MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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About the picture on the cover:

The essence of the multistakeholder model is embedded in the globe. The hands reconstructing the globe, piece by piece, symbolise the collaborative efforts by various stakeholders to address the challenges of the modern world.

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FOREWORD

The face of traditional diplomacy has changed. The on-going process of globalisation has had an obvious effect on the conduct and content of diplomacy. Rapid means of transport and modern information and telecommunication technologies (ICT) have intensified the interaction between states, markets, non-governmental sectors, and academia and, in so doing, have accelerated global interdependence. In addition to, although not independently from this process, traditional arrangements of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity are becoming supplemented by polylateral, multistakeholder diplomacy.

Multistakeholder diplomacy is an innovative diplomatic method aimed at facilitating the equitable participation of all parties concerned in discussions on and debate over particular issue or issues at stake. It is based on the principles of mutual recognition and trust and on shared expertise and information. The multistakeholder approach to diplomacy thus brings about a synergy between state and non-state actors in their efforts to seek co-operative solutions to the most pressing problems of global development, human resources, and environment, to name but a few. The concept accepts and thrives on the widely appreciated wisdom that state bureaucracies alone cannot solve the enormity of the challenges that mankind faces, no matter how powerful any one state may be.

Indeed, to a great extent, diplomacy today is less state-centric and more multistakeholder in substance. To give clear examples of this, the UN-led multilateral summits on sustainable development, gender and human rights issues, world trade, the information society, and internet governance all illustrate the increase of non-state actor contributions in the preparatory processes and outcomes of diplomatic negotiations. International governmental organisations have, in fact, adopted innovative procedural arrangements that allow for the participation of non-state actors in their conferences. These arrangements allow such actors to act in tandem with the international community of states in the implementation of international projects and actions.

A growing number of national diplomatic systems rely on non-state actors' policy, advice and expertise. Their institutional structures often include specific units responsible for capitalising on the capacity of non-state actors

to realise national foreign policy goals. Thus, non-state actors are becoming engaged in public diplomacy campaigns. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for foreign ministries to outsource the implementation of projects to non-governmental organisations such as in the case of aid development and capacity building programmes.

In this respect, one needs also to acknowledge that the diffusion of internet technologies is substantially facilitating the creation of non-hierarchical, bottom up arrangements for networking and the pooling of resources between traditional diplomatic and non-state actors. This setting is increasingly facilitating network diplomacy which often develops into multistakeholder partnerships between governments, civil society, and the private sector. In this manner, diplomatic stability and practice becomes the mutual responsibility of professional diplomats as well as non-state actors, within an inclusive environment and relationship based on trust and the recognition of mutual interests.

The multistakeholder approach to diplomacy is not new to Malta. As a country with limited resources, Malta has made, and continues to make, the most of academic, business, and civil expertise to the greatest extent possible. This ability was clearly demonstrated when Malta began EU accession negotiations. These negotiations, demanding for even larger countries, were comparatively more so for Malta. Moreover, the EU accession negotiations required more than the typical diplomatic negotiations as they affected all strata of society. From the offset, it was evident that Malta required a multistakeholder approach to the negotiations. A very complex exercise followed, in which consultations were carried out on a national level, involving all those who had an interest at stake. The successful outcome of the EU accession negotiations also made a success of multistakeholder diplomacy.

The very fabric of the European Union is an example of the multistakeholder approach, where the participation of the business sector and of civil society is strongly encouraged within decision making-processes. This trend is bound to continue and develop in Malta as the effort intensifies to bring EU decision-making closer to its citizens.

In this context, I am particularly pleased that the Maltese/Swiss DiploFoundation has been one of the leading academic institutions in exploring the challenges and benefits of multistakeholder diplomacy in international relations. It has long integrated a multistakeholder network model in its research and training activities. Diplo courses constitute collaborative e-learning laboratories for sharing information and knowledge from participants with

various backgrounds--including professional diplomats, international civil servants, academics, students, civil society representatives, and members of the ICT community.

In this volume , Diplo offers the reader a collection of essays that examines the multistakeholder approach to diplomacy, internet governance, the information society and to conflict resolution from a wide scope of angles, whether diplomatic, academic, socio-cultural or organisational. Various specialists share their practical and research experience and help identify best practices in the field.

The case studies presented in the publication attempt to systematise the knowledge on a still understudied subject. They also raise the awareness of the diplomatic community regarding the need to utilise the potential of a multistakeholder model in modern diplomatic practice.

I wish you an interesting read through this collection of contributions, each of which throws an equally interesting and different light on the content and conduct of the various perspectives of multistakeholder diplomacy.

The Hon. Dr Michael Frendo
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta
Valletta

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This publication is a product of the co-operative efforts and dedication of the whole staff of DiploFoundation. The book's conceptual and thematic framework crystallised during six months of in-depth research and analysis by a Diplo team of experts and interns. Conference discussions helped a great deal to systematise the knowledge on the subject matter. We would like to thank all speakers, DiploFoundation interns, moderators, and *rapporteurs* who contributed to the success of the Multistakeholder Diplomacy Conference with their insights and observations. Yasmeen Ariff and Sylvana Bugeja are to be thanked for the impeccable organisation and management of the event.

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Lichia Yiu works with United Nations organisations and national governments in building internal capacities for transformation and performance improvement. She also works with multinational companies on issues related to developing trans-national leadership, building cross-border teams for technological innovation, and on business development in emerging markets. Her current research interests are human capital formation and quality of training and education, chaos and complexity theory and its application to large social system change, business diplomacy and multistakeholder relationships, and global leadership. She is President of the Centre for Socio-Eco-Nomic Development in Geneva and a partner of Organisational Consultants Ltd. Hong Kong. She has published 7 books and 40 articles in different professional journals.

INTRODUCTION

Jovan Kurbalija and Valentin Katrandjiev

The unprecedented challenges to the development of the contemporary, highly interdependent and vulnerable world require alternative forms of management of international affairs. The nature of these challenges requires new levels and forms of partnership of traditional diplomat-practitioners with the business sector, grass roots organisations, civil society, scientific and technical communities, and prominent individuals. The need for the involvement of non-state actors in diplomatic negotiations gradually evolved through a series of major UN summits, beginning with the Rio Environmental Summit in 1992. The last such summit was the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in two phases (Geneva in 2003 and Tunis in 2005). The participation of non-state actors was considerable. WSIS also introduced certain new organisational forms, such as the Civil Society Bureau, as a branch of the Summit Secretariat. The main breakthrough occurred with the establishment of the Working Group on Internet Governance, a body encompassing the equal participation of various stakeholders, including governments, civil society, and the business sector. The establishment of the Internet Governance Forum will also use the multistakeholder innovation introduced by WSIS.

The analysis of interaction and co-operation between state and non-state actors in the field of international relations and diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is that for the past decade a trend to unite models of this interaction with the multistakeholder model has been established. Although the word "stakeholder" originates in the area of business relations, it has slowly entered the diplomatic vocabulary through UN fora. Networking between various stakeholders in diplomacy has become an integral part of modern diplomatic practice. Therefore, placing the term "multistakeholder diplomacy" in academic and analytical circulation is a justifiable and even indispensable step.

The promotion of multistakeholder diplomacy has brought many new issues, controversies, and different viewpoints into the purview of interested parties. The state-centred international system provides no sufficient legal and policy mechanisms for accommodating non-state actors. While some accommodation could be effected, as was done during WSIS, a proper multistakeholder framework would require profound changes in international legal

and political systems. In discussions on multistakeholder diplomacy, many question the legitimacy and accountability of non-state actors. While most governments acquire legitimacy through democratic elections, confirming the legitimacy of non-state actors remains an open question. Some view the question of multistakeholder diplomacy from a developmental perspective. The non-state sector is much more active in developed countries, resulting in its more prominent participation in international affairs. Some developing countries believe this situation adds an additional misbalance in relations between developed and developing countries. These and other issues have been frequently discussed and deliberated over the course of many international forums, including the International Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy.

This volume considers the multistakeholder model of international relations from different professional backgrounds. It measures its applicability not only to the conduct of modern diplomacy and international negotiation, but also to the development of the information society and the Internet governance system. The authors are diplomat-practitioners, senior university tutors, institute researchers, international civil servants, and information and communications technology (ICT) specialists who first presented their case-studies during the "Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy" in February 2004, co-organised by DiploFoundation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta, the Global Knowledge Partnership, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The volume also incorporates the results of a DiploFoundation on-line multistakeholder diplomacy research project.

The volume begins with a contribution from *Brian Hocking*, who looks at the ways traditional diplomatic practice evolves and adapts to the challenges of contemporary world politics – politics characterised by complex linkages and a wide diversity of state and non-state actors. His comparative analysis of state based and multistakeholder diplomacy (MSD) models of diplomacy serves as a good foundation for understanding the essential characteristics of MSD.

The second section deals with multistakeholder participatory models for management of the information society and its core aspect – the Internet. *Derrick Cogburn* argues that the creation of interactive ICT based collaboratories advances the involvement of civil society organisations and developing countries in determining the norms and values of an emergent international regime for Internet governance. The current method of global communication policies also requires more active reliance on transnational policy networks and

knowledge driven communities. *Petru Dumitriu* examines the complexities of the first phase of the WSIS process from the point of view of a diplomat-insider who has been closely involved in the preparatory and final stages of the summit. He outlines the perception problems, dividing lines, fears, and expectations surrounding the negotiation process and offers an in-depth analysis of the positions and interests of the key stakeholders. The author believes that were the important stakeholders to agree on a set of minimum soft rules and values, an emergent Internet regime could be secured that would ensure smooth functioning and inclusiveness of the Internet system.

The third section examines the changing role of non-state actors in the functioning of the international system. *Britta Sadoun* provides a thorough analysis of the mechanisms of NGO involvement in the UN system of international conferences. The empirical findings show that the NGO role in UN conference diplomacy has been transformed. The author believes that improved participation modalities for civil society organisations would make access to the UN structures easier and their presence in policy making more visible. *Raquel Aguirre* examines the models of non-state actor incorporation into multistakeholder diplomatic processes and investigates the efforts by international treaty organisations such as the UN, WTO, and the EU to build multistakeholder networks for the implementation of trade, poverty reduction, and social development projects. *William Assanvo* explores multistakeholder practices in the context of national diplomatic systems. Multistakeholder activities provide appropriate venues for diverse segments of society to be part of national foreign policy making and give the public a greater sense of ownership in the process. As well, *Valentin Katrandjiev* acknowledges that today's diplomacy must adjust to the realities of a global, yet interdependent system of international relations in which non-official stakeholders significantly impact the outcomes of intergovernmental diplomatic forums and influence the establishment of international norms and regimes. Following consideration of procedural and institutional arrangements for non-state actors in the work of intergovernmental organisations and national diplomatic services, his paper assesses the willingness of the diplomatic guild to look at non-state actors from an inclusive perspective, recognising them as equal counterparts in national and international policy dialogue and decision making.

The last two papers in this section address the multistakeholder dimension in development diplomacy. *Raymond Saner* contends that increased service provision by non-state actors in the sphere of development aid makes them sizeable players in development policy negotiations. Resource-rich tran-

snational NGOs, multinational businesses, and financial institutions sponsor alternative policy frameworks. In this respect, the demands by non-state actors for supranational representation undermines the ability of traditional actors of diplomacy – governments – to exercise control over the co-ordination of development policy processes. The author suggests that at the national level, state diplomats need to utilise non-state actor policy analysis capabilities and share diplomatic space with all stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental) engaged in planning and implementation development aid programs. For the International Labour Organisation, *Lichia Yiu* analyses the implementation of organisational policies and strategies regarding the decent work agenda and poverty reduction in developing countries. Different forms of advocacy are just one of the examined instruments of development diplomacy.

The papers in the forth section outline diplomatic activities of two major multilateral organisations acting as multistakeholder networks in the fields of trade, development, humanitarian relief, disaster preparedness, and poverty eradication. *Chris Lamb* reviews multistakeholder relationships of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) with governments and other external actors implementing the Millennium Development Goals. Despite procedural and political constraints, the IFRC has earned itself a name as a promoter of peace, wielding substantial influence in international fora. *John West* claims that the co-operative environment within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is very much multistakeholder driven, because governments have established operational structures for dialogue with business and labour on the issues of wages and industrial relations. Using the principle of good governance, the OECD has developed mechanisms for civil society inclusion in policy debates. The modern world, concludes the author, is characterised by a growing number of networks rather than by hierarchy.

The last section focuses on the dissection of post-modern conflicts and their effects on approaches to diplomatic training. *Anoush Begoyan* defines intra-state conflict, classifying the variety of stakeholders, global and local levels of intervention, and emergent partnerships in conflict resolution and transformation. *Victor Shale* assumes that traditional, first-track diplomacy is not sufficient to address the complexities of modern conflict. "Second track" or "citizen diplomacy" offers better options for bridging the divides between governmental elites and grass roots segments of society and for combining different cultural approaches to tackle the complexities of today's conflicts.

The volume ends with a list of conclusions and recommendations for the preparatory stage of the second phase of WSIS reached during the three days of intensive conference discussions.

In conclusion, while offering a set of interesting analyses of the modes of multistakeholder diplomatic collaboration, the book does not provide the answers to all questions. We rather hope that the issues raised will serve as catalysis for further discussion and contribute to a better reading of the new trends in the conduct of modern diplomacy.

Part I

BASICS OF MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY: FORMS, FUNCTIONS, AND FRUSTRATIONS.

Brian Hocking

It has become apparent to observers of diplomacy that its forms and functions are increasingly complex. At one level, for example, traditional distinctions between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy have become less clear and, arguably, of diminishing significance. At another level, it is evident that the array of actors engaged in the diplomatic arena is far more diverse and that, in this sense, we may be witnessing the return to pre-modern forms of diplomacy. This diversity of actors has attracted varying terminologies, of which *multistakeholder diplomacy (MSD)* is one. However, the ideas in which these various forms of diplomacy are rooted are similar. Actors, including states – commonly identified as the generators of diplomacy – are no longer able to achieve their objectives in isolation from one another. Diplomacy is becoming an activity concerned with the creation of networks, embracing a range of state and non-state actors focusing on the management of issues that demand resources over which no single participant possesses a monopoly.

However, in what sense can MSD be described as diplomacy? Simply pointing out that more actors are involved in international policy says little about the nature of contemporary diplomacy, either in terms of process or in terms of structure. After all, non-governmental actors have been participants in diplomatic processes in earlier eras and the inclusion of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in multilateral agencies can be traced back at least to the International Labour Organisation. Nevertheless, it is apparent that, as in the past, the character of the diplomatic environment is adapting to changing circumstances. We are living in an era in which the state and the apparatuses through which it conducts its business are responding to a plethora of internal and external challenges, leading to questions regarding the relevance of diplomacy within contemporary world politics. In this context, is MSD a new model of diplomacy and, if so, how does it relate to conventional models rooted in state-focused intergovernmental processes?

MSD and "Two Cultures" of Diplomacy

John Ruggie (2005) helps to set the scene for our discussion in drawing attention to the challenges confronting the UN as it responds to criticisms of its humanitarian operations. On the one hand, he argues, a traditionalist diplomatic culture lies in the UN, reflected in the administration of the Iraq oil-for-food programme. This sees UN multilateral diplomacy as beginning and ending with responsibility to member states and represented in institutions such as the Security Council (characterised by secrecy and a lack of accountability). By contrast, one can also find in UN processes a "modernist culture" rooted in transparency and engagement with a wide range of internal and external stakeholders. The traditionalists, he argues, regard opaqueness and exclusiveness as a strategic asset, whereas "for modernists transparency is the key to institutional success." While presented in obviously stark terms, this clash of cultures is symptomatic of an international system undergoing profound change, reflected in the character of diplomacy. As Mattingly (1973) notes, diplomacy is a functional representation of the political system in which it operates. Yet, however the contemporary context of diplomacy is characterised, Ruggie's two cultures are constrained to coexist. The older, state-based form of diplomacy exists alongside emergent forms, one label for which might be multistakeholder diplomacy. What kind of a diplomatic system does this represent and how does it work? In part, answering this question requires us to go back to first principles and to consider what it is that we are examining.

Identifying Diplomacy

Understanding variants on a states-system-based model of diplomacy requires us to take a broader perspective on its development. However, as a number of analysts have noted, the study of diplomacy has either been ignored by those preoccupied with the phenomena of globalisation and global governance or has been constrained by analytical frameworks rooted in statehood and sovereignty. Consequently, discussion of Ruggie's traditionalist culture has dominated the analysis of diplomacy as well as its practice. That is, much of modern "diplomatic studies" restricts itself to the association of diplomacy with a system of sovereign states, rather than seeking out its essential characteristics.

In seeking to dissociate diplomacy from preoccupations with its role within the states system, Sharp (1999) has suggested that we recall the fun-

damental qualities of diplomacy. He argues that these reside in the intersection of two conditions: separateness and the need to communicate. With a similar purpose, Der Derian (1987) notes that the continual shaping and reshaping of diplomacy sits uncomfortably with the assumption that it has attained its ultimate expression, "that we have reached – or even that we are approaching – after a long odyssey the best, final form of diplomacy" (p. 3). Likewise, Jönsson and Hall (2003) have argued for resisting the association of diplomacy with a state centric perspective, adopting in their analysis of diplomatic communication a definition of diplomacy as "an institution structuring relations among polities, that is, political authorities of various kinds with distinct identities" (p. 196). Equally, Lee and Hudson (2004) have pointed to the distortions that the assumption that diplomacy is essentially a dialogue between states poses to a broader understanding of its character and evolution. In sum, each of these arguments, in differing ways, makes the case for identifying both the essential character of diplomacy and the need to recognise that the form manifested in the classical state system is but one variant. These arguments suggest that MSD is not some transient mutation from a well-established norm, but may be an interesting development indicative of continuing adaptation.

Such considerations pose questions as to where MSD fits into the continually evolving patterns of diplomacy. If one argues that the principal discourse of diplomacy from, say, the 16th to the 20th century, has focused on the emergence and development of "national diplomatic systems," whose essence is rooted in the system of sovereign states, how does the concept of MSD relate to this? Does MSD represent a fundamental shift in the character of diplomacy such as that which accompanied the transition from the medieval to the Renaissance era – or is it simply a minor modification of well-established patterns of communication that have dominated international politics for several centuries? These questions invite us to extend the analysis that students of diplomacy such as Raymond Cohen (1999) have applied when considering the broader issues of the impact of globalisation on diplomacy. Arguing that a dispassionate analysis of diplomacy in a turbulent environment demands a conscious attempt to distinguish the "permanent from the transitory," Cohen (1999) invites us to identify the core characteristics of differing diplomatic systems. Pursuing the same theme, Jönsson and Hall (2003) argue for the importance of analysing change and continuity in evolving patterns of diplomacy divorced from culture-bound assumptions regarding its origins and fundamental characteristics.

One of the difficulties here (as Winham [1993] points out in reflecting on Mattingly's (1973) analysis of the evolution from medieval to Renaissance diplomacy) is that of perspective. What is clear with the benefit of hindsight would not have been apparent in, say, the 14th century. The same point applies now. If we are moving through a phase of significant change in international politics, the precise contours of the resultant landscape are uncertain. However, it seems reasonable to propose, and it appears to accord with the contemporary diplomatic environment, that we are witnessing the intersection, following Ruggie (2005), of a traditionalist and a modernist diplomatic culture. Assuming that we can denote MSD as one dimension of the latter, how can we describe its parameters and how do they relate to earlier phases in the long evolution of diplomatic practice?

What we are concerned with here is the adaptation of diplomatic systems to internal cultural challenges as older and newer forms of diplomatic environment and practice intersect. In *Table 1,* I sketch how a traditionalist, state-based diplomatic environment contrasts with the environment of the MSD image. The purpose here is not to argue that a form of new diplomacy is replacing an older, state based form or, indeed that they are discrete diplomatic systems. Rather, they exist alongside and intersect with each other, reflecting the pressures of adaptation in contemporary world politics. In other words, we can understand the character of significant areas of contemporary diplomacy only in terms of the interaction of practices and expectations generated by the interrelationship of the two images.

Context

The chief distinguishing feature of the setting or context in which diplomacy functions lies in the significance of the sovereign state as the "terminal authority" within the international system. While MSD does not deny the continuing significance of the state, Cohen (1999) notes that "one of the by-products of globalisation is an erosion of the exclusive functions and prerogatives of the state and the professions that served it" (pp. 1-2). Using Rosenau's (2000) terminology, we now live in an era marked by multiple "spheres of authority" whose agents are not constrained by domestic arenas. Instead, state agents pursue their interests in whatever policy arenas are appropriate to the attainment of their objectives. In terms of the evolution of diplomacy, this represents a return to pre-modern forms where non-

sovereign actors exercised the right to engage in diplomatic processes that would later come to be regarded as the prerogative of the representatives of the state.

One of the characteristic qualities of state-based diplomacy has been its exclusivity. Diplomats are defined in terms of their role as representatives of national governments; at the international level, their presence and activities reflect practices that emphasise a sense of community enshrined in codes of behaviour and protected through conventions of diplomatic immunity. In short, they can be regarded as a *guild,* sharing responsibilities deriving from the twin roles of diplomacy as statecraft and as an institution of the international system (Henrikson, 1997). Integral to this image is the proposition that diplomacy is distinct from other spheres of activity, a separation expressed in the concept of the diplomat as *gatekeeper,* or mediator between domestic and international environments. Diplomacy is also traditionally differentiated from policy making and from politics, points stressed by Nicolson (1939) in his writings.

MSD, by definition, possesses very different characteristics as reflected in the growing literature on multistakeholder processes from which it has emerged. A fundamental premise of multistakeholder processes is inclusiveness and partnership in policy processes, rather than exclusiveness. Such processes "aim to bring together all major stakeholders in a new form of common decision finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue" (Hemmati, 2000, p. 19). Furthermore, in multistakeholder processes, "influence and the right to be heard should be based on the value of each stakeholders' unique perspective and expertise" (Hemmati, 2000, p. 7). As is often pointed out, this modifies the dominant democratic paradigm. At the same time, it also modifies the dominant diplomatic paradigm in significant ways. Not only does it challenge the rationale of the guild-like characteristics of traditional diplomacy; it offers a very different picture of who is involved in diplomacy. In particular, within MSD, private actors – such as firms and, of course, NGOs – can and should play a significant role.

This is not to say that non-state actors are unknown in the state-centred model. However, their role is that of *consumers* of diplomacy, whereas the MSD model provides for a far more proactive role in which the private sector can become *producers* of diplomatic outcomes. However, these roles are likely to depend on the dynamics underpinning the trisectoral interactions between governments, NGOs, and business. Doh and Teegen (2003) have suggested that the patterns of relationships between business and NGOs exist

on a spectrum lying between "stakegiver" roles, in which positive outcomes are produced, to "staketaker" roles in which NGOs become opponents of the interests of other parties.

Table 1. State-centred and Multistakeholder Diplomacy

	State-centred model	Multistakeholder model
Context	State as unchallenged terminal authority.	Multiple spheres of authority.
Forms	Government-led using bilateral and multilateral channels.	Diffuse: may be led by governments or other stakeholder. Developing and fluid forms.
Participants	Professional diplomatic guild. Diplomats whose credentials are based on principles of sovereignty. Non-state actors as consumers of diplomacy.	Multiple participation based on varying models. Frequently based on trisectoral model incorporating governments, NGOs, and business. "Stakeholders" whose credentials are based on interests and expertise. Non-state actors as producers of diplomacy.
Roles	Diplomat as gatekeeper.	Diplomat as boundary-spanner: facilitator and entrepreneur. Stakeholders performing multiple roles: stakegivers vs. staketakers.
Communication patterns	Government focused. Relations with stakeholders defined as "outreach." Hierarchical information flows focused on governments. Exclusive but with recognition of need for outreach.	Networks. Open and inclusive. Can be fluid and unstable. Multidirectional flows of information.

Functions	Managing relations between sovereign entities. Defining and promoting national interests.	Compensate for deficiencies in diplomatic processes by exchanging resources through policy networks. Information exchange. Monitoring processes. Defining and promoting global interests.
Location	Outside domestic arenas. Diplomatic sites: intergovernmental.	Crosses domestic-international arenas. Multiple diplomatic sites.
Representation patterns	State-focused. Mixed bilateral and multilateral with growing emphasis on mission diplomacy.	Multilateral and mission oriented. Variable permanent representation.
Rules	Clear normative expectations of behaviour. Derived form sovereignty-related rules. Centrality of protocol. Immunity of diplomatic agents. Confidentiality.	Underdeveloped rules. Clash of sovereignty and non-sovereignty based rules. Openness, accountability and transparency. Institutional tensions. Clash of expectations between stakeholders.

Nonetheless, the MSD model does not necessarily imply a diminished role for the professional diplomat. Indeed, that role might gain in importance, but, at the same time, become redefined. Rather than that of gatekeeper, the diplomat becomes what might be termed a boundary-spanner, recognising that boundaries between organisations, far from being irrelevant, are fluid and continually reconstitute themselves, thereby becoming sites of intense activity (Ansel and Weber, 1999). In such an environment, diplomats assume the role of mediators or brokers, facilitators and entrepreneurs (Rana, 2004). Indeed, Rosenau (2000) sees a crucial role for diplomats in assisting the creation and legitimisation of new patterns of social contract between individuals and a plethora of spheres of authority.

Communication Patterns

In contrast to the traditional, hierarchical model of diplomacy that stresses the centrality of intergovernmental relations, MSD is a reflection of a much more diffuse, network model. Underpinning the various definitions of networks lies the proposition that they have become indispensable in managing increasingly complex policy environments through the promotion of communication and trust. A policy network can be defined as

> a set of relatively stable relationships which are of a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests, acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals. (Stone, 1997)

This definition underpins Reinecke's (2000) concept of global public policy networks. Starting from the premise that globalisation has highlighted the deficiencies of governments in terms of the scope of their activities, speed of response to global issues, and range of contacts, he identifies the significance of networks incorporating both public and private sector actors. Multigovernmental institutions are not irrelevant to the management of global issues, he suggests, but the more diverse membership and non-hierarchical qualities of public policy networks promote collaboration and learning and speeds up the acquisition and processing of knowledge. Furthermore, as an Aspen Institute (Bollier, 2003) report argues, centralised decision making processes are at a disadvantage when confronted by decentralised networks; the latter face fewer transactional barriers and are able to direct relevant information speedily to where it will have greatest effect.

Functions

In contrast to the premise that the agents of government exercise predominance in the shaping of international policy, the logic of MSD is rooted in the constraints confronting all actors – both state and non-state – in achieving their policy objectives. Challenged by ever more complex and multifaceted agendas, MSD establishes relationships of varying scope and composition, which, for example, bring together governmental actors, and business. Quite

clearly, the motivations for developing relationships will vary. Business has come to recognise that NGOs are now a critical element of the environment in which it has to operate. Indeed, taxonomies drawn from various stakeholder theories developed in the corporate political strategy literature have been used to analyse the motivations of business in engaging with NGOs and the variety of relationships that such engagement produces (Doh and Teegen, 2003). In general, such relationships seek to compensate for three forms of deficit that actors confront in achieving their diplomatic objectives: legitimacy, knowledge, and access. These deficits underpin the goal of resource exchange identified by Reinicke (2000) as a feature of global policy networks demonstrated in the trade policy arena where the pattern of a closed, club-like diplomatic environment has transformed into multistakeholder processes (Hocking, 2004).

The first deficit, legitimacy, reflects a decreased level of trust in the institutions of government. As Ostry (2002) has noted, accompanying the changes in the trade agenda lies a more general decline in public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy. Haynal (2002) sees this development as having a particular significance in the realm of diplomacy, which represents a mediating institution between people and policy arenas. What he terms the growth of "disintermediation," a rejection of such institutions, poses particular challenges to those charged with the conduct of international policy. The involvement of a broader cross-section of societal interests, as represented in civil society organisations, particularly the NGOs, is thus a logical strategy for dealing with this alienation.

Not surprisingly, in the wake of the experiences of the abortive Multilateral Agreement on Investment negotiations in 1998 and the Seattle World Trade Organization ministerial in 1999, policy makers have emphasised the need to consult domestic constituencies if support for trade liberalisation is to be sustained and anti-globalisation forces resisted. Thus, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) – now renamed Foreign Affairs Canada – is clear in its objectives regarding consultative procedures:

> By mobilising popular opinion and keeping people fully informed of the issues and the direction of trade negotiations, transparency and engagement combine to establish the legitimacy, consistency, and the durability of policy decisions and outcomes. (DFAIT, 2003)

Similar sentiments have been voiced in the USA and the European Union (EU). In evaluating the US system of trade consultation, Huenemann (2001) suggests that its biggest weakness is its failure to engage the public in a discussion on the aims of trade policy. The Seattle experience led Commissioner Pascal Lamy to introduce a DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue designed to "develop a confident working relationship among all stakeholders interested in trade policy, to ensure that all contributions to EU trade policy can be heard" (DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue, 2003). The underlying goal is, as Ostry (2002) suggests, for government to engage in capacity building within civil society if the anti-globalisation backlash is to be contained.

The second deficit that underpins the growing interest in developing MSP relates to knowledge. In the trade sphere, negotiators have long recognised that advice from the business community is an essential component in the framing of trade policy. Hence, for example, the advisory structures put in place by Cordell Hull following the enactment of the US Trade Reciprocity Act of 1934 (Aaronson, 2001). However, in the face of growing resource constraints, the knowledge capacity of government has, in general terms, diminished just as the demands imposed on it have grown. NGOs have a window of opportunity to fill this gap by capitalising on their own expertise. As Curtis (2001) puts it, NGOs

> possess . . . a reservoir of knowledge, skills and perspective that could be deployed to great advantage for policy development. This includes information that bears on the gamut of trade policy issues, from negotiations to administration of the multilateral system to the effective disposition of trade disputes. (p. 305)

In this context, Aaronson (2001) has suggested that one of the essential functions of consultative processes in trade policy is to establish a common language regarding the nature and objectives of trade agreements.

From the CSO perspective, another resource deficit – *access* – is apparent. One often hears that although the growing role of NGOs in world politics is underpinned by the diminishing obstacles to non-state actors, and that advantages inhere in the non-sovereign qualities of such actors, governments and the sovereignty-related rules governing the international system still control access to key diplomatic networks. Despite some movement at the World Trade Organization toward greater NGO access, its intergovernmental qualities still place a premium on opportunities provided by consultation at the national

level. To summarise, many areas of contemporary diplomacy, including those relating to international trade policy, involve the trading of resources between different actors, each possessing resources that the others need (Cooper and Hocking, 2000). Consequently, diplomacy is becoming more of a networking activity and thus demands the establishment of coalitions of diverse actors to manage complex policy agendas (Curtis, 2001).

We could point out numerous examples of these processes (I have described them elsewhere as "catalytic" diplomacy [Hocking, 1999]). The example of the Ottawa Process relating to landmines is an oft-cited example. More recently, the establishment of the Kimberley Process dealing with the sale of illicit "conflict" or "blood" diamonds is a good example; an NGO, Global Witness, acted as a catalyst to a process in which British and American diplomats, the EU Commission, together with journalists and the global diamond firm De Beers, contributed to the establishment of a diamond regime.

Location

Location refers to the primary sites within which diplomatic activity occurs. As noted earlier, Nicolson (1939) stressed two aspects of diplomacy that he deemed significant to its successful operation: the separation of policy from its execution and the separation of foreign from domestic policy. It is arguable whether the "old" diplomacy maintained these separations, but, clearly, they are no longer features of the diplomatic environment. The underlying rationale of MSD implies a democratisation of diplomacy that renders both assumptions redundant. Moreover, the character of the stakeholders – particularly NGOs operating in domestic and international environments simultaneously – means that the precise location of diplomacy becomes harder to determine. The linkage between domestic and international negotiating arenas is a well-established feature of contemporary negotiation and demands continual and simultaneous evaluation of developments in both arenas if successful outcomes are to be secured (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, 1993). The effect of MSD is to enhance the linkage and to project the domestic environment more definitely into the international environment. Quite clearly, the MSD model is likely to embrace a more diverse range of diplomatic sites, reflecting a varying degree of governmental involvement. Thus, Coleman and Perl (1999) have suggested a typology of four sites ranging from intergovernmental through multilevel governance and private

regimes to "loose couplings" where interactions between governmental and transnational actors are sparse and unstructured. The nature of the site will determine the objectives of MSD and the precise form that it assumes.

Patterns of representation

Diplomatic systems are marked by two basic modes of representation: diplomacy by mission and diplomacy by permanent representation. Nicolson (1939) regarded the latter as the essence of effective diplomacy. The recent history of state-centred diplomacy has emphasised the importance of mission over permanent bilateral diplomacy. "Diplomacy when and where you need it," instead of "diplomacy whether you need it or not" (Winham, 1993, p. 33) reflects the growing complexity and the technical nature of negotiations. Here, we find a direct linkage to MSD since one of the central impulses underlying it is to bring expertise outside government into areas of complex negotiations. As we have seen, however, the world of state-centred diplomacy has had to adjust to changes whose roots lie in the political and economic configuration of the international order, as well as within its social underpinnings. National diplomatic systems around the world confront similar problems: how to bear the burden of greater demands with fewer resources while responding to the claims of domestic sectoral departments to act as their own representatives in international environments. These dilemmas have produced, for example, various models of alternative representation such as hub-and-spoke systems and co-location of missions. The more complex the environment – as in the case of the proposed reforms in EU external policy contained in the 2004 constitution – the greater the challenge to national diplomatic systems and the greater the opportunity for creative responses to these challenges.

The concept of MSD adds another layer to the problems of representation. Alongside statecraft comes what Cooper (2004) terms "society-craft" or the weaving together of the diplomatic resources of the state with those of non-state entities, particularly the NGO community. Society-craft poses challenges both to governments and to multilateral organisations in deciding with whom to engage and on what terms. Of course, engagement with stakeholders is not a new idea; the International Labour Organization is commonly regarded as one of the earliest instances, establishing in 1919 trisectoral representation from governments, unions, and employers. Since the creation of the UN, the trend has grown apace, with many of the concepts

relating to stakeholder activity deriving from the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. As Dodds (2000) notes, a significant aspect of the subsequent Agenda 21 was its status as "the first UN document to recognise the roles and responsibilities of nine stakeholder groups" (pp. 28-29). Since then, the creation of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development has seen a gradual expansion of stakeholder engagement.

Nevertheless, the intersection of the two diplomatic cultures creates tensions. This takes us back to a point made earlier, namely, the significant degree of control that state-based diplomacy exercises over access to the diplomatic environment. This is evident in comparing the development of stakeholder engagement in the UN system with that of the World Trade Organization where the dominance of sovereignty-related rules provides a less congenial environment for the development of MSD (Marceau and Pedersen, 1999; Esty, 1998).

Rules

The transformation of multilateral diplomacy and the challenges that it poses emphasise the tensions that underlie the operation of contemporary diplomacy and generate the frustrations that stakeholders frequently express with multistakeholder processes. If we are witnessing the emergence of a new phase in the evolution of diplomacy, an important aspect is the development of rules through which the new processes can function. As Jönsson and Hall (2003) note, ritual and protocol in diplomacy reduce transaction costs and are critical to its operation. From an NGO perspective, Dodds (2000) suggests the need for the development of agreed norms and standards by which multistakeholder processes can operate. "This will require a clearer definition of the role and responsibility of governments, as well as of stakeholders, and an agreement on the modes of interaction" (p. 37). However, two sets of rules are frequently in tension with one another. The clear, normative expectations of behaviour derived from sovereignty-related rules do not parallel those in the MSD environment wherein patterns of behaviour by some stakeholders clearly reflect different, non-sovereignty related norms. To take one example, the sovereignty environment and the MSD environment take differing approaches to confidentiality in negotiations.

The character of these problems depends on the nature of the political environment. In general, they can be identified in terms of the institutional

tension created by attempts to graft newer onto older modes of diplomacy. The result is a "crisis of expectations," a mismatch of goals and ambitions of the participants in the various processes, and a more general legitimacy debate nested within the broader debate about the nature of democratic processes in the face of globalisation. Such institutional tensions can be seen in the trade policy sphere where conflicts produced by the definition of new rules at the national and multilateral levels are evident. Within national processes of trade consultation, the shift from a relatively closed "club" to a more open multistakeholder model has generated tensions between business and NGOs, with the former sometimes resenting what it regards as the incursion of the latter (Hocking, 2004).

Much of this disquiet is related to the second factor, a crisis of expectations concerning the objectives of consultation, the means through which it is achieved, and the likely outcomes. This phenomenon is part of the stress more generally manifest in the conduct of international policy making and diplomacy as NGOs, the business community, and officials from government find themselves rubbing shoulders with increasing frequency. It is hardly surprising that in the case of trade policy, differing operational styles, organisational characteristics and, simply, a lack of familiarity between differing participants condition the workings of consultative processes. This has been the case with the EU DG Trade Civil Society Dialogue in which, as one commentator has noted, such factors "make it difficult for the creation of consultation spaces where the actors feel comfortable and, sometimes, frustrations and misunderstandings arise" (Muguruza, 2002, p. 13).

Conclusion

The above discussion is not intended as an argument in favour of yet another mode of "new" diplomacy replacing older forms, nor is it a re-statement of the "decline of diplomacy" mantra. Certainly, it is the case that state-based diplomacy is confronting challenges as it adapts to fundamental changes in world politics. This is a perfectly familiar process in the long history of diplomacy. Nor has it been my purpose to suggest that the professional diplomat is an endangered species. On the contrary, the logic of MSD as I have sought to define it here suggests that diplomats have significant roles that relate to their historic functions – rather than to current preoccupations with, for example, commercial diplomacy.

What I have suggested is, first, that one must see diplomacy in a context broader than that of the state system with which it is often associated. I have also suggested that identifying evolving patterns of diplomacy presents us with problems of interpretation and understanding that is as applicable to MSD as it is to that of other models. Third, I have suggested that it is possible to recognise the intersection of two diplomatic cultures overlaying and informing one another. Not surprisingly, their coexistence generates, simultaneously, creative and negative tensions.

Such tensions frequently reflect a clash of expectations from all parties involved as to the purposes of multistakeholder processes. In particular, civil society organisations may well entertain unrealistic assumptions as to what might be achieved through essentially bureaucratic processes, especially where they are seeking to redefine the political agenda in a way to which bureaucratic interlocutors are unable to respond. Diplomats, for their part, may fail to appreciate the legitimate goals of non-state actors with whom they become involved in negotiating arenas. What appears to be happening is that "rules of engagement" between the essential sets of actors, government, business, and NGOs, are gradually being shaped. Not surprisingly, these rules are tenuous and fuzzy. Yet, the success of much contemporary diplomacy, not only in the trade arena, requires that they be developed.

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Part II

MULTISTAKEHOLDER MODEL FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE

THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (WSIS): FROM GENEVA (2003) TO TUNIS (2005). A DIPLOMATIC PERSPECTIVE.

Petru Dumitriu

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) is the most recent global meeting in the series of conferences convened by the United Nations at the level of heads of state and governments. Unlike previous UN Summits, WSIS is not a one-time event. It was conceived in two phases of equal political importance, in order to demonstrate the need for an enhanced partnership in reducing the so-called "digital divide," the differences between industrialised and developing countries in technological development.

Another distinct feature of this Summit is its topic. While previous high-level conferences had a clear subject to discuss, be it environment, population, status of women, or social development, the new Summit was devoted to a very broad and not clearly defined concept: the Information Society. In fact, the UN General Assembly assumed that member states had no common understanding of the Information Society and asked them to construe such a concept. This is not to say that during the diplomatic preparatory activities, no attempts had been made to define the new catchword. For instance, the challenge of drafting a definition was taken by one of the regional preparatory meetings, the Pan-European Ministerial Conference, held in Bucharest, from 7 to 9 November 2002. A special workshop was organised to that effect. Eventually, a group of government representatives, university teachers, and civil society activists agreed upon a definition. While not the most comprehensive, it gives a rough idea what Information Society means in the UN context: *"Information society – a sustainable process of humanity that is conducted by evolving knowledge management, where society develops as a community of highly educated individuals and where the knowledge economy promotes a growing welfare of the society and every individual."*

The first phase of the WSIS took place in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003. The second phase will be hosted by Tunisia, from 16 to 18 November 2005. The time elapsed between the phases is very short for a thorough judgement of the impact of the first phase. Nevertheless, the preparation of the second phase implies that an assessment is necessary to allow all participants in the Summit to make corrections, readjust priorities, and open new avenues,

which will be reflected in the final documents to be adopted in Tunis. The purpose of this paper is to offer a preliminary evaluation of the main results of the Summit, from the perspective of a diplomat who participated directly in various stages of the formal and informal processes that are leading to Tunis, via Geneva.

The Initial Mandate of the Summit

An assessment of the results of the World Summit on the Information Society should not be undertaken in the abstract. Nor should results be measured by the poor immediate response to proclaimed priorities for the development of the Information Society. The outcome should not be hastily evaluated as having been inadequate to bridge the digital divide, although such a goal was trumpeted in press communiqués and political speeches. A decent analysis of the progress made from December 2003, when the first phase of the Summit took place, to date, as the second phase approaches, ought to be undertaken in light of its initial mandate.

The first official description of the mandate was adopted in 1998 by the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Minneapolis (Resolution 73). The ITU assumed the responsibility: (i) to establish an overall framework identifying a joint and harmonised contribution of the Information Society; (ii) to draw up a strategic plan for concerted development of the Information Society by defining an agenda; and (iii) to identify the roles of the various partners to ensure co-ordination of the establishment of the Information Society in all member states .

The United Nations placed this mandate into a more comprehensive perspective directly related to the overall development objectives previously agreed upon by the heads of state and governments who participated in the 2000 Millennium Assembly. To this initial mandate, the General Assembly lent a substantial political message and added goals inspired by the potential of information and communication technology (ICT) in service of the actions previously agreed. On 21 December 2001 (Resolution 56/183), the General Assembly recognised the need: (i) to harness the potential of knowledge and technology in order to promote the Millennium Development Goals; (ii) to promote development with respect to access to, and transfer of ICT through partnership with all relevant stakeholders; and (iii) to construe a common vision and understanding of the Information Society .

The Secretary-General himself added the hope that the WSIS would turn into a unique event that would represent a new generation of Summits. This appears to have been wishful thinking, in fact, after the last decade of the 20th century overcharged with UN World Conferences at the top political level, which led governments to a notorious "summit fatigue."

A Few Lessons Learned

Even before December 2003, the preparatory process leading to WSIS Geneva proved that the Information Society, with all its enormous potential, does not automatically provide fast lanes to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Clearly, ICTs must not be restricted to communities that are already well off, but they must also be carried to those who hope that ICTs will work as an accelerator for their own development. The preparation of the World Summit on the Information Society failed to demonstrate exactly how advanced technologies could work where basic infrastructure was missing. Even if such ways had been designed, diplomats and ICT professionals realised that harnessing ICTs and bridging the digital divide would place the UN in need of additional resources. Referring to differences between the developed world and the undeveloped world in matters of technology, content, gender equality, and commerce, the UN Secretary-General stated: "We cannot assume that such gaps will disappear on their own, over time, as the diffusion of technology naturally spreads its wealth. An open, inclusive information society that benefits all people will not emerge without sustained commitment and investment. We look to you, the leaders assembled here, to produce those acts of political will"(Annan, 2003).

Bridging divides is an objective that has been around since the first UN Decade for Development (1961-1970), but which for that matter is not easier to accomplish. Thus, the symbolical importance of the proposal of establishing a Digital Solidarity Fund becomes apparent. Establishment of the fund found no agreement among government delegations that negotiated the Geneva Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. The formula retained in the Plan of Action (chapter D2, paragraph f) was the expression of a diplomatic compromise, rather than of a political commitment: "While all existing financial mechanisms should be fully exploited, a thorough review of their adequacy in meeting the challenges of ICT for development should be completed by the end of December 2004. . . . Based on the conclusion of the review, improvements

and innovations of financing mechanisms will be considered including the effectiveness, the feasibility and the creation of a voluntary Digital Solidarity Fund, as mentioned in the Declaration of Principles."

Somehow, surprisingly, the diplomatic preparatory process of the Geneva Summit brought to the attention of the international community a new area of global interest, namely the Internet Governance. The concept was not envisaged by the drafters of the initial mandate or by diplomats in the early stages of the negotiations. For example, not a single reference to the Internet can be found in the document adopted by the Pan-European Ministerial Conference, which was attended by the most technologically advanced countries in the world. The topic seems more important than initially perceived, because the Internet Governance has important social, economic, cultural, and national security connotations.

Therefore, the Digital Solidarity Fund and the Internet Governance have become central topics in the preparation of the second phase of the Summit. Both issues are additions identified by the first phase as major issues, not leftovers. Meanwhile, it is pertinent to say that the overarching mandate to find ways and means to use the potential of the Information Society in service of the Millennium Development Goals remains.

The preparatory process revealed the considerable gap in perception between diplomats and ICT experts in their understanding of the Information Society and, in particular, in the understanding of the terminology associated with it. It was a singular case among UN Summits, in which diplomats did not control the substance of the debate. Nonetheless, eventually the Declaration and the Plan of Action were taken over by the usual political UN phraseology.

The difference of approach was equally visible when some topics were debated. The ICT people did not fully understand all the talk about the human rights dimension of the new era of communication. The diplomats revealed their limited understanding of the functioning of the Internet. These distinctions placed protagonists on defensive positions, consuming a considerable amount of time in the preparatory process. Admittedly, the diplomats and their "business as usual" approach were more responsible for the delay in the focussed dialogue. They tended to over-emphasise the issue of procedures, which they master better. Only late in the day did they begin to listen to and understand the people who talked about root servers, firewalls, and domain names, or just about codes and protocols that were not exactly what they thought they were.

The Current Preparations

The participants in the previous negotiations are now aware that miracles will not happen in the preparation of the second phase. The preparatory process to date has been relatively stagnant in producing ideas and concepts on how to use ICTs to start a new era of development in marginalized countries and communities. The persistent controversies and the reluctance of many governments to create a Digital Solidarity Fund do not augur well for the future of this Fund. The usual norm is that Funds are easy to create, but subsequently, for various reasons, they are not fuelled up as intended and may fall gradually into obsolescence.

However, good progress has been made towards a common perception among stakeholders of the challenges of the Information Society. The dialogues between various actors in the early stages of the preparation of the Summit have contributed to a clearer identification of the main issues for each. The technical terminology used is less obscure to the diplomats, while the UN parlance and procedures no longer appear as a waste of time to the business community. On the contrary, recourse to the lowest common denominator, the unavoidable technique used in multilateral diplomacy to achieve consensus, was sufficient for participants to identify a minimum platform of common interests. This, after all, is major progress.

Certainly, the special guest star on the agenda of the Tunis phase seems to be the Internet Governance. This is a normal development since the initial representations of negotiators about the relevance of this particular subject for a UN Summit were very different. However, it appears doubtful that shedding light on the Internet Governance will bring more ideas to the overarching political objective, namely, action in service of development. On a positive note, governments on all continents know more about the current distribution of power and influence in the Internet world and about the problems related to cost sharing or to cybercrime. This adds to the achievements of the process, inasmuch as construing "a common vision" is part of the mandate.

Moreover, many governments understand what decentralisation and freedom mean for the existence of the Internet and the new era of communication. They are ready to preserve them as the expression of the original potential of the Internet. At the same time, they feel uncomfortable about accepting dark areas that are totally beyond their grasp. What worries some governments more is that the Internet will deepen the traditional development divide, rather than narrow it. They do not

believe that "invisible hands" and codes will take care of their economic, social, and cultural concerns.

Expectations and Fears

Assessing the first results of WSIS is a matter of fine-tuning between expectations and fears. The business community expects from governments an enabling environment, one conducive to investment in ICT development. Governments expect the business community to pay more attention to the social environment in which they operate. Civil society organisations expect from governments a deepening of human rights protection, rather than infringement on those rights by use of new technologies.

Fears were an inhibiting factor in the early phase of the preparatory process. The existing major actors in Internet Governance feared the emergence of dumb monsters taking the form of international regulatory bodies that would replace the splendid freedom of cyberspace with the ineffective dictatorship of bureaucracy. Some nongovernmental organisations feared that freedom of expression would be affected under the pretext of containing the abuses of the Internet made under the protection of anonymity and impunity. Other organisations feared that the rule of profit would prevail over the rule of law and that powerful companies would be disrespectful of social and cultural concerns of peoples in the Information Society. Traditional mass media feared that the digital media would take over and end the Gutenberg era.

The expectations are well-founded. The suspicions are exaggerated. The most disturbing is the association of the UN, by some media, with a threat to freedom and the independence of cyberspace. In reality, with all its sins, the UN has been always the flag bearer of freedom.

Common Interests: a Summit of Partnerships?

Hopefully, one can count on a few minimum attainments of the second phase of WSIS. First, an encouraging trend makes me hope that mutual trust among stakeholders will be enhanced. Second, I anticipate that the summit will manage to eliminate dark areas in the understanding and the distribution of roles of various stakeholders in a new partnership based on the recognised competence and comparative advantages of each. Third, I expect that

agreement could be forged on the need for all stakeholders to reflect upon some minimum soft rules regarding the conduct of all players in cyberspace. Those rules may be the expression of "permissive, not restrictive" governance (Sadowski et al., 2004, p. 187). Rules may be deemed useful to promote accountability and not to allow impunity. The idea to design regulations that take into account the interests of all stakeholders and not impose some against others might appear acceptable after all. Fourth, I look for a review of the mantra of the "neutrality of technology" and a reinforcement of the principle that ICTs should serve society, not only their creators. Fifth, I hope that the Summit, as a UN event, might do its fundamental job, like any other UN activity, namely to stimulate the creativity of stakeholders in mobilising new resources. I do not mean necessarily financial, but human resources, since talents exist abundantly in all countries.

A special note is needed with respect to the relation of governments with the business community in the WSIS context. More consideration could be given in motivating the private sector to co-operate with the public sector in undertaking socially relevant projects. Governments should continue to accept a more active role from business in the decision making process. Nobody suggests a surreptitious change of the fundamental rules of the UN. However, nothing in the current legal configuration of the UN system prevents a pragmatic infusion of the political principle used in designing global projects with inputs and resources from the private sector, including those of transnational corporations. In turn, the business community should move away from merely claiming "an enabling environment" towards a responsible awareness of the social challenges that governments have to pursue to provide a stable and sustainable environment for any economic project.

One should remember that WSIS was not the first case in which the UN and the business community identified common interests and availability of co-operation in ICT related areas. For instance, the General Assembly largely opened its doors to the private sector when the latter wanted to warn the world (and, in many respects, to advertise) of the coming of the famous, for some time, Y2K or Millennium bug. One may recall that, in a manner quite exceptional, on 26 June 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Global Implications of the Year 2000 Date Conversion Problem of Computers" (Resolution 52/233). It is a unique resolution whose every paragraph deserves retrospective analysis. I mention only operative paragraph 3 that "calls upon Governments, public and public sector organizations and civil society to share locally, regionally and globally their experiences in ad-

dressing the year 2000 problem." Probably we will never know to what extent this interaction between the UN and the private sector was prevention or just marketing.

More recently, the Global Compact has been a pioneering success story about partnership between the intergovernmental system represented by the UN and major business entities. Based on this positive experience, a Digital Global Compact could be established, which would open a new era for mutually beneficial co-operation and association between the global moral authority of the UN and the resources of major companies.

The World Summit of the Information Society claimed to become a development Summit. We are not yet there. However, if solidarity is not enough to alleviate poverty, in economic and knowledge terms, government and business may try hard to expand the platform of their common interests. For instance, any poor and socially problematic area in the eyes of governments may look like a potential market for private entrepreneurs. Investments in the technologically underdeveloped regions could help the emergence of new consumers.

Internet Governance: What about Values?

Undoubtedly, the Working Group on Internet Governance will provide exceptional conclusions about the configuration of interests and the distribution of power and resources over the Internet. The Tunis phase of the Summit might help us to understand better how we could use the Internet as an innovative means to facilitate and to assist projects of public interest or even of global public interest. In fact, this is a fundamental issue, because the whole WSIS process was meant to find out how the international community can use new technologies in order to solve old problems of development. In reality, the Internet can be a facilitator of development, not a substitute for it.

In order to help governments reach their economic and social aims, one should not look for methods to control the Internet, but for means to use its comparative advantages and prevent ICTs from becoming a factor that broadens, instead of narrows, divides. In other words, we need to turn the technologic advances into economic and social benefits; to attach societal assets to technological virtues, and to explore potential that has been uncharted.

The UN is not a financial agency. Its first responsibility is to create awareness and to promote values. WSIS should not limit itself to the issue of infrastructure and management. To take advantage of the potential of the Internet, the Summit should identify and build upon common values and create incentives for all stakeholders, enabling them to work not only for their own interest, but also for the public good. One should remember that effective work of the UN starts by raising awareness and creating broad support around some basic ideas. Concrete measures and financial commitments might come in time, once the values are clearly asserted and accepted.

In the specific case of Internet Governance, the embryo of a "grand collaboration" already exists. The idea is not completely Utopian since the Internet is fundamentally rooted in a collaborative approach. The Tunis phase of WSIS may not bring all the expected light, nor a consensus formula on how Internet Governance should be improved, but it could contribute to the expansion of in-built values of the Internet as pre-requisites for further development.

a) Inclusiveness

The Internet has been driven "from the bottom up." This feature could be enhanced by consolidating or by building from scratch governance structures that are genuinely open and inclusive of governments, the private sector, and civil society from developed and developing countries. This drive should include the three categories of players, not only in generic terms, but also in the specifics of their functions of regulators, developers, and users of technologies, networks, services, and applications.

b) Functionality

The Internet did not have a form at its inception. Its development actually started from the need to perform a function. Function has prevailed over form. The Internet was a tool to address a particular issue. If we decide to use the Internet as a tool for achieving social and developmental objectives, the governance model we follow should not be meant only to monitor, to restrict, and to regulate. We need to allow and enhance functionality by representing and adequately using a balance of interests, capabilities, and needs that exist in real life.

c) Specialisation

One of the lessons already learned is that inclusion does not rule out specialisation as a prerequisite for efficiency and effectiveness. Internet governance

should count on the value of specialisation. The separate and complementary functions of public and private governance structures, the legitimate roles of different actors, and the need to create organic and mutually supportive links between them should be recognised as building blocks.

d) Consensus

The development of the Internet has been the spontaneous expression of the consensus and discipline of the main players on the use of standards and protocols. If we replace the naturally normative work that has been emerging spontaneously with more systematic work, we need a common understanding on what should be expected from the parties involved. After defining those contours of governance, we may gradually move towards agreement on rules, decision-making procedures, and institutions.

e) Commonality

The Internet is based on global, open, and non-proprietary standards. Certainly, the benefits accruing from the Internet and access to it are unequal, but the networking protocols upon which it is based can be freely adopted by anyone. They are published and accessible without payment of fees. The community developing core standards and practices includes the Internet Architecture Board, the Internet Engineering Task Force or World Wide Web Consortium, and technical experts located in universities, research institutes, consultancy firms, corporations, and governments. We need to keep those doors open. Nevertheless, maximum caution is necessary when attempting to privatise essential commons.

f) Accountability

The highly technical nature of the work on standards and protocols does not imply ignoring consequences to society. Technical designs and processes frequently have social and economic consequences. Standards, software designs, Internet identifiers, and interconnection arrangements have effects on competitiveness of markets, on the exclusion or inclusion of people and on their position in society. This denotes the need to cultivate awareness and accountability. The "technical" entities should be aware of the social implications of their work. Governments should be knowledgeable about prospects in the technical field. The same conclusion is valid for the national policies and laws of the powerful countries when they set rules that affect the global community.

g) Self-restraint

While accepting the need for more governance, it is equally important for public policy to refrain from regulating what does not need regulation. Normal democratic procedures, particularly when applied at an international or, as one may aspire, at a global level, will inevitably be slow in an environment of rapid change and technological development. At the same time, the areas that need more governance, such as trade, taxation, privacy, security, cost sharing, consumer protection, education, and spam should be dealt with collaboratively.

A Proposal

The time remaining until the Tunis phase of the Summit will not be sufficient to bring more results. We are not yet close to a new generation of Summits. The current preparatory process is affected by the old symptom of *summit fatigue,* with negative consequences on the ambitious goals assumed by heads of state and governments in Geneva. For the time being, nothing indicates the willingness of governments to engage in a traditional, institutionalised follow-up to the Summit.

This is the reason why non-state actors may deem useful a post-Summit of their own, to which governments could be invited in a genuine multi-stakeholder approach. In this renewed framework, all stakeholders could use their creativity and resources to consolidate what has been established and to develop new forms of dialogue and partnership among themselves, beyond the traditional intergovernmental framework, after the end of the formal WSIS process. This might ensure that the objectives of the Information Society will continue to stay on the active agenda of multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, such an undertaking might create an audacious bid to inaugurate, eventually, a new generation of Summits.

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INCLUSIVE INTERNET GOVERNANCE: ENHANCING MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION THROUGH GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTRIBUTED POLICY COLLABORATORIES

Derrick L. Cogburn

Abstract

In this paper, we outline a vision for multistakeholder democratic participation in global information and communication policy processes. Drawing on international regime theory, we suggest that the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) is an explicit attempt to formulate the principles, norms, and values of an emergent international regime to govern the information society in general, and the Internet specifically. However, the formulation of an international regime requires the active and effective participation of multiple stakeholders who can represent their interests. Key to this effective participation is active membership in transnational policy networks and epistemic communities. We find that the working methods of international policy processes do not take full advantage of these networks and need restructuring in order to facilitate the active participation by developing countries and civil society organisations. In order to overcome the current limitations, institutional mechanisms to strengthen geographically distributed collaboration amongst the multiple stakeholders should be pursued. The institutional mechanism of a policy collaboratory could point to solutions.

The Global Information Infrastructure and Information and Communication Policy

On 21 March 1994, during his speech to the First World Telecommunications Development Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, then US Vice President Al Gore argued forcefully for the continued development of a Global Information Infrastructure (GII). He suggested that the "networks of distributed intelligence" represented by the GII could "allow us to share information, to connect, and to communicate as a global community" (Gore, 1994, p. 1). In his estimate, the GII would bring all of the communities of the world together.

While this rosy picture of the GII and its tremendous potential is yet to be achieved, more than a decade later, many of the members of the world community have finally realised that the ongoing processes of globalisation and the development of an information society affect communities around the world in profound ways. Incessant development in information and communication technologies – most fully represented by the current Internet – fuels the ongoing development of globalisation. Concomitantly, new social, economic, technological, political, and cultural forces act with remarkable influence on the global economy and society.

Specifically, the rapid development of the GII, now known in some scientific circles as *cyberinfrastructure,* provides the underlying mechanism through which large-scale distributed digital data, innovative applications, and services are emerging. Telemedicine, distance-independent learning, scientific collaboratories, and an increasing global trade in services are all illustrative of this phenomenon.

This plethora of applications has stimulated a variety of stakeholders with political interests and preferences to become involved in the development of information and communications policy. Traditionally, the primary stakeholders involved in global information policy beyond governments and corporations were legions of experts and epistemic communities in engineering, computer science, economics, and law. However, many of the new stakeholders who participate in global information and communications policy processes go beyond these traditional domains; we now see nurses, accountants, medical doctors, teachers, and entrepreneurs of all kinds interested and involved in information and communications policy. Many of these newcomers believe that developments in information and communications policy could either foster or impede the continued development of the information society.

This paper outlines a vision for multistakeholder democratic participation in global information and communication policy processes. Drawing on international regime theory, it suggests that the WSIS is an explicit attempt to formulate the principles, norms, and values of an emergent international regime to govern the information society in general, and the Internet specifically.

Global Governance for the Global Information Infrastructure

Many new stakeholders become involved in policy making because they want to have a voice in shaping the development of the information society.

More specifically, they want to have a role in determining the underlying norms, principles, values, rules, decision-making procedures, and enforcement mechanisms, with an aim to affect the allocation of scarce resources to its development. In short, new stakeholders want to participate in the global governance of the information society and, more accurately, in the governance of its fundamental underlying infrastructure, the Internet.

However, when we speak of global governance, what do we mean? At the same time that contemporary international public policy wrestles with the concept of global governance, significant academic literature explores this phenomenon. Much of the literature emerging from international relations fields focuses on addressing the *anarchy problematique* surrounding the issue. This fundamental problem means that if the world-system is comprised of sovereign and equal nation-states, as well as of a range of important non-state actors, all operating in a global environment devoid of a world government, how are decisions made and enforced, resources allocated, and stability and order maintained? This is a fundamental problem of international co-ordination and collaboration that has received attention from a wide range of scholars (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Axelrod, 1985; Keohane, 1984).

One conceptual framework for understanding and analysing the *anarchy problematique* has been international regime theory. In 1982, Steven Krasner and a group of colleagues interrogated the concept of international regimes in a special issue of *International Organization.* Here, Krasner sets out what has become the classic and consensual definition of an international regime: "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given areas of international relations" (Krasner, 1982, p. 186). When Krasner articulated this perspective, the dominant actors to which the theory referred were nation-states. However, as we currently think about regime theory, it is clear that the conception must be broadened to include non-state actors, from the private sector, as Haufler (2001) has done, to civil society and transnational networks (Cogburn, in press; Edwards, 2004).

According to Krasner (1982), an important aspect of international regime theory is a major structural division between soft components and hard components. The "softer" components of international regimes include *the principles,* defined as "beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude;" and *norms,* defined as "standards of behavior related in terms of rights and obligations." The "harder" components of international regimes include *the rules,* defined as specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action, and *the decision-making*

procedures, defined as the prevailing practices for making collective choices, resolving disputes, and enforcing decisions (Krasner, 1982, p. 186).

Using this theoretical framework, scholars have been able to identify a number of important international regimes in a wide variety of domains, ranging from international shipping, to air transport, international post, atomic energy and weapons, environmental issues, the global commons (e.g., seas and outer space) – and even in trading of commodities such as diamonds (Rittberger, 1993; Haas, 1980; Gourevitch, 1978a; 1978b). However, one of the oldest and most successful international regimes identified by scholars is the international telecommunications regime (Zacher and Sutton, 1996; Cowhey, 1990; Drake, 1988). The international telecommunication regime, based on the International Telecommunication Union, has provided stability and governance for the growth and development of the global telecommunications infrastructure for over one hundred years.

The global telecommunications infrastructure provides the foundation on which the GII – or Internet – rests today. However, as Gore and many others have articulated, a plethora of social, political, and economic factors combined in the mid 1990s to challenge significantly the existing global governance of telecommunications and, specifically, the global governance of the Internet. Some of the social factors included the rapid introduction of new stakeholders demanding universal access to the variety of so-called information society applications. Progressive political activists wanted to ensure that social welfare was maximised in the development of the GII and that resources would be allocated to alleviate what became known as the "digital divide."

Political factors eroding the existing telecommunications regime include the decline of support for the international accounting rate system and a negative reaction to the perceived aggressive dominance of the US in international fora relating to information and communications technologies. These fora included the World Trade Organization and its Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, the restructuring of Intelsat, and the overall global trend towards liberalisation and privatisation of telecommunications.

Economic factors, such as the drive to harness the potential of global electronic commerce for both large corporations and small, medium, and micro-sized enterprises, also contributed to this erosion. This drive required the rapid development of a GII that could provide high quality, low cost digital communication and data transfer around the world.

Finally, numerous technological developments contributed to the challenge to existing global governance. Newly emerging applications and hard-

ware, such as Voice Over Internet Protocol and Very Small Aperture Terminal Satellites, as well as new services such as call-back systems, allowed consumers to bypass local telecommunications companies.

Current Global Internet Governance Structure

In the Internet world, demand for broader participation in governance of the root servers and the domain name system on which the Internet rests led to the severing of the sole responsibility for these processes by the US government. This demand also led to the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). While ICANN was registered as a not-for-profit corporation in California, and still maintains a very close relationship with the US government, it was a major step towards the creation of international institutional mechanisms for multistakeholder participation in the global governance of the Internet (Mueller, 2002).

While a somewhat slippery concept, the Internet is defined as "the global data communication system formed by the interconnection of public and private telecommunication networks using Internet Protocol (IP), TCP [transmission control protocols] and the protocols required to implement IP internetworking on a global scale, such as DNS [domain name system] and packet routing protocols" (IGP, 2004, pp. 6-7).

Global Internet governance involves three interrelated layers of activity: (1) technical standardisation; (2) resource allocation and assignment; and (3) policy-making. The first, *technical standardisation,* is focused on "how decisions are made about the core protocols and applications that make the Internet work" (IGP, 2004, pp. 9-10). Examples of these technical issues include TCP/IP and DNS issues, the migration from IPv4 to IPv6, and the ENUM/E.164 standard. *Resource allocation* and assignment refers to the administration of the scarce resources of the Internet. These resource allocation issues include domain name allocation, IP addresses, regional registries, and dispute resolution processes. Finally, *the policy making* component includes policy formulation processes and the monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution processes for the technical and socio-economic aspects of the Internet. These policy issues include a wide range of socio-economic issues including customs and taxation issues, electronic payments, privacy/data protection, freedom of expression, security/encryption, authentication/digital signatures, knowledge and intellectual property, human rights, content creation and

protection, labour and the social impact, infrastructure development and financing, and universal service/access.

Although the global Internet governance regime is distinct from, yet currently based on ICANN, it is still intertwined and intimately related to the international telecommunications regime. Accordingly, disruptions in the international telecommunications regime contribute to disruption in the global governance of the Internet. This interrelation helps one to understand why the current process of regime formation for the information society, driven by the WSIS and organised by the International Telecommunication Union, is important. The UN Working Group on Internet Governance, which emerged out of the WSIS processes, is particularly important.

Internet Governance Policy Processes

However, before focusing on WSIS, a glance at the bigger picture will be useful. The process of establishing global governance for any international issue area is complex and includes the work of a variety of formal and informal institutions. These institutions, and the international conferences and decision-making procedures in which they are involved, vary in the degree to which they are publicly accessible. The traditional actors in these global governance processes are governments, including those organised governmental groupings such as the Group of Eight Industrialised Nations, the European Union and European Commission, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In addition to governments, international and inter-governmental organisations have been primary convening institutions. As well, the World Trade Organisation, the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, and the United Nations Conference on Trade Law have taken active parts. Increasingly, private and private sector organisations, such as ICANN, the Global Information Infrastructure Commission, the Global Business Dialogue for Electronic Commerce, and the International Chamber of Commerce, have played important roles. Interspersed within these governments and international, intergovernmental, regional, and private organisations are individual experts, whose expertise ranges from telecommunications, Internet, and international trade and law. Many of these individuals participate in organised groupings, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force, the World Wide Web Consortium, and the North American Network Operators Group.

Many of these individuals possessing expert knowledge have formed themselves into *epistemic communities,* primarily groupings of scientists holding the same or similar causal belief systems and who actively engage in the political process (Haas, 1992; Haas, 1990; Haas, et al., 1977).

Interestingly, in recent years another, more heterogeneous stakeholder grouping has emerged to play an important role in nearly all of these processes – civil society groupings and individuals. Individual citizens, represented by non-governmental organisations and transnational networks have increasingly demanded recognition as important stakeholders in global governance processes (Cardozo, 2004). These civil society organisations represent the new energy and vitality of the diverse human participation in global governance processes.

Cogburn (2004a) argues that international conferences play a critical role in global governance and, specifically, in regime formation processes. He argues that international conferences serve as focal points for contesting the norms, principles, values, and decision-making procedures of the emergent regime. These international conferences also serve to nurture global networks of recognised policy experts and epistemic communities. Policy-actors interact at these global fora and practice "conference diplomacy" in attempts to influence conference outcomes.

While it may be obvious to anyone who regularly participates in these international conferences, the actual summit is relatively anticlimactic in terms of actual decision-making. Numerous newcomers to the global policy making process may be heard asking, "When are we going to start negotiating?" and "When do we work on the closing conference statements?" Regulars in the international policy making arena know that the conference itself is only a large-scale punctuation of an on-going process of international conference diplomacy. This conference diplomacy starts in the pre-conference period, marked, in formal UN conferences, by a series of "preparatory committee" meetings or prepcoms. The issues the conference will discuss, the summit agenda, the procedures for participation, and the actual text of the final conference documents are settled in these prepcoms. These preparatory processes can take several years, leading up to the actual conference or summit itself.

Although dwarfed in importance for regime formation, the actual summit or conference is an important event. This is especially true for the networking elements and the final last minute negotiations that may take place. During any of these conferences, the drafting of language or text for insertion into emerging documents is critical. Persons, or delegations, possessing strong language skills,

writing ability, legal knowledge, and awareness of international organisations and protocol are highly valued in the drafting process. Effectiveness in these processes also requires a high degree of physical stamina.

Following a conference, follow-up on conference agreements and monitoring of the implementation is another critical phase. Follow-up is aided significantly by those policy-actors that have a substantial presence in the global nodal cities of international policy formulation, namely Geneva, Paris, and New York (and, to some degree, Washington, DC). However, not all international conferences are equal; the importance of a conference to regime formation can be determined by essential characteristics of the conference. For example, while each level is important, the "lowest" level of importance to regime formation is an international conference that simply presents and debates contending articulations of principles, values, and norms for the emergent regime. The middle level of importance is an international conference where rule making, decision-making, or enforcement takes place – including the settlement of international treaties and agreements. Finally, conferences that allocate actual resources make, perhaps, the largest contribution to regime formation.

Effective participation in these multiple global policy processes requires two important components: networks and knowledge. By networks, we mean transnational policy actor networks, comprised of elite policy experts (Creech and Willard, 2001; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler, 1998). By knowledge, we mean expert knowledge applied to the policy formulation process via organised networks of scientific experts holding the same or similar views on the specific policy issues under negotiation (Cowhey; 1990; Krasner, 1983).

Krasner (1983) argues that knowledge plays a critically important role in these processes, suggesting that "in a highly complex world, where goals are often ill-defined and many links are possible, consensual knowledge can greatly facilitate agreement on the development of an international regime" (p. 20). He argues that *the consensual* aspects to knowledge are most important in influencing international policy processes, for "without consensus, knowledge can have little impact on regime development in a world of sovereign states" (p. 20). International conferences play an important role in integrating this knowledge and helping to formulate a consensus amongst the relevant actors.

Over the last decade, at least ten clusters of international conferences have played a critical role in the global governance of information and communications technologies, including the Internet (Cogburn, 2004a). Each of these

clusters is centred around one or more international organisation, including the Group of Eight Industrialised Nations (Information Society and Development, Digital Opportunities Task Force); the International Telecommunications Union (World Telecommunications Development Conference, TELECOM, WSIS); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Global E-commerce); ICANN (Annual Meetings); the World Trade Organization (Ministerial Meetings); the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (Annual Meetings, Regional Meetings); the Global Business Dialogue for Electronic Commerce (Annual Meetings); the World Economic Forum (Annual Meetings, Regional Meetings); Global Knowledge for Development (irregular meetings), and the World Intellectual Property Organization. These meetings vary in the degree to which they are public, or by invitation only, but nearly all have now opened their doors to active participation by civil society actors, alongside governments and the private sector.

Problem: From Pawns to Partners

Having outlined the contours of global governance in general and, specifically, having looked at some of the regime formation processes for the information society and the Internet, we can address some of the major problems with this process. The existing global governance processes are not working for developing countries and civil society organisations (Cogburn, 2003).

Civil society and developing countries tend to participate in these policy processes with very little influence on the actual outcomes (Global Contract Foundation, 2003). Frustration with these processes led to the walkout by developing countries of the World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in Cancun (Economist, 2003).

Interestingly, neither developed nor developing country interests are well served by this continued imbalance in the world-system (Soros, 2002; 2000; Sachs, 1999). Several organisations, such as the UN Task Force on Information and Communication Technologies, are working on trying to identify ways to address these inequalities and to improve the inclusion of developing countries and civil society organisations.

However, pursuing this inclusion is no small feat. Numerous obstacles exist to the effective participation by these stakeholders in the global policy formulation processes. At the international level, MacLean (2004) has identified some of the primary factors limiting participation: the lack of easy, affordable, and timely

information; the structure, functioning, and working methods of international fora; and the ineffective use of available financial resources. At the national level, he identifies a lack of awareness among decision-makers, lack of technical and policy capacity on information and communication issues, and weaknesses in national and regional policy processes and institutions.

Due in large part to the inability of these stakeholders to wield much influence in the global policy formulation processes, two subtly divergent visions for the GII or information society are emerging. Cogburn (2003) calls the first vision the GII/GIS (Global Information Society) regime. Here, the focus is on using the GII to maximise social welfare, to redress socio-economic inequalities through a range of information society applications, and to open access to knowledge and information. Cogburn calls the second vision the GII/GEC (Global Electronic Commerce) regime. In this vision, the focus is on maximising economic growth and developing the socio-technical infrastructure to support global electronic commerce. This vision entails closed access to knowledge and information. Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the latter version has become associated with national security considerations.

Enhancing Inclusion: Collaboratories and Multistakeholder Participation

Given the nature of the global governance process and the limitations identified for developing country and civil society participation, innovative methods and mechanisms must be identified to enhance their participation. If *multistakeholder* diplomacy is to work, it must include mechanisms that effectively integrate developing countries and civil society organisations into the process. One such mechanism could possible develop out of the lessons learned from the building and evolution of scientific collaboratories.

Within the field of computer-supported co-operative work, some important pieces of literature have focused on the analysis of a new and highly innovative institutional form called a *collaboratory*. Blending the words "collaborate" and "laboratory," the concept emerged from the US National Science Foundation in the mid- to late-1980s. In 1989, William Wulf argued at a National Science Foundation sponsored workshop that a collaboratory was "a center without walls, in which the nation's research-

ers can perform their research without regard to geographical location" (Wulf, 1989, p. 7).

In 1993, a National Research Council report further developed this concept, unleashing tremendous energy as diverse scientific communities began to exploit this institutional model. Soon, collaboratories appeared in scientific fields as diverse as oceanography, space physics, and molecular biology. The development by the National Science Foundation was followed by similar work by the National Institute of Health, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other federal agencies. Currently, the National Science Foundation has been re-conceptualising the collaboratory movement, with a focus on making the collaboratory more mainstream in the scientific realm and creating an underlying *cyberinfrastructure* to stimulate large-scale scientific advancement (Atkins, et al., 2003).

In computer supported co-operative work, a standard 2x2 matrix illustrates the four quadrants of collaborative work. One axis represents *time,* with the two dimensions being same and different (synchronous and asynchronous). The other axis represents *place* with the two dimensions also being same and different (face-to-face and geographically distributed). Figure 1 illustrates these quadrants.



Figure 1. Matrix of Variants of Collaborative Work and Related Technologies

In addition to the identification of synchronous and asynchronous methods of collaboration, a National Science Foundation funded project called *the Science of Collaboratories* has identified three distinct functions of a collaboratory. These three functions include (1) direct people-to-people interaction;

(2) direct people-to-information access; and (3) immediate people-to-facilities access. A suite of collaboration tools and social practices supports the functioning of an effective collaboratory. For example, in *the people-to-people* category, a collection of tools supports the ability of members of the group to remain aware of and to be in touch with the various members of the research team. Regarding *people-to-information* functions, a collaboratory uses content management systems and other tools to ensure sufficient access to digital libraries and other knowledge and information required by the members of the collaboratory. Finally, certain collaboration tools such as webconferencing and application sharing provides remote *people-to-facilities* access, such as access to conference rooms and even shared access to instruments (for an overview, see `www.scienceofcollaboratories.org`).

Given the limitations outlined above for developing countries and civil society organisations to take part effectively in international fora, adopting mechanisms such as a collaboratory could be an important step in enabling the participation of developing countries and civil society organisations.

Outline of a Global Policy Collaboratory

It is possible that the insertion of a policy collaboratory into global policy formulation processes can enhance the ability for policy-actors from developing countries and the transnational civil society to participate in conferences, and to facilitate their interaction with geographically distant epistemic communities. In order to explore the potential that a collaboratory approach might have on enhancing multistakeholder participation in global policy processes, The Collaboratory on Technology Enhanced Learning Communities at Syracuse University has designed, built, and evaluated a potential policy collaboratory.

In this collaboratory, we have sought to design, develop, deploy, and evaluate the application of collaboratory approaches to the international information and communication policy domain. In particular, our goal has been to work collaboratively with interested parties to introduce a nascent policy collaboratory within the processes of the WSIS. We believe that it is possible to work collaboratively with widely geographically distributed WSIS policy-actors to enhance the following areas: (1) the administrative capacity; (2) the policy development capacity; (3) the deliberative capacity; (4) the density of social networks; and (5) the degree of engagement with epistemic communities.

For example, it would be possible to use the policy collaboratory to hold geographically distributed seminars and panel presentations on important themes, both to raise awareness of the themes and to conduct substantive training. These training sessions can include panellists from around the world sitting in their own country/organisation and participants from around the world sitting in a virtual plenary room. Following the seminar discussion, we can move these participants into multiple breakout rooms (which could be by language, by theme, by region, or some other characteristic) – all the while being physically located anywhere in the world having access to the Internet. We can also use this infrastructure to hold robust issue debates or strategy sessions, and to conduct administrative business and training. Evaluation and iterative redesign are critical components of the development of a policy collaboratory, so that the socio-technical infrastructure continues to meet the needs of the participants.

The technological infrastructure, designed to support the three functions of a collaboratory outlined above, include the following: (1) presence awareness and web-based deliberative dialogues; (2) webconferencing and application sharing; and (3) digital repositories.



Figure 2. Leading Chat Tools

Presence awareness, including applications such as iChat, AOL Instant Messenger, and MSN Messenger, shown in *Figure 2,* provide instant messaging, as well as easy to use person-to-person voice, video and data transfer. When people are collocated, it is common to drop in on someone's office or bump into someone in the hallway or coffee room. Further, it is usually easy to tell whether the other person is available for an interruption or is too busy and to create private lists so that only those colleagues whom you desire to know you are online can see you. This kind of informal interaction is critical to collaboration. It is also very difficult to do at a distance and, indeed, research has shown that it introduces considerable delay into processes that require interaction among dispersed participants (Herbsleb, et al., 2000). A number of research projects have attempted to provide such awareness at a distance. Some have used elaborate video or audio hook-ups that are always on to create virtual hallways or virtual shared offices.

Webconferencing and application sharing functionalities, shown in *Figure 3,* allow for virtual seminar rooms, with voice and video over IP, multi-media content, slides/whiteboards, polling and decision-making tools, and real-time application sharing.



Figure 3: Webconferencing with Video, Slides, and Text Chat

Web-conferencing substantially facilitates interactions among researchers involved in projects. At present, most of the interactions in the WSIS process take place either face-to-face, which requires expensive air travel and lodging, or via e-mail lists (Cogburn, in press). The Internet and World Wide Web make additional options available. Internet-based web conferencing tools make possible audio and video interactions, with the advantage that these are much less expensive and frequently more efficient than long-distance teleconferencing or traditional video conferencing.

An important companion to web conferencing is application sharing. *Figure 4* depicts application sharing. The ability to share any software application open on one computer with other members of a web-conference presents numerous opportunities. Using these technologies, researchers can collaboratively edit documents, review data sets, run and interpret statistical calculations, observe remote video cameras, and much more, all in real time from the comfort of their own home or office. Application sharing allows all participants access to the editable object (with appropriate floor control protocols), and jointly to annotate, sketch, and scribble on work material such as charts, photos, and presentation slides.



Figure 4. Sharing a Statistical Application via Webconferencing

In short, a high degree of real-time interactivity is possible. Further, these materials can be archived and replayed, an especially useful capability for long-distance education. In several of our earlier collaboratories, these capabilities have turned out to be one of the most useful features. By combining conferencing and application sharing, it is possible to carry out formal, scheduled sessions like lab meetings, colloquia, or seminars, or informal interactions among a small group of researchers. Cotelco has used these capabilities for six years to conduct interactive, weekly graduate seminars with members in the US and South Africa.

Digital repository functionalities facilitate document storage, digital library resources, shared data and archives, as well as photo directories of members. Projects inevitably generate digital artefacts, such as data sets, drafts of manuscripts, proposals, planning documents, schedules, contact lists, recordings of sessions, and photos. A project intranet is a web-accessible repository of these materials, each with a certain level of public access that maintains strict security. It is possible to provide security at several different levels of granularity, starting with something as simple as a login with password (with increasing access or non-access based upon the desires and decisions of the collaboratory management). The ability to share material across sites is extremely valuable. We are promoting the use of open source content management systems, such as Dotnetnuke, Plone, or Mambo in building content management systems (this means that the limited resources of the project go into the installation, maintenance, and population of the site, and not to a license purchase). For an example of a new but growing content management system, one can peruse `http://cove.cotelco.net`.

One of the challenges of co-ordinating a widely geographically distributed group is the scheduling of activities and shared access to calendars. A number of software applications are now available to collaboratory planners that facilitate easier scheduling of formal and informal joint activities, and awareness of other collaboratory members. Various methods control access to information from such calendars. Substantial research shows that online photo directories can help develop and strengthen social capital within physically distributed communities. Amazingly, a simple digital photograph accompanied by a brief biography and a statement of research interests and role in the project, recommended reading, and other facts, can significantly increase awareness and interactions within a project.

Many of these functions are included in most contemporary content management systems. These systems are more than digital repositories; they become

essential building blocks for a geographically distributed community. Using these systems, a community can use the same web site as a public face and provide highly regulated access control for members. One persistent principle is that the user sees only what they have access to, so that they are not frustrated seeing documents or folders that say "members only." In this model, if they do not have access to it, they do not see it. Members can have wiki-style access to the site, with any number of members being authorised to update, manipulate, and change the site.

Educational Integration: Going Global, Locally

We have integrated our work on the pilot information policy collaboratories into our interdisciplinary graduate training program in the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University. Since 1999, the Collaboratory on Technology Enhanced Learning Communities has organised and conducted a global graduate seminar entitled "Globalisation and the Information Society: Information, Communication Policy and Development." This interdisciplinary seminar has included up to six universities, three in the US and three in South Africa (Cogburn and Levinson, 2003; Cogburn, 2002; Cogburn, Zhang, Khothule, 2002).

Within the seminar, five global virtual teams each represent a different stakeholder grouping in the world-system, including: global and multinational corporations; developed country national governments; developing country national governments; intergovernmental organisations; and non-governmental and community-based organisations. These teams consist of students from each of the participating universities, representing different time zones, cultures, institutions, languages, technology background, levels of infrastructure access, and disciplines – making them complex, cross-national, collaborative learning teams.

Throughout the semester, these global virtual teams – that we call "Global Syndicates" – engage in simulated decision-making and policy formulation exercises designed to illustrate opportunities and challenges in working in global virtual teams and in influencing the development of global information policy. These teams provide novice epistemic communities with the experience of interacting with real-world civil society policy actors, providing mutual intellectual and practical benefit. Lessons learned from our work in this collaborative learning environment have encouraged us to begin exploring the impact in the real-world policy environment of the policy collaboratory.

Summary and Conclusions

In this paper, we have tried to sketch out a vision for multistakeholder democratic participation in global information and communication policy processes. Drawing on international regime theory, we have suggested that the UN WSIS is an explicit attempt to formulate the principles, norms, and values of an emergent international regime required to govern the information society in general, and the Internet specifically. Given the broad reach of the Internet and its implications and potential for world wide socio-economic development, it is critical that the broadest diversity of ideas and talents be included in the debate and discussions concerning its development. However, the point is not just to have those voices included, but to ensure that developing countries and civil society organisations are genuine partners in the process, not merely pawns to project a false image of multistakeholderism.

Pursuing this approach to inclusive Internet governance is an important step towards increasing awareness of and adherence to the regime principles, norms, values, and rules. Such an approach will certainly increase the legitimacy of the Internet governance process. However, such an approach requires the active and effective participation of multiple stakeholders who can effectively represent their interests.

An essential part of this process is participation in transnational policy networks and epistemic communities. Evidence shows that these transnational policy networks and epistemic communities already exist within both developing countries and civil society organisations (Cogburn, 2004b). The working methods of international policy processes, especially Internet governance, need restructuring in order to facilitate active participation of developing countries and civil society organisations. In order to overcome the current limitations, institutional mechanisms to strengthen collaboration among the multiple stakeholders should be pursued. The institutional mechanism of a policy collaboratory could point to some of the solutions.

Discussion and Way Forward

Now that the work of the WSIS is over, and with its report calling for the creation of a multistakeholder forum for global deliberation on issues of Internet governance, it is time to consider institutionalising some of the ideas discussed in this paper. Whether or not one calls the forum mechanism

a collaboratory, the activities described herein are critical to the success of a multistakeholder forum. Effective multistakeholder participation must go beyond one or two face-to-face meetings per year. *A status quo* approach to international meetings significantly privileges certain actors while simultaneously disadvantaging others.

It is crucial to utilise information and communication technologies much more explicitly to facilitate the active participation of geographically distributed actors as they engage in the business of global Internet governance. The innovative use of these technologies should be introduced as a controlled intervention, to study the impact that such an institutional form might have on enhancing participation in these processes. These lessons could then be used to improve the process, and transferred to other international multistakeholder policy processes. Our approach to such studies has been to use a collaborative action research model. In this model, we work interactively with the participants to help them design the contours of the intervention. We have worked to design the study in a way that helps them to meet their own objectives as well. This systematic and rigorous approach reveals great potential for the future of online democratic deliberation and global multistakeholder diplomacy.

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Part III

NON-STATE ACTORS IN MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

UN CONFERENCES ON THE SPOT – VOICES FROM CIVIL SOCIETY: WHISPERING, TALKING AND SHOUTING OUT

Britta Sadoun

In this short contribution for the "International Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy," some characteristic details of UN summits and their relevance for the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are identified.

Being able to draw on first hand experience, having participated as researcher or volunteer at the World Conference against Racism in 2001, the Social Summit +5 event (2000) and the World Summit on the Information Society I (2003), the author is now working within the ongoing research project "UN World Summits and Civil Society Engagement" in the programme area of "Civil Society and Social Movements" at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Combining actual practice with planned changes in conditions and structures allows delineation of both limitations and possibilities for NGOs active in UN policy-making procedures.

This study focuses on one particular group of actors: NGOs. Looking at the structures of UN summits allows an understanding of some of the limits as well as of the opportunities offered to NGOs in these summits. As well, focusing on NGOs as one particular group of non-state participants in summits is useful, as it is in the context of world conferences that NGOs became particularly visible and known to a larger public in the 1990s.

The paper begins by introducing NGOs as civil society actors. In order to understand the possibilities provided to NGOs by various UN summits, the general structure of these events is outlined. The next part discusses who used those possibilities. With some empirical data, certain trends are outlined. Finally, the conferences are set within a broader context. A short, chronological listing of some of the main world conferences in the 1990s and early 2000s culminates in the questions: Has the time of those huge events come to an end? What could be the alternatives? Several proposals of the "Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations" are introduced and critically discussed. These suggestions, which discuss issues

like legitimacy, responsibility and accountability, are then compared with the preparations for an "integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields and the follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit," and for the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS phase II). Some examples highlight discrepancies between well meaning ideas and reality.

The paper ends with a reflection on the question of how the presence of so many NGO representatives at the 1990s world conferences influenced the UN's attitude toward inclusion of the "new" actors. What was heard from so many voices?

NGOs as Civil Society Actors

Civil society provides an autonomous space for various forms of movements, organisations, and associations. NGOs are one part of civil society. Although NGOs have not yet been sufficiently defined in a consistent manner, they are increasingly subject to political analysis and public debate and they are partners in practical politics. In the 1950s, the UN first used the term NGO in legalistic fashion (Martens, 2002; Heins, 2001; Willetts, 2000; Dichter, 1999): "Any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization" (UN: ECOSOC resolution 288XB). Apart from the initial UN understanding of NGOs, which differentiated national, regional, and international actors, the expression NGO is now commonly used for organisations that operate at various levels (Hill, 2004; Heins, 2002; Martens, 2002; Judge and Skjelsbaek, 1975).

Martens (2002, p. 282) provides the following definition: "NGOs are formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level." NGOs are, therefore, formal organisations with a permanent structure, a headquarters office with (paid) employees with specific training. Moreover, although they might receive financial support from various donors, including governments, NGOs are independent and do not get under the formal control of any donor (Martens, 2002).

Structure: What Access Points Do NGOs Have?

Figure 1 General Outline of a Typical UN Summit and its Preparatory Process



Figure 1 outlines the yearlong process leading to a UN summit. It also shows, with round symbols, where NGOs are involved in the conference process. The star attached to the UN summit displays the parallel conference of NGOs often organised as a huge side event at the same time as the summit. The figure does not claim to represent the whole conference process; details of the various conferences are not well represented, nor are facets of the expert seminars or other events stated.

The figure highlights the various different seminars, conferences, and meetings that take place (often years) before the summit itself is convened. Starting from a decision taken by the General Assembly (GA), a first preparatory committee meets in order to fix the next phases of the procedure. Expert seminars on relevant fields and areas that should be covered by the conference are organised. On most continents, regional conferences are arranged. Around two years before the scheduled world conference gathering, the secretariat of the conference synthesises the outcomes of the regional meetings and the expert seminars and submits draft versions of an action plan and a declaration. In the following Preparatory Committees (PrepComs), delegates from all UN member states discuss the various sections, sometimes word by word. Text that does not find agreement within the delegate meetings is put into brackets for later follow up. In addition, regarding specific topics in dispute, numerous informal working groups are set up under the leadership of a state that offers to co-ordinate discussions. Finally, the UN summit takes place, either as a rule-making conference whose purpose is to agree on a legal document, or as an action-oriented conference, with a declaration and a plan of action that describes necessary procedures. In general, the follow-up process begins both in the national states and in the UN. In the 1990s, it was common to have a "+5 conference" five years after the main event had taken place.

Agency: Who Used These Possibilities?

Figure 2 provides information about the number of institutional participants (NGOs) and individuals (NGO delegates) at various conferences. Even the obvious primary sources, the documentation of the UN organisers, can be inconsistent, making comparisons difficult. Although the information helps to retrace which organisations registered for the participation in advance, it does not say who actually participated or how many delegates were sent. Nonetheless, the chart allows an overview to retrace the complexity of UN world conferences.

Figure 2 NGOs and their Delegates at UN Summits

Conference Place	Number of NGOs	Number of individuals	Source
UNCED Rio 1992	14,000 18,000 attended the parallel forum	17,000	Gordenker and Weiss, 1996
	Not mentioned	20,000 +	Gagain, 2003
	Not mentioned	47,000	United Nations, 1997; Schechter, 2001
	500 + at PrepComIV		Bichsel, 1996
Human Rights Conference (WCHR) Vienna 1993	248 NGOs in consultative status; NGO reports estimated 1,400-1,500	593 participants	Clark, Friedmann and Hochstetler, 1998
	841, 248 with ECOSOC status	3,691 representatives	Gaer, 1996
Habitat II Istanbul 1994	Not mentioned	8,000	Gordenker and Weiss, 1996
	Not mentioned	30,000	United Nations, 1997; Schechter, 2001
Women's conference Beijing 1995	Not mentioned	30,000	Emmerij et al., 2001; Scholte, 2002
		30,000 +; 4,000+ representatives of accredited NGOs	Boutros-Ghali, 1995
	3,000 accredited	30,000 + at NGO forum	Clark, Friedmann and Hochstetler, 1998
	Not mentioned	Almost 50,000	United Nations, 1997; Schechter, 2001
WCAR Durban 2001	2,000	6,000 +	CAW Human Rights Department, 2001
	Not mentioned	Approx 3,000	UN-NGLS, 2001
	Not mentioned	7,000	Sheperd, 2001a
	3,000	8,000	ICMC, 2001
WSSD Johannesburg 2002	Not mentioned	20,000 accredited officially, 60,000 participants were expected	Wesel, 2004

The figure shows the great differences of the quantity of participants, according to various sources. It is only safe to say, that many delegates from many NGOs attended the UN conferences, it is not possible to confirm the figures.

Examples of Official NGO Participation at WCHR and WCAR

What is special about world conferences is that everybody – at least in theory – can be granted access if they satisfy the regulations. Obviously, challenges like resources, networks, official attitudes, mass media, and political culture can impede participation (Scholte, 2004). The activities NGOs can pursue during a summit process depend not only on their abilities, but also on several general mechanisms influenced by resources and power, amongst other factors.

To have access to the conference process, NGOs and their delegates need to be accredited. Accreditation can be differentiated by status into organisational or individual-based access. When NGO members are invited to be part of a governmental delegation, individual access is granted. The bulk of participants, however, need to go through a multilevel accreditation process. An existing Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) accreditation can make it easier to become accredited to a conference, based on its specific rules. In both cases, the next step is personal accreditation, which means that individuals have to obtain accreditation in the name of their organisation or with any other organisation willing to let them participate under its name. To actually attain physical access to conference rooms, it might be necessary to obtain other passes issued on location. Depending on space conditions, another option can be to allow access on a first come, first served basis. With passes, access is possible to the plenary (with observer rights or, eventually, with talking rights) or to working groups, such as those that discuss the plan of action or those that discuss the political declaration, with rights to observe or to voice an opinion. NGOs are, however, normally excluded from entering informal meetings, for example, meetings called by single states to solve critical issues. In addition, depending on the status of accreditation, written statements might be distributed as UN documents. In addition, for the parallel summit, the NGO event, accreditation can be necessary.

Figure 3 shows the countries of origin for accredited NGOs at the "World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance" (WCAR). Of the almost 1500 NGOs pre-registered, nearly the same share came from Europe, North America, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The shares from Africa and Asia were each one third lower.

Figure 3 Accredited NGOs for WCAR 2001, South Africa, Organised by Continent



	Europe	Eastern Europe	North America	LA& the Carribbean	Brazil	Africa	South Africa	Asia	India
NGOs from	378		374	322		205		190	
biggest group (included)		75			79		28		50

Source: Wiseberg, 2001. NGOs not in consultative status as well as NGOs with consultative status.

Statistics for the "World Conference on Human Rights" (WCHR, 1993, Austria) also illustrate unequal participation opportunities in regard to regional meetings. Of those eight NGOs that participated in all regional preparatory meetings, seven came from Europe and North America, while only one was based in Asia.

At the WCHR, a total of 46 plenary statements were given by NGOs. Those based in Europe, North America, and Oceania gave 26 statements, more than half. Delegates from NGOs based in Asia (14), South America (3), and Africa (3) gave the other 20. For joint plenary statements, the picture is much more equal, as all continents are represented once. During the human rights summit itself, 21 of the NGOs that gave a plenary statement did not attend any of the preparatory meetings, either regional or general. What is striking is that this does not apply to the African based NGOs, but 8 from Asia, 5 from the Americas, 6 from Europe and 2 from Oceania. If one then compares the two figures, plenary statement with or without involvement before, it appears that all African based NGOs that gave a statement were involved in the conference process beforehand. Also, more than two-thirds of the North American NGOs were able to attend other meetings before they gave a speech in the plenary. Yet, none of the Oceanian NGOs participated in advance (cf. *UN documents for WCHR).*

NGOs that participate at UN summits have different locations. The non-representative sample shows that different world regions are represented to several degrees; as one might perhaps expect, Europe and Northern America are the biggest groups. Yet, Latin America and the Caribbean follow closely

at a conference held in South Africa. When it comes to active participation, the picture of a privileged group of NGOs holds, though distinctions are not as clear as one might expect they could be.

Is the Time of Big Conferences Over? What Comes Next?

Figure 4 Overview of Selected UN Summits In the 1990s Until Today

Looking back at the time when world conferences were popular events, it is be possible to distinguish three distinct periods in which these events were integrated differently into UN policy. First, UN conferences in the early 1990s and their predecessors in the 1970s can be seen as events in an experimental phase. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, new possibilities for non-state actors opened up in international politics. Increasing democratisation give more relevance and space to societal actors within states; as well, changing economic developments led to lively activities of various actors within and across national borders, sometimes trying to cope with limited state activities in the areas of social security. In the mid-1990s, following several conferences with a huge participation of NGOs (such as the "United Nations Conference on Environment and Development" [UNCED in Rio de Janeiro, 1992], the "World Conference on Human Rights" [WCHR in Vienna, 1993], "The International Conference on Population and Development" [ICPD in Cairo, 1994] or the "United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women" [FWCW in Beijing, 1995]), the mechanisms by which the UN related to NGO entities were transformed. ECOSOC mechanisms to accredit NGOs (based on Article 71 of the UN Charter) were extended, so that smaller NGOs were also able to gain ECOSOC status. Kofi Annan's appointment as Secretary-General (SG) in 1997 initiated various administrative reforms. Substantial reforms are currently under discussion, such as the reform of the Security Council, and the relationship of the UN to civil society is under scrutiny as well.

In 1996, ECOSOC recommended that the GA examine the question of participation of NGOs in all areas of the UN. A first report was published in 1998 (UN: A/53/170) and a comprehensive report by the SG followed in 1999 (UN: A/54/329). On the basis of these stocktaking documents, the SG announced in 2002 that he would establish a panel to review the relationship between the UN and civil society (UN: A/57/387 and Corr.1). Kofi Annan appointed the so-called "Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations" in February 2003 under the chair of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The eleven panellists joined various consultations and presented the outcome of these and their meetings to the public on 11 June 2004 (UN: A/58/817). In the 2004 GA meeting, the SG published his response to the report (UN: A/59/354).

The panel's comprehensive report lists 30 proposals for reform and elaborates on these at length. The focus of the panel's treatise is the reform of the UN. It bases its ideas on four so-called paradigm shifts. In the executive

summary, the report explains why United Nations–civil society engagement should be strengthened. It is expected to increase the organisation's effectiveness, to improve its performance, to further its global goals by becoming more attuned and responsive to citizens' concerns, and to enlist greater public support.

The "unique role of the United Nations as an intergovernmental forum" is stressed and seen as worth being "protected at all costs." At the same time, the panel demands to "engage others too." The report (UN: A/58/817) is quite pragmatic throughout. For example, it reads that the engagement of others "risks putting more pressure on the Organization's meeting rooms and agendas, which are becoming ever more crowded," and continues to state that because of this a more selective and not just increased engagement is necessary.

Centring its arguments on the fact that accreditation decisions are taken by member states, the panel emphasises several principles that will help to broaden and deepen civil society participation and foster its contributions to a coherent global development effort. To achieve cost- and time-effectiveness, it suggests focusing on technical rather than political considerations, increasing the overall transparency, accountability, and predictability of the process and encouraging the effective use of information technology. It suggests merging all current parallel accreditation processes into one. The review of applications should be directed to the Secretariat, and a GA committee would then decide on approval (proposals 19, 20). "Major networks of civil society and other constituencies" shall play a stronger role in the planning of future conferences with regard to the establishment of rules for participation, accountability, and responsibility.

The "big global conferences of the 1990s" are cited as examples of promoting participation at the UN. The panel talks about an "issue's life cycle in the global debate," which influences the nature of the forum, as well as the forum's size and selection of participants. However, it suggests that the global conference mechanism be retained "to address major emerging policy issues that need concerted global action, enhanced public understanding and resonance with global public opinion."

What does the practice look like today? At the WSIS, new experiments were practised, but within the original spirit of the UN conferences of the 1990s. On the one hand, the conference was split into two phases. The notion of non-governmental actors was explicitly extended to include market entities. In addition to the general preparatory committees, a Group of Friends

of the Chair, a Task Force on Financial Mechanisms, and a Working Group on Internet Governance were established to deal with critical issues. On the other hand, the flexible accreditation processes (known from other conferences) have been kept. NGO participation at the actual main event and in the preparatory meetings of different kinds was possible and remains a matter of accreditation.

Yet, several key elements have been left behind in both the mega event of the "integrated and co-ordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields" and the "follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit," to be held in September 2005 in New York. First, the accumulation of various big events runs the risk of loosing depth. The extremely short preparation phase, with the decision of the date taken only eight months in advance, hardly gives sufficient time for regional and thematic meetings to allow adequate participation by various stakeholders. For NGOs and other non-state actors, so-called interactive hearings are planned for June 2005 (UN: A/C.5/59/25). "For security reasons and the space limitations in the United Nations building, the broader participation of civil society is unfortunately not possible" (UN: A/59/545).

Conclusion

What was heard from so many voices? Despite the fact that NGOs have worked as one player within civil society both with and for the UN for considerable time, their presence at various world conferences was impressive. Conferences offered a moment where the quantity (and perhaps the quality) of civil society participation in policy making became noticeable. Nonetheless, the format of world conferences lost popularity with the +5 conferences, follow-ups convened five years after the conference.

In the 1990s, NGOs from all over the world wanted to be involved in the UN conference process. A wide range of NGOs gained an opportunity to speak out. This was true not only for the bigger events, the summits themselves, but even more for the preparatory meetings. The regional meetings especially allowed a considerable number of non-ECOSOC NGOs, that is, those that were not previously involved in UN processes, to participate. The preparatory meetings are closer events with the majority of attending NGOs registered by ECOSOC. Therefore, the (limited) data might sug-

gest that UN summits indeed influenced NGOs to become active on the international level.

In spite of this overall impression, however, it is important to highlight one other outcome. When one assumes that it is important to participate in the preparatory process of a conference, where real decisions are taken and where the greatest influence is possible, it becomes clear that the extent to which NGOs can take part and build that process is a question of power. Those NGOs that attended all preparatory meetings or regional conferences, thereby becoming deeply involved in a UN summit process, were mainly based in North America and Europe. It appears, from the figures collected, that only certain kinds of NGOs can afford to be active throughout the process. These indicators lead to the assumption that though a great mass of NGOs from all over the world participate in the UN *ad hoc* conference process, only a few (an elite?) can do so continuously.

World conferences are no longer planned for the coming years (except the WSIS). Instead, GA sessions will replace the +10 conference, as is happening with the women's conference, which has a relatively long history. A latecomer, if one wants, is the WSIS. Various possibilities still exist for NGOs to participate in both the preparatory processes and the summit, to raise their voices or to observe.

In contrast, the mega MDG follow-up summit bundles together various topics of otherwise separate thematic areas. It arranges for NGO consultations to be held three months in advance. During the actual event, NGO delegates will not be able to attend. The inclusion of non-state actors becomes a theoretical aim, prevented by practical reasons – or political will.

NGOs need to ask whether it is worth spending energy, time, and resources in supporting UN policy events that put them in a side role, keep them at a distance, and overrule standards previously reached. Yet, the UN has a need for civil society organisations, in order to upgrade the organisation's legitimacy. This should encourage NGOs and other civil society organisations to actively take part in the discussions about participatory conditions. Becoming more effective from the UN's point of view could endanger participatory standards that were reached in the last decade of world summits. It might also present the opportunity for NGOs to better organise themselves, to find mechanisms to enable those without financial means to make their voices heard, and to come up with alternatives. The possibility to speak out is the fundamental condition, to make one's voice heard in order to influence political decisions.

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THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

Raquel Aguirre Valencia

Recent developments in technology and better organisation have allowed non state actors (NSAs) to have a more active role in diplomacy, bringing new challenges to international organisations seeking to build partnerships with them. Different organisations and different actors have found ways to work together and reach a common goal. On a broader level, however, it remains difficult to incorporate all NSAs into multistakeholder diplomatic processes. Although previous experiences show that the participation of NSAs can facilitate communication with civil society while providing accountability and transparency to the process, their role is yet to be defined.

In general, the more stakeholders that participate on a task or issue, a greater likelihood of success is possible if a common goal is established. However, two questions need clarification even before participation in multistakeholder diplomacy is possible: Who can participate? and How can they participate? As NSAs take a more active role in diplomacy, challenges arise that must be faced. Communication between stakeholders requires improvement, flexibility in decision-making processes must incorporate all perspectives, and constant evaluation to advance in multistakeholder collaboration must be implemented.

The role of NSAs such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international businesses, and civil society groups in multilateral diplomacy has historically been an active one. In recent years however, several factors have influenced their participation, especially in multilateral diplomacy. These factors include the growth in numbers of NSAs, as well as the development of communication technologies. The latter, in particular, allow better organisation of NGOs, their co-ordination world wide, and more effective advocacy. Another factor contributing to the increased participation of NSAs is the recognition by governments and international organisations that these groups have vital information and can make a valuable contribution in global change.

Here, the efforts made by international organisations to incorporate NSAs in multistakeholder partnerships or networks will be analysed. Special attention will be given to efforts made by the UN to include NSAs in partnerships, since its various multilateral forums on specialised issues provide con-

siderable information on how the interaction between NSAs and governments has been developing. Because, to date, no single way of interaction between all actors or stakeholders has been defined, modes of participation and lessons learnt will be analysed as a way to identify what has been accomplished and, perhaps, to recognise what challenges lay ahead.

Efforts of the UN System to Build a Partnership with NSAs

Civil society organisations have long participated within the UN system. Some of the oldest forms of participation include the World Anti-Slavery Convention and the International Committee for the Red Cross, where citizen organisations co-ordinated their work on an international basis. Since its creation, the UN has recognised NGOs with consultative status at the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), because of their important role after World War II.

The 1990s saw a rise in the number of NGOs wanting a consultative status with the UN, which brought about an amendment to the rules governing the granting of a partnership with the UN. Consultative status is divided into three categories. *General* status falls to international organisations, giving them the right to put items on the agenda of ECOSOC, to present written submissions, and to address the meetings. Well established, national NGOs won the right to *special* consultative status, with more limited rights. NGOs in the third category were put on a *roster* of groups that might occasionally make useful contributions, but with limited access to the work of ECOSOC (Ottaway, 2001). Today over 2,500 NGOs have consultative status (United Nations, 2005), but, according to Ottaway (2001), "the number of those clamouring to gain recognition is much larger." Those who seek recognition are a diverse group, embracing a variety of causes.

Paul (2000) claims that "the UN system is the main focus of international rule-making and policy formulation in the fields where most NGOs operate." Therefore, UN conferences have recently been an important arena for actors to gather and form networks on global issues. In 1992, the Earth Summit in Rio marked the beginning of intense NSA participation in UN world conferences and parallel meetings. Since then, the World Conference on Women, the Millennium Forum parallel to the Millennium Summit, the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the UN Conference on Financing for Development, have all seen an increase

in NSA participation and contributions. According to a report by the UN (United Nations, 1999), they have encouraged NSA participation, knowing that the support of a wide spectrum of society is required to implement the policies discussed at these global forums.

At the World Economic Forum in 1999, Kofi Annan declared "the United Nations once dealt only with governments. By now, we know that peace and prosperity are unattainable without partners' involving governments, international organisations, the business community, and civil society. In today's world we depend on each other" (United Nations, 2005). Another way the UN is reaching out to NSAs is through the Global Compact, an international initiative to bring companies together with UN agencies, labour, and civil society (Global Compact, 2005).

Efforts by Trade Organisations to Build Partnerships with NSAs

International trade organisations like the G8, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and regional trade associations have made different efforts to open communication and participation with civil society, after recognising that these groups can contribute towards their goals.

Since its creation, the WTO has acknowledged the need for interaction with NGOs. The first significant step, however, involving NGOs with the WTO required NGOs to attend ministerial conferences and to establish day to day communication with the WTO. By 1998, the General Council announced guidelines for closer interaction. This entailed that the External Relations Division of the WTO present a series of regular briefings for NGOs, while also communicating to all member countries position papers submitted by NGOs. Currently, in addition to allocating a section of the WTO website (World Trade Organization, 2005) for documents and information regarding activities that concern NGOs, the WTO also arranges a series of symposia for NGOs that provide informal opportunities for them to discuss issues with WTO representatives.

An example of G8 efforts to include co-operation with NSAs is the 2002 G8 Environment Ministers Meeting in Banff, Canada. As a lead up to the annual G8 Summit, the organisers worked to engage local stakeholders in the process of the meeting, intending to diffuse violence and protest. The strategy outlined two groups, the first composed of local residents concerned about personal and property safety; and the second, of activists who wanted

to voice their concerns. The G8 group meetings, since the "Battle of Seattle," have been seeking better communication with civil society. According to Risbud (2002) "citizen participation and contribution helps inform deliberations at the ministerial level and serves to diffuse the need for violent protests."

International trade organisations have also developed different ways of interacting with NSAs, in an attempt to improve knowledge and acceptance of their activities. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), for example, has set up a Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society, which serves as a link with civil actors and receives their contributions for consideration. Examples of best practices for the involvement of civil society with the FTAA are creation of advisory bodies, organisation of public events and meetings with civil society, engagement of parliamentarians, and creation of public information material, electronic information networks, and media to inform the public (FTAA Committee, 2003).

The European Union (EU) is an entity that has special interest in developing a partnership with NSAs on various levels and issues. Through the European Commission, approximately 20% of EU yearly development assistance is managed by or with NSAs (Commission to the Council, 2002). The European Commission has realised the necessity of local NSA participation in development policies for them to be successful. The promotion of an effective dialogue with local NSAs, capacity building through northern NSAs, and the participation and ownership of civil society in the development process are all vital factors in effective aid.

The Commission seeks to improve the NSA role in policy dialogue on all levels of participation: planning, strategy development, policy dialogue, implementation, decision-making, reviews, and monitoring. An excellent example of EU implementation of NSA participation is the Cotonou Agreement; signed in June 2000. This Agreement aims to alleviate poverty and to promote sustainable development and the integration of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries into the world economy. The Agreement will last for twenty years and it contains a clause allowing mid-term review and revision every five years. This accord aims at fortifying co-operation between the EU and the ACP countries previously defined by the Lomé Convention. Three pillars hold the Cotonou agreement: development, political issues, and trade. While the central theme is poverty reduction, an essential, additional factor characterises this agreement: the involvement of NSAs on all levels of dialogue and negotiation.

Operationally, the Cotonou agreement defines National and Regional Authorising Officers (NAOs/RAOs) in the ACP countries, who work together with European Commission delegations to define on national and regional levels the priorities and sectors of intervention. NSAs have a contribution and consultation status in this process. The Cotonou agreement seeks to incorporate all stakeholders in the partnership: national governments, government institutions, northern and southern NSAs, and regional associations. Negotiation with and participation of all these actors occurs mainly through a process that begins with country strategy papers, designed at a country level to assess the national civil society and the needs in development, trade, and political issues. These papers are then analysed by Commission delegations and a consultation and assessment process called *programming* takes place with NSAs and NAOs. The on-going consultation, monitoring, and decision-making process reviews the partnership's work. The Cotonou agreement definitely sets a precedent for the incorporation of civil society into all levels of negotiation and decision-making, acknowledging the contribution of civil society in fostering healthy partnerships for development, poverty reduction, trade, and political issues.

Another example of EU collaboration with civil society is that of the European Environment and Health Committee (EEHC), which, in 1999, expanded its membership to include representatives of civil society. The EEHC Third Ministerial Conference in 1999 was organised under the theme of "Action in Partnership," acknowledging the importance of incorporating NGOs and the public for the success of EEHC projects. Partnerships were recognised as essential for communication, data, and information exchange, as well as for on-the-ground implementation of projects. The concluding document of this conference highlighted the importance of including NGOs in international decision making processes – to promote further effective participation by NGOs, to reach out to the scientific community, and to build more local partnerships with NSAs (EEHC, 2004).

One of the conclusions the EU has come to realise is that NSA participation is crucial for the effectiveness of development policies and that collaboration between stakeholders can improve implementation of these policies. However according to the European Commission, "with NSA involvement in the development process, a number of developing countries face two major problems, namely the lack of political will on part of national governments to involve NSAs and the poor structuring and capacity of NSAs" (Commission to the Council, 2002).

Conclusion

It has been widely recognised that NSAs have an important contribution to make to all international issues. The UN, WTO, and the EU, among other organisations, have recognised that their goals can be reached more efficiently with close co-operation with NSAs. Although each organisation has found a different way to work in partnership with NSAs, some of these collaborations need further development. Among the contributions NSAs can make, as active partners, are accountability and transparency, ownership of projects, with resulting empowerment and participation of civil society.

However, challenges still lay ahead. NGOs who collaborate with governments and multilateral organisations need to maintain their independence and neutrality. Other challenges are defining new frameworks for NSA participation without falling into too much bureaucracy or without stalling decision-making processes; therefore, frameworks need to be flexible to incorporate new participants and needs. Communication and information sharing between stakeholders, along with constant evaluation of the new networks, are further challenges that need to address if stronger partnerships are to be built.

The examples of organisations reaching out to NSAs are a demonstration that stakeholders create a better outcome when a common goal can be visualised and roles and tasks defined. The UN has done a great deal through conferences and agencies to promote partnerships and to serve as a platform for all actors to interact. The strength of NSAs lies in working in alliance and in co-ordination of their efforts. These strengths need translation to a multistakeholder environment where they can share their expertise. Evidently, NSAs are already a vital part of international issues and international forums; this role will develop, depending on the willingness of other actors to collaborate with them. Paul (2000) summarises the future importance of NSAs by saying, "globalisation has created both cross border issues that NGOs address and cross border communities of interest that NGOs represent. National governments cannot do either task effectively or as legitimately. In the globalising world of the 21st century, NGOs will have a growing international calling."

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DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY BY NON-STATE ACTORS: AN EMERGING FORM OF MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

Raymond Saner

Abstract

Conventional definitions of diplomacy previously reserved for state actors increasingly apply to non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and international organisations. Development policy and intervention in the form of development aid has been reserved in the past to interactions between state actors such donor countries (developed countries) and beneficiary countries (developing or transition countries). While non-governmental organisations have always been active in the field of development aid as providers of services, they have not openly become political actors in the development policy field until recently. The purpose of this article is to define the new term "development diplomacy" and to show how this broadening of mandate affects the policy dialogue and policy negotiations in international development.

Non-state actors such as national or international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are adding their voices to international development policy debates by organising, campaigning and lobbying across national boundaries in order to have a greater influence on international development policy making. This trend has gained major momentum, evidenced by the active involvement of NGOs in international co-operation for development, by vocal criticism of unfettered capitalism, by conflicts with multinational companies in regard to the exploitation of natural resources, and by confrontations with national governments on various socio-economic development policy issues.

Faced with growing economic and political interdependencies of markets and states, governments have to cope with the increasingly complex post-modern environment, including the activities of NGOs. Governments need to find effective ways to interact with non-state "adversaries" such as NGO pressure groups. These competent and well-networked groups monitor and evaluate the performances of governments and multinational companies and demand greater accountability and transparency of their actions. NGOs and

other civil society groups have learned to galvanise public opinion to forward successfully their own agendas and effectively to demand greater social and international solidarity.

A well-documented example of successful NGO influence on development policy was Eurodad's advocacy in favour of debt relief of poor and least developed countries. Prior to the campaigns by Eurodad, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, faced with the staggering indebtedness of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries, thought that limited debt relief would make the debt of these countries "sustainable" and allow them "to grow out of" their debt through economic growth. In contrast, however, Eurodad emphasised that partial debt relief could not manage the excessive debt of these countries, and that they required more substantial debt forgiveness to fight poverty (Bökkering and Van Hees, 1998). The persistent and well co-ordinated influence of Eurodad led international financial institutions to adopt a poverty alleviation based debt policy. The use of such tactics as monitoring of policies of international financial institutions, sharing relevant information with other NGOs, co-ordinating public pressures and promoting alternative policy frameworks, negotiating text revisions with representatives of the financial institutions and national governments constitute an excellent example of development diplomacy. The purpose of this article is to show how this broadening of mandate affects policy dialogue and policy negotiations in international development, and to define the new term "development diplomacy."

Defining Development Diplomacy by Non-State Actors

Development diplomacy has traditionally been a policy domain of state actors, such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Economic Affairs. Recently, however, non-state actors have begun to insert themselves into the development policy field previously kept closely in the hands of nation states and such intergovernmental development organisations as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme. The active insertion of non-state actors into the international arena of development policy debate necessitates an enlargement of the notion of diplomacy and a clarification of what comprises development diplomacy. To achieve such a redefinition, it is helpful to reflect on developments in the theory and practice of diplomacy as they have evolved over the last thirty years.

Growing participation of transnational NGOs in international affairs. NGOs represent diverse groups, including national civil society organisations and transnational NGOs. The latter often operate at national, regional, and transnational levels focusing on economic, social, and political issues. Together, these NGOs actively promote public awareness on issues ranging from environmental protection or degradation and animal rights to observation and investigation of possible human rights violations by global companies or foreign states.

Concerned with the negative impact of development on the environment and on disadvantaged groups, NGOs challenge states on economic and business issues by means of civil protests, campaigns, and negative ranking lists. For instance, Transparency International publishes research findings on corruption in the form of a Corruption Index to exert pressure on governments that misappropriate public funds and demand bribery from citizens and companies. Thus, NGOs stifle the ability of traditional sovereign actors to operate without impediment, be this at a state-to-state level or within the sphere of multinational standard-setting organisations.

NGOs are also able to exert pressures on transnational enterprises at home and in foreign markets alike. Through campaigning and boycotts, for example, INFACT has exposed life-threatening abuses by transnational companies and organised grassroots campaigns to hold corporations accountable to consumers and society at large. From Nestlé's infant formula marketing of the 1970s and 1980s to today's boycott of Kraft Foods – owned by tobacco giant Philip Morris – INFACT has successfully won concrete changes in corporate policy and practice (Multinational Monitor, 2001).

Internationally, NGOs are also leaving their footprints. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), an international treaty negotiated by World Health Organisation member states, is a successful example of change. A grassroots movement through supraterritorial alliance, the Network for Accountability of the Tobacco Transnationals, challenged the governments and international organisation into action. FCTC concluded the fourth round of negotiations in March 2002. The treaty will greatly limit business options for the tobacco industry and for transnational companies such as Philip Morris.

The Internet has changed greatly the power relationship between state actors, transnational enterprises, and transnationally active NGOs. A search of the World Wide Web for "stakeholder" related websites revealed more than 24,000 sites on *Google* alone. The Internet has become one of the most power-

ful and affordable tools for making strategic alliance amongst transnational NGOs and voluntary groups around the world. Instant connectivity creates virtual communities that evolve around common concerns and reaches beyond borders and resource limitations. They can exert pressures on governments and on global companies, demanding more information and more transparent government policies and business practices. At the same time, they use information technology to exert influence deeply into governments and global companies.

Significantly, NGO communities are putting forward alternative development models, thereby directly challenging dominant policy formulae such as the so-called Washington Consensus (Saner, 2000b). Internet based virtual communities allow NGOs to pool resources and information on things happening on the ground. Making use of their information gathering capacity and sophisticated policy analysis capability, transnational NGOs are increasingly active in the international policy arena; they demand the rights of supraterritorial representation – thereby challenging the abilities of Ministries of Foreign Affairs to co-ordinate national economic policy at international fora.

Insertion of NGOs into national and international development aid policy-making processes. NGOs of a large number of donor countries have succeeded in influencing the national policy-making processes that determine the framework within which development aid is spent. In addition, internationally active NGOs like Eurodad have established their own policy-making think tanks, which they use sometimes in direct confrontation with prevailing opinions of donor countries or with prevailing policies at the development organisation.

National and international NGOs have keenly used the apparent proliferation of development diplomacy activities by other ministries in efforts to play one ministry against another. They also have used their often excellent information technology resources to keep track of a government's inconsistencies in policy implementation and discrepancies in regard to development aid and funds earmarked for specific aid programmes. Having identified inconsistencies with concrete data backing the claim, local NGOs can then more easily assert influence on their respective governments to redress some of their findings.

Contrasting "development diplomacy by non-state actors" with traditional concepts of diplomacy. As diplomacy evolved, so did its definition and the professional identity of diplomats. Recorded history of diplomacy begins in ancient Greece and important contributions to diplomatic methods were

made during the period of the Italian city-state, in France before and after the French Revolution, and in England starting with industrialisation and the expansion of its empire (Saner, 2000a). Systematic contributions originated in the USA, especially after World War II, with the start of large-scale social science research aiming at analysing and understanding the behaviour of international negotiators.

Many historians have equated the period of modern diplomacy with the era following the Westphalian peace negotiations (Meerts, 2004). The term "Westphalian System" describes the post-1648 system of international relations composed of secular, sovereign, independent, and equal states, in which stability is preserved by a balance of power, diplomacy, and international law (Berridge and James, 2001). As recent history teaches us, however, conflicts might again arise that involve non-state actors. Many conflicts since the 2001 attack on the World Trade towers in New York involve a state (USA) and its allies (mostly OECD countries) facing a non-state actor (Al-Qaeda) working world-wide through various networks and alliances. Thus, the Eurocentric character of the Westphalian system might not fit the reality of the current, globalised play of diplomacy. As well, in addition to national states, many sub-national actors (e.g., regions like the Länder of Germany), supranational actors (e.g., the European Union, the North American Free Trade Association), and non-state actors (e.g., NGOs and enterprises) partake in the shaping of international relations.

Bátora (2005), describes the influence of the European Union on the institution of diplomacy and the changes in diplomacy consequent on the interaction between the supranational institution of diplomacy and the current, global institution of diplomacy. He anticipates four possible scenarios within which diplomacy might evolve in the near future: isomorphism, fragmentation, metamorphosis, and breakdown. For example, Bátora suggests that fragmentation would

> involve development of a different standard of diplomatic appropriateness in various states or various grouping of states, for example, a multitude of logics of appropriateness. Some states would, for instance, consider it appropriate to sign treaties with NGOs or give private enterprise a seat in the United Nations. (p. 51)

In a similar vein, in reviewing the evolution of diplomatic practice, Wiseman (1999) adds to the traditional diplomatic methods of bilateralism and multilateralism a third concept, that of "polylateralism," which he defines as

> the conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organisation) and at least one unofficial, non-state entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities. (1999, p. 11)

Wiseman's concept of polylateralism captures the broadening of interfaces between Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their respective state and non-state counterparts. In light of this proliferation of actors involved in international relations and diplomatic activities, Melissen (1999) offers a succinct definition of contemporary foreign policy and diplomacy by stating that diplomacy "is defined as the mechanism of representation, communication and negotiation through which states and other international actors conduct their business" (pp. 16-17).

Melissen and Wiseman's definitions of diplomacy capture the post-modern nature of diplomacy, characterised by the simultaneous participation of multiple state and non-state actors. Applying Melissen's enlarged definition of diplomacy to development diplomacy by non-state actors, the following definition seems most succinct:

> "Development diplomacy by non-state actors" attempts to influence development policy-making at national, regional, and intergovernmental levels by organisations mandated to make these institutions' development policies conform to their own developmental agenda.

Diplomatic Functions and Roles of Non-State Actors: The Example of NGOs

Developmentally oriented NGOs focus on economic and social policy, international economic development, and global business practice. NGOs are also active in many other areas. A distinction needs to be made here between NGOs acting within national boundaries and those operating on an international level through their own foreign outlets, as well as through

alliances with like-minded transnational NGOs. We may define *national development NGOs*:

> National development oriented NGOs represent civil society aims active in the development and aid sphere, and consist of various constituencies ranging from academically oriented groups to self-help groups focused on providing support to developing and transition countries.

The number of national development oriented NGOs is growing despite a shortage of funding (in comparison to funds available in the 1960s and 1970s). The growth occurs since development NGOs can more easily reach the public at large through competent use of information technology and public relations campaigns. However, a larger political space available to NGOs has also facilitated their growth. This enlargement of political space both at the national and international level has been triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall and a subsequent political liberalisation in many parts of the world.

Transnational development NGOs are able to organise advocacy events and lobbying activities at cross-border levels. We may define them as follows:

> Transnational Development oriented NGOs propose their own policy solutions in international arenas, working, for instance, during the multilateral negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol agreement, in the debt rescheduling of least developed countries at the International Monetary Fund, or within the negotiation of a multilateral convention on foreign investment at OECD.

They are also involved in implementing technical co-operation projects in developing and transition economies, thereby complementing, at times even replacing, national governments. They also offer current research in areas crucial for international co-operation and crisis management.

In contrast to national NGOs, transnational NGOs actively seek ways to influence the agenda at international governance bodies by putting forward their policy recommendations and by lobbying in the corridors of power. The dialogue between major transnational NGOs and the World Bank during recent annual conferences of the Bank is an outstanding example. Due to their domain of expertise, these non-state actors have taken the lead in many international fora and narrowed the range of operational freedom of

traditional diplomats. However, full participation at international conferences from planning to conclusion stages entails considerable financial resources and the development and cultivation of substantial networks. For these reasons, most of the internationally active NGOs are based in the developed countries (Sadoun, 2005).

As depicted in *Figure 1* below, national development oriented NGOs might focus on creating coalitions at the national level to lobby for development causes or to protect consumers from harmful food products (e.g., genetically modified food products). They may also organise media campaigns exposing business practices of local companies in countries that violate basic labour conventions.



Figure 1: Territorial Spaces for the Advocacy of the National NGO Diplomat and Transnational NGO Diplomat (Saner and Yiu, 2003)

Transnational development oriented NGOs organise alliances at the international level to create counterweights to such institutions as the World Economic Forum and its perceived pro-business policies; they may castigate multinational companies in various of their foreign subsidiaries causing environmental pollution illegal in their country of registered domicile.

To give an example of the complexities of post-modern diplomacy and the growing importance of NGOs, Finn (2000) cites a statement attributed to US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott:

> In Bosnia, nine agencies and departments of the US government are cooperating with more than a dozen other governments, seven international organizations and thirteen major NGOs . . . to implement the Dayton Accords. (pp. 144-145)

From the perspective of actual participation in world affairs, it appears necessary that different actors in the enlarged sphere of post-modern diplomacy acquire additional competencies (domain expertise) to engage constructively in international economic policy dialogue. Conversely, it should also become increasingly possible for Ministries of Foreign Affairs and state diplomats to learn to adapt their traditional roles and functions. Diplomats must evolve from inward looking, exclusive, and secretive actors to more reachable, outgoing, and inclusive diplomats constantly in search for possible inclusion of other actors, whether state (other ministries) or non-state (such as business diplomats and transnational NGO diplomats) (Saner et al., 2002; Saner and Yiu, 2003).

Role Requirements of Non-State Actor Development Diplomats

Regardless of affiliation to different ideological orientations and causes, the primary task of non-state actor development diplomats (NSA-DDs) is to safeguard the interests of their constituencies and to influence the outcomes of transactions between themselves and other parties. Transnational NGOs need to safeguard the economic and social interests of their respective interest groups, as well as those of civil society as a whole, and to uphold established international human rights and environmental standards. To succeed with their advocacy goals and objectives, NSA-DDs need to prevent confrontations, but not to shy away from using appropriate advocacy influencing schemes, as long as the latter do not lead to protracted conflicts.

In safeguarding the development interests of their respective constituencies, NSA-DDs fulfil a set of basic objectives and tasks. These common objectives and tasks are:

- To influence political, economic, and social policies to create the right conditions for development in developing countries, taking into account the needs and aspirations of other stakeholders in the developing countries;

- To work with rule-making international bodies whose decisions affect international development and development regulations;
- To limit conflicts with foreign governments, other NGOs, and various economic actors, thereby aiming to minimise political and economic risks;
- To use multiple international fora and media channels to safeguard the image, mission, and reputation of their development NGO ("reputation capital");
- To create social capital through dialogue with all stakeholders who might be impacted by the process of socio-economic development (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000);
- To sustain credibility and legitimacy of their representative bodies in the eyes of the public and their own communities;
- To know how to draw a line between advocacy and development diplomacy, whereby advocacy might be part of the repertoire of tactics but should not become the main strategy;
- To learn to work with many constituencies (Hocking, 2005), to create coalitions of interests and convenience, to know how to negotiate at bilateral, plurilateral, multilateral, and multi-institutional levels.

Conclusions

Traditionally, diplomacy has been the prerogative of ambassadors and envoys representing Ministries of Foreign Affairs and central government offices, with mandates confined to the affairs of the state. Today, management of international development co-operation no longer confines itself to the state, but extends to NGOs and civil society organisations. Protagonists of these new interest groups are often professionals with impressive academic backgrounds and equally impressive project experience, sometimes outperforming their state actor counterparts.

From this perspective, it appears necessary for NGO actors involved in the enlarged sphere of development diplomacy to acquire the competencies that will enable them to engage constructively in policy dialogue with state actors. Conversely, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and state diplomats should adapt their traditional roles and functions from inward looking, exclusive, and secretive activity into a more reachable, outgoing, and inclusive diplomacy.

New times call for modification of traditional roles and responsibilities. Ministries of Foreign Affairs are no longer sole guardians of diplomacy; instead, they must share diplomatic space with other ministries and engage constructively with non-state actors. Through dialogue, proactive consultation, and future oriented co-operation, they must ensure legitimacy of policy decisions and security of policy implementation.

In the final analysis, sustainable development in the global context demands equitable representation of multiple stakeholders and the recognition that relationships among these stakeholders are intricate and web-like, unrestricted by political or geographical boundaries. "Diplomatic" skills are now and will be employed by all to promote individual views and profiles. We need to see today's diplomacy in its full complexity.

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DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: NON-STATE ACTOR ADVOCACY AND MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

Lichia Yiu and Raymond Saner

Abstract

This article describes in detail the application of development diplomacy in the context of international co-operation for poverty reduction in Highly Indebted Poor Countries. In particular, the authors describe the goal of the International Labour Organisation – a non-state actor – in advocating the inclusion of employment and Decent Work Agenda policies in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, an instrument developed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In order to achieve such inclusion, the International Labour Organisation mandated CSEND to create an advocacy based guidebook and negotiations simulation in order to influence future Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper negotiations.

In December 1999, the boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund approved the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach to reduce poverty in low-income countries. Since then, a PRSP has become the prerequisite for debt relief and concessional lending by international financial institutions. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now expect major donor agencies to endorse the participatory process prescribed by the poverty reduction strategy process as a pre-condition for international financial support. In other words, a PRSP is now the basis for all donor and creditor relationships with a low-income country.

The World Bank first conceived of the PRSP idea as an operational plan linked to its country-level Comprehensive Development Framework. The new approach has linked PRSPs to debt relief under the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative. International financial institutions now expect countries to have a developed poverty reduction strategy, reflected in a PRSP, to show how they would use funds released

by debt relief to alleviate poverty in their countries. The central point of departure from other pre-PRSP development instruments is that PRSPs embrace a high level of civil society participation along with stronger national ownership.

The purpose of this article is to describe the advocacy strategy of a non-state actor, specifically, that of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva, in attaining inclusion of employment and Decent Work Agenda policies in PRSPs.

The Role of Country Governments in Drafting Strategy Papers

A country government must lead the production of its own PRSP. The country-authored PRSP should be result-oriented and offer comprehensive, long-term road maps to serve as a framework for domestic policies and programmes, as well as for development assistance. The principle aims of a PRSP are multiple:

- to strengthen country ownership of poverty reduction strategies;
- to broaden the representation of civil society – particularly the poor – through participation in the design of such strategies;
- to improve co-ordination among development partners;
- to focus the analytical, advisory, and financial resources of the international community in reducing poverty.

In short, a poverty reduction strategy relies on a two-pillar approach: self-help through country-ownership and support of the international community.

Scope of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

Poverty reduction strategies should include plans for rapid economic growth, macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, and social improvement; as well, they should lead to outcomes in which the poor experience reduced vulnerability to risks and increased benefits of growth. International financial institutions expect a PRSP to ensure consistency between a country's macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and the goals of poverty reduction and social development. Country PRSPs

should be produced on a three-year cycle, with annual progress reports for intervening years. Progress reports could include modifications to the original strategy.

As a preliminary step leading to a full PRSP, beneficiary governments draft an intermediate PRSP that the donor will use to expedite the decision on debt relief. An intermediate PRSP will:

- make a commitment to poverty reduction;
- outline the strategy;
- include a three-year policy and macroeconomic matrix;
- provide a timetable and participatory process for completing the PRSP.

Core Principles of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2002) require that PRSPs adhere to six core principles. PRSPs will be:

- *Country-driven*: promoting national ownership by involving broad-based participation of civil society (country ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount);
- *Result-oriented*: setting goals for poverty reduction with tangible and monitorable outcomes, for instance, universal primary education;
- *Comprehensive*: stressing the need for integrating macroeconomic, structural, sectoral, and social elements, and stressing that policies in these areas be consistent with the goal of poverty reduction;
- *Participatory*: requiring all stakeholders in the country to participate actively in transparently choosing poverty reduction strategies;
- *Partnership-oriented*: involving co-ordinated participation of development partners such as the beneficiary government, the domestic stakeholders, and external donors;
- *Long-term in perspective*: understanding the reform of institutions and building capacity in a long-term perspective.

Progress on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

According to the ILO *Governing Body Report in 2002* (ILO, 2002a), 71 countries may qualify for a PRSP. Nearly 50 have produced intermediate PRSPs and nearly 20 have produced full PRSPs. The PRS process is ongoing.

For an update on the countries participating, their timetables, and status of the process, please visit: http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/country_timelines.pdf and http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/prsp_deliveries.pdf.

The Main Concerns of the International Labour Organisation

The mandate to reduce poverty is inherent in the ILO constitution – the fight against poverty and for social justice lies at the heart of ILO concerns. The ILO believes that high quality employment is the most effective means to reduce poverty in a sustainable manner. Historically, the ILO has initiated many rights-based approaches to poverty, basic needs, and social exclusion. It has also identified other participatory approaches to issues of governance and empowerment, sustainable livelihoods, and income/consumption. It has noted that poverty is multidimensional and that it is essential that responses to poverty be integrated and multisectoral.

The ILO (2002c) has reviewed selected PRSPs, focusing on employment and decent work concerns, and has drawn from its experience in countries where it was engaged in their preparation, that is, Mali, Tanzania, Honduras, Cambodia, and Nepal. The review of other PRSPs has confirmed its findings. The overarching issues seen from the ILO perspective are four (ILO, 2002b).

- First, PRSPs need to include a more thorough analysis of employment and other aspects of decent work. Currently, sound employment policies are often missing in intermediate or final PRSPs.
- Second, employer organisations, worker organisations and labour ministries need more systematic integration into the participatory process underpinning the design and implementation of PRSPs. In numerous cases, the process either sidestepped or marginalised ILO constituents.
- Third, PRSPs require more attention focused on policies that maximise the effects of sustainable growth on poverty. Various macroeconomic policies geared to market liberalisation and privatisation, and to labour market flexibility, have failed to take account of the social impact on vulnerable groups.
- Fourth, in funding priorities, donor countries must include issues related to employment and enterprise creation, social protection, rights,

representation and dialogue, promotion of tripartism (i.e., government, trade unions, and employer organisations), and other poverty reduction policies in which the ILO has expertise.

Additionally, a need is growing to build the capacity of the social partners to become actively involved in monitoring the implementation of a PRSP and to make the most of the opportunity to engage in PRSP dialogue.



Figure 1: Main Actors in PRS Negotiation.

Figure 1 depicts the core actors within the PRSP process, namely Ministries of Finance and Ministries of Planning. They are the counterparts of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank within a specific country. Together, these four actors control and manage the PRSP process. Other government ministries, such as Ministries of Labour, Manpower and Youth, and Ministries of Rural Development, often are completely excluded from participation. Ministries of Labour rarely participate, nor do their constituent partners, namely, labour unions and employer associations.

ILO Development Diplomacy and Advocacy Approach

Development diplomacy (Saner, in press) describes the non-technical aspect of the development work of international organisations and development workers. The onus of development diplomacy lies in advocacy, influence, networking, and negotiation. While advocacy has all the implications of "going public" with an assertion and declared solutions, other aspects of development diplomacy consist of more discrete interventions in restricted spaces and are strongly focused on relationships among individuals.

The aim of advocacy and development diplomacy is to build bridges between economic, social, and ecological development policy objectives. In other words, it aims at bringing about reconciliation of different interests and communities. Ultimately, the goal of development diplomacy is to trigger a socio-economic development process to arrest the vicious cycle of underdevelopment and to help countries progressively achieve sustainable development.

Affecting Change and Change Theory

The ILO Decent Work Agenda (ILO, 2005) proposes a new approach to the eradication of poverty and deprivation. Implementing the Decent Work Agenda gives dignity and, to varying extents, security, and spending power to the poor. It offers both a theoretical understanding of poverty and practical solutions different from neo-liberal macroeconomic thinking. In order to be recognised as a viable alternative to the Washington Consensus, the ILO Decent Work Agenda has to reach a critical mass able to influence the public debate and the actual PRSP process.

The aim of advocacy and influence is to change the perception of what is right and appropriate; the aim of negotiation is to reach agreement on what should be done and how to do it. Combining advocacy and negotiation, advocacy and development diplomacy accelerates the rate of adoption of the Decent Work Agenda by national authorities. Such action fosters consistency between words and actions within international financial institutions and donor communities.

Basic Competencies of Advocacy and Development Diplomacy

According to ISO 10015 Quality Standard (ISO, 1999), the term "competence" is defined as "application of knowledge, skills and behaviour in performance" (p. 4). Applied to development diplomacy and the PRSP process, the required competencies consist of organisational and individual competencies.

Organisational competencies. Identifying organisational competencies provides a means for pinpointing the most critical capacities for their success. Agencies express these abilities through their political will and vision, availability of knowledge, quality of their human resources, and resources used in support of advocacy and development diplomacy. In carrying out effective advocacy and development diplomacy, specific capabilities are essential:

- environmental scanning capacities;
- capacity to perform labour and macroeconomic research and policy analysis, including gender analysis;
- capacity to plan, to manage, and to monitor advocacy work;
- capacity to mobilise members of the public and targeted trend-setting organisations (through information pamphlets, Internet contact, publications, public education events, demonstrations, direct action);
- capacity to influence policy makers through lobbying;
- capacity to manage the media and conduct development communication;
- capacity to conduct public relation campaigns at grass-roots, national, and international levels;
- capacity to network and to build coalitions;
- capacity for bilateral and multilateral negotiation.

These competencies lie in individuals dedicated to social change. Within social change organisations, it is necessary to have individuals competent to act in the roles of boundary spanners, salespersons, gatekeepers, and sociometric stars. These individuals have the organisational competence to accumulate social capital in different social contexts. Furthermore, due to the connections of these individuals, the organisation also enjoys other benefits, such as visibility and credibility.



Figure 2: Multiple Means of Advocacy

Figure 2 depicts the ingredients of an advocacy campaign to influence the PRSP process in favour of inclusion of employment and the Decent Work Agenda.

Individual competencies. Individuals given the responsibility of carrying out advocacy and development diplomacy should be equipped with adequate knowledge, skills, and appropriate attitudes. Civil society organisations should add country-specific knowledge and experience to a generic competence set. Country adaptation is crucial, since the cultural and political contexts determine effective approaches to advocacy and development diplomacy. In regard to *knowledge*, a decent work advocate and diplomat will be familiar with

- the Decent Work Agenda and related information (a key reference is the report of the ILO Director-General, called the *Report on Working Out of Poverty*);
- poverty reduction strategic plans and related policy debate (a key reference is the World Bank's *PRSP Sourcebook*);

- introductory knowledge of macroeconomics and development studies (to follow the debate and to have access to alternative development models and country case studies);
- theoretical framework of social change.

Individuals effective in the development diplomacy process will be equipped with specific *skills*:

- communication skills, including listening;
- presentation skills;
- critical thinking skills;
- networking skills;
- organisation and campaign management skills;
- rapport building skills, including empathy, respect, and contact.

As well, rather than taking an administrative approach to the development of PRSPs, a development diplomat will have

- genuine concern over other people's well being;
- curiosity and interest in learning;
- flexibility and enterprise in bridging differences and in framing solutions;
- integrity.

Advocacy and Development Diplomacy Task List

The advocacy and development diplomacy process in the context of the Decent Work Agenda has eleven dimensions:

- *Raising awareness* about issues of the working poor;
- *Promoting a sense of urgency* about the social exclusion of the working poor and their vulnerability;
- *Campaigning* for the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals and decent work for all;
- *Networking* with like-minded development partners, international NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals to strengthen a power base and to enlarge influence;
- *Contributing to the debate* on promoting employment and reducing poverty;
- *Influencing opinions* of potential change agents and decision-makers on the macroeconomic framework and development strategies;

- *Negotiating policy changes* more consistent with the Decent Work Agenda and poverty reduction;
- *Maintaining the coalition and other collaborative partnerships* regarding the Decent Work Agenda and poverty reduction;
- *Monitoring implementation* of policy changes in line with the Decent Work Agenda and poverty reduction;
- *Developing and strengthening* the capacity of advocacy and development diplomacy within partner organisations and networks;
- *Enhancing capacity* in advocacy and development diplomacy.

These dimensions offer the framework to assess organisational performance in the field of advocacy and development diplomacy. These eleven dimensions need to be broken down into measurable targets for continuous, monitored improvement.

The long-term effect of advocacy and development diplomacy requires assessment. The following areas need monitoring: (a) policy changes that favour the working poor and equitable labour market conditions; (b) the improvement of capacities of social partners in a country; (c) the participation of marginal groups and communities in the PRSP and Decent Work Agenda processes; and (d) improvement of economic and social benefits of working people. The bottom line of effectiveness will be the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and a significant reduction in the decent work deficit.

Entry Points and Strategies for Advocacy

Advocacy for the Decent Work Agenda in the context of a poverty reduction strategy works to achieve four objectives:

- creating receptive conditions for adoption of the Decent Work Agenda;
- creating rights-based policies such as active labour policies and pro-poor economic development strategies where they are non-existent;
- reforming harmful or ineffective policies, such as policies discriminatory to women or macroeconomic policies that impose the costs of transition on poor populations;
- ensuring that good policies are implemented and enforced.

The ILO and its constituents can influence the outcome of a PRSP in the direction of these four objectives through three strategies: (1) positional or "contact" advocacy; (2) methodological advocacy; and (3) standards- (or rights-) based advocacy.

Positional or contact advocacy focuses on specific solutions or values. The goal of this form of advocacy is to convince key players to choose pro-poor economic and social policies and to promote the value of decent work and the "potential synergy between the social and economic goals underlying decent work" (Rodgers, 2002).

Methodological advocacy concerns influencing stakeholders and their representative groups to become active as problem solvers and to use certain methods in poverty reduction strategies, such as social dialogue, poverty mapping, and problem solving. Normally, an advocate is careful not to favour openly any particular position. In its campaign for decent work, the ILO and its constituents simultaneously advocate labour rights, employment and social protection (positional propositions), and the use of social dialogue as methodological tools for both policy input monitoring and evaluation.

A standards-based advocacy strategy focuses on the implementation of conventions as a central platform of the PRSP architecture. Standards-based advocacy, supported by the planned Decent Work Deficit Index, is important throughout the process of a PRSP since it aims at choosing poverty reduction objectives and defining the strategy for poverty reduction and economic growth. In the process of a poverty reduction strategy and a Decent Work Agenda campaign, ILO advocates simultaneously utilise all forms of advocacy and strengthen their international, national, and grass-roots networks in order to achieve a reasonable result.

Development Diplomacy in Mali

The ILO experience in Mali (*Table 1*) is a good example of development diplomacy. Participants participated in a fairly comprehensive and broad-based process and both the intermediate and the final PRSPs contain good coverage of decent work issues backed by a national action plan for employment. The government of Mali established two additional thematic groups on income generation, employment, and training explicitly on the advice of the ILO and the social partners.

Table 1: Summary of Development Diplomacy Action Taken in Mali

	Advocacy			**Development Diplomacy**			
	Contact	Methodological	Standard	Networking		Influencing	Negotiation
Information politics		☑		Social Capital Formation	☑ Networks - Networking - Coalitions - Alliances	☑	☑
Symbolic politics	☑						
Leveraging politics Material Moral (shaming)	☑			☑			
Accountability politics							

Contact Advocacy. The aim of contact advocacy is to convince essential players to choose economic and social policies that promote the well being of the poor, and to promote the value of decent work The *use of symbolic politics and a Tripartite Solidarity Pact* was vital. International financial organisations and the government of Mali signed a Tripartite Solidarity Pact for Growth and Development in 2001. The Pact aimed at job creation as well as improving working conditions in the public and private sectors. Through the Pact, employer and worker organisations committed themselves to negotiate a new collective agreement to help workers without social protection. The country PRSP also highlighted this Solidarity Pact.

The *use of leveraging politics* also had a place. By participating in the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, which reports to the Parliament of Mali, workers and employers could use their political power in advocating the Decent Work Agenda.

The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD facilitated the co-ordination within the donor community, avoiding donor-driven, non-integrated, and often competing donor initiatives. The ILO thus could concen-

trate its efforts on advocating a pro-Decent Work poverty reduction strategy without competition with conflicting interests. It also provided the ILO with greater advantage.

Methodological Advocacy. Methodological advocacy consists of finding effective means to influence stakeholders in becoming active problem solvers and in using certain methods in their poverty reduction strategy, such as social dialogue, poverty mapping, and problem solving.

The ILO was particularly effective in Mali in its *use of information politics*. The ILO Multidisciplinary Team based in Dakar made frequent visits to Mali, recognised, and met the need for assistance in drafting the PRSP. Therefore, the government was well positioned to include the components of the Decent Work Agenda in the employment section of the PRSP. In this instance, the team was able to utilise the technical competence and resources of the ILO to assist the Malian government.

The Malian government was receptive to ILO technical advice and input, enhancing *networking and social capital formation*. Confidence building and networking activities were undertaken in both in-country workshops and a meeting in Dakar that facilitated dialogue between the Employment Minister, the PRSP co-ordinator (from the Finance and Economy Ministry), and employer and worker representatives. This networking and influencing opportunity helped to define the detailed framework of the employment section of the PRSP.

Furthermore, a *national action programme for poverty-reducing employment* was also agreed on, with provisions for biannual meetings of an inter-ministerial steering committee and a tripartite technical committee (*networks*). This high-level committee will provide a powerful platform for future advocacy and influencing tactics. It also represents a milestone of the work done so far.

Influence also took place through research and drafting of text. The best way to influence is to respond to the needs of the partners. These needs might range from technical input to strategic policy input. In the case of Mali, responding to local needs involved providing basic research on employment-generation strategies and drafting related economic policies. The assistance provided by the Multidisciplinary Teams made it easier for the government to have pro-Decent Work Agenda elements included in the country PRSP.

Development Diplomacy in Cambodia

Initial conditions in Cambodia were not favourable for the ILO. First, many donor initiatives in the country created absorption problems for the government and negative competition within the donor community. Second, the ILO did not have a field office or staff dedicated to the PRSP in the country to influence the ongoing consultations with various working groups. **Table 2** summarises the work done by the ILO in Cambodia.

The intermediate PRSP contained no reference to decent work issues. However, positive results resulted through empowering the social partners and influencing the Council for Social Development, which co-ordinated the drafting of the full PRSP. National consultations on the PRSP included workers' representatives for the first time in August 2002. Policy recommendations from the ILO were integrated into their respective PRSP policy matrices.

Table 2: Summary of Development Diplomacy Action Taken in Cambodia

	Advocacy			**Development Diplomacy**			
	Contact	Methodological	Standard	Networking		Influencing	Negotiation
Information politics	☑			Social Capital Formation	☑ Networks	☑	☑
Symbolic politics	☑				☑ Networking		
Leveraging politics Material Moral (shaming)					- Coalitions - Alliances		
Accountability politics							

Contact advocacy. Personal contact and discussions with government officials and consultations with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, responsible for facilitating

the PRSP process, helped to bridge the gap in acknowledging the need for social dialogue and participation.

In the *use of information politics*, the ILO prepared a comprehensive report titled *Generating Decent Work for Poverty Reduction in Cambodia: The Voice of Workers, Employers, and the Government*. Subsequently, this report was used in a series of consultations and discussions; it further served as the input for drafting the PRSP. Soft policy briefing notes prepared by the Bangkok Multidisciplinary Team Regional Office made it easier for the respective ministries to integrate ILO policy recommendations into their respective PRSP policy matrices.

As an effective example of *leveraging politics*, the ILO contributed to the Cambodian PRSP through its in-house technical expertise. By analysing the link between urban and rural economies and the role of employment-intensive investment using labour-based appropriate technology, the ILO made certain possibilities clear to all parties.

The ILO empowered the social partners through a series of capacity-building and awareness-raising workshops, demonstrating *empowerment and networking skills*. Through such workshops, worker and employer representatives made contacts and formed relationships. However, more importantly, since the trade unions and employer organisations were both young and lacked human and financial resources, broad-based capacity building prepared these actors to participate meaningfully in the policy discussions of the poverty reduction strategy process.

The ILO influenced the policy orientation of the Cambodian PRSP by providing technical support to carry out the drafting of the PRSP. This support occurred in the form of briefing notes, extensive research and recommendations, and consultations. Through analysis of the general context of the country, the ILO was able to identify strategic issues for country development and to propose appropriate solutions. This level of *responsiveness to country* needs made ILO advocacy more palatable to government officials and, therefore, the influence became more effective.

Conclusions

In conclusion, it is clear that in order to participate more fully in the poverty reduction process, all stakeholders – including governments, civil society organisations, and marginalised groups – need to develop new skill

sets that facilitate change and create clear policies for the implementation of the PRSPs. The ILO has a critical role to play in the development of these skills since it has established networks as well as training capacities and information-gathering abilities that can help identify and provide information for the concerned parties.

Since systemic barriers exist and resistance to change is common, creating an atmosphere of co-operation and creating win-win solutions for negotiating parties is critical. Additionally, in a strategy for advocacy and development diplomacy it is very important to achieve effective and participatory implementation of the poverty reduction process, thus leading to successful implementation of the PRSP and the Millennium Development Goals.

The need for international organisations such as the ILO to deploy their resources more effectively and to engage more effectively in development diplomacy is more evident than ever. Easy access to information and communication technology and to increasing knowledge capacities of civil societies has gradually resulted in a change of the role behaviour of specialised UN agencies, such as the ILO, the World Health Organisation, and UNICEF.

For these UN agencies, and for civil society agencies, a development diplomacy role is unsettling and requires a paradigm shift. To be effective, these UN agencies and their staff will have to master an additional set of competencies and to develop new partnerships with other social actors who may share similar concerns but who may not join "traditional" alliances. Additionally, organisations like the ILO will have to redefine their institutional relationships with the World Bank, with the International Monetary Fund, and with donor communities if they hope to promote their perspectives and advocate for people in abject poverty with little voice of their own. The case examples illustrate this shift and provide glimpses of the competence requirements and the challenges presented to them in the context of PRSP and the Decent Work Agenda.

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REFLECTIONS ON MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

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For centuries, the Westphalian system of nations has been the dominant feature of international order. The classical understanding of sovereignty is that the state, with its territorial control and institutional authority, has had ultimate legitimacy to define and represent the aspirations and interests of its people in relations with other nations. In this concept, international law assigns to the state a principal role in conducting diplomacy.

The state centric approach persists in traditional definitions of diplomacy, which emphasise the interstate character of diplomatic process. Harold Nicolson perceives diplomacy as the "*management of relations between independent states* through the process of negotiation;" and Ernest Satow, as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of *official relations between governments of independent states*." Likewise, Elmer Plischke considers it a "political process by which *political entities (generally states) establish and maintain official relations* . . . in pursuing their goals, objectives, interests, substantive policies . . . in an international environment" (Freeman, 1997, pp. 70-76).

However, complex geo-political, socio-economic, technological, cultural, and military developments in international fora have greatly affected this state-based concept of diplomacy in the last fifteen years. With the end of the cold war, the world has grappled with new realities of globalisation. The international system is no longer exclusively run by states, although states retain the privileged place of principal generators of diplomacy. A system of overlapping societies, rules, and allegiances focused around acknowledgement of global interdependence is eroding the Westphalian system of sovereign nations. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pressure groups, transnational companies, and multinational lobbies are now a sizeable factor in international relations. Thus, the international system is no longer manageable in the old pattern because of a growing web of non-state actors that operate beyond the fixed limits of a monolithic state apparatus and territorial sovereignty.

Human civilisation has reached a point where its further development and sustainability becomes the subject of shared responsibility and engagement of states, the private sector, and civil society. Essential problems such as global poverty, environmental pollution, exploitation of natural resources

on a massive scale, trade disputes, and inter- and intrastate conflicts cannot be resolved through conventional formats of bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental diplomacy. New participatory modes of interaction and approaches require consideration. A multistakeholder approach seems to offer promising opportunities.

Socio-economic and development theorists often apply a multistakeholder approach in their studies, yet it has found a way into diplomatic practice only recently. The core characteristic of the multistakeholder approach is an equitable interaction between a multitude of actors (state and non-state) of varying power and position. Interaction takes the form of a dialogue, consultation, and, in ideal cases, formal negotiation. The actors hold particular interests or stakes in the issues discussed and in the outcomes of consultation and negotiation processes. They may have divergent interests, yet have the mutual goal of finding a crossing point or common ground in addressing a particular issue and arriving at mutually acceptable, win/win solutions. The multistakeholder model involves participatory mechanisms that facilitate policy formation and collaborative decision-making. A set of participation modalities and decision-making mechanisms regulates each multistakeholder process and partnership.

The multistakeholder model has been a subject of numerous analytical case studies in the research and practitioner community. The studies cover multistakeholder processes (Hemmati, 2002), multistakeholder dialogues (Susskind, Fuller, Ferenz, and Fairman, 2003), and multistakeholder partnerships (Global Knowledge Partnership Secretariat, 2005). This paper looks into multistakeholder practices at the international level and analyses their impact on the conduct of modern diplomacy. The existing institutional and procedural framework for involvement of non-state actors in multistakeholder diplomacy and international policy making receives special attention. Through comparative analysis of procedural, issue, and policy documents of the UN and other international organisations, and through the study of press releases and research-based monographs, the author attempts to identify the principal stakeholders and modalities of interaction in the process of intergovernmental (diplomatic) negotiation and decision making. The examination also includes multistakeholder arrangements within some regional intergovernmental organisations and ends with brief review of the multistakeholder patterns of interaction in the context of national diplomatic systems and national foreign policy making.

The case-study approach used here relies on relevant web-based resources, evidence of the growing significance of the Internet as a valuable source and repository not just of data and information, but also of systematic knowledge.

Current Multistakeholder Practices in the UN System

The UN system of international conferences constitutes the background for the conduct of multistakeholder diplomacy. These multilateral diplomacy forums encompass multifaceted layers of activities often extending beyond a traditional intergovernmental framework and involving stakeholder participation both in preparatory and final stages of negotiation processes.

UN conference diplomacy is intergovernmental in character, which, as a rule, confines the negotiation process to state delegations and representatives of intergovernmental organisations. This rule, however, is slowly changing as the diplomatic community begins to acknowledge the growing relevance of NGOs, international business and financial entities, and civil society groups as actors in intergovernmental negotiation. By acting as individuals or as representatives of a group, these agents have a direct stake in influencing a particular decision or in wording a particular resolution. Non-state actors contribute to the outcomes of diplomatic summits in areas in which they hold special competence and within the range of their activities. States recognise their expertise and input in tackling global soft-security issues such as environmental protection, sustainable development, disaster relief efforts, international trade, human rights, gender issues, and the information society.

A participatory framework branded as "multistakeholder dialogues" evolved in the 90s. "Rio '92," the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit"), was one of the first major global events to adopt a multistakeholder network model. The conference resulted in the adoption of Agenda 21, recognising nine major groups as equitable stakeholders in the setting and implementation of a sustainable development agenda. The institutional post conference arrangements in the form of a Commission of Sustainable Development ensured effective monitoring and reporting of the agreements at local, national, regional, and international levels (UNDSD, 2005). Commission deliberations took the format of informal multistakeholder dialogues between governments and major groups. A steering committee composed of the major groups and the Secretariat facilitated the dialogues.

The dialogues offered a platform for many major groups (women, youth, indigenous people, NGOs, local authorities, workers, trade unions, business and industry associations, scientific and technological communities, farmers) to share concerns, experiences, and proposals in their discussions with governments on an equal representation basis (UNDSEA, 2005). By 1997, the informal consultations had become formal multistakeholder panels for each meeting.

Likewise, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg incorporated multistakeholder meetings into the official intergovernmental preparatory process. Session results were delivered by the Chair to the conference preparatory committee and included in its records. The summit itself gave a good opportunity for representatives of major groups to participate in a number of plenary sessions and, thus, to contribute to the multilateral negotiation process (WSSD, 2002). Nonetheless, analysts, like Dana Fisher from Columbia University, shared views that, in the end, the Johannesburg framework agreement was negotiated primarily by diplomats, while civil society organisations and citizens' groups were "disfranchised" – that is, restricted from international environmental policy making. In their post-Johannesburg recommendations, analysts highlighted the need for inclusive participatory and organisational mechanisms designed to enhance policy dialogue between national governments and other relevant stakeholders (Fisher, 2002).

The 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterey is another example of proactive multistakeholder practices. Multistakeholder consultations involving governments, international financial and trade organisations (so called institutional stakeholders), NGOs and civil society agencies, and members of the private sector produced an exchange of views on global economic issues. Seventy participants grouped in twelve roundtables took part in the deliberations chaired by heads of states, ministers of finance, trade and foreign affairs, heads of the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank, as well as regional bank managers. These multistakeholder dialogues were recognised as formal conference events meant to enhance the outcome of intergovernmental plenary negotiations. Participation modalities allowed all stakeholders to enjoy the right to table proposals first discussed and circulated in conference side events. Summaries of these meetings appeared in the final conference report and in the Monterey Consensus Resolution. Multistakeholder deliberations, therefore, provided meaningful input for conference diplomacy. In follow-up

multistakeholder meetings, the important issues of discussion concerned mobilisation of resources for financing development and poverty eradication. The meetings were co-ordinated by UN bodies, institutional stakeholders, and the NGO, Global Finance Coalition. Meetings took the form of thematic workshops and hearings. For instance, the UN Secretariat organised informal hearings of civil society and private sector agencies in preparation for high level intergovernmental "financing for development" follow-up activities. Parliamentarians, represented by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, also contributed significantly in the follow-up activities (UNDSEA, 2005).

In multistakeholder practices, active participation of the private sector is essential. The sector acts as engine of growth and economic development. Businesses mobilise funds for UN development programs; they also bring financial, technical, and managerial expertise and skills to multistakeholder processes. Together with other stakeholders, they are instrumental in solving complex global and regional problems. Yet, the international system needs a place where stakeholders can work constructively, free from the constraints of intergovernmental protocol and corporate pressures. The World Economic Forum gatherings in Davos, Switzerland offer conditions for informal settings where leaders from varying backgrounds can engage in collaborative problem-solving exercises through multistakeholder dialogues.

It is becoming a practice for multistakeholder dialogues to grow into problem-driven partnerships. The Report of the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly in 2003 defines "partnerships as voluntary and collaborative relationships between parties, both state and non-state, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and share risks, responsibilities and resources, competencies and benefits" (UNGPPI, 2003).

One problem-driven issue is disaster relief. The recent Indian Ocean earthquake and subsequent tsunami demonstrated the urgent need for consistent human response to prevent and reduce the risks of natural disasters. Emergencies of such magnitude exceed the boundaries of a single state, since their socio-economic consequences are global in nature and require global response. It is still necessary to form an appropriate co-ordination format for effective international efforts. Multistakeholder partnerships are a suitable venue for all agencies concerned – governments, international organisations with expertise and experience in disaster relief, local municipalities, scientific communities, industry and business associations – to adopt and implement joint measures to reduce risks and to minimise human loss, as well as to man-

age relief aid. In support of such an undertaking, the UN sponsored World Conference on Disaster Reduction brought together concerned stakeholders in an effort to establish a partnership mechanism that could share knowledge and good practices (WCDR, 2005). A two-year negotiation marathon resulted in two sessional and intersessional conferences preparatory to the Conference, as well as a thematic segment consisting of various regional workshops and roundtables. Partnerships proposed during the multistakeholder consultation process built on the partnership framework launched at the WSSD, in turn based on the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation for vulnerability, risk assessment, and disaster management.

Disaster reduction partnerships come up as specific initiatives taken by various institutions at different levels aimed at implementing disaster risk reduction goals and targets (UNGA, 2004). The conference proved that multistakeholder partnerships are not about to replace inter-governmental diplomatic negotiations and are still complementary to conference processes. Non-state actors involved in the Conference failed to accomplish their objectives, as the final agreement excluded many of their proposals. The text of the Conference final document was watered down and reflected the unwillingness of governmental delegations to undertake concrete commitments to reduce the death toll in future disasters and to raise funds for the development of early warning systems. The Conference also found no accord on international funding mechanisms for disaster prevention. The positive outcomes are the linkages made between climate change disasters and sustainable development disasters (Large, 2005).

The utilisation of non-state actor capacities in intergovernmental diplomacy remains a controversial issue. The World Organisation has invested considerable resources and expertise in developing a common denominator for meaningful multistakeholder interactions in UN fora. According to the Cardoso Report (Cardoso, 2003), the effectiveness of the international system depends on the ability of member states to make full use of NGOs, the private sector, parliamentarians, and local authorities. The report urges states to define clear rules of engagement (participation modalities) for non-state actors and procedures of political representation, and to allow innovative forms of partnership and collaboration. In any case, most UN member states cautiously welcome civil society and private sector know-how and influence (this assessment varies from state to state) and encourage flexible forms of multistakeholder diplomacy, rather than direct political engagement (Cardoso, 2003).

Participation modalities for non-state actors have been subject of institutional and procedural regulation by the UN. For example, *The Charter of the United Nations* (article 71) formally accepts NGOs as partners and allows the Economic and Social Council to make arrangements for national and international NGOs. The ECOSOC *Resolution of 1996/31* (articles 51 and 52) (UN ECOSOC, 1996) provide for NGOs to "address the preparatory committee and the conference in plenary meetings and subsidiary bodies [as well] as make written presentations during the preparatory process. Those written presentations shall not be issued as official documents except in accordance with UN rules of procedure." The Report of the Secretary-General issued for consideration at the 53rd United Nations General Assembly in 1998 (UNGA, 1998) goes even further, regarding non-state actors not only as "disseminators of information, but as shapers of policy and indispensable bridges between the general public and intergovernmental processes." The General Assembly's *Millennium Declaration* (UNGA, 2000) broadens the interpretation of non-state actors, generally associated with NGOs, to include private sector, civil society, and national parliaments and elaborates on the notion of multistakeholder partnerships.

However, each UN conference sets its own rules of procedure, based on the main parameters adopted in the UN legislative framework. Rules can be restrictive or open-ended for non-state actor participation. In recent years, one can see incremental shifts in the participation modalities of non-state actors. Each forum introduced procedural precedents that were then institutionalised in conference proceedings. Yet, despite existing political and procedural limitations to non-state actor involvement, they often contribute substantially in terms of expertise and policy advice. Non-state actors, in particular NGOs and private sector actors, take part in the deliberations through panel discussions, round tables, hearings, and multistakeholder parallel events. In multistakeholder fora, the secretariat and presiding chairperson play essential roles in interpreting and applying the procedural rules in deliberations. Historically, the role of non-state actors has been consultative rather than negotiative as they have enjoyed observer's status within the UN system without the right to vote.

One specific feature of the World Summit on Information Society deliberations, for instance, is the lack of unanimity among governments regarding the treatment of non-state actors. Some wish to elevate the status of non-state participants to that of negotiators, while others attempt to marginalise their observer's role. During the July 2003 inter-sessional meeting, the presid-

ing chair of Working Group 2 opened the room to observers, with limited rights to deliberate in the negotiation groups. While the principal negotiators – governments – debated particular paragraphs, the chair made procedural interruptions to invite representatives from NGOs, the private sector, and civil society to consider their suggestions and propose amendments to the proposed text. In the words of Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, such "stop-and-go-negotiations" would not change the *de jure* character of inter-governmental negotiations, but could bring *de facto* innovative input and transparency to the process" (Kleinwaechter, 2004).

Table 1 summarises the risks and opportunities for non-state actors in assuming the role of equals to governments in the system of intergovernmental (diplomatic) negotiations.

	Pros	Cons
Negotiating Status	Governments often fail to address legitimate concerns of particular segments of society at the negotiating table. The business sector and civil society have a substantial stake in the management of modern international relations and should have equal say in addressing the complex issues of environmental protection, sustainable development, and information society governance alongside government negotiators	This could change the nature of diplomatic negotiation and undermine the status of nation states as the exclusive sovereign representative of their people.
Equitable Participation in the Decision Making Process, Right to Table Motions and Vote	This will lift the status of non-state actors to that of full-fledged negotiators and bring greater legitimacy to their participation in the conference process; they could have a greater say over international norms and regime setting.	Decision taking may become difficult and reaching consensus less attainable.

Table 1: Pros and Cons of Changing Negotiating Roles of Non-State Actors

Some of the UN specialised agencies and partnership initiatives whose organisational structures resemble multistakeholder umbrellas allow non-

state actors to contribute beyond their official observer's status. For example, the International Telecommunication Union organisational structure consists of sector members that enjoy equal rights alongside government delegates, participating in and contributing written input to conferences. The UN Programme on HIV/AIDS allows NGO representatives to act in the Programme Co-ordinating Body as full-fledged members rather than observers, together with delegates from the business community, donors, and recipient states. The tripartite structure of the International Labour Union puts governments, employers, and workers' representative on an equal footing as far as agenda setting and decision making processes are concerned. Non-state actors share equal decision making powers in the UN Information and Communication Technology Task Force, which creates mechanisms for collaborative multistakeholder co-operation in the field of high technology.

Credibility and legitimacy remain critical and contentious aspects for non-state actors. Unlike governments, they do not stand elections and the problem of representability is pending. They are accountable only to boards of directors, membership entities, and constituencies that sponsor their activities. Non-state actors having consultative status with ECOSOC are approved by the member states and submit reports of their activity to the UN (Niggli and Rothenbühler, 2003). However, non-state actors have failed to acquire permanent presence in the deliberations of the two bastions of power of the UN, the Security Council and the General Assembly, despite their efforts to modify operational procedures. They work with those bodies on an *ad hoc* basis through working groups. For instance, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council has evolved into an important stakeholder channel between NGOs and the UN diplomatic community on issues of human security.

An independent review conducted by the Consensus Building Institute of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Consensus Building Institute, 2002) has identified professional and organisational limitations and advantages to forging a more proactive relationship between state and non-state actors in intergovernmental diplomatic negotiation. In their summary, they claim that

> governments never devise their negotiating positions in a vacuum. But which elements of "civil society" wield how much influence on policy making in intergovernmental fora – and what avenues are available to them to make themselves heard – currently varies… Some diplomats are deeply apprehensive about assigning an

> enhanced role to actors that escape government restraint. They are concerned about possible repercussions on both the global stage and in their domestic settings, and they adhere to the conventional notion of governance based on state dominance. Others see the "independent sector" (civil society, private sector, academia and technical community) as the repository of skills, knowledge and resources that are essential to making real aspirations of a more prosperous and equitable world. Governments, as a matter of course, retain strong co-ordination and leadership functions. (p. 45)

Multistakeholder diplomacy provides ways for non-state actors to influence formation of multilateral regimes and take part in global policy making. Through emerging patterns of interaction, levels of co-ordination, and linkages, multistakeholder diplomacy opens the door for "mobilising skills of diplomacy in fashioning ever-shifting 'coalitions of willing' to tackle the problems that no one actor, governmental or non-governmental, has the capacity to manage alone" (Hocking, 2002, p. 5).

Non-state actors do not enjoy legal international status under international law. "Although they cannot conclude international treaties and agreements, they advance such agreements and therefore wield considerable influence in international affairs" (Burnett, 2005, p. 1). NGOs have contributed to the adoption of a number of essential international agreements:

- The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, approved with the help of NGO-based expertise;
- The Mine Ban Treaty (also referred to as Ottawa Convention), 1997, approved by governments thanks to a vigorous, NGO Internet-based international campaign to ban land mines;
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, adopted with active involvement of the NGO-based Coalition for an International Criminal Court.

Multistakeholder Practices in Regional Intergovernmental Organisations

The input of non-state actors enhances, at least to a certain degree, the functioning of intergovernmental organisations. Non-state actors bring essential information, expertise, services, and support to governmental delegations.

Multistakeholder partnership schemes established by intergovernmental bodies allow for shared responsibility and accountability of major stakeholders (public, business, and civil society sectors) in co-ordinated implementation of educational, sustainable development, humanitarian assistance, and aid projects.

The European Union complements the traditional framework of relations with third parties for realisation of the Union's foreign policy and development aid objectives. The EU recognises the importance of multistakeholder involvement in the implementation of its development strategy plans. This requires active communication and liaison with non-state actors (EUROPA, 2003; European NGO Confederation, 2003). The European Commission has established policy guidelines for NGO participation in the implementation of EU development policy towards developing countries. Development, aid, or humanitarian projects demand complex organisational, operational, and financial efforts of relevant stakeholders. Establishing multistakeholder committees could facilitate the level of co-ordination between parties and help examine capacity building needs, and funding and procedural mechanisms that accompany the realisation of each initiative. EU delegations (outposts of EU common diplomacy abroad) seek the expertise of Northern and Southern NGOs, the business sector, and other stakeholders for successful planning and implementation of programs. EU co-operation programmes such as the EU Water Initiative (Institute for Environmental Security, 2005), the APS-EU Partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (Wikipedia, 2005), the EU ICT Initiative for the Middle East and Northern Africa (European Commission, 2005), and the ASEAN-EU University Network (Delegation of the EU Commission to Thailand, 2005) illustrate well how the EU operates through multistakeholder networks and partnerships.

The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is another example of regional intergovernmental organisations. Established in 1971, the Forum has a mandate to co-operate with regional non-state actors (representing, among others, the interests of educators, trade unionists, disabled people, women, and environmentalists) and to involve them actively in setting a social development, trade and investment agenda for the region. In October 2004, the Australian diplomat G. Urwin, the Secretary General of the Forum, welcomed input from eleven NGO groups on the implementation of the Pacific Plan for regional co-operation and integration.

At the invitation of the Secretariat, non-state actors attend Forum constituencies events and high level regional meetings as observers. These ac-

tors participate in the inter-governmental deliberations of *ad hoc* working groups, taking part in the formulation of policy. In setting working priorities for the organisation, the Secretariat consults biennially with non-state actors prior to formal ministerial meetings. These meetings take the format of round table dialogues between the representatives of member states and all regional stakeholders. Among the stakeholders are also partners from other intergovernmental organisations. Focal group meetings are another proactive approach to working with intergovernmental partner organisations and non-state actors. The latter present background papers and table recommendations for inter-governmental consideration on technically complex matters (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2002).

Multistakeholder Practices within National Diplomatic Services

Nationally, multistakeholder practices include interaction between domestic stakeholders on issues of national importance. Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) are no longer the "gatekeepers" of national foreign policy shaping. They tend to take the role of co-ordinators in synchronising a broad spectrum of bureaucratic, institutional, legal, commercial, and public policy interests. These interests, articulated by domestic stakeholders, are taken into account in the formation of national foreign policy values and priorities. Non-state actors (industry associations, think-tanks, churches, trade unions, civil society pressure groups) often enter into a dialogue with government structures (parliament, MFA, defence and finance ministries) in promoting specific agendas and in influencing foreign policy behaviour.

The way governments of Eastern European nations have negotiated the accession treaties with the European Union may exemplify national multistakeholder practices. Eastern European nations have kept their domestic audiences closely and regularly informed regarding every stage of the process, as the outcomes affect the livelihoods of millions of people and determine the socio-economic development of generations ahead. National negotiating positions crystallised as a result of the intensive interaction between core negotiating teams (comprised mainly of diplomats) and domestic stakeholder representatives. Thus, governments were able to defend national interests in the negotiations only after carefully considering specific interests and needs of their domestic constituencies.

The citizenry of an increasing number of countries begins to exercise greater public control over the work of government agencies, including national diplomatic services. Foreign policy, previously exclusively realm of "professional diplomacy" is becoming more transparent and open to public scrutiny and accountability.

Ad hoc interactions are common, but one sees an obvious trend towards institutionalisation of domestic stakeholder relationships with the professional diplomatic guild. Usually, the foreign office keeps a special liaison section or department responsible for relationships with non-state actors in the realisation of national foreign policy agendas. NGOs assist national diplomatic machineries in the conduct of economic, public, cultural, humanitarian, and development assistance diplomacies. Several concrete examples illustrate this co-operation.

The Liaison Mission of the Office of Policy Planning Department of the US State Department has formed an inter-professional team of diplomats, academics, intelligent analysts, military officers, business consultants, and arms control experts to act as a source of independent policy examination and advice. The Mission utilises views of experts and practitioners from non-state entities on matters relevant to US foreign policy and ensures the involvement of the public in policy formulation (United States, 2005).

Likewise, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade successfully integrates a multistakeholder model in its diplomatic practice. The Canadian Foreign Office holds regular dialogues with the business community, state and territory governments, consumer-based NGOs, labour unions, community groups, and all others with stakes in trade related issues. Appropriate platforms such as National Trade Consultations and Trade Policy Advisory Councils enable this on-going discussion. NGOs are also part of the group advising the Foreign Minister on multilateral trade policies and bilateral trade agreements (Hay, 2000).

The Directorate General for Multilateral Economic and Financial Co-operation of the Italian MFA offers an interesting example of multilateral economic diplomacy conducted through multistakeholder partnerships with domestic and international stakeholders. The department plays an essential role in navigating Italian participation in international trade and financial negotiations (Italy, 2004).

New Zealand's long-standing commitment to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is an important foreign policy goal. In an effort to engage the public in this goal, the Disarmament Division of the foreign ministry

co-operates with universities and arms control specialised NGOs. NGOs join diplomatic recruits in disarmament seminars. As part of the co-operation, universities invite government officials from the Division to appear as guest lecturers. NGO expertise is recognised as their representatives are periodically included in government delegations to international and regional disarmament talks (New Zealand, 2002).

The Public Diplomacy Strategy Board in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, consisting of senior ministerial officials, media people, and external non-civil servants, relies on non-state partners in defining the conduct of public diplomacy. Shaping a favourable British image abroad is a collective endeavour of a multitude of domestic stakeholders. Civil society, academia, the business sector, diaspora communities, and ethnic minority groups, as well as others, are considered network centres of which professional diplomats make valuable use in outreach activities with foreign publics. The Partnership and Network Development Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been tasked to draw on their experience and working practices (Great Britain, 2005).

In similar fashion, the Department of Information of Thailand's MFA liaisons with national mass media outlets in interpreting significant cultural and public diplomacy initiatives (Thailand, 2005).

The list of examples would be incomplete were we to forget the consistent efforts by some foreign offices to employ the experience of non-state actors in humanitarian relief and development assistance programmes. The Danish MFA implements its bilateral development assistance programs through a network of non-official professional organisations based on multistakeholder partnership mechanisms (Denmark, 2005). As well, Japan's educational assistance to developing nations is executed by a NGO network specialised in educational services – financed by the Japanese MFA (Japan, 2003). A Finnish MFA-NGO Liaison Union has attracted NGOs with special expertise to implement development projects in poverty reduction (Finland, 2003).

Of course, some national diplomatic systems do not view multistakeholder MFA-NGO partnerships with much enthusiasm. Such is the case, in particular, with France's *Quay d'Orsay*, which treats civil society organisations as groups defending specific political parties or foreign interests. Despite that, the French NGO Liaison Mission briefs NGOs on French external policy objectives and aids their participation in intergovernmental diplomatic events (Doucin, 2002).

Conclusions

The traditional perception of diplomacy as exclusively run by states is irreversibly changing. Modern diplomacy has to adapt to new realities of highly interdependent and globalised international relations where non-official actors provide considerable input in intergovernmental negotiation and establishment of international norms and regimes. States preserve the ultimate prerogative of principal architects of the diplomatic process and decision making. However, numerous examples amply demonstrate the growing role of non-state actors as policy shapers, not mere disseminators of expertise and information. This is due to the employment by the diplomatic community of a multistakeholder model as a complementary instrument in the UN system and other intergovernmental organisations. Through analysis of the procedural and institutional arrangements in the functioning of international bodies, the author has tried to measure the extent to which diplomats accept non-official networks and entities as equal partners in the diplomatic negotiation process. On the domestic front, societies demand greater public accountability of governments in the process of national foreign policy making. The paper analyses this trend through the organisational units in MFAs responsible for relationships with domestic stakeholders. Domestic multistakeholder practices allow for better representation of an array of societal interests in the formulation of national foreign policy values and priorities.

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MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL DIPLOMATIC SYSTEMS

William Taffotien Assanvo

The multistakeholder approach to negotiation is a new perspective and approach in addressing, solving, and dealing with an increasing number of issues at local, national, regional, and global levels. Most state and non-state entities, including governmental constituencies, multinational firms, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations are establishing, or have established, or are otherwise involved in multistakeholder practices.

The aim and the essence of the multistakeholder approach is formidable – to ensure that through dialogue and consensus building the views of the parties who have influence over or are likely to be affected by a particular policy, project, or decision are expressed, understood, taken into consideration, and integrated at all stages of a project. The overall objective is to promote better decision-making processes. The essential point of the multistakeholder approach is that everyone involved in the process has a valid view and relevant knowledge, resources, expertise, and experience to bring to decision-making.

Currently, diplomats involved in the multistakeholder environment are experiencing a number of substantial and significant changes in their job: they are actors involved in diplomatic activities with issues that are more complex and diversified than in the past. In this respect, Cooper (2001) has claimed that "in the new environment, the classic political and strategic matters are no longer the preponderant element on international relations" (p. 12). Likewise, national interests now need to take into consideration the global economy, international migrations, environmental crises, terrorism, drug trafficking, arms proliferation and cybercriminality (Brown and Studemeister, 2001). To say the least, in the complex, modern environment, "diplomacy will be more complicated" (Hocking, 2001) and will need expertise from other sectors.

The purpose of this paper is to report on one aspect of the Multistakeholder Diplomacy Research undertaken under the auspices of the DiploFoundation with the support of the Global Knowledge Partnership. This research program encompassed various topics, of which multistakeholder practices within national diplomatic systems worldwide was one. The author conducted the

research reported here during a three-month internship at the DiploFoundation from October 1 to December 31, 2004.

Objective, Tools and Methodology of the Research

The main objective of this particular part of the Multistakeholder Diplomacy Research was to examine multistakeholder practices or arrangements in the foreign services of some national diplomatic systems, with a focus on:

- identifying major domestic stakeholders involved in foreign policy shaping;
- identifying foreign ministry offices or departments in charge of relations with domestic stakeholders, their functions and responsibilities;
- mapping forms of interaction between national diplomatic services and domestic stakeholders;
- examining modalities of interaction between national diplomatic systems and domestic stakeholders.The research was based on identification, analysis, and summary, in the form of briefcases, links, and annotations, relevant information related to multistakeholder practices or arrangements within diplomatic systems.

Forms of Multistakeholder Practices within National Diplomatic Systems

Multistakeholder practices are visible in a number of processes within diplomatic systems: for example, in decision-making, in decision implementation, in negotiation, and in foreign policy formulation and conduct. Surveying a range of national diplomatic machineries' organisational charts, activities, and outlines of departmental, official, and bureaucratic responsibilities permitted the mapping of various forms of multistakeholder practices and arrangements. Multistakeholder practices take many forms, including:

- the creation within Foreign Ministries of departments or offices charged with liaison with domestic stakeholders (other domestic governmental agencies, parliaments, academia, businesses, media, churches, NGOs, trade unions, the private sector);

- permanent and/or periodic consultations between Foreign Officers and domestic stakeholders;
- dialogue with domestic stakeholders on both a formal basis (seminars, conferences) and an informal basis (meetings between Foreign Officers and members from NGOs, academia, media);
- the inclusion of personnel from NGOs, academia, business, in official delegations to international conferences;
- multidimensional supports (financial, material, and institutional) to NGOs or other stakeholders in their actions;
- the development and delivery of humanitarian assistance through NGOs and the creation of actor groups on particular issues.

Outcome of the Research:
Benefits of Using a Multistakeholder Approach

The issues and concerns with which national diplomatic services worldwide are currently dealing are complex and diversified. Addressing local, national, and global issues requires engagement with a number of changes, notably opening to other professional sectors and setting up new types of professional culture. This context also calls for greater transparency, governance, and participation by a wide range of local and national actors. Foreign policy can no longer be considered solely the responsibility of diplomats.

Yet, adopting a multistakeholder approach within a diplomatic system is not only a demand from national citizens; it is also necessary for better efficiency and effectiveness within national foreign policy procedure. Using a multistakeholder approach gives national diplomatic machineries the opportunity to benefit from resources, experience, and expertise from other stakeholders. Other stakeholders' inputs (opinions, views, thoughts, ideas, and information) can significantly improve the formulation of the perspective of national interests and can improve the negotiation process. This is particularly relevant because other stakeholders bring different points of view, leading to a better perception or vision of all policy facets. Adopting a multistakeholder approach helps to gain support from significant stakeholders, leading to a national consensus regarding foreign policy and its implementation.

Recently, governance has become an important value within political, economic, and social processes. National governments are urged to apply governance principles. A multistakeholder approach ensures better governance

because all main stakeholders feel a greater sense of ownership over foreign policy decision-making.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Mauritius Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During this research, the author surveyed a number of national diplomatic systems, looking for representative multistakeholder practices and arrangements. Several of these are presented here.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), as in other ministries studied, seeks to open to other UK stakeholders (local and national). This attitude is fuelled by the will "to tap into the expertise and experience of a range of groups and communities throughout the UK, from trade unions to faith communities, and from ethnic minorities to business and the voluntary sector" (FCO, 2004).

To carry out this objective, a particular unit has been created: the *Partnership and Network Development Unit*. This unit is responsible for encouraging involvement of other stakeholders in the work of the FCO. To date, the FCO, through this Unit, has been involved in dialogue and consultations on various issues with a number of communities and groups throughout the UK, including local communities, minority ethnic communities, faith groups, and the voluntary sector (FCO, 2004).

The Mauritius Ministry of Foreign Affairs Trade Policy Unit. Within the Mauritius Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Regional Co-operation section, the overall mission of the Trade Policy Unit consists of "formulating Mauritius Trade Policies and to ascertain that its concerns are adequately reflected in Multilateral and Regional Trading Arrangements and global trade rules" (MFA, 2004a). The unit is charged with the strategic task of elaborating negotiating positions of Mauritius in the context of global (World Trade Organisation) and regional (COMESA, Southern African Development Community, African Economic Community) trade negotiations.

In order to efficiently and effectively ensure the interests of Mauritius, as well as those of the Mauritius business sector, the Trade Policy Unit works closely with other Ministries, the private sector, academia, trade unions, and NGOs. This collaboration occurs through consultation and the dissemination of information to relevant stakeholders on a timely basis.

As well, within its Regional Co-operation Agenda, the Mauritius Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks "to promote national inter-sectoral consultations on issues of regional interest" (MFA, 2004b).

Conclusion

This research has permitted the identification of stakeholders involved and has analysed the most frequently encountered forms of practice and arrangement within some diplomatic systems. It also has permitted the mapping of and analysis of the benefits that diplomatic services, and particularly national foreign policies, could gain using a multistakeholder approach.

Clearly, this approach is relatively new and only a small number of diplomatic services has implemented it; nevertheless, considerable work remains in order to systematise and generalise this perspective in contemporary diplomatic services. It would be important and interesting to assess already existing multistakeholder practices as well as their difficulties and outcomes. We should "give the floor" to national stakeholders, so that they could offer their views and assess efforts and initiatives to get them involved in foreign policy making and in foreign ministries activities.

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Part IV

MULTISTAKEHOLDER NETWORKS

MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY AT THE OECD

John West

In the same way that nothing under the sun is new, multistakeholder diplomacy was not born yesterday. For example, the International Labour Organisation was set up in 1919 with tripartite representation from governments, employers, and trade unions. Since its creation in 1961, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has had consultative relations with business and labour stakeholders.

What *is* new, however, is that multistakeholder diplomacy has become a dominant trend in international relations over the last decade or so. This is particularly the case for multilateral organisations like the OECD, the United Nations, World Bank, and regional development banks. To some extent, this reflects changes in society and governance at the national level with the emergence of globalising stakeholder societies.

In this paper, I would like to outline multistakeholder diplomacy at the OECD. In order to do so, I first make a few remarks about the OECD and then comment on the emergence of globalising stakeholder societies, to set the scene for my remarks on multistakeholder diplomacy at the OECD.

The OECD groups 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market economy (OECD, 2005). Best known for its publications and its statistics, its work covers economic and social issues from macroeconomics to trade, education, development, science, and innovation. In short, the OECD helps societies and governments manage globalisation for the benefit of all. It does this through its studies, its policy dialogue, and its policy recommendations and instruments. Of particular relevance here is that while the OECD is and remains an inter-governmental organisation, it collaborates increasingly closely with other stakeholders, notably business, labour, parliamentarians, civil society, and academia. Yet, to look for the reasons why an inter-governmental organisation like the OECD undertakes such extensive multistakeholder diplomacy, we need to look first at the changing nature of government and the changing nature of these stakeholder groups in society.

Changing Nature of Government

Human history has witnessed major evolutions in systems of governance (OECD, 2002b). Top-down, centralised, and hierarchical systems of kings, chieftains, and dictators have gradually given way to democratic systems characterised by elected representatives, separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government; rule of law; and independent media. Transparency, accountability, and integrity are essential elements of good governance in democracies.

Freedom House (2005) has described the 20th century as the "Democratic Century" in light of the proliferation since the mid-1970s of democratically elected governments around the world. Indeed, this is the third wave of democratic expansion in the world, following the first wave from the 1820s to the 1920s and the second, shorter, wave in the 15 years following the end of World War II. The 20th century has also seen a dramatic expansion in the number of sovereign states. According to Freedom House (2005), 119 of the world's 192 states are electoral democracies (or 62%) – compared with 69 out of 167 (or 41%) some 15 years ago. In 1950, only 22 of the world's 154 sovereign states and colonial units (or 14%) were electoral democracies.

As well, over the last century, the size and scope of government have expanded enormously, particularly in OECD countries (World Bank, 1997). One indicator is general government outlays in GDP, which have risen from less than 10% one hundred years ago to over 40% in the last couple of decades. At the same time, the role of the state has changed with an emerging consensus that the state should set the policy, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for an efficient market economy.

Moreover, while democracy has been expanding across the planet, the nature of democracies has been changing in response to economic globalisation and rapid technological change (particularly in response to information and communications technologies). Governments no longer have a monopoly on authority for a population within a well-defined territory (OECD, 2000).

Globalisation has led governments to realise that they cannot tackle an increasing number of issues on their own – most notably in the provision of public goods (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 1999). Multilateral agreements in the areas of trade, finance, environment, and development represent ways in which governments have sought to co-operate to solve global problems. Another emerging area for international co-operation is the analysis of best practices and benchmarking of domestic policies; in these arenas countries

have much to learn from each other. Comparison with other countries can create pressures to improve national performance, while membership requirements can be a powerful motivator for reform in non-member countries seeking to join.

One indicator of such government awareness is the growing role of international organisations like the OECD. It is estimated that the number of international intergovernmental organisations has grown from less than ten at the end of World War II to almost 300 today (Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond, 2004). Many international organisations are also expanding their membership and missions. The OECD has expanded its membership over the last decade with the admission of Mexico, Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, and the Slovak Republic. Some of the highest priority issues, which are yet relatively new on the OECD agenda, are topics like education and health.

In recent years, many OECD governments – such as UK, Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden (and other countries such as China and Indonesia) – have transferred economic development powers to cities and regions (OECD, 2004a). This means that decisions can be more responsive to the needs and preferences of local people. Helping to ensure the availability of the right public services in the right way can strengthen democracy.

Towards Globalising Stakeholder Societies

Stakeholders are those who have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or representatives of a group (Hemmati, 2002). This includes people who influence a decision, or can influence it, as well as those affected by it. In this context, most OECD governments have well-established models of consultation with business and labour stakeholders, including models for wage determination and industrial relations issues. In addition, many OECD countries have long-standing traditions of citizen involvement in public policy making.

Recently, several driving forces have led OECD member countries to focus attention on strengthening relations with citizens (OECD, 2002a). These forces include the steady erosion of voter turnout in elections, falling membership in political parties, and declining confidence in important public institutions. Calls for greater transparency and accountability have grown, as public and media scrutiny of government action increase and standards

in public life become codified and raised. Increasingly educated, well-informed citizens want their views and knowledge taken into account in public decision-making.

These new demands are emerging against the backdrop of a fast moving, globalised world increasingly characterised by networks rather than by hierarchy. The Internet has opened new frontiers in the independent production and exchange of information, while providing a powerful tool for co-ordination among players on opposite sides of the globe. Citizens are also increasingly active politically – by direct participation, through civil society mechanisms – in policy debates that interest them (OECD, 2003a, OECD, 2002c). Their activity constitutes a broadening from representative to participatory democracy. Traditional democracy aggregates citizens by communities of neighbourhood (their electoral districts), while participatory democracy aggregates citizens in communities of interest. Thanks to modern information and communication technology, these communities of interest can be global as readily as local.

One of the predominant features of the globalisation of the world economy over the last decade or so is the dramatic rise in foreign direct investment and associated growth in importance of multinational enterprises (MNEs). International production is now carried out by over 900,000 foreign affiliates of at least 61,000 MNEs world wide (United Nations, 2004). These affiliates currently account for an estimated one-tenth of world gross domestic product and one-third of world exports, and their shares are increasing.

National governments widely accept MNEs as providers of beneficial flows of investment capital and managerial and technological expertise; as creators of high quality, well paid jobs; and as important sources of tax revenues (OECD, 2004b). MNEs thus contribute in many ways to promoting progress toward sustainable development. At the same time, public concerns remain regarding the social, economic, and environmental impacts of their activities. The organisational complexity of some MNEs, which can make it difficult to follow and discern their activities, may accentuate these concerns. Further, today's competitive forces are intense and some enterprises may be tempted to neglect appropriate standards and principles of conduct in an attempt to gain undue competitive advantage.

At the same time, many MNEs have responded to the "corporate social responsibility" movement. They have improved their management controls and practices to achieve appropriate standards of day-to-day business conduct. The development of business tools such as codes of conduct and related management and reporting systems has been one of the major trends in in-

ternational business over the last 25 years. Enlightened businesses are now working with other actors – especially with unions and non-governmental organisations – to improve their policies and management and reporting practices in the economic, social, and environmental fields.

Of course, the debate over the effectiveness of voluntary social responsibility initiatives continues. The core responsibility of business is, after all, the conduct of business itself. However, it is increasingly accepted that responsible business is good business.

In this spirit, MNEs increase their visibility in public policy discussions, both at the national and international level, either directly or through international business associations (Muldoon, 2004). The International Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1919, has always been a major player, while the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD was founded in 1962. More recently, particularly since the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, international business associations have flourished – witness the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum, the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders' Forum, CSR Europe, Business for Social Responsibility and the Global Business Council on HIV & AIDS, to mention just a few.

The second half of the 19th century saw the foundation of the trade union movement, whose fundamental concerns have always been to protect workers' rights, to secure the right of workers to form and join independent trade unions, and to bargain collectively with their employer (ICFTU, 2004). However, the globalisation and rapid technological changes that have affected the work place have also affected trade unions at the national level. Thus, the international trade movement has emerged dramatically from its humble origins in 1889 when the International Federation of Boot and Shoe Operatives, the International Federation of Tobacco Workers, and the International Typographical Secretariat were created.

The main objectives of the international trade union movement are the defence and promotion of trade union rights and labour standards, as well as the building of an international framework for economic and social justice. A social dimension to the rules of the global economy is crucial as social equality within and between nations is increasing. Accordingly, international trade union organisations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Trade Secretariats, and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD are increasingly active regarding:

- cases of perceived violation at the workplace of workers' fundamental rights, most notably at export processing zones where union rights are suspended or severely restricted;
- integration of basic labour rights in strategies for sustainable development and poverty reduction;
- integration of core labour standards (freedom of association, right of collective bargaining, ban on discrimination at the work place, abolition of child labour, and ban on bonded labour) into the procedures and mechanisms of the World Trade Organization (WTO);
- social consequences of financial crises and, in particular, the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) were born when the first cave man formed a hunting club with his neighbour. **CSOs include a wide of array of organisations: community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations.** The 20th century saw the creation of a large number of CSOs in response to war and related humanitarian crises – CSOs such as Save the Children, Oxfam, CARE, World Vision, and Médicins Sans Frontières. From the 1960s, many NGOs turned their attention to disasters and humanitarian crises in developing countries.

The universe of CSOs is vast and heterogeneous, and includes:

- small, close-knit village organisations in developing countries;
- humanitarian and emergency relief organisations, sometimes financed by governments;
- "watchdogs" and independent monitors of government activities;
- actors in development projects – a growing amount of official development assistance is now directed to CSOs for project implementation in developing countries;
- environmental and human rights activism;
- policy analysts and lobbyists;
- global communities of interest.

Since the 1980s, a remarkable number of CSOs (particularly NGOs) have arisen, and their influence has waxed. One indicator is the number of NGOs with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – this figure has grown from 4 in 1946 to 900 in 1990 and to over

2200 in 2002. The enormous increase in CSOs started at the time of their participation in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, and continued at the UN conferences on Human Rights, Population, Social Development, Women, Human Settlements, and the Food Summit. *Agenda 21* (United Nations, 2005) is the first UN document to address extensively the role of different stakeholders in the implementation of a global agreement (Josselin and Wallace, 2001).

The rise of the anti-globalisation movement in the 1990s saw the emergence of different CSOs and a different style of CSO. They were more forceful, demanded to sit at the table with governments, and took on different issues. The OECD experience with the unsuccessful negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the WTO Seattle Ministerial were important turning points. We also saw the emergence of broad, diverse alliances of groups that sometimes had little in common except for the desire to contest government and multinational business.

Notwithstanding the diversity of the CSO universe, it is worth noting that some opinion polls suggest that public opinion often trusts CSOs more than government. Even so, many CSOs (including NGOs) receive funding from business, government, and the European Commission, which belie their non-governmental status (CSO budgets keep growing strongly, in sharp contrast to official development assistance). Governments and CSOs are increasingly working in partnership in many policy areas. Both government and business are increasingly inviting CSOs to contribute to national and international policy debates.

Multistakeholder Diplomacy at the OECD

With this background in mind, I now turn to the issue of multistakeholder diplomacy in the OECD. Multistakeholder diplomacy aims to bring together major stakeholders in a relationship of communication, dialogue, or participation in decision-making. In his Millennium Report, the UN Secretary-General made a clear case for multistakeholder diplomacy:

> Better governance means greater participation, coupled with accountability. Therefore, the international public domain – including the United Nations – must accept the participation of the many actors whose contributions are essential to managing the path of globalisation. Depending on the issues at hand, this may include

> civil society organisations, the private sector, parliamentarians, local authorities, scientific associations, educational institutions, and many others. (Annan, 2000, p. 6)

As mentioned earlier, the OECD has long practised multistakeholder diplomacy to the extent that, since its origin, it has consulted with business and labour through the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD and the Trade Union Advisory Committee and other CSOs. Further, the OECD *Observer* was launched in 1962 to be distributed "especially to people who are most directly concerned with the development of society, i.e., members of governments, members of parliaments, labour and management leaders, leaders of industrial and agricultural organisations, trade organisations, bankers, educational institutions, scientists and the press" (OECD, 2002d, p. 64). The OECD began publishing books in its early years and has always attracted attention from the media.

Although, until the last decade or so, the OECD has been a very discreet and oftentimes confidential and closed organisation, the following examples show different ways in which the OECD has become more open and active in multistakeholder diplomacy.

Through Communications

Over the last year, OECD member countries reviewed the OECD approach to communications in the context of public controversy over the implications of globalisation. They endorsed a new communications strategy for the organisation that recognises that the OECD can fulfil its role effectively only through a coherent and targeted approach to communications, based on the highest standards of transparency and public accountability. Effective communications enhances organisational ability to promote intergovernmental co-operation and assist the governments of OECD member countries in communicating policies to their constituencies.

The main objectives of OECD communications are: (1) to explain the OECD better; (2) to disseminate OECD information and policy advice effectively; (3) to develop coherent and targeted messages; (4) to strive for transparency, impartiality, and accountability. The OECD is very active in its communications activities, notably through the OECD website and other on-line information services, publications, and the media.

Through Dialogue

Following an extensive review of the OECD relations with civil society in 2000 and 2001, OECD ministers recognised the importance of growing OECD co-operative activities with CSOs, complementing the organisation's co-operation with long-standing partners, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee (OECD, 2003c). The ministers stressed that this dialogue builds trust in public institutions and promotes public understanding of the benefits and challenges of global economic and social change. Over the last decade or so, multistakeholder dialogues in the areas of trade, the environment, development, co-operation, and information and communication technologies have become a feature of the work of most OECD committees.

Trade. The OECD underpins the multilateral trading system by providing analytical work and by helping to build understanding on sensitive issues, to facilitate negotiations at the WTO and to strengthen the constituency for free trade. Dialogue with civil society constitutes a significant part of these efforts. In this context, the OECD Trade Committee holds an annual informal consultation with CSOs, simultaneously with its autumn meeting. This informal consultation is a complement to the regular consultation mechanisms established at the national level in OECD member countries. Member countries and observers are encouraged to invite national CSOs, while a number of international CSOs active in important trade policy issues are also invited. To enhance transparency, a summary of Trade Committee discussions appears on the Internet following each meeting, as do official documents, once declassified. CSOs are also invited to participate on an *ad hoc* basis in conferences, symposia, and workshops. The 2004 consultations, which took place on 19 October, addressed business outsourcing and some aspects of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations.

Environment. A healthy environment is a prerequisite for a strong and healthy economy, and sustainable development needs both. The OECD provides a forum where countries can share their experiences and develop concrete recommendations for developing and implementing policies to address environmental problems efficiently and cost-effectively. The OECD has participated in a long tradition of CSO dialogue in environment policy, as CSOs have constituted a strong environmental lobby since the 1960s-70s. The role of CSOs has been evolving from one of primarily awareness-raising to one incorporating broader participation in policy implementation, decision-making, and monitoring activities.

Stakeholder representatives (business, labour, and CSOs) participate in a range of activities, including regular consultations, under the OECD Environmental Policy Committee (EPOC). Informed of the EPOC agenda, their views on non-confidential documents are sought. The participation of environmental NGOs is co-ordinated by the European Environmental Bureau and includes representatives of the World Wildlife Federation, World Resources Institute, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth. Stakeholders also participate in various conferences, workshops, expert meetings, and in some EPOC working parties and expert groups. A recent highlight in EPOC stakeholder dialogue activities was the stakeholder consultation with OECD Environment Ministers at their meeting in April 2004. Topics addressed included climate change and energy; globalisation; trade and environment; decoupling and resource efficiency; and technology innovation to address environmental challenges.

Development co-operation. OECD development work focuses on increasing aid flows and ensuring the use of this aid in the most effective manner to reduce poverty (to attain the poverty reduction targets of the Millennium Development Goals [Annan, 2000]) and to promote sustainable development in developing countries. CSOs have long been active in development and they co-operate closely with development co-operation agencies, both in funding and execution of aid programmes, and in defining aid policies and formulating public education on development. CSOs bring vast expertise to the table and help maintain support for development co-operation. Business and labour are taking more and more interest in the international development agenda.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee itself has wide-ranging interaction with CSOs for the development of policy guidelines and other analyses, as well as for peer reviews. One feature of OECD collaboration with CSOs is the organisation's annual contribution of data to the Reality of Aid publication, which presents an NGO view of donor assistance. In sum, CSOs make an important contribution to the work of the Development Assistance Committee as they are working towards the same goals and complement each other.

The OECD Development Center has played an important role in publishing directories of NGOs active in international co-operation and in studying the role of civil society in development co-operation. A recent publication (OECD, 2003b) concludes that civil-society participation in policymaking not only enhances efficiency in implementation, but also contributes to the creation of more pluralistic and democratic political systems.

Information and communications technologies (ICTs). ICTs are an important motor for economic growth in OECD countries and can be a means to help meet development objectives for poverty reduction, education, health, and environment. Policy-making in this domain has long required dialogue between governments and business; since the mid-1990s, one strength of the OECD in this area has been to bring the voice of civil society into the debate, particularly concerning regulatory frameworks. The main areas of this involvement lie in protecting consumers in the online marketplace and in balancing the rights of the individual (as a citizen, student, worker, consumer, or member of a minority) and the interests of enterprises and governments.

The OECD dialogue in these areas reflects its involvement in issues of law enforcement in the domains of privacy protection and security of information systems and networks. The nature and the mechanisms of the involvement, and the organisations concerned, vary widely according to the subject and the type of work conducted. Involvement – and corresponding dialogue – ranges from full participation in the activities of the Committee to informal contacts between secretariats on specific projects.

Several CSOs active in the areas of privacy protection, free speech, and civil liberties have participated alongside member governments and the representatives of business in expert groups preparing OECD Guidelines. The first such experience was the negotiation of the Guidelines on Cryptography Policy (over 1996-1997) and, more recently (2001-2002), the revision of the Guidelines on the Security of Information Systems and Networks. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, this work was particularly sensitive and all participants strove to ensure that the updated Guidelines struck the right balance between security, economic imperatives, privacy, and the rights of citizens. As a matter of routine, Consumers International, the body representing consumer associations across the globe, participates in all substantive activities of the Committee on Consumer Policy – including the drafting of the Guidelines on Consumer Protection.

Through Participation

Although one cannot neatly draw a dividing line between "dialogue" and "participation," some OECD multistakeholder co-operation goes beyond mere dialogue.

OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises. The OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises (OECD, 2003c) are recommendations for good corporate behaviour, addressed to MNEs by governments of countries providing most of the world's direct investment flows and home to most MNEs – namely, the 30 OECD member countries plus eight non-member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). They provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas including employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, competition, taxation, and science and technology.

First established in 1976, the guidelines were revised in 2000 in constructive dialogue with business, labour, CSO, and non-OECD stakeholders. At a very early stage, the OECD decided to involve the groups with whom consultations occurred at the time of every negotiating session. Drafts of the revised guidelines were also placed on the OECD Internet site for public comment. Implementation procedures for the guidelines explicitly provide a role for business, labour, and CSOs, all of whom may raise alleged breaches of guideline recommendations. Stakeholders now participate in Roundtables on Corporate Responsibility held in conjunction with the annual meetings of the National Contact Points for the OECD guidelines for MNEs. CSO contributions to these Roundtables are published as part of the OECD Annual Reports on the guidelines. In addition, the National Contact Points, as a group, hold consultations with CSOs simultaneously with each of their annual meetings; as well, throughout the year the OECD Investment Committee consults with them on the guidelines and on other foreign direct investment matters. Stakeholders have also begun to play an increasing role in promoting the OECD guidelines.

Fighting corruption. The private sector and civil society have frequently been ahead of governments in combating corruption. They have a personal stake in doing so. Most of the corruption in a society involves at least one of three principal actors between which exists a triangular relationship: the government, the business community, and the civil society. Corruption can take root in all three parties to the relationship. It is virtually impossible to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption effectively without the participation of all three. The OECD, therefore, has carefully worked in close collaboration with business associations, trade unions, NGOs, and the media in its anticorruption activities.

Civil society was vital in bringing about the signing by 35 countries of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public

Officials in International Business Transactions. CSOs, notably Transparency International, participate in the monitoring mechanism of the Convention. The OECD invites representatives of the private sector, trade unions, the media, and NGOs to exchange views on the structures put in place by governments to enforce the laws and rules implementing the Convention, and on their application in practice. CSOs are also an essential partner for regional outreach initiatives.

Multistakeholder Summitry at the OECD

Beyond day-to-day activities, the OECD has brought multistakeholder diplomacy to the highest levels by launching a multistakeholder summit in association with the annual OECD ministerial summit. The OECD Forum is a major international conference that brings together leaders from business, labour, civil society, and media to discuss the hottest issues on the international agenda with government ministers and heads of international organisations. Speakers are usually at the level of Minister or CEO. The sixth edition of the OECD Forum, *Fuelling the Future: Security, Stability and Development,* took place in Paris on 2/3 May 2005.

Some Concluding Comments

Multistakeholder diplomacy has become inevitable in a world of complex policy issues. At the same time, stakeholder groups, and governments themselves, are doomed to see global problems through the lens of their own specific contexts and conditions. A well-known story perfectly symbolises the situation, that of the elephant in a dark room. Everyone touches a part of the animal and everyone is right in what he or she describes, but no one grasps the animal in its whole.

Multistakeholder diplomacy provides a means, a hope for grasping the animal as a whole. It can help devise innovative solutions to critical problems. Nevertheless, it is very challenging. A number of lessons have emerged at the OECD.

Importance of efficient organisation. While it may seem obvious, the complexity of multistakeholder diplomacy requires paying attention to the following guiding principles: (1) start planning early; (2) demonstrate com-

mitment; (3) guarantee data protection; (4) tailor your approach to fit the groups; (5) test and adapt tools; (6) analyse the results; (7) provide feedback; (8) evaluate the process and its impacts.

Take each other seriously. Taking each other seriously is more challenging than meets the eye. It requires solid commitment and responses from all sides.

Learn by exploiting the "community of practice." Multilateral organisations are undertaking a vast array of multistakeholder diplomatic activities. Technical experts with their own constituencies undertake many of these. Some valuable initiatives exist for sharing experiences, such as the UN Civil Society Liaison Officer Network that meets annually, in which the OECD participates. Some organisations have provided their own high-level reviews; for example, the Panel of Eminent Persons, headed by former Brazilian President Cardoso, was appointed by the UN Secretary-General to examine United Nations-Civil Society Relations. Within the OECD Secretariat, the Public Affairs Division acts as a "clearing house" for the organisation's multistakeholder activities.

Develop consistent practices about multistakeholder diplomacy. Both within and between different international organisations, multistakeholder activities vary greatly. Common learning could be the basis for developing consistent practices in multistakeholder diplomacy. This could help stakeholders to understand what is expected of them, what they are being invited to do, and how reliable that role will be. The aim should be to generate commitment and forge partnerships, because the ultimate goal is to find the best solutions to the many challenges, risks, and problems that arise in the globalising world economy.

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RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES IN MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY

Chris Lamb

Recognition of the need for new approaches to diplomacy is now widespread. The intergovernmental relationships that have governed diplomatic activity for centuries can no longer meet the needs of people. This is particularly so in the Internet era, as is recognised by the UN itself in the context of such events as the World Summit on Information Society. In addition, a number of events have forced a new realisation on governments and intergovernmental organisations of the fact that to accomplish their own economic and social goals they need to involve a much wider range of stakeholders.

Alongside these realisations, governments have recognised that military strength alone can no longer assure international peace and security, which can be threatened by situations of poverty, disease, and despair. This is of special significance in countries so destabilised by disease and poverty that their own capacity for country management is damaged.

Governments became more willing to discuss cases of internal difficulty or instability with the reshaping of world alliances and relationships at the end of the cold war. This must be seen, however, as an addition to the earlier and fundamentally important development of treaty systems that saw governments accepting internationally-monitored obligations towards their own citizens. The best examples of this at the global level are the human rights and environment treaties system. In the fields of economic and social development, however, few examples contain so many lessons for the future as the work on disaster preparedness and disaster response. Preparation for disaster and disaster response are very relevant today, but they also show how work at the national level on an issue with priority in international diplomacy can be affected by rooting the multistakeholder approach at all levels simultaneously.

Background

In 1999, governments and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, meeting at their 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red

Crescent, adopted an international plan of action for the following four years. That plan included a commitment by states to establish national disaster preparedness plans that would include the representation of National Societies in appropriate national policy and co-ordination bodies (ICRC, 1999a). In the same plan of action, governments supported the need for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to initiate a study of the working relationships between states and National Societies. Hopefully, the working relationships would take account of changing needs in the humanitarian, health and social fields, the auxiliary role of National Societies and the evolving roles of the state, the private sector, and voluntary organisations in service provision (ICRC, 1999b).

The IFRC itself had become more deeply involved in the evolution of its own role in multistakeholder diplomacy about five years earlier. On 10 October 1994, after active discussion with many different governments, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/2 through which it accorded the IFRC observer status at sessions of the General Assembly. The resolution includes an important preambular paragraph, in which the multistakeholder approach is clearly resonant. It is worth quoting in full, for it shows how one of the foundations of modern multistakeholder diplomacy is set:

> Recalling the special functions of the member societies of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies which are recognized by their respective Governments as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field on the basis of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. (UN, 1994)

In other words, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are in many positions at the same time. They are independent, neutral, and impartial. They are also recognised by their governments and, in most cases, formed by parliamentary action of one kind or another. Their secondary role, once seen as auxiliary to their country's armed forces medical units, is now very much wider, although their work with the IFRC on issues relevant to the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law has lost none of its urgency or priority.

The decision in 1999 to study the evolution of this auxiliary role took place amidst awareness that National Societies and their International Federation had come to play a new and different role in national and global affairs. The study itself was brought to the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross

and Red Crescent in 2003 (ICRC, 2003), and will continue. The definition of the role, as this Conference shows, is evolving against the backdrop of similar changes in thinking in the international community.

Current Developments in Multistakeholder Diplomacy

Perhaps the best reflection of the way the International Federation's approaches sit alongside those of the other parts of the international community is the Federation's main strategy document, *Strategy 2010* (IFRC, 1999), also adopted in 1999. Its four core areas – the promotion of fundamental principles and humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and care in the community – are at the base of all the International Federation's multistakeholder diplomatic activity.

The UN response to the same developments, that is, to increasing multistakeholder diplomatic activity, came from member states in many ways, just after the adoption of the IFRC's *Strategy 2010* and the decisions of the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The most important UN response, perhaps because of its relevance to the growth of respect for multistakeholder diplomacy, was the Millennium Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in September 2000. Through this, heads of state and governments provided the UN and its family organisations with a clear responsibility to address the vulnerability of people at the same time as they sought to address their traditional agendas.

The Millennium Declaration formed the basis of new but erratic approaches to best ways of bringing civil society into international negotiations. It was unevenly accepted at the national level and the experience of the IFRC shows that only a combination of government willingness and civil society capacity will ensure its wide acceptance. This is why capacity-building programs are such an important part of the IFRC agenda.

The UN itself recognised that it had a responsibility from the Millennium Declaration to provide inspiration and, perhaps, a lead to governments and other parts of the international community. The vital decision, taken in 2002, was the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations chaired by former President Fernando Enrique Cardoso of Brazil.

The Cardoso Report, launched in June 2004, will have its first full airing in the UN General Assembly later this year. It reaches many conclusions

important to any discussion on multistakeholder diplomacy. One is that the multilateral agenda has changed and will increasingly respond to global issues brought forward by civil society and what it describes as "a crescendo of public opinion." Therefore, as the report says, multilateralism already includes ongoing processes of public debate, policy dialogue, and pioneering action to tackle emerging challenges.

These points are also picked up in the report of the UN's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. This report endorses the recommendations of the Cardoso Report on the establishment of a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organisations. Nonetheless, the recommendations are not directed with sufficient precision to make a real difference to the way the UN will work.

The Place of the IFRC in Current Multilateral Diplomacy

It is not the purpose of this paper to review the recommendations, but the IFRC's position as an organisation with a world-wide, grass-roots base does give us an opportunity to comment.

I remember well the time when the IFRC obtained its observer status with the UN General Assembly. There was considerable debate at the time as to whether adopting the draft resolution proposed by Australia would introduce a plethora of unrepresentative and unaccountable non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to the heights of international diplomacy and rule-making. In the end, the General Assembly adopted the proposal, after member states were satisfied that the auxiliary status of National Societies effectively distinguished them from NGOs. States also felt that the quadrennial International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent gave them a part in the evolution of the National Societies' priorities and programs.

The answer to this so-called dilemma was provided by a number of governments deciding to embark on domestic processes of consultation with NGOs and coalitions. This led quickly to some making it a regular practice to include representatives of those coalitions in their governmental delegations to international conferences.

Since then, the idea has matured to the point that the first provisional list of participants in official delegations to the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan showed that no fewer than eleven governments included people from outside the government itself. Of these,

six included people from their national Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies. The eventual numbers will be larger; the point to emphasise is that governments are becoming increasingly ready to include stakeholders when they move into international diplomatic negotiation. This point is all the clearer from the simple statistics that the Kobe conference was attended by over 4000 delegates from 168 governments, 78 observer organisations and 161 NGOs, not to mention 562 accredited journalists.

With the same objective of inclusivity, some governments and international organisations facilitated the presence of multi-national expertise in the IFRC Delegation at the Kobe conference. They did so partly because they knew that the IFRC's status provided the persons with a platform from which their expert knowledge could be easily integrated into the conference processes. These governments were perceptive. Although they could not have known it when they composed their delegations, the handling this year by the UN of the Tsunami disaster has underlined the importance of the IFRC role. Our status has enabled the UN to bring our expertise to centre stage in debates and negotiations in Geneva, New York, and other centres.

Our status also made it possible for ASEAN to include the Secretary-General of the IFRC in its Ministerial Meeting on the Tsunami Disaster in Jakarta in January. It has made it easy, despite the restrictions imposed on wider civil society by outdated rules of procedure, to bring the voice of communities to the centre of discussions about how to meet their needs.

The IFRC will take its multistakeholder constituency from many other stages into international diplomacy in the next years. One of the most important is in debate surrounding the implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration and its Development Goals. The purpose of referring to this again is to observe the multistakeholder dimension of the IFRC's consistent presentation to UN discussions.

The IFRC in the Future

We believe that vulnerability is best assessed, and best addressed, in concert with the people who experience that vulnerability. We say that the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are a realistic set of objectives, but that their achievement will, in most cases, depend on the willingness of governments to design and implement programs in consultation with the people directly affected. This means that government

at all levels – from local government to intergovernmental negotiation at the UN – must work with community representatives at each of those levels if development programs are to be successful in a MDG context. The MDGs present, hence, the greatest challenge to traditional ways of doing multilateral business.

The arrival of the MDGs on the scene in 2000 was followed by several other important and similar signs that new ways of doing business must be found. Some have already been mentioned: the Cardoso Panel of Eminent Persons and the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel (the reform panel). However, others are visible. One of the important tasks ahead is to bring their conclusions together and foster a coherent debate on them.

Apart from those already mentioned, those of greatest interest to the IFRC include:

- The work in progress on Good Humanitarian Donorship, which places substantial emphasis on accountability and, hence, on programming that takes account of the needs of the beneficiaries of assistance (CIDA, 2004). As it develops, it will bring other stakeholders and their interests to the centre of the international development debate. It will also permeate national level programming for the vulnerable, in both developing and developed countries.
- A review commissioned by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator of global response capacity. Although the review addresses needs in a disaster situation, it will include the work done at the national level to build community resilience and prepare for potential disasters. Any such work has implications for the stakeholder base to which governments and other institutions need to be accountable as they work towards their objectives.

The Non-Aligned Movement addressed similar themes at a ministerial meeting held in Durban in August 2004. The call put to the ministers in the opening address by the President of South Africa was for the Movement to rise to three challenges in 2005, the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Conference which created the Movement.

The third of those challenges is the most relevant in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy. President Mbeki saw it as the restructuring of the global exercise of power, and suggested that the Movement needed find a way to build a "democratic inclusive" answer for the affected people themselves (Mbeki, 2004). Some important steps in that direction by the bodies most

responsible for the global exercise of power include the way the UN Security Council has agreed that HIV/AIDS presents a threat to international peace and security. A long way remains before the Security Council's own procedures will permit the debates that this subject requires, but it is some comfort that the agenda item is alive.

It is also a comfort to us that the UN General Assembly has followed its own Special Session on HIV/AIDS (in 2001) with specialised high-level debates on the issues. The IFRC will utilise its observer status and take part; we will say, as we did in the first such high level debate (in 2003), that the debate would have been much more useful if the voices of civil society organisations, representing other stakeholders, could have been heard (IFRC, 2003).

We feel, as our President said to the special high level UN General Assembly debate on HIV/AIDS in 2003, a special sense of responsibility when we take part in debates that are closed to wider civil society because of old rules of procedure. We want to see much more inclusivity in the future, in the UN, and in all bodies that share objectives relating to peace, development, and the protection of human dignity.

The Objectives of the IFRC in the International Community

The UN family's work on its procedures coincides with similar but essentially unrelated work in other institutions, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Although the world knows us as one of the foremost examples of multistakeholder diplomacy at work, we too recognise the need to tune ourselves better to the needs of the most vulnerable.

We have taken some important steps of our own. One, already mentioned, is the study of the auxiliary status of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Another, just as far-reaching, is the 2001 Strategy for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IFRC, 2001). This strategy concerns the work of all components of the Movement – the ICRC, the IFRC, and each of the National Societies. One of its objectives relates to international diplomacy and relations with governments and other external actors, and makes it clear that we should see consistency in the humanitarian approach, as well as a thorough commitment to the Fundamental Principles of the Movement and to the integrity that must be present in our work at all times. This strategy is now under review. One of the issues that will be prominent is the way the Movement as a whole and in its individual parts relates to

the outside world – in other words, the way its own multistakeholder action reflects its multi-constituency nature.

Similarly, the IFRC is examining the way it fits into a future already very different from the time during which it was built. The IFRC's next General Assembly Session will be held in Seoul in late 2005, where one of its main agenda items will be a discussion of the kind of federation the IFRC will be if it is to represent the interests of its members in a changing external environment. To be fully effective, the work now being done needs to reach the people in whose name so much multistakeholder work is done.

Accordingly, it is the IFRC's hope that the World Summit on Information Society, when it concludes in Tunis at the end of 2005, will have identified the needs of the vulnerable as one of their priority areas for future work. For us, as we have said at several international conferences in recent years and emphasised recently, vulnerability exacerbated by remoteness is a particularly important challenge. It is, however, a challenge to address through effective communication and the use of the Internet and its panorama of opportunities.

The Summit, we believe, presents a considerable challenge for proponents of multistakeholder diplomacy. Many governments are still reluctant to accept that the Internet has changed forever the way they communicate with and listen to their constituents. The Summit, largely built around standard UN conference rules of procedure and incorporating a wide and inclusive process in preparatory stages, is unlikely to bring many of the beneficial concepts unveiled during those stages into its outcomes.

Nevertheless, the preparatory stages have opened a new window into the management of conference processes in the future. Their own public and its constituencies now demand of them what a few governments were doing in terms of public consultation 20 years ago. Our view of this, from the vantagepoint of our community-based organisation, is that at the top level of government it becomes easier to gain acceptance of the importance of this multistakeholder consultation. It is still difficult, however, in many countries to reach into the bureaucracy with fresh ideas and fresh ways of working. This is a significant challenge for us all.

Thus, what the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement sought 20 years ago in terms of respect for the views and needs of communities is now at the centre of the international development agenda, where it will stay. What is still missing is an international community that knows how to respond to the challenges this multistakeholder world presents. Some serious political

constraints limit the freedom of movement of international organisations, starting with the fact that almost all are membership organisations composed by governments.

This limitation is one of the reasons why the last 15 years has seen such a growth of alternative forums for the discussion of major world issues. One that deserves mention is the World Economic Forum, which meets every year in Davos (Switzerland) and has spawned related events on particular issues in other places. The IFRC is very grateful for the opportunity to provide its experience and insights to the World Economic Forum. We have found it invaluable for discussion of ideas and a very useful forum to reach another range of stakeholders who are often difficult to contact through regular channels. We place a high priority in reaching the private sector with our issues and have been consistently pleased with the reception our ideas have produced. Partnerships with the private sector are an essential part of the partnership agenda we must all develop in the future.

Conclusion

The Cardoso Report tackles the broad question of the place of partnerships and the multistakeholder approach by observing that governments in the multilateral world for which the UN was designed came together to agree on and then implement policy. The Cardoso Report called the process "omnigovernmentalism." Now, the report says, the world is multilateral and embraces many constituencies from many sides of debate in the process of decision-making.

The Cardoso Report says the UN should respond to this challenge by fostering multistakeholder partnerships, reaching to constituencies beyond member states. This, we say, is also a demand posed by the MDGs and, in particular, by Goal 8, built around the need for new partnerships for development. IFRC multistakeholder diplomacy has evolved in exactly this direction. Without these partnerships, and especially without partnerships linking the communities to governments, the MDGs will not be achieved. Without progress on those economic and social fronts against poverty, deprivation, and despair, the UN will not maintain the respect of the people of the world. Multistakeholder approaches, involving the people affected by the decisions of diplomacy, are the key to the next generation of governance for the world.

Debate on the Cardoso Report and the other important documents in the reform agenda will show us whether the world is ready to accept the changes to diplomatic patterns already in progress. The challenge for the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, as for all others committed to development, namely, the eradication of poverty and fostering peace, is to partner the same change process and to build the capacity of communities so they can play their part in the new stakeholder equations of the future.

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Part V

MULTISTAKEHOLDER MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESSES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Anush Begoyan

This paper presents a summary of multistakeholder processes in conflict resolution conducted for the DiploFoundation. Due to the global consequences of contemporary conflicts, conflict resolution is one of the most important fields of international politics and one of the areas where multistakeholder co-operation can produce the most fruitful outcomes.

This report first supplies a brief theoretical introduction to current developments within the international system, to changes in the reality and the conceptualisation of the nation-state, and to resultant changes in the security system and the notion of national (state) interests. Via the prism of these developments, the paper examines the changing character of contemporary intra-state conflicts and their driving forces.

It proceeds to analyse the main actors and stakeholders involved in contemporary conflicts and to offer a preliminary classification of these actors based on the magnitude of their activities, the nature of their involvement, and their potential for conflict resolution and transformation. Here, the term c*onflict resolution* covers processes of conflict management and conflict transformation.

Obviously, this report raises more questions than answers. More detailed and intensive research on the subject would provide criteria and categorisations for the examination of stakeholder involvement in conflicts; it would analyse possibilities for more productive multistakeholder initiatives in the resolution, management, and transformation of contemporary conflicts. However, at this stage one can draw some conclusions and recommendations to argue for more and wider multistakeholder co-operation in conflict resolution.

Evolution of Nation-States and the International System

With the end of the Cold War, the character of violent conflicts changed substantially. Currently, civil, intra-state wars of different scopes and dimensions affect almost a third of the countries around the world, while the number of pure, "modern" inter-state, military clashes has shrunk. This change includes not only a change in the ends and means of conflicts, but also a change in the actors involved and the agendas they pursue.

The reasons why this occurs and, subsequently, how it affects contemporary conflicts and the field of conflict resolution, lie in the changing character of the contemporary state. Compared to the classic Westphalian system of national sovereignty, the *post-modern state* has a complex inter-ethnic and inter-religious configuration, as well as political construction. Some political analysts perceive the current process of state transformation analysts as a failure or a malfunction of the state, apparently due to the emergence of two opposing trends. Both increasing levels of devolution and delegation of power to local authorities and increasing globalisation and transfer of control to global governance institutions decrease national sovereignty. Thus, some of the essential roles and purposes (in some cases even monopolies) of states are taken over either by local authorities or by regional or global inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as other global players.

Other analysts see this transformation as the evolution of the state as a political structure. They describe the post-modern state (usually coinciding with developed Western democracies and open market economies) as a higher and more advanced political edifice that enjoys all the benefits of an open system of inter-dependence and co-operation.

While some states seem to be moving from a modern to a post-modern structure, others apparently are regressing to pre-modern positions of internal strife, disorder, and turmoil. While post-modern states willingly give up some of their sovereignty in favour of power-sharing, thus enjoying the advantages of an open system of inter-dependence, pre-modern states fail to perform the basic functions of control over territory or provision of basic needs and basic conditions of security for their citizens.

Failed or failing states can be characterised by disharmony between communities that often grows into civil war, a collapsed or non-existent infrastructure, a high rate of criminal violence, highly corrupted governments, governmental bodies with clan or tribal structures, a lack of legitimacy and, in many cases, a failure of the government to exercise its authority outside the capital city. In the context of political and economic impotence, non-state actors play a bigger and more important role as providers of security, political goods, and economic opportunities (Rotberg, 2002). Pre-war Afghanistan and Sudan serve as illustrations of countries that have fallen into a pre-modern state.

This transformation of the state also implies changes in security concerns and objectives (the system of threats and fears along with the measures to overcome and defeat them) (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wide, 1997), and in the

perception of national interests that used to be automatically associated with state interests. Currently, national interest can be opposed to the interests of state regimes and the security of different groups, like national minorities and ethnic, religious, and other groups, on the one hand, and global security, on the other, may become the main focus of contemporary security systems.

Obviously, these rapid and substantial changes also affect the international system as a whole. The international system that we knew consisted of nation-states with sovereignty over their territories and a monopoly over the exercise of violence within that territory. Clear borders demarcated the domestic from the international, the authority within those borders from the anarchy of the international system. Nowadays, features of the international system either have changed or are in process of transformation.

In contemporary reality, we see a growing number of cases of anarchy within states – many processes, even if they are not chaotic, are still outside the control of states. Meanwhile, global governance becomes increasingly powerful and affects more aspects of our lives in social, political, and economic spheres. In some cases, the transparency of borders reaches a level where they become a vague notion and sovereignty is either a mere symbol or transformed to something requiring a new term.

The fact that today no clear borders separate these unevenly developed parts of the world has further complicated the overall situation. Post-modern countries of prosperity, peace, and democratic values intermingle with failed, pre-modern states throughout international relations.

One of the main causes and, at the same time, consequences of these changes in the concept and essence of nation-states and of the transformation of the international system, is the rise of new state and non-state actors. A growing number of non-state actors are becoming actively involved in, among other things, conflicts and the management and transformation of violent intra-state conflicts.

Dissection of Intra-State Conflicts: A Theoretical Background

Post-modern, intra-state conflicts differ greatly from traditional, inter-state conflicts fought between sovereign nation-states for political motivations, such as territory or sovereignty. In brief, contemporary warfare is a new form of violent conflict presenting a complex face that includes guerrilla and civil war, often with features of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Post-modern conflicts occur mainly because of individual or group motivations, on behalf of ethnic or religious groups, or nations. These are mainly armed conflicts (generally fought with small arms and light weapons) taking place within state borders, undertaken by non-regular (non-state) paramilitaries, such as mercenaries or terrorists (or "freedom fighters" by other standards of qualification). With the decentralisation of security, private entities started to provide security services of different dimensions and complexities, becoming part of the equation in violent conflicts.

Contemporary conflicts go beyond traditional military warfare and civilian populations may become deliberate targets of hostilities. These conflicts are fuzzy and difficult to control or predict as the motivations of warring parties and actors involved are vague, varying, or concealed. Obviously, this means that often more than two parties are directly involved in a conflict and almost all levels and groups within society are directly or indirectly affected by it.

The comparison between modern (traditional) warfare and contemporary, post-modern conflicts is summarised in *Table 1*.

TABLE 1 – The Changing Character of Contemporary Conflicts: A Comparison of Modern and Post-modern Warfare. (Based on Møller, 1996)

Modern:	Post-modern:
Who? ➢ Conscript professional	➢ Militias, terrorists, child soldiers
On whose behalf? ➢ The state	➢ Nation, ethnic, religious group, warlords
Against whom? ➢ Soldiers, civilians	➢ Civilians
Why? ➢ Political ends: territory, sovereignty	➢ Individual and group ends
How? ➢ Principles of war	➢ Guerrilla warfare, terrorism
By which means? ➢ Conventional weapons	➢ Small arms, non-lethal weapons, information systems

In the globalised world, no more borders distinguish so-called "zones of peace" (the prosperous and developed democracies of the West) from and "zones of turmoil" – globalisation enables a proliferation of threats with the same intensity as that of trade.

In sum, current conflicts are multistakeholder phenomena, involving a variety of actors, whether representing states or other entities. Consequently, as the state is no longer the main and only player involved in conflicts (it no longer enjoys a monopoly on violence), it also cannot be the sole actor in conflict resolution. This implies the active participation of a range of stakeholders in the process of conflict resolution, and the application of so-called "second track diplomacy."

New Actors and Levels of Multistakeholder Participation in Conflict Resolution

Multistakeholder partnerships are a relatively new political phenomenon and have only recently become instruments for policy-making. Their emergence is linked to the rising stakes of the private sector and of civil society. NGOs, trade unions, mass media, and other groups representing different interests claim stakes in policy-making, made even more complex by the spread of ethnic and religious, national and trans-national movements on the one hand, and the increasing involvement of global actors in contemporary conflict resolution, on the other.

These developments entail a growing need for the representation of divergent interests in conflict resolution. Although new actors are usually classified according to their affiliation with nation-states (state or non-state actors), in order to examine their role in the resolution, management, and transformation of contemporary conflicts I suggest classifying them according to the scale of their activities and authority compared to that of the nation-state.

This implies two scales of multistakeholder participation in conflict resolution processes. The first is the participation of large international actors or stakeholders, primarily global or regional inter-governmental treaty organisations like the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) – players larger than the state. The second is the scale of local actors and stakeholders, such as private business, civil society organisations, or national, ethnic, and religious groups. The second level of participation usually takes place with

the backing of a third party, either international NGOs dealing with conflict resolution and related issues or under the auspices of inter-governmental organisations.

The two levels of participation are different in many ways, because of their different objectives, stakes, and strategies. The involvement of the second level of stakeholders usually aims at resolving a particular small-scale problem and, accordingly, has only an indirect impact on a conflict as a whole. Alternatively, their involvement can be a process-oriented mission aiming to establish a better environment in general, facilitating a dialogue between conflicting parties. This practice is known within the conflict resolution community as "dialogue projects" or "trust building projects."

The involvement of global players in conflict resolution typically has a more direct and bigger influence (positive or negative) on a conflict and its dynamics. These players can afford to engage in conflict resolution at any stage – starting from peace making (the cessation of hostilities), through peacekeeping operations (the implementation of cease-fires), to involvement in conflict settlement, as principal participants (negotiators, observers, arbiters, or mediators).

Hence, the main participants involved in the resolution, management, and transformation of contemporary conflicts may include a variety of global actors, actors from the private sector and the media, paramilitary, religious or other traditional leaders.

Global actors: global and regional inter-governmental organisations. As mentioned, in the contemporary international system, borders between so-called zones of peace and zones of war are fuzzy and difficult to define. Any local conflict has the potential to generate cross-border unrest. Due to far-reaching consequences, such as refugees or economic costs, contemporary conflicts have not only regional, but global affect, raising the stake of global players who may represent the interests of the international community as a whole.

UN peacekeeping and nation-building missions have a separate place in the system of multistakeholder involvement. UN involvement and its role in Kosovo and East Timor represent the culmination of international and institutional engagement efforts in conflict resolution. Even in the context of the legacy of UN involvement in Slovenia, Namibia, and Cambodia, these two examples represent a unique case.

Private sector. The private sector is one of the most important and most powerful stakeholders in contemporary conflicts, as it has access to and control over economic power – an extremely powerful lever in the global system. Business and conflict intertwine in two ways. The first is the

way in which conflict affects businesses, usually reduced to factoring in financial risks in relation to investment decisions. The second, the reverse influence of the political, social, and economic impacts of businesses and their effect on conflict dynamics, is less studied, but is a crucial aspect of that interconnection (Arowobusoye, 2005; International Alert, 2004a, 2004b; Haufler, 2002).

The media. The media is a potent stakeholder in the management of contemporary social relations, due to its power to reach, influence, and manipulate large audiences. It is also a powerful means of politicising issues and of generating division between sides of a present or future conflict. The power of the media, however, can be used not only for generation or escalation of conflict, but also for its resolution (Howard, Rolt, van de Veen, and Verhoeven, 2003; Melone, Terzis, and Beleli, 2002).

Para-military groups. The form of the participation of para-military groups in the processes of conflict resolution can be controversial. Along with the transformation of the means and forms of contemporary conflicts, the need arises to identify new military, political, economic, and social methods of influencing these groups and their role in conflict resolution.

Within paramilitaries, child-soldiers constitute a separate group. A special approach is required for their care and to the protection of their rights before, during, and after conflicts. More than 300,000 children under 18 years of age are ruthlessly exploited as soldiers in government armed forces or in armed opposition groups in ongoing conflicts (Amnesty International, 2004; Coalition to Stop the Use of Childsoldiers, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2004; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004).

Facilitation of the engagement of paramilitary groups in political processes and political dialogues seems to be one of the most effective tools for demilitarisation and, eventually, for conflict settlement.

Traditional and religious leaders. As contemporary conflicts are mainly intra-state conflicts fought around issues of identity, be they national, religious, or ethnic, traditional leaders and religious leaders have an important role to play. In situations of chaos and turmoil, they represent the forces that have the potential to unite and consolidate people.

Often the authority of these leaders is recognised across the conflict line. This power can effect either escalation or resolution of conflicts. Accordingly, this power and influence of traditional and religious leaders must be recognised and utilised by decision-makers and used to facilitate reconciliation and trust building between and within communities.

Conclusion

Current changes to the contemporary international system, the changing nature of the nation-state, changing notions of security and how to provide it, the transformation of the concept of national interests – all substantially reshape the nature and methods of contemporary conflicts. On the one hand, the *de facto* presence of new actors with their specific interests, agendas, and strategies, and, on the other hand, the absence of mechanisms for *de jure* recognition and accommodation of those interests, fuel more and more violence in different corners of the world.

Meanwhile, we are witnessing the rise of powerful global actors that represent bigger interests that are able (via access to financial, human, and military resources) and willing to play an active role in the settlement of intra-state conflicts. These global, intergovernmental organisations are the only ones with a legitimate mandate to intervene and seem to be the more potent actors in the resolution of conflicts.

Nonetheless, international NGOs seem to be more capable and skilled in terms of knowledge and competence. They are less constrained by politics, free from bureaucratic apparatus and procedures and are able to link theory to practice in their activities. These circumstances create optimum conditions for gathering and accumulating knowledge and experience. In addition, international NGOs working on these issues seem to be the only entities with access to global actors at the highest international level and, via their grassroots branches and/or partner organisations, to local groups.

Thus, the partnership between global players with access to resources and power and international NGOs with expertise and access to information from all levels and sectors of society has the potential to produce the most effective outcomes for conflict resolution. Meanwhile, the interaction between smaller-scale actors, such as civil society groups, media and others, is essential in terms of breaking down stereotypes and rebuilding dialogue and trust between conflicting parties.

Multistakeholder processes are a new phenomenon in politics in general and, in particular, in conflict resolution. While further research on the various stakeholders and multistakeholder partnerships is needed in the field of the resolution, management, and transformation of contemporary conflicts, one major conclusion can be drawn: it is no longer up to states alone to start or to stop violence. Multistakeholder partnerships are an important factor in the sustainable settlement of contemporary conflicts.

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POST COLD WAR DIPLOMATIC TRAINING: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO INTER- AND INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS

Victor Shale

The demise of the Cold War has ushered in a new phase in international relations, a phase characterised by new forms of conflict. Whereas the Cold War conflict was mainly between the West and the East, with devastating effects on the Third World, the new era has seen the emergence of new and, in some countries, intensified intra-state conflict having the potential to assume an international character. The world also experiences higher levels of terrorism than has been seen before. The United States, Britain, and other European countries have become targets of ferocious attacks in which the enemy uses lethal strategies of destabilisation. The attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 and suicide attacks in the Middle East demonstrate the ferocity of the strategies employed by terrorist organisations.

One consequence of the change from Cold War era conflict to conflict in the post Cold War era is that traditional diplomacy, also referred to as First Track diplomacy, has had to change its approach in order to cope with the new developments. Defined by Sir Harold Nicolson (1988) as the management of international relations and the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by foreign service personnel, some scholars believe that traditional diplomacy is no longer adequate in addressing conflicts. They advocate Second Track citizen diplomacy that makes use of people outside the traditional diplomatic sphere. While not underestimating the strength of traditional diplomacy, these scholars argue that it may not be suitable in some settings, advocating co-harnessing traditional diplomats with other professionals.

A conundrum, however, lies in whether diplomatic training has to accommodate the various organisational and professional cultures or, whether, given the prevalence of terrorism and conflict, diplomats might prefer traditional diplomatic training. This paper examines multistakeholder diplomatic training and its importance as an approach in penetrating different cultures. The paper also examines whether this approach could be used to minimise intractable conflicts such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Sudan, and in the Horn of Africa.

Contemporary Global Conflict

Many people had hoped that the end of the Cold War would see the arrival of a new, peaceful era in world politics. Instead, it saw the flourishing of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and in many other countries. Unlike the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War where nation-states were clear enemies, recent and emerging conflicts are highly destructive both within and across state boundaries. Most of these conflicts involve ethnic groups who seek to control existing states or to establish their own states (Bradshaw, 1999). While these conflicts are political in nature, the underlying causes for these conflicts, particularly in African states, may be a dearth or absence of good governance, a scramble for natural resources, high levels of poverty, and inequitable distribution of resources.

Kelman (2003) indicates that nation-states used to be dominant actors within the global arena. However, issues of conflict and security are no longer the domain of states alone. Just as states have now become redundant, so has their exclusive exercise of diplomacy. One of the new, dominant actors in the field is the UN. Nonetheless, current conflicts are very difficult for the UN to contain, as they do not involve international aggression. The UN can act without hesitation only if the conflicts were of an increased intensity, consisting of disruptive interactions between two or more states. The UN could act decisively if the conflicts had a high likelihood for military hostilities that would not only destabilise their relationship, but also upset the structure of the international system. Consequently, it is necessary for diplomacy to take centre stage in creating more negotiation and less confrontation in international affairs.

The conflicts cannot be called wars because no state has declared war on another. Rather, they are civil wars as they often involve citizens of the same country. These have been hugely destructive and expensive. The intractable conflict in Angola where landmines have killed and crippled many people is a typical example. Likewise, the second American-led war on Iraq and others of its kind resist attempts to shift from confrontation to diplomacy. The use of military force by a country on another without UN sanction could have serious consequences to international relations. Countries that perceive themselves threatened may begin to strengthen their security by procuring arms. They may also form alliances with the super powers or, in the case of smaller states, allow foreign army bases in their territories as a defence strategy. It is

because of these possibilities that diplomacy has a greater importance than ever before.

Clearly, many countries will take some time before they refrain from the use of force. It would be myopic, therefore, to think that the use of force will end immediately. Despite this reality, the countries affected by these conflicts need to give diplomacy a chance before resorting to confrontation. The invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies offers a recent case. Much evidence suggests that the US was impatiently counting down days before the war on Iraq. The President made it clear around January 2003 that diplomatic efforts in Iraq would not continue indefinitely. He indicated that diplomacy would last for only "weeks not months" (Ross, 2003). It was unrealistic of those who promoted an invasion of Iraq (no matter whether right or wrong) to expect a quick and smooth military operation, given the hasty manner in which the diplomatic process was handled. As with many other conflict situations that culminate in full-blown wars, pre-war missteps always have negative outcomes in the post war period. The allied forces in Iraq are now having a difficult time trying to normalise the situation in Iraq – a problem that the US could have avoided had diplomacy been given a chance.

However, despite the prevalence of destructive conflicts and the consequent risks of regional instability, one can note a significant decline in the potential for conflicts to become international. However, the risk of external involvement exists, as one can see in the case of French involvement in the Ivorian conflict. The involvement of France has led to more tension in the Ivory Coast, resulting in the Ivorian president moving from being a friend of the French to being their foe.

Wilkenfiel and Brecher (2003) state that post Cold War crises have been more amenable to mediation by the international community and its organs than those that took place during the Cold War. The example of the Ivorian conflict illustrates that despite the recent escalation of this conflict, mediation by South African President Thabo Mbeki has resulted in a commitment from both the Ivorian government and the rebels to talk.

A number of institutions are usually involved in combating conflict at both the national and international levels, as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These institutions vary from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), state agencies, and nations, all of which act through various representatives such as officers, state officials, and diplomats. Due to the numerous levels of cultural conflict, diplomats are well placed to tackle the conflicts that divide communities. They become involved in the processes

of developing and participating in policy networks that bring together the resources of governmental and non-governmental actors. They have been involved, for instance, in the issue of conflict diamonds and their role in financing the continuing conflicts in Southern Africa.

Diplomacy

The strategic objective of any state, irrespective of its size, in its relations with other states, is to direct and influence those relations for its maximum benefit, thus gaining political or economic advantages while promoting international co-operation and harmony (Nailatikau, 2003). Influence applied through diplomacy entails negotiations in which state representatives draw from an accumulated wealth of experience in international relations. In negotiations, parties reach some form of agreement based on common interests. Negotiation is one of the most effective ways of dealing with conflict, whether at interpersonal, state, or inter-state levels because it offers the parties an opportunity to communicate.

Given the fact that nations and their governments have not seen the last of wars and internal conflicts, diplomacy remains the best tool available to reach agreements, compromises, and settlements. This involves attempts to change the policies, actions, objectives, and attitudes of other governments and their diplomats by persuasion, reward, concession, or even threat (Holsti, 1995). As well, diplomacy not only attempts to change policies of other governments, but it also prepares the basis for the formulation of domestic foreign policy. Facilitated by international law at state and inter-state levels, in turn it generates treaties. As Starr (1995) puts it, both law and diplomacy create intergovernmental organisations that facilitate more diplomacy and more international law. In sum, diplomacy today involves highly technical, bureaucratised, mutual learning experiences in which governments construct formulas to address multi-faceted international challenges. It is not only concerned with persuasion, but also with creating new knowledge for the benefit of those who may not comprehend a problem. Diplomacy therefore entails the management of change that arises from time to time in international relations.

Like other processes, diplomacy has undergone a number of changes. The old diplomacy imitated the systems that it used to represent. A significant development in diplomatic procedure has been the growing sense of global unity, the importance of peoples' involvement in all matters that affect them,

and the rapid increase in direct communication between heads of state. High-ranking officials can now bypass the traditional diplomatic intermediary and maintain direct communication. Such diplomacy did not exist during the Cold War, yet it is now commonplace (Holsti, 1995).

Diplomatic Training

The main objective of diplomatic training is to provide relevant skills to enable diplomats to execute their mandate effectively. In many countries, the personnel in the foreign ministries receive training and orientation on the fundamentals of foreign service. The methods of recruitment and subsequent appointment differ from country to country. Nicolson (1988) points out that in Britain, for example, the recruitment of personnel entails a thorough training in languages and some of the basic techniques of the Foreign Service. After careful selection, the candidates for Foreign Service training undergo probation and examinations. The service training introduces them to some practical skills in conflict management, negotiation, trade and investment, promotion, rank, protocol, and etiquette. In Germany candidates also go through several stages of probation and then take examinations in international law, economics, and history.

The traditional and still predominant approach to diplomatic training is through courses or programmes taking place at diplomatic academies or ministries of foreign affairs. The traditional approach reflects the reality of the 19th and 20th centuries when diplomats communicated mainly among themselves. In his book on diplomacy, Sir Harold Nicolson (1988) enumerates seven ideal moral and intellectual qualities that diplomatic training inculcates in diplomats: truthfulness, precision, calmness, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty. A "diplomatist" requires all seven virtues, not easily found even in the ordinary politician. When explained in detail, truthfulness means a thorough care to avoid the suggestion of the false or the suppression of truth. A good diplomat should always ensure that the impression left with the people with whom he or she negotiates is free of incorrectness. Precision, on the other hand, means moral and intellectual accuracy. Accuracy in mind and in soul is, therefore, imperative.

Calmness refers to the ability to suspend judgement. A diplomat must be able to eschew all personal animosities, all enthusiasms, prejudices, and moral indignation. Good temper and exceptional patience are attributes of a real

diplomat. Patience is a fundamental quality required by any diplomat because, as indicated earlier, diplomacy is essentially about negotiation. Negotiation is an enormous task for each negotiator and the process consumes considerable time, hence, the need for patience. During a negotiation process, each negotiator decides what to offer, what to reject, and how many concessions to make. In terms of its psychological effect, the principle of equal concession has an effect on individual diplomats in that they have to be mentally ready to accommodate those with whom they negotiate.

Modesty is also another quality vital to diplomacy. A real diplomat should not suffer from vanity and should be able to put him- or herself in another person's situation to understand the other. As I have argued elsewhere, people see themselves in the image of another. It follows therefore that to understand the thinking and the feelings of others, they have to wear their shoes and walk in them (Shale, 2004). Accordingly, a diplomat owes loyalty to all those with whom he or she works, from superiors to colleagues. A diplomat represents the ideals, values, and beliefs of his or her people; he or she often waives individual beliefs and conscience in favour of those of superiors (Harvey, 1985). Therefore, quick decisions in diplomacy are rare, since a diplomat always has to accept a proposition of his or her counterpart *ad referendum*.

The Value of the Multistakeholder Approach to Diplomatic Training

Individual countries need to adopt multistakeholder diplomatic training in order to produce diplomats more qualified for information gathering and trade negotiations. One issue high on the international agenda today is trade. Unlike in the past, where countries held bilateral trade negotiations, regionalism is the current, preferred *modus vivendi*. Countries now form regional pacts to channel and receive funds. Bodies such as the European Union prefer to work with these regional pacts, rather than with individual countries. For this reason, it is fundamentally important for countries to include technical experts and NGOs from various professional cultures in delegations to multilateral conferences. The inclusion of private citizens in diplomacy provides an opportunity to form and discuss opinions that inform the decisions of government officials and heads of government (Holsti, 1995).

A multistakeholder approach to diplomatic training allows diverse cultural interaction and suggests that diplomatic staff members not confine

themselves to the accepted circle of embassy guests. The rigidity of traditional diplomacy can be a disadvantage to diplomats because they will not get information if they are selective in interacting with people. The rigidity can be extreme. For example, the former US Ambassador to the UN during the Carter Administration was "fired" for having a cup of coffee at the UN in New York with a representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (McDonald, 2003).

Also pertinent to the question of the rigidity of the traditional diplomatic training method is the issue of morality. The extent to which diplomats are free to make moral choices is a subject that realists have often questioned. For instance, Rosenthal (1995) cites Morgenthau as saying:

> If we ask ourselves what statesmen and diplomats are capable of doing to further the power objectives of their respective nations and in what they actually do, we realize that they do less than they probably could and less than they actually did in other periods of history. They refuse to consider certain conditions, not because in the light of expediency they appear impractical or unwise, but because moral rules interpose an absolute barrier. (p. 223)

Actions such as those leading to the "firing" of a US Ambassador are discouraged by most diplomatic experts, particularly those who advocate a multistakeholder diplomatic approach because they believe that information is better obtained through informal means. It is easier to persuade and obtain information from local and foreign sources in a social setting that removes the strain of rigid protocol. Therefore, the training that current diplomats undergo should prepare them to be dynamic in their approach to international affairs.

The Role of Civil Society and Non Governmental Organisations

Civil society refers to sectors of society organised in any form and for any purpose (Selinyane, 1997). Civil society can be organised in trade unions, women's organisations, human rights groups, media associations, lawyers associations, and other professional and non-professional groups (Kabemba, 2003). Given the inevitable shift in diplomacy, civil society needs to play an active role in influencing developments in international relations. Diplomatic training has to extend into incorporated civil society groups. A tailor-made

content must accommodate them so that they create not only pressures, but also new resources that can strengthen governmental endeavours to achieve peace by diplomatic means.

NGOs are autonomous non-profit and non-partisan UN-affiliated organisations that advance particular causes or sets of causes in the public interest. They focus on many issues and operate in a manner consistent with the objectives for which they receive funds. NGOs depend on funding from governments, the UN, private trusts and individual donations, religious institutions and other NGOs (Steinberg, 2003). They contribute tremendously to diplomacy through their meetings, making important resolutions and conveying them to official diplomats. For instance, as Holsti (1995) indicates, in the recent discussions and negotiations on human rights under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, some NGO members were included. The collaboration between diplomats and NGOs is a requirement in the achievement of diplomatic goals.

The growing importance of civil society and NGOs in the last fifteen years has changed the way diplomats communicate with other professional cultures. Modern diplomats now communicate with very diverse professional cultures that have very specific ways of approaching issues. Diplomats can prepare for these changes by reforming training practices and adopting a multistakeholder approach as one of the basic principles of diplomatic training. Through close, daily contact with a variety of professions, diplomats can absorb information and develop the skills to communicate easily with different professional cultures (Kurbalija, 2004).

The range of relevant foreign affairs work experience that exists outside the Foreign Service is such that movement between the private sector, civil society, NGOs, and other foreign affairs related entities is now more feasible than ever before. In a world that is evolving rapidly, the constant infusion of talent from internationally engaged organisations is essential if government is to escape from what Quainton (2001) refers to as the sterile conservatism of an entrenched mandarinate.

Citizen Diplomacy

Having looked at traditional diplomacy and the multistakeholder approach to diplomatic training, and cognisant of other existing forms of diplomacy, it is important to look at citizen diplomacy as a complement to official

diplomacy in managing conflicts. We can define *citizen diplomacy* as an approach to negotiation that brings together professionals, leaders of opinion, and other influential individuals from communities or countries in conflict, without regard to their official status, to collaborate in finding solutions to a conflict. According to Davies and Kaufman (2003), citizen diplomacy complements official diplomacy, therefore opening opportunities for communication, cross-cultural understanding, and joint efforts to address parties' needs. Citizen diplomacy also seeks to bridge the divide between government and civil society, between elite and grassroots levels within communities, and between different cultural worldviews on how to manage conflicts.

A multistakeholder approach to diplomatic training allows for the inclusion of technical experts and private citizens. It is similar to citizen diplomacy in terms of targeting these groups. Both create a rich environment for information sharing. The difference is that the multistakeholder approach, although including various professionals, trains them for an eventual involvement in official diplomacy. Citizen diplomacy, on the other hand, includes various professionals who operate in unofficial capacities during conflicts. The important point to underscore is that citizen diplomacy prepares the ground for official diplomacy because the resolutions taken in the former influence and often form the basis for discussions in the latter.

The former US diplomat John McDonald related an instance where citizen diplomacy assisted the official diplomatic process. He states that following the accusations and counter accusations between the US and the Soviet Union with regard to involvement in terrorist activities, ten US private citizens visited Moscow and met with ten Soviet experts. They engaged in constructive discussions that ended up with the signing of a document that had recommendations on areas of co-operation. Two years later, the presidents of the US and of the Soviet Union met to discuss their co-operation on the issue of terrorism and adopted the twenty recommendations that were a product of citizen diplomacy (MacDonald, 2003). This illustrates that citizen diplomacy can be an indispensable ingredient to diplomatic method. It also follows that diplomatic training has to expand and incorporate various professional cultures.

The importance of the multistakeholder approach to diplomatic training cannot be over-emphasised. It is axiomatic that by accommodating other professional cultures, diplomatic training builds bridges for diversity and the smooth flow of information. The flow of information breaks many conflicts, as people rely more on facts than on perceptions about each other. Many of the deep-rooted conflicts in Africa and in other countries today are a result of

stereotypes and misplaced perceptions between parties. The diplomatic efforts to prevent such conflicts as exist in the Democratic Republic of Congo from spilling into other countries are made difficult, in part, by greater involvement of government officials and heads of governments than of private citizens.

The weakness of the traditional approach to conflict is that officials are usually prejudiced and sometimes force agreements between parties and set deadlines for them without regard to the causes of the conflict and to proper knowledge or acknowledgement of all the parties in the conflict. Premature agreement was perhaps one of the reasons that delayed the implementation of the Pretoria Accord signed in July 2002. This accord cites the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interrahamwe as responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It makes no mention of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda that was supported by the Congolese government (ICG, 2003). Forced agreements and deadlines have become anathema to the parties in the conflict, as it is in other parts of the world. It is important, therefore, that in any diplomatic engagement diplomats be augmented with skilled mediators trained in aspects other than traditional diplomatic training. This will assist diplomats to develop a broader and well-informed analysis framework to thwart conflicts.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have made a distinction between conflicts that occurred during the Cold War and those that have occurred since its end. Whereas conflicts during the Cold War were mainly polarised between the East and the West, with states acting as belligerents, contemporary conflicts are often between ethnic groups within and across state boundaries. These conflicts do not fit the description of international aggression as enshrined in the *Charter of the United Nations.* Consequently, it is difficult for the UN to apply an appropriate correction, such as intervention with peacekeepers. It remains a challenge to the UN and its member states to find solutions to these conflicts. The main question is whether the world will afford to have situations where diplomacy is insignificant in face of the use of force.

An important argument of this paper is that traditional diplomatic training is no longer adequate to address the global challenges that warrant diplomatic intervention. I have argued that the change in the form of global conflict requires a corresponding change in diplomatic strategies. Today's

diplomacy has to include technical experts from various professional cultures who are adept at handling the multifaceted nature of international affairs. Equally important is the involvement of civil society organisations and NGOs, since the current international agenda emphasises trade development. I have pointed out the importance of citizen diplomacy that makes use of various professionals as a supplement to official diplomacy.

It is fitting, therefore, to conclude that the inclusion of various professional cultures in diplomatic training is fundamental as states attempt to combat various conflicts within and across their borders and to pursue democracy and good governance. This paper takes cognisance of the importance of traditional diplomatic training such as diplomatic etiquette, state protocol, and itinerary preparation. The conjunction of traditional diplomatic training and other professional cultures could provide an impetus for the management of intra and inter-state conflicts. It is highly recommended if diplomacy is to be effective in its approach to the intractable conflicts that have arisen as a result of post Cold War changes – and as a result of factors that existed even before the end of the Cold War.

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CONCLUSIONS

MALTA – SALINA BAY CONCLUSIONS

The participants at the International Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy, held in Malta between the 11th and the13th of February 2005:

1. emphasised the value of the multistakeholder approach and the need to raise **awareness** about the positive results of organisations that already use a multistakeholder approach in their work;

2. promoted **understanding of processes** that support successful multistakeholder partnership and **highlighted lessons learned, including obstacles**, in developing the partnership;

3. encouraged efforts to place on the **agenda** of governments and intergovernmental organisations issues on which non-state actors believe debate and action is needed;

4. shared the conviction that the involvement of all stakeholders is **not intended to replace, but to complement and broaden, traditional international relations** conducted by sovereign states;

5. suggested that the **training of diplomats** should itself adopt a multistakeholder approach in order to enable them to react promptly and effectively to the dynamics of the global environment, and to interact with non-state actors including NGOs, the business sector, civil society, and international organisations;

6. promoted the adoption of **issue-based approaches** to facilitate easier exchange of ideas and co-operation among various stakeholders based on their concrete issues of concern or interest;

7. highlighted the importance of the multistakeholder approach as **a channel for vertical communication among different layers** of decision-making and implementation (local-national-regional-global);

8. understood that non-state stakeholders should themselves permanently change the **geometry of their participation** in international conferences and in related preparatory processes;

9. agreed that the multistakeholder approach has the potential to revitalise **democracy**;

10. believed that pragmatic and action-oriented multistakeholder coalitions should base their work on their **comparative advantages** in terms of expertise, networking resources, grass-root connections, financing, and other resources;

11. invited all stakeholders to use their creativity and resources to establish **new forms of dialogue and partnership** among themselves, beyond the traditional intergovernmental framework, even after the end of the WSIS process, to ensure that the objectives of the Information Society will continue to be on their active agendas;

12. recommended strongly the introduction of **a multistakeholder follow-up process to WSIS,** building on the lessons and methodologies of the WGIG;

13. invited governments that have not yet done so to introduce **Multistakeholder National Information Society Dialogues** as they pledged in the Geneva WSIS Plan of Action (¶ C1 8b). Participants to the Malta Conference, therefore, invite all governments to establish, before the second phase of WSIS in Tunis, national multistakeholder Information Society frameworks in order to provide *fora* for debating policy issues and promoting partnerships.

Salina Bay - Malta, 13th February 2005
Conference website: `http://www.diplomacy.edu/Conferences/MSD/`

The Salina Bay Conclusions were an official statement delivered by Ambassador Saviour F. Borg, Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations in Geneva, during the PrepCom 2 Plenary of the World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva, 24 February 2005).

MULTISTAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Recent publications by Diplo:

Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy
Edited by Hannah Slavik

This book is a collection of papers presented at two recent conferences held in Malta: the February 2003 "International Conference on Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy," and the February 2004 "International Conference on Organisational and Professional Cultures and Diplomacy." Topics covered include basic theory, intercultural communication in practice in diplomacy, negotiation and conflict resolution, professional and organisational cultures, and training for diplomats. The papers in this volume approach the topic of intercultural communication and diplomacy from a wide range of cultural perspectives, as the authors originate from 17 different countries and a variety of professional sectors, including foreign services, universities, businesses, and non-governmental organisations.

The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive
Kishan S. Rana

This book comprehensively examines the institution of the ambassador, a prime constituent of the international system, in terms of contemporary relevance, responsibilities, and potential. Noted diplomacy scholar G. R. Berridge (Emeritus Professor, University of Leicester) has called it "fluent, lively, comprehensive, in parts original, and, above all, sage." Jan Melissen (Director of Training, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael) says: "The book is highly recommended to practitioners. Its main purpose is to optimize the role of the ambassador in a globalised world." The book is based on the author's professional diplomatic experience of 35 years and scholarship of the academic literature.

Internet Governance: Issues, Actors and Divides
Jovan Kurbalija and Eduardo Gelbstein

The Internet Governance booklet, a part of the Information Society Library, does not attempt to provide definitive statements on Internet Governance issues. Rather, its aim is to propose a practical framework for the analysis, discussion, and resolution of the key problems in this field. The aim booklet explores and clarifies different aspects of the management and the governance of the Internet. Meant for anyone who is familiar with Internet Governance, it offers non-technical readers an insight into the few principles that are important and reasonably stable. It presents the material in a context relevant to the work of those involved in international relations. Furthermore, it aims to awaken the curiosity of readers enough that they will progress beyond this booklet and investigate and experiment and, thus, develop knowledge and take actions that will meet their particular needs.

This booklet was published in cooperation with the Global Knowledge Partnership, and has been translated into Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish.

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