

Modern Diplomacy

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Preface

Jovan Kurbalija

The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy has recently organised two international conferences addressing the future of diplomacy. The first was the International Conference on Information Technology and Diplomacy (May 1997) and the second was the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy (February 1998). The papers featured in this volume were presented at these conferences. The contributors are professors, diplomats and officials involved in international relations, coming from a wide variety of countries.

The volume begins with Hon. Dr. George F. Vella's opening address to the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy. Dr. Vella provides a general framework for discussion and identifies the main changes in modern international relations affecting diplomacy. It provides insight into several current concerns, including regional co-operation and preventive diplomacy. Dr. Vella highlights the important but often overlooked difference between diplomacy as a method of solving problems in human society and diplomacy as a profession. While diplomacy has been, is, and will remain an important method of harmonising relations in human society, especially among states, diplomacy as a profession can expect increasing competition from non-governmental organisations, the business community, and others who are rapidly acquiring diplomatic skills.

In his keynote address from the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy, Dr. Vladimir Petrovsky describes new challenges facing diplomacy. These challenges include technological progress, the relative decline in the sovereignty of the state, and the emergence of new actors such as NGOs, parliaments, and regional authorities. Diplomacy must function in a complex and sometimes paradoxical context characterised on the one hand by the process of globalisation and on the other hand by forces of fragmentation and localisation. In order to meet these challenges diplomats must adapt their methods of work to the new environment. They must become more open and agile. They must learn to fully utilise opportunities offered by the technological revolution. Modern diplomacy requires a variety of skills, in particular, a familiarity with the art of negotiation, an ability to work in a multicultural environment, and openness to co-operation with different actors, in particular, civil society.

Professor Dietrich Kappeler introduces his paper with a survey of the evolution of diplomacy from the beginning of this century. He then examines new developments, methods, and tools of diplomacy which characterise the post-Cold War period. Among new developments he identifies are intervention in internal conflicts by the international community and the globalisation not only of economic co-operation but also of problems such as AIDS and the disregard of human rights and basic humanitarian principles. He also mentions the emergence of "public diplomacy," meaning that the media has enabled the general population to become involved in international affairs. In analysing new methods, Professor Kappeler focuses on changes in traditional diplomacy, for example, the position of bilateral missions. He then describes the emergence of new actors in diplomacy such as NGOs, and the importance of "grass-root diplomacy," especially in dealing with internal conflicts. The third part of the paper, dedicated to new tools of diplomacy, considers the potential use of new technology and networking in diplomacy.

Professor Erik Goldstein's contribution identifies modern developments in the field of diplomatic protocol. Some characteristics of modern protocol are a growing informality and a need to ensure that states are treated as equals. Professor Goldstein reviews the development of meetings between heads of states from historical times, when such meetings were difficult and dangerous, and therefore uncommon, to the present day, when technology and transport developments have allowed a drastic rise in summity. A section of the paper is dedicated to the question of venue for meetings between heads of states, a frequent cause of diplomatic controversy. Professor Goldstein makes special mention of the modern phenomenon of the "diplomatic handshake," and finally discusses the diplomatic insult.

The paper by Professor Paul Sharp focuses on two trends in modern diplomacy: increasingly institutionalised multilateralism aimed at a stronger international order and the "tendency to see diplomats in terms of the skills they possess and the jobs they do, rather than whom they represent." Both of these trends move diplomats away from their roles as professional representatives of sovereign states. However, Professor Sharp points out that diplomats continue to derive their authority from the fact that they represent states. Recent failures in diplomacy can be attributed to over-ambitious attempts at establishing international order without enough support from individual states. Professor Sharp distinguishes between and explores four types of representation: representation as ceremony and symbolism, representing interests and power, representing ideas, and diplomatic representation and popular sovereignty.

Ms. Pamela Smith defines the key roles of public diplomacy: dissemination of information about the United States including US foreign policy, building international relationships and advising American foreign policy makers. She examines the modern context for public diplomacy, which is characterised by change. The growth of communications technology has allowed more public awareness and involvement in foreign policy making, and, as the public become more involved, the availability of reliable information becomes a crucial factor. Ms. Smith predicts that in the future the role of public diplomacy will be even greater, as these trends develop. However, she does not feel that technological developments will ever eliminate the need for face to face diplomacy, as personal contact seems to be necessary to build trust and mutual respect between states.

The first part of Ambassador Stanko Nick's contribution is dedicated to the main functions and duties of a legal adviser to the foreign ministry. These are varied: advising the foreign minister, participating in the conclusion and ratification of international treaties, taking part in the delegation of his country, participating in the activities of international fora, representing his government before national and international courts, assisting in the incorporation of international law into the internal legal system, and conducting academic and research activities. Ambassador Nick then turns his attention to the position of the legal adviser in the diplomatic service and the government. The higher the level of legal order and democracy in a particular society, the greater the influence of the legal adviser on his minister and government as a whole. Ambassador Nick stresses the importance of the legal adviser's being allowed intellectual and organisational independence. The minister, instead of acting *post-festum*, should consult and involve his legal adviser in making decisions. He points out that the legal adviser has an important function in developing new codes of international law.

Dr. Annabel Hendry addresses the position of spouses in modern diplomacy. Diplomatic services tend to neglect this important issue. According to Dr. Hendry, most diplomatic services adopt the attitude that spouses are not expected to do anything to support the service, but anything they choose to do is welcomed. She highlights the paradox that while spouses should show allegiance to the mission and function of the diplomatic service they do not have a contractual link, but only an accidental connection to the service. The paper discusses typical problems and difficulties for diplomatic spouses related to employment and careers, education of children, etc.

The evolution of diplomacy is analysed from a new and innovative perspective by Professor Richard Langhorne. The key element in his analysis is a concentration on the relationship between the needs and the functioning of the international system. Sometimes, the needs of the international system are met, or even defined, by successful evolution of the diplomatic method, for example, in 1815 and to some extent again in 1919. On the other hand, the emergence of the resident ambassador and the current period could both be mentioned as examples of situations where the needs of the system were not met by diplomatic methods until the need eventually provoked evolution. Current developments in the international system are characterised by the emergence of a much wider range of entities operating in international relations, diffusion of power in the fields of economics and telecommunications, and decline of the sovereignty of states. These changes and challenges need to be met with evolution of diplomatic methods, which we can expect to see in the forthcoming period.

Dr. Milan Mitic describes the problems encountered by a diplomatic service under sanctions, using Yugoslavia as a case study. After a general introduction to the sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia, he concentrates his analysis on the ways in which diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the outside world were affected. Internal effects of sanctions on the diplomatic service of Yugoslavia included a reduction of staff and a halt to the process of reform and adjustment within the diplomatic service. In terms of international relations, sanctions resulted in a reduction of the level of representation abroad to varying degrees. In some cases diplomatic relations were completely broken off (e.g., Malaysia and New Zealand), or consulates were closed (e.g., USA and Canada). In almost all missions Yugoslav diplomatic staff was reduced in level and number, and in some diplomatic corps Yugoslav diplomatic staff were personally isolated. Participation in multilateral diplomacy and international organisations was reduced or disallowed. Dr. Mitic clearly illustrates that normal or effective functioning of a diplomatic service is impossible under sanctions.

The topic of Professor Maria Muller's paper is the evolution of South African diplomacy from a "pariah diplomacy" in the apartheid period to a more conventional type of diplomacy in the post-apartheid period. She concentrates on the ways and means of a diplomatic service adjusting to governmental changes. South African diplomacy has had to adapt to new fields within its foreign policy; for example, to intensive involvement in regional and global multilateral activities. Moreover, the diplomatic service has had to undergo profound changes in terms of internal organisation, human resources, and diplomatic networks.

Professors Linda Frey and Marsha Frey analyse the issue of international privileges and immunities of international functionaries. Diplomatic privileges and immunities, traditionally limited to diplomats, were gradually extended to the personnel of and representatives to international organisations in four stages: after 1804, after 1899, after World War I, and after World War II. The increasing number of people protected by international privileges and immunities and the potential for abuse of these privileges has raised a debate about the necessity of limiting diplomatic privilege. Those who defend diplomatic and international immunities find themselves on the defensive in an environment which is increasingly adverse to immunity from local jurisdiction and to privileges for any group.

The following two contributions are based on presentations delivered at the International Conference on Information Technology and Diplomacy.

In his keynote address Professor Richard Falk discusses changes in modern society brought about by information technology, with special emphasis on the future of the state. Professor Falk draws a distinction in this context between IT as an instrument used by states in their quest for power and IT as an agent transforming market forces and various sectors of civil society. Using the example of the Gulf War, he highlights the extensive use of high-technology weapons systems, based to a large extent on IT. Topics related to the interplay between the role of the state and the emergent cyberworld are organised into three main clusters: a) world order as a mind-game; b) the emergence of a race between "soft power" and "soft targets;" and c) power versus powerlessness in the web of The Web. Although the prevailing tendency seems to indicate that IT will challenge the static world order based on the central position of the state, one should not exclude the possibility that IT could be used to stabilise and further strengthen the static state-centric world order.

Mr. Stefano Baldi explores potential uses of the Internet as a tool in diplomatic activities. He describes how the Internet is currently used in diplomatic procedure and suggests some technologies that could be profitably integrated into the operational structure of diplomatic services. Information resources of the United Nations and other international organisations are given special emphasis. Mr. Baldi reviews these resources and assesses their basic functionality. The paper includes many interesting illustrations, tables and comparative surveys.

Although each contributor in this volume approaches the issue of modern diplomacy from a different standpoint, based on his or her particular type of involvement in international affairs, a consensus is reached on the most important topics. All contributors agree that diplomacy

must change to face new challenges. Some describe changes that are already occurring, while others identify or propose changes that need to begin. Most of the papers identify technological development and changes in international relations such as involvement of new groups, decline in the sovereignty of states, public diplomacy and globalisation as new challenges which diplomacy must successfully meet if it is to continue to exist.

The first part of this volume consists of papers from the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy. The papers in the second part were presented at the International Conference on IT and Diplomacy. After the opening address and the keynote address, papers appear in the order of their conference presentation.

The Diplomatic Studies Programme of the University of Leicester, in particular, the director of this programme Dr. Jan Melissen, suggested potential participants and helped publicise the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy. This volume is a result of the excellent assistance provided by Ms. Susanna Geismann in organising the conferences and contacting participants. Special thanks are due to Ms. Hannah Slavik for linguistic help and reading the proofs of the book. Mr. Anthony Butigieg helped with scanning and collecting documents, and Mr. Chris Borg Cutajar designed the layout and completed desktop publishing work. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the former director of the Academy, Professor Fred Tanner, who supported the organisation of the conferences, and to Professor Felix Meier, current director of the Academy, who has provided full support for the publishing of this volume.

Opening Address

The Honourable Dr. George F. Vella
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
and the Environment of Malta

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to inaugurate this international meeting organised by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies. The main theme of the conference - modern diplomacy - is as topical as it is challenging. We are living through a period of rapid transition in international relations and impressive developments and achievements in the field of communication technology. Besides, new concepts and definitions have evolved over the years of what we mean and understand when we refer to threats to peace, and when we speak of security.

Today peace-keeping, peace-making, and the building and maintenance of security form part of a wider diplomatic and political exercise. Preventive diplomacy involves new diplomatic skills and completely new methods of approach, as well as the adoption of innovative strategies to achieve the ultimate objective of peace. It must be said that even the concept of peace itself has changed over the years to mean much more than just the traditional notion of absence of war.

More diplomatic activity is carried out today in the international forum than on a bilateral basis. More dispute-resolving mechanisms are being created, and more regional organisations are providing opportunities for further co-operation. The implications of these scientific and political developments for both the substance and the style of diplomacy are far-reaching.

Considering the inevitable changes which have already occurred in the immediate post-Cold War period one may indeed wonder what could be the main features of diplomacy as the next century unfolds.

The Cold War era, with its sharply demarcated ideological barriers and rigid strategic concerns, imposed significant constraints on the conduct of diplomacy and practically conditioned its practice outside the largely enclosed centres of the bipolar world. The loosening of these constraints in the late eighties has imposed additional tasks and opened up new areas for diplomacy world-wide.

Over the last decade diplomats from many more countries have been involved in such tasks as seeking a resolution to regional conflicts, delivering humanitarian assistance, dealing with global environmental problems, and promoting international economic co-operation. Diplomats are now involved in these types of activities to a much greater extent, and with much greater relevance, than was the case during the previous four decades.

In the past diplomacy was a prestigious but discrete profession, usually, though not always, conducted at a prudent remove from the eyes of the public. Nowadays diplomats are themselves becoming targets of the international media and public, not as exceptions, as was previously the case, for example, with a colourful personality like Henry Kissinger, but on a more routine basis. Media coverage on CNN, Euronews, and other world media of the comings and goings of a Richard Holbrook, a David Ross, or a head of a United Nations agency such as the UN High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, or the Chief UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq, is sometimes comparable to the coverage traditionally reserved for the activities of political leaders in their own right or of personalities in show business or sports.

Diplomacy and diplomats have become part of the day-to-day life not only of people involved in international relations but also of the general public. Diplomats are seen not only in conference rooms but also in the field, exercising what one Kenyan diplomat has called "gumboot diplomacy."

In such a situation one would expect a greater universal appreciation for diplomats and for the role of diplomacy in solving the problems of the modern world. Ironically, this is not necessarily the case. There is another side to the coin of excessive media exposure. Diplomacy is continuously under the scrutiny and criticism of the public. Looking at international developments with a jaundiced eye, some have even come to the conclusion that diplomacy is often futile or unnecessary.

Are diplomats, if we may borrow environmental terminology, an endangered species? Will diplomacy survive, but diplomats disappear, as was suggested perhaps not so light-heartedly, by one recent commentator? The situation is paradoxical. On the one hand, some argue that in today's world diplomats are gradually becoming superfluous or redundant. On the other hand, far greater importance is being assigned nowadays to diplomacy in resolving the problems of the modern world, in contrast to the alternative of military power. Admittedly, this is a new type of diplomacy. Diplomacy as an institution, and the profession of the consummate diplomat, in modern times and even more so over the last decade or two, have gone well beyond the original early Greek conception of the "go between" acting on behalf of governments as representative of the City States.

Diplomacy is faced by many challenges. Is this a completely new phenomenon? Has diplomacy been challenged in the past? Canadian author Dr. Gordon Smith recently cited the following challenges for diplomacy: first, the growing "community of interests" among nations; second, the dramatic impact of public opinion on diplomacy; third, the communications revolution. At first glance, these challenges look familiar and contemporary. In reality they are quoted from an article which was first published in 1910. As we can see, diplomacy has survived in spite of all of these challenges, constantly adapting to the changes in its environment. Instead of typewriters we have computers; instead of cable we have digital communication. Multilateral diplomacy today complements, and in certain aspects even supersedes, traditional bilateral diplomacy.

If, as mentioned in a book written by two of the participants at this conference, the origin of diplomacy can be traced back to the moment when our predecessors realised that it was better to hear a message than to eat the messenger, then it can safely be surmised that the future of diplomacy is assured as long as humanity exists. Diplomacy will survive. Undoubtedly it will be practised differently; it has to! Changes are already taking place.

New concepts have evolved, and will continue to evolve. We speak today of economic diplomacy, of environmental diplomacy, of preventive diplomacy, of multi-track diplomacy. The coining of new phrases constantly enriches the vocabulary of this profession, reflecting new trends in political thinking and in the methods and tools used by nations in their perennial quest for stability and peace around the globe.

What about diplomats? Their case is more complex.

What is the role of diplomats today? What will be the role of diplomats in the future? Diplomats today are no longer just members of an exclusive professional guild as was the case in the past. Instead of an exclusive diplomatic elite we have now quite a heterogeneous body of professional people participating in various capacities in the management of current international relations, both global and regional. Some of them are diplomats in the classical sense, that is, members of the professional diplomatic services of their countries. Others are international civil servants working within the framework of international organisations, and of increasingly important international regimes. Other individuals, from worlds far removed from diplomacy, are called upon on an ad hoc basis to intervene in particular issues. UNICEF, for example, has been particularly successful in recruiting the involvement of show business personalities in its humanitarian work.

The required skills are also heterogeneous, starting from general diplomatic skills, mainly negotiation and representation, and extending to specialised skills and competencies for dealing with particular issues, such as the protection of the environment, or the procurement of trade and the establishment of the commercial ties that are so vital to the strengthening of relations between nations. These skills should also to be considered diplomatic skills.

The number of individuals involved in diplomatic work has also increased astronomically. Does the increase in number, like every inflationary development, reduce the value and quality of the inflated object? Can we think in terms of whether we could eventually subcontract some diplomatic functions to private and specialised companies? Considering the vast range of specialised subjects that have to be tackled in bilateral and multilateral contacts, would it be too heretic to think along the lines of having the functions of a diplomatic mission, or parts of them, subcontracted to highly specialised companies in the same way that highly sensitive financial or economic issues are contracted out to a firm of bankers or accountants?

These and other ideas are being considered in many capitals world-wide, all with a common objective - that of achieving more and performing better with fewer financial and human resources.

In such a situation diplomats cannot take their position and role for granted. They have to justify their continuing existence in what is gradually becoming a very demanding and competitive environment which unwittingly could be supplanting them, or at least some of their original functions and traditional responsibilities. For example, the difficult task of negotiating the delivery of humanitarian aid, a task the responsibility for which used to fall squarely on the shoulders of the traditional diplomat, has gradually been taken over in places like Bosnia by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Red Cross, etc.

One should also recall that in some of the trouble spots of Central Africa, NGOs continued playing their humanitarian role in the field well after international diplomats had retreated in despair if not also in fear of their lives. This demonstrates that multi-track diplomacy, the process in which a mixture of government and unofficial bodies work at the same time but not necessarily together to help in dispute-resolution, does promote problem-solving and could also lead to the establishment of constructive dialogue on the way to peace-building.

In the field of information-gathering diplomats traditionally face strong competition from journalists, compounded today by the impact of the Internet, e-mail, and satellite transmission technology. In the management of international regimes such as environmental protection, human rights, transport, and so on, the expertise of specialists outside the diplomatic profession is today as much in demand as it has traditionally been in the military field.

One constant question arises. Is there any specific skill that distinguishes the diplomat from other professionals? For those engaged in diplomacy it is as obvious that there is a specific role for diplomats as it is difficult for them to define and make others understand this role. Diplomats should mainly have a general role in co-ordinating policy and putting it into the proper internal and international context. For example, in the field of environmental diplomacy, where expert knowledge is predominant, the diplomat has the important function of guiding specialists in one area not to enter into commitments which could have unintended political or economic implications. In the field of information-gathering, diplomats use their skills to put information in proper context, and to identify trends and signals in a way that is not, and very often cannot be, replaced by traditional journalism or the technology of the Internet.

As we move into the new century diplomats need to develop more intensively some of those traditional skills which have made diplomacy what it is up to now, while learning new skills, especially in the area of the use of information technology. They will still be needed to help weave the fabric of regional and global political, economic and social co-operation. Once that fabric is created it is even more important to maintain it and to develop it further. Diplomats will still be necessary to identify needs, potentials, people and institutions in other countries that could be utilised for co-operation. To do this they must know their own countries very

well. This is a fundamental and important maxim which can never be forgotten even when the world becomes one village. Without an understanding of the history, political system, habits and attitudes of their own countries diplomats cannot start making contact and co-operation with other entities.

Among the recognised qualities of a traditional diplomat are discretion and tact. Someone once said that a diplomat should always think twice before saying nothing. These qualities are hard to maintain in a world where media exposure has overtaken the profession of diplomacy. But throughout history, famous diplomats ranging from Talleyrand to Kissinger have shown that professional discretion and tact can be manifested, perhaps even camouflaged, under various guises, some of them quite colourful. Harold Nicolson speaks of the detachment of diplomats. He did not, however, mean that diplomats should be detached from life in general.

In spite of the joking description of diplomats attributed to Sir Henry Wotton, a late sixteenth-century English diplomat, that "an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country," the fundamental reality is that honesty has been and remains one of the most important qualities of a diplomat. In the conduct of diplomacy the reputation of the diplomat as a reliable person is crucial. Therefore the most demanding skill of a diplomat is indeed how to tell the truth, and not how to lie, even for his country. This basic responsibility was, still is, and in the future should remain one of the fundamental precepts of diplomacy.

I will conclude with what I think is the best description of this aspect of diplomacy, given by a former French ambassador in Washington, Herve Alphand. He said that a diplomat is a person who can tell the truth to anyone in the government to which he is accredited without offending him, and to anyone in his own government at the risk of offending him.

Beyond this I feel that the best advice one could give to any present or future diplomat is from the Book of Proverbs which cautions that a bad messenger falls into mischief, but a faithful envoy brings healing. Healing is precisely what the modern world needs. This is the task ahead for modern and future diplomacy.

The Internet and Diplomats of the Twenty First Century: How New Information Technologies Affect the Ordinary Work of Diplomats

Stefano Baldi
Permanent Mission of Italy
to the International Organizations

One director being a kindly man, and desirous of rewarding him for his long service, ordered him to be given something more important than mere copying; namely, he was ordered to make a report of an already concluded affair, to another court: the matter consisted simply in changing the heading, and altering a few words from the first to the third person. This caused so much toil, that he was all in perspiration, rubbed his forehead, and finally said, "No, give me rather something to copy." After that they let him copy on forever.

From Nikolai Gogol "The Overcoat"

Introduction

With the rapid increase in the amount of interesting and useful information available on the Internet for ordinary diplomatic activities, diplomats are already being confronted with the need to learn new skills in order to fully exploit the possibilities offered by information technology (IT). Those diplomatic activities which consist of acquiring and processing information are likely to be deeply affected by the changes wrought by IT.

Major developments in the functioning of both Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their Missions abroad are inevitable, provided that diplomats learn what is available online and how to access it. Obviously a certain amount of experimentation is normal during the present initial phase of supplying and gathering information. If diplomats are to access necessary information through IT, they will have to play an active role in guiding their counterparts (international organisations or national institutions dealing with foreign affairs) through both their input and specific requests.

The challenge for Ministries of Foreign Affairs is now to find new and more flexible ways to exploit IT, as well as to identify the most appropriate tools for this task. The economic constraints faced by most ministries further favour the use of IT, as it means savings in terms of both time and money.

The aim of this brief study is to demonstrate some of the interesting possibilities already available online for the diplomatic community. The first question any newcomer⁽¹⁾ faces (and not only diplomats) once he is connected to the Web is "what can I do now, where can I go?" That is a perfectly normal question, as the amount of information available is so vast and accessible that it is easy to get confused and be drawn into the World Wide Web (WWW). In order to analyse briefly the kind of "professional" use diplomats can make of the Internet the best thing is to examine an ordinary day at the desk and see how some routine activities can be complemented or substituted by the Internet.

Checking the Mail

The first thing a diplomat would normally do when he arrives at his desk in the morning is to check his incoming "paper" mail. This should also be done once the PC is turned on and connected to the Internet: incoming "electronic" mail (e-mail) should be checked. This simple task is all too often forgotten. There is no point in having a fast carrier (such as the Internet)

which acts nearly in real time if, once the message has arrived, no one goes to check it and to read it.

Electronic mail is particularly important for diplomats whose work, by definition, means contacts with colleagues all over the world. Two things make it an indispensable tool in diplomacy: firstly, it's low cost (in a period when public budgets are being cut drastically, cost becomes a priority) and secondly it overcomes time zone barriers. When a colleague is still sleeping in U.S., it is possible to send him a message from Europe and be sure that he will find it right in his mailbox as soon as he arrives in the office in the morning. And all this at the cost of a local call!

Another big advantage of e-mail is the possibility of sending documents together with the message (so-called attachments). In this simple way, one can save retyping time and modifications to the text can be made directly to the original text. Furthermore, everything which is available in electronic form can be sent by e-mail (i.e., newspaper articles, official UN documents, meeting agendas, etc.). Therefore, if somebody finds an interesting item (such as a press release or an article) on the Internet, he can easily and quickly send it to as many colleagues as he wants, using the same text and simply adding the accompanying message once.⁽²⁾ E-mail is particularly useful for sending all those periodical communications (bulletins, circulars, press releases, etc.) which should have a rapid and wide diffusion in an internal organisational structure.

It is wrong, however, to think that the electronic transmission of communications and documents will completely replace traditional transmission and carriers, although it is possible to predict in the relatively near future a mixed system of electronic and physical transmission, which will be more efficient and economical than present systems. It is important to bear in mind that electronic distribution and electronic mail will never completely replace traditional means of communications and is a complement rather than a substitute. Easy access to basic information should free up time, which can then be devoted to analysis and study, consequently permitting more balanced and coherent decision-making.

Reading the News on the Net

However, no diplomat spends the whole day just checking his mail. . .he must be informed and keep up to date on many issues, particularly in international affairs. Therefore, he must read newspapers. Obviously, reading national and international newspapers and magazines does improve considerably diplomatic skills and knowledge and sometimes it is a real advantage. Nevertheless, it can also be both difficult and expensive to buy the last issues of several newspapers on a daily basis. Once again, the Internet is rapidly changing the ways news is circulated and newspapers are adapting to it. The most important international (and national) news agencies and newspapers are already online (see tables 1 and 2), with fairly comprehensive editions and sometimes even a full edition.

Table 1 – News agencies online:

Reuters Online	http://www.yahoo.com/headlines
Agence France Press	http://www.afp.com/francais/infos/breves/simple/
CNN	http://cnn.com/

It is certainly easier to read printed paper, because we are used to it and because it can be easily transported, but when we find an interesting article on the Internet we can still print it and then read it on paper.

There are two principle advantages for diplomats who read newspapers online, as mentioned above:

a) It is always possible to read the most recent issue. For diplomats posted abroad this is not always the case for the conventional printed version, especially if the newspaper is published on the other side of the world.

b) It is very cheap. Most of the newspapers online offers free access and even those which require a subscription have very competitive rates (if compared to local costs of international press).

But these are not the only advantages:

c) Search facilities: The example of a very famous news agency such as Reuters can be used. The Internet service of Reuters (<http://www.yahoo.com/headlines>) is not as comprehensive as the commercial one, but it does cover the most important news. The special advantage offered by the Internet service is represented by the search facilities and by the hyperlinks to previous articles (see point d). Search facilities mean that it is possible to search for a specific subject and within a few seconds receive a list of articles issued recently by the news agency.

d) Easy reference - The list resulting from the search will be clickable (with hyperlinks), meaning that it will be possible to display the full text of every article just by clicking on its title.

Another advantage of the electronic version of Reuters is that at the bottom of every article there is a list of previous articles published recently on the same issue. In this way it is easy to have a quick idea of how a specific event has developed over the last three or four days.

Newspapers have also developed Internet editions which assist diplomats in their activities. Not only do some of them provide search engines, but it is often possible to consult issues of the preceding days. They are also developing services which are not available for the ordinary paper format, such as sections where all the articles concerning one specific issue are grouped together.



Fig. 1 - Example of search on "Italy" in Reuters Internet Service

Table 2 - International newspapers online:

Financial Times <http://www.ft.com/>

Le Monde <http://www.lemonde.fr/journal/lemonde/>

International Herald Tribune <http://www.iht.com/>

The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>

The wide range of information accessible through the Internet has another important function for diplomats: they can use it as a source for all sorts of details about the country where they are accredited. Quick and easy access to local newspapers, news agencies, institutions, associations, laws and regulations, etc., through the Internet, permits diplomats to be well-informed at any time without leaving their desk, thus enabling them to have a deeper, more comprehensive (not to mention constantly updated) knowledge of the people and the country where they are posted.

Information Concerning International Organisations

Major improvements are also taking place in the number of documents and databases available on the Internet which are relevant for the diplomatic community. The United Nations,

in collaboration with some member states, now endeavours to provide most of the information for distribution also on the Web. A quick perusal of the homepage of the United Nations (<http://www.un.org>) gives an idea of the amount of information already available for consultation online.

A good example could be Security Council resolutions, which diplomats often cite or use as references. Once it was difficult to have the complete final text of a resolution immediately after its release. Now, through the UN Web page, they are easily accessible and retrievable. The same applies for ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions. All the most recent documents issued by the UN Secretariat (including UNCTAD, DHA, ECE, etc.) are available, but their access is restricted to the diplomatic community in a site protected by username and password, in order to avoid excessive traffic. Table 3 illustrates some examples of interesting news services provided by international organisations on the Internet.

Some interesting magazines for international affairs have also developed useful and original services, as has, for example, "Le Monde Diplomatique" (<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/index.html>). This weekly French magazine has set up a free mailing service that sends e-mail periodically to those who have subscribed (for free), concerning the highlights of the current issue, as soon as it is available online.⁽³⁾ Since it is impossible to cover all the news agencies/newspapers/magazines online, the information received by e-mail can be a very useful tool to keep diplomats constantly informed.

Table 3 - Selected News Services of International Organisations:

Latest News from the United Nations - <http://www.un.org/News>

Latest News from the United Nations Office in Geneva - <http://www.unog.ch/news/newsen/presrele.htm>

Daily News Flashes from the European Commission - <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/dnews.html>

News from OECD - http://www.oecd.org/news_and_events/release/

News from US Government - <http://www.usia.gov/products/washfile.htm>

Obviously diplomats should not be only the end users of the information provided by international organisations. As members of organisations, states have the right (if not the obligation) to provide guidelines and suggestions to the international organisations regarding information available and the way it is provided. On this particular issue the ECOSOC resolution E/1997/28 of 14.7.97 concerning international cooperation in the field of informatics stated that: "The ECOSOC reaffirms the continuing need for representatives of states to be closely consulted and actively associated with respective executive and governing bodies of the United Nations institutions dealing with informatics within the United Nations System, so that the specific needs of States, as internal end-users, can be given due priority."



Fig. 2 - United Nations Homepage

Most of the UN bodies have set up a Web site and an official UN Web site locator (<http://www.unsystem.org>) has been created to facilitate both access and the retrieval of information. The different sites are brief, in order to give an overview of the activities and the nature of the organisation, and they often provide additional updated information, such as press releases, programmes, calendars of meetings, reports, description of co-operation programmes etc., which can be most valuable for the diplomatic community. There are also sites with unofficial lists of international organisations and other organisations (UN and international organisations and related links) dealing with international matters which can assist the diplomat. The most renowned is the page prepared by UNDCP(4) (<http://undcp.or.at/unlinks.html>) which features links not only to all international organisations, but also more than one hundred related links concerning international matters.

Taking, for example, the World Health Organisation (<http://www.who.ch>), we will find the Weekly Epidemiological Record (WER) which "serves as an essential instrument for the rapid and accurate dissemination of epidemiological information on cases and outbreaks of diseases under the International Health Regulations, other communicable diseases of public health importance, including the newly emerging or re-emerging infections, non-communicable diseases and other health problems." This publication is made available on the Internet and therefore WHO is not obliged to forward it to local Permanent Missions (in Geneva), which in turn do not have to send it to headquarters. This means not only a saving in money but also in time, as those online who are actually more concerned with the reports' contents (final users) are able to consult the publication directly, without intermediaries. This small example illustrates the kind of savings in terms of time and resources which can be achieved through the implementation of new procedures in the distribution of documents relevant to international affairs.

Today it often happens that information does not reach the final user, a cause of frustration both for the information source and for the potential beneficiary. Foreign policy information is not an exception and the Internet does offer some unique opportunities to fill the gap existing between the provider and the final user. In fact, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, international organisations, NGOs and others are realising the opportunities available. Many of them already have updated press releases, offering at the same time extensive information on their mandates and activities. The more advanced even send this information through e-mail to subscribers on distribution lists which they have set up for this purpose (for free), thus increasing the probability that at least some the information they produce will reach the interested parties. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs of UN (UN/DHA) is a good example, as it sends Diplomatic Missions updates on emergency situations in different parts of the world via e-mail.



Fig. 3 - Homepage of Reliefweb

This information is naturally available also on their Web site (<http://www.reliefweb.int/>), but it is certainly simpler (and more effective) to send it directly to potentially interested parties. The originating organisation can send the same information either directly to headquarters (e.g. Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Ministries For Development Co-operation) or to the accredited missions, which can filter the information according to centrally-established priorities of foreign policy, before forwarding it on electronically. No matter which procedure is followed, diplomats will waste less time as passive intermediaries between the organisation and the ministry and can use this time for more valuable activities.

It is worthwhile saying a few words on the above-mentioned site created by DHA (Reliefweb). In fact this site is a good example of how the correct use of the Internet can increase efficiency. Reliefweb is a project of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

(DHA). The purpose of the service is to strengthen the response capacity of the humanitarian relief community through the rapid dissemination of reliable information on prevention, preparedness and disaster response. Everybody can access the site and have a comprehensive overview of on-going emergencies and crisis situations.

Taking, for the example, the crisis in the Great Lakes, it is possible to have an updated chronological list of information on the region. The particular value of the service consists not only in the easy and fast access to the information but also in the fact that the information provided does not refer to DHA alone, but also includes other international organisations (UN Secretariat, FAO, UNHCR, ICRC), NGOs (Oxfam, Church World Service, Amnesty International etc.), governmental institutions (USAID, USIA), etc. In this way it is possible to have a broad and varied picture concerning a specific topic on a single page. How long would it take to collect the same information from different sources? Certainly much longer than




Fig. 4 - Map contained in the service, Reliefweb.

the few seconds needed to access the Reliefweb service. Moreover, there are other important features of this service which can be most valuable for diplomats, such as the areas dedicated to maps, and to financial tracking. In the case of maps it is possible to visualise a geographic or thematic map concerning one of the areas of crises on screen. How many times we have heard of unknown places in some remote part of the globe? Well, now it is possible to locate the place immediately by consulting one of the fully detailed maps available. The thematic maps are even more interesting, particularly in the work of development assistance. A good example is the map concerning the "Rwanda Regional Emergency Transport and Logistics Network" elaborated by the World Food Programme and available on the Reliefweb site.

Another interesting service which caters for the information needs of diplomats is the financial tracking database for complex emergencies. DHA provides financial reporting for all the countries which receive UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals. The scope of reporting is continually expanding in order to incorporate new emergencies, whilst still maintaining financial reporting for ongoing humanitarian assistance programmes.(5) Consultation of the service allows one to know what has been the response of donors to the different appeals of the organisation (or even inter-agency appeals). It is certainly an important step towards providing the transparency of development assistance funds, as every citizen can monitor the destination of funds decided by national authorities.

All major international political events are now followed by the creation of a specific Web site aimed at providing information on the event. The G7 summits, World Conferences and the Presidencies of the European Union all have specific sites where all the information concerning the event is available and, more importantly, where it is possible to obtain any official documents issued (declarations, statements, etc.) as soon as they are made available. Therefore, there is no longer any need to wait for the fax incoming from the local Embassy or for the communication coming from headquarters: all one need do is log-in and print the document available online. For example, the document concerning the reform of the United Nations, officially presented by the Secretary General Kofi Annan on 16 July 1997, was available on the Internet (<http://www.un.org/reform>) that very same day. Consequently all permanent missions (not only the one in New York where the document was presented) and Ministries of Foreign Affairs were able obtain the text immediately.(6)

Information Concerning Ministries of Foreign Affairs

The Internet can also be useful to learn more about the foreign policy of other countries. There are already fifty Ministries of Foreign Affairs which have set up Web sites.(7) Once again, the type of information available varies greatly from site to site. Nevertheless, most of the basic information necessary for the everyday work of a diplomat, such as press releases, speeches, official positions on specific issues, organigrams, consular information etc., is usually available.

The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) has one of the most comprehensive sites(8) among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.fco.gov.uk/>), providing information which ranges from key foreign policy themes to consular & visa services, from the organisation and the responsibilities of the ministry to commercial operations overseas. For example, the news on 'FCO ON-LINE' is updated several times a day, with a wide range of news and information material, including the FCO Daily Bulletin, issued each day at 1200GMT. If somebody is searching for a recent speech, transcript or publication, he can check the site, and presumably easily find what he was looking for.

Information Provided by Permanent Missions, Embassies and Consulates

There are also many embassies, consulates and permanent missions which have opened Web sites. The most comprehensive site with a list of all the relative links is the Embassy Page (<http://www.embpage.org>). At the moment there are nearly two hundred embassies, consulates and permanent missions online, providing a vast amount of information which is increasing every day and is strictly related to embassy activities. The type of information provided by embassies online is often related to bilateral relations between the host country and the country of the embassy. In the case of consulates, the information is obviously focused on services for citizens abroad and visas, whereas for permanent missions the accent is on the relations between the country concerned and the international organisations.



Fig. 5 - Homepage of the Permanent Mission of Italy to International Organisations in Geneva:

The site of the Permanent Mission of Italy to International Organizations in Geneva (<http://www3.itu.ch/MISSIONS/Italy/>) is a good example of the kind of information given at these sites, with information ranging from details about the relations between Italy and the international organisations in Geneva (WHO, ILO, ECE, CERN, WTO, WMO, Human Rights, etc.), to a list of who's who in the mission, a list of vacancies in international organisations and links to other sites related to international affairs.

Other Useful Instruments

There are many other instruments on the Internet which are useful, but which so far have been left outside the framework of diplomatic work, such as the Chat (Internet Relay Chat), the Newsgroups and video conferencing.

Through Internet Relay Chat (IRC) several people can participate simultaneously in a discussion over a particular "channel," or even multiple channels. There is no restriction to the number of people participating in a given discussion or the number of channels that can be formed over IRC. All conversations take place in "real time." This is one of the strengths of IRC, which has been used extensively for live coverage of world events, news, sports commentary, etc. It also serves as an "extremely" cheap substitute for long distance telephone calls. People from all corners of the world can use IRC, which makes it particularly well-suited to diplomats, who often need to discuss an issue with colleagues spread around the world.

A newsgroup is a medium which allows people to exchange ideas and information. A newsgroup is basically a forum for discussion. Users post their ideas on a particular subject and other users respond over a period of time. The network which permits this exchange of information between all newsgroups is known as Usenet.⁽⁹⁾ There are now thousands of newsgroups available on the Internet, some of them dealing with international matters.

Video-conferencing through the Internet is still very restricted because of the limited bandwidth of the communications. Nevertheless, the progress being made in data transmission (and compression) procedures will probably soon render videoconferencing more reliable than it is at present: when the service will enter into activity, enormous savings will be possible, as meetings and physical travel will be reduced drastically.

The Diplomat of the Future

It is clear from the few examples given in the previous sections that the diplomat of the future will presumably work in a very different manner, making better use of available technologies. The significance of the Internet for the Diplomatic Corps was pin-pointed by Dr. Chasia, Deputy Secretary General of the International Telecommunication Union, in his speech at a meeting with ambassadors in Geneva: "Electronic methods will change the way diplomats work. As most UN System documents and data are made available electronically, and connection to the Internet becomes possible from most countries, the information which you have here in Geneva will be available just as quickly to the ministries in your capitals. This means that the part of the Permanent Missions' job concerned with collecting and sending paper will become less necessary, while the ability to identify items of real interest in the mass of information becomes ever more important. The relatively informal nature of email exchanges at the working level, exchanges which can take place independent of distance, will alter the dynamics of consultations. The fact that participants in an electronic discussion do not need to be in the same city is likely to affect the role of a place like Geneva, where the representatives of more than 140 countries are physically present. These changes may seem threatening - and indeed they are, because ministries will be increasingly using electronic methods irrespective of what happens at their missions - but more than a threat, they represent an opportunity. There is an opportunity to be seized immediately to exploit these technologies, especially in the context of the reform of the UN system, to demonstrably increase the effectiveness of the Permanent Missions and multilateral diplomatic processes."

Equally relevant is one of the chapters of the Report on the Reform of the United Nations, presented by the Secretary General Kofi Annan on 16 July 1997, concerning the creation of an "Electronic United Nations." In his report Annan mentions some of the new services developed by the UN exploiting information technologies:

- All permanent missions in New York are connected to the Internet and thus to UN documents via the Web site and the Optical Disk System, by 30 June 1997. Workstations are installed in the Delegates Lounge.
- An enhanced Web site, including information on Peace and Security, international law, and the environment.
- 4200 users and all servers at headquarters supplied with standardised software via a centrally managed system, cutting down on distribution costs and reducing trouble calls.
- Transition from cable and telex to e-mail and fax underway at headquarters, to be completed in 1998.
- Documentation reduced through a variety of steps, including voluntary reductions by missions because of electronic availability, shorter documents and cleaning of distribution lists. Projected decline in document production at New York headquarters: 3,975 pounds of paper in 1997, down from 5,862 pounds in 1995, a 30 per cent decline.

There is still room for improvement in most of the facilities and systems described in this brief study, despite their utility. However, if we consider the progress made by the Internet over the last couple of years,⁽¹⁰⁾ it is very likely that in the near future new and more powerful facilities will be implemented and the everyday work of diplomats will be even more affected.

The big challenge which diplomats now face is not technical, as the means are already available, but concerns their capability to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the quickly evolving world of international technology so that they can improve both their work and their efficiency

Annex 1 - Comparison on cost of messages

The estimated cost is referred to a text of one page (A4) composed of about 300 words sent from Switzerland to Italy. (in Swiss Francs)

Message type	Real transmission time of the message	Cost for 1 minute trasmission (in SFR.)	Cost for sending the message	Time to deliver the message to the final user	Advantages	Drawbacks
	B	C	D = B * C	E	F	G
Telex	6 minutes	1 (+ 6 Frs. per call)	12.00	1 - 2 days	- Valid for all kinds of communications	- It is not possible to send documents originating from other sources - It is a text-only means
Message through X40 connection	1 minute	0.42	0.42	1 - 2 days	see telex	See telex
Fax	49 seconds	0.75	0.75	Between 1 minute and 1 day	- It is possible to send copies of documents originating from other sources	- Often a fax cover is needed - To send the same fax to the different destinations you have to repeat the procedure (unless it is a group registered in the machine)
Note by diplomatic pouch	1 day	n.a.	n.a.	4 - 6 days	- Valid for all kind of communications - It is possible to send copies of documents originated by other sources	- Slow delivery times
E-mail	20 seconds	0.16	0.16	1 - 30 minutes	- Message send directly to the final addressee without intermediaries - The same message can be sent simultaneously to different addresses.	- Limited use for official communications - the final addressee needs an e-mail address

For the sake of comparison, the time to read the text was calculated as 3 minutes. An International telephone call to Italy lasting the same time costs about 2.25 Frs.

Note: Most of the times indicated refer to estimates based on experience.

NOTES

1. The so-called newbies.
2. This is substantially different to a fax where one must repeat the actual operation on the fax machine for every person (telephone number) to every addressee of the fax. The other big difference is cost. While Internet e-mail is always at the cost of a local call, fax costs vary according to the country of destination.
3. The infor-diplo e-mail service offers the index of Monde Diplomatique, special issues and announcements concerning new debates and services proposed. Five or six messages are sent every month.
4. United Nations International Drug Control Programme, located in Vienna.
5. DHA actively collects data from UN Agencies, donor governments and NGOs. DHA also follows-up on specific pledge references carried in the media, quoted in pledging conferences, mentioned by in-country UNDP/DHA representatives or by the DHA complex emergency desk in New York/complex emergency support structure in Geneva. The Financial Tracking System (FTS) works under strictly defined procedures, which include considerable cross-checking and reconciliation of data from various sources.
6. For the occasion, the UN transmitted live the presentation of Kofi Annan through the Internet, experimentally, taking advantage of the multimedia possibilities offered by the Net.
7. An indicative list, with hyperlinks, can be found at <http://www3.itu.ch/MISSIONS/Italy/mofa.htm>
8. This service is maintained by the Information Department of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London in conjunction with numerous other public and policy departments. It was launched on 1 May 1995, and is updated on a daily basis.
9. Usenet is not the Internet, but is a part of it; its traffic flows through the Internet.
10. In fact generalised use of Internet did not start till 1995.

The Waning of the State and the Waxing Of Cyberworld

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Introductory Comments

The title of this contribution is intended to anticipate the main line of my argument: namely, that one of the central tendencies affecting all dimensions of diplomacy and political life involves the generally diminishing (although not uniformly and invariably so) capabilities of the sovereign territorial state and the correspondingly growing significance of various cyberworld dimensions of political reality that we are beginning to appreciate, and are not nearly ready to identify or assess. Closely connected with this theme is the question as to whether IT is functioning mainly as an *instrument* of states in their quest for power and wealth or is principally operating as a *transformative agent* by market forces and various sectors of civil society.

What I am calling cyberworld can be understood as "the global village" in the age of informatics, or perhaps more accurately, and less grandly, as the IT dimension of the global village reality.

In the first definition, the idea of global cyberspace provides the fundamental world order framework for the future, with a decent prospect of being acknowledged as such, possibly, but probably not before the year 2050 or so. In this regard, it is worth recalling the European experience with the emergence from feudal Europe of the sovereign, territorial, and eventually secular, state taking hold of the political imagination only a hundred or so years after its historical establishment as the basis of world order that was formalized at the end of the Thirty Years War by way of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, but has been associated by scholars with even earlier developments that provide evidence of the formation of the modern European territorial state. The second definition of cyberworld is the instrumental one, linking it with the structure of power, and thus making it quite compatible with a world that continues to be dominated by sovereign states.

I want to contrast these strong and weak versions of this emergent cyberworld hypothesis. The strong version of my approach asserts that the reordering of political behavior as a result of markets, new transnational actors and social movements, and technological innovations associated with the use of information is truly creating a new world order that is in the making while we speak, but that despite the dramatic character of this process, it is likely to take several decades before the old statist categories that have informed diplomacy and statecraft for centuries will have been so evidently superseded that we are no longer content to describe political life in this habitual language. Even in this strong version, I am not contending that states or their diplomatic representatives will disappear, or not remain prominent, and possibly even decisive political actors for many purposes, but only that the present trajectory of major global trends suggests that in the space of half a century or so, states will not be any longer consistently seen as the defining units of world order, and that geographical boundaries and territorial sovereignty will be only one of several global indicators of how authority is located and exercised in the shaping of human behavior.

The weaker form of the argument suggests that the state may be waning, or declining, in certain of its aspects, but that it is waxing in other aspects, and contrariwise, that cyberworld is an emergent reality that is of increasing relevance to elites throughout most of the world, and so is having waxing, as well as waning political effects on the capabilities of the sovereign state, and that the technological potency of IT is to varying degrees being appropriated by the state in its struggle to remain at the center of the human adventure. This may be particularly true with reference to dominant or hegemonic states, generating a new gap in warfare

between the strong and the weak in international society, but within the framing of the states system seen not as relations among equals but as a reinforcement and restructuring of geopolitical hierarchy in which a few powerful states, possibly as few as one, control the system as a whole. The implication of this view that the capacities of some states may be partially augmented by IT suggests that we will have to wait somewhat longer than 2050 before announcing the birth of a new world order, and paraphrasing a famous remark of the American writer, Mark Twain, "the reports of the death of the state system are greatly exaggerated." The impact of IT, in other words, may be to create a new phase of geopolitics, but this is not likely to be transformative in the sense of producing a new world order with different actors in control, altered policy priorities, and innovative social consequences.

Undoubtedly, the safest kind of conjecture would be to take the middle ground, arguing that the state will be diminished by the cumulative impacts of IT, but that its record of resilience is such, that there will not be any clear consensus on how to delimit the distinctive overall reality that we seek to identify by changing the terminology of world order. It is quite irresistible when reflecting along these lines to make some reference back to George Bush's short-lived efforts at the beginning of the decade to mobilize popular support for interventionary diplomacy in response to Iraqi aggression during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 by a heavy reliance on the slogan of "new world order." Of course, Bush used the terminology opportunistically in the aftermath of the cold war to claim that world conditions were now favorable for recourse to the collective security procedures of the United Nations, as concentrated in the Security Council, so as to enforce the Rule of Law against violators of the peace, specifically, to act on the widely endorsed view at the time that it was for a variety of reasons beneficial to act in concert to reverse the aggression committed by Iraq against Kuwait.

In retrospect, the claim of a new world order could have been more interestingly made, in that setting, by reference to the revolutionary implications of IT superiority in the context of warfare, although this was disclosed only as a consequence rather than a cause of the Gulf War. Such a claim, reinforced by the one-sidedness of the outcome and the incredible military benefits that resulted from the control over information being processed by satellites and surveillance aircraft resulting in a dominating intelligence capability. Another related aspect of this spectacular display of high tech military approach to warfare involved the large-scale use of precision munitions that demonstrated their ability to deliver knockout blows against critical Iraqi targets with accurately guided missiles, bombs, and long-range artillery. Even discounting for much self-serving technological hype associated with the Gulf War, this conception of the new world order as based upon IT-based militarism is quite misleading in its grandiosity, because what was manifested, at most, was the renewed capacity of a strong state to achieve geopolitical goals through the application of its military superiority in a conflict situation. The Gulf War certainly exhibited some of the various component elements of IT, but suggested nothing about a possible restructuring of international relations or the changing values of political leaders. As Bush made unwittingly plain in his first public remark after the Gulf War ceasefire, the main achievement of American-led victory over Saddam Hussein was a backwards reworking of history rather than a prelude to what lies ahead. Bush's imaginative horizons were not at all bold, claiming nothing more startling than to have, finally, erased the bad memories of defeat in Vietnam, and thereby hoping to remove the inhibitions on force associated with the so-called "Vietnam syndrome." It became evident that what the United States government was seeking, beyond the immediate goals in the Gulf region, was merely to restore the geopolitical confidence of its own citizenry so that its global role could be fulfilled in the future without encountering opposition at home. In the end, the Gulf War outcome was presented to the world simply as a rather frightening reassurance to the American people that these new generations of war-fighting techniques provided quick and painless means to achieve battlefield victories. But however this renewed US assertiveness is interpreted, it did not represent any substantial modification in world picture that would accompany the birth of a new world order system. In this regard, the rhetoric of "new world order" used in the Gulf War context was a fraud. Whatever else, the encounter with Iraq confirmed that world order was still premised upon a states system rooted in the Westphalian experience. On this occasion, at least, IT had been revealed to be an important instrument of power in the existing order, perhaps also the lynchpin of a valuable new approach to geopolitical management, but, whatever else, not as a revolutionary development with transformative implications for the future of world order.

Finally, then, we can usefully interpret the Gulf War as the beginning of a new chapter of international relations, but it would be foolish to think of it as representing a move toward the end of history. IT, as a geopolitical instrument, seems at present to be as dominated by a single country as did atomic weaponry in 1945 after its initial uses at the end of World War II against Japan at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the time, transformative claims were made by world leaders, but were soon abandoned after it became clear that even nuclear weaponry could be absorbed by statist geopolitics. Indeed, the proliferation of this weaponry occurred much more rapidly than expected, despite the strenuous efforts by the United States to maintain secrecy and maintain its monopoly over the weaponry. Later these efforts sought to retain the nuclear superiority of the United States by continuous innovations in weapons design, delivery systems, and such quantitative indicators as numbers and magnitudes of the warheads. The sobering truth is that nuclear weaponry was politically neutralized as soon as the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device only a few years later. In matters of technological rivalry among states, the original application, especially in the dramatic circumstances of war, opens up what seems at first like a decisive, and even an unbridgeable gap, but the dynamics of a catchup process are such that a lead of this sort based on technological breakthrough, is virtually impossible to maintain.

And the same pattern is likely to be repeated, as well, for IT, producing dangerous new vulnerabilities for those that have initially applied its informatic and networking skills most effectively, and claim an advantage that turns out to be quite transitory, and in the end, even dangerous. That is, what is historically first disclosed as qualitative superiority engenders a paradoxical process that leads the initial claimant to find itself subject to unprecedented forms of unanticipated vulnerability. This pattern of breakthrough and neutralizing response is a complex, unresolved dimension of my theme that I can only identify as such in this presentation, without being able to explore some of its wider ramifications.

Let me turn now briefly to describe three clusters of issues that clarify this focus on the likely interplay between the role of the state and the emergent cyberworld:

- first, world order as a mind game;
- secondly, "soft power" versus "soft targets";
- thirdly, IT as an instrument of power versus IT as a weapon of the powerless.

I. World order as a mind-game about the nature of political reality on a global scale:

For several centuries the game has been played according to the rules of the state system, juridical rules about the equality of states and geopolitical practices that focus on the inequalities of states. The framework and deeper implications of this type of world order have been best articulated by political philosophers, perhaps most persuasively by Machiavelli and Hobbes, but there are many versions of these "realist" themes, including in the thought of non-Western traditions. The state with its ability to mobilize resources, impose order within its borders, and most of all, by its capacity to wage war, sustain diplomacy, and establish temporary conditions of stability, has remained central to these analyses. In recent years, Hedley Bull in *The Anarchical Society* and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Society*, have been the most successful international relations specialists when it comes to theorizing this contemporary condition of the state system. Kenneth Waltz has been influential in emphasizing the structural side of statist geopolitics, especially by calling systematic attention to the behavioral implications of bipolarity during the cold war era. The gatekeepers of this Westphalian mind-game were very effective at marginalizing counter-traditions of political thought: that is, variants of non-violent or warless worlds, visions of peaceful global governance. Such images of alternatives to statism, have, perhaps, most vividly been associated with Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* and the diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson after World War I that half-heartedly led to the problematic establishment of the League of Nations. These alternative images have been marginalized by being labeled as "utopian," "salvationist," and even "apocalyptic."

In this regard, the statist paradigm has dominated thought and practice throughout this century:

- The bitter ideological and geopolitical rivalries between liberal democracies and fascism, and then communism, have been predominantly understood as struggles for ascendancy between states and groups of states.
- The great upheaval in the South associated with the process of decolonization have proceeded on the basis of legitimating the imposed boundaries of the colonial era, even if artificial and ethnically non-sustainable, given the identities that persisted in these societies and their relationship to uneven distributions of public and private goods.
- Even the experiments in global institutions were carried out in a manner that limited membership to sovereign states and adopted a constitutional language that was reassuring about the retention of sovereign rights and the avoidance of supranationality.

But despite this apparent domination of the conceptual landscape, states have seemed cumulatively and increasingly to be losing their grip over the dynamics of "community" and "identity," and even of "security." New mind-games are taking shape around the ideas of globalization, global civil society, and the cyberworld. Will these claimants on the future also be marginalized as "utopian" or "exotic"?

We cannot now be sure. The state has proved to be resourceful in appropriate new technologies for its own purposes. It is now challenging unrestricted civil access to IT. Can the state retain the advantages of IT while protecting itself from its disempowering and subversive influences? What sort of balance will be struck between civil society and state power? Will there emerge new governmental layers of authority at the regional and global levels with the assigned task of regulating access to and applications of IT?

II. The emergence of a race between "soft power" and "soft targets":

This concern has been discussed earlier in relation to the Gulf War. IT greatly enhances the role of brainpower in relation to firepower as an ingredient of geopolitical influence. Information, and its controlled use, becomes the basis of a new geopolitical strategy that reconfigures and sustains the relations of strong and weak, rich and poor. Such stabilization is reinforced by the current worldwide acceptance of neo-liberal approaches to trade, investment, and economic policy.

But this form of soft power also presents soft targets for adversaries that experience deprivation and subordination. Whether these soft targets can be protected from determined, skilled hackers with terrorist or conspiratorial goals is far from assured. The nature of the challenge was rather vividly, if in an excessively Hollywood mode, depicted in the movie "The Net," with the aspiring tyrant bearing some shadowy resemblance to Bill Gates.

III. Power versus powerlessness in the web of The Web:

not only is power being redefined by IT, but so is powerless. Can even the most totalizing state restrict the access of its citizenry to soft power? Can the benefits of IT be gained without enduring the related forms of vulnerability? As with the discovery of dynamite, is IT being perceived by the powerless as a potential equalizer? Or will IT contribute to the stability of hierarchical arrangements of privilege and wealth?

It is illuminating, I think, to ponder such questions in relation to two limit cases: China and the United States. Here are important examples of large and influential states that are seeking to exploit IT, and yet control its potential adverse consequences.

China would like to be modern without relinquishing authoritarian control over its population. China is concerned about the subversive impact of alien ideas, and realizes that IT is difficult

to control. And yet, its ambition to continue on the path to superstate state depends on a receptivity to IT at all levels of society. Will China be able to reconcile its economic objectives with its ideological effort to avoid democratization? Whatever the eventual answer, it will help us understand better the relationship between IT and the state, especially whether the state can take advantage of IT for market purposes, while avoiding the erosion of state power.

With the United States, the same tension is posed in relation to global arbiter of political and strategic development, especially with respect to achieving and retaining military dominance. Some of these issues surfaced in the Gulf War context, but only preliminarily and superficially. Will the US government find itself challenged by rivals among global market forces that seek to shape geopolitics in accordance with economic criteria? Or will militias and militant elements in civil society initiate new patterns of cyber-warfare that give the weak new sources of strength?

In the setting of democratic society, the struggle for "hearts and minds" has already begun. A small, yet influential and affluent, sub-polity has begun to take shape around the primacy of their affiliation to cyber-space, and their resentment over what is regarded as anachronistic affiliations with the territorially based sovereign state. *Wired* magazine has a feature on "netizens," the cyberworld sequel to the ideal of "citizens." Especially open democratic societies will be susceptible to the silent dynamics of disaffiliation arising from the expansion of netizenship, and its more or less direct refusal to honor the duties of citizenship.

Conclusion

The outcome of these various developments remains highly speculative. Undoubtedly, many large surprises await us. It is almost foolish to anticipate the future when the rate of change is taking place at such a high velocity.

But the momentousness of the issues can and should be understood. We already have evidence that the hold of cyberworld on the political imagination is undermining a statist world picture. Other developments are moving in the same direction, especially those associated with market forces and media relationships.

What seems to be happening is that the state is no longer able to foreclose other forms of political inquiry with respect to the character of world order. And yet there is enough ambiguity and contradictoriness manifest to preclude any firm judgment as to whether the overall impact of IT is stabilizing or transforming with respect to the diplomacy of states and the efforts of leading states to extend geopolitical regimes of regulation and control indefinitely into the future.

A Diplomatic Analogy: International Functionaries And Their Privileges

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Although many have grappled with the question of what privileges and immunities international officials should enjoy, no satisfactory theoretical framework has evolved. How has the issue evolved over time? How extensive is the problem? Why has the response been so ineffectual and the resolution been so intractable? Historians by disposition tend to look forward by going backward. Historically, international privileges and immunities, namely those bestowed on international functionaries, have influenced and become entwined with their diplomatic counterparts. Developments in diplomatic privileges and immunities have affected the immunities accorded international persons because diplomatic immunity developed as the standard and because "diplomatic" privilege is still used to define the privileges granted to some international officials. Diplomatic privileges and immunities, traditionally limited to diplomats, were gradually extended to the personnel of and representatives to international organizations in four stages. The first stage, beginning in 1804, witnessed the extension of the status of neutrality and the protection of inviolability to various riparian commissions and of "diplomatic privileges" to some international commissions. In the second stage, beginning in 1899, "diplomatic privileges" were granted to certain judicial tribunals. In the third stage, after World War I, the diplomatic formula was extended to the International Court of Justice, the League, and the International Labor Organization. The fourth stage, after World War II, witnessed the founding of the United Nations and the move toward certain regional or supranational organizations. At that time diplomatic status was still accorded certain officials but "official acts" immunity was applied to the majority.

The growth of international organizations and tribunals after World War I raised certain problems, both theoretical and practical, which led to the abandonment of the "classical" formula of diplomatic privileges and immunities for international functionaries and a shift to functionalism. Still, as the number of organizations, personnel, and representatives increased the pressure to grant the representatives and some of the officials "diplomatic" status was inexorable. Many residual elements of the classical "diplomatic" privileges linger on in the practice of international organizations like a recalcitrant but not unwelcome guest. Nonetheless, the juridical rationale for such privileges is different. Diplomatic privileges were designed to guarantee the representative freedom from the territorial jurisdiction of the state to which he was sent, but international privileges were designed to guarantee the independence of an organization from the jurisdiction of any state, including that of the official's home state. The situation of the diplomat and that of the international functionary are different. First, the diplomat remains subject to the state which sent him while the functionary remains exempt from any territorial power. Second, the privileges and immunities of officials stem directly from the immunity of the international organization. Third, certain principles which have been employed to justify diplomatic privilege, namely the sovereignty of the sending state and reciprocity, have not been used to justify international privileges. Fourth, international privileges rest solely on treaties, whether multilateral or bilateral; conventions; or on international comity. Traditional principles of international law do not oblige a state to grant international officials a special status. International functionaries, unlike diplomats, do not possess special prerogatives unless specifically invested with them.⁽¹⁾

Theorists have provided various rationales to justify international privileges and immunities; precedent, functional need, the independence or prestige of the organization, and the equality of member states. The first in particular has been vigorously attacked. In 1966 the subcommittee of experts of the Council of Europe echoed the opinion of many when they argued that precedent had played "too important" a part in the past. For them international privileges were justified, mainly but not exclusively on the basis of function.⁽²⁾ The prestige of the organization and the stress on the equality of states also played a role. Many jurists relied on the latter to justify the exemption of the organization and its personnel from taxation. They

contended that such exemptions permitted the organization to pay higher wages at lower costs and did not allow any one state, including the host, to profit at the expense of the others. Not surprisingly, the rationales for and extent of diplomatic and international privileges are converging because of the dominance of functionalism in international jurisprudence and because of certain historical similarities between the diplomat and the international official. International privileges in the twentieth century expedited international intercourse just as diplomatic privileges did in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁽³⁾ Moreover, so-called "international" diplomacy followed the same evolutionary path as did traditional diplomacy from *ad hoc* temporary conferences to permanent international organizations just as traditional diplomacy moved from *ad hoc* representatives to permanent legations.⁽⁴⁾

The decision to accord international officials diplomatic privileges confused the whole issue of immunity even in the very early days of the League of Nations. A report from that time argued that the equation of the League officials with diplomatic agents was "theoretically inexact" as it was.⁽⁵⁾ Regardless of the theoretical foundation or the juridical rationale, existing practice tended to become accepted; the *de facto* situation crystallized into the *de jure*.⁽⁶⁾ As international organizations increasingly played an integral role in the twentieth-century state system, the line between diplomatic and international functions became blurred. The differentiation between diplomatic and international privileges, so sound in theory, is confused in practice. This confusion partially stems from the custom of differentiating between *ad hoc* and permanent representatives to international organizations, by granting each a different status and correspondingly distinct privileges, and by providing various rationales for those concessions. Permanent representatives are often in contemporary jargon "assimilated to," that is, equated with diplomats and accorded "diplomatic" privileges. Ironically, a previous juridical construction, namely diplomatic privilege, initially adopted by analogy because of its clarity and convenience, obfuscated the issue.

This extension of such privileges to non-diplomats did not go either unremarked or uncontested. In the interwar period many who had witnessed the extension of such immunities worried about the burgeoning numbers of privileged individuals, about the increasing possibilities of abuse, and about the concomitant infringement on national sovereignty. Those concerns linger on. During the debate in the House of Commons on the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act in 1944, one member no doubt exaggerated when he charged the government with proposing to put international officials "outside the normal run of the law, enabling them to enter night clubs, drink after hours and all sorts of things." The Minister of State, Mr. Richard Law, protested that no foreign secretary would "create a vast class of privileged persons, who would devote their leisure, and probably their working hours as well, to careening incontinently about the King's highway massacring the King's lieges with absolute impunity, having first fortified themselves with unlimited quantities of duty-free wine and spirits, purchased out of tax-free incomes."⁽⁷⁾ No doubt some international officials were disappointed with this rejoinder. One of the issues raised at that time and still controversial today is exemption from taxation, especially income taxes.⁽⁸⁾ The salaries of international officials were and are based on the assumption that they were not liable to income taxes. Tax relief was designed to reduce the financial burden of the organization and the possibility of local interference, to establish uniform salaries (equal pay for equal work), and to ensure that the host state did not benefit at the expense of the other states. Although general exemptions were intended to benefit the organization, not the individual, some argued that the opposite happened. The creation of a tax-free class, for whatever reasons, could not but arouse resentment and raise questions about equity. In 1991 *The Economist* estimated that Eurocrats, that is, officials who work for the European community, were paid at least double what locals earned for the same job.⁽⁹⁾

In addition to the question of taxation, host states voiced other concerns. The large number of international officials within the U.S. caused considerable problems ranging from the annoying to the criminal. One of the most widely known, if not the most significant, was illegal parking. From March 1974 to January 1975 New York police issued an average of 360 parking tickets to twenty diplomatic cars and 671 to one alone.⁽¹⁰⁾

In 1978 U.N. officials in New York city accumulated 250,000 parking tickets few of which were paid.(11)

Other more serious problems, such as brawling and narcotic possession, have triggered a sharp increase in claims of immunity.(12) Even more publicized has been the problem of uncontested defaulted debts to local creditors that have continued to escalate. In Geneva as of February 1995 the total reported indebtedness of both missions and personnel was more than five million Swiss francs. That figure probably undervalued the total indebtedness because some debts were not reported. Twenty-eight out of the 140 permanent missions there owed debts which ranged from 400 to 1.6 million Swiss francs. In New York City in 1991 it amounted to more than two million dollars, in 1993 to more than four million, in 1994 to more than seven million and in 1996 more than nine million. In 1995 thirty-two missions owed debts which ranged from 200 dollars to more than 1.9 million dollars in one case. A solution has remained elusive. While these problems were serious enough, even more disturbing were criminal violations ranging from disorderly behavior to rape.(13)

The significant increase in the number of internationally protected persons exacerbated the problems. Before World War I one of the largest international organizations, the International Institute of Agriculture, employed one hundred permanent staff in addition to its committee which contained one representative from every member state small by the standards of the 1990s.(14) Since World War II the number of international organizations has grown geometrically as have correspondingly the personnel of and representatives to such bodies. In 1980 the Council of Europe estimated that there were approximately ninety thousand employed by more than two hundred international organizations.(15) In 1989 the ILO alone employed about twelve thousand in Geneva and more than one thousand elsewhere.(16) By the 1990s the U.N. was clearly the largest employer of the international civil service.(17) By 1983 according to U.N. figures the total number of professional and general service staff was 50,221. This number did not include the 17,152 employed by either the World Bank or UNRWA.(18) Europe also witnessed similar growth in the staff of the European Commission. In Brussels alone in 1966 there were purportedly twenty-three thousand who enjoyed such privileges.(19)

The expansion of new categories of "diplomatic" personnel coupled with the expansion of international organizations raised troubling questions about the numbers immune from local jurisdiction. This growth was partially attributable to the increase in the number of states. In the fall of 1993, the International Standards Organisation which assigned two-letter codes for country names counted 239 with 15 on a reserve list.(20) Many of those states came from the breakup of the European colonial empires in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. added more.

The explosive growth in the number of states paralleled that in the number of international government organizations (IGOs). The periods following World Wars I and II witnessed the greatest proliferation of new IGOs.(21) In the period 1815-1819 there was one IGO, in 1875-1879 nine, in 1900, 30, in 1920-1924, 72, in 1935-1939, 86, in 1945-1949, 123, and in 1978-1985, 378. The U.N. and its affiliated and specialized agencies grew tremendously since World War II as did regional organizations and their subsidiaries. In 1978 according to the International Law Commission, which did not compile a comprehensive list, there were eighteen such organizations in Africa; fourteen in the Arab States, Asia, and Oceania; and twelve in Latin America.(22) In the United States in 1946 there were five International Organizations which fell under Section 7 (b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act of December 29, 1945 and as such were entitled to privileges, exemptions, and immunities: the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, the Pan American Union, the United Nations, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.(23) As of 1967 the U.S. recognized forty-one which ranged from the Asian Development Bank to the World Meteorological Organization and which included the Coffee Study Group, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Inter-American Tuna Commission, the International Pacific Halibut Commission, the International Wheat Advisory Committee, and the International Hydrographic Bureau. By 1996 the number had risen to seventy-one.(24)

Two experts, Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, estimated that Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) may reach 450 by 2000.⁽²⁵⁾

The issue of privileges and immunities for such groups came under intense scrutiny by two groups simultaneously, the International Law Commission, which moved to expand them, and the Council of Europe, which moved to contract them.⁽²⁶⁾ In 1967 the legal *rapporteur* of the European Committee on Legal Cooperation, Mr. von Merkatz, summed up the report from the Council of Europe and drew attention to some of the problems caused by international privileges and immunities.⁽²⁷⁾ The legal *rapporteur* thought it was neither possible nor desirable to "harmonize" the privileges and immunities of international organizations because the criterion to be employed, functional necessity, meant that such privileges and immunities should by definition vary with the needs of the organization. With these issues in mind, the committee of experts in its draft resolution advocated restricting the privileges and immunities which international organizations and their officials enjoyed.⁽²⁸⁾ They recommended first, that international organizations, with some possible exceptions, such as the United Nations, "should not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction in auto accidents." The exclusions of such cases, they contended, would deflect much public criticism. Second, the high officials of certain organizations should enjoy the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic agents on the basis of function and prestige, but such concessions should be granted only to the Secretary General or his equivalent. This recommendation was considerably more restrictive than current practice. Third, when the organization refused to waive immunity and a settlement could not be reached, disputes should be submitted to arbitration. Fourth, the committee underscored that international officials could completely escape taxation in certain circumstances. The concern about creating a tax-free class underscored the larger issue that "too much emphasis has been placed on precedent and prestige."⁽²⁹⁾

The resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 26 September 1969 explicitly rejected the idea that international personnel should be accorded privileges and immunities "as a matter of customary international law or international practice."⁽³⁰⁾ The committee accepted the advice of its subcommittee that some organizations needed such privileges and immunities to fulfill their purposes, but stressed that organizations were not "entitled to any given privileges and immunities in the absence of any agreement." Neither was it necessary nor desirable to establish a scale of privileges and immunities which would be applicable to all international organizations. Member states should study the privileges and immunities required by that organization "without being influenced by those accorded to other organizations of a different character." In some cases, they advised, no privileges and immunities should be granted; the organization should function exclusively "as a legal person under the national law of the host state." States should not bid against each other by offering more privileges and immunities than those stipulated in the general agreement. The report underlined the duty to respect the laws and regulations of the states, the necessity and responsibility of all parties to avoid abuse, the importance of safeguards to protect third parties, and the dictates of state security.⁽³¹⁾ The underlying theme was the necessity of basing immunity on functional need. This position differed radically from that taken by the ILC.

The Council of Europe had hoped that the ILC would substantially revise its draft by limiting the number entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities and by distinguishing between permanent representatives and others.⁽³²⁾ Instead the draft "departed substantially from existing practice and existing agreements," by expanding the number of privileges and immunities and those entitled to them. Such a constant extension of privileges and immunities would, the Council of Europe feared, trigger in many countries "a sharp reaction against the whole system, which is already far from popular."⁽³³⁾ Those injunctions were ignored.

In subsequent meetings the committees from the Council of Europe continued to favor restrictions and to question the whole approach of the International Law Commission which was advocating a general "leveling up of privileges and immunities."⁽³⁴⁾

In 1972 at an international conference sponsored by the United Nations General Assembly, a number of delegates expressed some of the same reservations about the draft on

international privileges and immunities presented by the International Law Commission. Most of the delegates, stressing the fundamental principle laid down in the U.N. charter that officials of and representatives to international organizations should only enjoy such privileges and immunities as were necessary for the independent exercise of their functions, could find no justification for the high level of privileges and immunities recommended.⁽³⁵⁾ Others criticized the draft for neglecting the interests of the host, for basing the privileges and immunities of permanent observer missions "too closely on diplomatic law," and for using the 1961 Vienna Convention as its basic model and thereby virtually equating permanent missions to international organizations with diplomatic missions.⁽³⁶⁾ Some even questioned the utility of the exercise given the existing network of treaty provisions.⁽³⁷⁾ The representative from the United Kingdom quoted with approval the report of the European Committee on Legal Co-operation that opposed the establishment of a general scale of privileges and immunities and suggested that privileges and immunities should be tailored to the needs of the organization.⁽³⁸⁾ These reservations were not dealt with at that time and came back to haunt the participants later.

Despite considerable and fundamental disagreements with the ILC draft, the U.N. Conference on Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations was convoked in Vienna from 14 February to 14 March 1975.⁽³⁹⁾ The failure of the convention indicated the difficulties of grappling with an issue which had become so entangled in so many different agendas.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The contentious, often acrimonious, debate over the codification of the privileges of international officials reflected not a world united but one divided where the host states, coincidentally mostly Western, argued for a more functionalist rationale and the developing world, mainly sending states, for much more extensive and often unwarranted privileges.

Historically, diplomatic privileges and immunities, traditionally limited to diplomats, were extended to the personnel of and representatives to international organizations.⁽⁴¹⁾ Although the emphasis increasingly shifted to functionalism and away from "classical" diplomatic privileges and immunities,⁽⁴²⁾ jurists clung to the analogy of diplomatic privileges and immunities and to the criterion of status. Inevitably problems arose from extending to a new group privileges which evolved out of the needs of the state system of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The application of the diplomatic analogy may have hindered the move to weigh the privileges of international officials on the basis of need. The application of the analogy of diplomatic immunity to these officials will continue to pose certain problems.

Questions about "international privileges" have become part of the debate about the necessity of limiting diplomatic privilege. Those who defend both diplomatic and international immunities find themselves on the defensive in a world increasingly adverse to immunity from local jurisdiction and to privileges for any group. The ever-increasing numbers enjoying such status coupled with the modern rejection of such privileges generated ever more frequent parliamentary and public criticism of both. In 1949 Georges Perrenoud pointed out that despite the writing of theorists and the posturing of chancelleries about the limitation of diplomatic privileges for international officials, in actuality the privileges granted had not decreased but increased.⁽⁴³⁾ The problem was greater in the last half of the twentieth century because of the sheer numbers involved. The burgeoning numbers of officials coupled with the general shift toward functionalism lent credence to those who wanted to limit privileges and immunities. As early as 1942 and before the elephantiasis in the number of organizations and personnel, Percy Corbett argued that for officials of international organizations diplomatic privileges were "of doubtful utility." Nor, he continued, was the case for diplomatic immunities "above controversy."⁽⁴⁴⁾ It remains true as another, Clive Parry, pointed out in 1947 that too few have considered the disadvantages. For him such privileges were "sometimes superfluous" and "anachronistic."⁽⁴⁵⁾ "The clothing of new institutions in antique forms, be they of words or of conduct, is an absurdity."⁽⁴⁶⁾ Nor was antiquarianism its only flaw. Such an extension would "constitute a wholly false mutation of an institution already under suspicion of having outlived its usefulness." The "psychology of privilege" which sets a diplomat apart is even more invidious for international officials who are not replaced as quickly as diplomats.⁽⁴⁷⁾ "A subservient international civil service," he agreed, "would be pernicious," but "one functioning in a vacuum insulated by privileges and immunities [would be] scarcely less so."

Those criticisms have only gained force. The public perception is too often that such officials, as was said of those of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, are "overpaid and overperked."⁽⁴⁸⁾ Popular resentment against privileged status has fueled the movement to limit such privileges. In a 1965 referendum 35% of the Swiss electorate voted against granting immunity to any international group. Subsequently, OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) was denied immune status and shifted its headquarters to Vienna.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Generally, the political and economic competition for location of headquarters helps ensure their privileges. When four U.N. agencies threatened to move out of Manhattan, the city argued that not only were they important for the city's international standing, but that they were worth at least two hundred million dollars a year to the city's economy. The city could have lost 2300 jobs (one third of total number of U.N. employees in the city).⁽⁵⁰⁾ Despite the obvious problems and despite certain anomalies and ambiguities, no real alternative has been envisaged. The failure of the attempt to systematize such privileges and the simultaneous attempt to expand such privileges has left a sober legacy. One could ask whether law still serves as a metaphor for the international community or incarnates the community's vision of itself.⁽⁵¹⁾ As Archibald MacLeish contended "A world ends when its metaphor has died. . . . It perishes when those images though seen no longer mean." The question is what new vision, if any, will emerge.

NOTES

1. See Council of Europe, AJ, Div 2 (4), Legal Committee of Consultative Assembly, AS Jur (17) 36, 8 March 1966 and Council of Europe, 2202 vol. 1, CCJ (68) 18, p. 5, 10 October 1968, report of the subcommittee.
2. Council of Europe, AJ Div 2 (4), 10 November 1966, report of subcommittee of experts on privileges and immunities of international organizations and persons connected with them, pp. 4 and 5. and Council of Europe, #725, AJNU, p. 8.
3. Council of Europe, 2202 vol. 2, 5 November 1980, committee of experts on privileges and immunities, Prof. Dr. Maximiliano Bernad y Alvarez de Eulate, of the University of Saragossa.
4. *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, (1971) 2, part 1: 152.
5. Adatcide Visscher report quoted in Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations," p. 854, fn. 98. Mineichiro Adatci, a Japanese diplomat, was President of the League of Nations Council in 1929.
6. Elmer Plischke quoted in Michaels, *International Privileges and Immunities*, p. xi.
7. September 27, 1944. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 344.
8. Special thanks to Mr. Kern for pointing out this article. Vettovaglia, "Privileges and Immunities," pp. 71-83. Here, p. 83. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 22020, 19 December 1980), CB/De/Concl(80) 327, p. 120, par. 6.
9. *The Economist*, 6 April, 1991 p. 52.
10. U.S., House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st session, Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, p. 4.
11. Wilson, "Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction," p. 129. Also see U.N.DAG3./3.5.7 19.

12. U.N., DAG13, 2.0.14, Box 44, letter of 9 April 1965.
13. See U.N., DAG 1/1.2.1.303.2 on claims and incidents in 1965 and *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 September 1987.
14. Smaller agencies included the Universal Postal Union, the Rhine River Commission, and the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. Hill, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in International Organizations," p. 44.
15. Council of Europe, 2202, vol. 2, CJ PI (80), 1, 5 November 1980, Committee of experts, p. 8.
16. 1990 Interview with Mrs. Cleopata Doumbia-Henry of the ILO.
17. Feld and Jordan, *International Organizations*, p. 97.
18. U.N., General Assembly, 38th session, 1983. fifth committee, agenda item 116(b), A/c.5/38/17, p. 3 fn.a.
19. Council of Europe, AJ div 2, 3, subcommittee of experts, 10 November 1966.
20. *The Economist*, 2 October 1993, p. 2.
21. Feld and Jordan, *International Organizations*, p. 14 table.
22. *Yearbook of International Law Commission*, 1978, vol. 2 part 1, pp. 283-284.
23. Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act," p. 334.
24. A special word of thanks to Sallie D. Claibourn of the Office of Protocol, the U.S. Department of State for providing the 1996 figures.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
26. The special rapporteur, Mr. Abdullah El-Erian of Egypt, submitted his first report in 1963. See U.N. rapporteur survey in Strasbourg, Council of Europe, #725, AJNU and *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1969 vols.1 and 2 for the drafts and comments.
27. *Ibid.*, AJ, Div 2, Doc 2158, pp. 3 ff.
28. Council of Europe, 2201 vol. 1, CCJ (68), 18, 10 October 1968, p. 18, ff.
29. For comments on this report see *ibid.*, 2202, vol. 2, (CCJ (69), 4, 12 March 1969, p. 5. The Legal Affairs Committee responded to the subcommittee of the CCJ report in 7 February 1969, 2202 vol. 2, AS/ Jur (20) 40, pp. 1 ff.
30. *Ibid.*, 718 AJ, esp. pp. 14 ff.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
32. *Ibid.*, 718 AJ, 26 March 1970, *ad hoc* committee concerning relations between states and international organizations.
33. On October 5 1970, Sir Vincent Evans issued a statement to the 6th committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. *Ibid.*, 718 AJ, Strasbourg, GR/REO (71), pp. 4-5.

34. Ibid., 718 AJ, May 9, 1972. p. 26
35. See comments on the draft published in the *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 2, part 1 (1971).
36. Ibid., p. 102
37. Fennessy, "The 1975 Vienna Convention," p. 64. Fennessy was the Australian alternate representative at the U.N. conference.
38. *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* 1971, 2, part 1 (1971): 42.
39. United Nations Conference on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations. 2 vols. Vol. 2 *Documents of the Conference*, final document pp. 209-224.
40. Hevener, ed. *Diplomacy in a Dangerous World* pp. 211-236 for the text. See also Fennessy, "The 1975 Convention," p. 62.
41. Council of Europe, AJ. Div. 2, document 2158, p. 4, Mr. Merkatz.
42. *International Law Commission*, 1978 vol. 2, part 1, p. 271
43. See Perrenoud, *Regimes des privileges*, p. 242.
44. Michaels, *International Privileges and Immunities*, p. 27.
45. Parry, "International Government and Diplomatic Privilege," p. 112.
46. Ibid., p. 119.
47. Ibid., p. 120.
48. Council of Europe, AJ div. 2, vol. 1, April 1978.
49. Gormley, "The Right of Officials," p. 448, fn. 14.
50. *The Economist*, June 6, 1992, p. 26.
51. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 529-530 and Berman, *Law and Revolution*, p. vi.

Developments in Protocol

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Introduction

Protocol may not be the most exciting area of international relations, but every foreign ministry maintains a protocol department. Protocol goes as far back as there have been contacts between states, with evidence of diplomatic protocol being found in reliefs at Persopolis. The twentieth century has witnessed a growing informality in the practice of diplomacy, though there is always the underlying necessity, in the existing Westphalian system based on the sovereign equality of states, that states must see that they are being treated equally.⁽¹⁾ The trend towards informality in the treatment of individuals as representatives of their state is underpinned by the evolution of formulas which assure that all states are, and are seen to be, treated as equals. Protocol concerning permanent diplomatic missions between states is now well established, but the area which is seeing the most innovation is that involving meetings between leaders.⁽²⁾ Historically, personal meetings between rulers of states were infrequent before the nineteenth century, the logistics of travel making such meetings difficult.⁽³⁾ Developments in technology and transport have made meetings easier and safer to arrange, and there has been a vertical rise in summitry since 1960. Little changed in the protocol of meetings between leaders until the twentieth century boom in summitry, when protocol has had to evolve in order to facilitate political leaders' desire to meet. The result has been, for the most part, a further relaxation in protocol.

Venue

The problem of where to hold meetings is often caused by the implied prestige conferred upon the host, as well as the opportunities provided by the host to utilize this role. The problems of venue are not new. Initially, neutral areas were used because of the mutual suspicion of leaders. The fifteenth-century meeting between Edward IV of England and Louis XI of France on a bridge is symptomatic of the problems surrounding such meetings. Leaders were reluctant to travel through potentially hostile territory. Even in 1807 Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I met on a raft in the middle of the Niemen at Tilsit.

The nineteenth century, however, saw an increasing frequency of meetings between leaders of states, and by the early twentieth century a shift in protocol was beginning to emerge. One important turning point came at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, convened to settle the events of the First World War. France insisted that the peace conference be held at Paris, supposedly as a tribute to France's role in the conflict. By custom, the head of the host state chairs the conference, and therefore has a greater degree of control over the agenda. Both Britain and the United States were unhappy with this arrangement, and advocated neutral Geneva. Indeed, one reason why Switzerland was originally such a favourite venue for meetings is not only its oft cited neutrality but the advantages of its unique head of state, the Federal Council in corpore, which meant Switzerland was unlikely to interfere in this way.

French plans almost came unstuck, however, when the American president, Woodrow Wilson, announced his intention of attending in person. He hoped to play the leading role in the negotiations and therefore wanted to chair the conference. As the only head of state present (the others being heads of government) he would have precedence, and as he observed, "I assume also that I shall be selected to preside."⁽⁴⁾ The French were flabbergasted, as no American president had previously travelled abroad, much less personally participated in a conference. French complaints were so great that Wilson agreed

not to press his claims for precedence, a solution which confirmed the drift to greater informality at these gatherings. Wilson observed that "no point of dignity must prevent our obtaining the results we have set our hearts upon and must have."⁽⁵⁾ This was an important breakthrough, establishing a precedent that, for working purposes, there would be no difference between heads of state and heads of government. The practice has now become general, for example with ASEAN agreeing that at its meetings no difference will be applied between heads of state and heads of government, confirming this break with traditional formality.⁽⁶⁾

During the Second World War, Stalin, in his three summit meetings with his fellow allied leaders refused to travel to any destination which would force him to leave territory he controlled. There was no willingness to rotate the venue among the allies. The postwar era, however, has seen the principle of rotation become the norm. The EU rotates the now semi-annual EU Council summits.

While the first EC/EU summits were held in the capital cities, it has become more common to hold the sessions in provincial settings, allowing for a more informal atmosphere. The principle of rotating the venue according to a principle established in advance has eased the convening of summits. ASEAN has agreed that its triennial summits will rotate through member states in alphabetical order.

The growing appreciation of the value of informality in facilitating discussion is noticeable. The G-7's original ethos was minimal formality in order to allow the broadest scope for discussion, starting originally as the "Library Group" in the White House Library, and though now institutionalised, many of its most successful sessions have been held in resort venues. The ASEAN leaders meet formally every three years, but have also (formally) agreed to meet at least once informally in between. This is not to suggest that diplomatic meetings are becoming free-form events. ASEAN provides detailed rules, e.g., all heads of state/heads of government are to be accorded accommodation of two bedrooms and a chauffeur driven car, and so on, with a descending order for other officials. This is clearly intended to ensure that there is seen to be equality of treatment.

An increasingly favoured way of meeting, again the by-product of modern travel, is the "unarranged" holiday drop-in. Tony Blair, at the beginning of his 1997 summer holiday in France did admit that he knew Premier Lionel Jospin "lives nearby. We will see one another," which almost had the feel that he expected to bump into him in the local hypermarché. In fact, Jospin dashed from a papal visit to Paris, hundreds of miles away, to "drop-in on" Blair.⁽⁷⁾ The aim was to have as informal an atmosphere as possible. As it was a "drop-in" visit Jospin could justify not meeting the British prime minister along with President Chirac, which would be the normal practice in a period of cohabitation in French political life.

The 1997 Anglo-French summit in London was not held at 10 Downing St., or any government building, but in a previously vacant office suite, specially furnished for the day, in the newly developed London docklands. The hope was to create as informal an atmosphere as possible, away from the formalities that would inevitably surround any meeting at a traditional venue.

Another indicator of the move away from status based protocol is the increasing use of other formulas. At the 1818 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle it was agreed that states would sign treaties in alphabetical order. Many International Organizations now use this principle for seating representatives, rather than working out precedence as one still does with ambassadors accredited to states. While alphabetization is popular, there are several forms in use. The UN seats delegations alphabetically by the state's name in English, with the first letter of the alphabet being determined annually by lot. NATO's permanent representatives are seated alphabetically.⁽⁸⁾ The Council of Europe uses a mixed system, with the Committee of Ministers being arranged by their date of taking office, the Assembly by age, and at Official Meetings of the Council by alphabetical order in French. Alphabetization can raise issues of language politics, and the EU Council resolved this issue by seating states in

alphabetical order following the state's own language, while the EU Commissioners sit by date of appointment. The OAS draws countries by lot each time it meets.

Creative approaches to protocol are often resorted to for particular purposes. The funeral of Japan's emperor Hirohito became a major international event, with leaders from around the world attending. The Japanese were delighted when the United States president, George Bush, announced that he would attend. A problem was posed by traditional protocol, which dictates that heads of state be accorded precedence by the date on which they assumed their position. As Bush had only just taken office he would be the most junior in the seating arrangements. Japan, however, wanted to make the most of having the world's most powerful leader present at the funeral of its emperor. The solution hit upon was to treat the funeral as a celebration of Hirohito's life and not as a state event, and it was thus announced that heads of states would be treated in the first instance in the order of countries Hirohito had visited during his life. This resulted in placing the American president at the centre of the front row of attendant heads of state.

The Diplomatic Handshake

One recent phenomenon is the increasing importance of handshakes as part of diplomatic practice. The proffered hand is now taken as an signal of good faith and willingness to cooperate, the refusal to do so is seen as the opposite, and ignoring a proffered hand a significant diplomatic insult and a clear signal of disapproval. Prince Charles pointedly ignored Idi Amin's proffered hand at Jomo Kenyatta's funeral (1978). The question of whether or not Yitzak Rabin would shake Yasser Arafat's hand was focused on to such an extent that President Clinton virtually threw the two together on the lawn of the White House. Symbolic as this was seen at the time, this tepid handshake was a far cry from Begin and Sadat's embrace when Sadat visited Jerusalem. Perhaps embraces will be the next development. British Prime Minister Tony Blair in meeting Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams temporized, shaking hands with him, but out of public sight. There is, of course, the issue of paranoia amongst leaders. Nicolae Ceacescu feared assassination from poison made to be absorbed through the palm and so kept his hand to himself.⁽⁹⁾ President de Gaulle was a master at ignoring proffered hands.

Diplomatic Insults

Some diplomatic practices do not change. The diplomatic insult has existed since the origins of diplomacy. In the Bible there is an account of the king of the Ammonites shaving off half of the beards of the envoys sent by King David.⁽¹⁰⁾ The diplomatic insult today can be a carefully crafted instrument of statecraft used as a way of communicating extreme displeasure when all other efforts at communication have failed. France in particular is a consummate user of the diplomatic insult. Napoleon "insulted the British ambassador in 1803, the Austrian in 1808 and the Russian in 1811 - a sign that war with each power was imminent."⁽¹¹⁾ The French signalled their displeasure with a number of American policies, including their differences over the UN secretary-generalship and the command of the NATO southern command, through just such a gesture. At United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher's last NATO dinner the secretary-general of NATO (Javier Solana) proposed a toast to Christopher, whereupon the French foreign minister Hervé de Charette abruptly left the room. To make the gesture clear, the French ambassador to NATO (Gérard Errara) took Charette's place and ostentatiously turned his back on the room while the toast was conducted.⁽¹²⁾

Such gestures are not the preserve of France. During the November 1997 visit of Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to Washington the White House announced the "scheduling difficulties" prevented a meeting being arranged, a snub clearly intended to

convey American displeasure at what was seen to be Netanyahu's lack of cooperation over the Middle East peace process.

Conclusion

As times change so do customs generally. In diplomacy protocol too changes and develops, mirroring broader societal norms. Protocol is often considered to be synonymous with formality, but for diplomacy protocol provides the commonly accepted norms of behaviour for the conduct of relations between states. As informality becomes the norm in diplomacy, so diplomatic protocol will help systematize and therefore stabilize these new forms in the communication and negotiation between states.

NOTES

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From Parallel to Dual Careers: Diplomatic Spouses in the European Context

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In this paper I provide a brief summary of the main issues relevant to the contemporary role of diplomatic spouses and its future in the contemporary European context. Later, I outline some of the measures being introduced by Foreign Services to respond to the changing role and position of spouses. By doing this I hope to stimulate comparative discussion and maybe even to prompt some fresh solutions to the dilemmas - they are needed.

In the recent past (and in some countries, even now) diplomatic spouses have been expected to follow their partners around the world, and until recently many accepted the role of supporting their spouses and their Services on an unpaid basis. As a result the vast majority of spouses, the overwhelming majority of whom were wives, were unable to follow their own careers and instead became incorporated into their partners' work and way of life; often identifying with his work and progress. Many did not even consider the possibility of following their own careers, but rather saw their *own* career as being a kind of "parallel" one alongside their partners, vicariously "taking on" the latter's rank and status and feeling a high level of consciousness of the sets of rights and duties which followed from this.⁽¹⁾ It is still quite common to hear older wives refer to "our career" when discussing that of their husband.

Over the last two decades the situation has altered both as a result of changes in the surrounding economic and social climate and as a result of shifts in the nature of diplomacy itself. In the European context, spouses are today becoming far more ambiguously placed in relation to the overall structures and operations of their Foreign Services, and for their part often feel increasingly ambivalent about their position, their role, and the impact of diplomacy as a way of life upon their own life chances. Therefore, following from the general shifts in the overall social climate relevant to diplomacy, there are two closely related specific sets of questions which need to be addressed. First, there are those which concern the way in which the duties and privileges flow across the conjugal link. What kinds of role should and will be played, if any, by those who marry diplomats? Second, there are the questions which follow from the need for Services to take into account the constraints that diplomacy as a way of life imposes on officers' families if they are going to be able to maintain a healthy level of recruitment and retention of staff in the future. I shall return to these questions later.

General Social Shifts Relevant To Diplomatic Spouses

Shifts in overall career patterns and the tendency towards dual career families:

Volumes have been written within the growing literature on the theory of management on the lines that vertically directed careers for life are a thing of the past and that the future lies in "portfolio careers" (e.g., Handy 1995; Grigg, 1997). Reading these texts you often end up with the impression of societies made up of modern Renaissance men and women, leading lives of utopian variety and flexibility. All this ought to be very good news for diplomatic spouses. Yet, unfortunately, in many ways this message filters through in rather negative ways to those

within Diplomatic Services and often becomes translated into the experience of the transformation from a secure job for life into insecurity, uncertainty, and anxiety as to how to live up to concepts such as performance pay. This growing insecurity exacerbates the urgency that is often felt for both partners in a marriage to keep up their careers. Yet, this can be difficult to achieve. For spouses, who frequently still suffer repeated rejections when they apply for jobs on the grounds that they have shifted around and changed jobs too often, the vision of a portfolio career utopia can seem a long way off. This was borne out in a recent Swiss survey (Schaller, 1995); against 60% of the respondents who worked before their first posting, only 16% worked on their return and only 22% were able to pursue their chosen professions. Concern over career prospects was also reflected in a study undertaken by the Austrians in 1992 (Wille-Romer, 1992); 75% of the respondents who had completed professional training were not exercising their professions.

In the meantime two main general trends are emerging. The first is towards dual career couples, with each partner having equal earning potential: in the case of the UK, 70% of couples have dual incomes (Family Resources Survey, Department of Social Security). A direct reflection of this is the second trend towards more women entering diplomatic services and of a resulting increase in the ratio of male to female spouses in our Associations (the overall percentage of males in all the EU Associations taken together is now 15%, rising to 37% in the case of Denmark; 25.5% in the case of the Netherlands, and 13% in that of the United Kingdom). The consequence of both these tendencies is that spouses, more than ever before, want not just jobs, but to pursue their careers. The growing ratio of male to female spouses represents its own challenges. Although it is popular to say that male and female spouses present the same problems and face the same challenges, I think the question is more complex. At present male spouses, and indeed couples, are far less prepared for the male partner to compromise his career prospects in order to follow his spouse round the world. In some countries, this is reflected in rising numbers of unaccompanied married officers at posts (statistics for this are provided in the Appendix). Male spouses also tend to feel less obliged to participate in the activities traditionally associated with diplomatic spousehood.

Changes in marriage patterns and in the nature of the family and household:

The need to take account of the whole family and the way in which this social category has itself changed is one which is gaining increasing prominence in personnel policies, in both the private and public sectors.

During the 1997 Conference of the European Union Foreign Affairs Spouses Association (EUFASA), the Dutch pointed out how partners play a greater role than ever before in Personnel Department policies. Why this need? First there is the reason of changing biographies: parents are living longer and needing care; children are remaining dependent for longer: one of the observations to emerge from the British Diplomatic Spouses Association's (BDSA) AGM last year was that it is quite often once children have completed their education that they need the most support from parents, especially when jobs are scarce and the economic climate uncertain. Second, there are the changing social structures that surround families. In the EUFASA Conference, the Dutch also pointed to the trend that nation states in Europe are demanding more and more that people fall back on their own resources for supporting themselves and others when they are not actually earning money; one consequence of this is that personal pensions are becoming more and more indispensable if one wishes to avoid a penurious old age. Third, there are the choices which people make about how to live their lives. The resulting changes in family set-ups will inevitably force changes and greater flexibility in personnel policies, particularly when it comes to considering unmarried partners. Some countries do recognise unmarried partners as having the same rights as married ones when it comes to allowances (The Netherlands and Sweden accept both sexes, whilst the European Commission, Finland, Norway and France accept only heterosexual partners). It is also becoming increasing practice in the private sector to incorporate unmarried partners into packages providing for international assignments.

A further change, which might be a result of the relaxation of the rules in some Services which prohibited marriage to foreigners,⁽²⁾ is that there are increasing numbers of foreign born spouses within diplomatic services. In a questionnaire sent out by the BDSA this year,⁽³⁾ respondents were invited to suggest issues which they thought our Association should address in the future. Of those who made suggestions, the greatest proportion - 10% - mentioned the particular problems faced by foreign born spouses. In the case of the Austrian study, it was found that foreign-born spouses suffered particularly from lack of social recognition in Austria. Finally, of course, we must mention the seemingly ever-rising divorce rates.

Changes Within Diplomacy And Foreign Services Relevant To Spouses

Amongst the many changes which are taking place within diplomacy, the most relevant to spouses seem to be:

Multi-lateral diplomacy:

There are a number of ways in which this tendency within diplomacy affects the role of spouses. First is the muting of the importance placed upon the promotion of national identity characteristic of bilateral embassies, with all the symbolic and entertainment aspects of representation that go with this. Taking the example of the EU *corps* in Brussels, the whole promotion of the common European ideal tends, if anything, towards the suppression of national differences. This, plus the fact that officers work according to punishing schedules and tend to do business over lunches, means that spouses posted there find themselves free, if they wish, to participate only to a minimal extent in representational entertaining. In the case of the United Kingdom Permanent Representation there, it is popular to describe Brussels as "Whitehall with allowances." Whilst some spouses welcome this, others feel excluded, diminished and isolated.

At another level, the case of the European Union has fostered a significant development in the form of EUFASA. This yearly conference began in 1988 and is currently in the final stages of achieving a legal status as an association in its own right, with an aim to promoting joint action on the part of all Associations of the member states and that of the European Commission.

The emphasis on producing "meaner and leaner" Services; increasing overlaps with the private sector; and increasing use of IT:

All the above trends represent a new rationality penetrating the way in which diplomacy is conducted, and a stripping down of superfluous expenses and unnecessary entertainment. This, again, of course affects spouses, insofar as it involves a reduction in some of the spheres of activity traditionally associated with their position and role at post.

The overall decline in the notion of "public duty":

This is a subtle and complicated topic, and details can not be entered into here. The question of the public service ethos question was raised in the recent conference on "Diplomacy - A Profession in Peril?" last year. One theme was the way in which many foreign services are importing private sector practices into their management policies and contracting out certain activities to the private sector. Yet, several speakers also expressed anxiety over putting at risk such qualities as loyalty, long term commitment and experience which are central to the continuing effectiveness of foreign services. In fact, in some Services, including the British, there are signs that loyalty and long term commitment are currently on the decline. Younger

officers do not view entry into the Service as necessarily a career for life - particularly if this should involve a sacrifice of their spouses' careers.

Shifts in personnel policies:

An important point to stress in the European context is at that, while spouses are rejecting "traditional" patterns of incorporation into Foreign Service life, it is becomingly increasingly true that the questions which preoccupy those in Personnel Management within our Services concerning recruitment and retention of staff are intimately bound up with precisely those matters which involve discussion of spouses, partners and families. There is a nice irony here, of course. Spouses may be beginning to feel like withdrawing, sometimes because of lack of recognition and/or consideration from their Services, at the same time as they are being newly appealed to and asked for their opinions.

Changing Attitudes Of Spouses

In many of the spouses' associations in Europe there is on-going debate as to where the lines should be drawn between choice and duty and between voluntary versus paid work. It needs stressing that there is still a wide spectrum of opinion, and in the case of the British Service, this can be illustrated through two quotes. The first is from a speech given by the Chairman during a seminar which the BDSA held with the Administration on Role, Recognition and Recompense for Spouses in 1995 where she said "It is a case of the role is dead, long live the role! We face a difficult contradiction. We do not want this role and yet we perform it. We even say that we choose to do it and then, of course, as we do it, it comes to be expected." The second is from a reply to one of the questionnaires in our survey. In answer to the question of which measures she felt could be taken to improve her contentment with her role as a spouse of a Foreign Service officer, a woman aged 31 and married to a Second Secretary replied "the whole problem as I see it is that I *don't* see this as my role; my role is too connected with my own sense of identity, i.e. *my* life, career and children. The fact that my husband happens to be a diplomat is his business and I go abroad not because of his job or because of any transferred sense of role as his wife but simply because I choose to spend my life with him and not with the DS." It could be added that her view was not by any means the most extreme; one spouse, to the question "which duties as a diplomatic spouse do you think deserve pay or recompense?" replied "just being married to a diplomat!"

Amidst all these different views, two trends can be detected. First, spouses feel uncertain about their role and its future and morale is often low. This clearly emerged from the comments made by the spouses who responded both to the BDSA survey this year and to the one undertaken by the Austrians, that morale is generally low. The study undertaken by the Austrians revealed that morale tended to be far lower amongst junior officers and their spouses. Although in the British case this does not seem to be the case, there was the impression, shared by the Austrians, that more effort needs to be made to involve and reflect the views of younger spouses and those married to junior officers. The responses to the BDSA survey revealed a tremendous division of opinion over whether the supporting role of the spouse will continue into the 21st century: 53% believed it would; 41% thought not and 6% did not know.

Second, although at present, in most European countries, the majority of spouses do continue to accompany their spouses to post and to "opt in" whilst at post, there is a growing sense that greater recognition and some form of remuneration is due, particularly in the case of the work undertaken by Heads of Mission spouses. In the BDSA survey, the overwhelming majority - 81.5% - believed that spouses should be recompensed for duties associated with the role. Those who replied negatively frequently gave the time-honoured reason for this: that it would remove the element of choice. The respondents to the Swiss survey also raised the

question of remuneration, even though this was not directly asked. In the Austrian case, 60% of the respondents expressed disappointment at the lack of recognition they received from their Ministry - this was particularly true of those over 50 and those married to more senior officers.

Debates around this question are by no means new, and can be dated back a good twenty years. One of the problems which emerged during the turbulent debates of the late 70s in several Foreign Services was precisely that of what did wives owe their Services and vice versa? In the case of the British Service, the whole situation ended up with rather a head on clash - with a movement in the Diplomatic Service Wives Association saying that, quite simply, wives owed the Service nothing. The British administration (along with others, including the US and the Australian) responded with the suave, but not very helpful, statement, that of course wives owed their Services nothing, but any contribution they might choose to make would be most welcome. Thus, the firm ground of obligation gave way to the more shifting one of choice - a shift which did not please all spouses, for it left some feeling undervalued. Twenty years on, in the case of the British Service, the position remains more or less the same. Today the official line is that "the spouse is not expected to do anything in support of the officer but that anything the spouse does on a voluntary basis is greatly appreciated by the Service." To many, this position appears to be derogatory, condescending and untrue. Indeed, there is a certain disingenuousness to this position - as long as it can be said that it is the spouse's choice to contribute; however great that contribution might be, it can then be freed of any contractual taint and the issue of pay can be ducked.

So, what might be the future for diplomatic spouses and how are Services taking into account the need to acknowledge the constraints that diplomacy as a way of life imposes on the families of officers?

Policies and Solutions

New types of incorporation?

Maybe part of the solution to the ambiguous situation regarding recognition is that spouses should be newly incorporated into Services but on a new and more professional footing than in the past. Under pressure, the British Service is inching forwards - at least spouses of Heads of Mission in some posts can claim for the hours put into residence management. It has to have been already established that the residence requires a manager/housekeeper. Heads of Mission spouses can then apply for this position, and be paid at the appropriate local levels of pay. What is interesting here is that this trend represents a new form of incorporation of spouses into Services as a resource, but on a very different, and more professional, footing than in the past. Another aspect of this professionalisation of the role is the introduction of new accounting procedures and the provision of IT packages to help in managing residences.

Spouse employment:

Here, there are no easy solutions, and there tends to be something of a contradiction involved: something which always emerges within attitude surveys, both amongst officers and spouses, is that travel abroad figures high on the list of reasons for remaining within the Service and as one of the advantages for remaining with a diplomatic way of life (travel abroad was cited as the most important reason for not leaving the British Service in the Staff Attitude Survey undertaken in connection with the 1996 Review of Overseas Allowances (Hornby, 1996); and as the most important advantage of marrying a diplomat in the 1998 BDSA survey). And yet, it is precisely all the movement involved that contains one of the major disadvantages - that is the blight on the career opportunities of the accompanying or

"trailing" spouse. It should be said that Diplomatic Services are not alone in facing this challenge - it is one which is well recognised within the private sector as one of the key questions to be tackled in organising international assignments. In a meeting the BDSA held with the company Employment Conditions Abroad, the ECA representative pointed out that all the major multinational companies are recognising that the issue of dual careers is becoming the primary factor affecting policies and practices governing expatriate postings, and recently a conference was held by the CBI on "Dual Careers and International Assignments." And for all that the private sector is not altogether comparable with our situation, the fact that the question of dual career couples in the context of international assignments has been placed on the agenda more widely may well bode well for the future in general for spouses who wish to keep up their careers.

As for more specific and immediate solutions to the dilemmas associated with spouse employment and the lack of it, the issue that has been top of the list within several European Associations for a good many years is that of compensation for lost pension rights. The British Service has now gained the acceptance of the Secretary of State that compensation should be paid for the inability of spouses to build up pension rights. If it is carried forward, it will be paid as an additional allowance overseas for spouses who were under fifty on marriage and who have spent at least 3 years abroad accompanying an officer. Although the money will still have to be found to fund this scheme, and the approval is still needed of the Minister of the Office of Public Service for the new regulation, the fact that it has been agreed upon in principle represents a major step forwards (the Austrians have also obtained agreement in principle for compensation for lost pension rights).

When it comes to making it easier for spouses actually to work and keep up their careers there are various policies now in place. One trend which is towards establishing databases upon which spouses can register for work - the BDSA established one in 1995, and has had some success (other European countries with employment databases include: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). A recent idea to emerge from Sweden is to establish an internet site, with each registered spouse having their own e-mail address to facilitate communication with potential employers. Other sources of help provided within the British Service include the provision of funds for re-training; the policy of employing spouses within missions; bilateral agreements; provision of language tuition and payment for passing language examinations. Also, greater provision is, in theory, being made for joint postings, for more flexible working practices, for Special Unpaid Leave and for Officers to spend up to ten years on a home posting, if for family or other reasons they feel this is necessary.

Family friendly policies and the need for administrations to wake up and smell the aroma of the coffee:

In conclusion, we need to return to the more general need for Diplomatic Services to stay in step with the changes in the societies within and between which they operate, if they are to recruit and retain staff. The need to take account of the whole family and the way in which this social category has itself changed is currently under review within the British Service. The aim is to introduce greater flexibility in the policies and practices governing personnel policies, allowing within the overall structure of allowances etc. space for differences in circumstances, rather than each individual having to do battle with the Administration each time a need arises which does not fit strictly with the rules and regulations. However, for these and other changes in policy to work out in practice, there will need to be a change in the consciousness of those actually administering it towards a greater openness and flexibility of thought. An illustration of this was provided by an American Community Liaison Officer. Commenting upon the impressive set of policies the Americans have in place for promoting spouse employment, the CLO pointed out that many management officers still had attitudes from the ark, - and that no amount of machinery could work unless they woke up and smelt the aroma of the coffee.

In the case of the British Service the bottom line was well expressed in one comment the BDSA received when spouses' views were requested on the importance of family-friendly policies: "the Office must decide whether it wants a married service overseas. If yes, then it must persuade the Treasury that these days there is a fundamental difference between the Diplomatic Service and the Home Civil Service and that stems in large part from the mobility requirement and its effect upon spouse employment. Terms and conditions of service have to contain incentives to make spouses want to go overseas."

All the shifts which have been described above indicate a more general direction: Foreign Services in Europe increasingly need to acknowledge the fact that the category of "diplomatic spouse" no longer remains a secure, nor always a particularly comfortable, hook upon which to hang identity. The notion of "serving one's country" in the capacity of being a helpmeet is becoming out-dated. In the case of Europe, this trend is possibly exacerbated by the increasing importance of a pan-European ideology and identity following on the establishing of the European Union. This pan-European identity is in some countries displacing the previous key importance of national identity. However, it is also true that so long as Diplomatic Services continue to exist in something resembling their current form, and so long as people continue to marry and/or have partners, the spouse/partner "problem" will continue to raise challenges.

NOTES

1. A penetrating examination of this consciousness was provided by Callan (1977).
2. This cause was suggested to me by Professor Dietrich Kappeler in discussion during this Conference.
3. The survey asked spouses to respond to a series of questions concerning their opinions and experiences of their role. It was undertaken in preparation for a working session during the 1998 EUFASA Conference on the "Role of The Diplomatic Spouse/Partner in The 21st Century."

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Appendix: Information on EU Spouse/Partner Associations

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Membership and Composition of EU Associations

Country Membership Females Males

Austria 384 377 7

Belgium 230 218 12

Denmark 1272 803 469

Eur. Commission 150 148 2

Finland 260 252 8

France 364 322 42

Germany 900 830 70

Greece 200 195 5

Ireland 56 52 4

Italy 486 479 7

Luxembourg 29 29 0

Netherlands 1276 951 325

Portugal 171 169 2

Spain 310 306 4

Sweden 315 283 32

United Kingdom 2736 2373 363

Totals 9139 7787 1352

Overall

Percentages 100% 85% 15%

Percentages of Men And Women

Country Females Males

Austria 98 2

Belgium 95 5
Denmark 63 37
Eur. Commission 99 1
Finland 97 3
France 88 12
Germany 92 8
Greece 97.5 2.5
Ireland 93 7
Italy 98.5 1.5
Luxembourg 100 0
Netherlands 74.5 25.5
Portugal 99 1
Spain 99 1
Sweden 90 10
United Kingdom 87 13

Associations Containing Unmarried Partners

Country Total Female Male

Denmark 326 196 130
Eur. Commission Some Unknown Unknown
Finland Not Many Unknown Unknown
France 1 1
Netherlands 234 94 140
Sweden 15 Unknown Unknown

Diplomacy of Tomorrow: New Developments, New Methods, New Tools

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In the course of the twentieth century diplomacy has undergone enormous transformations. At its beginning diplomacy was still the art of conducting bilateral relations between states as an alternative to violent confrontation. Diplomats were cultivated men of the upper strata of society, who often got along with each other across borders much better than they were able to communicate with other circles of the population at home. One was supposed to be born a diplomat and professional requirements were merely an excellent general education, perfect manners, good appearance and of course full fluency in French, the only language of diplomacy.

The First World War brought a first revolution in diplomacy. The Peace Conference in Paris was the beginning of high level multilateral diplomacy, where English rapidly became the second working language alongside French. Politicians became increasingly active on the diplomatic floor and career diplomats were required to understand such complex matters as international economic and financial relations, arms control and disarmament, regulation of international transport, and communications. Diplomats were more often recruited for their professional competence than for their social background. Female diplomats made their first timid appearance and gradually occupied a growing percentage of diplomatic positions. Loyalty to a country's ideology became an essential element. The use of force as a means of conducting a country's external relations was restricted and eventually prohibited, thus giving diplomacy a theoretical monopoly. Bilateralism increasingly gave way to multilateralism and multilateral relations now tended to be conducted within the framework of international organisations with either general or specialised competencies. In the latter case, diplomats were no longer necessarily members of a country's foreign service but could be representatives of specialised government agencies.

The last decades of this century have witnessed an even more profound transformation of diplomacy. The barrier of sovereignty, which protected states against interference in their internal affairs by other states or international bodies, has begun to crumble. Diplomatic activities often take place outside the traditional framework of conference rooms and consist of getting involved with ordinary people at all levels. Information technology (IT) and the Internet are overcoming distance and making continuous contact with all segments of one's own diplomatic establishment as well as with international institutions feasible. Information technology also frees the diplomat from a lot of routine work and enormously enlarges his capacity for action, while leaving him free to concentrate on his core duty: to establish and maintain personal contacts and relations. It is this new revolution that will shape the diplomacy of tomorrow.

New Developments

East-west and north-south confrontations among groups of states obscured evolutions which suddenly became fully evident after the collapse of the communist system in 1989-91. The United Nations itself and various regional organisations had tended to become involved in internal affairs of states for a considerable time. The two main motives for such interventions were internal conflicts and the disregard of human rights and even basic humanitarian principles. The rationale for such activism was the fear that internal conflicts and

confrontations resulting from intolerable violations of human rights might spill over the borders and endanger peace and security in the neighbourhood and even beyond. The plight of people affected by such developments is always stressed but not the dominant consideration, as evidenced by the reluctance of outsiders to get involved in large-scale situations that look difficult to handle, e.g., the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi or the endless civil war in Afghanistan.

Globalisation has recently become a new catchword in the field of economics and finance. But the globalisation of problems like the degradation of the natural environment, the population explosion, epidemics and particularly the AIDS pandemic have been with us for decades. The general issue here is that individual countries, however big and powerful, can no longer handle such problems themselves or in small groups but that these have to be tackled by the international community as a whole. Moreover, simple solutions such as the adoption of regulatory systems no longer suffice. The flow of people, ideas, money, germs and viruses, and indeed communication over the Internet, so far have largely defeated national, regional and even world-wide efforts to control them. This is in part due to the failure to involve non-governmental entities and the ordinary people themselves. Tomorrow's diplomats will have to consider this.

Involvement of the media and through them, the ordinary people, in international affairs has led to what is known as public diplomacy. This means that at home the public puts pressure on the authorities to follow or abandon certain courses of action, often in disregard of international commitments or true national interests. Diplomats must therefore justify their action or inaction before the public and strive to convince it of the appropriateness of external policies of the government. Conversely, diplomats on bilateral assignments may have to interact with local media of the receiving country in order to explain or even justify their country's policies and try to get support for or at least reduce hostility to them.

New Methods

Professional diplomacy itself is undergoing considerable changes as regards the methods used. In bilateral relations, the need to maintain diplomatic missions and consular posts has been questioned, and, as far as the traditional way of doing things is concerned, this may well be justified. However there is still one essential element in bilateral relations, the human interaction, which cannot be replaced by distance communication. Provided that missions and posts are properly trimmed and only manned by people who are there to cultivate human contacts and, in the case of diplomats, report on the thinking and feeling of closed circles, they will remain invaluable instruments for bilateral relations. Moreover, they will be better placed to conduct public diplomacy in the receiving country than would action from the sending state. In the multilateral field too things are changing quickly. The fruitless ideological and political confrontations are giving way to co-operative interaction aimed at actually dealing with the problems at hand. This is partly due to financial constraints. Neither individual countries nor international institutions can afford any more the endless conferences and meetings of yesteryear. The number of days - and of hours within each one of those days - are being restricted and few countries are willing to afford the cost of sending delegates to such events if no results are achieved. This has led to an increasingly informal approach to discussions, with few formal meetings, dealing mostly with organisational matters and the proper adoption of whatever conclusions have been reached. The preparatory role of international secretariats and the importance of interaction with them through permanent missions (or over the Internet) is constantly growing. As a result of all this it has become possible to handle far more complex issues in less time than the rather fruitless debates took up in past meetings.

A more striking departure from traditional methods is the growing involvement of non-professional human actors in what used to be purely diplomatic activities. Non-governmental organisations, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds now surround bilateral as well as multilateral events and insist on being heard and consulted. External involvement in internal

issues and conflicts also increasingly relies on specialised and also non-governmental institutions. The International Red Cross Movement is a case in point. With its triple instruments, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the national societies present in each country, it is ideally prepared to mix local and international action. Red Cross delegates as well as representatives of other non-governmental institutions, especially in the humanitarian field, have already been and are playing an important role as intermediaries and even negotiators. We also note a proliferation of non-governmental bodies at national and regional levels directly aimed at helping to resolve conflicts. Some have been quite successful in at least promoting talks among representatives of conflict parties.

Involvement of diplomacy in internal conflict situations means dealing at local and even grassroots levels. Diplomats active in such fields have to accept a lot of hardship and develop the ability to interact with often difficult military field-commanders and even simple leaders of armed bands loyal to no one in particular. This means a lot of preparation as the diplomat will have to know the history, culture and religion as well as the language of the people he is going to deal with. In order to establish and maintain the kind of mutual confidence required for the job, the diplomat will also have to stay at it for long periods of time or, if the confidence is lost, have to be withdrawn immediately and then replaced. Traditional rules regarding the duration of diplomatic assignments are irrelevant in such contexts. Personal qualities such as good health, ability to withstand physical and emotional hardships, patience, and willingness to listen endlessly to the same litanies are more important than profound knowledge of international law, international economics or international relations, or perfect manners in rarefied international spheres. Thus the same person may not necessarily make a good traditional diplomat as well as a good grassroots diplomat.

New Tools

The telegraph, the telephone, the telex, and the fax machine have gradually allowed for continuous contact of the diplomat abroad with his home base. IT continues on this road but its main contribution is networking. At the level of ministries, this means that all divisions and sections can constantly interact, including accessing each other's files. The same can be achieved with missions and posts abroad, at their level as well as together with the home base. As a result, most administrative work, accounts and consular matters can be automated and handled in a single place at the home base, with the outside mission or post merely providing input and implementing the results. Networking can also be extended to other government departments, thus bringing together all administrations active in external relations both at preparatory and decision-making levels and when implementing policies, e.g., by acting abroad. A further circle can be added by extending the network to the private sector and to non-governmental bodies of all kinds having a stake in external relations.

Networking could go beyond national establishments. Members of a regional group could enhance their capacity and efficiency of intervention if they were networked and their agents therefore in constant contact. Such a system would be particularly useful for groups of small countries like those of the Caribbean and the Southern Pacific. It would also involve their regional organisations and thus ensure that at all times a delegate of one country could serve the others by being in constant liaison with everyone involved. Bigger institutions such as NATO or the OSCE may consider networking their members. As national establishments of bigger countries are very wary of networking beyond the limits of their own institutions, and as even networking of such institutions still leaves a lot to be desired because of resistance of tradition and security minded groups, the overcoming of such obstacles may not be possible very soon.

A much less controversial form of networking is already under way and will again be especially useful for small countries. International institutions are creating internal networks including access to libraries and documentation facilities. Their output is accessible to member countries over the Internet. The United Nations even offers support to permanent

missions of small countries in New York for installing easy access to their network. Recently the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD in Geneva and the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly in New York held a joint session over audio-visual facilities. In the future this may allow a poorer country to be represented only in one body if all important matters are discussed in joint sessions with the other.

Public diplomacy relies both on traditional media and IT facilities. This means that the diplomat of today and tomorrow must be thoroughly familiar with them. Privacy of diplomatic relations is increasingly invaded by the media. Thus the diplomat must be prepared both for impromptu encounters with them and for facing them in a more organised manner for statements, interviews and media conferences. He will have to learn how to use IT facilities to reach the media when this has to be done quickly or when he wishes to reach media with no representation in the region where he works. The diplomat must also know how to handle media hostility and, hopefully, turn it around into neutrality or even sympathy. This has mostly to do with the content of the message rather than the way in which it is delivered.

Looking Ahead

The time of diplomacy is far from over. Its role will on the contrary become ever more central as most important affairs will have to be handled at global, regional and sub-regional levels. The full implementation of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations will mean that states have only diplomacy left to overcome their differences.

But diplomacy will keep evolving and changing, partly in ways that we cannot yet imagine. It is thus important for those involved in the study and teaching of diplomacy to keep their eyes open and take note of changing patterns and needs, so as to prepare diplomats of tomorrow and re-train diplomats of today in such a way that they may serve their countries - and international institutions - in the best possible manner. In particular, small and poor countries should be enabled to fully exploit the possibility given to them by the new tools of diplomacy to be effectively present on the international scene for the first time.

History and the Evolution of Diplomacy

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Diplomacy as practiced by foreign services and foreign ministries has seemed in recent years to be in decline. Governments in the post-collectivist age have wielded few economising axes more deeply than in respect of the management of their overseas representation. The urge to save increasingly hard won tax revenue was backed up by the sense that foreign services needed modernising - which tended also to mean minimising. This notion had been present before the real force of the anti-collectivist gale had developed. One of the English writer Nancy Mitford's wittiest novels is called *Don't tell Alfred* and was written in the 1960s. The Alfred in question is the professor of Pastoral Theology in the University of Oxford and has been unexpectedly summoned to become the British Ambassador at Paris. Not all the family was impressed by the apparent honour: "Now listen, Mother dear", said Basil, "the Foreign Service has had its day - enjoyable while it lasted, no doubt, but over now. The privileged being of the future is the travel agent"⁽¹⁾. A serious part of the atmosphere which this quotation catches was caused by the steadily increasing sense that the gathering and assessment of information about foreign societies and governments which had been the principal purpose of diplomacy since the emergence of the Resident Ambassador had been overtaken by other and more efficient means of communication. At times the change has seemed more significant than the fact that diplomacy had always had other functions and that the relative significance of the different functions of diplomacy undergoes constant modification, sometimes slowly sometimes fast. Some discussion of previous ebbs and flows in these functions may thus be appropriate.

We do not know when human societies first felt the need to communicate with each other, but it is safe to assume that they did so from the very earliest times. We know that diplomatic status existed very early and it is both evident and instructive why it should have been so. If it has been decided that it may be better to hear the message than to eat the messenger, then there have to be rules about who a legitimate messenger is, and there have to be sanctions which will ensure his uneatability. The earliest diplomats were a response to a felt need for a mechanism to convey messages between societies safely and reliably. It is instructive to note that right from the beginning, diplomacy, even in its crudest forms, evolved in response to political needs reciprocally felt. It has continued and is continuing thus until today and we shall shortly look at some outstanding and complex examples of the process in action. Once diplomacy actually existed and was conceded to be irreplaceably useful, a reverse factor also became possible. The nature and functioning of the diplomatic machine at any particular historical moment could of itself shape the way in which principals - whoever they might be - conducted their exchanges. Thus it has occasionally occurred that functions which had developed within diplomacy came to create a particular international activity simply because they existed. We will, therefore, look at an example of that process as well.

Of course, sometimes what the machine could not do, or could not be seen to be doing without damaging its basic function, could be done by other means - by Secret Services, for example, or by hired assassins. But sometimes it just meant that what could not be done was not done and opportunities were lost. For this purpose, perhaps one example will suffice. In the period just before 1914, when most foreign services were not equipped to handle commercial matters, the British Board of Trade - the then Ministry of Commerce - asked the Foreign Office to provide information about arms manufacture in Imperial Russia. The Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, replied to this enquiry that he had not been sent as His Majesty's Ambassador to the Russian Court to do arithmetical computations for the Board of Trade.

Let us begin by giving some outstanding examples of the process where an unfolding international and diplomatic need evoked a corresponding addition or development in the machinery of diplomacy. This has certainly been the more usual process of modification. The growth of very complete - perhaps too complete - systems for the giving and checking of full powers was a reflection of the increasing significance of diplomatic activity and the greater risk of serious harm flowing from embassies being disavowed. The habit of issuing minute instructions, and the consequential almost hysterical desire on the part of others to know what they contained in advance of negotiations, was evoked both by the emergence of greater central control of diplomatic activity and by the greater potential damage a careless or over confident ambassador could cause(2) . And both of these again reflected a rising level of diplomatic traffic. The evolution of foreign ministries followed from the desire of rulers and their ministers to maintain a continuous flow of diplomatic business in which cross relationships between diplomatic partners, between internal sources of political influence and between differing issues could be carefully followed and controlled. To do this successfully, and to have instantly available knowledge of current obligations and commitments required an institutional memory obtainable only through a properly managed single foreign ministry archive(3) .

These kinds of development occasionally engendered reluctance from contemporary traditionalists. None, however, encountered the fierce opposition and disapproval from the principals themselves that accompanied the emergence of the resident ambassador. There could be no doubt that this was an inescapable response to particular circumstances otherwise it could not have triumphed over the objections of the proprietors of the system itself. The origin of the problem lay in a change of emphasis in the purpose of diplomacy. Internal circumstances in northern Italy in the renaissance period had produced a highly competitive group of small city states, each directly bordering others, none able to triumph over the others either directly or in alliance groups. The most significant - Venice - was not concerned with territorial power so much as trading expansion. External circumstances for the time being provided no threat of intervention. The Byzantine Empire was in its final decline, the Muslim advance had stopped short in the eastern Mediterranean and the development of centres of political power in northern Europe was still in gestation. The result locally was a stalemate: war, apart from being an inconvenient way of extruding power for very small entities - mercenaries notwithstanding, had proved to be incapable of giving victory to any state or group of states. The attempt to gain a sudden and final advantage by means of a great diplomatic coup became an obsessive preoccupation. It might be achieved by constructing the so far elusive winning combination of states; but it might also be achieved by altering the balance of power by subverting the regimes of neighbouring states. Neither Popes nor secular rulers would necessarily refuse to stoop even to poison in this regard, but more usually sought to operate by creating or supporting opposition groups in the hope of due reward when they had clawed their way to power. It was not a pretty picture nor did its apologists suggest otherwise(4) .

Ugly or merely pragmatic, the international situation had produced a new diplomatic need. Whereas, with the exception of the Byzantine Empire, the main thrust of previous diplomatic activity had been to convey messages and the answers to messages from one principal to another, often spun out over long periods of time, the priority had now become the acquisition of knowledge about the political and military situation of others, the information to be reported with maximum speed and secrecy. Domestic security and external advantage both demanded it. The functioning of the system, however, only reflected the previous need. Embassies occurred *ad hoc* induced either by a particular issue about which information needed to be exchanged or by a ceremonial occasion - e.g. a funeral or an accession or a wedding. The stay with the host was likely to be relatively short, if luxurious, and the opportunities for spying or interference were naturally very restricted. The only practical answer was to keep a representative on the spot and have him report by courier - so secretly that a whole new range of possible ways of concealing documents came into vogue which make swallowing contraceptives full of drugs seem crude by comparison.

The resident ambassador thus appeared. Martin Wight said that he represented the "master-institution" of western diplomatic development(5) . The rulers of the period, however, objected to his existence in the strongest terms and from time to time cleared them all out. But as

much as they did not want them to report on their domestic situations or indeed to intervene in them, they wanted just as much to receive such information and have such opportunities in respect of others; and the stresses of the contemporary international environment enforced a reciprocal if unwilling tolerance of the existence of permanent representatives(6). Their usefulness entrenched them, although they did not immediately supplant the older temporary missions, which simply carried on, gradually losing business to the residents and becoming finally purely ceremonial.

It was to take over a hundred years before this development was complete and the slow pace was partly due to the patchy emergence of the fully sovereign and secularized state across the rest of Europe. It was this evolution which led to the gradual restriction of diplomatic representation to states and thus to the office of ambassador achieving greater prominence as the sole international extrusion of his ruler's power and policy. The conjunction of these two factors contributed to the increasing acceptance of the significant role of the permanent resident embassy. The other delaying factor arose from the intense diplomatic complications caused by the corrosive ideological split brought about by the Reformation. This produced sharply fought wars both general and civil and led to a kind of diplomatic "cold war", where embassies of Protestant rulers at Roman Catholic courts and *vice versa* became the focal point for dissident groups within the host state, possibly sanctuaries for them, where they could attend religious services otherwise banned and develop plots for the future, perhaps to be aided and abetted by the forces of the resident's principal. Not surprisingly, it was only when the full force of this struggle blew itself out after 1648 that the position of the resident ambassador became generally recognized *de jure* as well as *de facto*, as it had been in Italy a hundred years or more earlier.

Later periods produce further examples. Adjustment to the communications revolution of the 19th century and the creation of international organizations first in response to practical requirements and later answering to an overwhelming moral need to sustain peace when the contemporary conduct of war had produced unacceptable casualties. More recently, the diplomatic machine has needed to integrate the need for representation by a rising number of private international organisations concerned with humanitarian and environmental matters with the existing structure of states. In this case, the process is very difficult since the practical point of entry has been on the very edges of the machinery of diplomacy gained through a particular arm of the United Nations system. In this there is more than a resonance of the other form of diplomatic development which was mentioned at the outset: development characterised by shaping a response to a new need by reference to a pre-existing element in the machine(7). One of the most interesting examples of this second process occurred at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and it repays examination.

The Congress of Vienna was an historically peculiar event in many ways, not least that it was technically at least, an illegitimate meeting, as Metternich typically grasped(8). The basic assumptions upon which it proceeded were, however, far more significantly odd. Unlike the practice at previous peacemakings, the makers of the Vienna settlement were less concerned about punishing and disabling the vanquished - though quite clear about removing Napoleon himself from further active participation in international politics - than they were about protecting the world from the ravages of an ideology. The extraordinary trajectory of the Napoleonic imperium had left behind a strong sense that what had fuelled its course was not so much the intrinsic power of France, which was correctly sensed never to have been greater than that of the other great powers, but the positive effects of the ideology of the revolution on those who espoused it and the negative effects on the power and security of those who did not(9). The consequences of concluding that the long and - by contemporary standards - destructive war had in effect been caused by an ideology, rather than a state or a ruler, profoundly affected what the Congress tried to do. It meant that the usual behaviour of states was changed and that jockeying for relative power *via* shifting alliances was in effect suspended. Indeed, a deliberate effort was made to maintain the wartime coalition, implicitly - explicitly after 1818 - including France, who signed the settlement, for the stated reason of defending the system against any resumption of revolution.

The consequence of this sea change for diplomacy was, to begin with at least, that there appeared to be no means for giving effect to the obvious wish of the powers to institute a kind of cooperative management of the international system. Diplomacy had steadily developed as the means by which sovereign rulers communicated with other sovereign rulers. It was the great assertion of sovereign individuality, functioning in a sometimes avowedly - or sometimes simply politely - adversarial mode, depending on circumstances. If it was asked to give expression to the wish that rulers cooperate on what was intended to be a permanent basis, it was not easy to see how that could be done. Two ideas were tried out, one very traditional, the other uniquely naive. The first was that an extra treaty should be signed in order to give a special force and legitimacy to the settlement as agreed. It was to have been called a Treaty of General Guarantee. For various reasons, though drafted and revised, it was never signed. The second was the Tsar of Russia's notion that a highly simplified version of the tenets of Christianity - modern terminology would suggest "born again" as the most accurate description - would serve as the basis for a new kind of international security. This was called the "Holy" alliance, and amidst a good deal of covert giggling it was signed in 1815. The other parties did not believe in its likely efficacy, and felt right up to the end of the negotiations, resumed post-Waterloo, that something else was required. More or less in despair, the British delegate, Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, drafted a clause which turned a piece of recently evolved diplomatic practice into the cornerstone of the international system, which, *mutatis mutandis*, it has remained.

This clause established the peacetime conference as the mechanism by which governments would give expression to their wish for permanent cooperation in the face of a revolutionary threat, or, as later became the case, against any threat of disruption. The idea that the most effective response to a crisis was to call a meeting in peacetime to discuss it before it got out of hand was new. Conferences or congresses had of course been well known devices, but always in the context of bringing an existing war to an end. Such a thicket of protocol had come to surround them, that by the mid-eighteenth century, powers were beginning to try to avoid formal meetings and resorting to informal ones, without traditional rules.⁽¹⁰⁾ But the main purpose was still the same. Towards the end of the war, there was a final example of this kind of meeting in its traditional form. Late in 1813, Napoleon had allowed his minister Coulaincourt to hint at a possible peace negotiation and the abortive Congress of Prague was the result. To achieve the abortion, the French side resorted to wonderfully old fashioned mechanisms, demanding formal proposals submitted through a mediator and denying the legitimacy of viva voce discussion. The allies drew the correct conclusion that the negotiations were not serious and withdrew⁽¹¹⁾.

The failure of the Congress of Prague was almost simultaneous with the events that were to provide the basis upon which the modern peacetime conference was later introduced. After the battle of Leipzig in 1813, which to most observers signaled the coming end of the Napoleonic *imperium*, there was a general belief that the Emperor must soon sue for peace in order to obtain the best possible terms, and that the sooner he initiated the process, the more of his Empire he would save. The likelihood that negotiations would soon start made it important that an allied response should be more or less immediately available, and for the British who were the most geographically remote of the partners, there was an obvious risk that the first stages of a peace negotiation might take place without their participation. To fend off that possibility, the British Cabinet took the hitherto unheard of step of sending the Foreign Secretary on a personal mission to the continent which began at the very beginning of 1814. From mid-January, Castlereagh joined up with Metternich, the Prussian, Hardenberg, and Czar Alexander I of Russia in Switzerland and the group remained together until the war ended and beyond⁽¹²⁾. The ever extending length of the mission was caused by the refusal of Napoleon to see the apparent logic of his position. To him, anything other than victory in war was synonymous with losing his throne, for he understood that his domestic power was dependent on foreign domination. He thus fought on through appallingly wintry conditions and survived by some of the most remarkable generalship of his career, until the end came in May with the retreat to Paris and his abdication. The continuation of the coalition thus became a more significant objective and achievement than preparing for peace, and it is clear from the course of events that the political direction which was provided by the foreign ministers and rulers was essential in protecting the coalition from breaking up, as all previous ones had done. What in effect had happened was that a *de facto* rolling conference of the allied powers

was established, ready to deal on a daily basis with the thrills and spills of a major alliance at war *à l'outrance*.

The success of this operation caused its members to proceed in the same way with the making of the Treaty of Paris of May, 1814 and the preparations for the Congress of Vienna, originally scheduled to meet in August of 1814 but persistently postponed until November(13). The difficulties inherent in creating a major resettlement of Europe were in themselves immense, and the determination of the representatives of the Great Powers to do the job without the participation of others produced major tensions with smaller powers, notably the King of Sweden. But despite the great crisis of December/January over the future of Poland, the core group succeeded in constructing a new European order and did so by including France among the negotiating parties, thus completing the process by which affairs were being conducted essentially by a directorate of all five of the Great Powers.

Initially nobody noticed that what had occurred constituted major revision of the machinery of diplomacy, except in so far as they objected to it as a new and excluding phenomenon. As the settlement proceeded, and particularly after the episode leading to the battle of Waterloo, the notion first adumbrated by Pitt the Younger in 1805 that the final agreement needed some exceptionally definitive and permanent expression grew in strength. As was noted earlier, two possible routes were discussed: the first was the drafting of a special Treaty of General Guarantee. This was redrafted several times, but it fell by the wayside and was never signed. As time passed, the Czar of Russia came to prefer the idea of encapsulating new rules for the international community in a specifically Christian - and, indeed, wholly naive - form; and successfully insisted on the institution of the Holy Alliance in September 1815(14). From a different point of view, Lord Castlereagh also became unenthusiastic, as each day that put distance between the British Parliament and a real military emergency, increased its reluctance to have anything further to do with obligations to intervene in defence of a general European agreement. He dared not risk what President Wilson was later to do, knowing more certainly what his fate would be. Since there was to be no treaty of General Guarantee and no one really believed in the efficacy of the Holy Alliance, something else was required.

What eventually happened was the codification of the new piece of the diplomatic machine that we have seen coming into existence(15). The pre-existence of its development made possible the implementation of the wishes of the powers: the system became the message and the significance of an historical development became crucial. It was not called into being by the demands of the moment - that path had been attempted but failed - and the character of its origin shaped the nineteenth century international system in profound ways, most particularly by stressing the practical and consensual over the application of rigid principle.

We may thus conclude that in at least two ways understanding the significance of historical development leads to a clearer vision of why we have what we have, and, perhaps, how it may be expected to evolve. Looking at the present and likely evolution in the immediate future, we can identify at least two significant developments. They both arise out of the changing nature and increasing numbers of principals in the global system. The complexities that these introduce can be listed: the spectrum of power, size and efficiency among states has widened sharply and produced a parallel widening in the range of the activities about which they may wish to be represented. In turn this has affected the functioning of associations of states - the most usual form of international organisations - who have discovered limits to the effectiveness of bi-lateral relationships. The recent difficulties encountered by the IMF in dealing with the financial crisis in Asia is a clear example of this. If both states and associations of states have experienced baffling complications and loss of power in their global dealings, the role of private, usually humanitarian organisations has sharply increased in significance, chiefly because the major crises in global politics are being caused by semi- or complete collapse of weak state structures. The consequences are unlike the previous patterns of international politics and have not proved amenable to traditional systems of control. They have instead induced the participation of large numbers of private organisations, with no tradition of self representation and little machinery for achieving it. Indeed, in so far as having to join the diplomatic nexus means joining the world of states, there can be an element of reluctance involved: fear of the 'poacher turned gamekeeper'

syndrome. However, all the signs are that this reluctance is being overcome. Private organisations are developing their own diplomacy both between themselves and between actors in the state system; and the way they have been doing it is remarkably reminiscent of the early days of state self representation. The decisions of the UN to avoid bilateral compulsions by adopting coordinating status in humanitarian crises and to give recognition to greatly increased numbers of private organisations have provided another example of how existing parts of the diplomatic system can provide the means of responding to the needs of the current situation and to some degree actually shape them.

It is very different, however, in other areas of activity. Organisations, whether states or not, that have a vertical structure and relate to each other over geographically precise events and issues can in various ways inherit the machinery of diplomacy already constructed. The need to deal with other aspects of globalisation seems likely to provoke much more radical change. The reason is that important developments in human behaviour are no longer occurring in relation to the destruction, reform or establishment of human authorities, but in relation to burgeoning areas of new activity. These tend to be arranged horizontally across global geography, time zones and cultures. They are commercial, financial and intellectual. They represent new areas of power, speaking chiefly and dramatically to individuals and they are particularly capable of profoundly affecting the economic fate of individuals. Unlike previous centres of power, they have not yet developed either internal organisation and control or the means of representing themselves, either to each other or to state or nonstate structures. The limitations that this imposes on global relationships have recently been made sharply clear during the Asian economic crisis. This has proved to be alarmingly immune to treatment by the usual authorities, and those authorities have discovered no means of speaking to the real deployers of power - unsurprisingly, since there is, for example, no known means of finding representatives of global currency dealers, let alone negotiating with them. This amounts to a crisis of representation and there is nothing in the existing machine that is going to help. The problem will worsen until areas of activity have also become centres of organised power and have acquired the need to deal with others like them. History suggests that this transition always happens in the end, but offers no guidance as to how it will be done on this occasion or how long it will take or if violence will be involved in the process, which it generally has been. It is only possible to conclude that, in the contemporary world, this is certainly the most significant space to watch.

NOTES

1. Nancy Mitford, *The Nancy Mitford Omnibus*, London, 1986, p. 561.
2. See Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, London, 1995, pp. 48 - 49 and 52 - 53.
3. See Hamilton and Langhorne, pp. 71 - 75.
4. See Macchiavelli, Guicciardini. Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, Oxford, 1954, pp. 31 - 35, also commented on the "wolf-like habits" of Italian diplomacy.
5. M. Wight, *System of States*, London, 1977, p. 53 also p. 141.
6. The classic statement of this is in Philip de Comynes, *Mémoires*, Paris (n.d.), VI, pp. 198 - 199, "It is not very safe to have ambassadors coming and going so much because they often discuss evil things. But it is necessary to send and receive them...My advice is that it is both politer and safer that they be well treated and (that) wise and trusty servants....attend them. For by this means it is possible to find out who goes to see them and to prevent malcontents from taking them news....For every messenger or ambassador sent to me, I

would send two in return, and if the princes become bored with them and say that no more should be sent, I would still send them whenever I had the chance or the means. For no better or safer way is known of sending a spy who has the opportunity to observe and find things out. And if you send two or three people it is impossible to remain on guard so constantly that one or the other cannot have a few words, either secretly or otherwise with someone".

7. See Richard Langhorne, "Current Developments in Diplomacy", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8, 2, (1997), pp. 1 – 15.

8. See a newspaper article by Metternich justifying rather uncomfortably the summoning of the Congress of Vienna in d'Angeberg (L.J.B. Chodzko) *Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815*, I, pp. 362 – 364.

9. As early as 1805, William Pitt, Prime Minister of England spoke of "all the Calamities inflicted upon Europe since the disastrous era of the French Revolution". Memorandum on the Deliverance and Security of Europe, 19 January, 1805, printed in H.W.V.Temperley and L.M. Penson, *The Foundation of British Foreign Policy*, CUP, 1938, p. 18.

10. See Rousseau' s blistering description of this: "Il se forme de temps en temps parmi nous des especes des espèces de diètes generales sous le nom de congrès, où l'on s'assemble pour ne rien dire; où toutes les affaires publiques se traitent en particulier; of l'on delibère en commun si la table sera ronde ou careè, si la salle aura plus ou moins de portes, si un tel plenipotentiare aura la visage ou le dos tournè vers la fenêtre, si tel autre fera deux pouces de chemin de plus ou de moins dans une visite, et sur mille questions de pareille importance, inutilement agitèes depuis trois siècles, et tres dignes assurément d'occuper les politiques du nôtre. " quoted in E. Satow *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, London, 1922, p. 2.

11. Metternich, *Mémoires, Documents et Ecrits Divers, I*, Paris, 1879, pp. 175 – 176.

12. Castlereagh's own expectations were instructive: "One of the great difficulties which he expected to encounter in the approaching negotiations would arise from the want of an habitual confidential and free intercourse between the Ministers of the Great Powers as a *body*; and that many pretensions might be modified, asperities removed, and the causes of irritation anticipated and met by bringing the respective parties into unrestricted communications common to them all, and embracing in confidential and united discussions all the great points in which they were severally interested." C.K.Webster *The Foreign Policy of Lord Castlereagh*, London, 1931, I, p. 199.

13. For the Vienna Congress, see C.K. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna*, London, 1950.

14. E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty, 1814 - 1875*, London, 1875, p. 317.

15. The relevant text is in the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance which accompanied the Second Treaty of Paris of 20 November 1815. Clause 6 read: "To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, and to consolidate the connections which at the moment so closely unite the Four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their meetings at fixed periods for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe." Hertslet, I, p. 375.

The Yugoslav Diplomatic Service under Sanctions

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Sanctions not only destroy the economy of a country but also threaten the existence of its population. They adversely affect all the structures of the state and society, and render difficult, if not impossible, the normal operation of services, including the Foreign Service.

In the case of Yugoslavia, the situation which arose following the introduction of sanctions was made exceptionally complex by two additional negative circumstances: (a) the secession of four of the former Yugoslav Republics and the break-up of the Federal State including its Foreign Service, and (b) the fact that Security Council Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 contained provisions directly related to the diplomatic and consular missions of Yugoslavia.

As the four former Yugoslav Republics seceded, a great many officials and staff coming from these republics left the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic and consular missions. The Yugoslav system had ensured equal representation of the republics; thus, it should be noted that over 70 percent of Yugoslavia's ambassadors were from these four seceding republics. Because the republics seceded before the imposition of sanctions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and many of its diplomatic and consular missions were understaffed when the sanctions were instituted. Furthermore, the ministry was in a difficult state which was first reflected when some heads of the diplomatic and consular missions did not act upon instructions from headquarters. Instead, they blocked the operation of the missions, leaving the missions and joining the Foreign Services of the newly formed states. After this shock it took a long time for Yugoslav diplomacy to restructure and prepare for the tasks facing it in a new, changed environment.

In addition to economic sanctions and sanctions on transport, paragraph 8 of the Security Council Resolution imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia also stipulated that "all states shall:

- reduce the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
- take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events in their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
- suspend scientific and technical co-operation and cultural exchanges and visits involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."

Paragraph 8(a) was interpreted and enforced differently by individual countries. A great many of them recalled their ambassadors from Yugoslavia and insisted on Yugoslavia recalling its ambassadors. A number of countries neither recalled their ambassadors nor requested Yugoslavia to recall its ambassadors. During sanctions Yugoslavia had no heads of missions with the rank of ambassador, both as a result of the enforced sanctions on the reduction of staff in the missions, and even more, because ambassadors from the republics which had declared their independence left Yugoslavia.

While the sanctions were in place, there were only a few instances of accreditation of Yugoslav ambassadors in foreign countries, as the arrival of new Yugoslav ambassadors was not acceptable to most countries. A number of countries promised to give agreement for and to receive Yugoslav ambassadors. In fact, several Yugoslav ambassadors left to take up their duties in those countries (Indonesia, Tanzania, Israel) but after waiting in vain for months to present their credentials, were eventually forced to return to Yugoslavia.

The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, strictly abiding by its established rule of a four-year term of office for diplomatic staff, recalled its ambassadors from a number of important countries, but, due to the sanctions and the lack of will on the part of receiving states, was prevented from posting new ambassadors in those countries. As a consequence, for no serious reasons Yugoslavia was deprived of the opportunity to be represented at the ambassadorial level in those states. This situation could not be rectified until the total lifting of the sanctions.

Some states simply applied paragraph 8 of the Security Council Resolution to reduce the level of staff at Yugoslav diplomatic missions, which, in turn, had an adverse effect on the conditions of work of Yugoslav diplomacy. However, a number of countries enforced both the reduction of staff and the recall of ambassadors. The United Nations Secretariat insisted on reduction of the level of representation at the Yugoslav Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York and to the United Nations Office at Geneva. The permanent representative or the head of mission was replaced in both cases by an ambassador/charge d'affaires ad interim.

As far as consular posts were concerned, the majority of foreign states did not insist on a reduction of level of staff. Thus, all consuls-general continued to perform their duties except for those who completed their terms and were transferred back to Yugoslavia. However, during the sanctions no new consuls-general received exequatur or were accepted in that capacity.

The Yugoslav government made a serious error of judgement in this area at the time of the secession of the former Yugoslav Republics and immediately prior to the imposition of sanctions by the UN. The government temporarily suspended the operation of several consulates, mostly in Europe, which it could not reactivate without the consent of the receiving states. These states were unwilling to give consent while sanctions were in place.

In pursuance of paragraph 8 of the Security Council Resolution, the most radical measures, in excess of the specific measures detailed in the resolution, were taken by the governments of Malaysia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada. The governments of Malaysia and New Zealand actually ordered the closing of Yugoslav missions in their states and broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. Malaysia went so far as to impose a general ban on the entry of Yugoslav citizens to Malaysia. New Zealand prevented the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs from taking over the records of the Yugoslav Embassy in Wellington.

The United States and Canada, as well as reducing the staff of the Yugoslav Embassies in Washington D.C. and Ottawa, ordered the closing down of all Yugoslav consulates in their territories. A particularly difficult situation arose in the United States, where Yugoslavia had several consulates-general because of the size of the United States and the many consular problems there. The burden of these problems fell entirely on the shoulders of the Washington D.C. Embassy Consular Section, which also had reduced staff. In the space of a couple of days all Yugoslav consulates had to shut down and their staff had to leave the United States.

It was not just the recall of ambassadors and the reduction of staff at diplomatic missions that prevented the normal work of Yugoslav diplomacy. Other conditions contributed considerably to deterioration. Demonization of Yugoslavia and the Serb people contributed, above all, to the tarnished reputation of the country of Yugoslavia and of its representatives. A number of countries undertook a series of unprecedented measures of isolation and discrimination against Yugoslav diplomatic staff, diplomatic missions and consular posts. These measures,

inter alia, included the practice of not inviting Yugoslav diplomatic and consular staff to various functions and meetings for the diplomatic and consular corps, refusal by the authorities of receiving states to have contacts with Yugoslav diplomats, and limiting possibilities of contact even within the Foreign Ministry of the receiving state to a lower level. In some other states, despite the maintenance of diplomatic relations and the continued operation of diplomatic missions on reciprocal basis (the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, etc.), embassies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were removed from diplomatic lists under the section for "embassies" and listed under "other representations." Problems were encountered by the staff of Yugoslav missions regarding the issue of their ID cards. Because of these measures the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided in 1994 to retaliate against these states and finally to assure the authors of these "solutions" that playing with diplomatic law cannot benefit any side.

Some states or their Foreign Ministries and diplomatic or consular missions, in their official correspondence with Yugoslav authorities, began to avoid the usual rules and formulas of diplomatic communication, resulting in further tensions and emotional attitudes taking an unnecessary and extremely negative direction. Some of this communication ceased when the Yugoslav authorities started simply ignoring the requests addressed by foreign missions in such a highly non-diplomatic manner. They openly refused to deal with these requests, especially concerning issues essential to diplomatic missions and their staff.

Representatives of some states having embassies in Belgrade went so far as to claim that they did not recognise Yugoslavia as such, and that such a state did not exist for them. This proposition was officially supported and evidenced also by decisions of the courts and other authorities from these countries. It is interesting to note that the majority of these states were the first to send ambassadors to Belgrade immediately after sanctions against Yugoslavia were lifted, and have accepted the appointments of Yugoslav ambassadors in their territories. Is this a tardy admission of a mistake made, an apology, or an attempt to forget unusually arrogant behaviour for the sake of common interests?

It should be noted that despite the sanctions, Yugoslav missions and Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in a number of countries enjoyed normal conditions of life and work and were not discriminated against or ignored in any way, as they were in the above-mentioned countries. However, they too, both in personal life and especially in their work, felt the same serious effects of sanctions as the entire Yugoslav diplomatic network world-wide.

Some of these serious effects include the banning of communications, particularly air services with Yugoslavia, and suspension of payments transactions. These measures severely affected the operations of a service which depends on mobility and extensive contacts with the world. The most drastic example of this disadvantage was failure by the Yugoslav delegation to attend an important hearing before the International Court of Justice, which was not scheduled ahead of time. Therefore, Yugoslavia was represented at the hearing only by its charge d'affaires in The Hague and by a legal representative from Jerusalem who was able to arrive in The Hague within twenty-four hours, which the Yugoslav delegation could not.

A specific additional obstacle was presented by the visa regimes introduced by many countries immediately after sanctions were imposed and while they were in place. They suspended bilateral conventions with Yugoslavia on the abolition of visas and slowed down or made more complicated processing of entry visas for Yugoslav citizens.

Except for contacts between the Foreign Ministry and foreign missions in Belgrade and the receiving states - which were, as already pointed out, reduced to a minimum in many countries - Yugoslavia had few opportunities to take advantage of special missions while sanctions remained in force. Yugoslav delegations were reluctantly received in a number of countries, while few delegations from abroad came to Yugoslavia. The exceptions were the various international organisations involved in the solution of the Yugoslav crisis.

In 1992-93, the president of Yugoslavia authorised so-called "special representatives" in a few European countries; representatives who acted alongside and in parallel with the diplomatic missions of Yugoslavia. They were eminent public figures, academicians and university professors of high standing in the receiving states. Their performance in public relations and contacts with the authorities were sometimes much better than that of ordinary diplomatic representatives. While the contributions of special representatives in France, and Germany in particular, were rather modest, primarily due to resentment and a less co-operative attitude by the Foreign Ministries and governments of these countries, the special representative in Rome managed, in co-operation with the Yugoslav Embassy there, to arrange a Yugoslav-Italian meeting at the highest level. Of course, this achievement was also the result of a much better understanding on the Italian side for the problems faced by a neighbouring country and of a much less formal approach by Italy to a country under sanctions.

Incidentally, Western European countries were highly restrictive in their contacts with officials from Yugoslavia, including officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, the British Foreign Office refused to meet even informally with a Yugoslav assistant foreign minister on a private visit to London. The same thing happened in Germany, where the prime minister of a provincial government refused to see a Yugoslav official of the same rank during his visit (allegedly, on instructions from the German Foreign Ministry). At the same time, however, the Foreign Ministries of Germany, France and Austria accepted even official visits from Yugoslav assistant foreign ministers in charge of consular affairs.

During the application of sanctions, Yugoslavia and its Foreign Service made a number of very useful contacts with members of Parliaments of some countries, the very same countries whose governments had a restrictive attitude towards Yugoslavia. (That national Parliaments had a much greater understanding for Yugoslavia than their governments is demonstrated by the fact that unlike the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, except for a few major attempts by some countries to deny it, has explicitly recognised the continuity of Yugoslavia.)

By preventing Yugoslavia and Yugoslav diplomacy from participating in the work of international organisations, including suspension from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, General Assembly Resolution 47/1 totally isolated Yugoslavia from an important process in international relations. Considering that only two states have gone so far as to sever diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, the recall of ambassadors and reduction of the diplomatic staff in a number of countries have not had such a bad effect on Yugoslav diplomacy as its isolation in international organisations. To make matters worse, Yugoslav representatives were not even allowed to attend meetings scheduled to discuss their own country. Although this measure was regarded in those organisations more as a punishment than as a legitimate statutory decision, removal of a member country from an organisation surely cannot be productive for any of the countries involved. Hence, the dialogue between Yugoslavia and these organisations sometimes resembles the dialogue of the deaf.

Although it has been two years since sanctions were lifted, Yugoslavia has not yet been reintegrated into the international community. Specifically, Yugoslavia has not yet been enabled to participate in international organisations, universal or regional. In fact, sanctions remain in place in the form of a "outer wall" of sanctions, on which there is no formal decision but the consequences of which are unambiguous and tangible.

One of the results of such a policy is the radicalisation of public opinion in Yugoslavia, i.e., a marked rise in support for political parties interpreting UN measures as a conspiracy against Yugoslavia and concluding that Yugoslavia has no place in such an organisation. This is best illustrated by the results of the two rounds of presidential elections in Serbia in December 1997. The causes of these election results should be sought also in the way in which sanctions were introduced and extended, as well as in their very nature and purpose. Sanctions affect the masses and often produce precisely opposite effects from those intended. Damage is also done to neighbouring and other countries through the interrupted flow of economic traffic.

The various levels of enforcement of sanctions and co-operation with the UN Sanctions Committee have demonstrated that even the specific items detailed in the relevant Security Council Resolutions were implemented in ways dictated by the political and economic interests of the countries sitting on the committee. There is a separate committee at the UN for each country under embargo and each of these committees has its own rules of procedure and policy. However, this is not the time or place to discuss the inconsistency of the UN Sanctions Committee on Yugoslavia in implementing the Security Council Resolutions, the unwieldy procedure, the delays and the refusal to grant authorisations in even the most urgent humanitarian cases. Suffice it to mention the examples of the prohibition of the import of heating gas and the refusal to allow the transport of oxygen for a hospital, on account of which a dozen prematurely born babies died.

Yugoslav diplomacy had contact with the Sanctions Committee only through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. However, in view of the fact that applications, as a rule, were made directly to the Committee by the importing country, the experiences Yugoslavia gained in that context cannot be viewed as positive.

There is another type of sanctions which were not described in any Security Council Resolutions but which Yugoslav diplomacy experienced as a major impediment to its normal work. That was the ignoring and denying of the rights of Yugoslavia as a state, party to a number of international multilateral agreements. Regardless of the fact that the UN Secretariat and the depositories of these treaties consider Yugoslavia to be a full party to the treaties, Yugoslavia was prevented on several occasions from participating in the review conferences of the party states envisaged under these treaties. Oddly enough, the treaties are the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and international human rights covenants, treaties in the acceptance and implementation of which the international community is vitally interested.

The activities of every foreign service is determined by internal developments, its policy and by its international position. This is true of the Yugoslav Foreign Service in general and during the application of sanctions in particular. Were its activities so targeted as to achieve optimum effect under the given circumstances, or was there room for even more intensified and flexible forms of activity? Were all possibilities offered by the regular diplomatic channels, although limited and reduced during the time of sanctions, fully utilised? Or should informal contacts and co-operation have been more used, including greater use of para-diplomacy? These questions all deserve an in-depth analysis.

It would be incorrect to say that all opportunities were optimally used. In particular, the recall of some ambassadors for formal reasons only and the failure to appoint heads of missions and to fill vacancies at the missions in the countries where it was possible, were ill-considered. The opportunity was missed to better equip the diplomatic network for the critical period of sanctions and isolation of the country.

It is generally known that in the media war which followed the Yugoslav crisis, Yugoslavia and its diplomacy were the weaker and less organised side, even though the struggle for the hearts and minds of the public, especially at such a critical time, was one of the most important tasks and most decisive factors. While in the media the Yugoslav effort was weak, the contribution of Yugoslav diplomacy to the efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, at general stabilisation in the region and, therefore, at a formal lifting of sanctions, is more evident, particularly in light of the obstacles and restrictions it had to overcome.

Very soon after the lifting of sanctions, Yugoslavia has succeeded in fully normalising relations with most countries of the world, and in a very short span of time the number of ambassadors accredited in Belgrade has risen sharply. The same is true of Yugoslav ambassadors, although the number of their accreditations is slightly smaller, solely because of hesitation on the Yugoslav part. However, re-integration of Yugoslavia into international organisations and the so-called "outer wall" of sanctions still remain a problem facing Yugoslavia's Foreign Service and also Yugoslavia as a whole.

Current Developments In South African Diplomacy

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Abstract

South Africa underwent historic and radical change both in its domestic political and social structures and in its objective and perceived role and position in the world since the beginning of the nineteen-nineties. These changes have been reflected in South African external relations and in the conduct of South African diplomacy. The country has made an impressive transition from one of the most isolated in contemporary history to a fully integrated member of the international community conducting what its foreign policy makers term a "universal foreign policy." The conduct of South African diplomacy has also been changed in many ways: whereas it was previously an interesting case study of "pariah diplomacy," it has now become more conventional though no less interesting. In the interim between the historic February 1990 speech by President De Klerk and the April 1994 democratic elections and the coming to power of the ANC led government under President Mandela, changes were already beginning to occur. However, the more thorough-going changes would come after May 1994. The situation more than three years hence remains dynamic. Current developments, as the new South Africa adapts to an ever-changing regional, continental and global environment, are reviewed against the background of the historic situation and of the evolution of diplomacy world-wide.

Introduction

The historic and radical changes which South Africa underwent since the beginning of the nineteen-nineties both in its domestic political and social structures and in its objective and perceived role and position in the world, have been well-documented by now, as have the radical changes in the international arena which accompanied the end of the Cold War. The practice of diplomacy has been evolving world-wide in response to the latter changes. Current developments in the conduct of South African diplomacy are shaped by all of these, domestic and international. South African diplomacy remains dynamic and will continue to evolve and adapt.

There is a particularly sharp contrast between pre-political transition and post-political transition South African diplomacy. This has been explored elsewhere⁽¹⁾ and may be summarised here: the "old" South African diplomacy had been secret and low-key, the "new" is characterised by summitry and a powerful role for the head of state; the "old" had particular difficulties in Africa and Southern Africa and interaction with the region was often characterised by the use of force, whereas the "new" has a strong regional focus, with "preventive diplomacy" as an innovative feature; the "old" was primarily bilateral, whereas the "new" has a very strong emphasis on the multilateral. In addition, one could also mention that the "new" South African diplomacy was heralded by a rapid extension of formal relations and representation abroad for a country which had formerly been the most isolated in modern times. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Service have also been made more inclusive of all sections of South African society and a greater role for parliament and public opinion in foreign policy making has been emphasised. It has been accepted that a great measure of openness and transparency in foreign affairs should be the goal. Nowadays there

is hardly the same need for various forms of "unconventional diplomacy" as in the old days, as the "new" South Africa has few enemies. However, this has not prevented some innovation in diplomacy; South African diplomacy is in many ways subject to special tensions and these can manifest, amongst other things, in innovativeness. Herein will lie its contribution to modern diplomacy, which is by nature continuously evolving in response to the needs of the times⁽²⁾ and is in the final instance shaped by all participating in it.

In this paper current South African diplomacy is reviewed against the background of the historic situation and of the evolution of diplomacy world-wide. The following will be looked at briefly: current developments in South African foreign policy, some issues and incidents and how these impact on the way in which South Africa communicates with the rest of the world, i.e., South African diplomacy; current developments in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, its structure, problems encountered, personalities involved and including the deployment of South African missions abroad; the use of direct communications and technology; official visits abroad as well as visitors to South Africa, with special emphasis on summitry; South Africa's increasing involvement in international organisations, conferences and agreements and the implications of this for South African diplomacy. The paper will conclude with some remarks regarding the future of South African diplomacy.

Current Developments in South African Foreign Policy: Some Issues and Incidents

Olivier and Geldenhuys described the evolution of South African foreign policy as follows:

For symbolic and political reasons, the South African foreign policy continuum, which existed since autonomy from British rule, had to come to an end with the accession of the new ANC-dominated Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1994. The old regime's foreign policy and culture had to make way for political legitimacy defined by the ANC's vastly different political philosophy, external experience, constituency, and priorities.⁽³⁾

A radical ideologically driven foreign policy was probably prevented by the necessity of adaptation to the new post-Cold War world environment, a change which took place almost in tandem with South Africa's domestic transformation and implied a far more complex external environment.⁽⁴⁾ However, the new government did bring about important philosophical shifts and many changes in emphasis and priorities: the old regime was "philosophically right-wing oriented, uncompromisingly pro-Western, critical to the point of being hostile to the Third World and its causes, and sceptical about universal liberal ideals such as human rights and gender issues."⁽⁵⁾ The shift in policy implied that priority would now be given to the African continent and in particular Southern Africa, to the southern hemisphere, the Non-Aligned Movement, and to universal moral and humanitarian issues.⁽⁶⁾ This had a substantial impact on the frequency and nature of contacts between South African leaders and their counterparts in the areas of priority, and on South African involvement in international organisations, conferences and agreements.

A lively debate has been taking place amongst academics and other observers of South African foreign policy regarding how consistent and substantial support for universal liberal ideals and human rights has actually been and the broad consensus seems to be that, although the rhetoric is still there, actual practice has shown that the new South African government may be influenced quite substantially by old friendships on the one hand and pragmatism on the other.⁽⁷⁾ The pragmatism has probably been brought on by economic imperatives as well as some rather disappointing failures in foreign policy (or diplomacy?). A case in point is the Nigerian case where President Mandela's strong stance and attempt to get support for strong action against the Nigerian regime after the hanging of the political dissidents, came to nothing and turned into a loss of face. There is no room here to go into the debate, the merits of the "broad consensus" mentioned or the question what South African should be doing with regard to its "human rights foreign policy." The important issue here is how South African foreign policy, such as it is, has shaped her diplomacy. As will

become clear below, policy and implementation (diplomacy) have in some cases been mutually influential.

Foreign policy issue areas in which the new South Africa has made special efforts and has had some considerable success, have included non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons, including land-mines. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa's policy of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control forms an integral part of its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.⁽⁸⁾ The primary goal of this policy is to reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional arms fields and in implementing it high priority is given to nuclear, chemical, biological, missile delivery systems non-proliferation, conventional arms export control, small arms non-proliferation as well as working towards a ban on anti-personnel landmines.⁽⁹⁾ According to a document on this aspect of policy,⁽¹⁰⁾ South Africa is generally accepted by countries from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as well as the developing world, especially the Nuclear Weapons States, as a leader in the field. South Africa is seen as having the standing and the capacity to promote dialogue and interaction between the developed world on the one hand, while on the other, address the concerns of the developing world that they do not acquire the technology they need for their development. The South African government, therefore, supports all bilateral and multilateral initiatives to prevent the proliferation and development of such weapons on the one hand and to promote total disarmament of these weapons on the other.

South Africa's strong stance in the area of disarmament and arms control has not meant that it ceased to function as an arms trader; as has been mentioned it merely implied that it would act as a "responsible arms trader." The sale of arms is, therefore, supposed to take place according to a fixed set of criteria.⁽¹¹⁾ However, the application of these criteria and the resulting decisions about whom to sell to, may not necessarily correspond with what others, notably the United States (US), would want to see happen. This has resulted in some diplomatic difficulties for South Africa, as in the case of the leaking of information on the possible sale of arms to Syria and the resultant tension in relations with the US.⁽¹²⁾

As far as the impact of the shift in foreign policy on bilateral relations was concerned, it was more a question of adding than changing.⁽¹³⁾ The old South Africa was very isolated and even ties with the Western countries were restricted. Immediately after the 1990 De Klerk speech, which heralded real political change in South Africa and started the country on the road to regaining respectability in the international community, existing ties were beginning to be restored to normal and some new ties (such as with Eastern Europe, due to changes there) were being forged.⁽¹⁴⁾ After 1994, the new government did not bring about changes in a zero-sum fashion.⁽¹⁵⁾ Relations with the West were not downgraded - in fact, in some ways these relations have been raised to "a higher plateau than previously."⁽¹⁶⁾ However, many new ties were forged, including the cementing of relations with countries formerly known for their animosity toward Pretoria and including some so-called pariah states. Most African states (including the "pariah" Libya), India, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Mexico and Cuba, are examples of the new additions.⁽¹⁷⁾ This "universal foreign policy" made necessary a vast extension of South African diplomatic communications (permanent and ad hoc). However, resource and other constraints (such as the lack of sufficiently trained and experienced personnel) and special circumstances in individual cases, resulted in some difficulties. In addition, relations with the "pariahs" have put a strain on South Africa's relations with the United States, necessitating some diplomatic manoeuvring.⁽¹⁸⁾

The much debated and analysed love/hate triangle between South Africa, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China/Taiwan, is another interesting foreign policy and diplomatic case study.⁽¹⁹⁾ It took the new South African government quite some time to finally make a decision on the issue: prior to the political change in South African diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level had been maintained with Taiwan and this was retained after 1994. In the meantime a "special type" of diplomatic representation was exchanged with the PRC. At the end of 1996 the decision was finally made to opt for full

diplomatic relations with the latter and to downscale relations with Taiwan. At the end of 1997 this came into effect and the special type of representation was now in place for Taiwan.[\(20\)](#)

Current Developments in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs: Structure, Problems and Personalities

Reorganisation and restructuring are not new to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA): since its establishment in 1927 it had continuously been adjusted to changing circumstances and perceptions about the best way to organise it.[\(21\)](#) In summary, by the late 1980's the DFA closely reflected South Africa's unique position and the country's perception thereof. It was basically organised along geographic lines and it was quite noticeable, therefore, that some regions of the world were hardly regarded as worth much concerted effort, that international organisations generally got rather limited attention, and that those who organised the Department did not think in terms of global issues. Of course, South Africa could not always choose to have relations with foreign countries, as it was actively isolated by many. The TBVC states (the "independent" homeland created by South Africa, but recognised by none except South Africa and each other) occupied a relatively large number of people in the Department.[\(22\)](#)

Immediately after 1990, some changes began to occur in the Department, one of which was the "upgrading" of multilateral affairs from a directorate to a chief directorate (1991). However, it was still housed within the Branch: Overseas Countries and the range of issues reflected in its structure was not yet as extensive as it is today.[\(23\)](#) By March 1992 there was a complete Multilateral Affairs division, separate from the Branch: Overseas Countries and gradually the range of issues provided for were being extended.[\(24\)](#) Other changes were also being effected to provide for new ties being forged: Eastern Europe, which had previously been conspicuously absent from the organisational chart of the DFA, appeared early on and the Africa Branch had shown considerable growth.[\(25\)](#) Other more subtle changes were that a greater awareness of the different countries in, for example, Asia was manifest from the structuring of the section responsible for relations with that part of the world, and the fact that, at that time, the Middle East was apparently increasingly seen as part of Africa.[\(26\)](#)

After the political transition of 1994, the political map of South Africa changed and the TBVC "states" were "reincorporated" into South Africa and "disappeared" from the organisational chart of the DFA. The way in which the various sections of the Department were listed, also seemed to suggest a shift in emphasis: Branch: Africa was listed before Branch: Overseas Countries, the Multilateral section was listed before any bilateral sections and within branches where multilateral sections were also included, the latter were listed before the bilateral component.[\(27\)](#) Perhaps one should not make too much of this; however, what other feasible explanation can one think of except a change of perception, albeit unconscious? Fact is that multilateral relations remained a growth area and the relevant section of the DFA was further expanded and diversified.[\(28\)](#) By early 1996 the Multilateral Branch, taken together with the division of Branch: Africa and the Middle East which concerned itself with multilateral relations, almost balanced those sections of the DFA burdened with bilateral relations.[\(29\)](#)

Reference has already been made to the fact that the new government did not follow a "zero-sum" foreign policy, but rather a "universal" one, which implied that ties with Western countries were not downgraded at the expense of the forging of new ties with countries which had distanced themselves entirely from the old South African regime. This approach was reflected in the fact that ample provision which was still made at head office for relations with North America and (Western) Europe, in spite of all the new additions, such as Africa, Asia and the Far East.[\(30\)](#)

Towards the end of 1997 an organisational chart of the DFA listed five Branches (Bilateral Relations (Africa); Bilateral relations (Americas & Europe); Bilateral Relations (Asia & Middle East); Multilateral Relations; Administration. Also listed were two Chief Directorates (Legal Affairs and Corporate Liaison) and a Sub-Directorate (Work Study) independent of the

branches.⁽³¹⁾ Effective from 1 December 1997, a Democratic Transformation section was also added.⁽³²⁾

The breakdown of these divisions, when looked at in detail, amply illustrates the extension of South Africa's foreign relations to include all regions of the world, many functional aspects and a great intensity of interaction.⁽³³⁾ However, this is not a static picture. Budgetary problems will probably prevent too much further extension, but will hopefully not cause shrinkage. The organisational chart of the Department is, as in the past, continuously changing in its detail. A prime example of this is the change which was effected in the Multilateral Branch in January 1998 and which entailed the scrapping of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) Sub-directorate as a subsection of the Directorate ASAS, NAM and the Commonwealth - which in turn had formed part of the Chief Directorate: Multilateral Political and Security Affairs - and replacing it with a separate Chief-Directorate of Branch: Multilateral Relations.⁽³⁴⁾ This was, of course, directly due to the capacity required in South Africa to organise the NAM Summit in 1998 and also to support the Chairmanship of the Movement thereafter.

The DFA's capacity to handle the many and varied challenges resulting from the extension of the country's relations with the external world, has been sorely taxed. The Department has had to deal with the challenges of the process of integration of six different "diplomatic services" - those of South Africa, the four TBVC "states," and the ANC's "foreign service" - all of which came with different levels of training and experience and, of course, with often divergent perceptions of the world and the role South Africa should play in it.⁽³⁵⁾ All of this had to be dealt with at the same time as the DFA was subject to very serious budgetary constraints due to the great need for funds to get the Reconstruction and Development Programme off the ground. The DFA is also subject to constant criticism and is often in the news due to rumours and accusations about appointments, the ineffectiveness of the Minister and his possible replacement, and the stepping down of and successor for the Director-General, Mr. Rusty Evans - who had stayed on after 1994.⁽³⁶⁾ After months of speculation about when Mr. Evans would vacate his post, where he would go and who would succeed him, the Director-General finally retired towards the end of 1997 and he has been temporarily replaced by one of the Deputy Directors General in the DFA, Ms. Thuthu Mazibuko.⁽³⁷⁾ It is now rumoured that a permanent appointment may soon be under way in the person of Mr. Jackie Selebi, currently Ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

South Africa's overseas missions grew quite spectacularly from 1990 onwards: in 1990 South Africa had representation in only thirty states and by 1997 this had grown to 160 states.⁽³⁸⁾ This meant ninety-six missions, including a mission accredited to the Palestine National Authority and located at Ramallah on the West Bank, and five multilateral missions: New York (United Nations), Geneva (United Nations), Addis Ababa (OAU), Brussels (European Communities, including the European Union) and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency).⁽³⁹⁾ The ninety bilateral missions were made up of twenty-four in Africa,⁽⁴⁰⁾ forty-five in America and Europe,⁽⁴¹⁾ and twenty-one in Asia and the Middle East.⁽⁴²⁾ Many of these bilateral missions are actually accredited to more than one country, which accounts for the 160 countries South Africa is represented in.⁽⁴³⁾ This is in very many cases a cost saving practice and certainly not uncommon. The result is that South Africa has been able to establish representation (including diplomatic and consular representation) in all but twenty-two states in the world, "a number that includes some very small states and none of major significance to SA, except Iraq."⁽⁴⁴⁾ This number also includes some potential trouble spots, such as North Korea and Haiti, several Pacific island states, three African countries (Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone), and some central American states, including El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.⁽⁴⁵⁾

South African representation abroad is a good illustration of the country's "universal foreign policy" though it is clear that economic pragmatism weighs heavily in the allocation of missions abroad. According to the DFA, the expansion process has been slowing since 1995 and is now all but over.⁽⁴⁶⁾ There is no doubt that financial considerations play an important role in this, though it is not necessarily the only consideration. South Africa is now facing some new dilemmas, including the problem that there is not full reciprocity in the country's

foreign representation: there are a number of countries maintaining a presence in South Africa despite the fact that South Africa has no representation in those countries, and there is also not full reciprocity as to the status of representation.(47) In addition there is great disparity in residential and non-residential representation.(48) Of course, reciprocity is not an absolute rule in diplomacy, but too great a disparity could well be cause for growing irritation in the long run. Only time will tell whether South Africa will address the problem by increasing its overseas representation or whether some other countries will in due course end their representation in South Africa due to the disparity.

In answer to budgetary pressures, it was reported in the press in early 1997, South Africa was keen to discuss sharing resources with other SADC countries, possibly by accrediting South African representatives to the embassies of other countries in exchange for allowing representatives of SADC countries to share South Africa's resources.(49) However, nothing has apparently as yet come of these plans of sharing missions as a moneysaving idea. The idea may be taken up again in future.

With regard to permanent foreign representation, mention should in conclusion be made of the nature of the missions exchanged between South Africa and the two Chinas. As was explained before, the new South Africa initially continued diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with Taiwan - a "left-over" of the old South Africa. However, in 1991 an informal representation agreement was concluded with the PRC and in March 1992 informal offices were established in the form of a *South African Centre for Chinese Studies* in Beijing and a *Centre for South African Studies* in Pretoria.(50) From 1 January 1998 South Africa and Beijing exchanged embassies and the respective missions in Taiwan and South Africa have been downgraded to a liaison office. Initially it had been hoped, (by Taiwan in particular) that relations could be maintained at a level just short of diplomatic relations. However, Beijing had consistently exerted pressure on South Africa in this regard and Taiwan got rather less than it had hoped for.(51)

The Use of Direct Communication and Technology

The Nigerian debacle in November 1995, when President Mandela made a call for strong action against the Nigerian regime at the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand, occurred after lengthy and ineffectual "quiet" diplomacy by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. However, the President had apparently not consulted directly with his regional neighbours prior to his scathing indictment of the Abacha regime and his call for sanctions on Nigeria. Up to then he had apparently been in the habit of doing so, often by telephone, and this included the successful 1994 diplomacy with regard to the "King's coup" in Lesotho.(52) The lack of support from his regional counterparts in the Nigerian case would seem to indicate that perhaps in this case he did not consult directly with them prior to his public action. Should this be the reason for failure in this case - rather than its being a case of foreign policy failure - this may illustrate very well the working of the so-called "Mandela magic" so often referred to.(53) In the case of Nigeria then, a failure of diplomacy - strong action at a summit without prior direct consultation with other African leaders putting the "Mandela magic" to work - may well have led to change in policy - the subsequent weaker stand by South Africa on the issue.(54)

In addition to using the more conventional direct communications media, such as the telephone, the DFA has apparently also been working towards gearing themselves for the new technology, such as the electronic media. This may be deduced from the inclusion in the organisational chart of the Department, within the Branch: Administration, of a Directorate: Telematics and a Directorate: Information Technology.(55) Such sections were apparently not present in the Department in, for example, 1995.(56) The electronic medium is obviously intended for easier communications within the DFA (including communications with the missions). However, it could also be used for diplomacy as such and information technology is now getting increasing attention in this context. A DFA Website is envisaged for May/June 1998.

Visits and Visitors:

the Prominent Role of Summitry

Another manifestation of the awareness of the value of the "Mandela Magic" referred to above, is the great use to which summitry as a form of diplomacy is put by the new South Africa. Elsewhere this has been described as one of the main characteristics of the new South African diplomacy.⁽⁵⁷⁾ This form of diplomacy has been used in the implementation of many aspects of South African diplomacy, but probably most noticeably to further South Africa's economic interests (trying to put to work the "Mandela Magic"), to forge relations with countries in Africa and the rest of the Third World (underlining the importance of these relations by adding the symbolic value of diplomacy at the highest level), and in South Africa's role as regional agent for peace (which, of course, also implied the putting to work of "Mandela magic" in trying to bring about resolution of conflict). With regard to the latter aspect, it should be noted that expectations concerning the role South Africa could and should play in peacemaking and peacekeeping have been very high. Apart from noteworthy diplomatic initiatives - often at the level of head of state - in the case of Nigeria, Lesotho, the Great Lakes area, and Zaire, South Africa has been reluctant to don the mantle of peacekeeper and commit much resources other than the diplomatic to such issues. However, this could change in future.⁽⁵⁸⁾

According to one source, between them the President and Deputy President/s paid forty-six foreign visits in the period of eighteen months from January 1996 to June 1997.⁽⁵⁹⁾ These included both summit conferences (often relating to the region) and (bilateral) state visits. It is quite noticeable from the list that visits to important economic and trading powers in Europe and the US were the object of many of these; however, African countries also featured strongly. The latter category of visits included a number of Southern African summits, two OAU (Organisation of African Unity) summits, and visits by Deputy President Mbeki to Zaire and President Mandela to the Republic of Congo to meet with President Mobutu Sese Seko and Mr Kabila in an attempt to broker peace and a democratic transition. President Mandela also undertook a state visit, in February-March 1997, to the Phillipines, the Sultanate of Brunei, the Republic of Singapore and the Federation of Malaysia. The visit was - in the days prior to the economic crises in Asia - aimed at furthering the economic interests of South Africa.⁽⁶⁰⁾ According to press reports President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki paid at least another ten foreign visits later in 1997.⁽⁶¹⁾ President Mandela visited Indonesia in June 1997 to aid the peaceful solution of the East Timor question, visited Switzerland in September 1997, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Scotland (for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting) in October 1997, and Saudi Arabia in November 1997; and Deputy President Mbeki visited Algeria, Mali, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Germany and Austria, and Gabon, between July and November 1997. He also visited Germany to co-chair the inaugural meeting of the South African/German Binational Commission on 1 October 1997. Quite obviously the Deputy President carries the brunt of summitry at the present time.

At the level of head of state or government or deputy head of government, some eleven visits were paid to South Africa in the period February to November 1997, according to DFA media statements. These included visits from the King of Sweden, the presidents or vice-presidents of Finland, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Togo and Indonesia, and the prime ministers or deputy prime ministers of Singapore, Saudi Arabia and India.

Summit conferences and state visits are however not the only forms of ad hoc diplomacy employed by South Africa. Many visits, at many different levels, have been taking place, both of South Africans abroad and by foreigners to South Africa. Some were bilateral in nature and others multilateral, involving more than two parties at the same meeting. One source lists thirty-seven overseas visits for the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period January 1996 to April 1997 and this included visits to many African and European, as well as other countries.⁽⁶²⁾ In some of these cases the Minister accompanied the State President. These visits also included attendance at the funeral of the late King of Lesotho in January 1996, participation in the Joint Permanent Commission between Iran and South Africa, and in

the 51st Regular Session of the UN General Assembly. According to the same source the Deputy Minister paid eleven visits to foreign countries between May 1996 and April 1997 and these included visits to Ghana, Botswana, the United Kingdom (London), the US (Atlanta, Washington), Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Nigeria, India, Rwanda and Togo.⁽⁶³⁾ After April 1997 DFA media statements and/or the South African press also reported at least nine visits by the South African Foreign Minister and/or Deputy Foreign Minister to foreign countries including Pakistan, the UK, Indonesia and Thailand, Kenya, Swaziland, Ukraine, the US, Zimbabwe, and Canada. In July 1997 a delegation of 130 officials went to Washington to attend the fourth US/SA Binational Commission meeting - the Commission had been founded in 1994.⁽⁶⁴⁾ A December 1997 meeting to the US for Deputy Minister Pahad entailed leading a government delegation to hold discussions with the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs concerning the resolution of the (long standing) Armscor case.⁽⁶⁵⁾ This was aimed at normalising defence trade relations between the two countries.

There were also reports/media statements on a variety of official visits by foreigners to South Africa at levels lower than deputy president or deputy prime minister during 1997 and early 1998. These included visits from Portugal, Norway, Libya, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Australia, Mozambique, Thailand, Egypt, Algeria, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Indonesia, Iran, Zambia, Hungary, the Peoples Republic of China, Italy and Russia, as well as of officials representing various international organisations. It also included a visit by Zairean opposition leader Kabila in May 1997 - that is, before he became president - and by Indonesian opposition leaders in July 1997.

Given the expectation that international interactions will continue to increase in frequency and intensity and given the assumption that South Africa will not be marginalised, foreign visits to and from South Africa will probably increase even further in future. Depending on the diplomatic style of the future Head of State (probably Thabo Mbeki, after April 1999) and his deputy or deputies, this may also hold true for summitry. In the interim between now and the 1999 elections, President Mandela's health will doubtlessly be a factor in determining how many visits he will personally undertake, and the Deputy President will in all likelihood continue to make the more frequent contribution to South African summit diplomacy.

International Organisations, Conferences and Agreements: the Importance of Multilateralism

As was mentioned before, the Multilateral Branch of the DFA has become very prominent and active largely as a result of the shifts in South African foreign policy as well as the fact that South Africa is once more acceptable in international society and has joined a great many international organisations. This is a reflection of the importance attached to membership of international organisations, the demands of effective participation in international conferences, the need for the conclusion of many new agreements in a globalising world, and the special importance the new government attaches to certain issues (such as non-proliferation and disarmament). South Africa has concluded increasing numbers of international agreements,⁽⁶⁶⁾ many of them multilateral, and has in fact been called to positions of leadership in some important international fora. This includes the election of South Africa as Chairperson of SADC (Southern African Development Community) at its Summit in August 1996, a position the country will hold until 31 August 1999,⁽⁶⁷⁾ the chairing of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in April-May 1996, and the assumption of the UNCTAD presidency by South Africa's Trade and Industry Minister, as well as the hosting of the NAM Summit in the second half of 1998 and the assumption of the chair of the organisation by South Africa.⁽⁶⁸⁾ The country is also co-founder of some new international arrangements, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation.⁽⁶⁹⁾ South Africa is now participating in a vast number of international organisations on a regular basis.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The extensive involvement of the country in multilateral affairs is reflected in the Annual Report of the Multilateral Branch of the DFA, which was published for the first time in June

1996 and again in June 1997.⁽⁷¹⁾ The activities of this Branch of the Department revolve around at least five or six main functional areas: international economic affairs (including relations with the European Union, alignment with the Lomé Convention, South-South co-operation, multilateral development issues, UNCTAD, and the promotion of trade, investment and tourism); environmental, scientific and technical affairs (which includes such issue areas as conservation, marine, maritime and Antarctic affairs, liaison with some of the specialised agencies such as FAO, UNESCO and WHO, and even narcotics and crime prevention, and satellite telecommunication); disarmament and non-proliferation (which was explained in some detail as a prominent aspect of current South African foreign policy); political and security affairs (which includes liaison with and participation at the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth and, until the creation of a separate Chief Directorate for this purpose, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)); social affairs (which refer to human rights and humanitarian affairs and also include such issues as migration and humanitarian disaster relief assistance; and, until this was moved to Branch: Africa, regional development affairs (which focus mainly on SADC).

The report of the Multilateral Branch lists a variety of international commitments, involvements and responsibilities taken on by South Africa in the fields mentioned. All of this has not only meant greatly increased activity for South African officials, but also a vastly increased need for thorough knowledge about issues and procedures, the ability to communicate easily and effectively with the representatives of other participating countries and to report accurately and timeously on developments and results achieved. As the old South Africa was so thoroughly isolated from multilateral diplomacy in most areas, the country starts with a very serious lack of experience, skills and knowledge. This has been further depleted by the loss of some experienced people in the process of attempting to rectify the non-representativeness of the DFA as a whole. Though some affirmative appointments doubtless contributed to the pool of experience and skills, the ever-increasing needs in these areas are putting tremendous strain on the diplomatic ability of South Africa. Function-specific as well as diplomatic training are going a long way towards dealing with this, as well as frequent consultations with academics, experts and other members of civil society.⁽⁷²⁾ It seems to have almost become DFA practice to involve such "outsiders" in various aspects of the performance of its functions, such as the development of policy, the working out of some of the details of its implementation, and consultations with overseas visitors. In some ways this may be quite innovative and it certainly is a deviation from the past.

Concluding Remarks

Whether South Africa will find a special niche in the post-Cold War world will depend on many factors, not all of which are under its immediate control. The prevailing circumstances in the world will impact, but nevertheless it is relieved that South Africa is the author of its own destiny. It is in the area of foreign policy and diplomacy that the quest for a niche will occur.

According to one point of view the central problem to be solved by South Africa in the course of this search for a leadership role at the middle power level - which in essence seems to be implied by the term "diplomatic niche"⁽⁷³⁾ - is to unite the people of South Africa so that a common purpose can be pursued in foreign affairs.⁽⁷⁴⁾ It would be hard to differ and say that unity of purpose is *not* important. However, as the same analyst points out,⁽⁷⁵⁾ both "sides" - the "upstairs" and the "downstairs," or the old establishment and the newcomers (liberation movements) - brought a dowry into the marriage in the form of their own special bilateral relationships. This could be a great strength in South African diplomacy and should be used both at the governmental and non-governmental level, e.g., in second track diplomacy. The latter is a form of diplomacy which is not unknown in the South African context.⁽⁷⁶⁾ However, it is probably still under-utilised. As was pointed out before, consultation processes, making use of academics and experts outside of government in order to "add" knowledge and expertise to South African diplomacy, have become increasingly common. It is to be hoped that this practice will continue in order to help provide what is needed for effective participation in an increasingly complex world. Thorough training of professional diplomats is,

however, not unimportant either, and such persons should be retained for the foreign service in order to establish an ever-growing pool of experience in the DFA. These are all aspects of the "micro level" of diplomacy and essential if the country is to succeed at the international level.

In addition, consideration will have to be given to the choice of different forms of diplomacy and their combination; the wrong choice can have serious consequences, as the Nigerian debacle would illustrate. The question of what balance should be maintained between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has been raised;(77) summitry needs to be used judiciously; an appropriate role for technology in diplomacy will have to be found; the extent to which the nine provinces or regions in South Africa can be allowed to conduct their own foreign relations will have to be considered;(78) and, difficult choices will have to be made regarding emphasis on different regions. Prioritising in diplomacy seems unavoidable as the possibilities are almost endless, whereas the resources are really very limited. This is not a problem unique to South Africa.(79)

If prioritising in diplomacy is important, the same certainly holds true for foreign policy. This matter is much debated by academics(80) and quite clearly South Africa will not be able to actively pursue each and every worthy cause. With more and more going on in the world out there, South Africa will not be able to be everywhere at the same time and will equal effectiveness. The choices that are made here will, of course, feed back to South African diplomacy and interact with it to produce an outcome which will help determine South Africa's future role and position in the world.

If there is going to be an African Renaissance, it is fairly safe to assume that South Africa will not only be part of it, but probably one of the driving forces behind it. In an article entitled *Renaissance of African Diplomacy?* Vernon Seymour explores South Africa's leadership role in Africa since 1994.(81) He concludes that the new South African foreign policy establishment has "set in motion a refreshing policy direction that could charter a new course in African Diplomacy," having also pronounced as follows:

The South African government is no world-weary regime which has seen it all before, but a young, enthusiastic administration eager to display its talents and ideals. The government preaches the virtues of interdependence, co-operation and human values. It has realised that today's leaders need to be good diplomats who can balance domestic and international pressures, who can cut deals, make compromises, and resolve disputes, defining the interests of their states in congenial ways.

Everyone in South Africa should strive to prove this assessment right. The task in Africa - and elsewhere - is enormous; however, such a South Africa will go a long way to helping the African Renaissance happen.

NOTES

1. Marie Muller, "The Diplomacy of Reintegration: South Africa Back into the Fold," in Jan Melissen, ed., *Diplomatic Innovation*, London: Macmillan, 1998 (forthcoming).

2. See Jan Melissen's explanation how and why diplomacy is by nature dynamic and constantly evolving ("Diplomatie in de internationale statensamenleving," *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 51, No. 10, October 1997, pp. 534-541).

3. Gerrit Olivier & Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," *Business & the Contemporary World*, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1997, pp. 365-366.

4. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 366.

5. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 366.
6. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 366.
7. See for example: Greg Mills, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Year in Review," in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* 1997, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1997; Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism"; Hussein Solomon, ed., *Fairy God-mother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African Foreign Policy*, Halfway House: ISS Monograph Series, No. 13, May 1997.
8. *DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996* (MB1/97, June 1997), published by the Multilateral Co-ordination Centre of the Multilateral Branch of the DFA, p. 6.
9. *DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996*, p. 6.
10. Document compiled by the Directorate Non-proliferation and Disarmament (DNP), Department of Foreign Affairs, July 1997.
11. Details of the criteria and procedure involved, is summarised in the *Guide to the terms of reference of Conventional Arms Control in South Africa*, issued by the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control, Office of the Secretary for Defence, Pretoria, 01/05/1996. Also see Tyler Robinson & Jeffrey Boutwell, "South Africa's Arms Industry: A New Era of Democratic Accountability?" *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 599-618.
12. See *Sunday Times*, 19 January 1997, p. 6; Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," pp. 373-374.
13. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 366.
14. See Marie Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," in Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller, eds., *Change and South African External Relations*, Midrand: International Thomson Publishing, 1997, pp. 51-72, for an exploration of these changes. Also see Marie Muller, "South Africa's Changing External Relations," in Murray Faure & Jan-Erik Lane, eds., *South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions*, London: Sage, 1996, pp. 121-150 for a broad overview of the evolution of South Africa's external relations.
15. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 366.
16. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 367, cite actions of President Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, including the creation of a Binational Commission between the US and South Africa under the chairmanship of the two Vice Presidents and the starting of negotiations with the European Union on a free trade agreement and accession to the Lomé Convention, as proof of this.
17. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 366.
18. See Roland Henwood, "South African foreign policy and international practise-1997-an analysis," *South African Yearbook of International Law*, 1997, (Pretoria: VerLoren van

Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa) for a brief analysis of the issue relating to Libya.

19. See for example: SAIIA Research Group, eds., *South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs & Foundation of Global Dialogue, 1995; Greg Mills, "South Africa and the Two Chinas," in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1996*, pp. 165-171; Jean-Jacques Cornish, "New South Africa and China," in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, pp. 250-256; Henwood, "South African foreign policy and international practise-1997-an analysis."

20. See Henwood, "South African foreign policy and international practise-1997-an analysis." Also see the discussion of overseas missions below.

21. See Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," for a brief survey of these adjustments and changes.

22. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," p. 55.

23. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," pp. 55-56.

24. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," p. 56.

25. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," p. 57.

26. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," pp. 57-58.

27. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," p. 58.

28. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," p. 60.

29. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," p. 62.

30. Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions," pp. 59-60.

31. *Approved Organisational Structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs*, 29 September 1997.

32. *Approved Organisational Structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs*, 20 November 1997.

33. See the *Approved Organisational Structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs* as set out in various charts dated between September and December 1997 - hereafter referred to as "chart" or "charts."

34. See the chart dated 22 September 1997. The January 1998 change was conveyed to the author by two Foreign Service Officers in personal and telephonic conversations respectively.

35. For a more detailed discussion of the process, see Muller, "The Diplomacy of Reintegration: South Africa Back into the Fold"; Muller, "The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions."

36. See for example: *Die Burger*, 7 January 1997, p. 7; *Sunday Times*, 12 January 1997, p. 2; *Rapport*, 4 May 1997, p. 8; *Beeld*, 16 July 1997, p. 10; *Sowetan*, 8 August 1997, p. 2; *Rapport*, 17 August 1997, p. 7; *The Citizen*, 16 September 1997, p. 19; *Rapport*, 21 September 1997, p. 6; *The Sunday Independent*, 28 September 1997, p. 2.

37. *Beeld*, 15 May 1997, p. 15; *Saturday Star*, 13 September 1997, p. 2; *Sunday Tribune*, 9 November 1997, p. 14.

38. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 367.

39. Charts dated November-December 1997, as well as *Mission Address and Telephone List* of the DFA, 27 January 1997. According to the (Official) *South Africa Yearbook 1997*, (published by the South African Communication Service, Pretoria), p. 213, there is also a multilateral mission in Gaborone, accredited to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, this is not reflected in the Charts of late 1997.

40. In the sequence listed by the DFA: Ivory Coast, Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Zaire, Algeria, Botswana, Nigeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Lesotho, Morocco, Angola, Swaziland, Tunisia, Zambia, Kenya, Namibia (Walvis Bay) and Namibia (Windhoek).

41. In the sequence listed by the DFA: Greece, Germany (Bonn), Romania, Germany (Berlin), Brazil, Hungary, Switzerland, Slovak Republic, Argentina, US (Beverly Hills), Belgium, Venezuela, US (Chicago), Germany (Hamburg), Peru, Denmark, Cuba, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, UK, Germany (Frankfurt), Ukraine, Spain, France (Marseilles), Canada (Montreal), Norway, Mexico, Russian Federation, Canada (Ottawa), Italy (Milan), Germany (Munich), France (Paris), Uruguay, US (New York), Czech Republic, Italy (Rome), Sweden, US (Washington), Chile, Netherlands, Brazil, Canada (Toronto), Bulgaria, and Poland.

42. In the sequence listed by the DFA: United Arab Emirates, China (Beijing), Indonesia, Jordan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Kuwait, India (Bombay), Malaysia, Japan, India (New Delhi), Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, South Korea, and Iran.

43. According to a report in *Business Day* (13 January 1997, p. 1) South Africa has "accredited a nearby embassy to cover 44 countries." It is not mentioned which embassy this is, but it is very likely a mission in an African country.

44. *Business Day*, 13 January 1997, p. 1.

45. *Business Day*, 13 January 1997, p. 1.

46. *Business Day*, 13 January 1997, p. 1.

47. *Business Day*, 13 January 1997, p. 1. According to this report South Africa has 75 embassies or high commissions in foreign countries, while there are 96 embassies or high commissions in South Africa, and South Africa has consulates in 18 countries, but 57 countries have consulates in South Africa.

48. For a listing of the Foreign Representatives in South Africa, see: *South African Yearbook 1997*, pp. 205 & 210-213; *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, pp. 465-468; *Mission Address and Telephone List*, 27 January 1997.

49. *Business Day*, 10 January 1997, p. 1; 13 January 1997, p. 7; *Beeld*, 13 January 1997, p. 4.
50. Greg Mills, "South Africa and Asia: New opportunities, lessons and dilemmas," in Carlsnaes & Muller, *Change and South African External Relations*, p. 192; *Mission Address and Telephone List*, 27 January 1997, p. 23; *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, p. 465.
51. See, for example, *Beeld*, 24 October 1997, p. 17. *Media Statement* of the DFA, 22 December 1997.
52. See Denis Venter, "South Africa and Africa: Relations in a time of change," in Carlsnaes & Muller, *Change and South African External Relations*, pp. 88-95, for a more detailed discussion of these affairs.
53. See *The Citizen*, 24 June 1997, p. 14, where reference is made to a number of telephone conversations between President Mandela and British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, and to a "warm relationship" which has apparently developed between them as a result.
54. Henwood, "South African foreign policy and international practise-1997-an analysis."
55. See the charts dated 22 September and 8 October 1997.
56. See *Department of Foreign Affairs List*, July 1995
57. Muller, "The Diplomacy of Reintegration: South Africa Back into the Fold."
58. Olivier & Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism," p. 371.
59. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, pp. 468-469.
60. *Background Briefing on Mandela's State Visits*, issued by the Office of the President, 25 February 1997.
61. See *Media Statements* issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs, July to December 1997.
62. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, pp. 470-471.
63. *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, p. 471.
64. *The Citizen*, 25 July 1997, p. 15.
65. *Media Statement* by the DFA, 2 December 1997.
66. For a useful listing of the international agreements, bilateral and multilateral, entered into by South Africa, see the regular feature on Treaties in the *South African Yearbook of International Law*, as well as a similar feature in the Foreign Relations section of *South Africa Yearbook*.
67. *South Africa Yearbook 1997*, pp. 192-193.
68. *South Africa Yearbook 1997*, pp. 203-204. Mills, "South African Foreign Policy: The Year in Review," 1996, p. 6; Greg Mills, "South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement," in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, p. 160.

69. See *Media Statement* of the DFA, 3 March 1997. For a critical assessment of this new initiative, see Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, "A Sceptical view of South Africa within the IOR-ARC," *The South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 97-109.

70. See for example: the *DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996*; the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*; the Foreign Relations section in the *South Africa Yearbook*; and the regular feature on South African participation in international organisations in the *South African Yearbook of International Law*.

71. *DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1995* (MB1/96) & *DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996* (MB1/97). The 1997 Report, to be published in 1998 is unfortunately not available yet.

72. See *DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996*, p. 6.

73. See Andrew F. Cooper, ed., *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, London: Macmillan, Studies in Diplomacy, 1997. Also see Hussein Solomon's application of the concept "middle power leadership" to South Africa: "South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership," in Solomon, *Fairy God-mother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African Foreign Policy*, pp. 53-64.

74. Peter Vale, "South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs," in Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, p. 211.

75. Vale, "South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs," p. 211.

76. Businessmen, in particular, have been very active in South African economic diplomacy.

77. See for example Greg Mills, "South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement," in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997*, p. 165.

78. This is an aspect which could not be explored at all in this paper. However, some attention was given to it elsewhere: Muller, "The Foreign Ministry of South Africa: from isolation to integration to coherency," in Brian Hocking, ed., *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, London: Macmillan, 1998 (forthcoming).

79. See for example Richard Langhorne, "Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now?" *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 8, No. 2, July 1997, pp. 1-15.

80. As an example see Greg Mills, "Leaning all over the place? The not-so-new South Africa's Foreign Policy," in Solomon, *Fairy God-mother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African Foreign Policy*, pp. 19-34.

81. *Sapem (Southern African Political & Economic Monthly)*, Vol. 10, No. 7, April 1997, pp. 28-29.

The Role of the Legal Adviser in Modern Diplomatic Services

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Towards the end of the 1980s Yugoslavia started falling apart. At that time I was the chief legal adviser in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. One of the last out of many interesting and pleasant jobs I had in that capacity was, by the way, participation in the first conference organised by the CSCE on peaceful settlement of disputes, here in Malta at the beginning of 1991. A few months later it was obvious that the disintegration of the country was imminent, so I decided to leave Belgrade for my native city of Zagreb and accept the position of the first legal adviser in the newly created Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the newly independent Republic of Croatia.

Upon my arrival I had a long interview with Professor Šeparović' who was then foreign minister. He asked me many questions about myself and my background, my past work and working experience. In those circumstances of armed conflict and strong mistrust I found it quite normal. As the minister seemed satisfied with my replies, I decided to ask him one question, almost as *conditio sine qua non*. I said that in my previous job as chief legal adviser, I always had the privilege to openly speak my mind to my boss, the federal foreign minister, who sometimes took my advice, and sometimes not. That was his right, of course, but my right and even my duty was to give him my opinion straight. I emphasised that I considered this way of working essential not only for my functioning, but also as a condition for any normal diplomatic service. The minister agreed fully and we were in business.

Let me add that I took care to reproduce the elements of this conversation to all those who succeeded Professor Šeparović in the post of Croatian foreign minister. They all agreed verbally with me, but some seem to have forgotten it soon afterwards...

I have chosen this true story as an opener to my subject, because it brings us immediately to the very basic element of the role and the position of the legal adviser in any diplomatic service in the world. The legal adviser usually has a rather unique status in the structure and the organogram of the Foreign Ministry. Mostly, he is subordinated only to the minister himself and his deputy. Very often he is the head of the service (division, sector, bureau or whatever it might be called) of international legal affairs, treaties, *contentieux*, etc. Sometimes he enjoys even fuller freedom and is completely independent from any organisational framework: at the disposal of the whole Foreign Service for opinion and advice, but responsible only to the very top of the ministry. Most probably he would have a correspondent diplomatic title (usually that of an ambassador). Sometimes the legal adviser does not even come from the diplomatic service, but stems from a previous successful academic career (almost without exception that of an eminent professor of public international law). Such a solution obviously has the advantage of a more profound theoretical knowledge of international law, but also the disadvantage of the lack of operative skills and practical diplomatic experience. Some countries try to overcome this problem by employing two persons, associating the services of a distinguished scholar to that of a senior diplomat who has international law background. This seems to be quite a good combination.

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What is, actually, the real work of a legal adviser? What occupational activities consume his working day?

The first and most important duty of the legal adviser, obviously, is to *advise* his minister, sometimes the government, Parliament or even the head of state, of the existing international law in respect to a particular issue, problem or situation. The purpose is, of course, to give the proper legal framework in making appropriate foreign political decisions, so that the country's policy does not come in conflict with international law and the broad interests of the international community. It is significant that even countries and their leaders who bluntly break fundamental rules and principles of international law almost invariably make a considerable effort to wrap their acts in a legally presentable or at least justifiable form.

The second important part of the legal adviser's work is connected with the *conclusion of international treaties* and their *ratification*. He and his service must take care not only of the conformity of a new treaty with general rules of international law (particularly *ius cogens*, norms that cannot be altered or modified) and of his country's previously accepted legal commitments, but also of the legal-technical correctness and necessary precision of the text: clear and non-ambiguous formulation, appropriate final and transitory provisions, etc. In this context a special problem emerges in connection with various scheduled state visits: very often the treaty or legal division is put under pressure to finish the work on a draft agreement and prepare the text for signature "by Tuesday, 11:00 A.M.," because the visitor shall then call on such-and-such a high official and it would be an excellent opportunity to sign the treaty that has been dragging on so long. . . It happens so more often if the visit is lacking in real content and both sides are trying to find some justification for spending their tax-payers' money.

Very often the legal adviser *takes part in* (or heads) *the delegation of his country* to various bilateral or multilateral meetings: diplomatic conferences ranging from negotiations with a neighbouring state to the UN General Assembly sessions. He is also, through his function or in a personal capacity, *appointed to a number of domestic bodies* or *member of various international forums, boards, and commissions*. (If I may be excused for taking my own example, I am participating in the work of three or four Croatian national commissions, vice-president of the administrative board of the Regional Centre for Protection of the Mediterranean in Split, arbitrator to the European Tribunal for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the OSCE, member of the Council of Europe Committee of Legal Advisers - CAHDI, member of the Venice Commission "Democracy through Law," etc.).

The legal adviser sometimes has to *represent his government before the national courts* and sometimes *before international tribunals or arbitration commissions*. This is always a very difficult and delicate task, particularly if the country's position is precarious. It may well happen that such a situation occurs just because the legal adviser's opinion was not valued, or maybe was not even sought. Even in such a case he must do his best to defend his country's policy, in the same way a barrister has to scrupulously defend a murderer, although he may intimately strongly condemn the committed crime. The legal adviser, then, has an important role to play in the *adoption of internal laws of the country dealing with international legal obligations or laws that have a certain international element* (such as the law on conclusion and ratification of international agreements or the law on the protection of the rights of minorities).

Finally - and this may consume a great deal of the legal advisor's time - he should be ready to *give advice on practically any question or help to resolve any dilemma* put to him by any department or section of his own ministry or any other one, whether it has a connection with international law or not. This may particularly be the case with new countries where the majority of public servants still lack knowledge and experience. Outside of his official duties, but obviously connected with his job and experience, the legal adviser is frequently asked to *teach at universities at home and abroad, give lectures, and participate at scientific conferences* like this one. (Forgive me for being personal again - I teach regularly at the Croatian Diplomatic Academy, at the Faculty of Law and also at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, at the High Military-Diplomatic School of the Croatian Ministry of Defence,

and occasionally at one or another university abroad). In his free time (!?) the legal adviser is free to *write books, articles, give interviews to the press, or participate in public political and cultural life.* . .

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The institution of the legal adviser may itself not be particularly old, but the customary rules and norms, and indeed international law, have been known and more or less respected for ages. There have always been experts, specialists, or people of knowledge and wisdom who could advise of its existence and its requirements. What could be new and modern in such a long-established practice? Is there anything one should investigate in the framework of our subject of modern diplomacy?

First of all, there is an ever-growing tendency to democratisation, transparency, and "glasnost" of foreign policy: democratisation both internally, from the point of view of the population of the country, its tax-payers, and externally, from the point of view of the third countries, and the international community as a whole. Secret diplomacy is not dead, but its scope is very much reduced. Good and sound legal advice is, therefore, so much more sought and needed. Secondly, there are entire new areas of international law which need to be thoroughly studied, followed on a daily basis, and almost constantly translated into the domestic legal system. A good example of this is the continuous development of norms protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, rights of minorities, environmental law, communitarian law, etc. Such developments impose another important aspect on the work of a good legal adviser in a democratic, law-abiding country: that of contributing to the further development of international law. I shall quote my former British colleague Sir Arthur Watts who wrote very explicitly about it: "Since there is no legislature, it (international law) changes essentially through State practice - which means what Foreign Ministries do and what Foreign Ministry legal advisers advise their Ministries it is lawful for them to do. Since the law has to change in this way, it means that States can, and do, break new ground and so contribute to the creation of new law. A legal adviser, accordingly, may have to participate in this process; and he may certainly, in appropriate circumstances, advise that it will be lawful to do something which has never been done before, or which would involve the development in a new direction of an existing rule of international law. The circumstances of international life are pressing, and even though a situation may have novel elements it cannot be met with inaction; and novel situations may call for novel responses." Finally, due to the spectacular development of technical and telecommunication tools - as we have just been so well enlightened by my old friend and dear colleague Jovan Kurbalija - there are entirely new possibilities of access to information, new ways to exchange views, dramatic increase in the speed of inter-communication and consultation, and therefore, immensely increased potential to reach consensus in bilateral negotiations or international conferences. Legal advisers of all countries of the world benefit from these new tools every day in the preparation of new treaties, in clearing many problems by phone, fax or through e-mail even before meeting to discuss legal matters, and even in obtaining ordinary information - be it a telephone number or an address - from each other.

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May I be allowed, however, to return to the problem which I announced very briefly in the beginning of my intervention. Almost all authors writing about the work and the role of the legal adviser pay special attention to his relationship with his superiors (be it the minister or the government). The minister is the head of the Foreign Service: not only of the Foreign Ministry, but also of a whole network of diplomatic, consular and other missions abroad (for example, the missions to the United Nations and their specialised agencies, military missions, information and cultural centres, special representations, *ad hoc* missions, delegations to the international conferences, ambassadors *at large*, special envoys, etc.). In making decisions, the foreign minister must take into consideration a whole array of various factors, from political ones (both internal and external), through economic and social arguments, up to security motivated requirements. He has to follow the instructions of the head of state and the prime minister, and the foreign policy guidelines set by Parliament, and also to take care of

requests by various lobbies or the views expressed by an overzealous and active senator or member of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee. In the cacophony crescendo of such a chorus, the legal adviser's voice can very easily get lost. The cynics among the lawyers say that it is almost normal, usually does no harm, and that the ministers get from their legal advisers exactly what they deserve.

The worst conceivable kind of relationship (and results) is that of a minister surrounded by "yes-men" and accustomed to that, expecting the same attitude from his legal adviser. It is not surprising that, in the end, the minister will get what he wants. (Even legal advisers are, after all, human. Should a very conscientious lawyer refuse to accept the role of the rubber-stamp, there will always be others to offer their "services.") But in doing so, "the boss" loses the very best that a legal adviser can provide: his penetrating, critical, analytic, discriminating mind. Even the most autocratic medieval rulers and tyrannical dictators used to keep at their palaces a buffoon, a jester or a court fool. The fools were paid to amuse their master, but more often than not their jokes contained sharp criticism and reasonable advice: many of those despots who did not tolerate any disapproval from the "cortigiani" around them knew how to listen to the voice of good sense, even wisdom, coming from their "fools."

Not only the position of the legal adviser, but also the scope and the quality of his work, its efficiency and usefulness, depend to the greatest extent on the political climate, the degree of democratic development of the society, and the existence and functioning of the rule of law in it. Even in countries where those values are, generally speaking, at a very high level, one can detect the problem of hypertrophic subordination normal in any administration (unhealthy servility and poltronism, lack of civic courage, absence of constructive criticism, etc.).

The problem is much worse in those countries where democracy remains a word on paper or just a distant goal, where every dissonant voice risks ostracism for high treason or at least dangerous deficiency of patriotism: precisely in those lands which are in most need of solid, unbiased, objective legal advice (and also of focused, well-intentioned criticism). As much as the normal work of the legal adviser is hardly possible under such circumstances, and in spite of the fact that the real solution cannot be sought in the limited microworld of the legal service or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but rather in deep changes to the state and society as a whole - or perhaps just because of the above reason - the legal adviser must do his very best to "remain in saddle" and to preserve all the possibilities, meagre as they may be, to raise his voice and keep trying to put his obol to efforts which eventually could lead in the right direction. It is symptomatic that many authors from very different countries at various stages of the development of diplomatic services indicate the existence of this problem.

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I should not like to close my brief review by criticising the ministers; the opposite is also true. So, let me quote Robbie Sabel who says: *Foreign ministers like to complain about their legal advisers. The complaints usually are that their legal advisers are pedantic, lack vision, are ultra-cautious and miss the bigger picture, but, like the well-known credit card, foreign ministers usually "don't leave home without them."*

Diplomacy as an Instrument of Good Governance

Dr. Vladimir Petrovsky

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I wish to begin my statement by expressing my deep gratitude to the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies for convening this Conference on Modern Diplomacy. For the first time top specialists from different countries are gathered to discuss, in all aspects, diplomacy as an instrument of international communication and negotiation. It is not by chance that Malta has initiated this meeting. For all who are involved in international politics, this country has been associated with very successful diplomacy since the first days of its independence in 1964. The handwriting of Maltese diplomacy can be clearly seen in the activities of the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in promoting regional co-operation in the Mediterranean.

Our conference is a most timely event. Each time a major transformation in the international system occurs, the role of diplomacy in world politics is revised. This issue was on the international agenda at the beginning of the twentieth century, and now, on the threshold of the new millennium, the debate reoccurs. The exchange of views among the participants will help to better understand what should be the purpose and the method of diplomacy in the age of global transformation.

The efforts of the international community to find diplomatic solutions to the present Iraqi crisis adjoin a supplementary flavour to our conference.

New Challenges

One hundred years ago the question of the future of diplomacy was raised as a result of technological progress - the invention of the radio and telegraph and the intervention of public into the domain of foreign policy. The first factor brought the apprehension that diplomats would become "honorary mailmen" and the second raised the issue of open diplomacy. However, the role of diplomacy in the twentieth century has not been restricted by these two factors.

The functioning of diplomacy is influenced by a complicated combination of different interrelated factors and I would like to start with a brief analysis of their impact on the evolution of diplomacy.

To begin with, there is a set of *political factors*. During most of the twentieth century, two world wars, the Cold War, the rivalry of two super powers, the ideologization of international affairs and military confrontation have made diplomacy a subsidiary instrument of power politics and ideology. As a result, diplomacy has very often executed the "dance of death." The end of the Cold War has radically changed the international political scene. Moreover, today we are facing the shift of the civilizational paradigm, which affects not only the major units of world politics - the states - but which also brings new actors into the forefront of international relations.

The major political factor influencing diplomacy is the relative decline of the role of the national governments. Today governments are facing stern competition from other actors. Private sector, religious groups, immigrants, media and other entities of the civil society are demanding from the government that their interests be taken into consideration and that they

have a say in making and implementing foreign policy. People want to travel freely, to conduct business abroad or to be involved in various types of cultural exchange.

Perhaps the most active "intruders" into the modern diplomacy from outside are non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is particularly well seen from the UN viewpoint. For example, in Geneva there are currently about 1,400 NGOs officially registered with the UN Office. All of them are international, and have branches in at least two or more countries. Although their status is different from that of the diplomats, in practice they often participate in the diplomatic process, in particular in the promotion and discussion of such issues as human rights and environmental protection. Nowadays, international decisions are more often shaped according to the opinions of the NGOs. Gradually they are expanding the sphere of their influence. Last year NGOs prevented the adoption of the Convention on the Copyright Law in Electronic Media which was prepared by the International Telecommunications Union. Perhaps the most vivid example of their influence is the world-wide campaign to ban anti-personnel land-mines which led to the signature in Ottawa last December of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines.

Curiously, not only NGOs but legislative branches of the states themselves are contributing to this diplomatic process. The parliamentarians of the world have successfully set up a structure of global and regional interaction and are now claiming a role in diplomatic meetings which was traditionally reserved for the executive branch.

An important aspect of the "degovernmentalization" of foreign affairs is the growing involvement in the international interactions of local or provincial authorities. I had an opportunity to observe this phenomenon on numerous occasions. For example, it is not uncommon for the heads of a local government to visit a UN agency because they wish to participate in its programmes directly rather than through the national government. A few years ago this was difficult to imagine. During the conference of the mayors of the Mediterranean cities in Barcelona, many recognised that they often have more close economic or cultural ties with their partners across the sea than with their national capitals. Many big cities and provinces have enough resources not just to influence the national governments but also to actually maintain their own "diplomatic" agencies.

The immediate implication of this development for the diplomatic practitioners is that now, in addition to their colleagues representing formally recognised states, they also have to deal with numerous other non-state counterparts who conduct their own "foreign policy."

On the macro level, one of the major developments is the proliferation of multinational institutions and regional and subregional organisations. The EU, APEC, ASEAN, CIS, NAFTA, - this is just a short list of the most well known transnational structures which claim part of their member's sovereignty. The major motive behind their creation is the same as in the case of the increased activity of the local authorities - to facilitate cross-border co-operation and to weaken or eliminate restrictions imposed by the national states, such as customs tariffs.

The second set of factors that makes the life of a modern diplomat increasingly difficult is of an economic nature. In general I would say that *economic diplomacy* is gradually taking over the traditional politics-oriented diplomacy. A lot has been written in recent years about the phenomenal growth of transnational economic interactions. Indeed, with the huge expansion of international trade, the power of private companies and the electronic transfer of money, private entrepreneurs and fund managers are eclipsing central bankers and finance ministers.

Meanwhile the international economy is becoming more and more competitive. With the rapid development of the Pacific Rim countries, and the opening to the outside world of the economies of such huge states as China and Russia, the world market has expanded dramatically, but so has the number of economic actors. Governments everywhere are primarily concerned with maintaining the competitiveness of their economies. Accordingly, private economic decisions are now largely controlling political choices of the governments,

and diplomats have to devote more time and energy than ever before to the creation of a favourable environment for trade and commerce.

Last but not least, an important factor influencing modern diplomacy is the *revolution in telecommunications*. This is a big issue that deserves special attention. Of particular relevance to the diplomatic services are two technological developments - satellite broadcasting and digital networks including the Internet. I will not go into detail on the technological problem, as this afternoon we will have a special session on this issue. I would like just to give you a few examples of the use of modern technology at the United Nations.

One of the functions of the diplomatic missions accredited to UNOG is to collect UN documents and send them to their Foreign Ministries or other government agencies in their capitals. A few years ago UNOG introduced an electronic system of document distribution. It is no longer necessary for the missions' staff to collect documents from the Palais des Nations - they can obtain them via computer connection without leaving their offices. Now we are about to introduce another innovation. Soon the documents database will be connected to the Internet. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministries will be able to retrieve the documents they need, directly bypassing the missions. In fact, some Foreign Ministries have already subscribed to this new service and we have started to receive requests for particular documents. This could mean in particular that the missions are losing one of their functions.

To take a further example, currently the senior managers at the UN are being provided with video-conferencing equipment. This technology is already widely used in many large companies. The cabinet meetings of the Secretary-General are held with the participation of Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi senior managers using video equipment. I understand that national foreign services are also experimenting with this kind of facility. In future we could easily imagine a situation where presidents, prime ministers or foreign ministers would be able to hold direct instantaneous face-to-face communication with each other, in addition to simultaneous data transfer. The consequences of this technological development for the diplomatic services could be quite significant. How should the role of the embassies or the missions change in this environment?

All this testifies to the increasing interdependence in the world. Now, problems which affect one part of the world's population can spread very rapidly to the entire planet. Like passengers of Leonardo da Vinci's ship, all of us - rich and poor, women and men, young and old, white and black - share a common destiny. In the words of Albert Einstein "the world is one or nothing."

The process of globalisation, which strengthens the "oneness" of the world is, at the same time, accompanied by the fragmentation and localisation by the growing gap between rich and poor nations. Moreover, this process is characterised by the acceleration of the pace of events. Time has become "compressed."

All these transformations bring new challenges for diplomacy on a global level: the maintenance of positive peace and comprehensive security, democratisation, the promotion of human rights, economic co-operation and sustainable development, facilitation of humanitarian actions, prevention of terrorism and criminal activity.

Today diplomacy is called upon to help political and economic leaders to channel the global changes in an evolutionary, non-violent, democratic rule-based manner. One of its top priorities is facilitation of good governance, both on national and international levels. The prospect of good governance provides an opportunity for the renaissance of diplomacy which, throughout the centuries, played the role of an intermediary between governments and acquired a unique experience in this field. Now it has a chance to become an instrument of international governance. How can diplomacy cope with this new challenge?

Diplomacy as an Instrument of Good Governance

To begin with I should like to stress that for modern diplomacy, whose only asset is the software, it is important to maintain a balance between traditional innovations. Despite all the changes in the international environment the past experience of diplomacy is of great value and it is ultimately important to keep links in time. The classical texts on diplomacy of François De Calliers, Harold Nicolson, Ernest Sato and Jules Cambon are as useful reading for a diplomat today as they were a century ago.

One of the major lessons in the history of diplomacy is that the personal factors continue to play a key role. As far back as in seventeenth century, a great Frenchman in diplomacy, François De Calliers wrote: "The good diplomat must have an observant mind, a gift of application which rejects being diverted by pleasures or frivolous amusements, a sound judgement which takes the measure of things as they are and which goes straight to the goal by the shortest and most natural paths without wandering into meaningless and endless refinements and subtleties. The diplomat must be quick, resourceful, a good listener, courteous and agreeable. Above all, the good negotiator must possess enough self-control to resist the longing to speak before he has thought out what he actually intends to say. He must have a calm nature, be able to suffer fools gladly, which is not always easy, and should not be given to drinking, gambling or any other fantasies. He should also have some knowledge of literature, science, mathematics, and law."

At the threshold of the twentieth century, another famous author, the British diplomat Ernest Sato, described diplomacy as an application of intellect and tact to conduct foreign affairs. In my view, a modern diplomat is discreet, practical, careful, and with a sense of responsibility. I also think that in modern diplomacy the feeling of momentum is of crucial importance. As a whole, diplomats are very good at preserving the traditions of their profession. However, there is a lot in the legacy of the past that diplomacy has to abandon. Unfortunately, despite changes of huge significance to diplomacy that have taken place in recent years, the mechanisms of traditional diplomacy have barely begun to adjust. The Cold War has gone out of diplomacy, but in many cases diplomatic behaviour remains loyal to it. This includes, among other things, thinking only in terms of power equilibrium. Methods of diplomacy are still strongly influenced by military thinking - diplomacy as the war by other means, or as a zero-sum game.

To become an efficient tool of good global governance diplomacy needs first to overcome the stereotypes of ideology and military confrontation. Its task today is to search not for the balance of power, but for the balance of interest. The top priority today is to reinvigorate in full scope traditional methods of diplomacy - the search for compromise solutions. The all or nothing mentality no longer works. A partial and balanced approach is an answer to the new geopolitical and economic realities.

According to the political stereotypes of the Cold War, diplomats of different countries are considered to be opponents, each trying to reach his goal at the expense of the other. No doubt, the primary mission of a diplomat is to protect the national interests of his country. However, we all have a common aim - good governance both on global and national levels. We all strive for a better world, a world without violence and poverty, a world that provides security and justice for all. Thus, diplomats must learn to co-operate without sacrificing the national interests of their countries. In many other professions one can witness the existence of a corporate spirit. Unfortunately it does not happen often among diplomats. However, such club relations could be of great help to each and all of them.

The corporate spirit of the diplomatic community does not mean that corporatism should prevail over the national interest of the country which a diplomat represents. By articulating the national interests of his country the diplomat provides the possibility to better understand its position. This makes the country predictable in its international behaviour which is of supreme importance in our time of change. Attempts to please both a foreign government and his own government renders disservice to the diplomat.

The international diplomatic partnership is now more feasible than before, in particular because of the gradual unification of the national styles of diplomacy. International organisations and multilateral diplomacy are effective "melting pots" of cultural differences. Diplomatic methods are becoming universal. However, national styles still exist and should be studied and taken into consideration in the practical diplomatic work. National style is difficult to define though it is an important ingredient of the art of diplomacy. But of course a national style should not be mixed up with an inappropriate behaviour when a so-called diplomat disregards local cultural, religious and specific features of other nations.

Another stereotype concerns confidentiality in diplomacy. Diplomacy is often accused of too much secrecy and indeed, for centuries diplomacy was conducted entirely in private. The Cold War has tremendously strengthened this pattern of behaviour. However, in the world of openness and free information flows, the cult of diplomatic confidentiality looks rather archaic. Though every professional diplomat knows that in certain situations confidentiality is unavoidable, it does not mean that the profession requires him to keep quiet. Lack of openness and in particular misconstruing the truth is incompatible with modern diplomacy. This leads to the important problem of interaction between diplomacy and mass media which deserves particular attention nowadays.

Multilateral Diplomacy

All these observations are applicable to both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. However, the latter has some specific problems. For me multilateral diplomacy is of particular interest and concern since I am involved in it on a daily basis. I would like to share with you some of these concerns and ideas on how multilateral diplomatic interaction can be improved. Multilateral diplomacy is often considered to be a type of superstructure over bilateral diplomacy. I think these are two sides of the same coin and none excludes the other. Interaction between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy creates a new pattern of political behaviour. A good example is the negotiation of a nuclear test ban. In the past test ban treaties were the result of bilateral Soviet-American negotiations. Only CTBT has been worked out at the Conference on Disarmament. Multilateralism has not excluded bilateralism or other types of negotiation. To use a modern technical analogy, I would say that bilateral negotiations are similar to using a mobile telephone, whilst multilateral negotiations resemble using the Internet. They can naturally complement each other.

More than that, multilateral negotiations, despite their being time-consuming, are a very effective safeguard against hegemonistic and similar intentions. This has become more evident at the dawn of multilateral diplomacy. When the series of congresses which followed the treaty of Vienna of 1815 at last came to an end, the British Foreign Secretary, Canning, returning from conferences, was said to have praised a state of normal bilateral diplomacy which he summed up as "each for himself and God for us all." Undoubtedly multilateral diplomacy drastically limits the egoistical aspirations of the states.

Although multilateral negotiations are basically similar to bilateral, a number of sophisticated methods and techniques have been developed in multilateralism to cope with extensive diplomatic interactions. In the United Nations and other multilateral fora there is an official hierarchy of committees and sub-committees and a semi-official system of groups of states formed on the basis of geographic or economic proximity. For example, there are the groups of African, Latin American and Arab States, the EU States or the Group of 77 developing countries which actually comprises more than one hundred states.

Perhaps, the major peculiarity of the multilateral talks is the importance of the rules of procedure. When, as in the case of the United Nations, 185 delegations have to communicate with each other at the same time, there must be some rather clear and strict rules to maintain orderly interactions. As the well-known British historian, Harold Nicolson, once noted during a large international conference - the matters of organisation and procedure become no less

important than the political issues. If poorly handled they can become a major disintegrating factor.

The post-Cold War multilateralism is characterised by more complex agendas of conferences and negotiations with larger numbers of issues and the growing involvement of experts, citizens groups and NGOs. Multilateral diplomacy is trying to adapt to these new conditions. However, this process is painfully slow. Many aspects of multilateral diplomacy still need to be revised, starting with procedural and methodological issues.

First of all there should be a clear line of distinction between negotiations and treaty-making. The process of multilateral negotiations consists of two stages: exploratory, as the initial stage, and treaty-making as the highest stage. The latter could be subdivided into the definition of parameters of a future agreement and the working out of it. Of course, the division is conditional. There is no Berlin Wall between the different stages. Bearing in mind this simple structure, it is not difficult to build the negotiations process in such a way that the result is achieved quickly and minimal resources are used. Unfortunately in some negotiation fora, the participants confuse the different stages and throw the whole process into disorder. Such negotiations may last for years and consist of endless positional statements.

One of the favourite negotiation methods during the Cold War was the linkage of unrelated issues. This was a rough way of forcing the counterpart to make concessions. Though the international environment has drastically changed, this method is still in use today. Modern diplomacy needs the opposite approach. Compromise requires what I call constructive parallelism in all areas of negotiation, which presupposes that progress in one area creates the opportunity for advancement in other directions. Compromise is neither a capitulation nor a sign of weakness. The art of compromise is a concession in secondary matters, not in principles. It should be noted, however, that not everything depends on the negotiators. If there is no political will even the best negotiator cannot do much.

There are a lot of debates on the expansion of the conferences. In my view, the principal failures come not so much from the enlargement of fora, which sometimes provides positive results in the creation of open-ended structures, as from the nature of issues themselves and the absence of political will to find compromise solutions.

In the field of structured multilateral diplomacy there is surprising resistance to innovation. The lack of flexibility on the part of the member states is a major problem with the UN reform. The reform programme announced recently by the United Nations' Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, is quite radical and includes significant changes in the structure of the organisation, its functions and priorities. However, the changes adopted by the General Assembly concern only one UN body - the Secretariat. As far as the restructuring of other major bodies is concerned, the proposals of the Secretary-General are still under consideration.

Meanwhile, changes in the major United Nations bodies are of critical importance. Multilateral fora, including the UN, are frequently criticised for being too slow, in particular when dealing with conflict situations. When one speaks of a multifaceted, multidimensional, broad approach to security, conflict threats, and the need for preventive actions, one implies that diplomacy comes cheaper than infantry battalions. Diplomats can be more effective, not in stopping aggression once it has occurred, but earlier, in coping with civil combat, frontier disputes and the danger which we see when people who are condemned by geography to live together are instructed by their leaders that it is their duty to hate and kill others. But it is true, if there is a role for international diplomacy, it has to move earlier and be better organised for preventive actions which undoubtedly strengthen the new role of multilateral institutions as a safety net for crisis and conflict.

As for the role of multilateral institutions with regard to consensus building on policy issues, and setting norms and standards, it should be strengthened through increased attention to monitoring in all fields. Take for example, human rights. The commemoration of the fiftieth

anniversary of the Universal Declaration needs a greater emphasis on practical implementation, which requires us all to be even more penetrating about the legal obligations.

At the same time, diplomacy should not monopolise conflict prevention and solution. For example, the legal tools could be used more extensively. The International Court of Justice which was created precisely to help to resolve conflict situations is currently considering only nine cases, mainly territorial or commercial disputes. However, the court has a considerable potential in conflict settlement. Let's take for example, the settlement by the court of the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. At the beginning the conflict had obvious and dangerous ethnic overtones with heated polemic in the media. After the involvement of the court it was quickly transformed into a purely technical matter.

My last observation concerns the interaction between global and regional structures. When international organisations are mushrooming and multilateralism is invading all walks of life, there is a need to set up a mutually supportive and reinforcing system of international organisation to develop complementarily among them. The UN can and should play a more active role as a facilitator among the regional structures; the time has come for the Security Council to read anew Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, written when only two regional structures, the OAS and the LAS existed.

The United States Deputy Secretary of State, S. Talbott, was absolutely right when he stated that "regional co-operation is a positive force if and only if it enhances the positive aspect of global interdependence and combats the negative ones."

The UN is doing a lot to achieve this aim. The annual meeting of the Secretary-General with heads of regional organisations, tripartite meetings between the Director-General of UNOG, the Secretary-General of the OSCE and the Council of Europe are good examples. The United Nations has developed several forms of co-operation with regional structures. However, it is not enough. Everyone would agree that we are only at the beginning of the process. We have some way to go before establishing a coherent pattern of mutually beneficial co-operation between the United Nations and the panoply of institutions involved with regional affairs.

Conclusions

A few conclusions can be drawn from this overview. Firstly, since diplomacy is an instrument of good governance it should adjust itself to meet the new challenges, to become more relevant, open and agile, to modify its methods and to fully utilise opportunities offered by the technological revolution. So far the pace of its transformation has not always been adequate.

Nevertheless, modern diplomacy, which requires a variety of skills, in particular familiarity with the art and science of negotiations, proves its ability to work in a new multicultural environment with different actors, including the civil society.

I deeply believe that the flexibility, which was always the trademark of diplomacy, provides the hope that diplomacy will not only adapt to new challenges but will also be helpful both for states and other new actors on the international scene, in their efforts to create a better world for the twenty-first century.

Public Diplomacy

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I have been asked to describe and discuss public diplomacy from the practitioner's perspective. Perhaps the invitation resulted in part from the fact that besides being a practitioner of public diplomacy for most of my professional life, I recently worked in a government "reinvention lab" at the U.S. Information Agency in Washington, where the newest ideas in management and communications technology were tested. This experience gives me, I like to think, a view of the future of public diplomacy as well as the present. In any case, I will speak from my experience and hope that you will see parallels and applications that might be relevant elsewhere. I would be happy to take questions and debate any of my assertions at the end of the presentation.

What is it?

I'll start with something very bureaucratic to explain what public diplomacy is - USIA's mission statement, which defines public diplomacy as well as anything I've found:

To understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad. To accomplish this, we

- explain and advocate U.S. policies in terms that are credible and meaningful in foreign cultures;
- provide information about the U.S., its people, values, and institutions;
- build lasting relationships and mutual understanding through the exchange of people and ideas; and
- advise U.S. decision-makers on foreign attitudes and their implications for U.S. policies.

A colleague of mine summarized this mission by calling our activities "retail politics on a global scale." The people practicing public diplomacy are the ones disseminating the President's latest speech on foreign policy, explaining its points to a skeptical local newspaper editor, or writing a speech on the same theme, but adapted to local conditions, for the U.S. Ambassador to give. On another day, the public diplomacy practitioner is helping select candidates for the Fulbright academic exchange program and attending a seminar or cultural event that connects the country where he is posted with the United States. In each case, our practitioner is reaching beyond the government elites who decide policy and is interacting with the larger publics in the country where he or she is serving. He is in touch primarily with influential people, journalists, academics, and other leaders in society who help shape public opinion. He knows people from several age groups and across the political spectrum, including among the opposition - even if the opposition is not in the local government's best graces.

Public diplomacy, at least as it is construed in the U.S., is NOT the act of winning support at home for government policies. Most U.S. federal agencies and departments conduct public affairs programs that are meant to inform our citizenry about policy changes and the workings of government, but public diplomacy is specifically aimed at the overseas audience, not the one at home. Hence the term "diplomacy."

What's our context?

I'd like to outline the context for practicing public diplomacy today. You will not be surprised that this is essentially the same as the context for practicing "regular" diplomacy, except that with public diplomacy one throws a bit more communications technology into the mix.

A number of foresightful people in our foreign affairs community - chiefly Barry Fulton, my recent boss and mentor in the Information Bureau at USIA - have observed that the era of the "wise men" has now ended. Diplomacy is undergoing changes as profound as those that established it as an art and science in the sixteenth century. For a host of reasons including the telecommunications revolution, decision-making about foreign policy (and about many aspects of life) is moving away from the center of government and out into society. Foreign affairs is no longer the preserve of a few elites, but increasingly is shared by regions, states, non-governmental organizations, businesses and other non-state actors. (Who is more influential - Bill Clinton or Bill Gates?) Jessica Matthews of the Council on Foreign Relations warns us of a forthcoming "emotional, cultural, and political earthquake" as a result of these changes.

Parallel with the way decision-making is evolving is, of course, the revolution in technology - especially information technology - and the effect of this revolution on the social order. Dr. Fulton has drawn attention to a Canadian scholar, Harold Innis, who observed over fifty years ago that major changes in communications result in social change. He cites how Gutenberg's invention of moveable type ended up challenging the authority of the Church, and he makes the case that each major change since then has had a similarly profound effect. To test this theory, I invite you to consider how progress in information technology affected human and official reactions to war:

- The U.S. learned about the events of our Civil War 130 years ago through, among other means, newly invented still photography;
- We learned about World War I through documentary film footage;
- We learned about World War II through nearly "real-time" radio bulletins;
- We learned about the Vietnam War from television;
- We learned about the crackdown at Tiananmen Square through the fax; and
- We learned about developments in the former Yugoslavia through e-mail.

I would propose that with each advance of technology, more information became available, the interested public became broader and public opinion rallied faster and more powerfully around the world. I would further propose that this sequence expands citizen participation and enlarges democracy and is therefore, on the whole, a desirable development.

Finally, for further context, I would like to turn again to Dr. Fulton, who constructed a paradigm last year for considering the world now and into the next century. In my view, this paradigm seems more valid than Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" theory, Frances Fukuyama's "End of History" proposition, or any of the others I have heard of. Dr. Fulton asks

that we imagine a three-dimensional space defined on one axis by the terms "integration" and "fragmentation." A second dimension would be bounded by the terms "participatory" and "centralized." And the third dimension would have an axis that runs from "resource abundance" to "resource scarcity." With sophisticated analytic tools and discerning judgment, one could place most of the nations within this cube and one also could map groupings of cultures and civilizations.

If we repeated this same exercise in ten years and if we constructed our map using data from ten years ago as well, we could demonstrate the dynamism of the world, seeing how the units move in relation to each other. No country or group would stay in the same place or in the same relation to other units. While dynamism characterized mapping processes in the past, change was occurring much, much more slowly than it is today. As the rate of change accelerates, former habits of control and of international relationships need to be re-thought.

What this new paradigm suggests is that the geo-political world has become so complex that the notion of national control is obsolete, a useless chimera. Instead, "dynamic stability" is what we should be striving to achieve. This is actually a central thesis of "systems theory," which suggests that stability is strengthened in a rich but loosely connected dynamic system that maintains its integrity through an information flow that is called "feedback."

Before I leave theory behind, I ask that when you consider Dr. Fulton's paradigm and how it might apply to your particular country or circumstances, you factor in a few important variables. The first is time, which is implicit in the dynamism in the map. Time's acceleration seems to be a fact of contemporary life, so we'd best not ignore it. The second is image, and how important the effect of images has become on us as our world becomes more visual and less literary. The third variable is trust. When trust in relations and institutions diminishes, the dynamic relation between elements on the map can easily fall into a state of disequilibrium and the stability of the system is put at risk.

Why do we need it?

Now that we've defined public diplomacy and sketched the world in which it we practice it today, the question remains: why do we need it?

The first and most important reason from my perspective is that the influence of public opinion on government decision-making is increasing steadily around the world. Publics in democratic countries have learned to wield influence on their governments in ever more effective ways - note the reasons the Vietnam War ended, for a classic example of this phenomenon. Meanwhile more and more countries appear to be in the act of becoming democratic and thus subject to the power of public opinion. There is little rationale for believing that either of these trends will fade away; in fact, it is more likely that they will intensify. Even the few closed societies that remain are finding themselves somewhat more attendant to public opinion than previously. I argue that where the influence of public opinion is growing, there should be a concomitant strengthening of public diplomacy.

With the rise of the importance of public opinion, we find decreases in the proportion of government decisions taken behind closed doors, decreases in the proportion of government-to-government dealings that occur outside public view, and decreases in the proportion of government-to-government deals at all, vis-à-vis dealings in which the public is involved. Leaders now often use the media to talk to other leaders and publics - Iran's Khatami, for example, appealed to the U.S. via CNN. Citizens similarly and routinely use public demonstrations, like those that often occur outside embassies, to convey their views, directly or via the media, to foreign governments. Leaders also bypass the closed circuits of traditional diplomacy to talk directly by phone, as Clinton and Blair seem in the habit of doing, often several times a week. What we're seeing is a growing need for collaboration driving an increasing amount of dialogue between governments and publics.

Most of this open-circuit communication is made possible by the modern revolution in information technology, and most of this is wonderful. It would be disastrous to conclude, however, that CNN does all of public diplomacy's work. For one thing, the media are not always accurate and not always complete. For another, the media often sensationalize or slant a story in order to attract audiences in what is a fiercely competitive commercial battle for market share. Additionally, the profusion of sources and amounts of information available results in a public overwhelmed and confused by the welter of messages. What is true? What is real? Who has time to figure it out? One significant solution to this nexus of problems is a robust government public diplomacy program that organizes, conveys, verifies and authenticates information about its country, so that the interested public, including opinion-leaders, have a reliable source.

A major power is going to be the subject of discussion and controversy no matter what it does. It is going to wish to have some direct input into that discussion, and it can do so through public diplomacy. This has not changed with the passing into history of the bipolar world of the Cold War. In fact, the multipolar world, rife with less predictable threats - terrorism, ethnic rivalries, contentious trade disputes among allies and adversaries alike, catastrophic environmental degradation and so on - forces the major powers into simultaneous efforts to win public support for a variety of their positions. This isn't easy and we don't always succeed. I believe we could have had more productive global debate and a better outcome on global warming prior to the Kyoto conference, for example, if we had mounted a concerted public diplomacy campaign explaining the U.S. position.

Generally, the smaller powers do not enter the global public discussion unless a crisis or scandal envelops them. It is unfortunate, but these seem to be the events that attract the global media and interest the mass audiences to which they cater. Perhaps it is for this very reason that smaller powers need public diplomacy programs, just as major powers do. The task for the smaller powers is to be heard on the stories that matter to them, to explain their positions and aspirations during the non-crisis moments, and to do so in a way that captures attention.

The demise of the bipolar world and the rise of the new paradigm appear to mean that major and smaller powers both find themselves in new relationships and collaborations with other nations. Power and prosperity don't mainly depend any more on who has the most missiles, the most land or the largest population. Power and prosperity depend, instead, at least as much and maybe more, on a healthy economy, access to markets, and leadership in the creation of marketable services and products. As a result, diplomacy is no longer about gaining surreptitious advantage over one's enemies or negotiating treaties closeted in some Foreign Ministry conference room. Diplomacy has become the art of achieving agreements among entities whose mutual advantage is served by collaborative effort. Public support is essential.

How to do it?

I hope by now I may have persuaded you that public diplomacy has an important place in foreign affairs in today's world. Now I intend to describe how public diplomacy programs are conducted, drawing on my own experience as an American practitioner. Other countries with energetic public diplomacy programs, which most of the major powers have, would offer interesting variations, and I certainly invite you to examine them.

I will start with information programs and proceed to cultural and educational activities. Information programs concentrate on the fast-moving actions and decisions of government and aim dissemination of materials to international journalists, government officials, and those academics and other opinion-shapers who follow the daily agenda of world affairs. For the U.S. this includes the following efforts:

- In Washington at our headquarters we gather all the speeches, public position papers, transcripts of press conferences or other public pronouncements of the U.S. government that could possibly be of interest to audiences anywhere in the world.
- Within hours of these materials becoming available, we compile them and send them electronically to each U.S. embassy. We also mount them on our Website so that the overseas public has direct and immediate access to them. Additionally, we translate many of these materials into world languages - French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, with recent additions of Chinese and Portuguese. We do all this centrally because it saves time.
- Also centrally, we develop strategies on how best to convey U.S. positions on issues of global concern. The U.S. position on NATO expansion, for example, was explained and clarified in a number of countries simultaneously, thanks to materials formulated in Washington.
- At our embassies overseas, we have people like me in London or, here in Malta, like Keith Peterson, who manage the dissemination locally of all this material coming from Washington. We also absorb it so that we can explain it in person, ideally with sensitivity to local issues and concerns and by means of using the local language with some fluency. In large media centers like London, we have a larger staff, of course, with several American officers each specializing in, say, broadcast or print media, and with locally hired experts to assist them.
- Our embassy operations in large media centers also become adept at handling the press-related requirements of VIP visits. In London, where the number of visiting U.S. officials is overwhelming, we can and do very frequently put on press conferences and set up facilities for the traveling White House or State Department press. In the last couple of months, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met frequently in London with Cook, Netanyahu and Arafat, and each time she held a press conference afterward, thus confirming the observation that the public side of diplomacy is at least as important as the private side. Actually, in Malta I should not neglect the fact that high-visibility events come to small countries, too: remember that it was off Malta that Bush and Gorbachev held an important meeting one stormy December. The press arrangements were just as crucial and considerably more challenging than if they had met in London.
- The information side of public diplomacy also includes the writing of speeches, either for senior officers of the embassy or oneself. Our Ambassador in London, for example, is asked to give far more public statements than any one person could generate alone, if he intended also to keep time aside for such other tasks as running the embassy, acting as liaison between the two governments or staying abreast of policy developments. So my office provides him with background information, research and other materials on which to draw.
- Finally, but by no means least, a government information program also must respond in some fashion to public inquiries about one's country. In a large embassy, this means acting as the information front-end of the U.S. government by responding to hundreds of phone calls, letters and research inquiries each week. The questions run the gamut from a British tourist asking "What's the temperature in Florida when I'm going on vacation?" to a Member of Parliament requesting detailed information about Wisconsin's welfare reforms, which will be useful input to the debate on welfare reform in the U.K. Our offerings must run this same gamut: from a London-based Website that has answers to frequently asked questions, to a sophisticated electronic retrieval system that accesses legislative databases in the U.S.

It might be useful to illustrate how information programs can work in an environment other than London, and I'm going to choose examples from my previous posts that intentionally convey a very key point: public diplomacy must be based on honesty, openness and trust in order to be successful. I gave a talk once at the diplomatic training school of a country in which I was serving, and my subject was "How to be a Press Attaché." I had a long recitation of "do's" and "don'ts" that was heavy on recommendations about never lying, always returning reporters' phone calls, and telling as much as you could. At the end of what I thought was a very persuasive presentation, one of the junior diplomats in the audience said, "Yes, but what

we really want to know is how to control the press." Well, my view is that you can't and you shouldn't try. No amount of "spinning" is going to change the facts. What you can do, though, is present and explain the facts accurately, persuasively and fast.

When I was in Indonesia, we had a very contentious trade dispute that involved obscure U.S. regulations governing how much market share certain imports into the U.S. could acquire and how U.S. customs taxes could be reduced for certain developing countries under certain circumstances. The Indonesian press and public initially were outraged at what they assumed was an action on the part of the U.S. that unfairly targeted their country and protected U.S. domestic industries. Fortunately for both countries, this initial assumption was faulty. By first grasping and then explaining the facts of the U.S. law, we were able to show that the same regulations applied to all countries, that the U.S. tariffs for imports were already among the lowest in the world even before any preferential reductions, and that the planned action wouldn't hurt anyone very much anyway. Thus a fast, fact-driven campaign was able to prevent a nasty dispute and preserve what were quite harmonious overall relations.

At another time I lived through what is probably a Press Attaché's worst nightmare: something incontrovertibly bad happened and there was no explaining it away with the truth. An American employee of the Embassy was caught red-handed selling drugs in "commercial quantities." There was an immediate firestorm of protest that only escalated when he was removed from the country for trial in the U.S. Denying that this happened or trying to minimize its negative character were not options. We gave out as much information as the law allowed, we expressed our heartfelt regret, and we were especially careful to explain that the military court martial the man faced in the U.S. would leave no room for escape from justice by the guilty. Fortunately for public perceptions - and justice - the suspect was found guilty and incarcerated. U.S. law officials also cooperated with local police to move related aspects of the case into local courts. The outcome in the public view ended up being neutral for the U.S., which was a distinct gain over the disaster it would have been for us had we not released any information.

My last example in support of the open approach derives from Indonesia in the fall of 1994, when Jakarta hosted the APEC summit and eighteen heads of state, including our President and most of his senior staff. It was, needless to say, a busy time for press relations, as nearly 4,000 journalists were in town, most notably for us the celebrities of the White House press corps. A few hours before the arrival of the President, twenty-some East Timorese protesters vaulted the walls of the U.S. Embassy, determined to stage a sit-in that would, they hoped, involve the U.S. in supporting their position regarding the future of Indonesia's troubled province of East Timor. They achieved one objective, which was to draw global media attention to their cause. What sort of public diplomacy should be attempted under these circumstances? We opted for openness. We answered every one of thousands of press inquiries, we gave live radio interviews from the embassy, we told callers what we were feeding the demonstrators, how we were handling one who needed medical attention, what our position was and why, and we did nothing to stop journalists from interviewing the protesters through the embassy fence. At the same time, negotiations were being conducted privately on what happened to the protesters, which succeeded in the Red Cross helping them depart for a third country. The U.S. came in for no serious criticism from the press or the local government and indeed earned some praise for its handling of this potentially explosive incident; I am convinced that our openness to the press was a very large contributing factor.

Now I will move to a description of cultural and educational programs, which are a significant and often underappreciated component of a successful public diplomacy program. These longer-term programs provide the context and deeper understanding of a country's society, values, institutions and motives for forming the positions it takes. You could think, perhaps, of information programs as being the newspapers of a country's foreign affairs, and cultural and educational programs as being its literature. You can make do with the newspapers alone, but they will mean far more if you have read the literature.

For the U.S., cultural and educational programs start with the renowned Fulbright academic exchange program, which enables graduate students, researchers and professors to travel on

programs of several months or more between the U.S. and most countries in the world. The aim is to increase mutual understanding and prevent the kinds of misunderstandings that lead to war. After Senator Fulbright founded this program immediately after World War II, a number of other countries and private institutions established similar programs, so that now we have a fairly thick and, I believe, very helpful web of scholars with international experience. The U.S. also has several programs that bring professionals in various fields related to public policy to the U.S. for meetings with their counterparts. These programs also strengthen bonds of understanding by providing firsthand experience of the U.S.

We find that many people form very definite opinions about the U.S. that they base not on personal experience but just on our movies, popular music, TV programs, or other forms of popular culture. These opinions are quite often pretty negative, or at best inaccurate and incomplete. We find that people who go to the U.S. and form opinions as a result of actual experience and observation usually come away with a much more realistic basis for whatever views they may hold or actions they may take. When they go on a U.S. government-sponsored program, we make no attempt to show them only the good sides of the American coin. If they want to see slums, we make sure they can see slums, but we show them what some communities are doing about slums, too. I know a number of other countries have similar programs. Few, perhaps, are battling as much popular-culture-induced myth as we are, however.

I will add that public diplomacy used to mean additionally the organizing and financing of performing and visual arts programs, particularly in societies where American culture was underrepresented or unappreciated. We spent quite a lot of money sending wonderful arts programs to the Soviet Union, for example, and we are told that these programs kept alive for many Russians a positive impression of the West despite a great deal of negative propaganda to the contrary. Now, however, that we are not engaged in the superpower struggle, our funding has been cut and we have eliminated most cultural programming. We do assist American arts events that are financed privately, however, and in a place like London where there is a wealth of American talent on display, we provide an official presence and facilitative assistance to major events.

We also are able to undertake the supervision of programs that help build democratic institutions in areas where such efforts need sustenance. I know the European Union is active in this work as well, and some other countries are too. In the new countries of the NIS, for example, we have helped the organs of the free press get started through the provision of equipment and expert advice. In Northern Ireland, programs run from my London office support conflict resolution workshops and foster the formation of small businesses in an attempt to mitigate the poverty that is one of the roots of the troubles.

Other tools of public diplomacy I will mention in passing, as they may not be applicable to all national efforts. We and several other major powers support international radio broadcasting, beaming news and other programs overseas in dozens of languages. We also run a parallel television service, which provides ready-to-use public affairs programming to overseas stations that wish it. We additionally conduct public opinion polling overseas for the U.S. government and we compile and analyze what the foreign press is saying about the main themes of U.S. policy. This information is useful for policy-makers in Washington, who need to be aware of reactions and perceptions of foreign publics as they craft U.S. policy.

Before I leave the "how to do it" section of this talk, I want to touch on audiences and technology. A public diplomacy practitioner has to choose his audiences carefully, unless unlimited financial resources are at his disposal. They never are, so we leave appeals to mass audiences basically to our radio, television and now Website programming, and we concentrate everything else on the people who shape opinions. I have defined these before as journalists, government officials, academics, and I will add think-tank and non-governmental organization workers and leaders of business, the arts and society. We also have to assign resources of funding and personnel according to an analysis of which countries matter the most to us and in which countries can we make an important difference that serves our national interest. Every nation's Foreign Ministry will have to make such an

analysis, and for each it will, of course, be different. Given the paradigm I mentioned earlier, we examine and adjust resource allocations each year, because each year our relations shift somewhat.

Finally, I suggest that the application of modern communications technology to public diplomacy is absolutely essential, and I suggest that this means its design should not be left to the systems managers. Public diplomacy practitioners need to educate themselves in the techniques of communication in today's world and learn to deploy them. Most government organizations, I have noticed, in the U.S. and everywhere, lag behind business in the application of technology. I recommend, therefore, that international business rather than government bureaucracies provide the models for effective public diplomacy technology platforms. I would also recommend rejecting an incremental approach. Some of the most startling and effective uses of cutting-edge information technology are occurring, I understand, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, because these countries have leap-frogged generations of now-obsolete technology. They got, for example, from snail mail to email without the intervening inconveniences of commercial express mail or faxes.

What's next?

Now it's time to look into the future a bit, to see what trends public diplomacy may face in the coming decades, and then I will stop and take questions.

My belief, given the geopolitical trends already underway, is that we will be seeing governments engaging in more public diplomacy, not less. Furthermore, I believe that openness, or transparency as it's fashionably called, will become a more common attribute of governments, businesses and international organizations. Along with transparency will blossom collaboration and less hierarchical processes of governing, less top-down decision-making and more bottom-up and collaborative policy-making. Public opinion will demand it. I heard recently of an example of how this might look: a White House advisor recently was tasked with developing guidelines for regulating a certain kind of international commerce. Rather than drafting what he and his experts thought best and then sending it up the chain of command, he first posted it on the White House Website for comment and input from whomever was interested. The result was a set of guidelines far better than any closed-circuit team could have devised, plus he had buy-in thanks to the collaborative approach. Even better, enough people and governments had seen the guidelines that they started developing compatible regulations themselves.

The next prediction is that successful leaders in international endeavors will themselves become more adept at using the tools of public diplomacy to gain support for their positions. Public diplomacy will no longer be a job just for certain specialists, like press attaches and cultural attaches. Nearly everybody in an embassy will be engaged in public diplomacy, especially the Ambassador and other senior officers. There will, however, still be public diplomacy specialists, and they will be people who combine the skills of systems managers, modern librarians, publishers, database experts, marketers and cultural interpreters. They will advise the whole embassy team about how to target, distribute, differentiate and authenticate information so it is as useful as possible. In parallel to this trend, I expect that there will be a decreasing need to classify and restrict information. The dynamic of everything about transparency in government and the culture of the information revolution argues for openness.

The future will assuredly bring us further advances in the amount of information available and reductions in its cost. Andrew Grove, the brilliant head of Intel Corporation, has said about technology, "What can be done will be done." Technology will become so simple and universal that it will "disappear," much as books and telephones do for most of us now. The vehicle is simply not threatening or even important. These developments will result in the death of distance as an important factor in modern communications. The world will sort itself out into three major time and work zones, the Americas, Europe/Africa, and Asia. Already,

software companies are employing workers in these three zones to keep projects going around the clock.

In this fast-moving environment, the people who know how to choose, sort, edit, and authenticate information will become extremely valuable. I don't mean only in diplomatic services, of course, but throughout the workforce. The sought-after experts will be what we now are beginning to call "knowledge workers." And the institutions and nations that lead or play an influential role in the information revolution will have the advantage, the power, and the rewards.

In the information-rich world evolving before us, does the "virtual embassy" have a role? Can we depend on digital video conferences, Websites and real-audio news feeds to carry the public diplomacy of the future? Probably not. This same dismal outcome was predicted when the telegraph was invented and it did not happen. Human beings seem to need live representatives in order for important business to be conducted, especially when cultural differences are involved. Trust and mutual respect seem best to be obtained by people on the ground. I doubt that will change. We will probably see virtual teams of experts assembled by our foreign ministries, tasking people who possess particular expertise wherever they are stationed around the world to team up with headquarters colleagues to discuss problems electronically and formulate solutions. Canada is already a leader in doing this, I understand, having discovered that a wide-bandwidth platform between its headquarters and embassies produces efficiencies and savings that more than justify the initial cost outlay. In any case, virtual foreign policy and public diplomacy teams should work well, as in-house trust will already have been established. Such teams could be expanded to include NGOs or other entities. But I expect to see real embassies and real diplomats - and public diplomacy practitioners - well into the future.

Conclusion

I will return, in conclusion, to Dr. Fulton, for three summarizing recommendations on what we all need to mount the effective public diplomacy campaigns and programs of the future:

Bandwidth. We must persuade our foreign ministries to find and acquire sufficient bandwidth to exchange information of all kinds between embassies and headquarters and between embassies and the publics whom we are addressing in foreign countries.

Networking. We must establish complex networks of communication between publics and officials at home and abroad, and the complexity of these networks must mirror the complexity of the world in which we operate. There is such a thing as "Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety," which asserts - correctly I think - that no institution can survive in an environment whose complexity exceeds its ability to communicate.

Intellectual capital. We must obtain the growth, training and expansion of knowledge that diplomacy will need to be effective in an increasingly knowledge-based world. For this point, I guess I will face no argument, because everyone at this seminar is doing exactly what I recommend: seeking to expand the barriers of their thinking by bringing different points of view and sources of information together.

Who Needs Diplomats?

The Problem Of Diplomatic Representation⁽¹⁾

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Introduction

What or who does the post-cold war diplomat represent? Two trends are evident: increasing institutionalized multilateralism aimed at a stronger international order, either by improving cooperation between states or transcending the need for it; and the tendency to see diplomats in terms of the skills they possess and the jobs they do, rather than whom they represent. Because both developments seem to move diplomats further away from the sovereign state, their traditional source of authority and *raison d'être*, a number of writers have raised the possibility that diplomacy's identity as a discrete practice may be subsumed under broader notions of conflict resolution and bargaining.⁽²⁾

This neither is nor ought to be the case. Diplomats and the diplomatic system continue to derive their authority from the claim that they represent sovereign states in their relations with one another and not from some wider notion of international community, of which states are but one expression. Failures of diplomacy in places as different as Maastricht, Mostar, and Mogadishu involved over-ambitious attempts at international management for which no consensus existed in the great powers expected to supply the resources. Either this consensus has to be strengthened, a labour of Sisyphus given recent disappointments, or the ambitions of those who wish to manage the international system have to be scaled back. Otherwise we face more muddle, a further weakening of the frail consensus for maintaining overseas commitments, and even, although this remains a remote prospect as yet, a falling out among the great powers.

The paradox of our times is that in international politics, as in domestic politics, there is a high expectation that governments can and should solve problems and a widespread reluctance to pay the price. The result is a dangerous cycle in which governments embark on difficult international projects with inadequate resources because a major mobilization of them cannot be justified. To ease the resource problem, governments collaborate with other governments, adding a host of complications and dangers to already difficult tasks. Failure further weakens the potential for future consensus and cooperation, but the expectations that someone ought to do something are not reduced.

To explain this disjuncture between champagne tastes and beer budgets, we must look in part to the need for political leaders to sound optimistic above all else if they are to be elected. They, however, are swift to retreat to mere appearances as soon as their electorates chafe at the costs of an ill-founded international policy. A few dead rangers, disgraced paratroopers, or negative percentage points on the stock market will quickly pull them back. Not so the policy experts. One of the most striking features of the present wave of internationalist ambition is the extent to which it is embraced by the experts who advocate the policies of international order-building and by the professional diplomats whose task it is to carry them out. While diplomats are not immune to the temper of the times, they contribute to the present state of affairs because they have temporarily lost sight of what they represent - sovereign states and the people who live within them as independent political communities existing as ends in themselves. This is a sweeping claim which I hope to substantiate in this article.

The Idea of Diplomatic Representation

The idea of diplomatic representation has had problems throughout the life of the modern diplomatic system. If Michel Foucault was right, medieval thought accepted the idea of direct correspondence, one-for-one, far more readily than we do today.⁽³⁾ The medieval ambassador represented his sovereign in the sense that he was him or embodied him (literally in some readings) when he presented himself at court. Since then, however, representation has come to involve at least three elements: the sovereign; the ambassador as a person; and the ambassador in his representative capacity as the "sovereign." To complicate the matter further, the identities of sovereigns and diplomats alike have changed, blurred, and become more complex. Representation is a slippery concept but one which we cannot entirely do without. Politically incorrect though the language of representation might be, with its emphasis on symbols of power, wealth, and the grandeur of the state, it will not go away.

Diplomats are frustrated when people think they enjoy the grind and tedium of what some of their number in the United States Department of State refer to as "flowerpot duty,"⁽⁴⁾ but there is no general agreement about the value or necessity of such work. One former protocol officer assured me that only the new and the insecure "go to town" on ceremony and protocol; diplomats of the established great powers are far more relaxed about such matters. Diplomats relax perceptibly when I tell them that I am interested in representation in a simpler and more conceptual sense. Their prejudices about academics who need to make a meal of the obvious, after all, have been confirmed. "We represent our governments and countries," they reply, and any implicit ambiguities merely reflect those arising from the notional qualities of life in general. There are no big secrets to be revealed, only small uncertainties to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

Academics, of course, are not satisfied with this approach: some because they believe there are indeed secrets to be revealed (when diplomats say they represent their governments and countries, what they really represent is...); some because they are interested in why diplomatic life is constructed around particular notions and not others (when diplomats say they represent their governments and countries why do they follow government instructions on x and but not on y?); and some because they are interested in the consequences of attempts to negotiate the ambiguities arising from the notional qualities of social life (what follows from diplomats' attempts to represent their governments and countries in their relations with one another?) - hence, their attention to the obvious, and most commentaries place representation first or second among the functions of the resident embassy.⁽⁵⁾ While academics may wish to take the idea of representation further than diplomats, they seem to be no clearer about what that involves. Five elements vie for attention: ceremony; symbolism; interests; power; and ideas.

Representation as Ceremony and Symbolism

On the question of ceremonial representation, commentaries have added little to the observations of diplomats. Close observance of certain formalities helps to maintain the hierarchies which make social life possible in the diplomatic profession, as in other walks of life. This is tame stuff compared to an era in which the correspondence of ceremony and reality meant that when the French king or his ambassador visited the court of the English king, France had come to England, and ambassadors' retinues could come to blows over questions of precedence. In the Middle Ages and early modern period, the status of the ambassador as his sovereign emerged in response to the problem of how to deal with a person at Court who was not a subject and was, indeed, acting on behalf of someone else. Immunity, a functional requirement of effective communication, was justified by arguing that diplomats enjoyed the rights and privileges of their sovereigns, and since sovereigns embodied their polities then so, by default, must their representatives. And so, problems created by one fiction - the division of the political world into sovereigns and subjects -

assisted in the maintenance of another - the ambassador-as-sovereign or as the symbol of his sovereign.

For this fiction to work, diplomats must retain a certain residue from the era of direct correspondence. They may not think that their symbolic status is necessary to function effectively (in which case they are almost certainly wrong), but they do regard it as helpful. Thus, they have to pretend and get others to pretend that their symbolic claims are in some sense true. Here the problems begin in earnest: the idea of embodying the state is seen as immodest, false, and dangerous in a democratic and empiricist era replete with memories of the evils which can flow from treating nations as real and states as ends rather than means. Once acknowledged, therefore, the idea of symbolic representation is either safely cordoned off or watered down. It is cordoned off by confining it to relatively insignificant ceremonial occasions. It is watered down by suggesting that rather than embodying their states, diplomats exemplify or express their national, cultural identity. Marcel Cadieux sketched a profile of the Canadian diplomat both as a reflection of what he saw as the key elements of Canada's identity and as a catalyst in the process by which that identity could achieve its fullest expression. Identity diplomacy per se, however, belonged to the "romantic phase" of Canada's diplomacy. By the early 1960s, its officers were "no longer only symbols of our political independence," for that was "firmly established." Instead, they confronted "real and numerous tasks."⁽⁶⁾

Even if symbolic diplomacy recedes into the background in some process of national development as real diplomacy takes over, it refuses to remain there. Rejection of communications and invitations, nonappearances at functions, and the diplomatic walk-out all suggest that diplomats remain sensitive to perceived insults to the honour of their countries. The less professional among them may confuse personal dignity with the reputation of their country, but there are limits to what even the best will endure to maintain communications. Anatoly Dobrynin, the long-serving Soviet ambassador to the United States, expressed great frustration at the readiness of others, including his own leaders, to allow slights (real or imagined) to get in the way of business. Nevertheless, he shared his government's anger when the United States bombed North Vietnam in 1965 while Premier Alexis Kosygin was visiting Hanoi. "The fact remains that they bombed the country while our premier was there." The insult, rather than the political, military, or human consequences of the bombing, seemed to count for him.⁽⁷⁾

Whether they are sensitive to it or not, diplomats may have their symbolic significance thrust upon them in the form of verbal and physical assaults from egg-throwing to assassination. When Geoffrey Jackson was British ambassador to Uruguay, he was taken hostage by urban guerrillas who told him that he was "being punished as the national symbol of institutional neocolonialism." This brought home his symbolic significance with a directness he had not previously experienced.⁽⁸⁾

Representing Interests and Power

While the symbolic dimension never entirely disappears, it remains a source of unease for diplomats and those who comment on them. If diplomats represent sovereigns, be they princes, governments, or states, it would seem reasonable to suppose that they represent their interests just as other professionals represent the interests of their clients. This gets one off the difficult metaphysical level and allows a freer discussion of diplomacy, but the cost is high in terms of conceptual clarity and an ability to evaluate diplomatic activity. Once diplomatic representation is seen to represent interests, virtually everything a diplomat does must be viewed both as an aspect of representation and as an attempt to serve the interests of governments or countries. In R.P. Barston's standard work on diplomacy, six "tasks" of diplomacy are listed. The first is representation, which is divided between "ceremonial" and "substantive."⁽⁹⁾ Into the latter are packed explaining and defending national policy, negotiating, and interpreting the policies of receiving governments. As may be expected, the distinction between these three components of substantive representation and some of the

other tasks (which include listening, preparing the ground for initiatives, reducing friction, and contributing to orderly change) is by no means clear, and one is left wondering why representation qualifies as a distinct, let alone important, activity at all.

One possible way out of this confusion is provided by Hans Morgenthau, although at a price which one suspects most students of diplomacy would be reluctant to pay. He distinguishes between political, legal, and symbolic representation.⁽¹⁰⁾ The first two provide catch-alls for all functions of diplomacy. Surprisingly, given his reputation as a realist of the power political school, he also declares that the diplomat is "first of all. . .the symbolic representative of his country." The letdown follows swiftly, however, as it becomes clear that symbolic representation, like sovereignty, soldiers, and dollars, is just another instrument in the arsenal of power and influence. Diplomacy is merely "one of the lesser tools of foreign policy."⁽¹¹⁾ The task of the diplomat is to assert the prestige of his own country while testing that of others. If power is primarily a psychological relationship, then prevailing beliefs and ideologies are significant only insofar as they provide ways of obtaining influence over others and denying them influence over you. All the functions of the diplomat reduce to what Ermolo Barbaro, the Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1490, called the "first duty of an ambassador. . .that is, to do, say, advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state."⁽¹²⁾ In the political world associated with Morgenthau, in which national and self-interests are defined in terms of power, what else could diplomats do but represent their own power?

Representing Ideas

Barbaro's quote appears to provide one of those rare glimpses into what the realist believes goes on behind the general depreciation of power. As an account of what diplomats do, however, it is as inaccurate and incomplete as Morgenthau's reduction of symbolic representation to one of the lesser instruments of state power. Diplomats have never accepted that their only business is to advance the particular interests of their states. They also see themselves as working for and, therefore, representing the idea of peace. As Abba Eban notes, the words for messenger in both Greek (*angelos*) and Hebrew (*mal'ach*) have sacred, as well as secular, connotations.⁽¹³⁾ The use of both for messenger in general came before their use as messenger of God, but diplomats and their defenders have happily used the association with the divine to strengthen the idea that the profession serves a higher calling than, or as well as, secular power. Certainly, the idea that diplomats serve peace predates that of serving the prince. Over a half century before Barbaro, Bernard du Rosier declared that the "business of the ambassador was peace" and that he was "sacred because he acted in the general welfare."⁽¹⁴⁾ Barbaro assailed this orthodoxy because it raised "the gravest ethical problem...for theory...the possibility of a conflict between the ambassador's duty to his prince and his duty to peace."⁽¹⁵⁾

Secularism and statism were great spurs to the development of diplomacy as a profession, but they did not overwhelm the earlier commitment to peace. Indeed, a shared commitment to peace and saving their respective princes from themselves became hallmarks of the profession, something which diplomats could hold in common to cement their sense of corps and to gain some distance from their political leaderships. What it meant beyond this is less easy to say. In commentaries on diplomacy, it is possible to identify at least three conceptions of peace: minimalist, positivist, and transformationalist. None is a watertight category, still less a school of diplomatic thought on peace.

The minimalist school focuses on the conduct of relations by peaceful means and the peaceful resolution of disputes by negotiation. "Peace is usually better than war, and the medium of intercourse between states should not itself become a source of conflict."⁽¹⁶⁾ Seventeenth-century princes were driven to protect their interests through peace and diplomacy only after they had been exhausted by war.⁽¹⁷⁾ Ambassadors served peace when peace served, but, in the meantime, their main purpose in talking to one another was to ensure recognition from equals of the status their masters believed was their due. Britain's

ambassador to West Germany in the 1960s saw his contribution to peace in terms as describing "the other side of the story" either to his own ministers, who "were sometimes reluctant to hear it," or to foreign governments.(18) Dobrynin saw his "fundamental task" as "helping to develop a correct and constructive dialogue between the leaders of both countries and maintaining the positive aspects of our relations wherever possible." "To both sides," he "tried to be a reassuring presence in a very strained world."(19)

While these are practical responses to the question of what it means to serve peace, minimalism gives no more than an implicit answer to the question of what one should do when the interests of peace and those of the prince fail to coincide. For de Wicquefort, the diplomat should have an aversion to war only when war is no longer productive. Even those more obviously associated with the peace tradition in diplomatic writings are not entirely clear on this point. Du Rosier, for example, is usually interpreted as speaking in defense of the *respublica christiana* or God's order in the world as it faded before the twin assaults of schismatics and rationalists. The ambassador should be regarded as sacred because "he labours for the public good" and the "speedy completion of an ambassador's business is in the interests of all."(20) Rather than seeking to restore God's order, all this maybe is a case of special pleading for diplomatic immunity at a time when travel was dangerous and uncertain. Similar ambiguity can be found in the writings of François de Callières, who suggests that we will understand diplomacy better if we think of the states of Europe as joined by "all kinds of necessary commerce," as "members of one Republic" where "no considerable change can take place in any one. . .without affecting the condition, or disturbing the peace, of all the others." He even speaks of a "freemasonry of diplomacy," in which all members work for the "same end." It turns out, however, that the shared end is nothing more than "to discover what is happening."(21)

Disappointing though this might be to those attracted by the grand rhetoric in which some writers package their practical suggestions, these suggestions go beyond the minimalist conception of diplomats as simply seeking to avoid war or prevent themselves from being a source of further tension. Whether or not states preferred peace, they had to agree upon procedures for communicating with one another, and these procedures could be arranged to minimize their potential for becoming a source of unwanted conflict. This gave rise to the positivist conception of peace, *la raison de système*, in which the international system or society has its own qualities or even needs which impose a certain logic, practical or prescriptive, on the behavior of its members. The sparse character of *la raison de système* may be contrasted with the richer *respublica christiana* it replaced.(22) The latter arose out of a sense of universal law, while the former sees diplomacy as "an integral part of the minimal conditions securing the existence of international society." This amounts to little more than a *corps diplomatique*, which "had an independent existence, whose members were all doing the same job and who would treat each other in a civilized way even when their principles were at war."(23) Even in war, life must go on, for diplomats at least, and this is the value which they need to represent to their princes.

However, like all positivist accounts of emerging systems of order or rules which possess their own logic, the argument for *la raison de système* has to distinguish those developments which are consistent with the original conception from those which are not and decide what to do about the latter. The *corps diplomatique* acquired a life of its own and, by providing states with a better means of conducting their relations, appeared to make possible a transformed international system in which the imperatives of states could be transcended.(24) Even as the evolution of diplomatic practice suggested such a possibility, the rise of popular sovereignty and its consequences for international relations made it seem both desirable and necessary. Where the people were sovereign, the business of diplomacy could no longer be to find a way of living under conditions of anarchy. It had to construct a means of escape or perish as an institution unsuited to the era of popular sovereignty.

Diplomatic Representation and Popular Sovereignty

Constructing a means of escape so that international relations might be transformed is usually presented either as a social theory parable about the need for international reform or as a historical narrative of tragic proportions. In the former, sovereign state diplomacy, born in the simpler times of seventeenth-century Europe, failed to deal with the challenges of the increased application of science and technology to the satisfaction of a variety of human purposes. It could not prevent war when wars became too destructive. It could not secure prosperity when prosperity became dependent upon extensive cooperation across borders. And it ceased to be an authentic expression of the way human beings associated or ought to associate, either transnationally or subnationally. We find ourselves, therefore, inhabiting fading structures imposed by general principles and their particular political and territorial expressions, both of which were established to provide dubious solutions to long-forgotten or out-dated problems. In this view, the institution of diplomacy, whatever its members might say about the need for orderly and peaceful reform, is perpetually under suspicion and, indeed, may be fatally implicated in the resistance to change unless it can show itself to be in the vanguard of change.

The historical narrative is more forgiving. The twentieth century began with two defeats for diplomacy. The failure to prevent the First World War was more perceived than actual because policy, not diplomacy, was to blame. Perceived failure, however, contributed to a second defeat when the League of Nations was unable to prevent the Second World War. Facilitating the operations of conferences and congresses between the leaders of the great powers was one thing, but diplomats saw the democratic and egalitarian imperatives of the League as "the negation of their craft."⁽²⁵⁾ However, their resistance, together with those features of the League system which they opposed, was eventually swept away by larger struggles, first with the Axis powers and then with the USSR. In these struggles, diplomats were subordinated to the requirements of grand strategy, geopolitics, and ideological "great contests" in which both revisionists and the principal status quo power could be described as anti-diplomats. Whether by world domination, world revolution, or world reform, they all sought peace by replacing differences with what they believed were superior, universal values.

It is interesting to consider the role of the sovereign people in each account. For the social scientist, the role is implied but important. It is the people who will no longer put up with an international institution – diplomacy - which never served them well but which was rendered ineffective by developments in science and technology. The role of popular sovereignty in helping to make possible some of the horrors which overwhelmed diplomacy is not considered, except as a mobilizing device cynically manipulated by diplomats and their masters. In the historical account, the possibility that the people, or some of them, contributed to the great international failures of the twentieth century is entertained, but the conclusions about what must happen to diplomacy are, by and large, unchanged. Its proper business must now be to construct international institutions to corral the state and, where those institutions fail, to construct better ones.

Under such pressures, diplomacy could not stand still. According to Adam Watson, its independent logic combined with external pressures to imbue *raison de système* with a more complex and ambitious significance as a "conscious sense that all states in an international society have an interest in preserving it and making it work." What emerged was something which "transcends the mere mechanics of dialogue." In an increasingly interdependent world, states seek agreements by which they surrender particular bits of their authority, and "*this way forward is the way of diplomacy.*" International affairs are moving "towards a more collectively organized society of states." As diplomacy evolves, so too does the individual diplomat, from Barbaro's instrument of the prince to Talleyrand's servant of the state who recognizes that Napoleons come and go but that the interests of France are eternal. Such diplomats, aware of the long-term interests of states and their continuous contact with one another, begin to discern the interest they share in maintaining "the effective functioning of the system itself, and of their responsibilities towards it." The result is statesmen and diplomats who exhibit "prudential responsibility," pursuing interests with restraint, rather than

"uncompromisingly, regardless of confrontation and clashes." They see "positive advantage in co-operating with other states and international bodies." The responsible statesman will be "willing to pay a price in state interests narrowly conceived, for the sake of the greater advantages which he sees that his state will obtain from the existence of an orderly society."[\(26\)](#)

To be sure, a little self-abnegation goes a long way. Watson remains enough of a diplomat to emphasize the importance of well socialized great powers to the success of his version of *raison de système*. And I am aware that all his comments can be rendered consistent with the advice given down the years from Thucydides to Kissinger that a prince should be prepared to make concessions on matters which are not of vital interest to gain ground on those which are. However, it is clear that for Watson peaceful international change does not mean the "same old melodrama" of international politics in which all that happens are shifts in the balance of power.[\(27\)](#) When he and others speak of the surrender of authority, particularly on the part of the great powers, they mean changes in the fundamental character of international politics and claim a major role for professional diplomacy in bringing it about.

The case can be made tentatively. While diplomacy may be "the art of resolving negotiations peacefully," it is also "the technique or skill which reigns over the development, in a harmonious manner, of international relations."[\(28\)](#) It can be made in a balanced manner. American foreign service officers saw themselves at the turn of the century as "spokesmen for the Old Diplomacy" at home, "obliged to teach their countrymen a healthy skepticism about world politics," while their mission overseas was "to persuade other governments to subscribe to a meliorist vision of world politics."[\(29\)](#) It can also be preached that a "diplomatic representative is preeminently a peacemaker" whose duty is to take a part "in the elevation and purification of diplomacy."[\(30\)](#) Such preaching was not the preserve of American diplomats. In 1949 Britain's wartime ambassador to Turkey declared that "enlightened countries" had long since realized the futility of manipulative diplomacy and that "much of our energy nowadays is directed to the wider and more honourable task of serving the international welfare and harmony by taking into account the legitimate interests of all."[\(31\)](#) Given his own career as an ambassador, in which he was machine-gunned in China by Japanese aircraft and duped in Istanbul by a member of his own staff, and the circumstances of the time in which he expressed his views, one is tempted to conclude that Knatchhull-Hugessen was engaging in the Persian practice of "ketman," pious dissimulation for a good purpose. Rare though this candor (if such it is) may be for a diplomat, it does capture the rhetorical triumph of the transformational conception of peace which in this century came to dominate the environment in which diplomats operated and to which they were constrained to adjust. Representation - of sovereigns, interests, or ideas - was replaced by metaphors of constructing and building by which issues were to be managed and problems were to be solved.

To accept that diplomacy came under great pressure to reform does not tell us why diplomats shifted from seeing international change in terms of adjustments which accommodated the interests of sovereigns to reforming or transforming the international system as a whole. After all, if the idea of representing sovereigns posed practical, political, and conceptual problems, why would the idea of representing a transformational conception of peace be any easier? One does not have to like a prince, state, or nation to be able to see on what basis diplomats attempt to represent them. One may like the idea of peace, but on what basis do diplomats claim to represent it and act on its behalf? In a transforming system, why does peace need diplomats, rather than politicians and other civil servants, to represent it? As the historical narrative makes clear, diplomats faced immensely mitigating circumstances as they wrestled with these questions, but their answers directly impinge on the larger question: what next? After a mere ninety years, the universals have departed and the disciplines of grand strategy have been relaxed. To begin to answer the question of what happens next, some observations have to be made about how diplomats see the world and their place within it, to identify "the family likeness. . . in Instructions and State-papers composed in countries and at times remote from one another" and which I refer to here as the diplomatic disposition.[\(32\)](#)

The Diplomatic Disposition

The simplest explanation for why diplomats became representatives of a transformative conception of peace, and one to which they are surprisingly willing to subscribe when the heat is on, is that they are a pretty over-determined crowd. It may be that "the vices of diplomacy appear to be in general. . . those of the surrounding society and of the time" and that diplomats spend most of their time simply trying to carry out the instructions of their governments.⁽³³⁾ If the prevailing assumption among governments and people is that a stronger world order is needed, then it should come as no surprise that diplomats will be engaged in its construction. But this begs the question of where the prevailing assumptions about diplomacy come from in a way which is unflattering to the profession, and it sits uneasily with the sense diplomats have of themselves as an élite.

Two other explanations for this professional passivity might be explored. The first is that it is not a function of their professional self-image as public servants but arises from a pessimism about the human condition which resides in the bosom of the best diplomats and is confirmed by their experience. In Ernest Satow's study, the Austrian diplomatist, Hubner, was "compelled to contend for a bad cause" and the author concludes that the most one can attain by "prudence and love of peace is the postponement of the evil day."⁽³⁴⁾ This might be a reasonable conclusion if one had spent one's professional life in the service of the Ballhausplatz, but it is a remarkable one for a Briton lecturing in the midst of his own country's greatness. In a similar vein, the Englishman, Harold Nicolson, noted that diplomats tend to develop certain "functional defects" because of the "human folly or egotism" they are forced to witness during careers in which they know the facts and others do not. As a result, they may mistakenly regard serious passions as transitory emotions and "thus underestimate the profound emotion by which whole nations may be swayed." The danger is that the diplomat "often becomes denationalized, internationalized, and therefore dehydrated, an elegant, empty husk." Yet Nicolson also notes that a profession should not "be judged by its failures" and elegant, empty, diplomatic husks are rare outside the world of fiction and popular imagination.⁽³⁵⁾

Secondly, the experiences which feed world-weariness may also give rise to cynicism, laying diplomats open to the charge that they simply seek power or, worse, to be close to it without responsibility. In accounting for his own success, the British Foreign Office permanent under-secretary, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, declared in the early 1900s that his "theory in the service was that 'power' is the first aim."⁽³⁶⁾ Diplomats have served some fairly odious regimes. The Nazi seizure of power provoked only one ambassadorial resignation.⁽³⁷⁾ Dobrynin, for all his efforts to present himself as a civilizing influence on Soviet power, remains remarkably glib about the activities of his colleagues. Indeed, the Russian experience from Tsarist empire to Bolshevik state and from USSR to Russian republic provides remarkable examples of shifts in the allegiances of professional diplomats.⁽³⁸⁾ It can be argued that the evolution of the European Union (EU) is providing us with others.

However, the most one can conclude from this is that diplomats are neither more nor less virtuous than the rest of the population. For every quote about power, there are many more about restraining and tempering its use. Nor have diplomats played the passive and pessimistic parts assigned to them by some commentators in which they simply go with the flow or, to put it more professionally, do their best to execute the will of their political masters without making things worse. More research is needed on the role of diplomats in policy formulation, but it is clear that some have taken the lead in advocating peace through the construction of an order which circumscribed the autonomy of their sovereigns. They did so because they thought it was a good idea. They continue to do so, however, not as cosmopolitans in the pejorative sense used by critics to call into question their patriotism.

More typical than Nicolson's elegant husks is what might be called the practical - or even unreflective - cosmopolitanism exhibited by Frank Roberts when he recalls his role as Britain's ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the 1950s. He suggests that his position was unusual because he was "like any Ambassador, the representative of his country, but at the same time share[d] a collective responsibility as a

member of the Council." As a consequence, it was his duty "not only to represent British views on the Council but also to press upon London, when required, the collective views of the Council in addition to reporting those of Spaak, Norstaad and individual national representatives." It is "pressing" rather than reporting which is important here, and on one occasion "pressing upon London" resulted in Roberts being summoned to 10 Downing Street after Earl Mountbatten complained about his support for American generals in an argument with their British counterparts. Roberts makes no explicit judgment about his conduct and discusses neither his conception of his role nor the issues raised by his carpeting. Nevertheless, one senses a confidence bordering on smugness that Roberts believes that he was right, Mountbatten was wrong, and that anyone with a grasp of diplomacy would agree.(39)

This interpretation involves a degree of reading into the text, one of the professional hazards of studying people who write carefully but not necessarily transparently. Although unabashed and assertive cosmopolitanism is hard to find in the writings of diplomats, in one case at least, there is little need for such interpretive skills. Dag Hammarskjöld, in writing about the impact of public opinion in the 1960s, maintained that, while diplomacy had changed little from ancient times until the nineteenth century, it now needed "new techniques" for a "new world." The challenge was to gain acceptance of the new techniques when neither diplomats nor the general public were "fully acclimated" to the role now played by public opinion. Too often, public opinion meant that compromise would be shunned "out of fear that it will be labeled appeasement or defeat." If that was so, Hammarskjöld argued, "no diplomat is likely to meet the demands of public opinion on him as a representative in international policy unless he understands this opinion and unless he respects it deeply enough to give it leadership when he feels that the opinion does not truly represent the deeper and finally decisive aspirations in the minds and hearts of the people."(40) What is remarkable in this quote is not the internationalist claim implicit in it. After all, Hammarskjöld as secretary-general of the United Nations was an international civil servant in a sense that goes beyond Roberts' experience of trying to wear multiple hats. Nor is it the remarkable rhetorical finesse by which he proposes to give people what they want, rather than what they think they want, because he respects them. It is the underlying professional confidence, shared with Roberts, that he knows best because he has a grasp of what is needed and what is possible in international politics.

This confidence in a grasp of the essentials is a dominant theme in writings of diplomats. They present themselves as practical men and women who take the world for what it is, rather than what it might be, and who let reason, rather than emotion, govern their actions. Mattingly notes with approval the "platitudinous character" of the advice-to-ambassadors literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because "the simple and difficult rules of any enduring art" always sound like platitudes.(41) Diplomacy "does not so much require special qualifications as make special calls for common qualifications."(42) To the honesty at its heart might be added "the application of intelligence and tact" and "a ready wit and sense of proportion."(43) Diplomats "are not inclined to separate questions of principle from their practical affairs, or to neglect administrative problems because of their more theoretical preoccupations."(44) Lord Carnock, for example, was convinced that Anglo-Russian differences at the turn of the century "were caused by simple misunderstanding of each other."(45) His grandson, Harold Nicolson, maintained that foreign affairs consisted of "the development of perfectly simple and ascertainable probabilities." Indeed, he was highly critical of those who persisted in seeing them "as some elaborately shifting pattern" or who made diplomacy more complicated than was necessary.(46) The corollary to straightforward, honest men capable "of seeing the right people at the right time and saying the right things to them in the right way" is that the world is populated by people who are not.(47)

Thus, like Dobrynin with his "reassuring presence," diplomats see themselves as the steadying influence when others - publics and politicians alike - are carried away by the heat of the moment to demand the satisfaction of national honour with war, or be tempted by fear and selfishness to renounce important international responsibilities when they become dangerous or expensive to uphold. This professional detachment, however, is made possible only by a philosophical distance from the idea of international politics. Diplomats see themselves as more aware than those they represent of the conceptual sand on which the international order is built and believe that it is their professional duty to let this awareness

guide their actions. It is the amateurs, in this view, who, when it occurs to them to think about it at all, will take an idea like sovereignty literally and insist upon its implications uncompromisingly. The professionals, by contrast, keep the notional world of sovereign states running by curbing the impulses to apply its principles too vigorously. They can do so because, thanks to their expertise and training, they do not inhabit the international world in quite the way the rest of us apparently do.

It is this which may be called the diplomatic disposition. Leaving aside the accuracy of the assumptions on which it is based, it has important and paradoxical consequences because diplomats believe it. On the one hand, their professional detachment from international politics inhibits them from defending the representational requirements of an effective system of diplomacy among sovereign states, even though their own positions would be inconceivable without such an idea. Representing one's literal prince in a God-ordained order has a plausibility which representing one's figurative prince, be it a government, country, or people, can never quite attain. Besides, diplomats know that in an important sense France, Japan, and Britain are not real and that bad things can happen when foreign policy is dictated by those who believe they are. On the other hand, they cannot welcome their publics sharing their own convictions about the notional quality of international politics because, in the end, they think that international order depends upon such notions being accepted. A world of states whose citizens possessed the consciousness of diplomats would be unrepresentable, and a world of states whose diplomats possessed the consciousness of citizens would be unmanageable. Ideally, therefore, people should live with the consciousness of citizens within their countries, accepting the claims of their governments while acknowledging the expertise of their diplomats in the conduct of relations among them.

Insofar as this state of affairs pertains, diplomats enjoy considerable leeway in establishing procedures for pursuing and reconciling the interests of the states they represent. They can "cheat" on the rules and even, on occasion, on their princes to keep the world running smoothly. The trick, as ever, is knowing what one can get away with. However, in the twentieth century public opinion had to be palliated before it would allow diplomats to do anything. Hammarskjöld suggested that this would result in nationalist or statist restrictions imposed on diplomatic practice, but it did not, at least not in any simple sense. Rather, the rise of public opinion coincided with the emergence of the great ideological conflicts whose strategic and material consequences impelled diplomats to accompany their political leaders from serving peace through international adjustments to building it through international reform. Grave threats and great promises enabled governments to embark on this adventure and their publics to support them.

The diplomats went along with both because they had little choice. They went along with equanimity because, at heart, they were confident that the sovereign state system, notional though it might be, was real in that it enjoyed more correspondence with the fragmented human condition than any other way of expressing it. This confidence, too, is part of the diplomatic disposition. It underpins Dobrynin's impatience with the ideological rigidities of his political masters, ensures that no one could take Lord Hardinge's search for power above all else as implying something above the interests of his king and country, and allows Nicolson to claim that, in the end, diplomacy is a simple business. So long as the countries remain real, everything else fits comfortably into place. Roberts' story is so comfortably told precisely because we know he has not become a NATO man in the same sense that he is "Britain's man" and that his claim to represent NATO derives from nowhere else but his claim to represent Britain.

Post-Cold War Representation

But is Roberts right? Is the confidence of the diplomatic disposition in the sovereign state system which allows him to tell his story in the way he does justified? After all, it is not merely the sterile, frightened ideologues of the Politburo who have recently been swept away. So too has the USSR which Dobrynin served and about the impermanence of which he has little to

say. It can be argued that European great powers face a similar, if gentler, fate. It may be symptomatic of international political change that one must turn to diplomats from the remaining superpower for clear reaffirmation of the priorities of princes over peace. The American Max Kampelman argues that one should be careful about creating too many international organizations because "experience shows that [their] staffs. . . begin to establish their own policy and goals."⁽⁴⁸⁾ Few contemporary European diplomats would openly agree, and none would echo Robert Vansittart's view of a half-century ago that "The more we are together" should become "the Froth-Blowers' Anthem," at least not on the record.⁽⁴⁹⁾ And yet the anchor remains. Ask EU diplomats about their daily work and they will describe in great detail the multilateral committees in which they try to establish a better way of solving this problem or regulating that behavior for the benefit of all. The operative pronoun is "we" and yet, ask them who they serve and they will say their government or their country.

Skepticism about the complacency of the diplomatic disposition is, indeed, widespread. It is most obviously called into question by aspects of the complex pattern of relations which is emerging among the members of the EU. Much of it remains recognizably diplomatic, the bilateral relations between members, for example, and, if the diplomats themselves are to be believed, even a great deal of the complex and technical bargaining around the operations of common policies. It is less easy to regard the activities of the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Commission staff, or even the people seconded to the European presidency in the same vein. Who do they represent as they engage in the construction of new policies, regimes, and, in the latter case conceivably, a politico-diplomatic entity? Can French policy on monetary union be interpreted as a security strategy against Germany when, if it is implemented, it will possibly be no longer clear just what is being secured against whom? Only the intense difficulties which the representatives of the member states experience in accomplishing common objectives permits agreement with those who contend that the whole ensemble may still be regarded as an exercise in conference diplomacy.⁽⁵⁰⁾

A far more common scholarly reaction to the diplomatic disposition is the increasing body of international theory which assumes that the sovereign state system is fading and that this is not necessarily a bad thing. Brian Hocking, for example, identifies catalytic diplomacy, in which new kinds of actors deal with new kinds of issues in new ways.⁽⁵¹⁾ Catalytic diplomats control resources, enjoy access, and possess certain skills which allow them to work at all levels of society building coalitions out of a shifting milieu of actors to secure interests and solve problems. Canada's high commissioner to Britain, for example, can mobilize Cornish fishermen to press London for a European fisheries policy more friendly to the interests of the Atlantic provinces. His ambassadorial position gives him certain assets, but it does not appear to be essential. A lawyer or professional mediator representing Canadian fisheries might play nearly the same game, indeed, might do rather better than the professionals who "retain an overriding concern with principles of state sovereignty" and work with an overly narrow understanding of peace. Some think we need "field diplomats," distinguished not by whom they represent but by the skills they possess in mediating and facilitating conflict resolution.⁽⁵²⁾

Conceivably, therefore, diplomacy is losing both its professional and conceptual identity as we move towards an era distinguished by what George Kennan called "diplomacy without the diplomats." In an otherwise sympathetic treatment, Hamilton and Langhorne suggest that "diplomacy has been transformed and transcended."⁽⁵³⁾ Such sentiments are expressions of the current movement among international theorists away from treating international relations as a distinctive branch of human relations. If they are right, the institution of diplomacy as it has emerged over the centuries is certainly in deep trouble because it is built upon the notion of representation, and, problematic though this is, on what basis might diplomats be said to represent anything other than states?

One could imagine replacing them with a new sort of profession defined in terms of the functional skills of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation, contracted on a commercial basis, but its agents would not be diplomats because they would lack both the symbolic and political significance of servants of the state. Nor, one suspects, would they be as effective. Today, for example, an American's negotiating skills may be formidable, but they

are enhanced by the fact that he or she represents the United States and not the United Nations, the EU, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, or any other agency.

However, the possibility that diplomacy might disappear or be transcended should be treated with considerable skepticism on empirical grounds. Diplomacy has not changed all that much because, on close inspection, it turns out that it was never quite the way we have learned to remember it. At the end of the fifteenth century, two French diplomats on the way to visit the Sultan were killed by Spanish troops on behalf of Margaret of Hungary, then the governor of the Spanish Netherlands.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Four hundred years later, Arthur Hardinge found himself presiding over Portuguese courts in Zanzibar and settling territorial disputes between his Portuguese and German neighbours, while Lord Carnock spent at least some of his time in Tangier building local coalitions to oppose the deforestation of the surrounding hills by charcoal burners and attempting to frustrate British gun-runners acting in the French interest.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Even Hardinge of Penshurst describes how his efforts to marry Princess Marie to the Romanian Crown Prince did not detract from a parallel campaign to secure access to the Romanian market for British cotton.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Sovereigns may have been a requisite of diplomacy in the past, but a tidy world of sovereigns with clearly demarcated political relations never was.

We may conclude then that, with a few exceptions resulting from undiplomatic excitement or most diplomatic ketman, the diplomats were right. One could serve peace, even in the sense of constructing international order, without damaging one's foundations in the sovereign state system because essentially that system was and is not disappearing. Nevertheless, the imperatives of world war and cold war which made serving peace in a transformative sense seem so necessary, and the certainties of the ideologies which made it seem so attractive, have been greatly weakened. They have been replaced by a world of relative security in which fragmentation is as much a fact as interdependence, and in which diversity and separateness have re-emerged as a counterpoint to cosmopolitanism. The challenge which confronts post-cold war diplomacy, therefore, is not how to respond to the erosion of its own premise; it is to reassert the extent to which that premise, the problem of relations in a fragmented human community whose components value their sovereignty, remains operative.

A failure to be effective here courts two dangers. First, diplomacy's legitimacy as an institution of international society may be weakened. Every diplomat who does not represent a country faces the questions: who do you represent and in whose name do you make your requests and suggest your policies? The more institutionally removed diplomats are from their established positions as representatives of their governments, the harder these questions are to answer. The claim to represent countries has problems, but the answers that diplomats represent no one or everyone, or different people and different things in different contexts, are no answers at all. Hocking's high commissioner does not derive his authority from his skills, the situation he finds himself in, or the services he can provide, but from the fact that he represents his country. To obscure this is to do him and his profession a disservice.

Secondly, a failure to reassert diplomacy's premise contributes to bad foreign policy. It is still too early to predict the consequences of community-building and community-expansion in North America, Europe, and elsewhere. I suspect that either the more grandiose schemes for building political order on economic and financial integration will subside into more prosaic exercises in intergovernmental collaboration, or that we shall witness a partial disintegration of the fusion between politics and economics which has been one of the hallmarks of the last century. If countries on the gold standard, or countries like Canada and the United States or England and Scotland, could pursue independent political policies and conduct intense arguments while their currencies intermingled, then conceivably the participants in a single European currency system could do the same. However, one does not need to speculate about the possible consequences of community-building in the absence of community to identify examples of bad policy. Several failures have already occurred in one area of traditional concern - getting the great powers to exercise their responsibilities towards the maintenance of international order.

As recent experiences in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Zaire suggest, the consensus behind this traditional role remains shallow and fragile. The war against Iraq was won, but only after a major expenditure of diplomatic and political effort. Iraq had to be presented as a major threat to international order, not because of any equalization of power brought about by changes in military technology - the course of the war demonstrated that no such equalization had taken place - but because this was the only way in which a variety of constituencies could be persuaded to support it. The wars between the republics of the former Yugoslavia proved impervious to the new type of military intervention practiced under United Nations auspices, described as humane and sophisticated by its supporters in Europe and timid by its detractors in the United States. Only direct but limited punitive intervention by the United States against one side arrested further deterioration, but the consequences of that action remain uncertain, principally because great-power commitment to raising the stakes, if necessary, remains equally uncertain. And in Africa, the general unwillingness of the great powers to intervene and their inability to agree with each other when one of their number risked a more assertive role - the United States in Somalia, France in Rwanda - were exposed by the demand that something must be done.

Whatever the answer may be to that problem of post-cold war great power intervention (and it is possible that it involves convincing publics that sending one or two thousand soldiers abroad is a small deal rather than a big one), it will not be found in improving the machinery for co-ordination at the interstate or supranational level. By concentrating on the architecture within which such problems might be managed, post-cold war diplomacy has done little to correct the lack of perspective and much to maintain the gap between the weak commitment to do something and the high expectation that something must be done. Even when the vast amount of diplomatic and political effort expended on these architectures succeeds in sending a few thousand soldiers into the field or committing a few score of aircraft to aerial policing, the best this approach seems capable of delivering in terms of great power engagement is over-commitment. This, in turn, courts disappointment, failure, and increased public skepticism about the value of foreign adventures which, when they become costly or dangerous, are exposed as serving no demonstrable national interest.

The worst it courts is great power disagreement. To date, such disagreements have resulted only in the immobilization of policies. Differences over Bosnia, for example, meant that United States preferences were not acted upon until European preferences had been demonstrated to be bankrupt. Differences between the French and the Americans over policies in central Africa resulted in the former's withdrawal. Suppose, however, that the gap between the United States and other claimants to great power status narrows, as it eventually must, and suppose that in their efforts to secure domestic support for interventions, governments and their advisors are tempted to make their case in terms of national interests (how else are they to persuade their electorates to pay the necessary price in blood and treasure?). Either development might make it harder for great powers to resolve their differences over collective intervention by suspending their policies or by doing nothing.

Diplomats should, therefore, reconsider the ways in which they have dealt with ideas such as nationalism and independence in the course of the twentieth century. Should they still be seen as obstacles or residual facts of international politics, for example, which skilful diplomats should seek to finesse, or is it possible to refer to them again as the building blocks of the only international order we are likely to enjoy? This may sound like a very tall order, and, insofar as it raises the question of the relationship of the diplomat to the specific thrust of foreign policy, it is. Even so, diplomats must respond to it because it involves a responsibility which they have assumed throughout the history of their profession, namely to ensure that their activities do not become a source of international tension. Diplomats should remind themselves and others that they are first and foremost the representatives of sovereign states, that this is their *raison d'être* and a precondition for anything else they might aspire to be or to do. This might require an adjustment in their professional orientation but not a transformation.

NOTES

1. Originally published in "International Journal" (Autumn 1997)
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