The Peace of Augsburg (1555) and then the Peace of Westphalia (1648) marked the end of common rules across emergent European states. Henceforth each state was autocratic within and autonomous without. The border was the line delimiting internal and external power – and by implication ‘friend’ from ‘foe’. This boundary was physically protected by the army, and administered by diplomacy (diplomacy is war by other means, said von Clausewitz). The diplomat sought ‘friends’ and identified ‘foes’ across the border, acting as ‘peacetime gatekeeper’ deciding which interferences might constrain the state.
Borders were the bulwark of state autonomy and the diplomat its agent. Yet absolute autonomy was an illusion – it became orthodoxy (1) (see When They Severed Earth from Sky: How the Human Mind Shapes Myth by Elizabeth Wayland Barber and Paul T. Barber). Meanwhile, the discovery of America and integration into Eurasian trade allowed a global society to emerge. Since then, globalisation has intensified irreversibly.
The question is whether the absolute autonomy of the state – and the corollary view of the ‘foe’ beyond the border – is still viable as states go about ‘making the social world’ (2) (see Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization by John Searle). My conjecture: this worldview has become maladaptive.
Empire-formation by conquest, such as Genghis Khan’s horseback empire, belongs to the past. Totalitarian ideologies of world domination have faded. Even regime change by external force has proven elusive. State formation is now largely complete: nations are secure in borders, and defence of ‘vital interests’ (3) (see The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century by Robert Cooper) – territorial integrity and autonomy – has become perfunctory though still busy. The foe has lost its war paint.
Autocracy and nationalism used the border to support state formation by defining against the ‘other’ or ‘foe.’ In agrarian societies this was feasible: land was the main resource, and social reality was comparatively simple. Legitimacy rested uneasily on this heuristic (4) (see The Concept of the Political by Carl Schmitt – note how ‘for or against’ becomes ‘friend or foe’).
In the long term, however, the heuristic became reductive. With complex modern systems it yielded false positives, hindering cooperation. Friends today could be foes tomorrow. Reducing multi-dimensional reality to the border became harder, and legitimacy was questioned. As state-sustenance lost legitimacy, ‘narcissism of small differences’ arose, with sub-identities demanding autonomy.
Borders no longer fit social complexity. The ‘friend vs. foe’ dualism yields to pragmatic ‘for vs. against.’ Policy preferences, which cross borders, now dominate. States must coordinate across borders to improve welfare. Neighbours are opportunities, not threats. Borders are administrative, not bulwarks.
The EU is instructive. After WWII, member states abandoned their struggle for mastery in Europe (5) (see The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 by A. J. P. Taylor). They integrated instead. Borders ceased being central. The core six expanded to 25+, built by ‘diplomats without borders.’ Though made of ‘crooked timber’ (6) (see The Crooked Timber of Humanity by Isaiah Berlin), and like all human undertakings subject to compromise (7) (see The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm by Stephen J. Gould and Robert C. Lewontin), the result is remarkable. The EU shows cooperation can outpace competition. Proximity helped shift from defending borders to dismantling them.
In the EU, citizens moved from ‘negative’ liberty (defence) to ‘positive’ liberty (shared improvement). Identity is no longer fixed to territory but evolves with the living group. Identity is dynamic, not territorial.
What is the profile of a ‘diplomat without borders’?
Economic mercantilism has faded, but political mercantilism persists. International relations are still seen as zero-sum. So the first quality of a diplomat without borders is to see the border not as transcendent but as a useful approximation – an administrative tool, not a bearer of identity.
This implies abandoning the ‘friend/foe’ duality. The ‘other’ is not foe simply because he differs (8) (see L’Autre en Nous: Pour une Philosophie du Pluralisme by Tariq Ramadan). The diplomat without borders builds coalitions and communities of purpose. Though ‘community’ has often been used for exclusion (tribalism, nationalism), it can be inclusive. Positive Deviance (see entries 175 and 176) is one example of constructive community empowerment (9) (see Communitarism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship by Henry Tam). Empowerment need not exclude; the ‘other’ is welcome to join.
This is a Copernican revolution for diplomats. But they should not worry unduly – it is so that everything can remain the same (see entry 29).
The post was first published on DeepDip.
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