

2.1. From Harmonising Cyberpolicies to Promoting Twiplomacy: How Diplomacy Can Strengthen Asia-Europe's Digital Connectivity

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Abstract

Together Asia and Europe accommodate more than two billion Internet users, which accounts for about two-thirds of the global user base, and this number is still growing. With the ever-expanding number of users, the Internet drives global social and economic developments; social media is central to the lives of many Asians and Europeans and e-commerce is facilitating international and inter-regional economic linkages. At the same time, with the heightened dependence on the Internet, the risks of cyber threats have exponentially grown. How can Asian and European diplomats capture the benefits of the Internet-facilitated connections, while cooperating to ensure cybersecurity?

This chapter provides an analysis of the digital connectivity between Asia and Europe, seen from a diplomatic perspective. After the introductory remarks, the first section addresses digital geoeconomics and geopolitics and provides an analysis of the impact of the Internet on the fast-changing political, social, and economic environment for diplomatic activities.

The second section outlines the ways in which Asia and Europe deal with digital policy issues as an important pre-condition for more intensive digital connectivity. In particular, the analysis focuses on how the two regions address the main digital policy challenges, including the regulation of the Internet infrastructure, privacy and data governance, cybersecurity, and content policy.

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The last section deals with the use of the Internet for public diplomacy, both in Asia and in Europe, as well as between the two continents.² Ultimately, diplomacy in Asia and Europe can, and should, play an important role in strengthening the digital connectivity between these two continents. This can be done by capturing the opportunities of the Internet as a force for economic growth and cooperation, by harmonising policy and regulatory frameworks, and by using social media effectively to promote understanding and trust between, and within, the regions.

1. Introduction: The intertwined history of diplomacy and technology

Innovations in information and communication technology (ICT) – including the telegraph, radio, and telephone – have always affected diplomacy. Each invention created a dynamic interplay between continuity of the main functions of diplomacy, i.e. negotiations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and change in the way in which diplomatic functions are performed, namely through the use of new tools.

The most relevant historical period in which the interplay between communication technology and diplomacy can be identified falls between the Vienna Congress (1815) and the First World War (1914). During this period, structural developments took place in both communication and diplomacy. The telegraph, telephone and radio became part of everyday life, gradually integrating into global telecommunication networks. At the same time, diplomacy transformed from ad hoc meetings into an organised system consisting of diplomatic services, international organisations, and regular international gatherings. The Internet is the latest phase in this historical interplay³, which was described by one diplomat in the following way: “Diplomacy has always been Darwinian; we must evolve or die.”⁴

The impact of the Internet on modern society is immense. It accounts for over 20% of GDP growth in the world’s largest economies.⁵ With more than three billion users worldwide, every third person on this planet is connected to the Internet. It is also the stage for criminal activities with 1.5 million victims of cybercrime every day.⁶ The digitalisation process has influenced the access to information and knowledge; Facebook and other social media networks have brought a new phase in the communication revolution. For example, with the big book scanning projects⁷, most English language books will soon be available online. The Internet has become vital to the functioning of our society. Integral to all aspects of our daily lives, it has become the backbone of the global economy.

² This article is based on a conceptual approach, focusing on the impact of the Internet on a) the geo-political and geo-economic environment of diplomatic activities, b) the emergence of new Internet-driven topics on diplomatic agendas, and c) the use of new digital tools by diplomats. For a comprehensive survey of this methodology you can consult: Jovan Kurbalija, ‘The Impact of the Internet and ICT on Contemporary Diplomacy’ in Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (eds) *Diplomacy in Globalizing World Theories and Practices* (Oxford University Press 2012).

³ For more information consult *Evolution of technology and diplomacy*, a series of webinars on interplay between communication technology and diplomacy conducted in 2013 by Dr Jovan Kurbalija. <http://www.diplomacy.edu/2013/evolution>.

⁴ Tom Fletcher, “Our man in Beirut strips down to 140 characters,” *The World Today* 68, no. 6 (December 2012). <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/187839#>.

⁵ Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, “The Internet is 20% of economic growth,” *Business Insider*, 24 May 2011. <http://www.businessinsider.com/mckinsey-report-internet-economy-2011-5?IR=T>.

⁶ Willie Jones, “This Week in Cybercrime: Cybercrime’s Industrial Revolution,” *IEEE Spectrum*, 30 June 2013. <http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/security/this-week-in-cybercrime-cybercrimes-industrial-revolution>.

⁷ Google Books, “Google Books Library Project – An enhanced card catalog of the world’s books”. <http://www.google.nl/googlebooks/library/>.

In the long history of diplomacy, we can identify two key pillars of diplomacy: information and communication.⁸ The core relevance of communication and information to diplomacy, and developments affecting both of them in the Internet era, set the stage for this study on the influence of the Internet on diplomacy in the context of digital connectivity between Asia and Europe.

Research on the impact of the Internet on diplomacy (as on overall society) is in its formative stage. Its terminology is gradually being developed. The impact of the Internet on diplomacy is very often described as e-, virtual, cyber and digital diplomacy.

Yet while these prefixes describe the same phenomenon – the Internet – we tend to use e- for commerce, cyber for crime and war, digital for development divides and virtual for Internet spaces. Usage patterns are starting to emerge. In everyday language, the choice of prefixes e-/virtual/cyber/digital might be casual, but in Internet politics, the use of prefixes has begun to have more meaning and relevance.

The etymology of the word cyber goes back to the Ancient Greek, meaning of governing (*kubernete*). The cover of Norbert Wiener's book *Cybernetics*, which deals with information-driven governance, introduced the word to our time.⁹ In 1984, William Gibson introduced the word cyberspace in his science-fiction novel *Neuromancer*.¹⁰ The use of the prefix cyber grew parallel to the Internet. In the late 1990s, almost anything related to the Internet was cyber: cybercommunity, cyberlaw, cybersex, cybercrime, cyberculture, etc. In the early 2000s, cyber gradually disappeared from general use, yet it remained alive in security terminology. This is most likely because of the 2001 *Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime*, which is still the only international treaty in the field of Internet security.¹¹ Today, the US has its *Cyberspace Strategy*; the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has its *Global Cybersecurity Agenda*¹² and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has its *Cyber defence policy*¹³, as well as a *Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence* in Estonia.¹⁴

⁸ "Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the human body. Whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead, and the result is violent conflict or atrophy." Tran van Dinh, *Communication and Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1987).

⁹ Norbert Wiener (1965) *Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

¹⁰ William Gibson (1984) *Neuromancer* (New York, NY: Ace Books).

¹¹ Council of Europe (2001) *Convention on Cybercrime*. <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=01/11/2011&CL=ENG>.

¹² International Telecommunications Union (no date), "Global Cybersecurity Agenda," <http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/>.

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (no date), "NATO and cyber defence." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-12A1F016-A72FF943/natolive/topics_78170.htm.

¹⁴ CCDCOE (no date), *NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence*. <http://www.ccdcoe.org/>.

2. Digital Connectivity

The prefix 'e-' is an abbreviation of electronic. Its first and most important use is through e-commerce, as a description of the early commercialisation of the Internet. In the EU's Lisbon Agenda (2000)¹⁵, e- was the most frequently used prefix. It was also the main prefix in the declarations of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005). The implementation of the WSIS declaration is centred on action lines that include e-government, e-business, e-learning, e-health, e-employment, e-agriculture, and e-science. The prefix is not as present as it used to be and even the EU has abandoned e- recently, perhaps trying to distance itself from the failed Lisbon Agenda.

Digital refers to 1 and 0 – the two digits that form the basis of ICT and Internet developments. Ultimately, these two digits are the starting point of all software and programmes. In the past, digital was mainly used in development circles to describe the digital divide. In the last few years, however, digital has started to conquer the Internet's linguistic space. The EU has a Digital Agenda for Europe¹⁶, the United Kingdom and the USA use the term digital diplomacy¹⁷, although the USA maintains the prefix cyber in its *International Strategy for Cyberspace*.¹⁸

¹⁵ European Commission, "Lisbon Strategy – towards a green and innovative economy," 8 March 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009/.

¹⁶ European Commission (no date), Digital agenda for Europe. <http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/>.

¹⁷ Foreign & Commonwealth Office (no date), *Foreign Commonwealth Office Digital Diplomacy*. <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/digitaldiplomacy/>.

¹⁸ Howard A. Schmidt (2011) *Launching the US International Strategy for Cyberspace*. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/16/launching-us-international-strategy-cyberspace?utm_source=related.

Methodology

In order to examine the digital linkages within, and between, Asia and Europe, this paper looks into the impact of the Internet on geopolitics and geoeconomics, the degree of harmonisation of digital policies in European and Asian countries and the opportunities for diplomats, provided by the Internet, to connect to the public in Asia and Europe.

The analyses provided in the paper are partly based on a review of literary sources, reports and statistics, as well as by DiploFoundation's own data analysis on digital policy and on the role of the Internet in public diplomacy. The relevance of different issues in digital policy (e.g. e-commerce, encryption and cybersecurity) for separate countries has been measured by using the *Internet Governance (IG) Media Text Corpus*, which compiles more than 50,000 online news reports from 2015. Using a quantitative analysis, we were able to compute the importance of IG issues for European and Asian countries by aggregating the number of times the countries and issues were mentioned together in the same source. More information about the *IG Media Text Corpus* and the analysis can be found in Annex I.

Furthermore, to better understand the connection between the Internet and public diplomacy in Asia and Europe, we measured the degree to which European and Asian ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) had a social media and web presence. Examining whether these MFAs operate web pages and accounts on Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and YouTube, we established not only which MFAs are particularly active, but also which social media tools are popular among Asians or Europeans. Furthermore, the analysis elucidated the languages that are used on MFA's online platforms. A more comprehensive summary of results can be found in Annex II.

2. Digital geopolitics and geoeconomics in Asia and Europe

Diplomacy does not exist in a vacuum. It is influenced by its particular social, political and economic context, both internationally and domestically. For example, a few decades ago, the promotion of the interests of the US automobile industry abroad was a high priority of US diplomacy. Nowadays, Internet industries are receiving increasingly more attention from US diplomats, in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Such examples of the Internet's impact on diplomacy can be cited for most states and sectors of society.

Historically speaking, each epoch has its defining technology that determines economic, social, and political successes. In the past, possession of land, access to raw materials and possession of industrial technology were the defining technologies. The Internet, as the defining technology of today, influences both traditional geopolitics, centred on the question of national security, and, increasingly, geoeconomics, defined as the promotion of national interests through economic means. As Grosse argues: "geoeconomics is becoming increasingly more important for state policies in the age of globalisation and the changing international order."¹⁹

¹⁹ Thomas G. Grosse, "Geoeconomic Relations between the EU and China: The Lessons from the EU Weapon Embargo and From Galileo," *Geopolitics* 19, no. 1 (2014): 40-65.

2.1. The Internet's effects on interaction capacity and interdependence

The core of the discussion on connectivity, including digital connectivity, relates to interaction capacity and interdependence.²⁰ Barry Buzan and Richard Little²¹ highlight the following three factors that influence interaction capacity:

- Geographical factors – topography of terrain, which facilitates or prevents physical movements;
- Physical technologies – availability of transportation and communication technologies;
- Social technologies – shared ideas, common languages, systems of shared rules and institutions.

The Internet has considerably influenced two of the three factors mentioned above: physical technologies, as the Internet facilitates the exchange of information, and social technologies, as the Internet has developed a common communication space with shared rules and procedures. Today, e-mail, social media and other services have empowered individuals to easily communicate with people from other countries and continents. This heightened intensity of communication has generated more contact and greater interdependence.

The level of interdependence directly determines the position and function of diplomacy. It is generally perceived that more interdependence leads to a more frequent use of diplomacy as a tool for managing international relations and solving potential conflict. This high economic and social interdependence puts limitations on the use of military power, and therefore generates a greater need for peaceful ways to settle disputes, a need that is filled by diplomacy. For Asia and Europe, digital interdependence could contribute towards a more frequent use of diplomacy in settling disputes both within two regions, and between countries from the two regions.

In addition, growing digital interdependence has blurred the traditional division between national and international communication spaces. As was indicated in Keohane and Nye's analysis, growing interdependence is leading to an increasing number of traditionally domestic issues that will become relevant to foreign policy.²² This aspect should influence both Asian and European diplomacy and the design of future ASEF projects.

²⁰ For a more detailed explanation on the importance of interaction capacity for the functioning of the world system, consult Bull (1997, p. 11); Reynolds (1994, p. 195); and Waltz (1979, p. 95).

²¹ Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000) *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 82-83.

²² Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1972) *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).


2.2. The continued relevance of geography in the Internet era

Geography is essential for diplomacy. Diplomats aim to contribute to the growth, well-being and protection of their national territories. The introduction of the Internet generated the idea of the end of geography²³, and consequently, the end of diplomacy, a profession that heavily depends on territorial boundaries. The end of geography view was inspired by our online experience as Internet users in accessing distant Internet resources, or communicating easily over long geographical distances. But, in many respects, this assumption of the end of geography has been misleading in evaluating the overall impact of the Internet on geography. As a matter of fact, the Internet has strengthened the relevance of geography in many respects. Through geo-location, we are more anchored in geography than ever before. For example, our mobile phones trace our physical movements. Geography matters in the way Internet data flow via cables, where data are stored, and how Internet data are used for commercial purposes.

2.2.1. Internet cable geography

Figure 1: Map of the world's major Internet submarine cables

The internet's undersea world



Source: Thumbnail from the Guardian, 2009

More than 90% of all global Internet traffic flows through submarine cables, which physically largely follow the old geographical routes used by telegraph cables since the 19th century (see Figure 1). Submarine Internet cables reach land in a few Internet traffic hubs. Most Latin American cables reach land in Miami. In Asia, the key Internet traffic hubs are Singapore and Hong Kong SAR. Other key points for Internet traffic include Amsterdam, New York and San Francisco. The most vulnerable points for the Internet cables and traffic continue to be traditionally strategic hotspots, including the Straits of Luzon, Hormuz and Malacca, as well as the Suez Canal.

²³ For end of geography arguments, please consult *The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Is Changing Our Lives*, by Frances Cairncross (Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Opposite arguments are provided in the book: *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, by Robert D. Kaplan (New York, NY: Random House, 2013).

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In digital connectivity between Asia and Europe, geography matters as well. For example, 95% of the Internet traffic between Asia and Europe passes via Egypt, similar to maritime transports that use the Suez Canal as a shortcut.

Table 1: Survey of the data capacity of submarine Internet cables globally (in Terabytes per Second (TBps))


Region	Capacity (in TBps)
Transatlantic	23
Transpacific	20
Pan-East Asian	17
South Asia & the Middle East	12
North & South America	9
Australia & New Zealand	5
Sub-Saharan	2
Total	87

Source: Terabit Consulting, 2014

In 2013, Europe managed approximately 28% of the international Internet bandwidth in Asia, while 40% of the traffic went to the USA, and the rest of the Asian traffic was mainly intra-Asian bandwidth between countries. The European share in Asian Internet traffic has risen from 21% in 2009 to 28% in 2013. This trend is likely to continue if risks are addressed and growth opportunities are realised.

2.2.2.Submarine vs. terrestrial Internet cables


Figure 2: Map of existing and planned Internet cable routes connecting Asia and Europe



Source: DiploFoundation

Table 2: Existing and planned Internet cable routes connecting Asia and Europe

Existing Internet cables	Planned Internet cables
<p>Route 1: The main route for submarine cables that currently carries 95% of the Internet traffic between Asia and Europe. On European side, the main starting points of these cables are located in the United Kingdom and France. They go through the Suez Canal (Egypt) and Red Sea towards India (Mumbai and Chennai) and continue towards Singapore, where Internet traffic goes into two directions: towards the south (Indonesia and Australia) and the north (Hong Kong SAR). Currently, there are 15 cables going through this route.</p>	<p>Route 5: Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway (TASIM) was proposed in 2008 by Azerbaijan. It includes partners from China (China Telecom), Kazakhstan (KazTranscom), Russian Federation (Rostelecom) and Turkey (TürkTelekom). TASIM cables should provide fast Internet connection to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.</p>
<p>Route 2: Trans Europe-Asia (TEA) fibre optic connects, as end points, Stockholm and Frankfurt on the European side and Hong Kong SAR on Asian side. TEA is operated by Rostelcom (Russian Federation) and China Telecom (China). TEA is particularly important in providing the Internet to Mongolia and Kazakhstan.</p>	<p>Route 6: The Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System (ROTACS) project was officially approved by the Russian Minister of Communication and Media in 2011. End points of ROTACS should include Bude (UK) and Tokyo (Japan). The cable should traverse Norway and the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>Route 3: Euro-Persia Express Gateway (EPEG) connects Frankfurt and Oman via Eastern Europe, Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and Iran. In Oman EPEG connects to the main submarine cables on Route 1.</p>	
<p>Route 4: The Trans Asia-Europe (TAE) network includes a wide range of national backbones. TAE connects Frankfurt (Germany) and Shanghai (China) at its ends points. It passes through many countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.</p>	

Figure 3: The Suez Canal as a hotspot for Internet-cable traffic

Source: Thumbnail from TeleGeography, 2016

Since most Internet traffic currently flows through submarine cables (route 1), the installation of new terrestrial Internet cables is often seen as an important step towards diversifying Internet traffic between Asia and Europe, for the following reasons.

First, new terrestrial cables can defuse the current risk of a high concentration of Internet traffic in only a few geographical points, in particular in Egypt (see Figure 3). Submarine cables are exposed to a wide range of risks from anchors (often the cause of cuts of Internet cables in Egypt and the Malacca Strait); earthquakes (e.g. the cut of cables near Chinese Taipei in 2006, and in Japan in 2011) and sabotage (three divers were arrested when they tried to cut an Internet cable near Alexandria, Egypt).²⁴ Political instability in Egypt and the broader Middle East region has added to the vulnerability of Internet cables and overall digital traffic between Asia and Europe.

²⁴ BBC News, "Egypt arrests as undersea internet cable cut off Alexandria," BBC News, 27 March 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21963100>.

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Second, terrestrial cables can provide shorter routes and faster Internet. High-speed Internet connections over long distances are essential for high frequency trading. Sometimes a difference of one millisecond can affect transactions worth up to USD 100 million a year.²⁵ Fast Internet, and the need for high speed trading, converge geographically in Frankfurt and Hong Kong SAR, which are both key points in the Euro-Asia Internet networks and hosts of big stock exchanges. A search for the shortest possible geographical route for the Internet traffic between these two places inspired projects for laying cables via the Arctic, which could shorten the distance from London to Tokyo from more than 22,000 km to 15,000 km (see Route 6 in Figure 2).²⁶

Third, terrestrial cables provide an opportunity for increasing the connectivity and development of landlocked countries in Central Asia. For some countries, the geographical remoteness of access to the sea creates a major obstacle in achieving better Internet connectivity. Stronger Internet bandwidth could increase economic growth and foster new industries such as the hosting of data servers.

Fourth, terrestrial cables are cheaper to develop and maintain than submarine cables. According to one Korean study, the cost for laying one kilometre of terrestrial cable is USD 58,000 while submarine cable costs USD 135,000.²⁷ In addition, the cost could be further reduced by using railway trenches and the electrical power grid for laying fibre-optic cables. Very often such infrastructure systems already have fibre-optic cables being used for the management of railway signalling or the management of power grid systems. It is also faster and cheaper to repair terrestrial cables. The damage to terrestrial cables is usually repaired in one day, with an average cost of USD 5,000, while the repair of submarine cable may take up to 20 days, for a cost of USD 500,000.

These reasons led towards a growing interest in the development of terrestrial cables, which are now viewed as a viable option for diversifying Internet traffic carriage between Asia and Europe. Figure 2 shows that the main terrestrial link is currently provided by the Transit Europe-Asia (TEA) Terrestrial Cable Network, which follows the Tea Road from China and Japan, through the Russian Federation and into the Baltics.²⁸ Another existing cable that provides partial terrestrial connection between two continents is the Europe-Persia Express Gateway (EPEG), which links Germany to Oman via the Russian Federation and Iran. In Oman, EPEG is linked to the cables leading towards Asia. By using a mix of terrestrial and submarine cables the Internet traffic is diversified from the high concentration of cables in Egypt. It is interesting that the EPEG was developed in a time of sanctions against Iran and very turbulent political relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation.

²⁵ Nadège Rolland, "A Fiber-Optic Silk Road," *The Diplomat*, 2 April 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/a-fiber-optic-silk-road/>.

²⁶ OECD, "International Cables, Gateways, Backhaul and International Exchange Points," *OECD Digital Economy Papers*, No. 232 (2014). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz8m9jf3wkl-en>. p. 22.

²⁷ Ko Ki-young, "Case study – Korea: Opportunities for BB Connectivity in APAC," *UNESCAP*, 24 September 2013. http://ebac.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Case%20Study%20-%20Korea_0.pdf.

²⁸ TEA, 'About the project,' <http://teacable.com/en>.

More terrestrial link cables are in the planning phase. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been promoting a digital component of the Asian Highway, a transcontinental transport infrastructure project that spans 141,000 km, from Japan to Turkey.²⁹ Furthermore, the Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway (TASIM) is planning to connect Eastern Europe and Central Asia, further diversifying the data flow between the two continents. The project aims to “enhance the speed of the connection with the Eastern Asian partners and to improve the resiliency of the Internet,” and, in the process, improve regional cooperation in Central Asia.³⁰

Figure 4: The One Belt – One Road initiative that includes the Digital Silk Road project



Source: Wikimedia Commons

²⁹ UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Discussion Paper Series on Problems and Challenges in Transit Connectivity Routes and International Gateways in Asia,” *Discussion Paper series*, 2014/1. http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Discussion%20Paper-Transit-Connectivity_0.pdf.

³⁰ Matteo Verda, *Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway*. (Baku: TASIM, 2014).

2. Digital Connectivity

Digital aspects also feature prominently in the One Belt – One Road initiative, which includes the Digital Silk Road project.³¹ Digital connection could benefit from transportation and energy infrastructural projects, which will include laying fibre-optics cables along railroads and energy pipelines.

All planned terrestrial cable projects, and the Digital Silk Road in particular, might alter the balance towards terrestrial versus submarine cables. For the first time in history, they could generate a shift in the major international communication channels from the sea to the land. Ever since the first telegraph cables were laid in the 19th century, most international electronic communication has followed the maritime rim around Eurasian land mass (UK – Gibraltar – Suez – Aden – Bombay – Singapore).

In the short term, this shift could address some immediate problems, such as overcoming vulnerability by the high concentration of Internet traffic in Egypt and introducing faster Internet for high frequency trading. In the long term, the shift towards overland Internet communication could have far-reaching impacts on geoeconomics and geopolitics in Asia and Europe. Namely, this shift could create new economic and development opportunities for landlocked Eurasian countries.

3. The Internet as a new topic on diplomatic agendas

The Internet has also emerged as a topic on the diplomatic agenda, negotiated by diplomats and other actors regionally and globally. This section focuses on digital policy and Internet governance issues, which are essential for the effective cooperation between Asia and Europe in the digital realm. Harmonised digital regulation impacts the way in which digital connectivity is maintained at the level of technical infrastructure, standardisation and data exchanges. Growth in e-commerce depends on these harmonised digital regulations as well.

The Internet has only recently emerged on the global policy agenda following a general trend of extending diplomatic agendas, which accelerated after the Second World War. David D. Newsom explained this process in the following way:

“For most of the twentieth century, the international diplomatic agenda has consisted of questions of political and economic relations between nation-states – the traditional subjects of diplomacy. After the Second World War new diplomatic issues arose, spurred by the technical advances in nuclear energy and electronics.”³²

³¹ The term Digital Silk Road is used informally as an umbrella concept that encompasses various cooperation projects between Asia and Europe in the digital field; See: Liu Jia and Gao Shuang, “Digital Silk Road to span Eurasia,” *China Daily Europe*, 10 July 2015. http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-07/10/content_21241323.htm; and Zhao Huanxin, “Web companies asked to support ‘digital Silk Road,’” *China Daily Europe*, 8 September 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015chinaarabforum/2015-09/08/content_21823475.htm.

The Digital Silk Road is part of the initiative ‘One Belt – One Road’ (yidai-yilu), which consists of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt that should cross the continent and the Maritime Silk Road connecting China to the maritime regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa and the Mediterranean (Arase, 2015, p. 25). The overall project is planned to cross 60 countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people, which accounts for 63% of the world’s population (Tsao, 2015, p. 11).

³² David D. Newsom, “The new diplomatic agenda: Are governments ready?” *International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (Winter 1988-1989): 29.

The growing social, economic and political impact of the Internet on modern society has brought the question of Internet governance into sharper focus. Who exactly governs the Internet? Who are the actors most likely to influence its future development? How will future policies evolve on connectivity, commerce, content, funding, security and other issues central to our emerging information society? These are some of the key questions that need to be addressed within the framework of Internet governance.

Internet governance was placed on the global diplomatic agenda during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which was organised around two main summits: one in Geneva in 2003 and the other in Tunis in 2005. In Tunis, WSIS decided to establish the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which has been the main global body in the field of Internet governance since then. The IGF is a unique global policy body because it is open to equal participation of all main stakeholders (government, business sector and civil society).


The importance of effective digital policy and Internet governance as pre-conditions for digital growth and development was highlighted by the World Bank's *World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends*. According to the report, infrastructural access will not be sufficient, and countries will "need to work on the analogue complements."³³

Internet governance covers a wide set of issues, which can be divided into the following seven baskets³⁴: infrastructure and standardisation; security; human rights; legal; economic; development; and sociocultural. This seven-basket classification of Internet governance is metaphorically presented through the image of a building under construction, which also reflects the formative phase of the global regime of Internet governance.

³³ The World Bank, *World Development Report 2016 : Digital Dividends* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2016).

³⁴ The term 'baskets' was introduced in diplomatic practice during the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) negotiations. It is used in the Internet governance taxonomy in order to describe cluster of IG issues.

Figure 5: The Internet Governance 'Building Under Construction'




Source: DiploFoundation

3.1. Asian and European digital policy positions: from diversity to harmonisation?

Asian and European countries' positions on digital policy and Internet governance are mostly characterised by a large degree of diversity. There is as much diversity between the regions as there is among the digital policy issues themselves, which range from technical issues to economic and cultural topics.

Figure 6: Hierarchical cluster analysis showing the similarity between countries when mentioned in the IG Media Text Corpus




Source: DiploFoundation

The hierarchical cluster analysis of the IG Media Text Corpus (Figure 6) shows some similarities across the regions. For example, it puts in proximity countries like Italy, Viet Nam, Indonesia and Korea, and in another branch Cyprus, Greece and the Lao PDR.

High diversity of policy views provides a possibility for variable geometry engagement, where countries across two regions could gather around issues of major concern or similarities in positions.


Figure 7: Relative importance of IG Issues per region (Importance per region representing the existence of the semantic overlap between the mentioning of a country from that region and the relevance of some particular IG issue in online media)



Source: DiploFoundation

Figure 7 shows the relative importance of policy issues in both regions. Encryption has high importance in Europe (69%), mainly due to the current debate on the Internet and anti-terrorist measures. Security agencies see strong encryption used by Internet companies and users as an obstacle in gathering information in their fight against terrorism. Public discussions on encryption are much less prominent in Asia (31%).

Figure 8: Encryption (Europe – 69% and Asia – 31% in the IG Media Text Corpus)



Source: DiploFoundation


2. Digital Connectivity

In digital politics there is a practical need to involve the technical community, business and civil society in addition to governments. This led to the development of different forms of multi-stakeholder participation in Asia and Europe. Asian countries are more prone toward a leading role for governments, and the use of multilateral diplomacy for addressing digital policy issues. European and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are more inclined toward a new type of multi-stakeholder governance which involves the equal participation of government, the business sector, civil society and the technical community, such as is used in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). These two different approaches toward multi-stakeholder participation are sometimes a cause of tension between some Asian and European countries.

3.2. Positions of Asian and European countries on specific digital policy issues

The analysis of the specific digital policy issues is supported by data mining studies of the IG Media Text Corpus. For example, the illustration in Figure 9 shows that China has the most extensive media coverage of digital policy issues, followed by France and the United Kingdom.³⁵

Figure 9: Country presence in IG Media Corpus (52,892 documents)



Source: DiploFoundation

³⁵ The indicators on the maps that will be used in this section point to capital cities. Sizes of shaded areas are proportional to the number of times the respective country was mentioned in the IG Media Text Corpus.

3.2.1. Infrastructure and standardisation

The infrastructure and standardisation basket incorporates the basic issues related to the running of the Internet. A multi-layered approach is often used to describe the operation of computer networks. All the elements that make up the Internet can be divided into three layers: the telecommunications infrastructure (e.g. cables, satellites); technical standards (e.g. TCP/IP) and content standards (e.g. HTML, XML).

The first layer – the telecommunication infrastructure – comprises all the physical facilities capable of transporting Internet traffic, such as copper wire, fibre optics and cables. This also includes non-physical media such as satellite, microwave and Wi-Fi. In the policy framework, there is a major division between Asian and European countries. Most Asian countries signed the amendment of the International Telecommunication Regulation (ITR) adopted at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) (2012, Dubai), while European countries and most member states of OECD refused to sign the amendment, mainly due to the stated risk that some provisions opened possibilities for a stronger role of the government in managing the Internet.

As of the beginning of 2015, when the ITR amendments came into force, there are two telecommunication policy regimes: the 1998 regulation followed by mainly OECD countries and the 2012 amendments followed by mainly developing countries. Fortunately, due to the limited number of changes introduced by the ITRs in 2012, this double system has not affected the general functioning of telecommunications at the global level. Yet Asian and European countries, together with other actors, should address this inherent regulatory instability in global telecommunication regulations.

The existence of Internet infrastructure is a pre-condition for the Internet's functioning, but the Internet really came into being due to the second layer, which is defined by technical standards, and most importantly the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol – TCP/IP (hereafter Internet protocol/IP). In simple terms, each computer, or other device connected to the Internet, must have a unique IP number. The system for the distribution of IP numbers is hierarchically organised. On the top is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) – a subsidiary of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which distributes blocks of IP numbers to the five regional Internet registries (RIRs). In turn, these are distributed to national registries, smaller Internet service providers (ISPs), companies and individuals. In Europe IP numbers are distributed mainly by technical and business companies, while in Asia governments have more prominent role in this field.

The growing economic and social importance of the Internet, as well as ever increasing Internet traffic, are imposing more and more pressure on the current version 4 (IPv4) and incentives to upgrade towards version 6 (IPv6). Asia reached the final IPv4 address block in April 2011³⁶ and Europe in September 2012.³⁷ The new version of IPv6 provides sufficient Internet numbers for the future growth of the Internet. IPv6 also provides a more robust security of the Internet. The transition towards IPv6 requires financial investment as well as regulatory changes.

The Domain Name System (DNS) handles Internet addresses (such as www.google.com) and converts them into IP numbers. The DNS consists of root servers, top-level domain (TLD) servers and a large number of DNS servers located around the world. Since the DNS facilitates identities on the Internet, it is of high policy importance. One of the main controversies surrounding the DNS involves the ultimate authority of the US government over root servers, the top tier of the hierarchically organised DNS. This authority is implemented by ICANN, a legal entity incorporated in California, USA. Asian and European countries have had a similar position on the need to internationalise the management of the DNS. The US government initiated the process of ICANN's internationalisation in 2014. It is likely to be completed in September 2016.

Infrastructural access is a precondition for the dimensions of digital connectivity within and between Europe and Asia. In absolute terms, Asia has the highest number of Internet users, with China and India topping the list. In Asia-Pacific alone, almost 1.7 billion people are connected to the Internet, and this number is still growing at 12% a year, since Internet penetration is still relatively low (about 40%). Europe has an estimated 616 million people connected to the web, and this number will only increase at about 4% a year (Internet penetration is approximately 75%).³⁸ The immense popularity of the Internet in Asian countries is evident when looking at the average number of hours they spend on the Internet per day, by PC use. In a global ranking, many Asian countries top the list, with the Philippines (2), Thailand (4), Indonesia (6), Viet Nam (8) and Malaysia (9) in the top ten. The first European country is Poland on number 12.³⁹

³⁶ See: APNIC, "APNIC IPv4 Address Pool Reaches Final/8," *APNIC*, 15 April 2011. <https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2011/final-8>.

³⁷ See: RIPE NCC, "IPv4 Exhaustion," *RIPE NCC*, 14 September 2012. <https://www.ripe.net/publications/ipv6-info-centre/about-ipv6/ipv4-exhaustion>.

³⁸ We Are Social, "Digital in 2016," 27 January 2016. <http://wearesocial.sg/blog/2016/01/digital-2016/>.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, slide 25.

3.2.2. Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is another area of high relevance in both Asia and Europe. The high dependence of modern society on the Internet makes the Internet part of the critical societal infrastructure. While both Asian and European countries have cybersecurity high on their policy agendas, there are differences related to the type of cybersecurity challenges faced by the two regions, as well as differing views on how these threats should be addressed. For example, in Asia cyber attacks follow political tensions, such as those in the South China Sea or between India and Pakistan. In Europe, cybersecurity efforts mainly focus on the fight against terrorism and cybercrime.


There is a terminological difference related to the term cybersecurity between countries in the two regions. This has resulted in conceptual differences in dealing with cybersecurity. China, the Russian Federation and other core members of the Shanghai Cooperation Council⁴⁰ opt for information security, which implies a broader understanding of the Internet security and involves, for example, banning the use of the Internet that could affect social and political stability. European countries follow a narrower definition of cybersecurity, mainly covering the security of the Internet infrastructure. Countries from both regions cooperate in the UN Group of Government Experts, where they have managed to find common ground on several issues, including the principle that existing international law applies online.

Among Asian and European countries, there are different levels of cybersecurity capacity. The *Global Cybersecurity Index*, developed by the ITU and ABI research, ranks the level of commitment to cybersecurity of different countries. European countries rank relatively well, with nine countries in the top 20, and with few states among the lowest-scoring countries. However, in Asia-Pacific there is extensive disparity. Whereas Australia (3), Malaysia (4), Japan (12), Korea (13) and Singapore (19) have high scores, there are also many Asian countries among the lowest scoring states, especially small and island states.⁴¹ Capacity building in cybersecurity among Asian, or between European and Asian states, could be an area in which ASEM/ASEF could play an important role.

⁴⁰ Core members of the Shanghai Cooperation Council include: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Uzbekistan.

⁴¹ Allied Business Intelligence (ABI) Research & International Telecommunication Union (ITU), *Global Cybersecurity Index* (ITU: Geneva, 2014).

Figure 10: Cybersecurity (Europe – 62% and Asia – 38% in the IG Media Text Corpus)



Source: DiploFoundation

In the field of cybercrime European countries are parties of the Council of Europe's *Convention on Cybercrime*, which remains the main international legal instrument in this field. This convention was adopted by non-European countries as well, including the USA, Australia, Japan and Sri Lanka. In the field of cybercrime, a high degree of harmonisation of rules has emerged, as the substantive norms of the Council of Europe *Convention on Cybercrime* have influenced many national and regional regulations in Asia and in other parts of the world.⁴²

⁴² For critical views of the *Convention on Cybercrime* expressing the concern of civil society and human rights activists, see Chris Bailey, "The International Convention on Cybercrime," *The Association for Progressive Communications*, 6 May 2002. http://rights.apc.org/privacy/treaties_icc_bailey.shtml; and American Civil Liberties Union, "International Cybercrime Treaty," *ACLU* (no date). <https://www.aclu.org/international-cybercrime-treaty>.

3.2.3. Intellectual property rights (IPR)

The area concerning the protection of copyright and other intellectual property rights (IPR) on the Internet used to be an area of divergence, with Asia having a more relaxed approach to the protection of IPR than Europe. Nowadays there is more convergence, with the increasing level of protection of IPR in Asia. This development can mainly be subscribed to multilateral regimes, including the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which manages the traditional IPR regime, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which is in charge of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS).

The IPR field saw further convergence by the decision of the G20 meeting in Antalya (15-16 November 2015): "that no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors."⁴³ This policy convergence is likely to extend to countries beyond the G20, including Asian and European countries.

3.2.4. Data protection and privacy

Data is considered to be the oil of the modern economy. Data governance has various aspects, including technology, security, human rights and economics. Data governance has come into sharper focus on the part of the international community after the Snowden revelations.⁴⁴

Privacy and data protection are two interrelated Internet governance issues. Data protection is a legal mechanism that ensures privacy. Privacy is usually defined as the right of any citizen to control his or her own personal information, and to make relevant decisions about this information, i.e. to keep or disclose information. Privacy is a fundamental human right, recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in many other international and regional human rights conventions.

⁴³ "G20 Leaders' Communiqué," Antalya Summit, 15-16 November 2015. <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/11/16/g20-leaders-communication>.

⁴⁴ Edward Snowden is a former employee of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who leaked classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA) in 2013. The information contained details about numerous surveillance programmes, many of which were run by the NSA. The revelations sparked a global debate concerning the balance between national security and data protection.

National cultures and lifestyles influence the practice of privacy. In Europe privacy is generally perceived as more important than in Asia. However, in Asian countries, a new business model based on monetising data has sharpened the focus on data governance as an e-commerce issue. As a consequence, over the last few years, Asia has become increasingly privacy aware. For example, 83% of Indian Internet users have become more concerned about digital privacy than one year ago, as of November 2014, followed by 73% of Korean users, 72% of users in Hong Kong SAR, and 64% of Chinese users.⁴⁵ Privacy awareness has been mirrored by privacy regulation in the Asia Pacific region, which has seen a sharp increase.⁴⁶ By 2014 comprehensive data privacy regimes were established in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, often with the aim of sustaining their continuous e-commerce growth. China and India have adopted legislation with similar provisions for data protection.⁴⁷

In addition, the cloud economy, related to the competition for hosting data centres, will create a new dynamism between Asian and European countries. The traditional approach that less regulation of data and privacy should attract more data centres is being challenged with the growing pressure on privacy and data protection. For example Germany and Switzerland, which have a high degree of privacy and data protection, have, at the same time, experienced a sharp increase in data storage business over the last few years. Central Asian countries may experience a rise in data storage business due to their access to a strong Internet infrastructure (the Digital Silk Road) and elements conducive to big data-storage facilities, such as a dry and cold climate and access to cheap electricity.


⁴⁵ Statista, "APAC increasing digital privacy concern by country 2015," <http://www.statista.com/statistics/459005/apac-digital-privacy-concern-growth-country/>.

⁴⁶ Hogan Lovells, *Data Privacy Regulation Comes of Age in Asia* (London: Hogan Lovells, 2014). <http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2014/11/Data-Privacy-Regulation-Comes-of-Age-in-Asia.pdf>. p. 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 1.

3.2.5.E-commerce and digital economy

Figure 11: E-commerce (Europe - 60% and Asia - 40% in the IG Media Text Corpus)



Source: DiploFoundation

The Internet has been one of the main engines of economic growth in Asia. As a result, Asian countries place a lot of emphasis on creating a policy environment that will support innovation and boost the digital sector. The creation of such an environment has included the establishment of laws on intellectual property, digital signatures and consumer protection and has resulted in the fast growth of e-commerce in most Asian countries.

Europe has long been lagging behind in the field of e-commerce, although this has recently started to change with the Juncker Commission⁴⁸, which took the establishment of the Digital Single Market as one of the EU's highest priorities.

E-commerce in both Asia and Europe is either local, or directed toward the USA as a major e-commerce power. Asia and Europe can increase e-commerce exchanges significantly.

3.2.6. Content policy

Content policy is one of the most politically controversial digital policy issues. It is often addressed from the angles of human rights (freedom of expression and the right to communicate), governance (content control) and technology (tools for content control). Discussions usually focus on three groups of content:

- Content that has a global consensus for its control, including child pornography, justifications of genocide and the incitement to, or organisation of, terrorist acts, all prohibited by international law (*ius cogens*).⁴⁹
- Content that is sensitive for particular countries, regions or ethnic groups due to their particular religious and/or cultural values. Globalised online communication poses challenges for local, cultural and religious values in many societies. Most content control in Middle Eastern and Asian countries is conducted on the basis of the protection of specific cultural values. This often means that access to pornographic and gambling websites is blocked.⁵⁰
- Political censorship on the Internet. The yearly-published *Freedom on the Net Report* ranks the degree of Internet freedom of different countries. The 2015 edition has found that freedom on the net has diminished for the “fifth consecutive year as more governments censored information of public interest”.⁵¹

While both Asian and European countries agree about filtering content that promotes, for example, child pornography online, there are differences when it comes to other aspects of content policy. The question of freedom of speech online is often an area of disagreement between some European and Asian countries.

⁴⁸ Current European Commission headed by Jean-Claude Juncker and a team of Commissioners in office since 1 November 2014

⁴⁹ Timothy Zick, “Congress, the Internet, and the Intractable Pornography Problem: The Child Online Protection Act of 1998,” *Creighton Law Review* 32 (1999): 1147, 1153, 1201.

⁵⁰ Jenna F. Karadbil, “Note: Casinos of the next millennium: a look into the proposed ban on internet gambling,” *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law* 17 (2000): 413-439.

⁵¹ Freedom House (2015) *Freedom on the Net 2015* (Washington, DC: Freedom House). <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2015>.

3.2.7. Multilingualism

The Internet tends to predominantly promote the world's biggest languages, with 54% of all content written in English, 6% in Russian and German and 5% in Japanese and Spanish. All other languages account for less than 5%.⁵² As identified by Yvonne Guo and Thierry Schwarz in this publication, digital connectivity reinforces the importance of some of the dominant languages at the expense of others.

Asia and Europe share a sensitivity to cultural diversity and multilingualism. For example, Asia is home to 3,500 different spoken languages. Both Asian and European countries have been strong promoters of multilingualism on the Internet. In some areas, such as internationalised domain names, these efforts resulted in ICANN's support for multilingual domain names. Both continents, and ASEP in particular, could further strengthen efforts towards a multilingual Internet.

⁵² W3Techs, "Usage of content languages for websites," 12 February 2016. http://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_language/all.

4. Public diplomacy in a digital environment and the advent of e-diplomats

This section analyses the impact of the Internet on public diplomacy⁵³ activities in Asia and Europe, providing examples of the use of web and social media communications by diplomatic services and other governmental institutions.

4.1. Internet and changing context for public diplomacy

The Internet has created a new context for public diplomacy characterised by, among others:

- the rapid availability of information to public everywhere, where governments are too often behind the game, and certainly behind the 24/7 news media (both traditional and new media)
- the abundance of visual information
- the virtually infinite quantity of information available with the expansion of the World Wide Web (WWW)
- the transformation of the Web from a one-to-one source of information into a multidirectional forum for interactive debate

The amount of information available, and the speed with which it reaches an average user, has increased dramatically. Most major broadcasters, from the BBC and CNN to Al Jazeera and Radio China International, have introduced webcasting to enable live access via the Internet to TV and radio news programmes and documentaries. To compete with the 24-hour news coverage provided by broadcast media, the print media have been obliged to introduce electronic versions of their publications, available to the online reader many hours in advance of their own printed copies. And thanks to social media, ordinary Internet users have also become reporters, providing live coverage 24/7.

⁵³ The term 'public diplomacy', first introduced by Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy in 1965, has gained prominence in the foreign policy field in the last 10-15 years. A large number of articles dealing with this subject, and institutions specialising in public diplomacy, are signs of such prominence. However, the meaning of the term is not always consistently understood. It is generally agreed that public diplomacy refers to activities aimed at influencing the public, understanding their attitudes to foreign policy activities, and shaping their views on these issues to the advantage of a nation which carries out public diplomacy activities. At the same time, there is disagreement as to whether public diplomacy refers only to activities directed at foreign nationals (this view is dominant in the USA and the UK), or at a domestic audience as well (this approach is characteristic of Canada and South Africa).

The trend toward instant and abundant information about different events at home and abroad is just part of the story. Another, probably more important, part has to do with the changing role of end users, who have become both consumers and providers of information. The balance has shifted from a one-to-one or one-to-many relationship between the information provider and the consumer, to a many-to-many interactive experience.⁵⁴ Thanks to mobile providers, the feedback loop has become even shorter. As the problems of limited mobile bandwidth are being solved, the stream of user-generated multimedia content – mostly photos and videos – is growing stronger. Broadcasters are opening up to two-way communication with their followers: CNN offers a regular spot for I-witness reports⁵⁵ and photos and videos from its viewers and Al Jazeera launched its own citizenship journalism upload portal⁵⁶ “seeking eyewitness news reports from its vast international audience.” Users are invited, and have come to expect, the possibility of providing immediate comments online, on the news, in blogs and on social networking sites.

The challenges for diplomats have multiplied with the advances in technology since 1995, when David Pearce, cited by Stephen Livingston, wrote: “Policies can no longer be presented to the public in abstract. They are constantly measured against images on television – images that are instantly available, around the clock and around the globe.”⁵⁷ Diplomats are now competing with instant news, visual and graphic, and can be caught unprepared by rapidly breaking stories.

This analysis maps the way Asian and European countries have been using the Internet’s tools for their public diplomacy activities.

4.2. Websites

For many countries, the development of websites has been the first step in developing a presence on the Internet. Websites are mainly used for the dissemination of information about foreign policy. Typically, these websites contain information on foreign policy, the organisation of the MFA (including diplomatic missions) and consular and travel information. MFA websites have become increasingly integrated with Twitter, YouTube and other social media tools.

All ministries of foreign affairs of ASEM partners have websites, although their level of interactivity differs. All 51 surveyed MFA websites maintain a news (or an updates) section. However, the use of an RSS news feed (an important technology for sharing updated information) is not widespread.


Most MFA websites are bilingual, containing a version in English and in the national language of the country. The following two figures represent the distribution of languages in which the MFA websites provide content in Europe and Asia, respectively:

⁵⁴ Daryl Copeland, “Connectivity and Networks Rule: Virtuality, Public Diplomacy and the Foreign Ministry,” *CPD Blog*, 26 November 2008. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/connectivity_and_networks_rule_virtuality_public_diplomacy_and_the_for/.

⁵⁵ CNN, *CNN iReport*. <http://edition.cnn.com/specials/opinions/cnnireport>.


⁵⁶ Al Jazeera, *Sharek*. <http://sharek.aljazeera.net>.

⁵⁷ Stephen Livingston (2002) “The New Media and Transparency: What are the Consequences for Diplomacy?,” in *Cyber-diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century*, edited by E. H. Potter (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press), pp. 110-127.

Figure 12: Languages in which content of European MFA websites is provided

Source: DiploFoundation

Figure 13: Languages in which content of Asian MFA websites is provided



Source: DiploFoundation

The analysis of the websites furthermore shows that only ten countries have an information page on ASEM. When it comes to the coverage of both continents, nine MFA websites from Asia have a page dedicated to Europe, and nine European MFA websites maintain a dedicated page on Asia.

4.3. Social media

Social media has become overwhelmingly popular in both Europe and Asia. Southeast Asia is the region with most social media users (together more than a billion), whereas Europe is estimated to host about 400 million social media users. Penetration of social media is similar and accounts for approximately 40% in both regions.⁵⁸ The Philippines is globally most active on social media, with users spending an average of 3.7 hours a day on social media. Italy, at number 14, is the highest-ranked European country, with an average of two hours per day spent on social media.⁵⁹

Social media channels (e.g. blogs) do not need to have large audiences in order to play an important role in politics, both domestic and international, due to their influence as agenda-setters in the information environment. Drezner and Farrell suggest that:

“Increasingly, journalists and pundits take their cues about what matters in the world from weblogs. For salient topics in global affairs, the blogosphere functions as a rare combination of distributed expertise, real-time collective response to breaking news and public-opinion barometer.”⁶⁰

According to Drezner and Farrell, news and information are filtered upstream from lesser-known blogs to more popular ones. Eventually some topics reach the summit of the blogosphere – the pages of a few prominent blogs with hundreds of thousands of readers. From there, the information is often picked up by mainstream media, decision-makers in government and other political actors. Even when blogs are not as good as major news channels at providing breaking news or detailed analyses, they may help promote a story that would otherwise be ignored by the press, or keep it alive long after it disappears from the mainstream news agenda.

In addition to being an information channel, social media is also a powerful organisational tool. Groups, from movie star fans to environmentalists, to diaspora communities and to terrorists, use Facebook and other social networks to plan and coordinate their activities on a global scale.

The impact of social media on social organisation is mainly anecdotal. The term Facebook revolution was coined to describe the use of social networks during the Arab Spring.⁶¹ The initial hype of the impact of social media was followed by more realistic analyses expressing the view that the overall impact of social media during the Arab Spring has been overstated.⁶²

⁵⁸ We Are Social, “Digital in 2016,” 27 February 2016, slide 33.

⁵⁹ Ibid., slide 37.

⁶⁰ Daniel W. Drezner and Henry Farrell, “Web of Influence,” *Foreign Policy*, 29 October 2009. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/26/web-of-influence/>.

⁶¹ Raymond Schillinger, “Social Media and the Arab Spring: What Have We Learned?” *Huffington Post*, 20 September 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymond-schillinger/arab-spring-social-media_b_970165.html.

⁶² Anita Singh, “Ways With Words: Role of Twitter and Facebook in Arab Spring uprising ‘overstated’, says Hisham Matar,” *The Telegraph*, 11 July 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/ways-with-words/8629294/Ways-With-Words-role-of-Twitter-and-Facebook-in-Arab-Spring-uprising-overstated-says-Hisham-Matar.html>.

Another campaign that was often quoted in analyses of the impact of social media on social movements is the *Bring Back Our Girls* Twitter campaign, following the Boko Haram kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls.⁶³ This campaign rapidly went viral, thanks in part to Michelle Obama's retweet, publicised the girls' misfortune and provided an outlet for public expressions of outrage and sympathy, but sadly has had neither influence on the abductors, nor on government action.

Although the impact of social media varies, it is clear that it has become an important factor in politics, both domestic and international. The Internet has spurred the creation of thousands of virtual networks, which share and discuss views on everything from climate change to world trade. It has become an affordable and instant means of communication with mass audiences. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), lobby groups and protest groups are successfully harnessing the power of the Internet to promote their own interests, to exchange opinions and information, to offer alternative interpretations to official positions and to conduct lobbying campaigns.

The existence of large diaspora communities around the world has led to the creation of Internet groups allowing expatriate nationals to connect to both their homelands and to each other. Members range from business representatives to migrant workers and political exiles. These communities are a force in their own right, with views and opinions about their countries of origin. Some may be in a position to influence official opinion in their countries of residence, or are skilled enough to attract media interest. Facebook is particularly popular among diaspora communities as a tool for communicating with the home country. It is widely used by diaspora communities from the Philippines and other Asian countries. Online diaspora communities have created new possibilities for ministries of foreign affairs to engage with them on consular and promotional activities.

4.4. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly – How MFAs (Mis)use Social Media

Government institutions, including MFAs, are rarely among the early adopters of new technologies, with the notable exception of military technologies. The Internet is similar in that respect. Although, by now, most government institutions have some sort of web presence, and numerous e-government initiatives have been launched around the world, there are relatively few examples of the government sector fully using the potential of new communication technologies. When communicating with the public at home and abroad, many foreign ministries are still in the broadcast age.

Nevertheless, examples of smart use of the Internet – and particularly social media – by governments are growing. Some governments are developing virtual networks with their diaspora, for example India's Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC)⁶⁴, which aims primarily to empower the Indian diaspora abroad, but also to create a connection between communities abroad and public institutions at home.

⁶³ BringBackOurGirls (BBOG_Nigeria), "276 #ChibokGirls abducted on 14 April 2014. 57 escaped. 219 are still missing. #BringBackOurGirls NOW & ALIVE! info@bringbackourgirls.ng," Twitter account, <https://twitter.com/hashtag/bringbackourgirls>.

⁶⁴ <http://www.oifc.in/>.


The majority of foreign ministries, starting with the US Department of State, have also begun to experiment with social media. On 4 February 2009, shortly after the first Obama administration took office, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, said: “We are, in my view, wasting time, wasting money, wasting opportunities because we are not prepared to communicate effectively with what is out there in the business world and the private world”.⁶⁵ Accordingly one of her priorities was to revamp the digital diplomacy of the State Department as part of the broader *21st Century Statecraft* campaign. Today the US State Department is one of the leaders in e-diplomacy, with its digital assets including a YouTube channel, a Flickr profile, an official Facebook page, audio and video podcasts distributed via iTunes and its own wiki Diplopedia and social network Corridor.⁶⁶

Our survey (see Figure 15) shows the wide range of the use of social media tools among ASEM countries. European countries are more inclined towards using social media tools. Twitter is especially popular among the diplomatic services of European countries. Asian and European countries use Facebook almost equally, which is probably related to the high level of popularity of Facebook in Asia. The major difference exists in the use of YouTube, which is utilised by European countries in their public diplomacy activities significantly more often. The use of other platforms such as Pinterest, Google+ and Instagram is marginal among ASEM partners.

⁶⁵ Matthew Lee, “Hillary Clinton, e-diplomat, embraces new media,” *USA Today*, 23 March 2009. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-23-clinton-digital_N.htm.

⁶⁶ Fergus Hanson, “Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2012, http://lowyinstitute.richmedia-server.com/docs/Hanson_Revolution-at-State.pdf.

Figure 14: The social media use of ASEM MFAs



However, when engaging with European and Asian social media dynamics, one should bear in mind an important difference. Even though the number of social media users in Asia is much higher than in Europe, they might not constitute a balanced representation of Asian society, due to the limited Internet penetration in the region. As digital divides usually follow the lines of existing socio-economic cleavages, social media might over-represent men, the wealthy and the urban populations, while potentially excluding women, the poor and rural citizens. For example, the gap between male and female users in Asia-Pacific is estimated to be 17.6%, whereas this number is about 8% in Europe.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ International Telecommunications Union, *Measuring the Information Society 2015* (Geneva: ITU, 2015), p. 8.

On all four surveyed social media platforms, the percentage of MFAs represented on the respective platform are higher in Europe than in Asia. Asian MFAs are more frequently represented on Facebook than on YouTube, while the situation is reversed in Europe, where Twitter is the most frequently used social media platform, and where Facebook is of relatively little importance. In Europe, YouTube is more frequently used for diplomatic representation than Facebook, and the video-streaming platform has almost reached Twitter's number one position.

The Indian Foreign Ministry, too, is becoming a leader in digital diplomacy and it has even published its own online pamphlet, *Indian Diplomacy at Work*.⁶⁸

Today there is a multitude of digital and social media tools that an institution can use for internal and public communication, and we will now further elucidate the digital tools provided by Twitter, blogs, Facebook and Wikipedia.⁶⁹

4.4.1. Twitter

Usually classified as a microblog, Twitter entries are short (140 characters) and often include links to relevant files; at the same time microblogs are typically updated more often than traditional blogs – often several, to a dozen times, per day. Twitter users create a circle of followers (which is not necessarily reciprocal: one user can follow the other without them following the other back). This allows for a high level of interaction, such as re-tweeting interesting posts by others, responding to them and mentioning other users in posts.

The specific value of Twitter for public diplomats lies in sounding out the opinions of the community on various issues, engaging in discussions to present and explain positions and identifying articles and readings on particular topics of interest, through following posts tagged with hashtags, e.g. #ediplomacy.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Indian Diplomacy, *Indian Diplomacy at Work*, http://issuu.com/indiandiplomacy/docs/digital_diplomacy_english_b8e5741f3dd1c2.

⁶⁹ A practical guide to the most popular social media tools, designed for diplomats, is Antonio Deruda, *The Digital Diplomacy Handbook: How to Use Social Media to Engage with Global Audiences* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015).

⁷⁰ To learn more, we recommend *Twitter for Diplomats* (Malta: DiploFoundation, 2013), a short online book by Italian diplomat, Andreas Sandre.

Currently more than three-quarters of world leaders have a Twitter account. All 45 European governments have an official Twitter presence. In Asia, 76% of governments are on Twitter. US President Barack Obama (@BarackObama) is the most followed world leader, with over 70 million followers. In Europe Pope Francis is the second most followed world leader with close to 20 million followers on his nine different @Pontifex accounts. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) with over 10 million followers and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (@RT_Erdogan) with six million followers are among the top five most followed world leaders. Queen Rania of Jordan (@QueenRania), Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (@MedvedevRussia & @MedvedevRussiae) and HH Sheikh Mohammed of Dubai (@HHShkMohd) are all in the top 10 list of most followed leaders, and have more than three million followers each. Among the most followed MFA heads on Twitter are Sushma Swaraj of India (@sushmaswaraj) with over 4.6 million followers and Abdullah bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates (@ABZayed) at around 1.6 million followers.⁷¹

4.4.2. Facebook

Facebook is primarily a personal social media platform, used to connect with friends and share updates (photos, event invitations, music, interesting readings and links, etc.). However increasingly it is also used for professional outreach. By creating institutional or public personal profiles, pages, interest groups or events, diplomatic institutions can gather visitors interested in their work, organise and share content and engage efficiently with their communities.

With 1.59 billion monthly active users⁷², Facebook is becoming a key tool for public diplomacy. Some diplomatic Facebook accounts, such as the US Embassy in Jakarta, with close to 635,000 followers, are highly successful. A sample of other foreign ministries with Facebook pages shows that countries as diverse as Greece, Finland, France, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Romania and Spain have taken up the opportunity. Facebook is widely used for support of consular activities and contacts with diaspora.

4.4.3. Blogs

Since their emergence in the late 1990s, blogs have become immensely popular. An estimate from late 2013 says there are over 150 million blogs, with two new blogs being created every second.⁷³ Simply defined, blogs are an online self-publishing tool. Bloggers post short entries regularly, to deliver information on a wide range of topics, and to invite response in the form of comments from readers. Blogs usually aim to foster interaction between the author and readers, who may be a specific group or the general public.

⁷¹ Twiplomacy, "Twiplomacy Study 2014 – Update," 26 November 2014. <http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2014-update/>.

⁷² Statistics as of 31 December 2015, Facebook Newsroom, <http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/>.

⁷³ Brandon Gaille, "How Many Blogs are on the Internet," WP Virtuoso, 20 November 2013. <http://www.wpvirtuoso.com/how-many-blogs-are-on-the-internet>.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is among the leaders in diplomatic blogging, with a focus on public diplomacy and individual views. Over 100 of its officials and diplomats – including ministers and ambassadors – blog regularly from all over the globe. “We want our blogs to be personal, real time, integrated with other things we’re doing, responsive to comments, and written for particular (sometime niche) audiences”.⁷⁴ The French MFA uses blogs in a very effective way by explaining the MFA’s e-diplomacy activities, including a training in digital diplomacy for French diplomats, in a humorous blog posting.⁷⁵

Blogging by diplomats raises questions about the relationship between the expression of professional and personal views on social media. Although the history of diplomatic blogging is fairly short, there are already a few examples of diplomatic conflicts directly associated with the use of personal elements in blogs by diplomats. For example, Jan Pronk, the UN Envoy in Sudan, was expelled from the country following the comments he made in his personal blog.⁷⁶ During the summer of 2006, Pronk’s doubts about the effectiveness of the Darfur peace process and his criticisms of both the Sudanese government and the rebels were picked up by mainstream media. Three days after a further critical posting on his blog in August 2006, Pronk was declared *persona non grata* by the Sudanese government and given three days to leave the country. The UN offered him no official backing.

Former UK Ambassador Oliver Miles is critical of diplomatic blogging, arguing that ambassadors should not try to replace journalists: He says: “Their [Ambassadors’] job is to advise their governments on policy [...] to carry out policy and on occasion to advocate and promote it publicly; and to provide a discreet and reliable channel of communication between governments.” Blogging, he claims, does not support these aims. On the contrary, diplomatic blogging is bound to be risky, as in order to attract readers a blog has to be a bit spicy, whereas diplomatic communication is typically cautious and bland, for good reason.⁷⁷

Despite doubts and risks such as these, many major MFAs, including the US State Department and the UK FCO, continue to encourage their officials to blog.

4.4.4. Wikipedia

Wikipedia – the free, online, collaboratively written encyclopaedia – offers some very interesting opportunities for public diplomacy, in particular for enhancing a country’s image. Wikipedia is the seventh most visited website worldwide. Wikipedia is a primary source of information about the history, geography, politics, institutions, and international relations of different countries worldwide. It is often the first source users turn to when they want to learn something about another country.

⁷⁴ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, (no date), *Foreign Commonwealth Office Digital Diplomacy*. <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/digitaldiplomacy/>.

⁷⁵ Anne Chounet-Cambas, “Hands on digital diplomacy,” *Carnets Diplomatiques*, 21 February 2014. <http://blog.diplomatie.gouv.fr/Hands-on-digital-diplomacy?lang=fr>.

⁷⁶ Jan Pronk, <http://www.janpronk.nl>.

⁷⁷ Oliver Miles, “Stop the blogging ambassadors,” *The Guardian*, 12 July 2010. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jul/12/lebanon-israel>.

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The creation of articles on Wikipedia is a very interesting process. All articles are written by volunteers, and any Internet user can become an editor. This does not mean, however, that anything can be published on Wikipedia as the organisation maintains strict policies and guidelines. One of them is verifiability where all information included in an article should be supported by verifiable sources such as books, published academic works or media news. Another important policy is a neutral point of view, which means that all views about a particular topic should be fairly represented.

Due to its wide use, Wikipedia can be a powerful tool for public diplomacy. Creating new articles on Wikipedia, or improving existing ones, should be part of MFAs' public diplomacy strategy. Nevertheless, in the context of Asia-Europe, Wikipedia does not accurately reflect linguistic diversity. English is the most frequently used language with more than five million Wikipedia articles, followed by Swedish, Cebuano, German, Dutch and French – mostly European languages – whereas a very limited number of articles are available in Asian languages, especially when compared to the size of their populations.⁷⁸

4.5. Challenges for MFAs

The culture of interactivity and transparency embodied in blogs and other social media is very different from the more closed and hierarchical culture of traditional diplomacy. Frederick Jones, former editor of the official State Department blog, puts it quite straightforwardly in the following quote: “A lot of diplomacy has to be conducted behind closed doors. The challenge we face is striking a balance between having informed and interesting comments and giving diplomacy the space it needs. Diplomacy is not transparent by nature. Blogs are.”⁷⁹

What kind of balance may be found between these two cultures? While many authors are doubtful about the applicability of social media to diplomacy, and public diplomacy as part of it, others suggest that the Internet culture of openness, interactivity and two-way communication may transform the very way public diplomacy operates. Former US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman described this upcoming change as “public diplomacy 2.0.” According to Glassman, the State Department “would like to see the government as a facilitator and convener... What we want to do is encourage a conversation in which we are part.” This means supporting online activities by anti-violence, anti-extremist organisations, especially in troubled regions, without necessarily preaching the US story to them. The implementation may fall short, but the ideology behind such initiatives is revolutionary: to cede control of information, to build an open channel for criticism and alternative points of view. According to Josh Fouts: “Government has always been driven by an effort to control information, but to be part of this conversation inherent in Internet culture is to let go of control of information and roll with it.”⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Kristen V. Brown, ‘Unless you speak English, the Internet doesn’t care about you,’ *Fusion*, 18 February 2016. <http://fusion.net/story/270135/the-english-speaking-web-creates-digital-ghettos/>.

⁷⁹ Matthew Lee, “State Department launches diplomacy blog,” *USA Today*, 25 September 2007. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-09-25-state-department-blog_N.htm.

⁸⁰ Amy Harder, “Clinton State Department looks to boost online presence,” *Nextgov*, 11 February 2009. http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20090211_9513.php.

Another concern with regard to e-diplomacy as part of public diplomacy has to do with measuring the results of such activities. It is well known in the business world that social media marketing does not immediately lead to increased sales – it is more effective at less measurable tasks like building awareness, increasing customer loyalty and improving reputations. Many foreign ministries find it challenging to ensure funding for public diplomacy in circumstances where the impact of public diplomacy cannot be easily measured and presented to a broader public.

5. Conclusion

Diplomacy in Asia and Europe can, and should, play an important role in strengthening digital connectivity between these two continents.

First, Asian and European diplomats have to be prepared to work in fast-changing geopolitical and geoeconomic spaces where the Internet is becoming the defining technology of modern society. In the Asia-Europe context, digital technologies should foster interdependence as a way to improve relations, reduce the use of force and solve conflicts through peaceful means.

Second, to increase digital connectivity the two continents should harmonise their policy and regulatory frameworks. This includes setting technical standards for Internet development, regulating e-commerce, consumer protection and dispute resolution, among others.

Third, diplomats should start using social media effectively in building understanding and trust between the two continents. Despite all the risks associated with the use of social media tools, if used strategically they may become an important channel of communication with foreign publics.

Glossary

Content policy: the deliberate restriction of online content in order to protect vulnerable communities and cultural values, to divert security threats and radicalisation, or to limit political opposition. The latter use of content restriction often coincides with violations of the right to freedom of expression.

Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: signed in 2001, this is currently the only international treaty in the field of Internet security. The convention has also been adopted by non-European countries and has caused international harmonisation of cybersecurity rules.

Cybercrime (computer crime) refers to any crime that involves a computer and a network, where the computers may or may not have played an instrumental part in the commission of a crime.

Cybersecurity: measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against unauthorised access or attack (www.merriam-webster.com)

Cybersovereignty: governments' exclusive control over their national cyberspace, often coinciding with restrictions for foreign content and applications and the promotion of domestic Internet companies.

Data governance: the construction of a regulatory regime related to the digital movement and storage of data. It is highly related to data protection and privacy.

Digital centralisation: challenging the assumption that the Internet is decentralised, digital centralisation points towards the limited number of cables through which the Internet is carried, which can ultimately cause security risks and tensions between countries.

Digital interdependence: the increased level of interdependence between countries, caused by information and communication technologies. It is believed to increase the incentives for peaceful dispute resolution and to blur the traditional division between national and international communication spaces.

Digital Silk Road: part of the One Belt - One Road initiative aimed at connecting China to the Eurasian landmass through different infrastructural projects, including strengthening the digital links on the Eurasian territory.

Diplomatic blogging: the use of the blogosphere by diplomats and ministry of foreign affairs officials.

Domain Name System (DNS) handles Internet addresses (such as www.google.com) and converts them to IP numbers (a simplified scheme of this process is presented in the illustrations). The DNS consists of root servers, top-level domain (TLD) servers, and a large number of DNS servers located around the world.

E-commerce: the use of information and communication technologies for the trade in products or services.

E-diplomacy: the use of information and communication technologies for diplomatic objectives.

Encryption: the scrambling of electronic documents and communication into an unreadable format that can be read only through the use of encryption software.

Geoeconomics: the promotion of national interest through economic means.

Geopolitics: a way of viewing politics by assessing how it is affected by geographic factors.

Guidelines on Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data: adopted on 23 September 1980, continues to represent international consensus on general guidance concerning the collection and management of personal information. By setting out core principles, the guidelines play a major role in assisting governments, business and consumer representatives in their efforts to protect privacy and personal data, and in obviating unnecessary restrictions to trans-border data flows, both on and off line (<http://www.oecd.org>).

Information and communication technologies (ICTs): umbrella term covering technologies that allow for communication and access to information using telecommunications.

Information security: a broad conception of cybersecurity that allows for taking measures in cyberspace to create social and political stability.

Intellectual property rights (IPR) are temporary grants of monopoly intended to give economic incentives for innovative activity. IPR exist in the form of patents, copyrights and trademarks (<http://dret.net/glossary/ipr>).

Interaction capacity: the possibilities for transportation and communication between different social systems, largely dependent on physical and social technologies.

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was formed in 1998. It is a not-for-profit, public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. It promotes competition and develops policy on the Internet's unique identifiers. ICANN does not control content on the Internet. It cannot stop spam and it doesn't deal with access to the Internet. But through its coordination role of the Internet's naming system, it does have an important impact on the expansion and evolution of the Internet (www.icann.org).

Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.

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Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is run by the IGF Secretariat. Its purpose is to support the United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate from the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) with regard to convening a new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The site provides an interactive, collaborative space where all stakeholders can air their views and exchange ideas.

Internet Protocol (IP): unique numeric addresses that all computers connected to the Internet must have. As no two computers can have the same IP number, IP numbers are a scarce resource.

Many-to-many communication: form of communication in which each user can contribute and receive information, allowing for dynamic forms of online interaction. It has largely been facilitated by social media platforms.

Multilingualism: the promotion of online content that is accessible in multiple languages.

Public diplomacy: diplomatic activities aimed at influencing the public, understanding their attitudes to foreign policy activities and shaping their views on these issues to the advantage of the country conducting the activities.

Public diplomacy 2.0: the use of the Internet to conduct public diplomacy, often using social media channels, to engage directly with foreign and domestic publics and enhance the interactive character of public diplomacy.

Social media: an umbrella concept encompassing online communication channels dedicated to user-generated content and many-to-many interaction.

Telecommunications infrastructure: all facilities capable of transporting digital signals, such as copper wire, fibre-optics and cables, but also microwave and Wi-Fi.

Twiplomacy: the use of Twitter for diplomatic activities.

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Annex I. Data analysis on Internet and new policy issues on the diplomatic agenda⁸¹

Data set: the IG Media Text Corpus (52,892 online news and reports from 2015)

Diplo Text-Analytics Framework (DTAF) was used to:

- map the IG specific keywords (more than 2,000 specific terms from the DiploFoundation's IG Terminological Model) onto the documents in the IG Media Text Corpus;
- project the previously developed statistical model of Internet Governance Forum 2006-14 session transcripts onto the documents in the IG Media Text Corpus;
- project Dr Kurbalija's Internet Governance Taxonomy onto the documents in the Corpus;
- recognise mentions of Asian and Europe countries in the IG Media Text Corpus;
- correlate information on country mentions and importance of various IG Issues from the Taxonomy in the Corpus.

Results:

- typical IG Issues are described via semantic topics (i.e. "contexts": lists of IG specific terms, with each term receiving a specific importance weight in each IG Issue);
- correlation between the pattern of country mentions in the Corpus and the pattern of IG Issues in the corpus;
- the recognition of typical IG contexts in which a particular country tends to occur in online media.

⁸¹ For more information about the IG Media Text Corpus, please contact DiploFoundation at diplo@diplomacy.edu

Annex II. Summary of ASEM Partners' web presence⁸²

Country	Web	ASEM	Asia/Eur ⁸³	Languages	PD ⁸⁴	Projects & exhibitions	Twitter	Facebook	Flickr	YouTube	News	RSS
Australia	Yes	Yes		English	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Austria	Yes		Yes	English, German		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Bangladesh	Yes			English							Yes	
Belgium	Yes		Yes	English, German, French, Dutch			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Brunei Darussalam	Yes	Yes		English	Yes						Yes	
Bulgaria	Yes	Yes		English, Bulgarian			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Cambodia	Yes			English, Khmer				Yes			Yes	
China	Yes		Yes	English, French, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, Russian							Yes	
Croatia	Yes			English, Croatian			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Cyprus	Yes			English, Greek							Yes	
Czech Republic	Yes	Yes		English, Czech	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	
Denmark	Yes		Yes	English, Danish			Yes			Yes	Yes	yes
Estonia	Yes			English, Estonian, Russian			Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Finland	Yes		Yes	English, Finnish, Swedish			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
France	Yes		Yes	English, French, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, German		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Germany	Yes		Yes	English, German, French, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, Russian, Portuguese		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	yes
Greece	Yes			English, French, Greek		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Hungary	Yes			English, Magyar				Yes		Yes	Yes	yes
India	Yes			English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Hindi			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Indonesia	Yes	Yes		English, Bahasa		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Ireland	Yes			English, Irish			Yes			Yes	Yes	
Italy	Yes		Yes	English, Italian, Arabic		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Japan	Yes	Yes	Yes	English Japanese	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Korea	Yes	Yes	Yes	English, Korean		Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes

⁸² Websites of Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 51 ASEM Partners and organisational web sites for the ASEAN Secretariat and the European Union

⁸³ Pages on Asia (in Europe) and on Europe (in Asia)

⁸⁴ Pages on public diplomacy

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Country	Web	ASEM	Asia/Eur ⁸³	Languages	PD ⁸⁴	Projects & exhibitions	Twitter	Facebook	Flickr	YouTube	News	RSS
Kazakhstan	Yes		Yes	English, Russian, Kazakh			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Lao PDR	Yes			English, Thai							Yes	
Latvia	Yes		Yes	English, Latvian, Russian			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Lithuania	Yes			English, French, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Luxembourg	Yes			French							Yes	
Malaysia	Yes		Yes	English, Bahasa	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Malta	Yes			English, Maltese				Yes			Yes	
Mongolia	Yes		Yes	English, Mongolian	Yes		Yes	Yes			Yes	
Myanmar	Yes			English							Yes	
Netherlands	Yes		Yes	English, Dutch, Papiamentu, Papiamentu			Yes				Yes	yes
New Zealand	Yes		Yes	English, Maori		Yes					Yes	yes
Norway	Yes			English, Norwegian, Samegiella			Yes		Yes		Yes	yes
Pakistan	Yes			English	Yes		Yes	Yes			Yes	
Philippines	Yes			English			Yes	Yes			Yes	
Poland	Yes		Yes	English, Polish	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Portugal	Yes			English, Portuguese							Yes	
Romania	Yes	Yes	Yes	English, French, Romanian	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Russian Federation	Yes			English, French, German, Spanish, Russian			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Singapore	Yes	Yes	Yes	English			Yes				Yes	
Slovakia	Yes			English, Slovak				Yes		Yes	Yes	
Slovenia	Yes	Yes		English, Slovenian			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Spain	Yes		Yes	English, French, Spanish, Catalan, Basque, Galician			Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Sweden	Yes		Yes	English, Swedish			Yes				Yes	yes
Switzerland	Yes		Yes	English, French, German, Italian		Yes				Yes	Yes	
Thailand	Yes		Yes	English, Thai			Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
United Kingdom	Yes		Yes	English			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes
Viet Nam	Yes			English, Vietnamese		Yes					Yes	