconductor subsidies
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues

China: Between cooperation and competition

China is scarcely mentioned in the text – digital cooperation is deferred to an upcoming summit. However, the Strategy is clearly defensive: it doubles down on ‘secure and trusted 5G networks’ globally, implicitly excluding Chinese vendors like Huawei. It also casts the EU’s Global Gateway as a digital alternative to China’s Belt and Road, investing in secure cables and AI infrastructure in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In sum, the signal to Beijing is one of wary competition. Digital relations will be discussed during the forthcoming China-EU Summit in July 2025.

Neighbourhood: Deep engagement

Regionally, the EU will push its Digital Single Market model to neighbours. For instance, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans are targeted to integrate EU digital rules rapidly (secure IDs, connectivity, regulatory alignment).

Moldova
Security connectivity– Alignment with EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox
Digital identities/DPI– Preparation for integration with EU Digital Identity Wallet
– Extension of EU Cyber-Reserve
Cybersecurity– Cyber capacity building
Ukraine
Security connectivity– Development of Black Sea digital links
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues
– Extension of the EU Cyber-Reserve
Digital identities/DPI– Preparation for integration with the EU Digital Identity Wallet
– AI-based Local Digital Twins for urban reconstruction
Defence innovation– Enhanced collaboration via the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS)
– Synergies with Hub for European Defence Innovation (HEDI)

Global South: Global inclusion

The EU plans to expand Global Gateway digital projects for Africa, Asia, and Latin America: co-financing secure submarine cables, undersea connectivity to Europe, and building local digital infrastructure. A dedicated Tech Business Offer will extend to Southern Neighbourhood and sub-Saharan Africa.

Brazil
Cybersecurity– Cyber Dialogues
Digital identities/DPI– Cooperation on e-signatures and DPI interoperability
Egypt
Digital identities/DPI– Mutual recognition of trust services
– eID Wallet interoperability cooperation
Costa Rica
5G/6G– 5G testbed partnership (with Nokia/Ericsson)

Several critical questions will impact the implementation of the Strategy. 

Synchronising internal and external digital policy

So far, the EU’s internal and foreign policies have been in sync. Europe has been practising locally what was preached abroad. The new Strategy may change these dynamics as Brussels remains committed to a value-based domestic order. Still, externally, the Strategy recasts digital policy in terms of global rivalry and resilience in security and economic domains. This shift from principles to geopolitical interests will trigger tensions in the implementation, as the two approaches necessitate different policy instruments, methods, and language.

Defining digital and internet governance 

The Strategy repeatedly speaks of ‘digital’ affairs, but it also includes several references to ‘internet governance’, leaving it unclear how the EU sees the two concepts and the distinctions between them (if any). In practice, nearly all tech issues (from infrastructure to AI) fall under the internet’s umbrella, so perhaps a clear separation between the two is not very straightforward. Clarifying what means what for the EU is needed to avoid confusion over overlapping mandates.

Cyber vs. digital diplomacy coordination

The EU has two separate diplomatic tracks for cybersecurity and overall digital issues. The new Strategy implies these converge, but the organisational plan is vague. Will the EU continue to have two – cyber and digital – ambassador networks, or will there be an integrated structure? The cyber-digital coordination will rise in importance as the strategy is implemented. The forthcoming Danish presidency of the EU in the second part of 2025 may provide some solutions as Denmark has experience in running holistic tech diplomacy, combining security, economic, and other policy aspects. 

Implementation and resources

The Strategy misses implementation details. Which EU body will lead its rollout? How will funding be allocated across the many initiatives (Tech Business Offer, infrastructure projects, partnerships)? Importantly, will the EU follow on the 2023 Conclusions, which explicitly call to ensure that ‘at least one official in every EU Delegation has relevant expertise on digital diplomacy‘ and that diplomats receive training? 

Progress on this front will be a key test of delivery.

AI Strategy – Computing power vs data and knowledge 

The Strategy heavily emphasises computing infrastructure (AI ‘gigafactories’). It follows global inertia but not AI research, which shows that adding GPU power does not significantly improve AI inference quality (diminishing returns)1. Should the EU instead leverage its data strengths, broad knowledge pool, and human expertise? Ensuring quality data, skilled human capital, and innovative applications may be as important as raw compute. Balancing EU’s high-education workforce and data resources with these new AI investments is an open policy debate.

The 2025 Strategy marks a realpolitik turn for EU digital policy. It recognises that digital affairs are a geopolitical competition and an economic power domain. The EU is right to bolster its tech capabilities, diversify alliances, and secure critical infrastructure. However, it must not abandon its foundational advantages:

Keep values and ethics in view

Even as the strategy focuses on power and security, EU core values – human rights, privacy, democracy – remain the EU’s unique selling points. The EU should ensure that its external actions (e.g. tech exports, partnerships) reflect these values. For example, the Ethics Guidelines for AI or human rights due diligence in tech supply chains should accompany hard-power initiatives. Over time, this ‘soft’ aspect of tech diplomacy will underpin global trust in EU solutions, especially during the AI transformation of societies.

Leverage the knowledge ecosystem

Europe’s educated workforce, strong research base, and innovative companies are among its strengths. The Strategy should explicitly link new initiatives (like AI factories) to European data assets and talent. For instance, investing in common European data spaces, R&D hubs, and AI talent training will complement hardware investments. Policies should channel these resources into EU security and cooperative R&D projects with partners, maximising long-term benefits.

Building digital diplomacy capacity

The EU should develop digital diplomacy capabilities. The Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs should clarify the future of the cyber/digital networks, ensuring diplomats and delegations have the skills to carry out the strategy. This could involve appointing Digital Envoys in key regions, scaling up EU-funded training programs for officials, and embedding digital attachés in trade missions. Progress should be reported regularly (as the 2023 Conclusions demanded).

Clarify governance frameworks

The EU should avoid confusion by clearly defining its terms. If ‘digital diplomacy’ now covers everything from 5G to AI, the Strategy (or follow-up guidelines) should explain how it relates to internet governance, cyber diplomacy, and other fields. This will help partners and stakeholders navigate the new agenda.

Continue global engagement

Finally, the EU should remember that its influence often came from combining hard and soft power. Alongside alliances, it should maintain active engagement in multilateral fora (e.g. UN Internet Governance Forum, WTO e-commerce activities) to promote interoperability and standards. The Strategy’s emphasis on bilateral ties should balance efforts to shape open, rules-based markets globally.

The 2025 Strategy lays out an ambitious vision of a stronger, more assertive EU in global tech. To make it work, policymakers should marry this realpolitik turn with EU’s enduring strengths – its values, expertise, and rule-of-law model – and put concrete implementation in place.

The 2025 strategy covers the impact of digital technology on the geopolitical environment for diplomacy, and topics on the diplomatic agenda, as per Diplo’s methodology for the impact of digitalisation on diplomacy.

The Strategy uses the term ‘digital diplomacy’ only once in the context of a policy topic to advance ‘our international priorities and to build partnerships’. It does not address the use of digital tools for the conduct of diplomacy (e.g. use of social media). The EU has been using ‘digital diplomacy’ to cover geopolitical changes and new topics on the diplomatic agenda, as summarised here.

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  1. As Ilya Sutskever (OpenAI co-founder) stated: ‘The 2010s were the age of scaling; now we’re back in the age of discovery’ (LINK) ↩︎

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