Persuasion
the essence of diplomacy

A publication in honour of
Professor Dietrich Kappeler

Edited by Jovan Kurbalija
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Foreword

The world of diplomacy is better equipped to address the challenges of contemporary international relations thanks to the tremendous contribution that Prof. Dietrich Kappeler has made in the field of diplomatic training globally during the past five decades.

I vividly recall meeting Prof. Kappeler when he was Director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) in the early 1990s. His crystal-clear analysis of the changing world around us and his unique ability to highlight the crucial role that diplomacy must play to secure a peaceful post-Cold War era inspired me to seek a better understanding of our Mediterranean world in my doctoral academic studies.

During the past two decades, MEDAC at the University of Malta has sought to continue to build upon the prestigious legacy that we inherited from Prof. Kappeler by providing training to young diplomats from the Mediterranean and beyond.

More than 700 diplomats have followed the postgraduate Master's programme in Diplomatic Studies that offers scholars academic insight into the core disciplines of international relations, international law, international economics, international history and diplomacy. Since its establishment, MEDAC has also continued to be a regional diplomatic training institution offering young diplomats the opportunity to specialise in issues pertaining to the Mediterranean.

Prof. Kappeler's indefatigable approach to the world of diplomatic training clearly distinguishes him as an international academic par excellence. His relentless pace and sense of vision are evident throughout his entire international career and also in the numerous diplomatic training initiatives he has mentored.

As the Mediterranean experiences another historical transformation with upheaval across the Arab world, Mediterranean diplomats are fortunate to have had the opportunity to learn from the wisdom of Prof. Kappeler. On this occasion, on behalf of all of us at MEDAC, I would like to pay tribute to Prof. Kappeler for empowering a generation of diplomats in the Mediterranean and beyond and salute him for being an inspiration to thousands of diplomats who are seeking to navigate the complex world of twenty-first-century international relations.

Professor Stephen C. Calleya
Director, MEDAC
Preface

Over the course of 50 years, Prof. Dietrich Kappeler trained thousands of diplomats and officials, from ambassadors and to complete novices, from both the richest and the poorest countries in the world. He established numerous diplomatic training institutions of which Diplo is the last in this line.

We, at Diplo, are particularly honoured to have benefited from Prof. Kappeler’s rich experience. He inspired Diplo by focusing on two elements: innovation and tradition. While we were innovating, through the use of the Internet and ICT, we took care to base our work on the best parts of traditional diplomacy. The marriage of these two elements forms the basis of DiploFoundation today.

Prof. Kappeler has written numerous articles; he has spoken at many conferences. It would be difficult to find any one person with such a broad and diverse experience in the field of diplomatic training. And amidst his lasting legacy to diplomacy one word keeps cropping up: persuasion.

Persuasion, the essence of diplomacy is the theme that Prof. Kappeler selected for his Farewell symposium held in Malta in February 2009. In March this year, he will celebrate his 80th birthday. The sheer breadth of his experience, the lasting imprint he has left on so many cities and countries, and the hearts and mind he has captured along the way are all evident in the profile that follows.

DiploFoundation is in his debt. We continue to learn and benefit from his vast experience. This collection of contributions from his colleagues, students, and those interested in the subject is our present to him, as he marks yet another achievement in a lifetime of accomplishment. We have included Prof. Kappeler’s original 2008 piece on the subject and then follow with a series of essays, short insights, and interviews that continue the story.

This project is the culmination of work by many people. Thanks are due, first and foremost, to the contributors, for giving their time to this project and for engaging so actively with the process. Thanks are also due to Milos Radakovic, Giovanni Buttigieg, and Drazen Pehar for their work on collecting the material, interviewing some of the contributors, and transcribing the content. Their knowledge of diplomacy and their persuasive powers made the process a lot smoother. To Mary Murphy for dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s. And perhaps most importantly, from a production standpoint, thanks go to Mina Mudric for her unfailing energy in pulling this production together. Without her constant stewardship and firm but gentle oversight, this book would never have made it to publication.

Dr Jovan Kurbalija
Director, DiploFoundation
Editor
Introduction

Dr Jovan Kurbalija

The fact that you are reading this text means that we have your attention. This is the first step in any persuasive endeavour, especially in the Internet era. We hope now to persuade you to read the rest of the book.

This journey through persuasion in diplomacy was initiated by Prof. Kappeler’s long experience in both practicing diplomacy and in training diplomats. When the bells and whistles of diplomacy settle down, what remains, according to Prof. Kappeler, is persuasion. His message that persuasion is the essence of diplomacy has inspired our discussion over the last five years and has led to the publishing of this book.

Prof. Kappeler has been persuading through enabling: he has been persuading in an indirect way. For me, I still recall vividly the day when he was at his best in persuading without persuasion. It was a winter day in early 1992 when our group of 12 diplomats attended the Master’s course at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies. In the morning, Prof. Kappeler lectured on diplomacy, making an intellectual bravura by linking broad trends and specific events, by finding illustrative historical anecdotes, by describing complex legal problems in a simple way.

That same day, later in the afternoon, this top scholar asked us to help move the Academy’s library to its new premises. He came with his small Subaru car and worked with us with to fix shelves and move the library to its new home. For junior diplomats, it was the best lesson in vivo.

At the early stage of a diplomatic career, when it is easy to be deceived by the external shine of diplomacy, this lecture without lecturing mattered. His message was simple: what matters in diplomacy is elitism of thinking and mission, and modesty in behaviour. This sequence and other similar events had a strong impact on all of us. With the hindsight of 20 years, I can say that his persuasion was enabling. He helped us to navigate those turbulent years when it was easy to slide into the temptation of the outer shine, comprised of shallow visibility and immediate gratification.

This book starts with Prof. Kappeler’s explanation of why persuasion is the essence of diplomacy.

In the keynote text, Dr George Vella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta, argues that persuasion is central not only to diplomacy but also to society in general. He highlights three aspects of persuasion. First is the high importance of trust for persuasion: trust
creates the context in which persuasion can be used. Second is the relevance of persua-
sion for small states: while for major powers persuasion could be an option, for small
states it is the main, very often the only, tool they can use in international affairs. Third,
Dr Vella stresses the limits of computers in persuasion. Persuasion is one of the areas
of human activity where, in spite of technology, the direct input of people will remain
essential.

The book is then organised in four main sections: persuasion in history, persuasion in
theory, persuasion in practice, and interviews with practitioners of diplomacy.

**Persuasion in history**

**Dr Paul Meerts** discusses persuasion in the context of the Vienna Congress (1814–
1815), one of the most successful diplomatic events in history. The Vienna Congress
created long-lasting peace and set the basic rules of multilateral diplomacy and
protocol. Dr Meerts’s paper focuses on how the Vienna Congress addressed one of the
main challenges of any negotiations: the more actors you have around the table, the
less effective those negotiations are. The Congress created a delicate balance between
inclusion and exclusion. It was inclusive inasmuch that all players at the time were
invited to Vienna, but it was exclusive as actors had different roles divided in circles
and committees. The core circle included the five great powers (France, Russia, Prussia,
Austria, and Britain). Other circles gradually expanded, to the outermost circle, which
had close to 200 representatives including dukes and other local rulers. Committees
focused on specific issues and were open to all players. For those who were not present
at the negotiating table, a space for persuasion was created in the lively Viennese social
life.

The question of exclusion/inclusion remains as relevant today as it was two centu-
rries ago. Legitimacy can be achieved only through inclusion of not only of 193 UN
member states, but also of other increasingly relevant stakeholders. At the same time,
efficient negotiations can include a limited number of actors; according to our research
and simulations, say, 12–15 as a maximum. Some attempts to address this ‘efficiency’
problem through various Gs (G8, G20) are criticised for their exclusivity and lack of
legitimacy. Global policy-making is searching for the winning participatory formula.
Can e-participation address this eternal dilemma of diplomacy and achieve both inclu-
sion and efficiency?

**Professor Andre Liebich** approaches the potential and limits of persuasion through
the analysis of the use of coercion in political life. Two concepts – persuasion and
coercion – are usually seen in binary way (as Dr Vella indicates in his article ‘persua-
sion is winning over by argument; coercion is subjecting by compulsion’). Prof. Liebich
situates this interplay between coercion and persuasion in the analysis of how China and the Soviet Union reacted to the need for transition. He starts with two events in 1989: Tiananmen Square and the fall of the Berlin Wall. China used force; the Soviet Union did not. He focuses on Gorbachev’s role in these events by relying on views of two classic authors (Vilfredo Pareto and Niccolò Machiavelli) on coercion and political methods, including persuasion. Prof. Liebich’s contribution provides an analysis of the interplay between coercion and persuasion by following Gorbachev’s blended approach of not using force (Berlin) and using it (Vilnius and Baku). From a distance of 20 years, this article provides a realistic, evidence-based reflection on coercion and persuasion.

**Persuasion in theory**

**Dr Biljana Scott**’s article on framing an argument introduces the linguistic and rhetoric aspects of persuasion. The way in which we frame an issue largely determines how that issue will be understood and acted upon. By dissecting Obama’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech of December 2010, Dr Scott illustrates the main techniques for framing an argument. ‘This speech can be seen as epitomising the exercise of framing, given the implausible task of using a peace prize as a venue in which to advocate war.’ Dr Scott’s analysis of Obama’s speech starts with the use of logic in the framing of the argument, followed by the importance of storytelling, and concludes with the interplay between reason and emotion.

**Dr Milan Jazbec**, a practitioner and researcher in diplomacy, positions a discussion on persuasion in the sociology of diplomacy. Social context determines both diplomacy and persuasion. Dr Jazbec makes a distinction between pressure and persuasion. In a rather counter-intuitive view to dominant discourse, he argues that genuine persuasion cannot be public. As soon as it becomes public, it immediately becomes pressure. Effective persuasion requires a certain level of secrecy in order to create an open, trusting, and reliable atmosphere among negotiators. Persuasion is much more effective when actors do not have to play to the gallery back home (high publicity) but instead concentrate on the interlocutor on the other side of the table. Dr Jazbec concludes that high interdependence in the Internet era creates a context which makes more space for diplomacy and persuasion than the use of force. At the same time, the high relevance of pressure for transparency and openness in modern society may limit the space for genuine persuasion.

**Dr Aldo Matteucci** explores further the relevance of social context for persuasion. Since persuasion leads to change, we should look into the mechanisms of change in society. Change is a social phenomenon. Change occurs when the intentionalities of individuals transmute into ‘collective intentionalities’. In this process, enablers play a key
role. Enablers emerge in a wide variety of forms from invention (the wheel, horse-riding) to social processes (educating women leads towards a drop in fertility). Persuasion is an important enabler of social change. Social media is an example where persuasion evolves from the individual to the collective. Through social media and crowd sourcing, collective intentionality can emerge. New forms of social, instead of individual, persuasion will emerge. The key criterion for their success is whether they facilitate adaptation to the fast pace of change in modern society.

**Persuasion in practice**

**Ambassador Kishan Rana** indicates the cultivation of relations and the credibility of diplomats as the basis for persuasion in diplomacy. He provides an initial taxonomy of the type of relations that diplomats should cultivate. When it comes to credibility, Ambassador Rana presents the main ways of developing and maintaining credibility in diplomatic relations. The more credible the diplomat, the more likely it is that their persuasion with local interlocutors will be successful.

**Ambassador Victor Camilleri** argues that the essence of diplomacy is a search for a point of convergence. Persuasion is one of the methods through which a point of convergence can be reached. He gives central relevance in diplomacy to the firm grasp of the essential points of negotiation, including assessment of balance of force. This article analyses persuasion in multilateral diplomacy through a case study of the Maltese initiative on the ‘Common heritage of mankind’.

**Ambassador Petru Dumitriu** provides a reality check on persuasion in diplomacy. Nowadays, in multilateral conferences, oratory is no longer needed. A successful speech is a short speech. ‘The chairperson will usually praise the short intervention rather than the smart ones.’ Even if diplomats manage to squeeze a persuasive speech into 2–5 minutes, the audience is often missing. Attention in multilateral conferences is a very scarce commodity. If any persuasive message comes through, it is often filtered through précis writers and adopted conclusions which keep track of what was meaningful for the organisation and cast the rest into oblivion. Ambassador Dumitriu concludes his text with a few precepts for fair and effective persuasion.

**Interviews on persuasion in practice**

**Dr Joe Borg** highlights inclusion and trust-building as common elements of persuasion in his diverse negotiation experiences as both Maltese Minister of Foreign Affairs and EU Commissioner. In the negotiations of Malta’s EU accession, the key task was to involve in the accession process as wide a stratum of Maltese society as possible.
The success of this process related mainly to the high level of ownership of the negotiations by civil society, professional groups, and the population in general. Inspired by the successful inclusive negotiations in Malta, Dr Borg used a similar approach as the EU Commissioner in charge of negotiation of the Integrated Maritime Policy. From the very beginning he involved a network of stakeholders with an interest in fisheries issues (e.g. fisherman, environmental groups, and port authorities). Inclusion, a high level of transparency, and fairness led towards a high level of trust that created the context needed for successful persuasion.

**Dr Alex Sceberras Trigona** stresses that not only persuasion but also resisting persuasion is highly important for small states, which tend to be seen as the ‘diplomatic prey’ of great powers. He analyses three examples of successful persuasion from Maltese diplomatic history. First were the negotiations on Maltese neutrality, which required a lot of persuasion of two major Cold War powers and numerous regional players in the Mediterranean. Second was Malta’s successful lobbying for membership at the United Nations Security Council (1983/1984). The third example is bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom for the removal of unexploded ordinances in 1984. Dr Trigona explains how these three instances used a wide range of persuasive and diplomatic tools.

**Future research**

In this book we have tried to make an initial mapping of the issue of persuasion and diplomacy by addressing it from different perspectives (historical, theoretical, and practical). The more we dug into the issues of persuasion, the more we realised its relevance and its complexity. We have encountered some recurring questions throughout our discussions.

- Is persuasion the essence of diplomacy or simply a way of achieving convergence in negotiations?
- Does persuasion imply a change in the mental state of the persuaded side?
- Is persuasion more a social than a rhetorical phenomenon?
- What are the decisive factors of persuasion (e.g. argument, emotion, rhetorical skill, the structure of incentives such as awards and penalties, social context)?
- Do historical considerations play an important role in the process?
- What are the techniques for identifying and resisting persuasion?
- What are the borderlines between persuasion and related disciplines: rhetoric, manipulation, propaganda, public diplomacy?
- Can persuasion be taught?
- Is persuasion a gender-sensitive talent and skill?
• What is the importance of trust and empathy in persuasion?
• What cultural differences are experienced in the use of persuasion?
• Can persuasion be done in public?
• Are the requirements of our time for short speeches (the twitterisation of our communication) going to affect persuasion?
• Will persuasion change in the Internet era? Will it be easier or more difficult to persuade via the Internet?

If you remain persuaded, we invite you to join us in this learning and research journey by participating in online deliberations at www.diplomacy.edu/persuasion
**Professor Dietrich Kappeler:**
diplomat and teacher

Prof. Kappeler served as director of the Diplomatic Studies Programme of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva from 1993 to 1998. He was the founding director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta, 1990–1993. Prof. Kappeler has extensive experience in diplomacy and international relations, and lectures and writes on international law, diplomatic and consular law, law of international institutions, human rights and humanitarian law, diplomacy, and constitutional and administrative law of Switzerland.

Born 6 March 1933 in Berne, Switzerland, he was educated in Berne and in Beirut, Lebanon. He received a Bachelor’s in French Law in 1953 from the Faculty of Law, Université St Joseph, Beirut. While in Beirut he was an auditor in Political Science at the American University. In 1955, he was licenced in Public Law by the Faculty of Law at the University of Berne, from whence in 1957 his doctorate in Public Law was conferred.

Prof. Kappeler joined the Swiss diplomatic service where he served from 1957 to 1965 with postings in The Hague and Algiers, as well with the Legal Department in HQ. From 1965 to 1973, he was a personal assistant to Professor Paul Guggenheim (second edition of Traité de droit international public and consultancies). During this time (1966–1974) he was a consultant with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace working on the training of third world diplomats. To his credit, he was involved in the creation of the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) 1971 and the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies of University of Nairobi (1973).

With this experience, it is of no surprise that he was the expert sent by the Swiss government to assist the government of Equatorial Guinea in setting up its Foreign Ministry and training its diplomats (1969–1970).

Back then to Geneva where he was a research fellow with teaching obligations at the Faculty of Law of the University of Geneva from 1972 to 1975. While there, he was also a member of the Evaluation Committee of the International Red Cross System (1974–1975). While a professor associated with the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, he was seconded to the University of Tehran, Centre for Inter-

Returning to Europe, Prof. Kappeler saw the need for diplomatic training in Malta and was the Founding Director of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies of the University of Malta (1990–1993). From there, it was back to Switzerland as Director of Diplomatic Studies Programmes of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (1993–1998). He has been a consultant with DiploFoundation since 2000 and was its first president of the Board of Administrators.

Prof. Kappeler’s teaching experience includes: Public International Law, the Law of Treaties, the Law of International Institutions, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Diplomatic and Consular Law, Swiss Constitutional and Administrative Law, Diplomacy, and Diplomatic History.

He has held guest lectureships at the Institute of Administration, Beirut, Lebanon (1973, 1974); the University of Shiraz (1976, 1977); the University of Isfahan (1976, 1977); Melli University, Tehran (1976); the Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar es Salaam (1979, 1981); University of Zambia (1979, 1981); University of Malawi (1981); Academia Diplomatica del Peru (1983); the Institute of International Relations, Trinidad (1983); the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (1986); the International Maritime Law Institute, Malta (1990–1993, 1995–2003); and the Association des Etudes Internationales, Tunis (1991, 1993, 1995, 1996).


He is a member of Société Suisse de Droit International, Rencontres Suisse, and the American Society of International Law.
Persuasion is the direct opposite of coercion. Persuasion is a positive process as against the negative connotation associated with coercion. Persuasion is an induced mental state of agreement, whereas coercion is forced acceptance or compliance. To persuade means to convince, whereas coercion implies imposition. Persuasion is winning over by argument; coercion is subjecting by compulsion.

Persuasion is the result of a process whereby one succeeds in convincing another that one’s opinion or one’s assessment of a particular situation is credible and acceptable, being based on knowledge of related circumstances, objective unprejudiced assessment, good judgment, and clear decisions.

One need not persuade one’s counterpart that the proposed option is the ideal … it is enough to convince that the proposed line of action or the proposed decision is the best under prevailing circumstances, and valid for the foreseeable future.

Persuasion is made easier if it is backed by integrity, respect, experience, and trust. Persuasion implies influencing one’s cognitive process to accept to agree to a proposal.

The talents and skills of a good persuader

The experience and the integrity of the proponent, influence in no small way the weight that will be given to the proposal by the intended recipient of the proposal. Experience and integrity elicit respect and esteem. These are the essential ingredients necessary to generate the most important factor in any discussion between parties wanting to come to some sort of agreement between them…trust.

Trust is reliability. Trust underpins confidence. Trust gives credence. Trust makes for assurance. These are the basic ‘desiderata’ for engaging in fruitful negotiations between parties holding divergent views, where each side tries to win over to its side the widest support for its proposal or for its way of seeing things, by persuasion.
This is the essence of diplomacy which is the art of negotiation, be it between parties having divergent views on any subject, or as the term is more commonly used in negotiations of a political nature between states, be it on a bilateral or a multilateral basis.

Diplomacy is an art. Like any artist, the diplomat has to have certain inborn qualities, which like the consummate artist, they need to refine by training, experience, and self-criticism.

The diplomat has their ‘tools’ which they must use with dexterity, tact, skillful manoeuvring, a sharp eye on detail, and most importantly with judicious timing.

Diplomacy, being the art of communication, necessitates a thorough knowledge of human psychology, body language, and a wide knowledge of the process of human thinking and the factors, intrinsic and extrinsic, that influence it.

The difference between persuasion in normal relations and in high diplomacy

As long as political decisions and policy lines continue to be determined by politicians and not by computers; by human brains and not by computer-printed circuits from inanimate databases, the art of persuasion will continue to play a most important part in the process of decision-making, be it in normal relations between politicians themselves, or politicians and the general public, as well as between diplomats, at whatever level they are practicing their diplomatic skills.

The art and science of politics itself is based on winning popular support by politicians from the man in the street, on proposals, and policy lines, according to the political beliefs and political orientation of the politician involved.

It is the basis of the democratic game wherein vying politicians, presenting different political options before the people, using all their skills to persuade their listeners that their political message engenders more trust and better prospects for prosperity and better governance.

In plain simple language the gist of the game is that of trying to persuade the largest number of voters to give their trust to the person who manages to persuade them of being the one with the best political options for their country’s future.
This applies also for contenders to any position of influence, the choice of whom depends on the free choice of members of the organisation involved. Winning support starts by persuading those who will be giving you their trust to lead and decide on their behalf.

Persuasion is at the basis of all political dealings, all political decisions, and all political diplomatic exchanges, irrespective of which level these are conducted.

**The importance of persuasion for small states**

With some notable exceptions, small states do not have the economic, financial, or military clout of countries that are much bigger; unless of course, they sit on huge oil or mineral deposits, and unless they have developed over the years into some strong influential financial centre.

As the saying goes, they ‘cannot throw their weight around’. They cannot achieve their aims, or impose their beliefs, let alone arrive at agreements by using the ‘tools’ countries that are much bigger and more influential can use. They do not have the critical mass to leave a dent on another country’s economy if they decide to impose sanctions, or trade restrictions. They will not hurt anybody by imposing travel restrictions, or trade embargoes.

Small countries can only obtain respect and achieve their aims if, for example, they manage to persuade the counterpart with whom they are negotiating, of the importance of their country, be it geostrategic, political, or that it just happens to fit in the overall political plans of the country being persuaded. One has to convince the other side by proving that the proposal on the table is in the best interests of both sides.

To be considered as a serious negotiating partner, a small country boosts its image by being stable, credible, reliable, and consistent. Any other country negotiating with a small state will have to be first and foremost persuaded of these attributes.

It follows that diplomats from small states will have to make full use of all their negotiating skills to convince and persuade their counterparts from other countries and international organisations of their credibility, credit worthiness, and above all of their country’s consistent track record in the fulfillment and execution of commitments and responsibilities undertaken in previous agreements.

The human factor remains central and crucial to diplomatic exchanges, and negotiations between diplomats.
**Man versus computer**

The world’s political, economic, financial and social scenario is changing fast. Modern methods of communication have changed drastically the frequency and the tempo with which diplomatic exchanges used to take place. The availability of vast amounts of information at the touch of a button, combined with unlimited data storage, and the ease of data retrieval, have changed the way diplomats have worked for centuries.

In spite of all these developments, the human factor remains central and crucial to diplomatic exchanges, and negotiations between diplomats. Computers can download gigabytes of information, and print truckloads of *note verbales* and files upon files of diplomatic exchanges.

It is however only the suave, experienced, well-prepared diplomat, who, on a person-to-person level, can convey confidence, elicit trust, and persuade their counterpart. The human touch, whatever the developments in the computer world, will remain.

No computer can convey the message diplomats transfer to their counterparts through a warm handshake, or on establishing eye-to-eye contact, on reaching an agreement or clinching a deal.

On this last statement, wise counsel prompts me to be diplomatic and hasten to add: ‘at least for the time being!’
Why persuasion? Reflections after 50 years of practising, teaching, and studying diplomacy

Professor Dietrich Kappeler

The functions of diplomatic missions and therefore of the diplomats are described in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as representation of the sending state, protection of the interests of the sending state and its citizens, negotiation with the government of the receiving State, collection and transmission of information regarding the receiving state and the promotion of friendly relations between the sending and receiving states.

This list is a reflection of diplomatic relations between sovereign states, the only ones generally accepted until recently. Today, diplomacy is seen as a multifaceted interaction involving states, international organisations and a host of non-governmental actors at national and international level now called stakeholders. This has reduced the importance of the elements of representation, gathering of information as well as promotion of friendly relations and enhanced the importance of the element of negotiation.

It is submitted that negotiation however is only part of a broader function which I call persuasion. The diplomat, whether they represent a State or any other entity or stakeholder, is there to persuade with a view to furthering the interests of the sending entity, reaching an agreement with the receiving entity, or avoiding or ending a conflict between the two entities. In a multilateral context the diplomat must persuade the other actors, or at least a number of them, of the position of the entity they represent. Finally, the diplomat may exercise persuasion as a mediator between two or more conflicting entities.

To effect persuasion, the diplomat may act unilaterally, engage in bilateral negotiation or participate in a multilateral negotiating process, or as already said, they may act as mediator.

To achieve persuasion, the diplomat uses arguments. These may be logical, emotional, ideological, religious, legal, economic, political or a combination of several. In most instances, such arguments are reinforced by considerations of power. Such power may be at the disposal of the sending entity or the diplomat must muster support of that
entity’s position from others. Where persuasion appears to fail, the diplomat may have recourse to threats, including that of using force, provided the sending entity has the necessary capacity. Where force is already in use, the diplomat may use persuasion with a view to ending violent conflict.

The better a diplomat is at persuading, the more successful they will be in furthering the cause they represent.

Persuasion only works when the arguments or threats used convince the destinatory of the diplomatic effort. To achieve this, appropriate knowledge of such a destinatory and its representatives is required. In the case of states, their history, culture and national sensitivities must be studied, including preferably their language(s). In the case of organisations, their organisational aims and culture should be understood. If the requisite knowledge is achieved, mutual respect and empathy may be the result and thus a situation may emerge which greatly favours the effort of persuasion. On the other hand, a diplomat who does not care to understand their interlocutor, or worse, thinks that the latter does or should think and react like their own sending entity, is bound to find persuasion other than by threats difficult, if not impossible.

Efforts at persuasion can be public or take place in a closed and confidential context. Unilateral efforts are the ones that characterise public diplomacy. Heads of State as well as diplomatic envoys and representatives of various stakeholders proclaim their views to the public at large, directly through the media or in public appearances. There is also a noticeable trend to publicise ongoing negotiations and debates in multilateral fora. This makes compromise much more difficult and helps explain why so many well-publicised diplomatic efforts misfire.

One aspect of persuasion, when the diplomat has to justify the results of their action, has been particularly affected by attempts to bring everything before the public. Instead of just reporting to their superiors, the modern envoy is asked to attend hearings before parliamentary bodies, many of them public, to give interviews to the media and to write articles and even books to present their action and their views. Such exposure may adversely affect their effectiveness and credibility when facing their interlocutors.

From the faraway days when representatives of fighting tribes tried to arrange for a truce, thereby risking their head, to the often derided endless discussions within present day international frameworks, the common aim of diplomacy has remained persuasion. The better a diplomat is at persuading, the more successful they will be in furthering the cause they represent.
Part I: Persuasion in history
Persuasion through negotiation at the Congress of Vienna 1814–1815

*Dr Paul Meerts*

Negotiators will best persuade their counterparts if they can be in direct contact with them, if possible face-to-face. This does not mean that persuasion through indirect channels would not be possible, it is; for example, through written messages, other negotiators, perhaps members of the delegation of the one who should be persuaded to change their opinion and course. In some cases such indirect influence might be more effective than direct ‘confrontation’. For example because the relationship between the negotiators is not good and therefore a person friendly to the target of persuasion might be more successful. Or perhaps the one who wants to convince the other is of lower rank – or much younger – and culturally speaking it would not be done to address the higher ranking diplomat in a direct way without an intermediary.

There are many reasons why indirect approaches could be more successful than direct interaction, but these are situational exceptions to the rule that direct contact is preferable. In some cases the direct channel of persuasion has been deliberately put out of order; for example in the Congress of Vienna after the Fall of Napoleon. The Great Powers did not want to be persuaded by the middle and the minor monarchs, as this would distract them too much from their own interaction within the ‘pentacray’: Russia, Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, and France. They were willing to listen to the others on an ad-hoc basis; they did not want them within their Inner Circle: the decision-making process of the conference.
Interstate negotiation processes

The nineteenth century witnessed a multitude of interstate negotiation processes, the most outstanding being the Vienna Congress of 1814–1815. All concerned parties were invited to the Congress, be they the former victims or the former allies of Napoleon. There were two reasons for inviting all relevant countries – big or small – to participate: for a legitimate conference and therefore a legitimate Final Act, all stakeholders had to be present. And if one country could be left out, why not another? Even for the Great Powers, this would be a dangerous precedent.

What would be the criteria for excluding a country from the Congress as a whole? This would be a political decision to be negotiated and there wasn’t a way to do that. To exclude those who had been in the camp of the enemy could not be a criterion as – apart from Britain – all stakeholders had been with Napoleon at a certain time. The duration of that connection wasn’t a criterion either, though in the political process of the Congress, it did work to the detriment of some countries like Denmark and Saxony. What could be done, however, was to create inclusiveness and exclusiveness inside the Congress itself: some were allowed to be decision-makers; most were kept at bay. There wasn’t a procedure and a principle for this either, it was just decided by the Great Powers and the others had no choice but to allow for this.

For a legitimate conference and therefore a legitimate Final Act, all stakeholders had to be present.

The dilemma of inclusiveness and exclusiveness and its consequences for persuasion through negotiation

Negotiation can be seen as a choice of partners. In general, negotiation is defined on the basis of its content. What are the positions of the contending parties and how far apart are they, and therefore how difficult will the negotiation process be. However, we can also define negotiation on the basis of the participating actors, in the case of diplomatic negotiations: the countries and their representatives, their agents. From such a perspective it as much the contending counterparts around the table, as the distance between their interests that will determine the flow of the process, the options for convergence, and closure by means of an agreement. Leaving a party outside of the process could have grave consequences for the value and viability of the treaty; taking the party in could be obstructing the process too much, thereby never being able to close the negotiation process.

Negotiation can be seen as a choice of partners.

But the choice of parties also is a choice of opportunities for persuasion. Not being able to influence the counterparts in a direct way, a party will be forced to do this indirectly, which is – in most cases – less effective than a direct negotiation process.
Power politics

The main criteria for co-opting a party into the day-to-day negotiation process of the Congress of Vienna were two-fold: did the party belong to the anti-Napoleonic alliance and was it so powerful that a peace treaty could only be implemented if that power participated fully in the central negotiation process? This principle implied that Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great-Britain would be included, but France would not. For power political reasons, France was allowed into the Inner Circle shortly after the bargaining process got underway, as at least three out of four Great Powers saw the benefit of it, skillfully clarified by the French plenipotentiary. Power politics dominated and the mistake of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 – to keep two of the main powers outside the Inner Circle because it had been the enemy (Germany) or was seen as a potential enemy (Soviet Union) – wasn’t made in ‘Vienna.’ After-all, the French participation did not obstruct the negotiation process and the question ‘what to do with France’ did not dominate the proceedings. On the contrary, to have an uneven number of actors on board proved to be vital for avoiding durable stalemates.

The pentacracy

For the implementation of negotiated outcomes, it is vital to have as many relevant parties as possible in support of the final agreement. However, a successful negotiation process with more than five parties seems to be a very difficult one. Complexity hampers effective negotiation; the number of parties matters. One could postulate that the greater the number of parties, the richer the process, therefore the more choices available, the more opportunities, the more integrative the final outcome. This is certainly true, but to manage a very complex multilateral process is often a burden. Especially if, as in the nineteenth century, rules and regulations were absent. The Congress of Vienna, for example, never decided on uniform procedures and, without such protection of the bargaining process, it is very difficult to move the parties in the desired direction.

It was only in the twentieth century that we started to manage multilateral negotiations through rules embedded within international organisations. Even then we bounced at the boundaries of negotiation. It is perhaps no coincidence that it is the United Nations Security Council where the main decisions are taken and within that Council five countries play a decisive role. A pentacracy of the victors of World War II indeed…but still. We saw this in 1919 in the Paris Conference, where five countries formed the nucleus of the conference, although only three of them really played a decisive role.
In 1814–1815 at the Vienna Conference we had Austria, Russia, Prussia, Britain, and France taking the lead, effectively excluding the other countries from real participation.

**A balance needed to secure the peace**

Exclusion of France at the beginning of the process wasn’t in the long-term interests of – foremost – Austria and Britain. Austria needed a counter-balance against its greatest competitor, Prussia. Britain needed to keep both Austria and Prussia in check, and therefore France had to become an integral part of the deliberations. Another reason for integrating the French enemy had to do with the unreliability of Russia on the one hand, and the need to control the Bonapartists and Republicans in France itself on the other. It was self-evident that only inclusion of the French could provide a balance of power in Europe, a balance needed to secure the peace wished for by the monarchies.

Exclusion of a major power from the negotiation process, like Germany and the Soviet Union in 1919, would have had disastrous consequences, especially as other major powers like Spain and Poland had lost their former strength or vanished completely. Excluding the minor powers was in the interests of the negotiation process and the need to reach an agreement within a certain time. The Vienna Final Act was signed nine days before Napoleon Bonaparte escaped from Elba, but the powers were not aware of this threat. This escape, on the other hand, would have been instrumental in forcing the allies to reach closure had their business not yet been done. , but in the Vienna case such a push wasn’t necessary. The process itself managed to converge into closure. Napoleon’s action did, however, provoke the exclusion of France from the negotiations of the Second Treaty of Paris in 1815, taking it back from its 1792 borders to those of 1790. France did not even get a chance to persuade the other powers through negotiation, as they were excluded from it.

**Exclusion from real participation should not be confused with lack of influence**

Excluding other powers from real participation did not mean, however, that they had no influence at all. Hundreds of their representatives – and their mistresses – were gathered at Vienna as well and this closeness to the actual process gave them some kind of leeway. However, they were dependent on the benevolence of the main negotiating parties; they sometimes literally had to beg for attention. In order to keep them busy, an enormous circus of events was set up. These festivities were far more lavish than the ones we know of in earlier Congresses like Westphalia and Utrecht, or the conferences that came after them.
While the costly social events kept the minor powers at bay, they also provided them with opportunities to lobby the negotiators of the five powers central to the process. These powers could afford to keep the middle and smaller powers at a distance, as long as they could be sure that they could control them afterwards. The decisions at Vienna would not be of value if the five powers themselves would not stick to them, or if the secondary powers could not be forced to obey them. In order to keep the excluded powers in check, a two-tier system was of help. One group of excluded parties was given a more or less permanent position as consulted constituencies. Although they were not allowed into the Inner Circle, they were in part included on an intermittent basis. Countries like Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, Spain, Portugal, Naples, and the Netherlands had to go along in order to be able to keep the real small powers – for example, the small states in Germany and Italy – in check.

**Involved parties**

This system of trickling down of power on the basis of inclusiveness and exclusiveness could therefore only be effective if there was a layer of middle powers who were both included and excluded. Included because they were regularly consulted, excluded because they did not have a ‘permanent seat’ in the negotiation process. We could label them as ‘involved parties’. As the middle class in a society provides for stability in the social and economic sense, these countries provided sustainability needed for the nineteenth century to be reasonably peaceful. However, one condition for the success of the Vienna framework had been the willingness of the major powers to be ‘in concert’. As in the European Union of today, smaller countries were needed to cement the relationship between Germany, France, and Britain. But if these three could not agree among themselves, the Union would not be able to make any progress. At the same time some dissent between the main powers was needed to give the auxiliary states the opportunity to influence their behaviour, and thereby the course of the Union.

Another condition was the absence of a major threat from the outside. As the United States was not yet a world player, as China and Turkey were in decline, and as Russia was included in the process, the centre – being Europe – could set the rule. Including Russia was a problem, however. A Russia too close to Central Europe was seen as a threat to peace. This is why the Austrians, the Prussians, the British and the French tried to keep the Russians out of Poland. They failed, however. It is fascinating to see how Russia entered the heart of Europe as a consequence of the Napoleonic defeat, was thrown out again after the Revolution and the end of World War I, came back in as a consequence of German defeat in World War II, and threw themselves out again after the downfall of communism.
The rise and fall of imperialism

This problem of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in the European realm became less relevant as the world enlarged through imperialism and it demise. Through imperialism, Europe's potential was focused outside, therefore allowing for a more or less peaceful episode inside nineteenth-century Europe itself. It was only through the rise of nationalism that Europe fell on its own sword at the beginning of the next century. Here we have the third condition for a peaceful Europe along the lines of the 'Holy Alliance': a common ideology, being the legitimacy of the ruling parties, foremost the monarchies. We therefore witnessed throughout the nineteenth century, notably in 1830 and 1848, collective attempts by the Five Powers to subdue democratic and nationalistic uprisings. As the collective security arrangement fell apart in the middle of that century, nationalism ran out of control and democracy started its triumphal march to power. Those who had been excluded took over, and half a century after the de-facto demise of the Vienna system, Europe broke down, allowing the rest of the World to rob it of its central position in the world. Europe lost its hegemony, one still undisputed when the victors of Napoleon sat down to negotiate, in order to preclude further war, but more importantly, to safeguard their own interests by peaceful means.

The language of the enemy

Communications in Vienna were facilitated by the use of French – the language of the ‘enemy’ – as the lingua franca, but of course common language did not lead to common ground. From a procedural point of view, the Vienna negotiations were quite messy. This had to do with the construction/content dilemma. The construction of the conference would, of course, have a large impact on the way the counterparts were going to deal with the content. A well-regulated Congress, with clear procedures and an opportunity for all to participate and to vote on the Final Act, would give the small and middle powers a very strong finger in the pie. Even then they would have to reckon with the Great Powers, as is the case in the European Union.

Although all member states are reasonably equal, although they all have a say, they cannot act if at least two of the Great Powers are not in agreement with each other. Indeed, the power of the countries is, to a certain extent, reflected in the votes they can cast in the Council of Ministers, but the very small and small ones have, relatively speaking, more votes for fewer people. Even then there is political reality and the Union has clearly been constructed around Germany, France, the United Kingdom, with Italy, Spain and France as a second circle. Also in the EU we see a certain measure of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, but this is very much in the more informal negoti-
ations, the bilateral, trilateral, back-channels, etc. Officially nobody can be excluded, but countries can be outvoted.

A voting system was out of the question in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. It became feasible in the twentieth century with the League of Nations. In Vienna it was completely out of the question to limit sovereignty in any way. This would have undermined the system of formally independent state and the legitimacy of their rulers. Such a precedent would not only touch upon the small powers, who did not want to be vassals – although many of them were – but also for the Great Powers. After all, being a Great Power today does not guarantee your status tomorrow.

The Polish example is a gloomy one, a Great Power that was completely eradicated, though the Polish Problem was alive and kicking. Perhaps the fading of the Holy Roman Empire – actually Rome itself – could be seen as a warning to those who thought that great kingdoms would be there for eternity. It is telling that the downfall of the Western and the Eastern Roman Empire has never been completely accepted and spiritually they linger till today, as the Roman and Greek Catholic Churches. Even nowadays it is difficult to imagine that vested powers might crumble, the shock and the after-shocks of the downfall of the Soviet Union and even of Yugoslavia have still not being fully digested in our day and age.

**Universally accepted norms**

One of the signals for this was the struggle of Prussia, mentioned before, to have as many ‘souls’ within its border as possible. One could image a system of weighing them – is a Polish farmer more or less worthy than a Saxon one – and indeed, a committee was set up to try to refine the system of population counting. But without universally accepted norms, such a methodology could not work. Norms, then, could not be universally adopted as the Conference did not have a procedure to allow for that.

Again, a universal system would endanger absolute sovereignty as – especially – the Great Powers would be limited by it. Of course they wanted to keep their hands free. As they still want today, though they are much more fenced in than before. Therefore only a system of exclusion could work. The Great Powers decided over the middle and smaller ones, who were given influence but no powers. The Great Powers were equal among themselves and in that sense there was already a veto system in Vienna. Consensus between the Big Five was needed as it is needed in the UN Security Council today.
How did the Congress tackle the problem of its own construction and what did it construct?

Late in August 1814, more than two months before the official opening of the Conference, the representatives of the four main allied powers, the Quadruple Alliance, met in Vienna. In their first meeting Metternich, Hardenberg, Nesselrode (on behalf of Tsar Alexander I), and Castlereagh decided on an Inner Circle consisting of themselves and several Outer Circles with a growing number of counterparts. The Inner Circle of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain would also be present in the other circles. In the first Outer Circle, France and Spain were added as Great Powers. As time went by, France, thanks to the skills of Talleyrand, would move to the Inner Circle; Spain would ever get there. Next to the Four and the Six, a Circle of Eight was created, adding Sweden and Portugal to the others. With that last Circle all signatories of the First Peace of Paris, the Treaty that laid the foundation for the Vienna Congress, were brought together in an institutional – though politically more or less irrelevant – setting. The more participants a Circle had, the less important the issues they were going to deal with. However, it was the Eight that were formally entitled to direct that directed the Conference as they were the participants in the constituent First Peace of Paris Treaty – the second one was signed after Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo.

In a meeting on 20 September, Talleyrand questioned the authority of the Inner Circle of the Four to decide on questions that would involve the sovereignty of other nations. His argument touched on the principle of legitimacy, and as this principle was the foundation of the whole exercise, the other powers could not neglect his reasoning. To him, territorial issues could only be decided upon by the Congress as a whole. His tactics delayed the official opening of the Congress and brought him into the Inner Circle on 9 January 1815, which was therefore referred to as the Five instead of the Four. It should be added that there were power political reasons for the original Four to incorporate France.

The British were of the opinion that a stable Europe would not be possible without France, the Austrians needed France to counterweight Prussia, and the Russians couldn’t do without it because of its maritime power to balance off the British as much as possible. To them, France could become valuable also to counterbalance Prussia or Austria in the future. Only the Prussians were against, but they could not sustain their resistance for more than a few months. As soon as Talleyrand was on board, he dropped his wish to deal with territorial issues in the Congress as a whole. None of the original Four regretted his opportunism on the issue.
Different circles, different topics

As has been said, the three conference Circles conferred on different topics, the most important once were dealt with by the Four, the next of importance by the Six and the leftovers by the Eight. The rest of the Congress only participated in Committees on the issues where they were stakeholders.

What was the content the Circles were dealing with? The Four, and after four months the Five, negotiated the position of France, Poland, and Saxony. As we saw before, Poland and Saxony were connected questions that had to be solved in a package deal. The trade-off was done just before Napoleon came back on stage. The Four initially decided on procedures, but after the main ones were established, it was the Eight who formally decided on them. Furthermore the Eight dealt with the question of what should be done with Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. But there were separate meetings of the Four/Five on Germany and Switzerland as well. Actually, the Five pre-negotiated all the main issues, for example, the questions of Spain and France, in informal bilaterals.

Conference diplomacy

However chaotic and ambiguous the rules of procedures were, if one could anyway talk about official rules of procedure, they were a novelty to conference diplomacy in the sense that they set up a structure consisting of Circles and Committees. The Committees were meant to get all relevant countries involved, both for reasons of principle and practice. With the creation of the Committees, those powers who could not participate in the core negotiations could be given some kind of legitimate place in the Conference processes, which avoided – also through the adoption of France – further complaints about the hegemony of the Inner Circle. The Committees had specific tasks, dealing with specific issues. The following Committees were installed: on Germany, Switzerland, Tuscany, Sardinia and Genoa, Bouillon (on the border between France and the Austrian Netherlands, now Belgium), on International Rivers, Slave Trade, Statistics, Diplomatic Precedence and finally on Drafting the Final Act. The German Committee can be seen as the most important, the trickiest, and the most emotional one, as Kings, Princes, Dukes, Counts, Barons, and other noblemen depended on this Committee for their survival, and if so, on the question of how they would survive. The German Committee was also responsible for tackling the Jewish Issue, for example, the rights of Jews in Germany.

Procedural innovations

Other conferences in the nineteenth century profited from the procedural innovations made during the Vienna Congress. They learned from its successes and from its
failures. The construction of the Congress tried to balance inclusion and exclusion in such a way that through exclusion the number of decision-makers would be limited, thereby avoiding too much complexity. The Great Powers were kept on board through inclusion, thereby avoiding the risk of deciding on a Final Act that would not survive the Congress for more than a few years. The procedures assured a European political constellation that would survive till deep into the nineteenth century. They helped to build a forward-looking state system. But the content was mainly reactionary and backward-looking, and this undercut the effectiveness of looking forward. While the construction of Vienna fostered institutionalisation for the future, the content undermined it. It is therefore necessary to turn to content now by looking at the process of negotiation; in other words the conversations between the main actors about their common and diverging interests and the way they managed to converge them into a Single Act.

The process of negotiation

The middle and minor powers had an opportunity to participate in Committees, but as there were no in-between plenary sessions, their voices could not be heard in public. The only plenary sessions were the opening and closing meeting of the Congress. Though there are very good political reasons for keeping the decision-making group as small as possible, it still is a strange fact that those who stood at the outset of the Congress, being signatories of the Paris Treaty and being signatories of the Vienna Final Act, were kept out of the decision-making process. When Talleyrand managed to move into the Inner Circle – as France from a power political perspective could not be left outside – the resentment of the others was raised further. This would create problems at a later stage, as Spain did not want to sign the Vienna Final Act in the end, but this did not stop the Act coming into being. One would expect that consensus between the Eight was a prerequisite for the Act to be legal, but as the principle of consensus between the eight signatories of the Paris Treaty was never literally stipulated as a precondition, it did not stop the others from overruling Spain.

In Vienna, inclusiveness and exclusiveness helped to get the work done. The mass of interested parties were included in the process through a series of festivities, but excluded from the day-to-day decision-making process. This ongoing process took
place between the five Great Powers. To include the major powers in this process was one of the wise decisions of the Vienna Congress, although it wasn’t self-evident. It had to do with the interests of most of the victorious powers, and with the negotiation skills of the French plenipotentiary. At the very start, and at the very end after Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the French were excluded, but as they took full responsibility for the Final Act of Vienna and the negotiation process leading up to this closure, the Act was carried by all five major European powers. This Great Power inclusiveness made the Congress forward looking and secured the survival of its accomplishments till the revolutions of 1848. The Great Power inclusiveness in the Inner Circle of the Five, while excluding the others, gave the negotiators the opportunity to manage complexity, or better to avoid complexity. It allowed for a rather smooth – be it ambiguous – bargaining process. Playing chess between five parties, trying to forge majorities, although only a four to five stand-off could really be expected to wrench the isolated power into the agreement the others wished for, through political and, indeed on a few minor occasions, through the threat of war.

**Equal in theory**

An alternative could have been to include more parties, but therefore strict procedures plus strong presidents would have been needed to facilitate this process. The world wasn’t up to that, at the start of the nineteenth century, as it wasn’t up to it a century later at the Paris Peace Conference being even more exclusive than Vienna. At a time where seventeenth- and eighteenth-century questions of precedence were still unresolved, the installment of fixed chairs wasn’t workable. The countries would not allow their counterparts to take a formally higher position; everybody had to be equal, at least in theory.

Procedure was still too much a political issue. It often is today as well, but we have overarching international structures and organisations that have a mandate to deal with those issues. Leaving it to the individual countries would be a problem even in today’s world. It also had to do with the perception of sovereignty and legitimacy, not only with power and equality. In an official sense, a breach of sovereignty was not acceptable, although it happened on a large scale when the Five thought it necessary, like on the ‘soul trade’. A kind of organisation that would have a mandate of its own with powers to do what normally states would be allowed to do wasn’t imaginable for the Great Five. It all had to come from their consensus-seeking proceedings without any possibility of outvoting anybody in the Inner Circle. The lack of internal procedures created great flexibility and opportunities and grave technical problems at the same time.
The importance of the Circles is mirrored by the number of times these groups met. The Four/Five had 41 sessions, while the Eight, being the signatories of the conference that gave Vienna its mandate and legitimacy, as well as the Circle that had to ratify its Final Act, met only nine times. The Five then consulted – and negotiated with – members of the Eight during these nine sessions, but they had bilaterals with them as well and they met them in the Committees on specific subjects. In that sense Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were not completely neglected. One could say that they were partially excluded, partially included in the process. The fact that Spain refused to sign the Final Act, which strangely enough did not make it invalid, signals the danger of leaving some relatively important powers out. But again, if seven of the eight agree, what can the isolated party do?

One might conclude that, in the end, the decision-making procedure of the Vienna Congress has been consensus, but consensus minus one could still be regarded as a forum that could come to a legitimate conclusion; this was a lesson learned by the Conference (later Organization) on Security and Cooperation nearly 200 years later, when the question of Yugoslavia had to be decided. This is quite a dilemma of course: the country that will resist till the end will probably be the main stakeholder and excluding the stakeholder raises problems in implementing the agreement.

**Exclusion vs dependency**

Excluding the vast majority of the stakeholders, up to some 200 actually, could be seen as a bigger threat to the Viennese value creation and its sustainability over time. But it didn’t, as the middle and minor powers of Europe were too dependent on the Great Alliance to be able to undermine the new-old order. They had to cling to the Great Powers as nearly all these less powerful countries were under increasing pressure from a growing middle class demanding more political influence, or at a later state political independence if they were from a sizeable minority.

The monarchs were pressured by their own populace and had to cling together as an overarching European ruling class, severely weakened by the ideas of the Enlightenment, and the American and French revolutions, not to mention smaller spontaneous ones like those in the Southern and Northern Netherlands, swiping away their rulers even before the French staged their own regime change.

It should be noted though, that de jure the old order from before the French Revolution had been restored, but de facto the Congress of Vienna sustained much of the
status quo of 1813 and not the status-quo ante of 1789. So did most of the countries. The vast majority of civil servants in the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands were people who had served the Batavian Republic and then Napoleon. King William of Orange preferred those who knew how to direct a centralised state over those who wanted to go back to the old particularism and regionalism, the ‘Orangists’.

The Congress of Vienna was chaotic, but because of its construction in several layers of influence, because of the relative power balance within the Inner Circle and the relative wide common ground between the Great Powers, it did reach a substantial outcome; an outcome creating stability, as well as laying the foundations for a lot of instability to come. Nevertheless, the system of ‘Vienna’ prevented another pan-European war in the nineteenth century. However, it could not prevent the World Wars in the century thereafter.

Conclusion

We conclude that the system of persuasion through negotiation worked well for the Great Powers who were included in the Inner Circle of the Five, less well for the Middle Powers who had to rely on intermittent consultations, and least well for the minor powers who had to rely on ad hoc contacts in the fringes of receptions, balls, fireworks, and the like. Inclusiveness and exclusiveness created effective and less-effective strata of persuasion, but this was an absolute necessity. At the time of incomplete procedures, lacking any perpetual organisational structure, the interests of the countries could never have been brought to closure, and closure was needed to give Europe a new future. Persuasion is necessary, but persuasion by a multitude of parties might work today, not 200 years ago. Persuasion, therefore, had to be artificially limited through inclusiveness and exclusiveness.
On the proper use of violence: reflections on the fall of the Soviet Union

Professor Andre Liebich

On the night of 3/4 June 1989, the Chinese authorities gave the order to suppress demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. For several weeks, thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people, mostly students, had been demanding democratic reforms. They did not put into question the socialist regime but their demonstrations were not authorised and they inspired a similar movement in a number of other cities.

At first, the Chinese leaders were at a loss to cope with the events. The proclamation of martial law on 19 May did not put an end to the movement of contestation and two schools emerged within the Chinese leadership. Zhao Ziyang, Secretary General of the Communist Party, denied the counter-revolutionary character of the demonstrations and called for conciliation, going in person to Tiananmen Square to talk to the crowd. Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Military Commission and the real power in the country, gave the head of government a mandate to repress the movement. Military units, backed by tanks, emptied the Gate of Heavenly Peace. The victims were numerous, estimates ranging from a few hundred to thousands of deaths.

The world reacted with dismay. Nevertheless, repression continued in China, with the mass arrest of protesters and their sympathisers, even those in very high places, and with the imposition of strict controls on freedom of expression. The United States and
the European Union levied sanctions; indeed, the embargo on delivery of armaments to China persists until this day.

In the final analysis, the Chinese regime, a one-party and nominally socialist dictatorship, survived and it is even doing very well nowadays. The People’s Republic of China is being courted by all countries of the world. It is experiencing an economic boom, uneven in its effects, but one that has been sustained over time. The weight of China continues to grow on the world stage. The country arouses respect and admiration; the bloody Tiananmen crackdown is but a distant and fading memory.

A Soviet analogy

It is the contrast between the course of events in China, which I have just described, and that in the Soviet Union which prompts these reflections on the proper use of violence. If we were to seek a Soviet analogy to the challenge the Chinese leaders faced on Tiananmen Square, we might refer to the Fall of the Berlin Wall, very close in time to Tiananmen and equally dramatic. The events in Berlin on the night of 9 November 1989 occurred far away from the Soviet capital, but they took place at the epicentre of Soviet international legitimacy.

Although it was a contingent, chaotic, and spontaneous event, the Fall of the Berlin Wall had an immense bearing on the Soviet position in the world. Far from using the troops it possessed in the vicinity of the Wall, Moscow looked at the upheaval, with equanimity and even impassivity. The situation was different in Vilnius on 12 January 1991. Faced with a popular movement in Lithuania, authorities in Moscow issued a warning calling for strict compliance with the Soviet constitutional order. Before a central government delegation could arrive in Vilnius to investigate the situation, military units had taken over radio and television installations by storming their facilities in the Lithuanian capital. Fourteen people were killed and hundreds injured. Mikhail Gorbachev, the CPSU Secretary General and recently elected head of state, denied having personally given the order to suppress the demonstrations but he did not escape responsibility for this act. Indeed, the real perpetrators of repression were not clearly identified and thus there were no sanctions issued.

This brief review of facts does not aim to introduce a comparison of the various crises that we have mentioned. Its purpose is to set the stage for an inquiry into the reflections that two classic authors have offered on the topic of violence and to raise questions about the relevance of their observations, formulated, of course, far from the context that concerns us here. As is clear from the cases evoked above, we have before us two scenarios related to the last days of the Soviet Union. The first case is one in which Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership refrain from any use of violence, as
they did in Berlin. The second case is one where they employ force, as in Vilnius, but without attaining the results sought, and even bringing about a deterioration of their position. Clearly, these events raise the issue of the proper use of violence, an issue that has been considered, as we shall see in this essay, by Vilfredo Pareto as well as by Niccolò Machiavelli.

**Vilfredo Pareto**

The first of these two classical authors, to whom we shall now turn, Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), is known among successive generations of students of economics as the author of the ‘Pareto Optimum’ or the ‘Pareto Efficiency’ principle. He is also acknowledged as an eminent sociologist, celebrated, among others, by Raymond Aron who wrote a preface for the French version of Pareto’s Treatise on General Sociology.¹

It is the historical experience of Louis XVI that inspires the thoughts of Pareto on the use of violence by political authorities. Pareto is not tender towards the unfortunate king. He reminds us that an established power possesses tremendous resources and benefits. It can draw on this capital in order to maintain himself or to adapt to the changing circumstances.

…when a governing class or nation has maintained itself for a long period of time by force and has enriched itself, it can survive for some time more without making use of force: by buying peace with its adversaries, paying for it with hard cash as well as obtaining it at the cost of honour and reputation … (§ 2059)

According to Pareto, the King of France could have slipped into the role of a constitutional monarch:

*Squandering in a short period of time the heritage of his ancestors, a heritage of love, respect and almost religious reverence towards the monarchy, Louis XVI, could have, by continuing to make concessions, made himself into the king of the Revolution (§ 2059)*

If we change our perspective to consider the case in question, we are tempted to ask

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¹ Pareto V (1968) *Traité de Sociologie générale*, préface de Raymond Aron, Oeuvres complètes vol 12. Genève: Libraire Droz. I wish to thank Pierre Hassner who put me on the trail of Pareto. The references are to paragraphs according to which Pareto’s Treatise is organised.
whether Gorbachev could have transformed himself into the president of a multiparty and multinational country which would have succeeded the Soviet Union as we knew it? Considering what we have read in Pareto, the obstacles are clear. Gorbachev was not in possession of any of the personal assets of a hereditary sovereign. But, nowadays, there is another type of heritage that carries much more weight. By being elected president, Gorbachev had behind him the immense prestige of the government and the halo of statehood. He was the heir to a historical myth, that of the creation of the first socialist state in the world and of the victory over fascism. He was the holder of a legitimacy that issued from his country’s status as a Super Power. He possessed the vast resources of a huge country that functioned poorly but in which people lived much better than they had lived in a still recent past.

For Pareto, leaders who do not take advantage of their assets, do not deserve any compassion. Pareto says:

_We do not recall the example of Louis XVI of France, who believed that he was able to stop the Revolution by his veto: it was the illusion of a man deprived of sense and courage._

Or even,

_If Louis XVI had not been a man with so little sense and even less bravery, who let himself be killed without fighting, who preferred to lay his head on the guillotine rather than fall bravely, arms in hand, it may have been he who would have destroyed his opponents (§ 2180)_

It is difficult to see Gorbachev, sword in hand, engaged in a deadly duel with, say, Boris Yeltsin. Nonetheless, Pareto’s thesis is clear:

_Louis XVI fell because he did not want to, did not know how to and could not use force: while the revolutionaries were victorious because they wanted to, knew how to and could use it (§ 2201)_

According to Pareto, abstention from violence, the neglect of violence shown by the King could be explained in terms of moral weakness and a failing intelligence. Can we attribute the same defects to Gorbachev?

It seems to me that before making such a judgment on Gorbachev, according to criteria that are yet to be defined, we must turn to what he says himself. The memoirs of politicians are, by definition, apologetic. Yet the very way in which one formulates an
apology or justifies oneself is meaningful. If we look into the memoirs of Gorbachev, we see that he does not avoid the issue of violence. Speaking about riots in Sumgait, an eruption of ethnic violence in the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in 1988, Gorbachev says:

We have often been accused of “showing weakness”. But when we were forced to bring in the militia and military units to avoid bloodshed, we again fell under the fire of criticism, this time for using force. There is no doubt that the government had to act in the way they did. Extreme measures were due to extreme circumstances. The same thing would have been done in any democratic state.2

The same plaintive note comes through in his defense of a severely criticised decree in January 1991, entitled, On the interaction of the militia and units of the armed forces in law enforcement and the struggle against crime. Gorbachev insists:

I saw nothing reprehensible in allowing assistance to be given to the militia by garrison servicemen to maintain order in the city … Obviously, I could not have anticipated that the decree would be discredited from its inception because of stupid orders issued by local commanders (p. 582).

Here we see the Gorbachev Line in all its complexity. ‘The main thing is to use political methods’, he says in his memoirs. (p. 335) If ‘political methods’ do not work, we are obliged to resort to force. According to Gorbachev himself, it is a centrist position that he is adopting.

Surprisingly, it is to the words of Alexander Solzhenitsyn that Gorbachev turns in a flurry of self-justification. According to Solzhenitsyn, as cited by Gorbachev:

The most difficult task in social development consists in tracing a centre line. It does not help to invoke the throat, the fist, the bomb and iron bars. A centre line requires utmost self-control, the most steadfast courage, the highest degree of deliberate patience as well as the most precise knowledge (p. 589).

Contrary to Pareto’s accusations against Louis XVI, Gorbachev would not have been reluctant to use force against his opponents when it was required. Yet, there is a persistent suspicion that Gorbachev is the Louis XVI of the present day. The Armenian president, Ter Petrossian, put it succinctly, ‘the center committed suicide’.3 This does

not mean that Gorbachev consciously sought the destruction of the Soviet Union; it suggests, rather, that Gorbachev did not resist its destruction, Gorbachev did not use the violent means available to him to defend what was essential.

If ‘political methods’ do not work, we are obliged to resort to force. Although Pareto applies the same analysis in terms of ‘suicide’, not only to Louis XVI but also to other French political regimes, he expresses reservations with regard to the image of ‘suicide’. Pareto quotes an author who is reputed to have stated that ‘there is only one way for governments to perish: by committing suicide’ but Pareto finds this statement to be ‘a bit too absolute’ (§ 2201). Retreating from his own affirmations, Pareto writes:

Why have some governments used force while others have failed to use it? It may not be accurate to say, as we have just done, that the fall of a government occurred because it did not use force; because if there were any facts on which the non-use of force depended, these facts would clearly be the cause of the phenomena, while the failure to use force would only be an apparent cause.

Indeed, this statement stands in considerable contrast to Pareto’s earlier statements.

If one does not know the destination, one cannot know the means for how to get there either. One could follow this train of thought in a profitable manner when it comes to the Soviet case. What were the facts on which the non-use of force might have depended? Surely we must admit that Gorbachev disposed of means of repression sufficient to give the order for their exercise? Lack of such means might have been the problem of Nicolas II in March 1917 or of Kerensky later that year. It was not Gorbachev’s problem. As the events of Vilnius and other similar incidents demonstrate, law enforcement agencies were just waiting for the moment to act. How can one then explain Gorbachev’s restraint? Was it a boundless confidence in himself, a mixture of optimism and arrogance that made him believe he could solve everything, make things right, without resorting to tanks or mass arrests? Was his credibility, both inside and outside his country, based to such an extent on the image and ideology he had created himself – ‘The main thing is to use political methods’ – that he became the prisoner of it? Or, must we admit, as Kolakowski has proposed, that Gorbachev had no real purpose: his whole approach lay in the process itself? [‘It became increasingly clear that he had no precise (or even imprecise) plan, that perestroika was an empty word (glasnost was not), that he reacted to events generally unprepared, in haste.’4] If one does not know the destination, one cannot know the means for how to get there either.

Pareto’s arguments and the observations we are drawing do have their share of truth but, as we have seen, they do not entirely resolve the problem at hand. The fact is that Gorbachev did (sometimes) use the means of repression, force and violence. Except that he, obviously, did not use them well and did not use them in a timely fashion. Let us now put behind us Pareto with his glorification of violence and his failure to address the circumstances of its use, and let us move on to the most famous of authors who has spoken about the problem that we are addressing here.

**Niccolò Machiavelli**

If Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) had dedicated his book, *The Prince*, to Mikhail Gorbachev rather than to Lorenzo di Medici, he would not have needed to change much. Taking the typology developed by Machiavelli, the situation of the Soviet Union in 1985 corresponds most closely to the Principality where the prince becomes a citizen neither through heredity nor ‘through crime or intolerable violence’ (Chapter IX). The mode of acquisition of power in these principalities requires cunning and luck (fortuna) but it relies, in one way or another, on the ‘support of fellow citizens’. The first type of such support is that of the people. It is the one that makes governance easiest because ‘the people long only not to be oppressed’. The other form of support is that of the aristocracy, which is what Machiavelli would have called the ‘central nomenklatura’ or the political elite of the USSR.

*Whoever becomes prince with the help of the nobility will have more difficulty to retain power than he who is raised by the people because he is surrounded by people who believe themselves to be his equal and he is thus unable to direct or to order as he wishes.*

Such a prince must seek above all to win the favour of the people. That would be easy enough if he would protect the people, since men who receive benefits from those from whom they expect miseries do feel a greater obligation towards their benefactors. As for ways of winning the support of the people, Machiavelli tells us that there are many but they vary depending on the circumstances and a rule cannot be established.

*I conclude only that it is necessary for a Prince to be loved by his people, otherwise there is no remedy whatsoever in his adversities.*

We are not going to enumerate the ways in which Gorbachev failed to win the favour of the people. It will be sufficient to recall, without concluding that such means would have been effective, that he could have used the instrument of violence to assert himself and to remain in power. Violence is an option that is, of course, uppermost in Machiavelli’s mind. He cites with approval the behaviour of Cesare Borgia towards a cruel and
competent minister who had been given the authority to restore order and unity in the country. Having implemented effectively his mandate, the minister had also inspired hatred among the population. Borgia therefore condemned the minister, cut him in half, and placed the corpse with a log of wood and a bloody knife in the middle of the square. ‘The ferocity of this scene caused the people both satisfaction and amazement’, concluded Machiavelli (Chapter VII).

But The Prince is not an apology of violence. Machiavelli carefully studies the dosage and appropriateness of the use of force.

You can refer to this cruelty as good (if it can be said that evil has good in it) due to the fact that it occurs only once, by necessity of security and then does not continue further .... (Chapter VIII).

In fact, in order to act ruthlessly only once one must act severely, promptly and expeditiously. According to Machiavelli, ‘.. by taking a country, whoever occupies it must consider all the cruelties that are necessary for him to realise and all the means at the same time’, in order ‘not to return to that topic everyday and to be able to, by not enforcing them again, reassure men and win over their affection by exerting kind deeds’.

Could Gorbachev have profited from the lessons of Machiavelli? It seems to me that we can draw two lessons from a reading of The Prince in relation to the case that is of interest to us. The first is that Gorbachev was wrong not to pursue relentlessly the party leadership which had brought him to power and that had led the country so badly, as all concerned would agree. Of course, Gorbachev did appeal to the intelligentsia or to other fractions of a virtual civil society to counter the resistance or even the opposition of his party.

One must commit one's share of violence or cruelty the sooner the better and at one go.

He took away from the party its leadership rôle and even, in extremis, he authorised the dissolution of the party. These gestures, carried out in small steps, quietly and reluctantly, did not succeed in winning over what Machiavelli calls 'the love of the people'. Gorbachev deprived the people of a spectacle, an amazing and satisfying spectacle, that would have offered them the destruction, at least in a figurative sense, of a collective or individual scapegoat.

The second lesson of The Prince is that one must commit one's share of violence or cruelty the sooner the better and at one go. The prudence, or even the trial and error process, that characterised the reforms of Gorbachev stand in total contradiction with such an injunction.
Gorbachev might have been able to make up for his initial errors, but by then the opportunity, the right moment, was missing. The first time that Gorbachev faced a direct dramatic challenge, comparable to that of the Tiananmen Square events, was on the occasion of the August 1991 attempted coup d’etat. Here was an opportunity to deal ruthlessly with the instigators of the coup or align himself with them and thus endow them with the effectiveness they were lacking. But Gorbachev had put himself out of the game. His rival, Boris Yeltsin, seized the moment and thereby experiences a crowning moment of which there would always remain a few bits of glory despite the failures and betrayals that followed. We may recall the image of Gorbachev returning from Sochi after the failed coup d'état, as a small, bent and weak man. He had nothing left in him of The Prince.

‘Nobody is so old that he could not survive for one more year.’ 5 Even if the days of the USSR were counted as are those of any political formation, its disappearance in December 1991 was not a matter of predestination. Other circumstances as well as other policies could have led to a different outcome. Among the variables relevant to such alternative policies is that of violence. By using the extensive forces of repression at disposition of the Soviet state, Gorbachev could have – perhaps – inflected the course of history.

We can sigh with relief that Gorbachev did not act otherwise than he did. Whether due to moral scruples, ideological blindness, lack of opportunity or lack of imagination, the reasons for his inaction continue to elude the historian. And we do not cease to wonder that, when Gorbachev did resort to violence, his attempts stopped short and halted neither the dissolution of a powerful empire nor the radical transformation of the regime. We are relieved to note that so little blood was shed at the centre, and we can only regret that this was not the case on all the Soviet peripheries during this period as well as in the period that followed. But we still cannot comprehend that Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership let matters develop as they did.

This misunderstanding seems to be shared by the post-Soviet population which, according to all polls, regrets the disappearance of the Soviet Union. [According to a poll conducted in Summer 2006, 66% of the Russian population regrets the disappearance of the Soviet Union; 57% believes that it could have been avoided.6 ] No wonder that the population supported President Putin who, in all likelihood, also does not comprehend why his Soviet predecessor did not want to or failed to use violence.

In contrast to what had happened earlier, in 1993, during the assault on the Russian Parliament, the first President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, showed that he

was unwilling to commit the mistake of his Soviet predecessor. One may suppose that the present and future presidents of Russia will be inclined to ponder these lessons.
Part II:

Persuasion in theory
Persuasion and linguistics: framing an argument

Dr Biljana Scott

The way in which we frame an issue largely determines how that issue will be understood and acted upon. This article considers the importance of framing in the exercise of persuasion and draws on Obama’s Nobel speech of December 2010 in order to illustrate the devices under discussion. This speech can be seen as epitomising the exercise of framing, given the implausible task of using a peace prize as a venue in which to advocate war.

Framing and the appeal to logic

This section focuses on those framing devices which appeal primarily to the power of reason, from assertion to typecasting and semantic categories. The next section considers the appeal to emotion, and the hand-in-glove relationship between reason and emotion are considered in the last section.

Assertion

The assertion of facts is one of the most emphatic ways of framing an issue. Expressions

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1 Adapted from a lecture given by Dr Scott on our Humanitarian Diplomacy course.

such as the fact is, the truth is, the key point is, what is important is, all signal that one's discussion is factual. Hence the emphasis in persuasive-speaking guides on gathering evidence and mastering the facts of one's argument. However, it is important to recognise that what follows such expressions is not necessarily a universally acknowledged truth, but may be a subjective take on the world.

In Obama's speech, we find several such assertions, of which these are some examples:

- We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth
- I face the world as it is
- For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world
- To say that force may sometimes be necessary... is a recognition of history
- The world must remember
- The plain fact is this
- Peace requires responsibility, peace entails sacrifice. That's why... that's why...

It is good practice to listen out for such linguistic markers and focus on the proposition which follows the colon – to what extent is it subjective? In what ways is it disputable? And what other pertinent truths or facts does this particular proposition obscure? Such questions may be thought of as the ‘Pride and Prejudice test’, following one of the strongest assertions to be found in the first lines of a novel: 'It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife.'³ In listening to others, one needs to distinguish between purported facts and established ones. In speaking persuasively one must estimate when it might prove judicial to blur that distinction.

**Pre-emptive arguments**

A salient use of pre-emptive arguments involves the recognition and acknowledgment of the opposing position, maybe sympathising and even identifying with it, but then showing why the particular circumstances demand the alternative approach being proposed. This framing strategy is illustrated by sequences such as the following, in which all the propositions preceding the 'but' act as acknowledgements which the following statement overrules:

> I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King said... I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there is nothing weak ... in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King. But as a head of state

sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their example alone. I face the world as it is and cannot stand idle in the face of threats.⁴

Acknowledging a counter-argument can also be done in counterbalanced sentences of a NOT X BUT Y structure. This is illustrated by the following extracts from Obama’s speech:

- To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history.
- We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest…
- I understand why war is not popular, but I also know this:…
- We honor those ideals by upholding them not when it’s easy, but when it’s hard.

There is a two-fold advantage to this counterbalancing dynamic. The first is that the speaker appears both well-informed and well-reasoned in so far as he presents his views not as assertions, but as the more considered choice. Secondly, a pre-emptive move is in evidence, since the argument being rejected anticipates likely responses to the one being proposed, and deals with them there and then.⁵

Typecasting and selectivity

Creating stereotypes and deploying them for good or ill is another standard framing device. We are all familiar with the Nazi anti-Semitic rhetoric which dehumanised Jews by depicting them as no better than vermin, worthy of extermination. American rhetoric against the Japanese was similar during World War II, as was Western rhetoric against the ‘Yellow Peril’ of China which originated in the nineteenth century and was revived during the twentieth. It has been claimed that the depiction of Muslims in current American war rhetoric is similarly dehumanising.⁶ To depict the ‘other’ as less than human is a preliminary to treating them inhumanely and justifying one’s actions on pre-emptive grounds: there can be no charge of inhumanity where the other is unfit to be human.

⁴ Notice the false equation between non-violence and standing idle.

⁵ For a more detailed analysis of this construction, see my blog of 31 January 2013 ‘Obama’s 2013 Inaugural: doctor’s diagnosis.’ Available at http://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/obama’s-2013-inaugural-doctor’s-diagnosis

Obama characterises ‘the other’ as a ‘vicious adversary that abides by no rules’, and as the personification of the evil that exists in this world, and of the ‘oppression’ which ‘will always be with us’ and of the ‘intractability of depravation’.

Typcasting need not be negative of course, and one should look beyond the denigration and demonisation of others for evidence of self-aggrandisement. In Obama’s speech, one finds considerable self-promotion of the USA as a ‘standard bearer in the conduct of war’: the USA is depicted as a valiant champion of lofty values fighting and enduring great sacrifices for the sake of all that is good in the face of an evil and intractable world:

*The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans.*

Notice the selective use of examples here, both with regard to the relative sacrifice of US versus allied forces in the example of World War II, and with regard to the wars omitted: most notably Vietnam. This kind of selective disclosure is a standard framing device: we foreground evidence which promotes our argument and omit mention of evidence which might detract from it. The very process of typcasting involves selecting certain attributes over and above others, and presenting them as definitive.

The onus is therefore on the audience to listen out for what has not been said: withheld information which might significantly alter the weight of the evidence, thus altering the import of the story being told. Notice in this case that the values being promoted are not to be enjoyed by the living, but by future generations, adding to the weight of sacrifice, and the wisdom behind it, for who would condemn current pain for future and more widespread gain:

*We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.*

Typcasting, in so far as it involves generalisations and oversimplifications, is invariably both selective and misleading, and yet it is a very powerful device. In a world where there are more stories to be told than there is time or attention to hear them all, let alone to choose between them, a story with black and white characters, who play the roles of goodies and baddies, pitted against each other in a war of salvation versus destruction, is a story that so readily fulfills the mythological narratives we are primed
for, that it wins out over other stories. We don’t even have to stop and think, we can just pledge our allegiance and back the ‘right’ side. The fact that both sides are telling equivalent narratives (value-driven, God-chosen, self-sacrificing yet ultimately victorious), is conveniently overlooked in a world made accessible through typecasting.\(^7\)

According to Joseph Nye’s ‘paradox of plenty’, which refers to the glut of information which characterises our age and the concomitant dearth of attention, the only way out of the paradox is to tell a winning story, and thus capture not only attention, but hearts and minds. Typecasting is one way of ensuring whose story wins. And so we find that the shades of grey, the subtleties and nuances and intricacies of argument which might otherwise appeal to the intellect, make way for the stereotypes which appeal to – and sway – our emotions.

**Appeals to authority and precedent**

Another persuasive framing strategy involves the appeal to authority and precedent, in the form citations of great men. Gandhi, Kennedy and Martin Luther King are all cited by Obama, to dual effect. First, he aligns himself with the thinking of these men by quoting them, and this creates a frame of reference within which he can then situate himself more precisely. Given that his speech is a call for greater violence, not less, he is playing a dangerous game by seemingly siding with Gandhi and King only to stab them in the back. Presumably Obama feels the risk is worth taking since circumstances demand his course of action (‘I face the world as it is’), and given that he will return to their creed of love and promote it whole-heartedly at the end of his speech.

Second, in citing them, something of their wisdom, authority and charisma – their stardust – might rub off on him. That, certainly, is one of the reasons we quote the words of others in order to express our own meaning: quotations legitimise our own beliefs because they are already in the public domain and approved of. Quotations legitimise our own beliefs because they are already in the public domain and approved of.

The onus is therefore on the audience to listen out for what has not been said: withheld information which might significantly alter the weight of the evidence, thus altering the import of the story being told.

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\(^7\) For an ironical take on the folly of such attitudes, see Voltaire’s *Candide*, Chapter 3, p10 ‘At length, while the two kings were causing Té Deum to be sung each in his own camp, *Candide* resolved to go and reason elsewhere on effects and causes.’ Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19942/19942-h/19942-h.htm#Page_9
seen that citations both provide a frame of reference for one’s own position and a form of legitimisation.

The appeal to precedent serves a similar legitimising function. The implication here is that there is wisdom in the past: what has been, will be, because it is fundamentally sound and worth protecting and perpetuating. This approach works best when one is dealing with perennial values, and therefore explains the force of tradition, since traditions are generally seen as embodying a culture’s values.

**Semantic categories**

We all seem to expect words to have fixed meanings which we can look up in the dictionary and use rigorously in our speech. What exactly does Obama mean by a ‘just war’ or a ‘just peace’; what is ‘enlightened self-interest’? Is there a checklist of semantic features by which to evaluate the reality on the ground and determine whether any given war is just or unjust, any given self-interest enlightened or benighted? And in the absence of any such checklist, how do we know what words mean, or how to assign members to categories? In order to answer this question, which as we shall see below is so central to securing a winning argument, we need to take a small detour into linguistics.

The checklist approach to semantic categories as first proposed by Aristotle, who claimed that every semantic category (for instance ‘human’) consisted of a set of defining features (in the case of ‘human’, he suggested these would be [+upright], [+walking], [+talking]). The advantages of this approach are (1) that category membership is unambiguous and fixed, (2) that structural connections can be made between categories: subsets, supersets etc. (bachelor and spinster are subsets of the category human), and (3) that logical connections can be made between categories and their containing sentences: antonyms, synonyms etc. (bachelor and spinster are antonyms in so far as they have opposite genders, though they are similar with regard to the features [+adult] and [+single]: therefore to say ‘my sister is a bachelor’ is contradictory).

We see the Aristotelian approach adopted in legal categories, or any categories which have legal implications: this is the case with regard to the categories ‘refugee’ as opposed to an ‘economic migrant’, with the category ‘mass killing’ as opposed to ‘genocide’. How immigration officials respond to the individual seeking asylum will depend on how they are categorised. How the United Nations responds to war-time atrocities will similarly depend on what category label they have attached to the events in ques-
tion, and therefore we find that the checklist of defining features for each category is strictly defined and adhered to. Note that ‘strict’ does not necessarily mean unambiguous or fair.

The disadvantage of Aristotelian categories is that they are too Procrustean (they manipulate the evidence to fit the frame). According to this approach, amputees, babies and mutes are not human since they fail the feature test (they are [-two legs] [-upright] [-talking] respectively). By extension, historians and politicians can disagree over assigning killings to the category ‘genocide’ by manipulating the evidence (by massaging the figures, or questioning the intentions of the perpetrators, for instance). The binary either-or status imposed by Aristotelian categories does not adequately reflect reality, which is often more fuzzy, more open to interpretation. Moreover, Aristotelian categories cannot account for (1) the well-formedness and (2) the difference in connotations between expressions such as ‘my sister is a real bachelor’ and ‘my brother is a real spinster’, which they would dismiss as illogical and which nevertheless conjure a plausible lifestyle in each case.

In actual usage, we are constantly redefining words to suit our needs. Why else would we so often use the expressions ‘it depends what you mean by X’. In order to capture this state of play, the Prototype theory of semantic categories proposes that category membership clusters around prototypes, or ‘best examples’ (a dispossessed and politically persecuted person who has fled their country is the prototype of a refugee). This means that category boundaries are fuzzy and can be redefined (a bat is a bird in that it has wings and it can fly); category members do not have equal status: (a robin is a bird par excellence versus a penguin is a bird par excellence); non-members have unequal status (a bat is a bird vs time is a bird ... in that it can fly).

The advantages of the Prototype approach are (1) flexibility: new members can be included on the basis of partial resemblance; (2) adaptability: redefinitions can be made according to need – significantly, this means that categories are negotiable, and (3) prototype categories reflect language use and explain linguistic hedges such as in that, in so far as, strictly speaking, technically, par excellence, etc. The prevalence of hedges suggests that we habitually use prototype categories, and that Aristotelian categories are the exception (e.g. strictly or technically speaking). The main disadvantage of prototype categories is that they allow for semantic slippage and ambiguity.

How do semantic categories relate to the topic of persuasion through argument, and to framing in particular? The creation of semantic categories such a ‘just war’ or ‘enlightened self-interest’ are powerful ways of redefining known categories in order to suit one’s purposes. In an age when justice and the rule of law is lauded over and above the might of war, a ‘just war’ detracts from the negative connotations of ‘war’ and replaces
them – or at least influences them – with the positive connotations of ‘justice’ and ‘justification’.\(^8\) Similarly, whereas self-interest is generally perceived as an expression of selfishness, ‘enlightened’ self-interest, as described by Obama, is an expression of altruism and evidence of paternalistic responsibility towards all peoples, across the length and breadth of the globe, both present and future. This kind of compound term may indeed function like a parasite: it simulates the properties of the referent and thereby allows entry to rogue elements. In what sense is Putin’s ‘managed democracy’ a form of democracy, or ‘gunboat diplomacy’ a form of diplomacy? Category inclusion is not a given, but is often presented as if it were.

Perhaps one of the most persuasive ways of framing an argument is to claim that one is dealing with Aristotelian categories while actually redefining terms in order to suit one’s purpose. Thus Obama presents the notion of a ‘just war’ as a given – it already exists out there and he is simply subscribing to it – whereas it could be argued that he is fitting the facts to the frame, and the same goes for ‘enlightened self-interest’. This is a good example of the need for a heightened awareness of the workings of language in order better to use and where necessary defuse persuasive language.

Stories are a key resource in persuasion because they structure events, create cohesion and invite identification not only with actors but with values as well. The choice of semantic categories, along with the definitions provided for each, is therefore instrumental in framing an argument. A given term will bring to mind a prototype, the features of which define the category. In the case of compound words such as the ones discussed here, these newly coined semantic categories are a way of encapsulating at word level the kind of pre-emptive argument of the Not-X-but-Y type discussed above. But word compounds are perhaps more powerful than that kind of argument since the persuasiveness of these terms operate at what is often a subliminal level: unless we think consciously in terms of semantic categories, we are less likely to notice the influence they exert on our thoughts.

It is worth keeping in mind that in communication, a balance obviously has to be struck between flexibility and fixity or we would not be able to understand each other. Meaning is therefore negotiable, and the negotiators are the speakers of a linguistic community. Language use determines word meaning, and dictionaries merely log that

\(^8\) The term ‘just war’ alludes to the terms ‘jus ad bellum’ and ‘jus in bello’, which refer to the legality of a declaration of war and the legality of conduct within the waging of war respectively. See for instance: http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum/index.jsp
use. That is why they have to be constantly updated. Of course dictionaries tend to exert a prescriptive influence on speakers as well, but the bottom line remains that meaning is negotiable. If somebody’s definitions contradict our own, and those we think are consensual, then we are in a position to question them, indeed, we may be duty-bound to do so. Conversely, if the redefinition of a term and the reassignment of members to categories suits out purposes, then we should take advantage of the opportunities to do so. Language is both the subtlest and strongest of resources.

**Reframing and the appeal of stories**

A story has been defined as ‘a fact, wrapped in an emotion that compels us to take an action that transforms our world’. This definition encapsulates the four components contained in all stories: an emotion, contained both in the passion with which the story is told and in the emotion it elicits in the listener; a protagonist who provides a point of view for the listener to identify with (or define himself against); a problem in the form of an antagonist or contretemps; and finally a change, usually in the form of a redemption. A fifth component, often overlooked because it occupies only a short space of time, is the epiphany or moment of awareness, which provides the turning point leading to change. These four or five components can be found in all stories, including political narratives.

Stories are a key resource in persuasion because they structure events, create cohesion and invite identification not only with actors but with values as well. Above all, they expand our horizons by speaking to us of possible worlds from which we can learn. The Greek concept of *pathos*, although defined as ‘the appeal to emotion for rhetorical effect’, tends to include within its remit imagination, identification and a sense of fellow-suffering (‘pathos’ means both ‘suffering’ and ‘experience’): all defining components of a gripping story.

All cultures have a variety of traditional story types, from myths to parables, fables, allegories, fairy-tales, anecdotes, apologues and beyond. In what follows, we shall concentrate on metaphors and connotations, both of which pack an entire story not only into a few words, but sometimes into a single word, or even into what we refer to as ‘between the lines’.

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12 For a succinct series of definitions, see Wiki’s entry on: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myth,_legend,_fairy_tale,_and_fable
Metaphors and analogies are conspicuous frame-setting devices, as illustrated by the metaphor ‘Afghanistan is the graveyard of Nations’ and the analogy ‘The war in Afghanistan is another Vietnam.’ Less overt devices, such as connotations and implications, can frame an argument equally well. Thus in a discussion of taxes, the use of the term relief as in tax relief, suggests that taxes are an affliction and that any party which manages to minimise this affliction is the hero rather than the villain, and is therefore the party of choice. If one wants to argue to the contrary, then one will not advance one’s case by simply asserting that tax relief is bad for society, or denying that tax is an affliction, or that one’s party is not the villain, since denials tend to consolidate the frame. Asking people not to think of an elephant is likely to bring one to mind.13 Similarly, Nixon’s claim ‘I am not a crook’ raised the suggestion that he might be.

A more effective way of presenting one’s argument and convincing others is not therefore to rebut an existing frame, but to reframe the issue.14 Where possible, this new frame should appeal to common values. This is because, as Lakoff argues, ‘people vote their identity, not their self-interest’: that is to say that we prefer candidates whose values appear to match our own, whom we can identify with as ‘one of us.’ This appeal to ingroup values, itself a powerful form of framing.

Emotions can be elicited through the use of metaphors and images, as in the succession of three vivid scenarios in Obama’s penultimate paragraph: the outgunned but valiant soldier; the protestor marching despite brutal oppression; and the mother sacrificing herself for her child’s education ‘because she believes that a cruel world still has a place for that child’s dreams.’ Further metaphors in Obama’s speech include faith in human progress as ‘the North Star that guides us on our journey’ and acts as our ‘moral compass.’

The power of such images in framing and reframing an argument is that they provide enough information for the rest to be inferred. The guidance-cum-manipulation of assumptions and inference is one of the most effective forms of persuasion. We are on a journey, Obama claims, and instead of questioning this claim, we fall into a mindset that acknowledges the importance of guiding lights and compasses in the context of a journey. When we are offered faith in progress and possibility as that moral compass, we feel reassured that the demands of the situation have been met. This is the power

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14 For an alternative frame to ‘tax relief’ scroll down to relevant heading in Lakoff’s web feature ‘Framing the Issue.’ Available at http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml
of metaphors, to prime us on how to see the world, what to expect of it and how to act upon it.

**Connotations**

Connotations, like metaphors, act as stories in a capsule, bringing a whole scenario to mind, with value judgments attached, through the ‘mere’ choice of a word. This is evident in paired terms which refer to the same entity in the world, but elicit very different connotations: *security fence* versus *apartheid wall*; *rebellion* versus *civil war*; *terrorist* versus *freedom fighter*; *honour killing* versus *mysoginist murder*; *scary movie* versus *terror porn*. In his speech, Obama pits America as the ‘standard bearer in the conduct of war’ against the ‘vicious adversary that abides by no rules’. George Lakoff’s admonition that an argument, to be effective, should appeal to ingroup values is complied with here: there are goodies and baddies and America is a model of good behaviour in war. This focus on positive attributes (questionable in itself in the light of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) takes the focus away from the contentious argument he is promoting: greater violence.

**Clusivity**

Typecasting is one expression of clusivity, as we have seen, and the use of first person pronouns is another. The use of pronouns is not limited to an US versus THEM divisiveness, but can also promote credit-seeking and responsibility-shunning. In Obama’s speech it is notable that when he wants to share the responsibility for actions undertaken, and perhaps even defuse blame, he uses the first person plural ‘we’ pronoun, but when he wants to take credit for actions and achievements, and thereby show his leadership, he uses the singular pronoun ‘I’. In the following passage, Obama shifts from ‘we’ to ‘I’ and back. The plural pronoun is used when community-building and identity-defining values are being spoken about, and the singular pronoun when he lists the measures he personally has undertaken in order to contribute to those values and the community and identity that go with them. Notice that the demonised other makes an appearance here the better to distinguish and define the ingroup:

*Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength. That is why I prohibited torture. That is why I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have reaffirmed America’s commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise...*
the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we honor – we honor those ideals by upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is hard.

Shared aspirations

Dreams, the future, would-be worlds, the ultimate expression of all that is best, most God-like, in the human soul – these are the stuff of aspiration, and aspirations are one of the most powerful framing devices. The end of Obama’s speech is one sustained crescendo towards a visionary future. The effect of a crescendo is, moreover, achieved by means of heightened language, replete with alliterations, refrains and other sonorous devices. His mention of our essential moral imagination, the ‘something irreducible that we all share’, our love and our fundamental faith in human progress signal a change of frame from the present to an aspirational future. Aspirations are a sure way of expanding the circle of inclusion by projecting our sights into an idealised future which shows none of the divisions and strifes that afflict our present condition. The poetic language Obama uses itself acts as a sonorous and emotive backdrop for the visionary frame he projects. This is best exemplified by the line: ‘Let us reach for the world that ought to be – that spark of the divine that still stirs within each of our souls.’

Redress

Obama’s vision of the future contrasts in edifying ways with what we currently experience: it has redressive force, where redress refers to the righting and setting back on-course of what has been overthrown or thrown off-course. As a framing device, redress goes hand in hand with aspirations, since it is usually future-orientated and comes with the strong underlying message that all will be put right and an ideal future attained if one were only to follow the precepts of the speaker. Moreover, the language of redress is often heightened in nature, replete with metaphors, music and imagination. The adage ‘One campaigns in poetry but governs in prose’ alludes to both to the redressive and the lyrical quality of campaigning language. Redress is evident in Martin Luther King’s counterbalance between the ‘isness’ of man’s present condition and the ‘outught-ness’ he aspires to.

Consider Obama’s last paragraph where a succession of three sentences, all variants on a ‘we can … and still strive’ refrain, build up a counterbalance between the shortfalls of our human condition and the virtues and values we nevertheless aspire to:

We can acknowledge that oppression will always be with us, and still strive for justice. We can admit the intractability of depravation, and still strive...
for dignity. Clear-eyed, we can understand that there will be war, and still strive for peace.

The redress of each of the second clauses is accentuated by the chant-like rhythm of the tricolon structure. This rhythm is repeated, at a faster tempo in the 'that' refrain of the next and final sentence:

We can do that – for that is the story of human progress; that's the hope of all the world; and at this moment of challenge, that must be our work here on Earth.

It is significant that the ultimate redress, implied in the very last word of Obama's speech, balances our work ‘here on Earth’ with, we are invited to infer, life beyond this world. Although heaven may not be mentioned explicitly, the thrust and rhythm of the repeated expressions of redress lead us inexorably to this conclusion, affirming that a divine power hovers over our endeavors and approves of them. God is on our side.

Credibility

A final framing device to be considered here involves what in Greek rhetoric is referred to as ‘ethos’, the credibility of the speaker as judged by their knowledge, authority, credentials and evidence. The debate at the time of Obama's being granted the Nobel Prize revolved in large part over his lack of ethos: that is to say that he had not yet achieved anything to warrant being granted the prize, quite on the contrary, his advocacy of greater armed intervention mitigated against his being a worthy recipient.

Obama, having decided to accept the prize, was therefore under pressure to prove himself worthy to the peace-promoting international constituency of doves. But he was also under pressure to placate the war-mongering domestic constituency of hawks who hold such sway in the USA. What linguistic resources did Obama use to meet this double challenge?

One can detect moments in the lecture when Obama makes a perceptible nod to each constituency. To the Doves, he offers overt proof of his credentials when he presents himself as a personification of Martin Luther King's life-work, as ‘living testimony to the moral force of non-violence’. His citation of King and Gandhi, as well as the entire aspiration argument at the end of his lecture act as not only a recognition, but an endorsement, of their philosophies. To the Hawks he acknowledges the necessity of war through his depiction of the world as he faces it:
We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.

But he also uses language which is straight out of his predecessor’s rhetoric: ‘For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world.’ These words are more recognisably Bush’s than Obama’s. To all constituencies, he asserts his status as head of state, a state which, moreover, ‘has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades’. He goes on to affirm his own leadership credentials through his switch to first person singular pronoun, as noted above. Thus through both overt flagging (statements and citations) and more covert linguistic uses (pronouns, Bush-mimicry), Obama attempts to present himself not only as worthy of the Nobel peace prize, but as a credible and authoritative world leader whose arguments and policies are worthy of winning hearts and minds.

To summarise, there are several effective ways of framing an argument.

- Assertion
- Pre-emptive arguments
- Appeal to authority and precedent
- Typecasting
- Selective disclosure
- Semantic categories
- Appeal to emotion through stories in a capsule
- Clusivity
- Shared aspirations
- Redress
- The use of musical devices
- Ethos and credibility

All of these framing devices can also be used in the process of reframing, and indeed, most framing involves reframing at some level, since we do not invent the world but, for better or for worse, reinvent it.

**Reason and emotion**

It should be emphasised that the appeals to reason and to emotion discussed in the preceding two sections are closely interconnected in the art of persuasion: logical
fallacies, for instance, are usually thought of as a form of faulty logic, but they constitute the staple of propaganda due to their rousing emotional content. Similarly, the choice of the ‘right word’ may be thought of as a rational exercise – certainly Classical rhetoric assigned it to ‘logos’ (Gk. ‘word’), namely the appeal to reason – yet the ‘stories in a capsule’ contained in connotations and metaphors also centrally belong to the study of emotional appeal, what the Greeks called pathos (Gk. ‘emotion’).

In Obama’s speech we see several combined appeals to both authority and emotion. His citations of King and Gandhi are a case in point: when confronted with words of wisdom, we are not only awed by their ‘rightness’ but swayed into wanting to support, promote and emulate them. The emotions of respect, allegiance and protective devotion which resonate within us are therefore triggered by the legitimisation offered by authority and argument. Conversely, the reasoned argument in favour of promoting war is fuelled by emotional images of sacrifice. And we have already noted the subtle use of modifying adjectives in compound terms which similarly help to tweak a definition and infiltrate a rogue member into an accepted category.

If we were to recast the traditional terms of rhetoric into the jargon of today, we might say that logos translates as ‘hard persuasion’, and pathos as ‘soft persuasion’. ‘Smart persuasion’, in addition to the judicial combination of soft and hard, would essentially include the sine-qua-non of all persuasion, namely trustworthiness, or ethos. The art of persuasion is to deploy rhetorical resources to suit the audience and the occasion in order to achieve ones objectives, namely to change the attitudes and associated behaviour of another party in line with one’s own beliefs (or a set of beliefs which suits our purpose). In the study of oratory, these aspects of persuasion are distinguished for the sake of clearer analysis. In its practice, they combine to create impact. The purpose of this article is to itemise those rhetorical devices which serve us best, and to bring them to our awareness.

A fist of iron in a velvet glove

Persuasion involves a judicial combination of force and grace: staying cool, calm and collected under attack, and remaining attentive and gracious while nevertheless standing firm. The expression ‘a fist of iron in a glove of velvet’ captures the sentiment explored in this section, as does the Latin ‘fortiter in re, suaviter in modo’ (stronger in the thing itself; more gracious in the method).
Force, I suggest, is achieved through assertion, and grace through attentiveness. Assertion ranges from asserting what’s what (labelling and typecasting), to asserting what words mean (definitions) and asserting what ‘things’ mean (the interpretation of facts and events through logical thinking and reasoned argument). The person who takes the initiative in assigning members to categories, defining key terms and pursuing a well-reasoned argument is likely to maintain control of the topic under discussion. These three types of assertion constitute the force, or iron fist, of an argument.

Attentiveness refers, in the first place, to acknowledgement of the other party. This may be done by means of expressions such as you know, as you say, you are right in…, don’t you think etc… One need not be in agreement with one’s interlocutor in order to use these phatic devices, the primary aim of which is to reach out and make contact: a form of verbal grooming.

As demonstrated in this analysis of Obama’s Nobel speech, attentiveness also involves not imposing on the other party through overly direct or demanding language. The kind of indirectness one finds in polite language secures face by giving the interlocutor freedom of manoeuvre. This is why we use indirect speech acts (do you know what the time is, or could you tell me the time) rather than direct ones, no matter how politely introduced (please tell me the time). Remaining relevant, respecting turn-taking and, above all, listening to the other party, are further mainstays of attentiveness.

Both assertion and attentiveness can be combined when arguing for a good cause aimed at the future benefit of all. Assertion comes into play through force of argument, backed by evidence, whereas attentiveness expresses itself through the power of shared aspirations and inclusive benefits.

**Conclusion**

In concluding, I would like to remind you of Joseph Nye’s ‘paradox of plenty’ and his claim that politics is a contest of competitive credibility. The challenge in an age of global communication characterised by a surplus of information is for leaders and opinion shapers to win first the attention and then the trust of their constituencies. To do so, they must tell the most convincing story, a process which involves a strong message conveyed in attentive language. Carl von Clausewitz prescription that ‘there is … nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point’ is especially apt in this information age where the cacophony of conflicting voices makes it all the more important to get one’s message across.
Nye’s notion of whose story wins in a contest of competitive credibility is not new. The aim of classical rhetoric, after all, has always been to seize the attention of an audience, to persuade that audience of the rightness of the speaker’s position, no matter what its truth-value, and finally to capitalise on trust earned through evidence of attentive leadership in order to secure continued support. Mastering both the ‘hard’ skills of assertion and argumentation and the ‘soft’ skills of attentiveness and engagement, and then finding a smart balance pertinent to the situation while retaining one’s credibility throughout, are indispensable towards that end. In this article, I have suggested how best to master this skill through framing devices.
Persuasion in sociology of diplomacy

Dr Milan Jazbec

I was never interested in diplomacy. My ambition and goal, from early childhood, was to become a journalist, which I actually achieved a decade and a half later. However, diplomacy entered my life much later then journalism and I would guess more or less by chance.

It was in mid-October 1987, when I started with my work as a mid-level diplomat in the then Yugoslav Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. So, roughly speaking, my diplomatic career started a quarter of a century ago, by which time Prof. Dietrich Kappeler already had spent the same amount of time in his diplomatic engagement. At the time, I did not know anything about him, and was practically an outsider in the profession that later became my vocation, activity, and hobby.

I was an outsider, in spite of the fact that I passed the diplomatic exams with almost the very best grades. Everything that I know now and have produced so far in the area of diplomacy\(^\text{16}\) is the result of enthusiastic, devoted, and demanding work throughout the past two and a half decades. Consequently, this was also the time during which Prof. Kappeler was slowly entering my research contemplations in this field.

\(^{16}\) Available at www.meles-meles.com
In contrast to my experience with our jubilant, I met Dr Jovan Kurbalija in early 1990, a few days after he, as a novice, with a degree from the Belgrade Faculty of Law in his pocket, entered the Foreign Ministry and landed in our department. We became acquainted at the very beginning and became friends soon afterwards. We spent approximately one year together.

In early summer of 1991, I left to Klagenfurt as a consul (the last of Yugoslavia, as it soon turned out, and just as soon after, the first of Slovenia) and Jovan left for the Diplomatic Academy of Malta, where his later career took off. I am glad and proud that our friendship has managed to strengthen with the passing of time.

**Scholarly contemplation**

My first encounter with diplomacy as a practitioner in those Belgrade years immediately encouraged me to dwell on it theoretically, primarily generally and later also seeking for backgrounds and specifics. This led to my theorising and the consequent publishing of various articles. My first book on diplomacy (on consular relations) was published exactly a decade after I entered the profession and my latest (the fourteenth) was published in July 2012, on the twentieth anniversary of the international recognition Slovenia and its diplomacy.

When I started with my scholarly contemplation and writings, I was careful enough not to choose foreign policy but diplomacy. The former is too sensitive a research issue for a career diplomat, while the latter offers a lot of challenge, practical examples, and unlimited potential for theorising. I think one could say that I have been absorbed by diplomacy so far (being most probably by now transformed to an insider).

**What diplomacy is**

My first understanding of the term was diplomacy as a skill. With that, I actually fully hit upon Prof. Kappeler's understanding, without knowing it at that time. A skilful diplomat is nothing but a persuasive one. Diplomacy as an activity followed as the next nuance and this was quite obvious for me, already a practitioner. It took a year or so before it occurred to me, listening to experienced colleagues, that diplomacy is also a profession. Diplomats are primarily professionals, career civil servants, or bureaucrats, dealing with the implementation of foreign policy through the exercise of diplomatic functions. Even more, they (actually, we) are the only part of public administration permanently pursuing this as a full time job. This distinguishes them (us) from all
others who occasionally deal with the same issues. All these three understandings radiate persuasion as the key element, as the essence of diplomacy, as we claim in this collection of papers.

Before continuing with the presentation of the evolution of my understanding of diplomacy, let me first elaborate my views on persuasion.

**Where persuasion fits in**

Perhaps one might say that persuasion is not just an activity, a skill, a way of doing diplomatic business, but rather a notion of diplomacy. It is a flexible concept for a broader framing of diplomacy into something not always clearly understandable, easy to catch and grasp, but a fluid understanding of what diplomats (and others occasionally engaged in this business) pursue and produce at the same time. Since diplomacy is a solution-oriented and conflict-preventing way of seeking to overcome differences and to make consensus or compromise possible, it is not necessary to contemplate why there is a need for persuasion and who is to be persuaded.

How to persuade would be the next question. The most efficient way to do so, I would say, is through personal example and natural authority. This includes persuading both by words and deeds as well as direct and indirect ways of doing so. Keeping in mind that the majority of states do not possess enough power as a means of persuasion, they should rely on a soft approach to this business. This could stand out in particular when persuasion is being exercised among states that are part of the same integration framework, as in the case of the EU. At the same time, the persuasive approach is accompanied by tougher means, in particular when issues of crucial importance are at stake. One could imagine that when concluding negotiations of the next budget period in late-night sessions of the European Council, the EU member states move on from softer to harder approaches and means. The tougher the negotiations are, the more states tend to cluster among two or three and push their interests; it is quite easily the case that at the very end, the ultimatum as the final method of persuasion is employed.

Persuasion, understood as an approach, method, and skill, for sure easily – or at all –

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stands out because of personal qualities of a diplomat in question, i.e. the one engaged in a process. Here, we could refer to Nicholson, who claims that an efficient, or even an ideal, diplomat (meaning also a negotiator) should derive their success from moral influence, which is founded on seven specific diplomatic virtues: truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty.\textsuperscript{18} Honesty and trust compose natural authority, which makes a self-confident diplomat, who knows how to encourage their counterpart, but also how to wait and let them get to know when a certain option is not adjustable. Often it is better to leave the counterpart to come to that conclusion by themselves than to rush them into such a conclusion by our eagerness. This could be an example of indirect persuasion, which as a rule is not a swift process, but a longer-lasting one.

Different historical situations and their social circumstances played a crucial role in shaping the mode and notion of diplomacy, its understanding, methods, and form.

Last but not least, one could say that good persuasion should reflect a given social context if it really aims to be successful. With this proposition we return to an understanding of diplomacy as a phenomenon.

**The sociology of diplomacy**

Working on my doctoral thesis, which took almost a decade (and literally a one-metre-high pile of books studied) and spanned two postings (Klagenfurt and Stockholm), a rather clear interpretation of diplomacy as an organisation articulated itself in front of me.\textsuperscript{19} A parallel with military organisation served well for the drawing of some initial conclusions and to aggregate some characteristics of the diplomatic organisation, while Aldrich\textsuperscript{20} and Morgan\textsuperscript{21} offered the theoretical background to back up the case. Needless to say, Weber’s concept of bureaucratic organisation was at the core of this understanding, interpretation, and application.\textsuperscript{22}

This was also the time when the concept of the sociology of diplomacy began to emerge in my research. Initially, I understood it as a sociological approach to the understanding of diplomacy, which emerged out of my study of sociological and organisational aspects of new diplomacies. I tried to describe it ‘as an approach and point of view for


\textsuperscript{19} For more on the understanding of diplomatic organisation, see Jazbec M (2001) *Diplomacies of New Small States: the Case of Slovenia with some Comparison from the Baltics*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 147–198.


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. pp. 49–50.
further theoretical conceptualisation and empirical researches of new diplomacies, based on (a) broad selection of methods, which sociology has developed so far for the study of social phenomena, and (b) large practical experiences, which diplomacies of small new states have contributed during the first decade of their existence to the field.\(^{23}\)

The next decade was spent researching this new topic, conceptualising, and defining it as well as its various research aspects. The more I dwelled on the issue, the more an understanding of a social dependence of diplomacy came to the forefront. The break-even point in that process was reached with the quotation from Benko, claiming that ‘diplomacy was established in a function of a historical situation, what would mean that in different historical periods the articulation of needs and interests dictated the establishment of diplomacy and guaranteed its existence.’\(^{24}\)

There is a significant and most probably also key interdependence between crucial historical periods and the way diplomacy is developing. One could claim this for the periods of the Greek city states, the medieval Italian city states, the Peace of Westphalia, the establishment of the League of Nations and the consequent end of the ancient regime as well as for the end of the Cold War and the consequent structural intensification of globalisation. Different historical situations and their social circumstances played a crucial role in shaping the mode and notion of diplomacy, its understanding, methods and form. So, generally speaking, it is a concrete social context that plays the decisive role in the way diplomacy appears and is being, accordingly, also researched.

With the end of the Cold War, this phenomenon highly increases in importance. First, one has to say that the globalisation processes gained increasingly on the structural momentum and secondly, an unprecedented revolution in both information/communication and transport technology definitively changed the historical situation and its social context. Their complexity and interdependence nowadays demand an understanding of diplomacy and its research not only with political sciences, history, law, and recently also with diplomatic studies, but furthermore with the approaches, methodology, apparatus, and reasoning of sociology. Therefore, according to my strong belief, a need for constituting the sociology of diplomacy has emerged.

The establishment of any special sociology is the result of a defined research topic (in our case the phenomena, relations, and processes within diplomatic organisation and

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with its environment, including diplomat as its main promotor), methodology (to a certain extent borrowed from general and similar special sociologies, like the sociology of international relations) as well as of initial research production. This special sociology would focus on diplomatic topics, like recruitment, education and training, promotion, social composition of diplomacy, gender issues, diplomacy as a profession, the so-called ideal diplomat and their relation towards a current historical situation, etc. These and other topics are dealt with in my book *Sociology of Diplomacy*, published in July 2012. As far as I can say, it was the first time that this emerging area and sub-discipline was thoroughly presented and elaborated, with contributions from various distinguished scholars and practitioners.

**Diplomacy as a social process**

Additionally, this was also the time when a notion of diplomacy as a process became fully clear to me. It means that I primarily and on the whole understand diplomacy as a dynamic social process, which enables foreign policy communication among subjects of international public law, and depends primarily on the changing social situation within a given historical context and is in principal relation towards the nation state.

This process nature of diplomacy stems from one point of view from its social context and from another from the fact that ‘without communication there can be no diplomacy.’ And as Petrič claims: ‘the core of diplomacy is communication among states, conducted by special personnel’ and this ‘communication with diplomats of other states and with the representatives and foreign policy bureaucracies of those states as well as with representatives and bureaucrats of international organisations represents the main activity of diplomats.’ At the same time, this definition is general enough to be able


to encompass various aspects of defining diplomacy (like the already mentioned skill, activity, profession, and organisation as well as foreign policy, behaviour, and also its reference to being an institution of the international community and not only of nation state) and dwelling on its substance.

But when it comes to its essence, I would stick to diplomatic functions as they are defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. They have been formulated quite precisely, but at the same time broadly enough to be able to survive half a century, without any clearly exercised determination of states to adapt them. This, however, does not mean these functions have not gone through a process of change.

**The ratio of diplomats to negotiations**

Representing the sending state in the receiving state is today much different than it was half a century ago or even earlier, but still serves its main purpose. Consular protection is increasing in importance due to the increased possibility to travel around the globe and to do business practically everywhere. Observing (by legal means) and reporting to the governments of sending states is increasing in importance as well, in particular due to complex societies and the growing difficulty to influence governments and their policies. Negotiations, historically the very heart of diplomatic activity, witness an increase in the number of experts – non-diplomats taking part in the process, while diplomats arrange the environment and conditions for it. One could even say that as the number of negotiations is increasing, the proportion of diplomats included is decreasing. Using each opportunity to deepen friendly relations among states and people remains an indispensable part of this profession.

Persuasion as a method and approach is being exercised by many different actors, not only by professional diplomats, which shows the high degree of its usage, efficiency and potential. So, finally, after this discourse, where do I see persuasion in diplomacy and how do I understand it?

**Persuasion in diplomacy**

Let me first try to say that its amount and level of practical use depend on its social context, too. The exercise of persuasion took a much different shape in the era of...
classic diplomacy, such as in the time of overseas mercantilist expansion of the western powers, than is the case at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is due to the changed structure of the international community and the way actors appear and function as well as a much diversified set of actors (state, non-state, private sector, civil society, media, individuals, etc.). I would say the contemporary highly complex and sophisticated interdependent international community cannot primarily rely on the use of force and exercise of power (this, of course, does not mean that it is no longer present or in use).

**Manoeuvring space**

Persuasion as a method and approach is being exercised by many different actors, not only by professional diplomats, which shows the high degree of its usage, efficiency and potential. Furthermore, it demonstrates the universality of diplomatic engagement as such. Diplomacy is a skill, present in daily life, used practically all the time. But due to the current social context there is much more manoeuvring space for the applicability of persuasion and its efficiency than there was, for example, a century or even longer ago. In particular, non-state actors like NGOs and media with their appearance and activity reduce significantly the manoeuvre space, where a hard line, ultimatum approach used to be in place. However, the pressure of lobbies still remains a method of persuasion, but overall their approach in a form of pure pressure has decreased.

**Persuasion and pressure**

Secondly, it is important to always distinguish between persuasion and pressure. Theoretically speaking, every attempt at persuasion could be interpreted also as pressure, but in practice this is far from true. Persuasion presupposes a rather broad area of operation in an open, trustworthy, and reliable atmosphere, where the main goal is generally defined and is solution-oriented, keeping in mind the general good and the benefit of all parties included. Pressure, on the contrary, follows the clearly defined goal of the dominant party, with a straightforward and rather dominant approach, where the interests of others are primarily taken into account only to the extent to which they serve the needs of the dominant side. One could say that in the current globalised society, far fewer situations appear where such an approach could prevail, primarily due to the social context. The role of media and the critical voice of NGOs both limit the modus operandi of a hard power pressure approach, or at least minimise the long-term results of its usage.
Off the record

Thirdly, one should bear in mind that persuasion is a method of working behind doors, off the record, without publicity. This is the only way that it can be successful. When persuasion goes public, it immediately becomes pressure. Sometimes, going public could be a way of doing the business of negotiations, to add pressure to the whole process. But still, even in such cases, persuasion is what remains behind the curtain. Not for the sake of pure secrecy, but for the sake of the atmosphere, of trust, and to avoid the fact that situations where options are given, taken, and refused, would become widely known. To refuse an option could sometimes provoke humiliation and destroy the process, but if it is being done behind the curtain and leads to a final result, then it is no longer important. But, alas, it would have been, had the process been public.

Finally, the current social context is not always favourable for these nuances. An enormous media web is timeless on the prowl for information, and it is highly demanding to keep any process secret. At the same time, as already pointed out, the same media complex is vigilant, ready to uncover pressure activities. In this intersection, I see the crucial role of the social context both for the persuasion process as well as for a comprehensive understanding of diplomacy.
Persuasion as a social phenomenon

Dr Aldo Matteucci

Where war is the continuation of politics, we often see the diplomat as the avatar of the great general – or his precursor. Uplifting narratives tell us of heroic people who, through skill of arms or persuasion, shape extraordinary events and ‘get their way’. Persuasion is the individual’s triumph over persons and groups. Argument and convictions defeat ignorance. The individual is at the centre of the process: it is personal agency at its best.

I have a different view. I’d rather look at persuasion as a social phenomenon.

Let’s make one thing clear at the outset. In life, there are no dichotomies. It is never either/or. We have a river with many channels, spreading apart somehow at random, and converging lazily downstream.

Which is the river? Which is the arm? This does not matter. Pragmatically, the one best taking us to the goal is the ‘main’ channel. This may have gone on for thousands of years. Then a new technology emerges, and what we judged to be a shallow, treacherous, and impassable channel may become a new way down the river.

Persuasion may well be the work of personal agency, under certain circumstances. I’d argue that we’d better look at persuasion again. We need to take off the present eyeglasses named ‘personal agency’ and try on ‘social phenomenon’ for effectiveness.

Developments in life and human sciences justify this suggestion. These developments allow us to imagine living phenomena in novel ways.
Biological evolution and sociology

Biological evolution explains how change takes place in nature. It is both an individual and a collective phenomenon. What matters for the evolution of the population is not what change obtains in the individual, but how the change spreads through the population. If change ‘takes hold’ in the population, over generations the species will evolve. For all we know, the process is endogenous, and the outcome is undirected and unpredictable. The result is adaptation.

Sociology looks at change in society. Change occurs. Change reflects adjustment to the material context, but also the social reality we have construed. Looking at change from a distance, and using the language of agency improperly, we can speak of ‘macro-persuasion’.

The process of change is akin to a phase-transition we observe in physical sciences. Change occurs when intentionalities of individuals transmute into ‘collective intentionalities’. No longer does one individual change a few. Many change many. The many make change their own and act on it – the process of change has become endogenous. Their experience transforms the group and the process may grow exponentially. People dimly perceive this phase transition and have given it a name: social empowerment.

As in biological evolution, whatever the original impulse, the outcome is undirected and unpredictable – it is adaptive.

Enablers as a source of social change

Enablers – ways of doing things and organising ourselves – are among the major causes of change. Someone learned to ride the horse, and as many imitated him, nomadism, but also long-distance raiding, emerged (I have shortened the process – in fact, innumerable small steps were involved). Democracy as a set of rules for a society emerged, and we had civilisation of sorts.

Enablers are a product of the human mind. They are akin to genetic change as the source of phenotype variability. Users, not the inventor, decide on the purpose of the enabler. As a result, enablers are open-ended. Enablers empower, and are inherently unpredictable – just think of black powder.

Enablers are exquisite persuaders. Their strength is transformative experience, the pleasure of doing more with less, or doing something new. This is far more powerful as an agent of change than argument or conviction. Experience spreads enablers fast: we hardly notice this process. Just think of how children learn to speak.
Enablers are the most powerful sources of social change. They often act in indirect ways. Just a few examples: educate women and fertility drops precipitously. If human population is expanding, it is no longer from fertility, but from the fact that we live longer. The pill made recreational sex safe – and collaterally we have inched forward in solving the population problem – this in two generations. Better cooking stoves may help mitigate anthropogenic carbon: billions of women will be thankful for taking suffocating smoke from their lungs. No one invented markets as an institution. They emerged slowly from the mists of time. Markets are among the great enablers – that is why it is difficult to fight them, even when they do not suit participants’ intentions.

**Cognitive science and social psychology**

Cognitive science resolutely casts doubt on the received model of personal agency in achieving macro-change (and even micro-change). Human brains are complex but seriously prone to illusion. Fallacies and biases infect reflexive and reflective thinking. A need for individual self-affirmation leads humans to see themselves as unchanging and coherent, when we are far from it. If need be, we will fabulate to sustain the self. What is described as ‘will’ turns out to be more akin to conscious commentary forever running slightly behind unconscious action. Rather than a well-designed structure, the conscious and unconscious mind is a rickety, jury-rigged contraption. From the population point of view, the system works: in 100,000 years we have made long strides. It was a story of successful adaption, rather than directed change.

At the micro-persuasion level, social psychology explains the behavior of the person in the social situation. It explores our nature as social beings. Far from being autonomous individuals bumping into each other in some form of Brownian motion, we continuously and subtly persuade each other and adapt in the process – mostly unconsciously. Change is a social phenomenon. Change has no recognisable individual origin, and the outcome is undirected and unpredictable. It is adaptive.

We seem to have made a discovery – we may have found a different river channel, and one which, unbeknown to ourselves, carries much water of social change. Change is also a social phenomenon and not only or primarily the result of individual agency. Change in society does not come from without – change emerges from within.
The process of empowerment

Is this a discovery? Possibly it is just that a narrative has been found for something humanity has known and used all along, but never narrated. In particular, we have a name for the process of social change: empowerment. It describes the transition from individual to collective intentionality and the moment when society starts to change itself. It is the moment when the social group adopts change – the newly created enabler – as its own and runs with it.

Let me revert to the analogy of the river: we have discovered a new channel. Admittedly, the realisation that the old channel had treacherous shoals and rapids, which made navigation adventurous, may have spurred on the search. We did not perceive the dangers: we only saw the saved and ignored the drowned.

Technological and culture create enablers all the time. While waiting for enablers to do their work: can we facilitate empowerment? We are learning how to speed up the process of empowerment. Economic and community development practices are in the forefront. When empowerment succeeds, the impact is stupendous. Positive deviance for instance builds on the basic idea that we can cleverly facilitate empowerment.

Information technology both facilitates and documents social interaction within a group. It explodes the physical limitations of the group. Information technology facilitates the emergence of new social groups – think of the common purpose that unites the editors of Wikipedia entries.

Information technology is the greatest enabler since the horse (my prejudice). Nothing is empowering people like their ability to record, process, and transmit information to others, hereby bypassing some obvious failures of the brain. No replacement, so far, but far more reliable than memory, and able to act at a distance.

Information technologies facilitate and document social interaction. We can use information technologies to track change. Information technologies may assist us in documenting empowerment as it takes place. Information technologies may even facilitate empowerment.

Social networks have become the rage. At the moment, they tend to be mostly gossip – a necessary aspect of sociality. Clever use of social networks may create what I’d call social – as opposed to individual – persuaders. They may become a new way of obtaining collective intentionality.

This is not going to be easy.
Crowd-sourcing or industry-wide sourcing has become a significant way of getting pointers towards the improvement of products (materials and processes are a different matter). The supply side of change is becoming public. It is bottom-up – and hugely successful. Whittling down the abundance of ideas is the challenge. So far selection has remained a top-down process – and internal to the firm (before confronting the public process of market selection, that is). Transformation of the idea into a product requires industrial organisation yielding the uniformity needed to allow for industrial mass production.

Social empowerment transforms individual intentionalities into a collective one. So far society has tended to use the top-down, directive approach in order to speed up the process. Dreading loss of control that goes with empowerment, the elite has used fear or incentives to turn individuals into agents. This process works against empowerment. Ideology mitigated the process. Inevitably over time, top-down choices and ideology created rigidities. Disconnect and social unrest ensued as the social and material context changed.

**Collective intentionality**

How do we achieve collective intentionality without resorting to top-down selection and direction? Village meetings work well if the village is a single social group. As soon as the size of the group becomes too large or we have nested groups, creating collective intentionality becomes difficult.

My practical conjecture is that information technology may be of assistance here. We are just at the beginning. Think of the spontaneous way of Wikipedia. Simple operational rules allow the aggregation of rules. Respect is the currency within the group. Peer review within the group reduces the abundance of opportunities. Crowd-reviewing has now been added. Other options and features may be added.

On the political scene, the instrument of petition is on the rise. Citizens can formulate relatively well-articulated propositions. Online voting rapidly whittles down the options. This is a rough-and-ready way. Quantity replaces quality.

Until 1250, humans paid little deliberate or deliberative attention to the concept of material reality as quantifiable. We changed the way of doing things. We measured everything, from time to space, to colours, and look where this way of doing things has taken us.
Quantifying social reality

The time may have come to make a further leap and quantify social reality. The democratic vote – one person, one vote – is a slightly distasteful and controversial precursor. The elites never took kindly to it. Information technologies may allow us to move towards the quantification of social reality on a broad scale, just as we have successfully quantified material reality.

Empowerment is what changes us, and makes us feel human.

When group behaviour is the objective, individual diversity no longer becomes an issue. We no longer need Gleichschaltung – in many instances nudging, rather than coercion and control suffices. In fact, we need to encourage it as the pool from which change emerges. This is an immense relief to me, and necessary for the system to function. Darwin said: ‘It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.’ Paying attention to change is the precondition for surviving and flourishing.

In this paradigm, we accept each other because, and not despite, human diversity. What a change in attitude! Information reality may facilitate this leap of attitude by making empowerment easier. Empowerment is what changes us, and makes us feel human.
Part III:

Persuasion in practice
Persuasion, trust, and personal credibility

Ambassador Kishan Rana

My ten years at Diplo as a part-time faculty member have involved close association with Dietrich. (The association came about as the result of serendipitous actions involving Diplo’s moving force, Dr Jovan Kurbalija, following a chance meeting in Malta in 1999.) I am particularly indebted to him for the decisive support he gave to my writing activities.

During my temporary duty as a Commonwealth adviser in Windhoek in early 2001, I showed to him a modest collection I had then put together of six lectures on bilateral diplomacy which I had written for use at Diplo; he urged me to work on this further, and to develop that collection into a textbook. In diplomatic studies one sometimes encounters a divide between the academic scholars and the practitioners. We need many more like Dietrich who have personally bridged this gulf, through their own experience, conviction, and their ability to work on both sides with fairness and transparency.

Persuasion is indeed at the heart of diplomacy, as anyone exposed to this profession knows through their life experience. In this essay, I propose to explore the linkage between persuasion and trust, given that the one is impossible to practice without the other.

Relationship building

The institution of the resident envoy survives, even thrives, in the Internet age of instant communication, universal connectivity, and the near-elimination of geography.
as a barrier, precisely because durable, credible relations between state representatives working in the field require human contact. Of course, the accredited ambassador has never been the only channel of contact, and today more competing channels exist than ever before. Foreign ministry officials have now begun to deal directly with one another, especially those that belong to active regional institutions; they encounter one another frequently at a succession of functional meetings and develop their own personal links. This is even truer of officials belonging to line ministries, who find it convenient to rely on their own personal friendship networks.

In different kinds of situations, either for problem solving, or when relations are particularly close, backchannel contacts come into play, involving personal emissaries and others. [This is an understudied subject, no doubt because hard information is seldom available. Leaders who enjoy close friendship, say among the G8 countries, often designate personal contact channels; this is distinct from the designated ‘sherpas’ that prepare for summit encounters. Some other countries use their respective intelligence agencies for such direct contact.] Further up the ladder, the heads of government and state, foreign ministers and others high personalities, similar personal contacts come into play. For instance, at ASEAN one hears of ministers and heads that exchange text messages, via e-mail and SMS, making it very difficult for the foreign ministry to track the communications, much less archive them. I am sure the same is true of the EU, given the frequency of encounters among the leaders of member states.

Amidst this plurality of interchanges, paradoxically, the resident envoy becomes even more central than before. The foreign ministry finds it hard to keep track of all the threads in the dialogue with individual partner states, the more so when the activities of the non-state actors, i.e. businessmen, the industry associations, think tanks, educational and scientific bodies, and civil society agencies, are woven into the bilateral tapestry. I have long asserted that it is only the resident envoy and his team that has the nearest approximation of the panoramic, realtime perspective that results from this frenetic pace of exchanges. This has changed the equation between the embassy and the foreign ministry, and made it a kind of ‘co-manager’ of the bilateral relationship. [This concept was advanced in my first book Inside Diplomacy (2000), and developed further in The 21st Century Ambassador (2004). For the past three or four years the MFAs of Austria, Canada, Germany, and the UK have implemented a parallel set of actions that have revalorised the
resident envoy, and embedded them and their team more closely into the MFA, even to the point of thinning out their bilateral departments.] It is thus appropriate that we treat the envoy and their team as one of the arch-stones of diplomacy. Of course, what is written below of the envoy, applies mutatis mutandis to the foreign ministry official based at home.

Each diplomat in the field, at all ranks, depends on the personal connections they establish with the concerned interlocutors. These in turn hinge on the diplomat’s credibility and winning personality; the deeper the trust that is engendered, the easier it is for the diplomat to be believed. The fact that the nature of work now requires the diplomat to network with a much larger circle of state and non-state actors makes this task more challenging than before. One should add that these dialogue partners are not only located in the country of assignment, but also include those in the home country. In net effect, the diplomat is engaged in multilayered relationships that are both dynamic, and expand over time.

This does not mean that the diplomat spins endlessly like a top, entering into ever widening circles of acquaintances, dealing with multiple partners. The essence of persuasion is to build deep relations with the key players that matter most in a given situation, both in the receiving country and at home. The diplomat adds continually to contacts, but also prioritises the ones that matter the most, i.e. those that are decision-makers and the real movers.

Cultivation and credibility

At one level, the diplomat, particularly the ambassador, needs to maintain an open door; they must be receptive to anyone that wishes to meet the envoy, within reason. This is good public relations and does wonders for the embassy’s image; it also exposes the envoy to a wide stream of information, unfiltered through any intermediary. In a small embassy, this is easy to implement; it even pays the envoy to drop by at the consular services waiting area from time to time, asking those waiting if they have faced delay or any special problem – it reminds the consular staff that they are service providers, judged by the quality of their delivery to their customers, be it foreign visa seekers, or one’s own nationals looking for passport or other services. In the large embassy, the envoy even needs to monitor the telephone manners of their personal staff; an African MFA permanent secretary recently told me that when he personally phoned to speak with the resident envoy of an important country, the secretary asked him to give the subject on which he wished to speak with the ambassador! In many big embassies personal staff act as minders for their head of mission, sometimes erecting barriers, functioning beyond their mandate.
Examine the relationship profile of any successful ambassador and you will find that the distinguishing element in their performance is the quality of ties that have been established with the principal interlocutors. It is the intensity of cultivation that is the hallmark. Who are the typical objects of such deep cultivation? Typically, they would include:

1. The key person in the MFA territorial department dealing with the envoy’s country; this unit is virtually the home base for the envoy, the one place where they must enjoy high credibility and access.

2. Someone in the office of the head of government; this is vital for rapid transmission of important communications if the bilateral relationship requires that.

3. Similar friendships in the other key ministries that play an active role in the relationship; the ambassador may farm out some of this to others on their team, unlike the first two sets of ties, where they must be the one enjoying that access.

4. A wide network of parliamentarians, media personalities, businessmen, industry association heads, academics, science and technology experts, civil society and religious leaders, and others that play an active role in that relationship; this is an open-ended cluster.

5. Leaders of the diaspora, including those that are politically and economically powerful and enjoy good contacts at home, as also the community leaders.

What about the head of government/state, and the ministers? Of course one needs access to these leaders. Local conditions may or may not permit the envoy to establish such contacts, not just in terms of business calls, but also by way of crafting real ties of affinity and trust. [In most Western capitals, other than the envoys of the great powers, ambassadors confront diminishing access to ministers; heads of government are virtually out of bounds. In Germany (1992–1995), I found that Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel had continued the baleful tradition of not receiving envoys even for the customary first call after presenting credentials; after a year, I did manage to meet him, via backchannel contacts. But in practice this hardly mattered as friendships with the state secretaries and the key MFA officials were easy to pursue.

All over the world, it gets harder for the resident envoy to deal directly with the ‘principals’ of the receiving country; this is a result of the multiplication of embassies in virtually all capitals, the increasing work burdens on the leaders, and a diminishing
space for real friendships at this level.\(^1\)\(^2\) In contrast, contact with key officials is seldom a problem for the envoy that learns to ration their pursuit of the senior personalities. For the interlocutor to know that the envoy does not abuse access, and seeks personal meetings only when essential, is also an aspect of credibility. [It is increasingly easy to conduct small items of business over the telephone, In Germany (1992–1995) I found it possible to communicate a short, specific message even to state secretaries in this manner; they appreciated being spared a request for a personal meeting.]

**Mechanics of persuasion**

How does the envoy’s credibility affect persuasion? The démarche made by an ambassador is an official act, and is universally understood as an expression of the viewpoint of the government that they represent. Credibility comes into play in several different ways.

First, the envoy may be acting on their own initiative, or on instructions from home; the interlocutor receiving the démarche has not sure way of knowing, except through the context. For the envoy, the level at which the démarche is made, and its timing are a matter of their discretion; the instructions from home will have typically asked that the démarche be made ‘immediately’ and ‘at the highest level possible’. [During an interview in an African capital, a US envoy made the wry comment that DC always wants that every démarche be made at the highest level possible; he would lose all credibility if he took that literally, and each time sought meetings with the head of the receiving country.] The timing and delivery method thus becomes a matter for the envoy’s judgment; the ambassador that enjoys high credibility has a wider choice of options in delivering that démarche. For instance, at a typical foreign ministry, they can opt to go to its top civil service head, or a junior minister – though in my experience I have found the former almost always the better choice, unless the issue is uniquely ‘political’. The well-connected envoy may also opt to lodge a parallel démarche at the office of the head of government, if the issue is vital and/or urgent. But when the issue is less vital, it may do just as well to deal with the concerned department or division in the MFA. The envoy may even leave it to the political counselor to

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deal with the issue at his level in the MFA or another ministry. The other side always appreciates an envoy that does not abuse access.

Second, the receptivity of that démarche is also affected by credibility. On the bulk of international affairs issues, global or bilateral, the recipient of the démarche has very limited personal discretion in accepting or rejecting that démarche. The policy of the host country generally determines their reaction, allowing little leeway. But on to some issues, especially of the bilateral genre, the receiving interlocutor may have a zone of limited discretion. Here the believability of the envoy, and/or their persuasive skill, comes into play. Put another way, an interlocutor may be inclined to tilt in favor of the envoy and take a small risk, if trust exists, based on past experience. They may look the individual in the eye, to decide if that person is believable. It is only the resident envoy that can build and sustain that kind of trust, accumulated over a period of time; I call this a ‘benefit of doubt’ doctrine. No amount of technology can replace such personal equations.

Third, credibility is no less vital in the reporting tasks of the envoy, where they have to narrate to home authorities an authentic picture of the country of assignment, and its viewpoint. Such feedback to the home authorities is also a form of persuasion. This can be a delicate task, if the envoy brings a perspective that runs counter to the assessment at home, and may consequently not be very welcome; in such situations it is easy to brand one’s envoy as acting as a spokesman for the other side. Rare is the envoy that has not encountered such sniping allegations in situations of political complexity, though usually not to their face. Personal credibility again provides a context against which unwelcome assessments can be judged.

One other dimension of inter-state communication deserves mention. Each government has at its disposal two parallel channels to make a démarche to a foreign state: its own envoy in the other capital, and the foreign envoy in one’s own capital. This is comparable to a ‘double entry bookkeeping’ system, as our good Maltese friend and leading member of the Diplo family, Alex Sceberras Trigona, describes it. By custom and practical convenience, it is the first track that is the primary choice of a foreign ministry; it is almost always better to have one’s envoy deliver a message, or obtain information, or a clarification – that way one deals directly with the principals, and goes through one fewer foreign actor. Yet, as experience affirms, the foreign envoy serves as a second, auxiliary channel, for confirmation of information or something specific about the partner country where that foreign envoy’s intimate knowledge of their home country is vital. There is one special situation where the foreign envoy is the preferred chan-

Persuasion is at the heart of the diplomacy process, and in turn depends on credibility and interpersonal communication qualities of the envoy to function in effectively.
nel: when one delivers a protest to the foreign country, or any other kind of warning message, governments tend to use the foreign envoy. Furthermore, the more serious the issue, the higher the level at which the message is delivered to this foreign ambassador. [For instance, in Germany, the foreign minister often holds the concurrent rank of deputy chancellor in coalition governments; since the days of Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1972–1991), it has become a peculiar tradition for the foreign minister not to meet resident ambassadors, even for the customary post-credentials call. In May 1998, after India's nuclear tests, the Germans lost no time in summoning my successor in Bonn, Satinder Lambah, to meet the foreign minister and receive a rather intemperate message of protest.] Parallel action may be taken at the other end as well, but displeasure is best expressed when the foreign ambassador is summoned, and then told off.

Persuasion is at the heart of the diplomacy process, and in turn depends on credibility and inter-personal communication qualities of the envoy to function in effectively. No less important is the envoy’s ability to work across cultures, but that is a dimension that I hope some other contributor to this collection might wish to pursue.
Persuasion, a step towards convergence in diplomacy

Ambassador Victor Camilleri

In my view the essence of diplomacy is the search for points of convergence.

Persuasion is one of the methods through which a point of convergence can be reached. If persuasion is given a wide enough definition, encompassing methods which in addition, or as the accompaniment, to rational interaction involve deception, corruption, and direct or indirect application of force, in the search for convergence, then I would agree that persuasion is an important method, but not the essence, of diplomacy.

Otherwise, if defined more strictly as straightforward rational interaction, in the form of argumentation, application of logic, and provision of evidence, persuasion can only be considered as one of a number of methods through which diplomacy is conducted. The most effective of these methods is the indirect application of force.3

Diplomats as agents

The primary task of the diplomat is to promote their country’s interest abroad. They do this through interaction with counterparts who have the equally demanding task to

promote the interests of their respective countries. The conditions of this interaction are often, though not always, of a confrontational nature where contrasting, sometimes conflicting objectives are projected.

Diplomats are agents not principals in the setting of these objectives – and therefore have limited leeway to allow persuasion to alter or even redefine the instructions under which they operate. Policy lines cannot be defined or changed within a negotiating context. In the final analysis, the most that a diplomat can be ‘persuaded’ to do is to go back to their principals and in turn try to persuade them to change their instructions.

It is under these circumstances that I define the search for convergence, rather than persuasion, as the essence of diplomacy. The most fruitful diplomacy in effect mostly resolves itself into an exercise where the contending parties seek points of convergence where the key elements of their respective positions can somehow be accommodated.

**Direct or indirect use of force**

A complete capitulation of one position in favour of another is rarely a result of diplomatic persuasion – especially when diplomats are the protagonists. When political leaders are the protagonists, a change of position is conceivable – however, in such cases, it is less persuasion than what I call the direct or indirect use of force, or what may more politely be termed ‘rewards and penalties’ that carries the day.

Factors such as argumentation, emotion, and rhetorical skills are a natural aspect of human intercourse. These factors evidently play a role in the search for convergence. But they do not constitute the essence of diplomacy.

Nor, more often than not, are they the main factors in diplomatic interaction. More important factors are the diplomat’s firm grasp of the essential points of their side’s position, their clear awareness of the essential points of the other side, and a frank assessment of the background balance of force (tactical or strategic, military or economic, and to a relative extent also legal or moral) between them and the opposing side.

These are the factors that play a key role in bilateral diplomacy.

Multilateral diplomacy is a different matter. At the multilateral level objectives are quite often, but not always (especially in matters which are take up at the UN Security Council level), defined in less confrontational terms.
**Point of convergence**

When objectives are premised on initial points of convergence (e.g. common interest in negotiations on such matters as protection of environment, regulation of maritime or air traffic, definition of trade relations), the role of persuasion comes more to the fore in the diplomatic exercise.

Even here however the same factors defining bilateral diplomacy are also at play.

And additional significant factors also have a role – notably the diplomat’s ability to identify and recruit like-minded partners (this is an aspect where the standard methods of persuasion can take a prominent role), their familiarity with, and ability to use to their advantage, precedents, rules of procedures and the institutional dimension of multilateral discourse and, no less important, their grasp of the technicalities of the subject being negotiated.

**Malta, a case in point**

In Maltese diplomacy, a classic case of diplomatic persuasion was the initiative taken by Ambassador Pardo in the 1960s to launch the process leading to the law of the sea. The factors which characterised the success of this initiative were varied and complex, but the ingredient of persuasion was undoubtedly among them, especially at the beginning. Other factors were however also at play (Box 1). In my view Ambassador Pardo’s was a tour de force representing more a unique event in diplomatic history than a model of diplomatic persuasion.

In my personal experience, the most extended and complex diplomatic negotiation in which I have been involved was my role as Permanent Representative in Brussels during the time of Malta’s for accession process into the EU. In some ways this had the features of a multilateral negotiation, calling for all the factors noted above. It also had a number of unique features which in the main highlighted the convergence objectives of a negotiations exercise rather than the role of persuasion.⁴

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⁴ For more details see the second half of the speech transcript How Small States Influence Diplomatic Practice: A Look at the Fourth Round of Accession Negotiations to the European Union. Available at http://archive1.diplomacy.edu/conferences/smallstates/program.asp [accessed 5 February 2013].
Box 1.

COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND

In August 1967, without much prior indication, the Maltese delegation requested the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the forthcoming 22nd session of the General Assembly entitled ‘Declaration and Treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interest of mankind.’

The detailed exposition of the proposal was made by Ambassador Pardo himself in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 1 November 1967, in a three-hour-long statement, which because of its length even had to be suspended for a lunch break, and during which he displayed a comprehensive grasp of the subject matter, an intellectual force in its presentation, and a visionary approach in its conception that awed contemporaries and has made it one of the more memorable events in UN history.5

The common heritage initiative had all the hallmarks of Ambassador’s Pardo’s approach – idealistic inspiration, intellectual vigour, multilateral commitment, and development oriented objectives. It was the product of a long period of quiet and thorough research and preparation, which also benefited from Malta’s solid tradition of study and practice of maritime law. In common with most of his ideas it was politically neutral in its conception but initially disconcerting in its originality and implications.

The proposal’s strength lay in a combination of the timeliness and topicality of its subject matter with an innovative and bold elaboration of concepts and principles related to this subject matter.

The initial shock and hesitation generated by the proposal were overcome surprisingly quickly. The genuine and wide-ranging relevance of the subject was undeniable. The thoroughness and professionalism of the way in which the initiative was presented were impressive. The fact that Malta was a small island country with a growing reputation as an independent-minded and altruistic instigator of multilateral action helped to lend credibility and to justify and explain its initiative.

In the initial phases, Ambassador Pardo piloted the proposal in a masterful way though the intricacies of UN tactics and procedures. Substantively he

5 UN Doc A/PV.1582 [6 October 1967] pp 11-13
managed to steer the opening discussions in the political rather than the legal direction, thereby limiting, though not completely avoiding, the interminable contortions of legalistic debate. Procedurally, by successfully insisting from the very outset on the practice of consensus decision-making, he also restrained, though here again with only partial success, the worst excesses of ideological posturing.

The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea was an unparalleled tour de force of multilateral decision-making. In the complexity, range, and depth of its subject matter, in the duration and procedural variety of its proceedings, in the wide sweep of its participation at governmental and expert levels, and in the far-reaching concepts and principles enshrined in the Convention which was its outcome, the Conference stands as an enduring monument to the value and relevance of the multilateral process.

Not least among the impressive aspects of the Conference was the way it confirmed the role that even a small state could play in the multilateral setting. What Malta brought to the process was a spirit of initiative, a deep sense of multilateral commitment and a determined readiness to persist in promoting a relevant concept. As translated in the personal energy and dedicated work of Ambassador Pardo, these constituted key ingredients to launch a process of astounding dimensions and complexity. As the process unfolded it engaged the interest, attention and support of an ever enlarging number of players.

The Law of the Sea initiative has had a lasting impact on Malta’s multilateral diplomacy in the way that it has constituted a model which has constantly inspired, though on occasion it has also distracted, this diplomacy. The inspiration lay in the fundamental belief in and commitment towards multilateralism which the initiative represented and which, as long as it is pursued even-handedly in conjunction with a recognisable national interest, complements and reinforces the relevance and credibility of such initiatives.

The distraction arises in the temptation that, in an attempt to emulate the success of the law of the sea initiative, attention and energy could sometimes be directed towards other initiatives which fail to sufficiently integrate far-sighted idealism with political realism, and which consequently risk falling more in the realm of academic exercises rather than in that of the political action which is a key ingredient of successful multilateralism.
Persuasion: bad practices and ... others

Ambassador Petru Dumitriu

A masterpiece of persuasion

When I was invited to contribute to this publication on the topic of persuasion, I naturally placed the issue in a diplomatic context. So, from the start, I had to put away all thoughts of various judiciary systems as well as the persuasion of juries and judges by legal and mainly procedural arguments.

I did so with the sincere regret that I would deprive myself of the opportunity to use a significant illustration of the persuasive power. I am alluding to the well-paid lawyers who made a jury believe that O.J. Simpson did not murder his wife. Notably, the rest of the American public is still persuaded that he did. The issue is no longer breaking news; other murderer was not found and ‘the trial of the century’ is just a banal Wikipedia file. People born recently may be persuaded that O.J. Simpson’s wife actually died of indigestion and not from being stabbed multiple times by her beloved husband. This is what I would call a masterpiece of persuasion.

Words and swords

It seems to me that persuasion is a very relative concept. Like beauty, persuasion is in the eye of the beholder. Admittedly, persuasion does not exist in the absence of results. One can say that persuasion can be defined as such, if and only if it is effective and reaches its goals. If we accept this prerequisite, we may find persuasion where we least expect it.

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6 This article in no way reflects the official views of the Council of Europe or of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.
For example, during the Dark Ages, the Inquisition was indeed very effective in persuading heretics and witches to stick to the right thinking. When soft techniques like interviews and frequently asked questions did not work, what could have been more persuasive than torturing the subjects and threatening to burn them at the stake?

Consulted by the Inquisition with respect to the conformity of their cosmologic doctrines to the astronomy and physics research undertaken by the four Evangelists, the academic world reacted differently. Giordano Bruno was not persuaded by arguments from the Church. He was burnt and he left us with his ashes dumped into the Tiber River. Galileo Galilei faked persuasion and escaped the fire. He left us with the famous quotation *Eppur si muove*.

The inquisitors had no mundane legal basis to respect. The rule of law was rather the law of the ruler. Nevertheless, highly educated as they were, they used to cite Psalm 73, paragraph 27 for their purpose: ‘For indeed, those who are far from You shall perish/ You have destroyed all those who desert You for harlotry.’ And as Shakespeare’s character Antonio would say: ‘The devil can cite scripture for his purpose.’

Finding useful quotations from the Bible still remains an argument nowadays. Yet, not all books were quotable in the eyes of the Church. On the contrary, some books may have been be very persuasive and at the same time very stubborn in their convictions. In addition, the books did not feel pain and they were very resistant to torture. The Inquisitors had a revelation: burning books may be as useful for their purpose as burning people. Centuries later, Goebbels, despite being much less Catholic than the Pope, would bless the *autodafé* of non-aligned books in 1933 by saying: ‘The future German man will not just be a man of books, but a man of character.’

For the crusaders, persuasion by way of preaching and public speaking preceded more robust efforts to convince pagans to accept the holy claims of the Christian knights. Word in mouth and sword in hand were effective means of persuading indigenous people to accept the right faith and the wrong colonisation.

**Robust diplomacy**

But let us move to diplomacy, which is after all our area of interest. Much to the credit of my noble profession, diplomacy was very creative in designing new tools of persuasion which were not exclusively based on word power. Honestly, gunboat diplomacy was quite an effective procedure used to persuade undecided interlocutors. Negotiations were faster, the boring speeches of heads of delegations shorter, the reach of
compromise quicker. Just try to figure how nicely United Nations negotiations would go on tough questions in New York, if some handsome crusaders patrolled East River and displayed fireworks in the immediate proximity of the General Assembly hall.

Persuasion was also nicely exercised through *big stick diplomacy*. Judged in terms of efficiency, Theodore Roosevelt cannot but be praised for this practical and theoretical contribution to the art of persuasion with his idea of negotiating while simultaneously threatening military fire power. As progress is inevitable and the world continuously improves, *dollar diplomacy* came to diversify the soft means available for diplomats, or at least for some of them (those whose Central Banks could print more dollars).

The United Nations did not at all neglect robust persuasion in trying to find acceptable solutions to international conflicts. Economic sanctions have been often used to persuade authoritarian regimes to step down from power, but not before starving the innocent and the poor. But this was taken care of. The *Oil-for-Food* Programme in Iraq came with its magic. It is true that some people continued to starve. Others got very rich indeed, precisely as a result of it.

Fortunately, recent sanctions try harder to focus more on the ruling regimes, before persuading the people to take to streets. Nowadays, these ways and means look much better and we see the advent of new persuasive embargoes and weapons, like smart sanctions and even smarter drones.

**Persuasive metaphors**

But let us not forget the hard operations called so softly *safe havens* and *no-fly zones*. It is true that those means were often not persuasive enough. The names of military operations themselves are called to play a role. For example, had I been Saddam Hussein, I would have been definitely persuaded by the planning of Operation *Shock and Awe*. Or, being Iraqi or an Afghan mujahedeen, one should be highly insensitive to resist the luring appeal of Operation *New Dawn* which brings us again a touch of poetry in realpolitik.

**From bad practices to good theories**

After this introduction to the wonderful world of persuasion, seen from a practical perspective, let us try to attach to it a more scientific approach. I looked into a solid book to find the best definition and I found this: 'Persuasion is the process by which
a person’s attitudes and behaviour are, without duress, influenced by communications from other people.”

Oops! So, the essence of persuasion is communication. Other factors such as threats and physical coercion are not really part of the picture, suggests the respectable Encyclopædia (†2012). As an illustration, torture may work very effectively but it cannot aspire to the glory of belonging to the noble family of persuasion. No wonder why we now have a United Nations Convention against Torture!

Yet, the same Encyclopaedia kills the joy of those who were about to believe that persuasion is entirely honest business. It admits: ‘Persuasion often involves manipulating other people, and for this reason many find the exercise distasteful.’ To be frank, so do I! Shame on the manipulators, from politicians in electoral campaigns to invasive TV advertising!

Despite being distasteful, it seems that manipulation is indeed a very popular technique of persuasion. However, to the extent that we do not have a UN Convention against Manipulation, any campaign based on arguments such as ‘they have weapons of mass destruction’ or ‘they have nuclear weapons’ may be seen as decent an attempt at persuasion as anything else.

Finally, Encyclopædia Britannica tells us: ‘In European universities of the Middle Ages, persuasion was one of the liberal arts to be mastered by any educated man.’ Obviously the members of the ecclesiastic tribunals, assembled under the auspices the Inquisition, graduated from other universities.

**Persuasion by repetition**

As we have alluded to universities, we cannot escape making a link between persuasion and education. Persuasion implies that someone assimilates knowledge by being exposed to new information. Repetition of the messages containing the new information will modify learning, thus having a persuasive impact as well.

One may remind me that a repeated lie becomes a truth. Well, yes. Nobody is saying that persuasion is always in service of truth and other just causes. Remember the mass suicide of the People Temple’s followers in Jonestown, Guyana, 1978? No one can doubt the high skills displayed by Jim Jones in providing some kind of religious education to

7 Encyclopædia Britannica 9:313.3b
909 members of the sect and convincing them to commit suicide. This is an illustration that both education and persuasion work very well if they are preceded by a robust effort to brainwash your target audience.

**Propaganda: the step-brother of persuasion**

I was about to end these considerations, when another concept raised its ugly head, to obscure the picture even more. Propaganda is also a systematic effort to persuade people, by manipulating their beliefs, attitudes, or actions. It is said that heavy emphasis on manipulation distinguishes propaganda from the free exchange of ideas and persuasion. The propagandist has a specified goal or set of goals. To maximise the effect, propaganda may omit pertinent facts and distort them. Persuasion may be more gracious, but it is not as alien to the evil nature of propaganda as we would like it to be.

**Diplomatic persuasion**

Persuasion, as depicted so far, may look to diplomats as a skunk at a lawn party. Obviously it was not my intention to recognise any virtue in the degenerate distant relatives of diplomatic persuasion. To quote Shakespeare again: ‘Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall.’ Persuasion still has a life and a future in the multilateral diplomatic context, doesn’t it?

The main objective of diplomatic communication is persuasion through non-violent means. The word is the main vehicle. In ancient Greece, the agora activists observed that everything depended on the people, and the people were dependent on words. Wealth, fame, and respect could all be arrived at by persuading the populace. The same goes for the arenas of multilateral diplomacy. With one important remark, though. ‘People’ in the conference rooms are more or less as educated and as informed as the people on the rostrum.

**From orators to speakers**

There was a time, in a remote and glorious past, where indeed working with the word in multilateral diplomacy had something to do with oratory. Oratory is still the practice of persuasive public speaking. It is supposed to have immediate impact on its audience’s relationships and reactions. In theory, an oration involves a speaker and an
audience. It is also expected to carry a message by voice, articulation, and ‘bodily accompaniments’.

The orator ought primarily to be persuasive rather than informative and entertaining. A genuine orator need not be a logician, but to have a capacity for good and clear thought and to use analogy, generalisations, assumptions, deductive/inductive reasoning, etc.

A successful speech is a short speech. The chairpersons will usually praise the short interventions rather than the smart ones.

Nowadays, in multilateral conferences, oratory is no longer needed. Had they been endowed with Demosthenes’ public-speaking gifts, the diplomats at the United Nations would not be able to display their talent anyway. Some of the prerequisites of a persuasive speech are no longer relevant.

One hundred and ninety-three nations share six official languages at the United Nations. Only a minority of the delegates use their native language while the rest have to listen to simultaneously interpreted versions as dull as dishwater. The only decent approach to articulation is to speak slowly enough to allow the interpreters to understand the content and convey it properly. Yet, speaking slowly and at the same time conveying a rich and convincing message is difficult when the speaker must not exceed the time allocated.

Many years ago, I had the opportunity to listen to Fidel Castro for more than one hour in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly. We sat in perfect silence. Now, heads of states and governments can only aspire to 15 minutes. In the Human Rights Council, the speaking time allocated to an ordinary diplomat varies between 2 and 5 minutes. A successful speech is a short speech. The chairpersons will usually praise the short interventions rather than the smart ones.

With the development of communications technologies, attention in multilateral conferences is a very scarce commodity.

‘Bodily accompaniments’ would be definitely ridiculous. The best speakers may turn out to be those equipped with prompters helping them to look extemporaneous. In informal meetings, PowerPoint presentations are replacing prompters, written declarations and, occasionally, the real knowledge of the speaker on the subject dealt with.

The higher ranked the speaker, the more likely it is that the text presented is written by somebody else. Yes, some political figures are assisted by qualified speech-writers. Yet, at the United Nations, most of the topics discussed are specialised. Input usually useful to brilliant electoral campaigns, such as generous promises, beautiful visions of a happier future, and confetti, cannot find their place. Texts are written, compiled, and
approved collectively by more or less obscure bureaucrats. If there was any sparkle in
the initial draft, it is inevitably lost at the end of the road.

**The twilight of the audience**

The audience is there. And in diplomacy, it is considerably more important than the
speaker. People speak more and listen less. For the speaker to be persuasive, they need
to capture attention, comprehension, and retention of the message. According to Aris-
totle, an essential mode of persuasion that a speaker may exercise is the ‘the excitation
of desired emotions in the audience’.

The audience should be catalysed by new ideas, galvanised by calls to action, and electrified by the speaker’s enthusiasm. As you can see, good chemistry is not sufficient; basic physics is also needed.

The United Nations, unlike the Greek agora, works with internationally adopted
concepts and norms, which are meant to be understood in all countries of the world.
The ‘excitation of emotions’, desired or not, is not very productive. Retention is
provided by précis-writers, chairpersons’ summaries, and adopted conclusions, which
keep track of what was meaningful for the organisation and cast the rest into oblivion.

Yet, with the development of communications technologies, attention in multilateral
conferences is a very scarce commodity. Taking notes on laptops provides abundant
alibis to all diplomats guilty of absent-mindedness. They exchange e-mails, SMSs, photos; they check
the news in their own countries, speak on their mobile phones and Blackberries, tweet, and chat.
As technology gets smarter, the gadget holders get dumber. They are physically in and
virtually out. No wonder why persuasion is no longer a keyword in most diplomatic
dictionaries and that Diplo is trying hard to re-discover it.

**Unfair persuasion**

Faced with so many bad influences, I still believe that there is a self-portrait that
persuasion can paint for itself. There are still decent ways to practice persuasion in
good faith. A cautious approach is a short list of what it is not diplomatic persuasion,
although it may sound like one. Trying to impose exclusively one’s own views and
ignoring the fundamental interests of the other side, for example, is mere pressure not
persuasion.

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8 Encyclopaedia Britannica 14: 62.2b
Basing one’s positions and attitudes on personal considerations rather than on principles is unfair, even if it is effective. Wikileaks revealed postures that are embarrassing for many. I do not dare to give illustrations on this one. I will stick to an old quotation that the perspicacious reader can easily attribute: ‘He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.’ Without a moral stand, persuasion does not work.

Making promises one has no intention of keeping and forcing the other side to make commitments that cannot be kept either may squeeze an agreement that will not last and make the issue at stake even more complicated. This kind of persuasion is fraudulent.

Using arguments which will blow up in your face later and undermine your credibility is not only diplomatic malpractice, but also it could have huge unwanted consequences. The ‘weapons of mass destruction’ argument in the case of the second campaign against Iraq is one such example.

In the case of the United-Nations-blessed intervention in Libya the use of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept was done by-the-book until that moment where the objective of the campaign became ostentatiously the overthrow of the regime. Not surprisingly, ‘the responsibility to protect’ lost its appealing power and trustworthiness in the case of Syria. Many judgments of the International Tribunal on former Yugoslavia not only failed to persuade, they also cast doubts on its impartiality.

**Fair persuasion**

Yet there are still legitimate and fair tactics to persuade your partners.

- Identify which of your own arguments may be acceptable to the other side.
- Identify those arguments that are not shared by the other side but are shared by third parties, which are closer to your interlocutors.
- Use arguments that are neutral, although they still serve your purpose.
- Identify and use arguments that also serve the public good.
- Identify among the possible arguments those that serve the interest of the other side, but which are not harmful to yours.
- Make a few concessions that will not alter your position substantially, but which will give enough ground to satisfy the other party.
- Offer decent and credible face-saving options in exchange for the concessions the other side may have accepted.

You may expect examples and illustrations of these simplistic precepts, if possible taken from reality. Where on Earth, do you, distinguished and educated reader, want
me to find such examples? These are principles! You do not really expect these nice, good-looking phrases to replace torture and fire, guns and drones?

Their power of persuasion is limited, unless all parties are persuaded that they may work and bring the same results at lower costs.
Part IV:

Interviews on persuasion in practice
Cornerstones of persuasion: inclusion and empathy

Interview with Dr Joe Borg

Diplo: Dr Borg, could you please give us some examples from your career when persuasion played decisive role in negotiations or policy initiatives?

I can mention two instances where I think that persuasion played the determining role in discussions or in negotiations as you said. The first was in my capacity as Minister of the Foreign Affairs of Malta, and the second was in my capacity as European Commissioner.

In my capacity as the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, one of the first and the major task that I was assigned was conducting the negotiations of Malta’s accession to the EU. As the Foreign Minister I was asked to lead the negotiation process at the political level. However, I need to in a way underline the fact that government had already decided that on the successful conclusion of negotiations, Malta would be holding a referendum on accession, and therefore the Maltese people would have to decide whether or not they were in favour of Malta’s membership. This meant that we had to inform the Maltese public of what the EU was about, what membership would entail, and what we would negotiate. In order to do so, I felt that it was important to do two things: one was to organise an information campaign, addressing the European issues you either persuade them in order to come onboard, to accept, or else even if they are not persuaded, at least they know exactly what you are trying to negotiate, because at the end of the day you have to move.
to the Maltese public and citizens in general; but even more than that, involving all
the different stakeholders and the different interest groups in negotiation’s process.
This meant that the government took an action to set up a committee, which we called
Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee. We called it MEUSAC; it still exists today.
This committee was formed of representatives from the government side, government
officials, and also of representatives from all the different interest groups, and also
some specialists and experts nominated and appointed by myself.

The scope of the Committee was to discuss with the different officials and the stake-
holders on each and every chapter of the negotiation; for instance, if we were dealing
with the Agricultural Policy, and what Malta had to change in order to implement the
Common Agricultural Policy, we had discussions in MEUSAC. The discussion was
held between representatives of the government and the representatives of farmers and
others, in order to determine what changes need to be done, and how would those
changes would impact the farming community in Malta, and what special arrangement
and transitional periods we needed to negotiated. This meant that these different
interest groups and stakeholders started owning the process more.

You either persuade them in order to come onboard, to accept, or else even if they are
not persuaded, at least they know exactly what you are trying to negotiate, because at
the end of the day you have to move. That is one
example where I felt that what we did succeeded
at the end of the day, and we managed to obtain
a positive result in the referendum very much
because of the fact that the different stakeholders
were involved, and they owned themselves the
negotiation process together with the government,
so they felt that they were direct parties to it, and
also because we kept the Maltese public informed
of what we were doing. Therefore, when they went to vote they could weigh whether it
was net beneficial for Malta or net not so beneficial for Malta, and the end-result was a
favourable one.

Another case was where, as the European Commissioner, I was also involved in having
to make decisions, which were sometimes not easy decisions to make in regard to
fisheries management. First of all fisheries is a common policy at the European level.
This means it is the Commission that is very much in the driving seat; it is the one
that makes decisions in most cases; it is the one that has a direct role of managing the
policy. Therefore, this meant that we were very much on the frontline as well. In fish-
eries, it is economically very small, it does not represent anything much in the whole
country GDP, but it is politically very sensitive, because we are dealing normally with
the people who live on the periphery. They are therefore people who have a lot of lobbying power with central administrations; central administrations would want to look good with these poor people who are living at the periphery and not in the big cities, which is very fair. That means that fishermen are a very strong lobby group at political level. There is also the other side of the coin. They are in control of their activity: they obviously can do it in a way, which is acceptable on all fronts, but they can do in a way which could be environmentally damaging. Therefore you have another side, which is the environmental side, with the green lobbies, which more often than not takes positions that are very different from the fishermen themselves.

I insisted with my own people that we had to involve both sides more and more – the fisherman on the one side and the environmental groups on the other – in any decision that we would want to take. Therefore, we started preparations for example for the Council of Ministers meetings, where decisions on fisheries would be taken. We started involving stakeholder organisations more and more. In actual fact there were the regional advisory councils, which started forming when I became the Commissioner. These regional advisory councils like the Nord Sea Regional Advisory Council, the Baltic Sea Regional Advisory Council, and the Mediterranean Regional Advisory Council had within them representatives from fishermen, from scientists, from environmental NGOs, and they used to increasingly start preparing their own positions and submitting them to the Commission, for the Commission to be guided in the process of taking decision. This meant that they started owning more, and they started being persuaded that what we were doing was good, and that it was in their own long-term interests, even if it was not in their short-term interests. Even if they were not persuaded they at least felt more involved; they felt that they were being consulted, that they were not being taken for granted. The first time I went to Brussels, the idea I had that it was somewhere very distant, and that they were making decisions, which we were then expected to implement, no questions asked, changed considerably. Today, we have a situation where the fishermen might not agree, but they feel that they are being consulted, and that they are a part of the whole mechanism, and this I think was a big positive step.

I can also mention something with regard to the Integrated Maritime Policy. President Barozzo when he offered me the position of Commissioner, suggested that I coordinate the work within the Commission, and that I should lead the taskforce on the development of the Integrated Maritime Policy. This was something very new. One of the first things I did on the basis of my experience as Foreign Minister in Malta was to set up a network of stakeholders who had an interest in maritime affairs, whether they were transport organisations, port authorities, environmental groups, fishermen, or working in the energy sector, i.e. all of those who had a role to play in maritime matters. We asked them for their feedback on this. First we published a Green Paper in which we
asked the stakeholders to submit their feedback on the development of the Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union. As the result of this feedback we came up with a Blue Paper, with an action plan, on how to introduce an Integrated Maritime Policy, and that action plan was based on the reactions that we received from different stakeholders.

_Diplo: What about persuasion in the context of Council negotiations; negotiations with third countries; and within the machinery of DGs itself. For instance, persuasion in negotiations with other stakeholders; or persuasion and procedures - what is the persuasion in highly formalised EU processes; and for instance how is persuasion used in different European cultures?_

What I can say is that within the European Union institutions themselves, you have formal decision-making mechanisms, where it is the Commission that proposes a new directive, for example, or a regulation, which today has to go to the Council and to the European Parliament. Most of decisions today require co-decision; before the Lisbon Treaty most of them did not require co-decision. This means that you have two institutions that you have to deal with. The Commission’s role has therefore been strengthened in the sense that whereas before, the Commission had to present its case strongly to the Council and then seek to convince the member states that it was the right way forward, and then try to strike a compromise between different interests of the different member states. Today, you have a new factor to contend with: the European Parliament. The European Commission now has to persuade the European Parliament of a better way forward.

Sometimes you find that the Council has one particular view, whereas the European Parliament has a different view, or a view on certain aspects, which could be different to that of the Council. Here the Commission has to play a role of broker; it has to try to find a compromise between the different interests of the European Council and the European Parliament so that a decision can be made.

On one hand, the Commission has to be persuasive in the arguments that it presents both with regard to the Council and with regard to the European Parliament. Apart from being persuasive, it needs also to be a good mediator and a good broker between the interests of the different member states within the Council. Some members might want to do things one way; other member states may want to do things somewhat differently, and therefore the Commission might need to mediate in order to find a compromise. Mediating between the Council and the Parliament can be quite a complex matter, but very often the Commission has the necessary expertise to do so.

Let’s take fisheries as an example, which was the area I used to deal with. When I
became Commissioner, I found within the Council a very strange phenomenon; the member states were divided into the two groups: one group, which called itself ‘friends of the fishermen’ and the other group that called itself ‘friends of the fish’. The friends of the fishermen took a position that was very often such that if the Commission tried to limit the fishermen’s catches or their activities, it would say no. The friends of the fish took a position whereby if the Commission tried to open up the fishermen’s possibilities, they would say no. This created a situation in which virtually no decision was taken, because each group had a blocking minority. The Commission ended up in a situation that if it proposed something, if it went in one direction, it would be blocked by this group; if it went in another direction, it would be blocked by the other group. The Commission had to invest a lot of time and effort in order to bring these member states closer together.

The situation was such that after five years, when I left, this was a thing of the past. The decisions were made very much in the best interests of the future of fishing. The best interests in the future of fishing was to fish sustainably, and therefore this meant that any decision made must take into account what sustainability of fishing is, because at the end of the day this is in the interests of the fishermen themselves as well, and it is in line with environmental standards and consideration.

I experienced similar situations in international discussions. Because fisheries is a common policy, it is the Commission that is very much in the lead in discussions. Therefore, on the one hand, you need to be careful that you are in command, but on the other hand, the interests of the representatives of the stakeholders should not be ignored. They need to be very much aware and very much in line with what you are seeking, because otherwise it can backfire. We had to be careful also, for example in discussion with ICCAT in discussions in GFSM and other forums. We used to work closely with the stakeholders and with the member states obviously, because at the end of the day the member states are the ones who we would be representing as the Commission, in order to try to work out the best deal possible in the circumstances. The best deal for our fishermen, but at the same time the best deal overall. Our end goal was to promote sustainable fisheries in international waters.

One another aspect, which is maybe worth mentioning, was when we had the fuel crisis. One of the sectors which was the most significantly hit by the fuel crisis was fisheries. This was because of the larger trawlers that had to travel hundreds of miles in order to fish in the ocean consumed a lot of fuel. Therefore, the increase in the cost of fuel when it went from $50 to $150 per barrel over a timeframe of a couple of months, meant that these fishermen were making a profit one minute, and with that huge increase not being reflected by a correspondence increase in the price of fish, they started making a very big losses, and were on the verge of bankruptcy because of this.
It is worth noting that in fisheries, if you have an increase in costs, you cannot just simply increase the cost of fish. You cannot just increase prices at random, because they are determined by the big supermarket chains. Secondly, if fish becomes too expensive, the consumer will simply stop consuming. There is no blind faith for eating fish. It is an interchangeable commodity.

I remember going to south Italy to address a conference on the maritime policy there. I found 300 fishermen protesting there from all over Europe, protesting because of the fact that they were going into bankruptcy. They were asking the Commission to intervene with the member states in order to help them out, to save their livelihoods.

At the end of the day, whether you are a Mediterranean person or you are come from the North, you need to be convinced that what I am saying or what I am seeking to do is the right thing. I ended up talking with the fishermen for two hours or more, until they started to calm down.

In the meantime other fishermen were in Brussels protesting, and they had burnt out a couple of cars. When I went back, I made a point to take up this case, because I felt it was untenable. I went to the Commission with a proposal for a package to help the fishermen out of this situation.

A package that would help them restructure and modernise, and at the same time assist the through this very bad patch, this very bad period. At first, it was difficult, because the Commission did not want to set any precedents. There was a fear that if the fishermen received this package, the public transport sector and farmers would want similar packages because of the rising cost of fuel. However, I made the point that the fuel element as a component of the total cost was much higher in fisheries than in any other economic sector. Finally, we agreed on a package and it went through the Commission and was also adopted by the Council. I think that this saved a lot of bad blood; it created much closer pull with fishermen, and it saved quite of few of them from bankruptcy.

_Diplo: Could you elaborate how is persuasion used in different European cultures (i.e. South, North, Continental, Anglo-Saxon)?_

In a way there are differences in approaches in the South, in the Mediterranean and in approaches in the North. The difference is more of style than substance. At the end of the day, whether you are a Mediterranean person or you are come from the North, you need to be convinced that what I am saying or what I am seeking to do is the right thing.

Don't go away with the idea that a person who lives in the Mediterranean wants it their
way, or a person coming from the North is willing to accept whatever you tell them; this is not so. You can have as hard a hardhead in the North as you can in the South. It is only natural; but the style is different.

Discussion in the Mediterranean tends to be somewhat more agitated, with a lot more gesticulations and movement, and that is natural. Perhaps it’s because of the part of the world we live in, maybe the climate can play a role, make us lose our temper more or pretend we are losing our temper more. In the North, people are more calm and composed, but they are as determined. You need to convince them that what you are saying is correct; otherwise they will tell you in a very polite manner – no way – you are not going to have it that way. It was as tough to make decisions which would affect fishermen coming from the North, as it was when it came to making decisions which affected fishermen from the South.

The element of persuasion had to be strong in the both instances. As I said it is a question of style, of the way they present themselves. The difference is to a large extent more about what happens with the decision. The North tends to be more disciplined; once something is decided they tend to implement it, maybe not always 100%, but they tend to implement a good part of the decision. In the South it is even more difficult to have it implemented, even if the decision has been made.

Today, things are improving considerably as well. We see that even in the south of the European Union decisions are taken and they are being implemented more than they used to be in the past. Maybe this is also attributable to the fact that because today they have been involved in the process leading to the decision, whereas before they used to feel that the decisions were imposed on them and therefore they used to do their utmost to ignore them, or to disregard them, or to put them aside. Today, they feel that decision has been taken in which they have been involved, and therefore it is their duty to implement it properly. This applies both in the North and also in the South.

**Diplo:** Can you compare the importance of persuasion in your various professional and political experiences (i.e. in Malta, foreign affairs, in the EU)?

Persuasion is important in itself whatever the scenario, whatever the situation or circumstances you are in. I believe wholeheartedly in this. Let’s take my role as a minister. I could have, as a minister, decided to do certain things my way, without consulting, without involving, without seeking to persuade others. I might have
managed to obtain the result I wanted, and maybe also push a piece of legislation through Parliament. However, then if we had needed to refer that result to the electorate, because of the referendum commitment that we had, I am quite sure we would have lost the referendum had we not involved the stakeholders from day one in negotiations process, had we not sought to inform the Maltese public as much as possible as to what was taking place in the negotiations process. The fact that we involved the stakeholders helped considerably. It was the main determining factor in our winning the referendum on Malta’s membership of the European Union. Remember, the situation in Malta at that time was that the two major political parties were against one another regarding membership. The Nationalist Party (i.e. the Christian Democrats) was in the favour of membership, and the Labour Party was against. We had pockets within the National Party that were afraid of membership: hunters, small businesses, farmers, etc. Had we had not managed to make significant inroads into the Labour Party supporters and persuade them that membership would be good for Malta, we would have undoubtedly lost the referendum.

But even if we had not held the referendum in Malta, I would think that it would have been against Malta’s interests not to involve, not to seem to persuade; we would have got the legislation through the Parliament, we would have acceded, but the public opinion could have immediately have turned sour. Obviously EU membership is not the manna from heaven that people tend to believe it is. It is very good, but you also have to take on a lot of responsibility. At least the Maltese people knew to a large extent what they were getting themselves into. Had they not known, they would have been very unpleasantly surprised to say the least with certain responsibilities that we had to shoulder. That would have been much more negative than it actually was. I firmly believe that the fact that we carried out the negotiations process by involving the stakeholders, by involving all the interested parties, by informing the public was very beneficial in the short term, because we won the referendum, we obtained a convincing ‘yes’ in the referendum, but also in the long-term because the Maltese felt that they knew much more, and therefore were prepared for the unknowns or what could have been the unknowns of the membership much more than certain others who acceded to the European Union. In fact, opinion in Malta after EU membership remained quite high. It was never too high, but remained almost constant, whereas in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, opinions before membership were in 80% of favour, but after slumped to very low levels. That did not really happen in Malta, and I believe it is because of the system we had in place.
As the Commissioner, I could have taken decisions on my own, with the group of people that were working together with me, the Director General, directors and other staff of DG MARE, and with my own cabinet, disregarding everything else.

But it would be have been difficult because I would have needed to convince Council and Parliament, and it is difficult to convince them if they sense that one is making these decisions without involving anyone. Persuading Council and Parliament to get onboard took a lot of effort. Even if one persuades Council and Parliament, one then has to implement those decisions, amongst the very people who are affected by them (e.g. amongst fishermen in the case of fisheries, amongst farmers in the case of the agriculture, amongst businessmen in case of the competition policy) and if they are not prepared, if they feel that these decisions have ignored their concerns, you meet more resistance.

Whatever the scenario, whatever the circumstances, it always pays to do your utmost to involve others, to persuade them, and if you do not manage to persuade them and you still have to move on, to move forward, then at least they cannot say that they were not involved or that they were not consulted.

_Diplo_: Can you draw some commonalities among these different contexts: _What is the importance of trust in the persuasion process? Is persuasion a matter of inspiration, improvisations, rhetoric or the result of the longer process of building trust?_

I am sure that genuine, honest persuasion cannot be rhetoric, cannot be show, and cannot be theatrics. It has to be something that you genuinely believe in, and people sense this. I can say from my experience that whenever you try to put on a show, people can pay you lip service. Whenever you try to impress them with fantastic words they might be impressed for a moment, but then they will call your bluff when the true test comes.

For example, I have already mentioned the question concerning fuel prices. Had I been telling them that we have to do this because it is in their interests, then when, in a moment of need, when they came and said we are on the verge of bankruptcy, if I had turned my back and said that I was not interested, I would have lost their confidence. When I did my best to try to find a way out for them, that effort strengthened the element of trust that we as the Commission in general were seeking to build. I firmly believe that people, stakeholders, your interlocutors are not stupid; they are intelli-
gent people, they can see through bluff, they can see through theatrics. They might be impressed for a while with rhetoric, but then they can test you and if they find it is only rhetoric, then they dump you.

What is really essential is to build the culture of trust between yourself and your interlocutors. This does not mean that you have to be soft, or that you cannot be firm in your position. In fact, there were various instances as the Commission when we were very firm in decisions we took, but at the same time we were fair. We sought to do our best, to involve stakeholders, to discuss with them.

Achieving results, which were as good at least or probably much better than our previous track record, I think was due to the fact that there was a significant element of trust between the Commission and the Council, between the Commission and the Parliament, between the Commission and the stakeholders, fishermen and environmental groups. This worked very well. It needed a lot of investment. You need to be seen to be honestly trying to find the best way forward. If your counterparts realise this, they will help you in identifying it, rather than create obstacles in your way. To a large extent, this is what I experienced in the job as Commissioner.

I remember when we were discussing the Mediterranean fisheries regulation one of stakeholders came to discuss certain issues with me. I understood, and I offered that I would do my best to try to help the sector out. However, when we came to Council this stakeholder had organised a group to come into the adjoining room of the Council in order to try to disrupt what we were trying to do, and I took offense to that. Following that incident, I gave instructions that I did not want to deal any further with this particular stakeholder, because that is not how one should deal with issues in an honest way. I am prepared for long discussions and to try to find solutions, and if you do not agree then we have to try to continue, but do not try to stick a knife in my back; that is not acceptable. Those instructions sent a message that I am approachable, and that I can be very open to honestly trying to find a solution where there is a problem, but do not try any double-dealings, because it will not work.

Another interesting point was in regard to the blue-fin tuna fisheries in the Mediterranean. In the blue-fin tuna fishery we started in ICCAT in 2005 and 2006 with an overall quota for the blue-fin tuna of about 33 000 tonnes per year. In 2010, which was the last year, because this decision would have been taken in 2009 for the 2010, and I was still Commissioner in 2009, we had reduced the quota because obviously there was
a lot of lobbying on the part of environmental groups that stocks of blue-fin tuna were being depleted, and scientists were saying that we needed to do something about this fishery. We reduced the quota from 33 000 to 13 000 tonnes, in a span of four years. We also shortened the fishing season considerably and introduced significant control measures (e.g. spot planes, prohibition of certain fishing methods, onboard inspection of vessels). It was the strongest control exercise that has been carried out in the fisheries anywhere in the world over those four years. Nevertheless tuna fishers protested in certain instances; they never completely abandoned ship, though, so we kept discussing with them till the very end. Before I left, we had discussions with them trying to work together on solutions. It pays off even if you have to take very tough measures; it pays off to involve stakeholders. It would be counterproductive if, when the going is easy you consult, because it is easy, and when the going is tough you decide on your own. You need to consult even more when the going is tough, and it will pay off.
Persuading and resisting persuasion

Interview with Dr Alex Sceberras Trigona

Diplo: Do you agree with Prof. Kappeler’s view that persuasion is the essence of diplomacy?

The functions of diplomacy as defined in the Vienna Convention of 1961 are representation, protection of own citizens, negotiation, reporting, and promotion of friendly relations. The fact that persuasion is not listed amongst them has to be seen in the context that this document is a product of the Cold War, when even reaching the least common denominator took 13 years of negotiations.

Whereas persuasion does not feature at all in reporting, representation could lead to negotiation, where the need for persuasion might arise. Protecting one’s citizens might involve lobbying, of which persuasion is an instrument. There is an element of persuasion on a macro level in promoting friendly relations, the type one associates with marketing, advertising, and branding, but not so much on the micro one-to-one level. Probably this is not the kind of persuasion Prof. Kappeler is referring to.

It is a small fraction of diplomats who are directly involved with the diplomatic function mostly associated with persuasion, i.e. negotiation. Even here, many agreements, such as those defining cultural, taxation, and friendship ties, are of a template nature, requiring very little persuasion, albeit they take the form of treaties, the highest expression of diplomatic relations. Moreover, in many other negotiations, such as
lobbying to elect candidates to international bodies and support for general resolutions considered harmless and not entailing giving up on anything, representation without much persuasion is employed most of the time. Interlocutors will be anyway taking decisions based on their own considerations and interests, whatever is politically more convenient and expedient to them. This lobbying is usually not so engaging. It is characterised with taking note and referring back, persuasion light at most.

Real persuasion is more than that. It involves a change in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour from what they were before embarking on a negotiation strategy. This is more rare.

Diplo: How is this reflected in your experience?

In my experience I often had to deal more with the converse. As a small country we always have to be careful from undue pressure into being persuaded. Actors with more resources view us as vulnerable diplomatic prey. Resisting persuasion is an equally diplomatic function.

Diplo: As the first designated Minister of Foreign Affairs for your country [Malta], can you recall particular situations where persuasion played a key role?

Adopting neutrality from an international law concept to a fulcrum of a country’s foreign policy required profound persuasion. More so when we were the first country deliberately opting for that path, since in the case of Austria neutrality was imposed by the victors of World War II. To start with, this was considered by the West, of which we traditionally formed part even if never members of NATO, as a step away from it. The East was not satisfied with this move, and it would have been easier convincing them to join their Block than becoming neutral. The two sides, always keen on recruiting new members, were afraid of the creation of a third way, as this could serve as an alternative for sympathetic countries who were reluctant to formally join any alliance.

We were a bad example for their efforts, with groupings in France and Italy arguing against NATO membership, recommending the ‘Malta way’ instead, and allies in the Mediterranean straying away from closer integration into the Soviet sphere of influence. Recognising a neutral status introduced a defect in the argument that only full membership can protect Finland and Sweden from the enemy. This created a cumulative effect between the mid-1970s and 1980.

Apart from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there were other groupings trying to persuade
us to move closer to them, including the League of Arab States. Libya and Algeria were not pleased with the consolidation of our ties with their former colonies Italy and France, and similarly the West grew suspicious with the warming up of our relations with Libya and Algeria. Persuasion took a new meaning when beyond the rhetoric, Mintoff managed to extract 500 million MTL (€1.2 billion) from Italy to guarantee our new stance. One cannot ignore the non-accommodating domestic dimension during all this. Our efforts were stunted by the disagreement on the matter by the Opposition at home, depriving us from the strength to present ourselves as a united national front.

Another situation related to persuasion is our 1983–1984 membership of the United Nations Security Council; the only time Malta occupied this position in our almost 50-year history at the UN. Starting with our nomination, we failed to persuade our grouping, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), to endorse our candidacy. Domestic politics again played a role here, when Italy, a customary ally and a very strong influence in the group, opposed our efforts claiming that this would be meddling with the national debate on the legitimacy of our government. From our point of view, it was that position which constituted interference in domestic affairs. We upped our stakes by declaring that unless our 18-year wait to get a WEOG nomination was vindicated, we would run independently for the General Assembly vote. This implied that if elected we would be taking decisions independently of WEOG positions. One has to note that at the time WEOG was tightly knit and controlled, and not unravelling as it is today. UNGA elected us with an astonishing 111 votes from 157 members. Once there, a relevant issue we had to deal with was the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 over Kamchatka, when we took a stance perceived as favouring the USA and against the USSR, contrary to other Western countries.

The third situation where a lot of persuasion was involved is related to the building of the national grain terminal. During negotiations with American investors in 1984 we had to deal with World War II unexploded ordnance on the seabed in the area. Our efforts with the British to clean the zone, as the rulers during the War, included phone conversations with the Foreign Secretary, discussions at the highest levels during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, corridor diplomacy in the shadows of other multilateral gatherings, and an audience at 10 Downing Street. The British Government was determined to stay out of it, quoting our independent status, and at a later stage bringing up its concern at creating a precedent of responsibility towards former colonies. We embarked on a campaign to bring up the issue at several international fora, such as the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, parliamentary assemblies, and in the media, driving the message that Britain’s abdication from responsibility was hindering our economic development. We invited a Soviet minesweeper to enter

Diplomacy does not allow much room for the emotional
the harbour immediately after the expiry of a deadline we gave to the UK. That same Christmas morning, the British High Commissioner contacted us to investigate what was its purpose, and by the evening we had assurances that the British were reconsidering their position. Eventually they agreed to our terms and the zone was cleaned. This represents an example of persuasion as part of a larger diplomatic strategy.

_Diplo: What do you consider decisive factors in persuasion?_

The Ancient Greeks distinguished between Pathos, Logos, and Ethos, corresponding to the emotional, the rational, and the principle. This is still valid, and persuasion is a mixed bundle of the three, with the dose of each varying according to particular circumstances. Diplomacy does not allow much room for the emotional, and convenience determines the application of the Logos. In the previous example, the British used independence and precedent as principles, whilst we put more thrust on the rational. The decisive factor was the fear of the UK being blamed by the USA for allowing Malta to slip further under USSR influence.

_Diplo: How do you explain the failure of some diplomatic counterparts to persuade you?_

At times I just resisted. At others, they were simply not convincing. Sometimes their demands went too far against the interests I represented. In some instances the expectations placed on the interlocutor were too high.

_Diplo: What lessons in persuasion could be drawn from your experience?_

Study the facts of the case under negotiation in great detail – bluffers are not very successful in persuasion. Know your interlocutor as thoroughly as possible – be aware of their sensitivities.

_Diplo: Who were the best persuaders you have met in your career? What were their key strengths? Do historical considerations play an important role in the process?_

Historical considerations certainly play a role. The former British Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe was very persuasive. His way of diffusing tension in difficult situations was a key to this ability.
Diplo: Do you think that persuasion will change in the Internet era? Will it be easier or more difficult to persuade via the Internet?

The Internet is an additional tool in the diplomatic process. Its intelligent use can be a part of a successful strategy.
Dr Joe Borg

Prior to taking up the post of Member of the European Commission with responsibility for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Dr Joe Borg, served as Foreign Minister of Malta, leading negotiations for Malta's accession to the European Union. Since 1979, Dr Borg has held various academic posts at the University of Malta specialising in Company Law, Industrial Law, and European Law. He also held various posts as legal adviser to companies and corporate bodies in Malta and abroad and, in 1995, he was the main author and drafter of the Malta Companies Act.

Dr Borg was elected in 1995 as a Member of the House of Representatives in Malta for the Christian Democrat Nationalist Party and also served as Parliamentary Secretary within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998/99.

Dr Borg retired from the post of European Commissioner in February 2010 and has since resumed lecturing at the University of Malta.

Ambassador Victor Camilleri

Amb. Victor Camilleri is currently serving as Malta's Ambassador in Tripoli. He previously served as Malta's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva. In his 40-year career at the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs he has occupied a number of senior administrative and diplomatic posts including that of Permanent Secretary. As Ambassador in Brussels he formed part of the Maltese team which negotiated Malta's membership of the EU. Amb. Camilleri was chef de cabinet to Maltese Foreign Minister Prof. G. de Marco during his Presidency of the 45th Session of the UN General Assembly. He has extensive experience in multilateral affairs. He is actively interested in the promotion of IT as a tool of diplomacy and for some years served as Chairman of the Working Group on Informatics at the UN in New York.

Ambassador Petru Dumitriu


**Dr Milan Jazbec**

Dr Milan Jazbec, Ambassador of Slovenia to Turkey, is accredited also to Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, Associate Professor of Diplomacy, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Author of 14 books on diplomacy, among them *Diplomacies of New Small States: The case of Slovenia with some comparison from the Baltics* (2001), *Osnove diplomacije* (Diplomatic Handbook, 2009), and *Sociologija diplomacije* (Sociology of Diplomacy, 2012) as well as more than one hundred articles and other publications from diplomacy, international relations, security and defense issues. He has lectured at many universities, among them Vienna Diplomatic Academy, Columbia New York, Victory Priština and Bilkent University Ankara. He was the last Yugoslav (1991) and the first Slovene Consul in Klagenfurt, Austria (1992–1995) and State Secretary at the Slovene Ministry of Defense (2000–2004). In March 2005, he received a high Austrian decoration: The Grand Golden Decoration of Honour with a Star for the Merit for the Republic of Austria.

**Dr Jovan Kurbalija**

Dr Jovan Kurbalija is the founding director of DiploFoundation, currently based in Geneva, Switzerland. He is a former diplomat with a professional and academic background in international law, diplomacy and information technology. In 1992, he established the Unit for IT and Diplomacy at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies in Malta. In 2002, after more than ten years of successful work in training, research and publishing, the Unit evolved into DiploFoundation. Dr Kurbalija currently directs online learning courses on ICT and diplomacy and lectures in academic and training institutions in Switzerland, the United States, Austria, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Malta. His main areas of research are diplomacy and the development of an
international Internet regime, the use of hypertext in diplomacy, online negotiations and diplomatic law.

**Professor Andre Liebich**

Faculty member of the Graduate Institute, Geneva since 1989, Prof. Liebich was previously Professor of Political Science at the University of Québec in Montréal. He has also taught at McGill University, the University of Montréal, the University of Fribourg, and the Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania. He has held research appointments at St Antony’s and Nuffield Colleges, Oxford; the Russian Research Centre, Harvard; the Hoover Institution, Stanford; the Kennan Institute, Washington, DC; the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; and the Institute for Historical Research, London. His interests lie in Central and East European history and politics, modern political thought and ideologies, and international history and theory. His current research deals with nationhood and statehood, and minority and diaspora politics. His published works include *From the Other Shore: Russian Social Democracy After 1921* (Fraenkel Prize, 1995) and *Les minorités nationales en Europe centrale et orientale* (1997).

**Dr Aldo Matteucci**

Dr Aldo Matteucci graduated from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETHZ) in Agriculture, and from Berkeley in Agricultural Economics. He spent three years in East Africa doing research on land use, then in Maryland, working on rural development. In 1977, he joined the Swiss Federal Office of Economic Affairs. He was deputy director of the EUREKA Secretariat in Brussels, and from 1994 to 2000, deputy secretary-general of EFTA (the European Free Trade Association). Since retiring early from EFTA, he has been DiploFoundation's ‘resident contrarian’.

**Dr Paul Meerts**

Paul Meerts pmeerts@clingendael.nl is institutionally connected to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, the College of Europe in Bruges, and the Processes of International Negotiation Program. Prof. Dietrich Kappeler succeeded him as Rapporteur of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training in the mid-1990s. During the first decade of the new millennium, Paul Meerts trained diplomats of the three South-Caucasus countries for CABIR on a bi-annual basis.
Ambassador Kishan Rana


Dr Biljana Scott

Dr Biljana Scott was trained as a linguist (BA in Chinese, M.Phil and D.Phil in Linguistics, University of Oxford). She is a Senior Lecturer in Political Language and Public Diplomacy at DiploFoundation and a lecturer at Oxford University and the London Academy of Diplomacy. She workshops internationally on Language and Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Public Speaking. Her current research is on the ‘unsaid’.

Dr Alex Sceberras Trigona

Dr Alex Sceberras Trigona, a Founder Member of DiploFoundation, has been organising courses simulating international negotiations – bilateral and multilateral – at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, since 1991 as well as for the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, for the Commonwealth, and for the Commission of the European Union, amongst others. Dr Trigona served as Malta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981–1987. He negotiated Malta’s Neutrality Agreements. He lobbied for, won, and managed Malta’s first ever seat on the United Nations Security Council for 1983/1984. His law Doctorate was awarded on the basis of a seminal thesis Constitutional Change and the Maltese Constitution. Fundamental constitutional changes in 1974 followed this thesis in both manner and substance. He was elected Rhodes Scholar for Malta and read Politics, Economics, and Philosophy at Oriel College, Oxford University for his MA. He Lectures on Diplomacy and Diplomatic Practice for International Relations students and on Private International Law at the Law Faculty of the University of Malta.
Dr George Vella

Dr George Vella is Minister for Foreign Affairs in Malta. He was elected as a member of the Maltese parliament in 1978 and headed Malta’s delegation at the local and regional authority conference in the Council of Europe. He was also a substitute member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. For a short period he was Malta’s Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe.

Between 1996 and 1998 Dr Vella was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. In April 1997 he was appointed honorary President of the second Euro-Med Conference which was held in Malta. As Malta’s Foreign Minister, Dr Vella made official visits to China, Italy, Belgium, Tunisia, Austria, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Greece, Germany, and Egypt.

He represented the Malta Labour Party at various meetings of the OSCE, IPU, and Socialist International. Dr Vella was also the Malta Labour Party’s substitute member at the Convention for the Future of Europe.
DiploFoundation emerged from a project to introduce ICT tools to the practice of diplomacy, initiated in 1992 at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic studies in Malta. In November 2001, Diplo was established as an independent non-profit foundation by the governments of Malta and Switzerland. Diplo has received wide recognition for its work, including consultative status with the United Nations.

In 2009, DiploFoundation featured in the World e-Democracy Forum’s list of ‘Top 10 who are changing the world of Internet and Politics’. In 2012, DiploFoundation was selected as one of the ‘top 100 NGOs’ based on its impact, innovation, and sustainability. In 2013, DiploFoundation’s Internet governance programme, the Internet Governance Capacity Building Programme, and the book *An Introduction to Internet Governance*, were nominated for WSIS Project Prizes.

Today, Diplo works to increase the capacity of small and developing states to engage effectively in international policy, negotiations, and diplomacy. We do this by providing capacity development programmes in areas such as Internet governance and climate change diplomacy; using and developing tools for e-participation in global governance, including remote participation in international meetings and social media for global negotiations; and providing specialised and effective academic programmes – accredited with the University of Malta - for professional diplomats seeking cost-effective but high-quality training in both traditional and contemporary diplomacy topics.
The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) is an institution of higher learning offering advanced degrees in diplomacy with a focus on Mediterranean issues. The programme consists of courses in International Law, International Economics, International Relations, Diplomatic History and the practice of diplomacy and languages. MEDAC was established in 1990 pursuant to an agreement between the governments of Malta and Switzerland. The Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) was among its first foreign partners. Since 2006, MEDAC has been constituted as an autonomous foundation, its Founders being the Government of Malta and the University of Malta. It is a centre of excellence for training and research in the field of international relations, with special emphasis on issues of common concern to Mediterranean countries, and environmental diplomacy. It counts over 500 alumni from 53 different countries who have completed successfully the postgraduate courses offered by the Academy since its inception.

With Malta’s accession to the European Union and with the financial support of the Arab League, MEDAC, more than ever, is emphasising the Euro-Mediterranean dimension by building bridges between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. MEDAC is a member of the European Diplomatic Training Initiative (EDTI), a group of EU diplomatic academies training EU personnel and of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT), a member of EuroMeSCo, and a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN). MEDAC is also part of the Advisory Board of the journal Europe’s World.