

Mainstreaming Development in the World Trade Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

It has been widely recognized that there is an important development dimension to international trade, both by academic observers and by civil society groups.² The arguments for the interests of developing countries to be given special consideration in trade negotiations can be traced back to the earliest days of the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).³ First, these arguments relate to the significant differences in economic power of the major developed countries and the relatively minor share of developing countries in global markets, in particular the least developed. Second, the major distortions in global markets caused by the protectionist policies of developed countries that continue to disadvantage developing countries has been another reason for developed countries to agree to provide special and differential treatment (S&D) to developing countries in the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

These S&D measures include preferential market access; longer tariff phase-down periods and flexibility in the implementation of GATT/WTO disciplines and rules for developing countries; and offers by developed countries to provide technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries to facilitate the implementation of GATT/WTO agreements.

However, several writers have argued that these measures have not succeeded in addressing the fundamental issues in the trading system of: inequity in the trading system, where developed countries have continued to distort global trade, and protect their markets and stifle the development prospects of developing countries; unbalanced rules, where the costs to developing countries of implementing these rules have been far higher than the benefits, with the benefits going mainly to the developed countries; and lack of capacity of many developing countries to participate in the trading system that is compounded by the lack of responsibility of developed countries for the negative

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² CUTS, *From Cancun to Sao Paulo: The Role of Civil Society in the International Trading System* (Jaipur Printers, 2004).

³ See P. Low and A. Keck, "Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?", WTO Staff Working Paper (ERSD, 2004).

development impact of unfair trade rules (e.g., cotton subsidies) and the relatively high cost of adjustment experienced by many developing countries (e.g., through preference erosion). In addition, it has been argued that the WTO, like the GATT before it, is a critical component of the system of global governance. The WTO, its many critics have argued, has to increase the transparency and inclusiveness of its decision-making processes. The perceived imbalances in the power structures of the WTO have also raised questions about the legitimacy of WTO agreements and decisions.

The debate about development in the WTO is often assumed to be about increasing the effectiveness of special and differential treatment for developing countries in the WTO. This perception relegates the debate about development to the margins of the WTO. Development is thus regarded as an afterthought, as a “nice to do” or at worst an “optional extra”. This perception of the development dimension is misconceived. It is argued in this article that developing countries have fundamental interests in the WTO that are at the core of the trading system and its functioning. These fundamental interests are unpacked and described below in the four elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system: fair trade; capacity building; balanced rules; and good governance.

In developing the above conceptual framework, this paper draws on the work of Amartya Sen who defines development as “the removal of unfreedom ...”.⁴ Development in the view of Sen is the process of expanding human freedoms. These substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, and enjoy political participation. Human freedom is seen as the pre-eminent objective of development. It is also seen as the means of achieving development. The focus on rights, opportunities and entitlements, he argues, contribute to the expansion of human freedom and promotion of development. Thus, for Sen, development is understood as the process of removing these unfreedoms.

We have identified four types of unfreedoms or deprivations, in Sen’s work, that are relevant to our discussion of development and the multilateral trading system. First, Sen argues that deprivations can result when people are denied the economic opportunities and favourable consequences that markets offer and support. Second, Sen argues that poverty should be understood not so much as low incomes but as a deprivation of basic capabilities. Third, while Sen argues for government regulation to enable markets to work more effectively, he states that a system of ethics is required to build vision and trust for the successful use of the market mechanism. Sen urges policy-makers to base these values on social justice as the bases and objective of public policy. Sen recognizes that individuals would assert their “prudent and material concerns” but argues that policy-makers can balance these concerns with the values of social justice through public discussion. Fourth, Sen argues against the view that the denial of political liberty and basic civil rights is “good” for rapid economic development and

⁴ See Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (1999), p. 3.

states that the deprivation of the opportunity to participate in crucial decisions regarding public affairs is to deny people the right to develop and strengthen a democratic system. The latter is seen as an essential part of the process of development.

In applying the above definition of development to the trading system, it could be argued, first, that fair trade would remove the obstacles that developing countries experience in exporting their products to developed country markets and create opportunities for them to advance their development. Second, increasing the capacity of developing countries, especially the poorest and most marginalized, to develop their comparative advantage to produce and export would provide the necessary human, institutional, productive and export capabilities, needed by these countries to level the playing field in the trading system. Third, establishing rules that ensure a fair balance between; the costs and the benefits of new agreements, the values and interests of developed and developing countries, appropriate flexibility for developing countries to implement development policies and the need to strengthen the rules-based system, would ensure both the legitimacy and sustainability of these rules. Fourth, by building a transparent and inclusive system of decision making in the WTO, Members will be contributing to the capacity of developing countries to participate effectively in the making of decisions that are both democratic and consistent with the above three dimensions of development.

In this context, special and differential treatment for developing countries could be a tool to ensure the proportionality of trade agreements, commensurate with the levels of development of developing countries and their capacity to manage the burdens of the adjustment process. There remain significant differences in economic power and benefits gained by developed and developing countries from international trade. A World Bank Study,⁵ for example, points out that the top 30 countries export about 80 percent of world products. However, it is argued in this article that S&D on its own is an inadequate concept to promote development objectives in trade. It will need to be part of a broader approach that recognizes that the fundamental interests of developing countries in the trading system is to seek fair trade, capacity building, balanced rules and good governance in the WTO. This broader approach mainstreams the development dimension of trade and recognizes Special and Differential Treatment as an important aspect of this development dimension. In addition, this article argues that advancing the development dimension in the WTO is of systemic interest to all—including developed and developing countries—that seek to build and advance a legitimate and strengthened multilateral rules-based system.

In developing the above approach to development and the multilateral trading system, it is recognized that the WTO is essentially a trade negotiating body and not a development institution. However, it is argued that the WTO cannot be understood in simple mercantilist terms. Most members of the WTO, developing and developed, locate these narrow mercantilist interests within the broader context of their strategic

⁵ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2002* (World Bank, 2001), quoted in R. Mendoza.

objectives in the WTO.⁶ These broader objectives within the multilateral system include the need to build greater equity in the trading regime, greater capacity for developing countries to benefit from trade, more balanced trade rules, and more inclusive and transparent decision-making in the WTO. If the trading system is unfair, is insensitive to the lack of capacity of developing countries to benefit from trade, the rules are imbalanced, and the decision-making system is not transparent and exclusive, then special and differential treatment will not be effective and will be seen as a palliative for an unfair and unjust system. Special and differential treatment, it is argued, is thus of secondary importance for developing countries in the trading system—their primary purpose is to ensure that the broader development dimension of the trading system is advanced.

This article begins by locating the discussion below in the current debate about the relationship between trade and development (section II). In the next section each of the four proposed elements of the development dimension in the WTO are discussed (section III). The article concludes by locating this debate within the broader context of the commitments made by world leaders to increase development and reduce poverty.

II. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT AND THE DEBATE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

The 1990s has witnessed a continuation of the processes of globalization, characterized by increased flows of trade, investment and technology in the global economy. However, these flows have continued to be uneven and inequitable, with a concentration in developed countries. While globalization has however provided increased opportunities for the development prospects of some developing countries, the vast majority (mainly from Africa) have failed to take advantage of these opportunities, resulting in their increased marginalization in the world economy.

The response to these processes has been unprecedented mass action by civil society groups, as witnessed by the demonstrations seen in Seattle, Genoa and other World Bank/IMF, G8 and WTO conferences. The civil society critique of free markets and unbridled capitalism is a continuation of the debate about the balance between markets and state. In the 1980s, the influence of Reagan-omics and Thatcherism permeated the policies of the multilateral institutions, especially the World Bank and IMF, and saw the development of “one size fits all” remedies for the problems of all developing countries. This so-called “Washington consensus” was critiqued by many who argued that this “consensus” was in stark contrast with the successful development experiences of East Asian economies including Japan, and the first and second generation newly industrialized countries (NICs). In these experiences the state played a leading role in guiding the market.⁷

⁶ See, e.g., Swedish Government Bill 2002/3: 122 “Shared Responsibility. Swedish Policy for Global Development”.

⁷ See Robert Wade, *Governing the Market* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

In his new book,⁸ *The Roaring Nineties*, Joseph Stiglitz critiques the policies of the United States during the last decade of the twentieth century and argues that in its domestic policy, the United States got the balance between state and markets wrong. More importantly, the United States continued to advance this free-market “Washington consensus” internationally, calling for free trade, deregulated financial markets and the privatization of state enterprises. These policies were advanced both bilaterally and through their influence in the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. Stiglitz, who was the economic adviser to Clinton, and then Chief Economist of the World Bank during the 1990s, points to the lack of coherence in US policy when he states that while “we pushed the ideology of free market . . . we did not think about the impact of our policies on the poor in developing countries, but on job creation in America”. In the area of trade, more specifically, he argues that, “the completion of the Uruguay Round turned out to be one of our greatest failures . . . the US pushed other countries to open up their markets to areas of our strength . . . but resisted efforts to reciprocate”.

While the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage and free trade has been espoused as a principle of the free market system that provides opportunities for all to benefit from globalization, developed countries have not complied with this assertion in their own trade policies. This incoherence could be seen in several examples of the Uruguay Round Agreements. The Agriculture Agreement reflected the double standards of developed countries, which called for developing countries to open their markets, while maintaining huge subsidies and high tariffs that depressed global prices, undermining the development potential of developing countries (e.g. cotton). In the area of industrial products, developed countries retained high tariffs, tariff escalation and tariff peaks, for labour-intensive products—precisely in the areas in which most developing countries had a comparative advantage.

In the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement, developing countries were pushed to reduce their right to policy intervention to support their economic development, whereas developed countries utilized similar instruments in their own economic development strategies in the past—thus they were “kicking the ladder behind them”.⁹ Similarly, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement too, reflected a lack of attention to balance the potential benefits of increased research with the high costs of reduced competition and monopoly power granted to pharmaceutical countries by patent rights.¹⁰ While there has been a growing recognition that the increased flow of goods across borders does require regulation to protect human health, physical safety and the environment, there has been wide criticism of the unilateral imposition of these standards on the global

⁸ See Joseph Stiglitz, *The Roaring Nineties* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).

⁹ See Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder. Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002).

¹⁰ See Ismail, *The Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health and the Negotiations in the WTO on Paragraph 6*, *Journal of World Intellectual Property* (May 2003).

trading system, which often reflects the norms and interests of the larger developed countries who initiate them. In addition, Mutual Recognition Agreements on Standards have been negotiated between a few developed countries, facilitating trade between them and thus increasing the barriers to entry for developing country exports.¹¹

In addition, the increasing proliferation of free trade agreements initiated by the major developed countries as they seek to gain advantage in global markets, has raised growing concerns that the diversion of trade towards developed country markets would increase the marginalization of those excluded from these arrangements. Many critics have also interpreted these arrangements as weakening the multilateral trading system and have called for strengthened multilateral rules.

Since the creation of the GATT in 1947 and with the launch of the WTO in 1995, the multilateral trading system has always been seen as a vital part of the system of Global Governance, in the economic area, together with the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank). However, the legitimacy and political credence given to the GATT and WTO by some major developed countries has been contested both in domestic debates about the issue of sovereignty (the Great Debate in the United States) and the use of unilateral trade measures (Section 301 and Section 201).¹² Developing countries too have contested the challenge to their sovereignty by new rules (behind the border) namely, the TRIPs Agreement and proposed Singapore Issues in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) by arguing that the latter could erode the instruments to enhance their development (erosion of policy space). However, there has also been wide and increasing convergence among WTO Members about the need to strengthen the multilateral trading system and its rules, especially as some more powerful members have continued to use unilateral measures.¹³ While it is widely recognized that the WTO dispute settlement system is an essential component of a multilateral rules-based system and needs to be strengthened, there has been significant criticism from developing countries, especially those with less capacity, that the system is not transparent and inclusive.

Finally, although the WTO has been relatively successful in developing a consensus-based decision-making system, it has largely been unsuccessful at being transparent and inclusive in its decision-making system resulting in major setbacks for the institution (e.g., Seattle and Cancún), causing some members, such as the EU Commissioner Pascal Lamy, to criticize its system of decision-making as being “medieval”. Moreover, it is most severely criticized for reflecting the powerful interests of the major developed countries (the EU and the United States). The formation of the

¹¹ See Ismail, *On the Road to Cancun. A Development Perspective on EU Trade Policies and Implications for Central and East European Countries*, Journal of World Investment (August 2003).

¹² See An Chen, *The Three Big Rounds of US Unilateralism Versus WTO Multilateralism during the Last Decade*, Working Paper No. 22 (South Centre, 2004).

¹³ See EU response to panel report on Section 201 safeguard cases reported in An Chen, *ibid.*

G20 and other developing country alliances (G33, G90, etc.) in the recent period are thus seen as being a positive counterbalance to this reality.

In response to this critique of the processes of globalization and the functioning of the multilateral trading system, a systemic response is called for. It is argued in this article that, notwithstanding the wide divergences in policies and interests of developed and developing countries there exist significant areas of convergence. A multilateral trading system needs to be built around these systemic concerns, values and interests, referred to in this article as the development dimension of the multilateral trading system. It is argued further that the development dimension is also the convergence of interests between the needs and interests of developing countries and the broader systemic interests of developed countries. In this article we unpack the development dimension of the multilateral trading system into four elements: fair trade, capacity building, balanced rules and good governance.¹⁴ Each of these elements is discussed further below.

III. THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION

A. FAIR TRADE

Several studies have demonstrated that the gains from globalization and international trade are not equal and developed countries enjoy the lion's share of benefits.¹⁵ While this is partly due to the vast differences in economic power and levels of development of WTO Members, it is also due to the inequitable trade and economic policies of developed countries. By removing the distortions in global markets, caused by their domestic trade policies, and creating greater coherence in global economic policy, developed countries will contribute significantly to allowing the theory of comparative advantage to work, stimulating increased growth and global economic welfare for both developed and developing countries. These changes to their domestic and international policies could contribute significantly to the effective and sustainable integration of developing countries into the world economy. Moreover, there is a vast literature that suggests that the protectionist policies of developed countries in agriculture for example are inefficient and ineffective in providing support to their own farmers and correcting market failure.¹⁶

The devastating negative development impact of these agricultural policies of the developed countries have been recently widely criticized¹⁷ and has prompted James

¹⁴ These four guiding principles have emerged from an analytical categorization developed by the writer of the 88 Special and Differential Treatment developing country proposals (market access, flexible rules, capacity building and governance). Powerpoint presentation available from author.

¹⁵ See World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2002 and 2004*.

¹⁶ See Stefan Tangerman, *How to Forge a Compromise in the Agriculture Negotiations?* Presentation to European University Institute, Florence, 2–3 July 2004. See also Patrick Messerlin, *Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe. European Commercial Policy in the 2000s* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

¹⁷ See Oxfam, *Rigged Rules and Double Standards* (Oxfam International, 2002).

Wolfenson, the President of the World Bank, to remark that these protectionist policies are “crippling Africa’s chance to export its way out of poverty”.¹⁸ Thus the WTO needs to ensure that the policies of the developed countries that are the major beneficiaries of globalization and dominate global trade, are consistent with the WTO objective of liberalizing global markets and allowing the exports of developing countries fair access to these markets, thus creating opportunities for developing countries to grow and develop.

B. CAPACITY BUILDING

It has long been established that for many developing countries, especially the most marginalized, increased market access will not contribute significantly to export-driven growth. Their capacity to export is constrained by a range of supply side factors, including lack of infrastructure, low research and innovation capacity, lack of access to finance and poor investment environment. Poor institutional capacity and human resources contribute to this lack of supply capacity. The poor fiscal base of these countries and health, education and welfare priorities reduce the capacity of the State to intervene to build these capabilities. In addition, the high adjustment costs and fiscal impact of trade liberalization make these governments reluctant to reduce their tariffs. In several cases unilateral liberalization as part of IMF structural adjustment criteria may have already incurred severe adjustment and social costs. For a significant number of countries the loss of existing dependence on trade preferences into developed country markets make them reluctant to support multilateral liberalization.

The multilateral trading system thus cannot ignore these development challenges¹⁹—the building of institutional, productive and export capabilities—which are vital for the effective integration of developing countries into the global economy. The need for a global trade adjustment fund to contribute to trade capacity building is thus essential. Increased financial support for trade policy capacity building has to come from additional sources of funding, including additional ODA. Gordon Brown, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, has called for the creation of an International Finance Facility (IFF)—long-term donor aid to be securitized to front load the funding available—that could generate an additional US\$ 50 billion a year for Donor Aid to fund the Millennium Development Goals, including trade-related capacity building. In the spirit of the Marshall Plan—the US programme to finance the development of a ravaged post war Europe—Gordon Brown has urged that other forms of funding be also considered, including the proposed Tobin Tax, to fulfil the promises made by world leaders at the United Nations in 2000 to meet the Millennium Development

¹⁸ International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2003.

¹⁹ There are several good reasons for the international community to take responsibility to address these challenges. Among these reasons is the impact of developed country (OECD) agriculture protection that is responsible for a loss estimated at \$100 billion a year by developing countries (Oxfam, *ibid.*). This is equivalent to twice the total amount of development aid (\$50 billion a year) that developing countries receive per year.

Goals.²⁰ In this context more sustainable funding, including a tax on international trade flows—distributing the gains from the Doha Round—could also be researched.

In addition, a more equitable distribution of the gains from trade within developing countries is possible with greater integration of trade policies and broader development and poverty reduction strategies. An effective WTO would need to build greater coherence—without compromising its trade focus—with the Bretton Woods institutions and other multilateral and bilateral development agencies.

C. BALANCED RULES

The argument put forward by the EU that globalization—which has created increased and rapid flows of trade and finance—requires increased regulation to protect the environment, consumers, animal and human health and food safety, is a cogent one and worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, the recent report of the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization, established by the International Labor Organization (ILO), responded to this concern by calling for “fair global rules applied fairly”.²¹ However, these new rules would need to take into account the need to ensure that (a) the relative costs and benefits of these rules for developed and developing countries are taken into account and appropriate levels of flexibility built into the agreement; (b) the interests and norms of developed countries and developing countries may not converge entirely and thus the creation of new standards would need to be negotiated, with their development impact made transparent and linked to the implementation capacity of developing countries; (c) while developed countries had recourse to a range of development instruments that allowed their judicious intervention in the market to enhance their economic development, this opportunity should not be unfairly denied to developing countries.

However, the calls for increased flexibility (“policy space”) by developing countries needs to be balanced against the equally important need to ensure that the multilateral rules-based trading system is strengthened to enable all countries, particularly the weak, to be treated fairly in trade disputes. A weakened rules-based trading system will allow the stronger and more powerful countries to resort to unilateral measures, discriminating against the interests of the weaker developing countries.²² Multilateral rules that are not balanced will not be perceived to be in the interests of developing countries and will lack legitimacy.²³ Thus it is in the interests of

²⁰ See Speeches by Gordon Brown to the Conference on “Making Globalization Work for All—The Challenge of Delivering the Monterrey Consensus”, 16 February 2004, and at the “Poverty and Globalization: Financing for Development” Seminar at Vatican City, 9 July 2004. See at <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/international>.

²¹ See ILO, *A Fair Globalization. Creating Opportunities for all* (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004).

²² The United States reluctantly accepted the strengthening of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system that was negotiated in the Uruguay Round, with many US legislators and academics arguing that the United States should not cede its right to act in the best interests of the country to a multilateral institution. See The “Great Debate 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results”,

all that WTO rules are balanced, taking account of the need for flexibility for the less developed countries without weakening the effectiveness of the rules-based system.

D. GOOD GOVERNANCE

Since the creation of the GATT in 1947 and the creation of the WTO in 1995, the multilateral trading system has been recognized as a vital part of the architecture of global governance—together with the other Bretton Woods institutions. The WTO has been relatively more successful than its Bretton Woods counterparts in building a more democratic decision-making system. However, this has been a slow and painful growth process. Propelled by some major setbacks (Seattle and Cancún) the WTO has continued to learn and improve its decision-making system. The failure of Cancún propelled the Commissioner of Trade of the EU, Pascal Lamy, to argue that the WTO decision-making system was “medieval” and needed major reforms.

For many developing countries and NGO observers, the WTO has long needed major reforms of its decision-making procedures, as the institution is alleged to lack transparency, and is said to be dominated by the big and powerful countries (mainly the EU and the United States). In addition, several of the proposals on special and differential treatment and reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) by developing countries, reflect their perception of a lack of inclusiveness, ownership and transparency of the decision-making system. The Director-General of the WTO, Dr Superchai, is very conscious of this criticism and has thus requested his Consultative Board, chaired by Peter Sutherland, to make proposals for more effective and democratic decision making in the WTO.²⁴

The emergence of stronger developing country alliances and negotiating groups has begun to provide a more effective counterbalance to the power of the EU and the United States, and the opportunity for shared leadership.²⁵ The legitimacy of the WTO and the sustainability of its decisions requires it to build on its experience and develop a more inclusive and democratic decision-making system, that would contribute to better global governance.

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quoted in An Chen, *The Three Big Rounds of US Unilateralism versus WTO Multilateralism During the Last Decade*, Working Paper No. 22 (South Centre, July 2004).

²³ See the implementation issues and the review of special and differential treatment in the Doha Development Agenda. Developing countries have called for a review and renegotiation of several of the Uruguay Agreements on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, Trade-Related Investment Measures, etc. In addition, they have made about 88 proposals to review the application of special and differential treatment provisions of the WTO, arguing that these have not been effective.

²⁴ The report of this advisory forum is likely to be presented to the WTO for debate in Autumn 2004. See address by Peter Sutherland, made at the European University Institute, Florence, 2–3 July 2004.

²⁵ The emergence of the G20 since Cancún and the inclusion of India and Brazil in the Non- Group of 5 countries that negotiated the agriculture deal in the July Package, was largely successful in providing developing countries with leadership and negotiating leverage. This type of small group negotiation, however, was criticized by most WTO Members as being untransparent and exclusive.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Having made an argument above for the development dimensions of the multilateral trading system to be addressed as a systemic issue both by developed and developing countries, this article concludes by cautioning that the WTO is “no panacea, and in particular, no guarantee for development”.²⁶ As many have argued, while trade policies may be a necessary condition for the development of many countries, they are not a sufficient condition, and a successful development strategy at a domestic level will require a range of other policies that are implemented in an integrated manner, especially to ensure that the gains from trade are distributed more evenly and contribute to poverty reduction.²⁷ However, it is also recognized by many policy-makers that long-term initiatives to halve hunger and poverty will fail without fundamental restructuring of the global trading system—particularly in agriculture—that includes rich countries dismantling subsidies, lowering tariffs and levelling the playing field.²⁸ Others have argued that, “the Doha Round could provide a Framework that could contribute to reduce poverty”.²⁹

Thus world leaders at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, in committing the world to reduce poverty by half by 2015, included as one of the goals, that of developing “an open, rules based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system”. At the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development these same world leaders agreed to forge a partnership between developed and developing countries—to advance the Millennium Development Goals—the Millennium Development Compact. The Doha Development Agenda should be seen in this context, as the WTO is an essential part of the global effort needed to achieve these aims.

²⁶ See V. Engammare and J.P. Lehmann, “Does the Multilateral Trading System Promote the Interests of the Poor?”, in *From Cancún to São Paulo: The Role of Civil Society in the International Trading System* (CUTS, 2004). See note 2 above.

²⁷ See PRSP studies of IF and JITAP.

²⁸ See Mark Malloch Brown in *UN Development Report 2003*, p. vi.

²⁹ See Engammare and Lehmann, as note 26 above.