The role of the United Nations in making progress towards peace in Burundi

Zenja Basagic

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The List of Acronyms

AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AU	African Union (referred to as OAU until 2001)
BINUB	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi)
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Community (referred to as EU since 1993)
EU	European Union (referred to since 2001)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FNL	Forces nationales de liberation
Frodebu	Le front pour la démocratie au Burundi
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMC	Implementation Monitoring Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity (referred to as AU since 2001)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMIB	OAU Military Observer Mission to Burundi
ONUB	Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Operation in Burundi)
PBC	Peace Building Commission
PBF	Peace Building Fund
Pelipehutu	Parti pour la libération du people hutu
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SC	United Nations Security Council
S-G	Secretary-General (of the UN)
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
Unifem	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOB	United Nations Office in Burundi
Uprona	Union pour le Progrès national
US	United States
WB	World Bank

WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

I INTRODUCTION

*Development has no worse enemy than war (*Annan, 1999)

Burundi is a small, overpopulated country situated in Central Africa. Between independence in 1962 and the latest democratic elections in 2005, it went through five *coups d'etat*, frequent massacres, genocides, repressions, three assassinations of kings/presidents, three Republics, five peace agreements and three new constitutions. The nature of Burundi's mayhem is internal, fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions, and stemming from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 2000). The Tutsi assassination of the first democratically elected president of Hutu origin resulted in inter-ethnic massacres that that inflamed Burundi in 1993 and drew global attention. In the nineties, at different stages, the whole Great Lakes region including Burundi Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),

suffered conflict rivalries. A major genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994 and the fear of the regional powers and the international community that the crisis would spill over to neighbouring Burundi was justified.

Ending a decade-long peace process was a combination of regional initiatives, military and diplomatic involvement, and the mediation processes by foreign parties. However, not always timely, efforts of traditional political diplomacy, good offices, quiet diplomacy, emergency diplomacy, multi-track diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, as well as parallel diplomacy have all been employed in Burundi. Since 1993, this nation has attracted a multitude of conflict-prevention activities and international agents disproportionate to its strategic value (Hara, 2003) and more than any other country in Africa between 1993 and 1996 (Zartman, 2006). A series of peace efforts took place over the period of 13 years, including the peacekeeping actions by the UN, the then Organization of African Unity (OAU)[1], the Central and East African states as well as the United States (US), Belgium, Republic of South Africa, Canada, Kenya, and the European Community (EC)[2]. Above all, a readiness of

[1] The AU was esablsihed in 2001 on disbandoned OAU and the African Economic Community established in 1963.

[2] The Maastricht Treaty, which was concluded in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993, established the European Union, founded on the European Communities. The EU's competency was expanded to include foreign and security affairs.

Burundian political parties to make concessions and sign the peace agreement has been pivotal.

From the political standpoint, the country entered a new phase in 2005 when the people adopted a fresh constitution, held democratic elections, established a government and pronounced a new president. In addition, the security situation has improved and the country has seen fewer armed clashes in the last two years. In 2006. the single remaining non-signatory party signed the Cease-fire Agreement, an offspring of the Arusha Peace Accord after many rounds of peace talks that had carried on after 2003 when first of six non-signatory parties of the 2000 Cease-fire Agreement round signed it. This small landlocked country covering an area of 27,830 square km has been since been trying to achieve some economic and social progress while living in fragile peace with weak democratic institutions and rule of law while human rights continue to be violated. Today. Burundi is a secular parliamentary republic, with power shared by an elected President and a Prime Minister appointed by the Parliament after decades of military oligarchy. Burundi is slowly moving from a permanent state of war to a permanent state of peace, and from remnants of colonialism to democracy and market economy.

In 2006, Burundi was 169th out of 177 countries in the UNDP human development index, meaning it was the eighth poorest country in the world with a huge foreign debt. After independence in 1962, it had been one of the best performers in the economic and social areas in Sub-Saharan Africa (WB, 2007). It is difficult to calculate the exact cost of the continuous political disorder or of the efforts by international and regional initiatives to secure peace, but it is safe to say that they must have been enormous. What we can measure is the extent of the human tragedy and economic suffering of Burundians. During the 30 years of violence and reprisal and in different waves of the Tutsi and Hutu warfare, an estimated 300,000 were killed and up to 1.3 million were made refugees and internally displaced making it "one of top ten refugee-producing" (Crisp, 2006) countries in the world. The UN humanitarian and development agencies estimate the extent of vulnerability among the general Burundian population to be one of the highest globally.

Today, in 2007, of 7.2 million Burundians[3], some 68 per cent live under the poverty line, 41 per cent are chronically malnourished, and more than two million require food aid. The country struggles with 20,000 demobilised soldiers who have to be reintegrated into normal life, 130,000 HIV orphans (Burundi is among the 15 countries most affected by HIV/AIDS), 3,000 street children, 10,500 handicapped

[3] According to the latest official census of 2002. The IMF estimates the number at 7.6 m people.

children, and many other vulnerable people, with malaria as one of the major health treats. There are still 100,000 internally displaced people and some 375,000 Burundian refugees in countries of asylum, mostly in Tanzania. Despite the positive political developments, 2006 was characterised by a low level of return of displaced populations (Consolidated Inter-Agency-Appeal for Burundi, 2007). To date, nobody had been held accountable for war crimes and human misery of Burundi.

In dealing with conflicts in Burundi, the UN has had an inter-changeable leading role with the regional actors. It was one of the major players in the bigger framework since 1993. It adopted a number of important resolutions, kept the focus of the international community on Burundi, deployed United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB) in 1993, a UN United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004, and a UN Integrated Office - BINUB[4] in 2007 to support the peace processes and promote conciliation through good offices, to maintain peace and organize elections, and to consolidate peace, respectively. Similarly, the UN was one of the few major providers of humanitarian assistance in Burundi.

Today, chief UN agencies, programmes and funds have their offices in Bujumbura and different regions of Burundi. These are Food

[4] Known by their official French acronyms.

Agricultural Organization (FAO), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children's Fund (Unicef), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Food Programme (WFP), and World Health Organization (WHO). The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Development Fund for Women (Unifem), UN-Habitat, as well as UNAIDS are also there. A number of them have been present since the early sixties implementing their regular regional programmes. The emergency agencies, UNHCR and Unicef had become engaged in addressing of humanitarian needs of the Burundi "caseload" in 1993, while OCHA arrived in 1998. In June 2006 the Peace Building Commission (PBC) formed a country specific group. In Burundi, BINUB acts as it focal point while the Steering Committee is made up of BINUB, donors, the Government of Burundi, UN agencies coordinates its work; BINUB and the UNDP as the Fund Manager coordinate the PBF.

Dozens of UNHCR, WFP, WHO and Unicef international personnel as well as more than twenty civilian and military peacekeepers have lost their lives to the noble cause of helping Burundians establish peace in their country. A number of others have been seriously injured.

The events in Burundi are inseparable from the tragic events in the neighbouring countries and other countries suffering of intra-state and ethnic conflicts on other continents. The question is whether the UN had the capacity, knowledge, will, skills, resources, and a clear policy to deal with the conflicts of this nature and whether popular expectations of the UN had been too high. The question is also whether the member-states showed adequate will and skills to act through the UN within the multilateral fora and/or bilaterally. Can we say that the UN does not learn lessons from its failures or it is also that there is an absence/lack of consistent foreign policies by its member-states?

In the following chapters, this paper will explore the history of Burundi, and reasons for the conflict. Importantly, it will focus on the reform and the changes taking place in the UN concomitant with the major events in Burundi; at the time when Burundi was trying to achieve durable solutions for peace, the UN was also trying to redefine itself. The paper will thus examine the extent of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) and the overall UN's support in establishing, maintaining and consolidating peace in Burundi with the emphasis on the period 1993 - 2007.

CHAPTER 1 Background and survey of events up to the present

I. Burundi between 1885 and 1987

Like Rwanda, Burundi was an independent kingdom before it became part of the German sphere of influence and interest after the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). After the First World War this colonial dominance was awarded to the Kingdom of Belgium at the Versailles Conference in 1919. The decision was ratified by the League of Nations in 1923 and this dominance lasted until 1962.

The kings formally governed the twin territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Hutu and Tutsi relationships were cemented by their shared loyalty to common institution of the kingship (Crisp, 2006). There was also the royal caste reportedly of a mixed Hutu and Tutsi origin which allowed both groups to enjoy power and prestige. Following the Second World War, Ruanda-Urundi became a United Nations Trust Territory with Belgium as its administrator. The kingdoms gained

independence from colonial rule in 1962 and the two became the independent states of Rwanda and Burundi.

Kirundi is the national language of all Burundians, while French though an official language is spoken only by educated Burundians. Kirundi is a language of the Bantu family and almost identical to that spoken in Rwanda. Nearly 95 percent of the population is rural.

Although there are no reliable data, it is estimated that about 85 percent of the population is Hutu, and 14 percent is Tutsi. A third group, the Batwa (also known as Twa or, popularly, Pygmy) constitutes less than one percent together with several thousand Greeks and Belgians. Hutu and Tutsi were referred to as tribes and most commonly, they were called ethnic groups although they shared the same culture, history and language, and could not be distinguished physically with any accuracy.

For quite a long time, historians and scholars claimed the existence of deep-rooted differences between the two ethnicities based on their ancestry: a stereotype was cultivated that Hutu were descended from Bantu people and Tutsi from Hamitic people. The former were represented as inferior and agriculture-oriented. The latter were considered more sophisticated and racially superior. The minority Tutsi were "wealthier and more powerful than the Hutu which

antedated imperialism, but was reinforced by the Germans and the Belgians during the 75 years of their colonial dominance over Ruanda-Urundi" (Hauss, 2003).

1.1. The beginnings of ethnic clashes

The conflicts emerging in Rwanda and Burundi from the late fifties often used to be explained as ancient tribal hatreds. First the Germans and then the Belgians adopted the pattern of indirect rule exercised in other corners of colonised Africa whereby Tutsi controlled the Hutu on their behalf. The Belgians cultivated this Hamitic myth for decades. The hypothesis of the racial superiority of Tutsis had a major impact upon both Rwanda and Burundi. These two states have history of similar events taking place consecutively and are often compared by scholars and researches. Lemarchand agrees that these two countries shared many cultural characteristics. He nevertheless warns that the relations in Burundi were "more fluid and not reducible to simple Hutu and Tutsi split resulting in different political trajectories, with Rwanda acceding to independence as a Hutu-dominated republic and Burundi as a constitutional monarchy under a mixed government consisting of Hutu, Tutsi and 'princely' elements" (Lemarchand, 1998, p.1).

The actual causes of the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi are a combination of theories of identity rooted in the ancestry and unmet human needs. Additionally, some believe that the Hutu have been discriminated against for an extended period, and that the resentment that they carry with them had fuelled the most intense and violent of conflicts (Hara, 2003; Zartman, 2006). Others however consider that this had been a conflict of both political and economic nature.

With emerging decolonisation processes and the pressure from the UN, in 1959 the Belgians started a political reform in Burundi. This allowed political parties to emerge. One was Union pour le Progrès national (Uprona), which was established by Prince Louis Rwagasore and had a genuine nationalist orientation. Soon after, the conservative Christian Democratic Party came into being with the support of Belgians. A Hutu-led movement also emerged in Burundi around the same time, because of a Hutu attempt to overthrow Tutsi hegemony prompting hundreds of them to flee to Burundi and Uganda.

The period before the reign of Prince Rwagasore was a majoritarian democracy that excluded the Tutsi from participation. The Prince's assassination, allegedly by two members of the Christian Democratic Party, triggered polarisation of Hutu and Tutsi and the leadership

crisis in which the idea of national cohesion was lost. The country found sanctuary in the monarchical system that had always existed as an alternative and in 1962, Tutsi King Mwambatusa IV established a constitutional monarchy. In a four-year period that followed, there were attempts to establish a balanced proportion of Tutsi and Hutu in the government and a Hutu took the prime minister's chair. In 1963 following the Hutu revolution, thousands of Tutsi fled Rwanda and found refuge in Burundi adding oil to the fire of in-country ethnic hatreds. A close tie between Tutsi community in Rwanda and that in Burundi was forged. The ethnic bubble exploded and discrimination at all levels started; Tutsis took over public service and the state apparatus. Ethnic provocations became widespread and spilled out of the realm of the parliament and civil service. The upheaval in Eastern Zaire in 1963 and 1964 placed an additional burden on an already very complex situation in Burundi. Bujumbura became one of the major crossroads for the arms-supply to the rebel movement. A number of Tutsi refugees in Burundi became part of that rebel army. Some kind of Hutu and Tutsi balance held in the Parliament until 1965 when a Hutu prime minister was assassinated and the King nominated a Tutsi replacement, despite the fact that the Hutu won the majority at the elections and expected that position. The same year, the Hutu tried a *coup d'etat* and failed, paying a horrendous price: thousands of culprits and suspects were massacred. Repressions continued. In 1966, the King was killed in a

Tutsi-led army coup when the monarchy was abolished and the republic declared. After this series of coups and assassinations on both sides, the army and the government purged the Hutus from the army and the military regime took over. The Burundian Army had been used as a tool of coercion against Hutus ever since. Burundi entered a period, as Lemarchand called it, of "republican kinship" (Lemarchand, 1996, p.76) where the state was built around a loosely knit assemblage of personal kinship and ethno-regional ties. The year 1969 saw repressions and executions of those suspected of conspiring against the state. This signalled a period of factional and intraethnic conflicts. Uprona, once a party of a national orientation became the arena of Tutsi conflict of interests.

1.2. First massacres

In 1972 Burundi saw the Hutu insurrection in which they systematically killed Tutsis. Some 50,000 were estimated to have fled to Rwanda. On the other hand, some 150,000 Hutus fled to Tanzania and an unspecified number of people became the first internally displaced people of Burundi. In turn, the Burundian Army, mainly comprising Tutsis, slaughtered anywhere between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutu. In the years that followed, a Supreme Military Council held control consisting of Tutsi with only a few Hutu among the cabinet ministers. Severe human rights abuses of the Hutu took

place. They were denied education, access to government and army while the Tutsi reinforced their position as the dominant class. Hutu were not to be included in the political scene until sixteen years later. This period in Burundian history is even today an obstacle to reconciliation. The pain has not subsided and the cultivation of memory of this tragic event is ever-present in Burundi.

What is more, in both Rwanda and Tanzania the first armed wings of Hutus, Palipehutu, and Le Front de Libération nationale - Frolina came into being, drafting their followers from the refugee and the displaced population in Burundi. The refugee camps were breeding grounds for training and bases for insurgent attacks on Burundi. In 1986, educated Hutus who survived the 1972 massacres and lived in exile in Rwanda established a new party Le front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu) that was mainly Hutu.

II. Burundi between 1987 and 1992

In 1987, problems arose among the Tutsi themselves and Major Pierre Buyoya who staged a coup and came to power. He dismissed the government, suspended the constitution, became the President of the Third Republic and raised high expectations of needed political change. However, he only scratched the deep problems. The following year saw the killing of 20,000 Tutsi by Hutus in the north of

the country and oppression and slaughter of Hutu in revenge. Unlike in 1972, now the international response was decisive in attempting to prevent the massacre of Hutus. In 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992 there were several serious inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic crises, attacks by Hutu refugees from Tanzania, Hutu uprisings and new waves of displacement. Action toward reform that was to bring national unity, and new multi-party elections scheduled for 1993, was gaining impetus. Having been financially dependant on foreign aid, the verbal economical threats of the US, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank (WB) found an ear with Buyoya, who multiplied efforts for national reconciliation and political reform. He also took some steps towards democratisation, and in 1992 changed the Constitution to that of a presidential regime. According to International Crisis Group reports, Burundi was used as a test case by the West on promoting a transition to democracy and the inclusion of Hutu in the government by a combination of financial aid and political influence (International Crisis Group, 2003).

These Western pressures resulted in the birth of a new government policy of voluntary repatriation implemented by a national commission for the reception and reinsertion of returnees. Additionally, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between Governments of Tanzania and Burundi, and UNHCR. During its extraordinary congress in December 1990, the Uprona, in power at

the time, encouraged the return of all Burundian refugees and other Burundians (Deng, 1994). Sensitisation campaigns were conducted for the organized repatriation of Burundian refugees. UNHCR had, in the meantime, started an emergency programme aimed at assisting spontaneous returns. It ran between July and December 1991. According to the UNHCR, there were 240,000 Hutu refugees in Rwanda, Zaire, and the European countries at the time and the biggest percentage of all in Tanzania (seventy-five per cent). For over three decades, Tanzania had been the main asylum country for Burundians. Roughly 40,000 refugees repatriated to Burundi in anticipation of the 1993 elections, but nearly 240,000 stayed behind (International Crisis Group, 1999). Twelve parties registered for the elections.

Around that time, human rights reports on Burundi started to come out and to have an impact capitalising on the increasing importance of human rights worldwide. By 1993, human rights had become an important tool in the new democratisation processes following the end of the Cold War and echoing strongly in the public opinion of the Western countries that subsidised the Burundian economy.

III. Burundi between 1993 and 2007

Frodebu and Uprona, with Buyoya as its candidate, dominated the elections. These went well, monitored by 1,100 international and national observers. Frodebu's Malchior Ndayaye won and Buyoya stepped down. Ndayaye actually represented several parties at the elections and won easily. This was a regime change from the military to civilian, from oligarchy to democracy and, for the first time in the history of Burundi, a Hutu became the president. Using the analogy of the French revolution, Lemarchand called it the "institutionalisation of the tyranny of an ethnic majority, in short, a Jacobine state under Hutu control" (Lemarchand, 1996, p.182). In an attempt to balance Hutu and Tutsi, Ndadaye brought several Tutsis into his cabinet and embarked on the reform of the army to bring in some ethnic balance. However, the Tutsi saw there the beginning of the end of their dominance and feared retaliations. Thousands of refugees began to return from Tanzania and other neighbouring countries demanding restitution of their land. Some returned and participated in the presidential campaign.

3.1. Beginning of mediation

In October 1993, three month into his presidency, Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated. This triggered extensive massacres of Tutsis and other acts of violence throughout that country, soon followed by army attacks on the Hutus. The violent ethnic clashes resulted in some 150,000 dead people, created up to 700,000 refugees, and internally displaced, of these 400,000 Hutu fled to Tanzania again (Weissman, 1994). The massive exodus far exceeded the capacity of existing relief operations, leading to high mortality rates and it "disrupted severely both the monetary and the subsistence economies, which lead to serious food deficits and acute malnutrition during the first months of 1994" (International Crisis Group, 1999). With the advent of food aid, the situation stabilised. While a large number of refugees returned, a steady flight of population continued. Many 1972 refugees complained that the international community duped them into believing that it had been safe for them to return to Burundi (International Crisis Group, 1999). At the time, the UNHCR categorised the internally displaced people as "displaced" and "dispersed". The first group consisted mostly of Tutsis who sought protection in Tutsi-run army camps, while the second included mostly Hutu, who were hiding. Paradoxically, being favoured has often been a source of misery for the displaced Tutsi who lived in camps (Deng, 1994).

After laborious negotiations mediated by OAU, a coalition government was formed, and Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Frodebu member, was pronounced president. He was the second Hutu elected president. Only four months later, he was killed in an airplane crash in Kigali, together with the president of Rwanda. The day after the assassination, the civilian authority, working together with both political parties and the Army, attempted to put an end to the bloodshed and appointed Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a Frodebu Hutu, head of the government. In Rwanda, at the same time, Hutu committed a massive genocide of Tutsis - over half a million people perished, followed by the flight of over a million Hutu including armed militias. These events deepened the polarisation in Burundi that was at the time being run by military coalitions of different Tutsi factions. A free arms trade complicated the alarming situation further. The neighbouring governments and some other African states - Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Zambia, Republic of South Africa, and Ethiopia - established the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (Regional Initiative hereafter) in 1995 to work on bringing the peace solution to Burundi.

Amid this anarchy, Buyoya a Tutsi soldier once again took power in Burindi with a coup in July 1996. He held it until mid-2003. Despite repressions that took place during his rule, overall security improved and the monthly death toll fell (Deng, 1994). His coup interrupted

the momentum that only just begun to build in the mediation efforts of the Regional Initiative powers led by Julius Nyerere, the former Tanzanian president who was appointed as a principal advisor to regional presidents. In reaction to the coup, the Regional Initiative powers imposed an economic embargo. Its aim was to pressure the state to restore the National Assembly and the Constitution and to normalise the work of political parties which had been banned. Although it loosened up in 1997, the embargo lasted three years and was a cause of disagreement between the Region, the international community, and the UN that had never endorsed it. Humanitarian assistance entering the country had been in decline anyway since the crisis started in 1993 and had almost stopped in 1996 for security reasons. The sanctions put an additional strain on the already hungry and disadvantaged population. The opponents of economic sanctions said loudly that not all the political options had been explored prior to their imposition. Calls for the resumption of aid and development assistance to Burundi were heard repeatedly, though it had always been questionable if such assistance could be offered in a hostile environment. The option of development and investments was, in Burundi, as much as anywhere else, often conditional on the establishment of peace. Importantly, the Buyoya Government perceived Nyerere as a main proponent of the sanctions and that had serious consequences on their relations throughout the peace negotiations and put his leadership and impartiality at risk.

3.2. Peace talks gaining momentum

After a long delay, later blamed for putting peace talk on hold, as the UN's assessed military intervention this option was finally disregarded and negotiations continued, albeit with hiccups,. Politically, the situation had worsened in Burundi with more splintering of Parti pour la libération du people hutu (Pelipehutu) and the birth of a new Tutsi extremist rebel group, Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) in 1994.

In 1996, Nyerere organized in Tanzania three summits in Arusha and three meetings in Mwanza. Nonetheless, the peace talks stalled in 1997 while the relationship between Nyerere and Burundi deteriorated and endangered the peace process. Calls for lifting sanctions came from all over the place. Claims could be heard that Tanzania dominated the process. Some say that the West and the Region countered the presumed Tanzanian dominance by naming four committees at the Arusha Peace talks and appointing a senior UN advisor. These committees were to look into genocide and the nature of conflict, good governance and democratisation, peace and security, and economic reconstruction and development. However, they too stalled, mainly, as was perceived, because Nyerere refused

to talk to rebels. in the course of the Arusha negotiations, the number of parties rose, as parties split and their military extremist factions separated as a result of internal rifts. Meanwhile, Buyoya's regime practised the forced relocation of population into "regroupment" camps. This practice started in 1996 to keep the population from rebel factions. By the end of September 1999, nearly 300,000 people in Bujumbura Rural province hd been forced into these camps by the armed forces of Burundi as revenge for rebel attacks. These camps remained in place until 2000 and certainly achieved the opposite of their aim – creating strong resentment.

After the sudden death of Nyeyere, Nelson Mandela succeeded him and unblocked the talks. Thirteen parties signed the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on 28 August, 2000. This encompassed proposals for deploying peacekeepers, establishing a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and reconstruction budgets and plans for the repatriation for refugees and internally displaced people. The legal foundation of the Accord was achieved with its ratification by the National Assembly of Burundi and the UN's support for it on 25 July 2001. The power-sharing schemes as well as the transitional government were to be worked out in a three-year process overseen by the IMC. This Commission was led by the UN appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Dinka and

participated in by the international community, OAU, representatives of all the parties that had signed the Accord as well as by Burundian civil society. As had happened before, donors gathered at a donor conference crowning the Accord but were prudent in making pledges of assistance, reiterating the importance of major reforms in the country. Although donors pledged some $1.1 billion, by November 2002 they had released only 20 percent (International Crisis Group, 2003). Most pledges were to go through the UN or non-governmental organizations (NGO), unlike before when the assistance went directly to the Government.

3.3 Transition

The fact that the ceasefire agreement was not signed by all the parties and that issues of peace and security dealt with through the Third Committee of the Arusha had not been concluded, compromised the Accord in eyes of many. Some considered the situation neither war nor peace (International Crisis Group, 2000), though the overall security immediately improved except in three provinces. It was expected, however, that this partial agreement reached in Arusha would be followed through. The IMC was one of the instruments planned for keeping the momentum. It also reflected continued international and regional interest in resolving the conflict in Burundi. The UN exclaimed, "The temptation to wait until all

outstanding issues have been resolved must be resisted vigorously" (Dinka, 2003).

A 36-month transition worked well. Under the Mandela-brokered deal there was to be a Tutsi president and a Hutu vice-president in the first half of the transition with the positions reversed in the second 18 months. Mandela decided that Buyoya should lead the country for first period as interim president.

Between October and December 2002, ceasefire agreements were signed with two minor rebel groups the CNDD-FDD faction and the Pelipehutu- Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) as well as with the CNDD-FDD itself. In January 2003, an agreement was set in motion to have a Joint Ceasefire Commission operational and a date fixed for the return of dissident leaders form exile. The AU force, including Republic of South Africa, Ethiopian and Mozambican troops, was deployed to protect the returnees and another more than seventy opposition politicians. Security improved except in two provinces.

The 2003 handover of power was considered a success because Buyoya stepped down. Simultaneously, there was an outbreak of violence from militias that had not signed the Ceasefire Agreement (Bentley & Southall, 2005, p. 96). This outburst again created displacement and insecurity. This frail peace somehow held despite

very grim prognoses. By the middle of January 2004, former rebels were integrated in the national army, except for the FNL that was not part of the peace agreement and that continued its attacks on the government army.

3.4 Peacekeeping

The AU and UN peacekeeping missions came as part of a peace agreement and, importantly, as a condition for the signing of the cease-fire agreement. They were a mechanism of third-party regional or international military reinforcement of peace process. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the UNOB were deployed in February 2003 and July 2004, respectively. At that time, almost one in six Burundians continued to live away from their homes; 388,000 people were in 226 camps in their own country, constituting the largest internally displaced population in the Great Lakes region. There were also an estimated 639,000 Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries, and a further 200,000 who had been living in Tanzania since 1972 (UN Document S/2002/1259).

The transitional government ended its tenure in 2005 by gaining national approval of a new Constitution by referendum in February of that year. Successful communal elections took place in June, and parliamentary elections in July 2005 with a power-sharing formula of

60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsis. The electoral code and communal law were adopted. Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former rebel movement, CNDD-FDD was elected president in August 2005 and the former rebel CNDD-FDD replaced Frodebuas the dominant party. Despite these developments, the Hutu FNL, an armed wing of Pelipehutu, remained at war with the Burundian armed forces until April 2005 when it first stated it would cease fighting and then in September 2006 when it put its signature on the Accord. In April 2006 the Government lifted a curfew that had been in force for more than thirty years. Thus, a full cease-fire accord was reached after 13 years of civil war. It was a major development and led to a significant improvement in the protection of the populations. The process leading to the FNL's signing of the agreement was long and cumbersome, in the end it was forced by the threat of sanctions.

Already in autumn 2005, the Government of Burundi had indicated to the UN that it wished aggressive development activities had started instead of peacekeeping. After lengthy negotiations between the Government and the UN, the United Nations Security Council (SC) adopted resolutions on the termination of ONUB in December and establishing BINUB at 1 January 2007.

However, the legitimacy of the new government that had gained a lot of sympathy nationally and internationally was undermined in 2006

after a series of financial and corruption scandals. One came when the EU discovered corruption in the government involving funds aimed at infrastructure works, after which the World Bank and some bilateral donors suspended assistance pending audit reports.

Furthermore, a continuous flow of cases of arbitrary arrests, killings and torture, as well as sexual and gender-based violence was reported throughout the year. Several opposition leaders were accused of plotting coups or of corruption and the legal procedure on the handling of these cases was not considered proper.

In 2006, the UN established the PBC, which has adopted Burundi as one of its first two focus countries (the second being Sierra Leone). In December 2006, the East African Community accepted Burundi in its membership.

CHAPTER 2: The UN after the Cold War

Before we continue with the exploration of the role the UN played in Burundi, we shall first review the major changes affecting the UN in the same period. This will not be all-inclusive; many have explained the UN reforms and changes well already. The aim here will be to illustrate the extent of the UN reform concomitant with the effort to resolve the Burundi conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War in the late eighties a series of crises had flared around the world, in Georgia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Namibia, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the former Yugoslavia. In these conflicts, which were all of intra-state character, political factions, military groups and warlords emerged as parties to conflict. The pressure from public opinion to resolve protracted ethnic and nationalist conflicts mounted on the international community and mainly on the UN. The UN's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of any state, stipulated in the Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter where there is no mention of intra-state or civil conflicts, as well as its prescribed role to maintain international peace and security, were both challenged. The UN involvement in the 1960 in two controversial military operations in the Republic of Congo and in West New Guinea as it tried to fill the power vacuum following

decolonisation, were traumatic experiences for the Organization. In both cases, the fine line of internal (security) affairs was crossed. Furthermore, in the Congo the UN suffered substantial fatalities including the killing of the Secretary-General (S-G). After this, the UN stayed out of the business of running the internal affairs of a state having learned ample lessons.

However, after the Cold War, as the strategic interests of the US and the USSR changed affecting international relations, pressure grew on the UN to engage in relatively new situations of prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peace building, for which there were neither international policies nor written prescriptions. The UN was somehow expected to fill in the void after the withdrawal of armed or humanitarian assistance by superpowers from their spheres of interest, which were mainly in developing countries. In his groundbreaking 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, the UN S-G Boutros-Ghali reflected on the major problems the UN had been facing and their causes. These included the number of vetoes which prevented it acting as a prime security organ controlling military conflicts and world crises. He announced a great shift in the UN's focus.

Some of his points are debatable. The number of vetoes had decreased and the number of mainly peacekeeping missions and countries in which the the UN was involved had increased. However,

the relation between the two does not necessarily lead to a conclusion about the quality or the efficiency of UN intervention. We have witnessed the UN's failures even after the Cold War. At the same time, the veto-wielding member-states grew more interested in financially supporting regional peace initiatives than in affirming and supporting financially the universal character of the UN. This resulted in the high demand for UN peacekeeping while leaving its resources extraordinarily stretched because states neglected to support it financially. The US debt to the UN has been a big setback to the organization. This has been a major paradox all along.

In 1997 the different human rights programmes were merged and the OHCHR established in Geneva for more efficient and focused work run by a High Commissioner, a post of which had been created in 1993. Violations of human rights came under serious scrutiny from the UN.

The path to changes had been embraced by Boutros-Ghali's successor Kofi Annan whose reform programme was endorsed by the UN's General Assembly in December of the same year. Another landmark document came out at the turn of the century when the UN launched its famous *Brahimi Report*. Lakhdar Brahimi, an eminent UN diplomat and a former Algerian Foreign Minister, prepared his report on United Nations Peace Operations at the request of the S-G Annan.

By then, the UN had faced a crisis of confidence when the internal UN reports of genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and massacres in Srebrenica in 1995 came out. Both were very negative and blamed the UN. The Brahimi report proposed extensive reform and sweeping changes in the UN peacekeeping operations to create an effective international security presence because, in Brahimi's words, the United Nations had repeatedly failed to meet the challenge of protecting people from the scourge of war (UN Document A/55/305, 2000). This report stressed the importance of adjusting the UN to the new reality of fieldwork and peace operations, unlike its conference work focus as originally envisaged to be the main activity of the UN.

To a certain extent, we can compare the significance of this UN Report for multilateral diplomacy to milestone reports in bilateral diplomacy such as The German Paschke Report of 2000 that inspired the transformation of foreign offices of different states. This is no coincidence; as the UN was starting to reinvent itself, national foreign ministries started the same process in support of changes in the international arena after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. "The end of the Cold War has liberated many countries to pursue independent policies…in recent years the diplomat's job has also changed as national agenda and interests have reflected the ascendance of human security issues and the dilution of traditional national security concerns" (Smith, 1999). In September of the same year, the

Millennium Summit Declaration laid out the track the UN should follow in the new century and set out the Goals.

The year 2002 was significant inasmuch as the General Assembly approved the resolution announcing the second part of Annan's UN reform, *Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change* (Annan, 2002). Major proposed changes encompassed aligning the priorities of all the UN entities with the Millennium Goals, enhancing human rights and working better together. In 2004, the US account office released an independent report that showed that 85 per cent of the 1997 and 2002 reform packages were either fully or partially implemented (UN Reform, 2006). Importantly, the reform dealt with internal affairs of the UN Secretariat to address the needed changes in the system of management, the efficiency of the organization, accountability, ethics and internal justice, staff security and many other issues. In 2005, Annan in his *In Larger Freedom* also said that the Security Council had increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the end of the cold war, had enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its permanent members.

I. Conflict-prevention, crisis management, post-conflict

Claims made since 1945 that development in the Third World will bring peace are difficult to prove. Some statistics support of this

hypothesis but there is no proof of causality (Smith, 1994). The *Human Security Report 2005* suggests that 80 percent decline in the civil conflicts in the nineties owes little to development (HRS, 2006). The theory that can be turned other way around and lead to the conclusion that "Africa remains poor because of instability and armed conflicts" (Marshall & Gurr, 2005, p.39). Development cannot address all the root causes of conflict. However, if combined with other economic efforts targeting communities, conflicts caused by economic inequalities can be expected to decrease.

A host of research has been done on the causes of modern conflict, prevention and reaction, and causality of development, good governance and democracy and peace. Nevertheless, none is conclusive nor do they set any rules. It is generally acknowledged that multiple causes trigger modern conflicts: malfunctioning states with inadequate political structures that collapse or fail to ensure the orderly transfer of power; repressive and weak governments; a state's inability to forge a single national identity that initially blocks development (Magstaadt, 2007); competition for scarce resources, or the so-called horizontal inequality of groups of varied ethnicity or race participating in power (Annan, 1997) are among the problems. Similarly, we could say that a relapse into conflict is now seen as a threat to peace in countries that have undergone a major conflict. According to one set of statistics, there is no safe period within the

first post-conflict decade; the chances of a conflict reoccurring during the first four years are estimated to be 87 per cent as compared to 13 per cent in the remaining six years of the period (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006). Furthermore, some research has established that Africa, from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, and from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south, has a volatile mix of poor human security, unstable and inequitable political institutions, limited resources, and, inevitably, a 'bad neighbourhood' of similar crisis-ridden states (Marshall and Gurr, 2005).

The results of conflict are human suffering, the destruction of the economic and social life of entire populations, and the threat to wider international peace and security. Conflicts generate phenomena such as illegal traffic in arms, drugs and precious stones, as well as human traffickin gand refugee flows, the effects of all of these cross the boundaries of the immediate warring areas. Hence, the increased focus on the UN as an international body that could drive the process of the conflict prevention and resolution as well as the preserve peace. Between 1992 and 2003, the last year for which the data were available to the authors of the *Human Security Report 2005*, the number of war conflicts dropped by 40 per cent (Human Security Report, 2006). There is however no proof that this can be attributed to the UN or any other organization or state.

New methods that had been developed in the US and had become a new field of study in the late eighties most likely instigated the UN's orientation towards conflict resolution. These new methods aimed at conflict resolution by dialogue and are based on the perception that it is legitimate to include the authors of violence, even though they are perceived as obscene and primal, in a rational process leading to a consensus (Hara, 2003). This was what some called the "all-inclusive" approach applied by Mandela in his regional negotiations for peace in Burundi.

Boutros-Ghali in the aforementioned peace agenda had announced a new approach the UN was taking in treating global conflicts:

"…disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation." (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992)

The turning point came with the peacekeeping mission to Namibia in 1989 which set a number of precedents for the UN: for the first time the UN not only monitored a cease-fire but actively assisted in the creation of democratic political institutions within a sovereign state. The mission to Cambodia, launched in 1991, was the first where the UN, together with other actors including the WB, took responsibility for assisting in running a state during its transition to democracy.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB started working closely with the UN at that stage, paving the way for modern integrated peace-building efforts. Additionally, the UN's Electoral Assistance Division was established shortly after the Namibia operation as the UN received numerous requests from member states for help with the elections.

In parallel to other changes taking place mainly in the peacekeeping and political work of the UN (namely in the DPKO and the UN Department of Political Affairs, DPA), as we shall see later, the UNDP started incorporating democratisation and good governance policies into its programmes in the countries where it operated. Between 1997 and 2000, the UNDP devoted 46 per cent of its budget to democratisation projects (Paris, 2004). Annan in 1999 encouraged "inclusive" democracy (combined with improved public services and especially security services, (Annan, 1999) as a means of preventing the destabilisation of a post-conflict state in the process of democratisation.

II. Security and peace operations

Another major area of soul-searching for the UN is the redefining the concept of security. This has been a critical process because security had become a single major pillar of its work. With the diversifying global issues and the inclusion of more and more of them on the agenda of the organization, even though they were not its original concerns, the meaning of security also begun to change. In the past, the security concept was nation-state oriented. It has now become increasingly people-oriented. Security has been more and more referred to as 'human security', reflecting all the new elements such as economic development, gender issues, failed states or human trafficking, which are all seen as threats to human security. These include food security, personal security, political security economic security, to name but a few. The UNDP's *1994 Human Development Report* and the UNDP's Human Development Office Report represent a milestone in this new direction for the UN.

Importantly, Boutros-Ghali also proclaimed a doctrine of "peace-operations" and made a distinction, though incomplete and inconclusive, between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building. Accordingly, these operations are meant to prevent conflicts and to reinforce peace after the end of hostilities. The categorisation went further, distinguishing between structural prevention and operational prevention. The former means peace building, which looks into root causes of conflict and is a long-term

commitment. Operational prevention assumes peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures, where the former is defined as operating under Chapter VI, which means the consent of the states to which the troops will be sent is required, and diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation are employed. Peace enforcement means operating under the Chapter VII, which allows the "use of all necessary means" and requires international consent (the Security Council's), but not that of the state hosting the UN troops. Force or threat of force is present to coerce compliance with resolutions aiming at bringing peace. Boutros-Ghali defined it as "peace-keeping activities which do not necessarily involve the consent of all the parties concerned" (UN Document A/81/93, 2002).

In an independent study that the DPKO commissioned in 2006, the evolution of the UN's peacekeeping has been represented as phased: their expansion in the late eighties (at the end of 1987, there were five UN peacekeeping operations) and early nineties following the end of the Cold War; the failures of the nineties, and a new generation of so called hybrid missions aiming at post-conflict interventions in partnership with different entities, as has been the case of ONUB in Burundi which comprises UN and AU force elements (DPKO, 1999).

The UN has launched some 36 new operations since 1988 while in the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping it mounted only 13 such operations. The demand for UN peace operations resulted in their explosive growth in the period 1992-1995. Many of those missions were large and "multidiscipline," for they reached out of the traditional military realm that had characterised earlier UN peacekeeping. They had started overseeing peace agreements, building state institutions, assisting in the organized return of refugee and displaced people, administering elections, monitoring human rights, dealing with political transitions, de-mining, and disarming, demobilising and reintegrating soldiers. However, funding of their mandates was not always commensurate with the requirements for many reasons, one of which lies in the contradiction of the UN: mission mandates are approved by the Security Council while budgets are dealt with the General Assembly and the budget body outside the Council. Today, there are 18 peace operations and 103,000 military and civilian personnel (DPKO, 2007), half are in Africa: peacekeeping in the Sudan, Liberia, Ivory Coast, the DRC, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Western Sahara, and political and peace building missions in Burundi and Sierra Leone. By 2003, the UN was setting up two operations a year and expanding others, overstretching its resources. The peaks of peacekeeping operations were in 1993 and in 2003.

Until 2000, the developed states were the biggest financial contributors and suppliers of troops though already in the mid-nineties one could sense the fatigue from France and others who once had strategic spheres in Africa. Francois Mitterrand was articulate in his message in 1994 to African leaders, saying "the time has come for Africans themselves to resolve their conflicts and organize their own Security" (Drozdiak, 1994). In 1997, the SC said that there was a consensus that the solution to African problems lay with Africans themselves and that this required a re-evaluation of the role of the international community in supporting Africa. The commitment gap or, better, the "Africa gap" (Jones and Cheriff, 2006) had become apparent. We will see a clear reflection of such an attitude in Burundi in the subsequent paragraphs. Some critics correctly pointed out that those states that contribute the least to the UN are those where death tolls are highest and where the UN's role – measured in lives saved not global political impact – is most critical (Boulden, 2003).

Thus, additional solutions were sought, such as including the troops of developing countries or forces of regional organizations, or individual states such as the South Africa's Protection Support Detachment in Burundi. In the 1990s and then again in the 2000s with the rise in demand for peace operations, the number of such institutions grew. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, African

Union, Economic Community of West African States focused on security while the EU added both the security and justice aspects to its economic and humanitarian aid work, as we shall see in the Chapter 3.

The changes in the UN and the world scene inevitably affected Burundi. On the one hand, questions about the hesitation over when and how to get involved remain unanswered. Nobody has done a study on the hypothesis that had the UN acted earlier, fewer lives would have been lost in Burundi. Human rights abuses in this country had not been measured against the interest that the international community had in Rwanda or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 3: The United Nations' entry into resolution of Burundi conflict

I. Sum of conflicts and divisions in Burundi

As we have seen, the conflicts and genocides of the past thirty years had destabilised the Great Lakes Region worsened by the spill-over of refugees into other countries where rebel movements and an illegal trade in weapons, among other problems, sprung up. Reprisals, revolutions and counter-revolutions trickled from Rwanda to Burundi and *vice versa*. Both Hutu and Tutsi had been victims of genocide in one or other of the countries – "most conspicuously and massively the Hutu in Burundi and the Tutsi (as well as a quite a number of Hutu) in Rwanda…, the myth for the emerging generations of Hutu politicians hence provided ideological justification for the wanton killings of Tutsi by Hutu" (Lemarchand, 1996, p.7). Ethnicity had been used as a pretext for political and economic competition between the two groups for decades. Tutsis embraced the myths of their origin and race as justification for a privileged position and an elitism that evolved into racism (Berkley, 2001). Racist propaganda was diffused through the media an d, along with racist iconography, gradually and systematically created new social categories pushing the country further into disaster. Lemarchand and others demystified

the superior race hypothesis and argued that the "resurrection of the Hamitic myth" (1999) was responsible for most of the conflicts and genocides in Burundi in 1972. There is no record of ethnic massacres from the pre-colonial period (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 2000) and unlike in Rwanda, these two ethnic groups were united by their loyalty to the monarchy. As much as the ethnic conflicts were the result of divisive colonial policies other factors also helped form the background of horrible massacres and social upheavals between 1963 and 2004. These included weak democratic institutions on the eve of independence, the struggle for scarce resources and living space and the political exclusion and oppression of Hutu. The extremist movements of resistance that grew out of the turmoil advocated ideologies of ethnic superiority.

Other structural problems present at independence persist in Burundi. They are territorial, elite and clan-related, and associated with land ownership. The (ethnic) confrontation was not confined to the elite political and military controlling classes. It permeated every layer of society. Members of each ethnic group felt that they were collectively engaged in a death struggle against extermination or subjugation, which fostered feelings of "ethnic loyalty", deep hatred and distrust of the "other" (International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, 2002).

What made the 1993 massacres in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda different from the previous ones is that they happened in front of the eyes of the international community, the UN as well as the African regional organizations. Conflict management and resolution had become a mantra of the international community since the late 1980s when the UN operations in Namibia and Cambodia had been mandated to build the nation in these two failed states. Rwanda and Burundi were not failed states. They both had administrative structures but had extremely poor governance. The appalling state the country and its people are in today is the result of war and a long history of violence caused by poor governance and the absence of political institutions which provided fertile ground for ethnic outbursts and triggered conflicts.

As long as ethnicity was a prime criterion, there could be no liberal democracy in which people are foremost considered citizens regardless of their ethnical affiliation. Beside the political impediments to the progress that have to be overcome in Burundi, the country has a long list of other problems relating to economic recovery, development, rule of law, and governance. Burundi‘s population almost doubled in four decades, which for such a small country with a long-standing problem of extraordinary population density is now exacerbated with the return of refugees. Furthermore, not only are there frictions around the unresolved issue of the ownership of land deserted following the flights of population that

began in 1972, but this scarce land must be further chopped into smaller plots to accommodate those returning. Similarly, Burundi's underdeveloped economy has suffered too. It traditionally drew revenues from mainly agricultural production, such as coffee and tea, and foreign subsidies. International aid fell 66 per cent between 1996 and 2003, economic sanctions were imposed between 1996 and 1999, the cost of servicing Burundi's external debt are high, inflation rose as hih as 40 per cent in 1998 and the Burundian France was devalued by 20 per cent in August 2002 (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). The country also suffered several droughts in the period under review.

Particularly troubling has been the lack of any accountability after each massacre or brutal oppression in Burundi. We should regard with scepticism the argument that such violent conduct was purely the product of strong ethnic antagonisms and the colonial policies. We should also not forget that "among the present adult population of Burundi, tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of individuals from both ethnic groups have at one time or another committed homicide" (International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, 2002). Nineteen political parties-signatories of the Arusha Peace Accord recognised that acts of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity had been perpetrated since independence against Tutsi and Hutu ethnic communities in Burundi. These cruelties should not be a

mandatory component of the transition to democracy. Impunity needs to be addressed urgently, which requires the establishment of proper institutions. Lemarchand thought that Burundi's pre-Arusha transition to democracy failed because of insufficient dedication on the part of the past political actors to peace (1996). What seems to be the case from 2000 onwards is that two warring camps gradually, and under the external pressure, came to terms with the need to negotiate the peace agreement and make compromises when deciding on power-sharing mechanisms and co-existence. However, only the future will prove whether this latest arrangement is the right one.

Where, in such a troubling place, do we start? Should we first establish democracy or improve security or should we prioritise development? Should there be a causal and conditional relationship between them? The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 1993-1996 war when more was spent per capita in assistance than in Europe under the Marshall Plan without producing a stable liberal democracy is illustrative (Chesterman, 2003). The operation in East Timor failed after the remarkable political success of the UN in establishing democracy. The UN however had left before ensuring the institutions and capacities and the ownership over the peace building-processes being transferred from the UN were built to help Timorese act on their own. The only way sustainable results can be achieved is

through a coherent approach by the UN and other actors and a coherent long-term conflict resolution policy and strategy. The UN has been looking for the answers, and learning, over the period that had been critical for Burundi.

II. Conflict resolution in Burundi and the UN's role

The assassination of a president in 1993 in Burundi and the resulting mayhem, as well as the Rwanda genocide of April-June 1994 were the breaking point for the regional and international communities that condemned these acts and initiated a host of activities from abroad. Efforts were directed at preventing a repetition of 1972 massacres or worse - the reproduction of Rwanda genocide.

2.1 Military versus negotiated option

The appeals for the foreign military intervention first heard in 1993 and 1994, continued persistently throughout 1996 from some Burundian parties and members of the Government, as well as the UN S-G. The Burundian President Ntibantunganya supported by the regional countries' reiterated demands for international military assistance. In late 1993, Boutros-Ghali sent a fact-finding mission headed by his Under Secretary-General James Jonah who made it very clear that UN peacekeeping troops should not be expected,

because the UN SC with the US as a leading member - "has shown no inclination to take on any new operations" (Preston, 1993). The memories of countries contributing troops to the UN were fresh from Somalia from where they withdrew after a debacle. The UN made a series of decisions that shaped its future peace operations. The main one was to avoid becoming involved militarily in situations where a peace agreement had not been reached and where there was no will from the parties for reconciliation. The UN did not have the capacity to perform peace enforcement missions and had suffered failures due to unclear and unrealistic mandates, in addition to undeniable structural deficiencies. Hence, owing to this SC mission to Burundi where the situation was assessed as far from ripe for a UN peacekeeping operation or preventive peacekeeping deployment, this new direction was conceived. This was a direct echo of the global suspension of UN peace operations for almost a decade to come.

Instead, Jonah suggested the obvious - the military should pull out of politics and sustainable civilian institutions should be constructed as a strategy for building the peace. He put the ball in the court of the OAU and its newly-introduced conflict prevention mechanisms. The UN was signalling that without a signed peace agreement it would not deploy its member-states' troops in Burundi. Having received an unambiguous signal, Zaire, Rwanda and Tanzania who sheltered the highest numbers of Burundian refugees turned to OAU. In February

1994, and after paranoid Tutsi government rejected any military involvement from abroad and hampered by financial constraints, it sent a very modest international protection and observation mission. The OAU's Military Observer Mission to Burundi (OMIB), aimed at re-establishing confidence.

However, with the change of the S-G, new military options were assessed by the UN. In a series of letters to the President of the Security Council, and in his quarterly reports to the Security Council about the situation in Burundi, Boutros-Ghali spoke in favour of some kind of military engagement of the UN in Burundi calling the country a "test case" for UN preventive actions. From December 1995 through October 1996 he was, using the UN vernacular, suggesting, as well as recommending, demanding and urging action based on the reports that Burundi was on the brink of relapsing into ethnic violence on a massive scale. These reactions were often interpreted as the UN's way of dealing with consciousness of its role after the Rwanda and the Srebrenica genocides in 1994 and 1995 respectively when the Security Council failed to react and which led to criticism of the S-G for not adequately presenting real pre-genocide situations to the Security Council.

Human rights reports warned of renewed outbreaks of violence committed by extremists resulting in the deaths of three to four

soldiers each day and some 200 civilians each week (UN Document E/CN.4/1996/16/Add1, 1996). The S-G's suggestions varied from the introduction of military guards for humanitarian teams (as was done in Iraq in the Persian Gulf War), a multi-national force organized by a state or group of states with rapid-response capacity, to alternatives such as the deployment of a UN force mandated by the Security Council and financed by statutory contributions. One of the options seriously considered was deploying a rapid-intervention force in Zaire to deter massacres in Burundi and secure refugees and internally displaced people should the need arise. The UN went as far as sending a technical mission to Burundi in February to explore the "guards" option but the situation was found to be too volatile for such a venture.

At the same time, the US had some exchanges with the OAU and European countries about its general and future support of African countries in crisis (Weissman, 1998). That raised hopes for material and logistical support. Had it happened, it would have been in line with Boutros-Ghali's efforts for the preparation of contingencies and preventive actions.

These recommendations were made in good faith and as an effort to apply bloody lessons learned from Rwanda. They raised expectations that the bad guys would be punished and good guys saved. Problems

relating to the materialisation of these military proposals went back to the question of command and funding of military options and the fact that most of the member-states did not even answer these appeals by the S-G, and of the five that did, four gave a negative response (UN Document S/1996/887). The major powers represented in the UN were simply not interested. At the same time, reactions and messages from within the Government of Burundi, political parties and its representatives to the UN were more than clear. They were saying that solutions should be found that respected Burindi's sovereignty and excluded any use of force. "The Burundian army was completely prepared to confront any expeditionary corps, regardless of its humanitarian or military label". "The military presence in the immediate vicinity of Burundi would appear to be a sword of Damocles", "obliging the Burundian army to prepare to defend the country against such an expedition" (Hule, 1997). The military option was thus put aside until 2003, when the first peacekeepers arrived.

2.2 Diplomatic and political solutions

At the same time, and as Khadiagala correctly points out, the OAU/UN's sustained mediation role as a preventive measure postponed difficult decisions about military intervention (Kahdiagala, 2003). We could draw here a parallel with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina around the same time, when the mediation role of Francois Mitterrand and his appearance in Sarajevo during the peak of the assault on that city diluted the international military option considered by the US and some other powers. However, those, like Zartman, who would give preference to negotiations over the military option believe that the calls for military intervention halted negotiations, as elaborated later. Subjectively, the UN playing its military intervention card in Burundi slowed other processes. This was also the reason why mediation efforts started almost 32 months after the 1993 coup.

In the communiqué of 31 July 1996 by the Second Arusha Regional Summit on Burundi, (Kahdiagala, 2003), Nyerere called for more coordination and better cooperation between the UN, OAU and the countries of the region. He found that the UN's insistence on searching for a viable military option made it hard for him to engage the Burundian parties, including extremists, in the peace process. According to Weissman, the alternative way forward would have been to mount all-inclusive political negotiations (Weissman, 1998). This is

what happened in 1999 when Mandela took over unblocking the process by bringing all 19 parties into the dialogue.

To fill the vacuum and lessen the extreme tension, the UN reacted in September 1994 by sending Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, an SRSG for Burundi, to use his good offices and to run the UN's political office, UNOB in Bujumbura. He encouraged the negotiations between the parties that in September 1994 came up with the "Convention de Gouvernement". Major features of this pact were the shared power between Frodebu and Uprona with forty-five per cent of cabinet seats reserved for Tutsi, namely the opposition. Some Tutsi as well as Hutu factions rejected the pact. As before, violence was used to obtain power during the transition.

Though brokered by the SRSG and backed by the UN in the SG reports and UN Security Council resolutions, the Convention was, in fact, the result of emergency last-minute diplomacy. It was also a presumptuous solution since Frodebu had been democratically elected to rule. Ould-Abdullah to some extent justified the formula by saying that the imbalance of political skills between the ruling party - Frodebu which lacked political experience and negotiating skills and the opposition party - Uprona who had higher political skills made political dialogues unsuccessful(Ould-Abdullah, 2000). His critics thought that his solution had fallen short of resolving the

problems of the country because the Convention included only the official forces and registered parties and left out armed groups and parties. This made the division between two antagonistic camps even sharper. The Burundian elite depended on Ould-Abdullah to annihilate the 1992 Constitution and establish of the power-sharing arrangements (Kahdiagala, 2003). One of the UN's principles, dealing only with the officially recognised parties, found its place in Burundi. Since late 1995 the UN witnessed through the visit of the Special Rapporteur that the Convention was no longer recognised as "a credible frame of reference by the partisans of Uprona and Frodebu, but served rather to provide a battleground for the opposing parties" (UN Document, E/CN.4/1996/16/Add.1). These acts paralysed the government and created further political uncertainty. With the strong mono-ethnic profile of political parties, the parity power-sharing concept seemed a wrong path in a search to find long-term solutions and it was coupled with the absence of an effort to marginalise the extremists. Instead, a proportional mode should have been pursued (Zartman, 2006). Moreover, this pact contributed to the rapid growth of Hutu militancy and rebellion which further fuelled conflicts.

On the other hand, Ould-Abdallah stayed with Burundians throughout the inflaming crises of Rwanda and was seen as instrumental in gauging the violence in Burundi through a busy interaction with all

the stakeholders. He, in fact, had reached his goal of preventing a repetition of the Rwandan massacre. He was quick to react to the rumours about a potential army coup and used his good offices and public appearances to talk about it, thus reducing its chances of success.

Ould-Abdallah was further significant in that he coordinated his actions well with the OAU and worked with it in forging solutions bearing in mind that was the first such UN experience in Africa. He "epitomised the emerging relationship between the UN and regional actors in conflict resolution, drawing on dual African and UN experiences" (Khadiagala, 2003, p.220) and ensured that numerous NGO activities undertaken in Burundi complemented his own diplomatic efforts (Hara, 2003).

From that year onward, the UN made sustained efforts aiming at diffusing tensions, preventing massacres and genocides and protecting refugees and displaced people and other vulnerable groups mainly through advocacy and promises to help development once the peace was established. It appointed the Special Rapporteur, Paolo Sergio Piniheiro for Burundi (1995-1999) and formed an international commission to inquire into the 1993 assassination of Melchior Ndadaye. Due to the strenuous process of the deployment, the International Commission arrived in Burundi after a delay of

more than two years, by which time much of the evidence had been lost. Unfortunately, this commission will not be remembered for making any sound suggestions on tackling the problems of impunity and genocide in that country as its terms of reference called for. Additionally, based on the request of the S-G, UNHCR's Sadako Ogata visited Burundi to discuss the status of Burundian refugees and displaced and to seek solutions from the Government.

As regards the peace process run by Nyerere, the S-G provided support verbally through his reports and called on the international community to continue to exert pressure (UN Document S/1996/887). In 1996, the UN appointed a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes with a mandate to recommend how to address the regional crisis which included Burundi. In addition, the UN supported the process by seconding its military expertise to Arusha in 1997 and in 1999 appointed a senior advisor for the peace initiative. The UN wanted to be very much present and employed to the maximum its diplomatic mechanisms to express its support of Burundi and the peace process. It kept searching for the most appropriate role for itself in resolving the stalling peace process until 2004 when it deployed a peacekeeping mission. The Security Council encouraged Member States to pay frequent visits to Burundi to see for themselves the situation and meet the government. In 1998 the S-G Annan visited Burundi; in 1999, the UN sent its top political expert,

Kieran Prendergast. However, these visits, which were expected to encourage peace discussions and find a role for the UN did not bear fruit. The UN was often told that the country would look for its own solutions. When in 2000 Mandela took over the facilitation, the UN raised the level of its representation to match the presidential one from South Africa and appointed a special representative for the Great Lakes.

Even in changed circumstances after the Arusha agreement was signed by almost all the parties, and years after the first exploration of military options had troubled all, the dilemma was still there and the UN hesitated over the same problem in 2003 and 2004. The question was whether the right moment had come to field a peacekeeping mission, bearing in mind that violence had not fully stopped and that one rebel party was still out there skirmishing and, to sum up, peace was not absolute. The AMIB that was deployed in 2003was funded by voluntary contributions and faced serious financial shortages. It requested the UN to take over in seven months when the transition period was due to expire; a new crisis in the peace process was possible and the UN's quick decision was needed. The Security Council established ONUB in May 2004 by its resolution 1545. This followed a multidisciplinary mission sent out to see the situation on the ground and to discuss features of a new mission with all the actors. The assessment that the parties seemed

to have come to an understanding that continued armed hostilities would not help them reach their political objectives (UN Document S/2004/210), was most likely the basis of the decision of the Security Council to mount the UN peacekeeping mission by 2004. To Burundi's benefit, by 2004, some confidence in the UN had been regained and the interest of the international community in funding it had increased. The DPKO had also reorganized itself and the major UN reforms were underway. Importantly, the UN estimated that 95 per cent of warfare had died down in Burundi. The additional fear, and a forceful one, was that history might repeat itself in Burundi where after both the 1962 and 1993 elections the country sunk into conflict. Therefore, extending the peacekeeping operation was vital for sustainable peace as Burundi was preparing for elections at the end of October 2005. AMIB was perceived a success for it stabilised the situation, created an increased sense of security and started demobilisation where continuity was necessary for a success. A peacekeeping effort was expected to address the root causes of the conflict. Lastly, the Government requested the UN to organize elections, secure the politicians, and cater for the general security.

CHAPTER 4: Regional organizations and other actors in Burundi

I. Governmental and non-governmental actors

Since the end of the Cold War, most of the world's armed intra-state conflicts have taken place in Africa and Asia. In the nineties, there was a noticeable increase in interventions by regional organizations in response to intrastate conflicts. This situation has been coupled with severe criticism of the UN and persistent questioning of its abilities, legitimacy, partiality and capacity to deliver: a number of failures in the nineties damaged the UN's image and credibility. This, combined with a host of other political agendas, led to the proliferation of different military missions and the emergence of parallel operations of the UN and other military organizations, interventions by individual states[5], or sequential or integrated operations of the UN and or EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the UN could not address every potential and actual

[5] In Africa in Sierra Leone (by the UK), in the Ivory Coast, the Central African republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (by France)

conflict troubling the world. Regional organizations, arrangements and other international organizations were invited to "complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems for they sometimes had a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and assisting the United Nations in containing them" UN Documents SC/6420, A/50/711, S/1995/911). In 1999, out of 16 regional, sub-regional organizations and arrangements which were cooperating or that had shown interest in cooperating (DPKO, 1999) with the UN peace operations, about one-third had well-established mechanisms for peace and security, many of which were for preventive diplomacy and peace-making and also for support of peacekeeping operations. Eight of them developed, or were in the process of developing, mechanisms for deploying peacekeeping operations alone or in conjunction with the UN.

A busy political and humanitarian mediation period was taking place in Burundi: first by the Regional Initiative in 1995, then the US, the UN Security Council and the SRSG, OAU, Tanzania, and the Carter Center. The Carter Center, a US–based non-governmental organization engaged in the resolution of the conflict not only in Burundi but at the regional level, organizing two regional peace summits (1995 & 1996) involving Desmond Tutu and Julius Nyerere. The focus was first on the UN and the OAU, then the private-tandem

Carter Center/Nyerere before moving onto other actors working in parallel with the regional states (Hara, 2003) and then back to the Arusha process and Nyerere who had worked with the EU, the UN and the US. Employment of non-governmental organizations meant searching through all the options and shifting the locus of mediation from the official to the unofficial track and back. The process of changing the "ownership" of the process actually began with the realisation that the 1994 Convention was a failure. This is where both the UN and the Carter Center withdrew from the driving seat of mediation and when Nyerere was appointed the facilitator/chief mediator/international envoy. The Carter Center's success was in keeping Burundi on the agenda as well as in institutionalising the regional concern through the organization of regular regional congresses. These processes were supported by national peace organizations such as the Apostles for Peace, international private actors and NGOs: the Vatican, Synergies Africa, Search for Common Ground, the Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, as well as International Alert. The Alert had established the Burundi Steering Committee to coordinate peace-building initiatives by NGOs, the UN, as well as foreign parliamentarians. The Belgian and the US embassies in Burundi were very active, as was the EU envoy to the region encouraging the NGO initiatives. From 1996, Nyerere started indicating that the UN Resolution about the potential multi-national

force was "making it harder for him to coax the nervous Burundian government into political negotiations" (Weissman, 1998).

UNESCO held a peace conference in Paris in October 1997. Sant'Egidio, the Rome-based Catholic group, convened in Rome a series of secrete peace talks between September 1996 and May 1997. This Rome process enjoyed the support of the EU and the US and raised high expectations, especially as this was the time when track-two diplomacy was reaping fame for the trend of successes of the Oslo and Mozambique peace processes associated respectively with the Palestine-Israel war and Mozambique war. However, this Rome process fell apart because the parties could not agree whether to reinstate the 1992 Constitution or adopt a new one.

This had been a whirlpool of ideas and options; a vicious circle of carrots and sticks coupled with mutual suspicion on part of all the major mediators to the solutions the others were proposing. Boutros-Ghali was definitely right when he called Burundi a test case. In January 1999, the UN and the West managed to talk the region out of sanctions (the UN Security Council had called for these to be lifted back in 1998). Questions remain as to whether, and to what extent, the sanctions worked in favour of political decisions and whether they really hurt those they hoped to be targeting. The sanctions, coupled with the negative consequences of the war, resulted in a ten-year

period of overall economic decline. According to data available Burundi received $247 million in international economic aid from 1981 to 1995 but only $76 million between 1996 and 2000 (WB, 2007; ICG, 2003). In the longer term, sanctions seem to have fostered a blossoming parallel economy and left those ruling Burundi unaffected. Yet, putting their human dimension aside, sanctions had political significance. They were an affirmation of the ownership of the mediation process by regional actors and testified to a regional assertiveness that contributed to the resumption of peace talks (Khadiagala, 2003). However, the monitoring of compliance and of illicit arms embargo, which remained in force until 1999, never took place in an organized manner

II. Neighbouring countries

Neighbouring countries had interests at stake such as establishing the overall stability of the region, repatriating refugees, stopping the arm flows, and commencing development and democratisation. This is why they were in a good position to play the role of mediators in Burundi. However, only distancing the leadership from the immediate neighbourhood by involving South Africa and Mandela bore fruit. Mediation by South Africa and the arrival of its troops to guard other black people in Africa was an important process and in a way, it was its own "growing-up" (Bentley & Southall, 2006). South

Africa continued to play one of the major mediator's roles in the continent after the success in Burundi having matured into one of the major proponents of development, the fight against poverty and good governance on the continent. Nyerere, too, enjoyed the support and respect of the continent for his integrity and earlier diplomatic successes. Most likely, his reputation and the process in general were compromised because his country was physically near to the conflict. His leverage was difficult to establish as some Tutsi parties and individuals considered him personally involved and questioned his real objectives in the process because a high number of Hutu refugees in Tanzania were taking part in rebel movements.

Mandela had a comprehensive and detailed approach and gave the talks a high international profile through the inclusion of Western presidents and African leaders other than those from the region, that is, by raising the level of talks. Additionally, his efforts were supported by pledges of donations made very carefully to highlight the fact that peace had to be fully established and not only promised. Mandela's personal delivery of the speech at the UN Security Council in New York about the security situation in Burundi made a strong impact and assured him of a stronger support. The ensuing Resolution, importantly, maintained a diplomatic momentum.

In 2002, the Republic of South Africa deployed troops to protect opposition politicians during the initial transition period and until the elections took place. Their mandate was straightforward and they persisted in delivering it in such a way as to assure the population that South Africa had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of Burundi. Likewise, the South African vice-president Zuma was instrumental in bringing the rebel parties around to signing the accord.

The WB and the IMF had field offices in Burundi too. These two bodies had also gone through their internal reforms and had adjusted their work to the changed needs of the post-Cold War era.

III. African Union in Burundi

The OAU went through an overhaul in 2002 and was renamed the AU and its mandate and inclinations changed to conflict prevention, peace restoration, disaster-management and humanitarian affairs. Interestingly, its charter allows it to intervene in the affairs of another state under the "grave circumstances" provision (AU Document, The Constitutive Act of the African Union). This lists war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The advantage of the AU is without doubt its knowledge of the region and potential for the quick deployment of troops and other personnel. In addition, the

Africans themselves have every reason to want to get a grip on conflicts in their continent and to try to resolve them. The memory of the UN's failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur is fresh there and the conviction that Africans needed to do something in future was strong. As far as the UN is concerned, it can only be an advantage to support the regional organizations in Africa and share the burden of costs and responsibilities. A number of sub-Saharan African countries and Burundi alike have been going through long conflicts and, although there is a plethora or regional and sub-regional organizations dealing with conflicts and they have good will, they are underfinanced, which hinders their efficiency.

Among the often-heard criticisms of AU peacekeeping troops are their lack of experience and resources, as well as a lack of institutional knowledge. Though there are strong elements of all these factors with the emphasis on the latter, we should not forget that 36 African states have participated in UN operations since 1960. Furthermore, of 54 UN peacekeeping operations undertaken by mid-2001, the African countries have taken part in 80 percent (Boulden, 2003). This shows a certain level of continuity that must have developed experience. Kenya and Ghana, for instance, built upon it and with the assistance of some independent institutions and NGOs established training centres for African peacekeepers. However, the disillusionment of donor countries (the US and Belgium being the

major ones) over the slow pace of AU progress resulted in lower levels of funding for the AU (Boulden, 2003). On the other hand, one should not forget that the UN has been going through similar crises and has been persistently criticised for similar deficiencies. Here we should differentiate between several influential components in the success of any peacekeeping mission – the political will of the parties involved in the conflict and that of the great powers; the clarity of the mandate and the availability of means for implementation coupled with good staffing and management of the mission. Some peacekeeping operations have failed "because the parties to the conflict have lacked the necessary political will, in addition to the administrative and financial problems inherent in any peacekeeping operation" (UN Document A/55/PV.29).

Some are very critical of the African Union's reaction to the conflicts in Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi, and the overall instability in the Central Africa including Uganda that had been a catalyst for armed operations and arms trafficking. Boulden asks and concludes: "Where were the neighburs who could have helped contain the conflict? Worse than deciding not to undertake multifaceted peacekeeping operations, is undertaking them half-heartedly and ineffectually" (2003).

Burundi in 2003 was the first case of an AU troop employment, excluding the 1994 unarmed observer mission, OMIB. Two cease-fire agreements signed in 2002 and one in 2003 between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the political parties and armed movements of Burundi had a provision that the international forces of African Union peacekeeping force monitor the implementation. Because of the different wording of these provisions in three successive cease-fire agreements and ambiguity over the type of force to be legally invited (the UN or the AU) (Agogaye, 2004), and because the UN could not become involved without a comprehensive cease-fire, the AU had stepped in. It was a one-year mandate to stabilise the peace (pending the deployment of the UN peacekeepers). The deployment of this entity was six months late. Its mandate was too ambitious and disproportionate to its means. Quartering and barracking over 60,000 ex-rebel fighters was beyond its personnel capacity. Thus, despite the training and in-kind support it enjoyed from some donors, it soon ran out of resources because not all donor pledges materialised. In essence, this problem is similar to the one the UN often faces with its assessed budget, funded by member states who are more or less the same ones who contribute to the AU. Due to the funding problems, AMIB was later "re-hatted", namely, the regional forces were transformed into a UN peacekeeping operation. For the sake of continuity and to maintain the momentum of the work of these troops, all three battalions (from

Mozambique, Ethiopia and Republic of South Africa) were absorbed into the UN peacekeeping successor together with the South African Force Commander.

AMIB should be given credit for its efforts in stabilising about 95 percent of Burundi, and for the creation of the conditions for ONUB. In his lessons learned report, which is pertinent for both the UN and the AU, Agogaye recommends that the responsibilities of two entities should be clearly drawn before the deployment of the AU troops / UN troops. He also suggested that the UN be included in the planning stages of an AU peacekeeping mission and should help it beyond the mere provision of assistance in the training of troops. He also recommended that the peacekeeping forces should avoid unwarranted reliance on the transitional government in a situation similar to Burundi without a comprehensive peace-agreement and cease-fire agreement (Agogaye, 2004).

From a seemingly mainly observation and mediation role it played in Burundi through OAU, OMIB and later AMIB, the AU played an important political role. It fostered the relationship with the UN even more over the questions of the IMC where each had a distinctive role. One of the important features of this AU–UN tandem was to keep the attention on the Burundi internationally. The relationship between the UN and the AU has been evolving since, especially in

Burundi. The AU is no longer in the driving seat but is one of the active members of all the coordination fora run by the UN mission in that country. The cultivation of this non-competitive but complementary relation could be thought of as one of the positive legacies of Ould-Abdallah.

CHAPTER 5: Humanitarianism[6], confidence and peace building in Burundi

"No one operational model and no single security provider can address every circumstance and meet every operational need with equal aplomb" (Durch & Berkman, 2006). Since the nineties, a sharp increase of the civilian peacekeeping mission personnel has been noted. The heads of these missions started leading so-called multidimensional/multidiscipline operations dealing with a plethora of issues unlike before. At the same time, and for the for reasons detailed in the Chapter 2, the mandates of agencies acquired new tasks. The phenomenon of the so-called cross-cutting issues (child protection, gender, HIV/AIDS, internally displaced population and many others) created an atmosphere of unintended competition and duplication of efforts and, importantly, of donor resources. Even before the recognition of these new fields of assistance, disharmony in activities by humanitarian (UN) agencies in one country were not

[6] Used here as "desire to help others: a commitment to improving the lives of other people", http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861619155/humanitarianism.html?partner=orp

unknown. There were also cases of parallel activities of bilateral military engagement and these two problems, in addition to known peacekeeping failures, gave the UN a bad image . Part of the S-G's reform programme in 1998 was to reorganize the Department of Humanitarian Affairs into OCHA mandating it to coordinate humanitarian response, advocacy and policy development related to man-made and natural emergencies. On the other side, the UN agencies, funds and programmes, made a series of rectifying actions leading to better coordination. Two of them were the establishment of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator's System and the UN Development Group.

I. ONUB's work in Burundi

In Burundi, the UN System and major actors have been learning lessons about their cooperation: in 2003 /2004, AMIB operated under the AU, UNOB, under the SRSG, and humanitarian and development affairs under a resident coordinator and OCHA. ONUB attempted a higher level of harmonisation, combining the role of the deputy SRSG and the resident/humanitarian coordinator. It personified political and military work and had under its wing humanitarian work through the deputy SRSG. It was considered a semi-integrated mission. BINUB embodies the novel features of an integrated office where actions are planed strategically and jointly and where some of the

traditional UNDP or DPKO associated activities are shared and integrated (good governance/democracy, justice and human rights, and small arms and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in case of BINUB).

The general view of all the actors, the Government and the Burundians is that UN peacekeeping did well overall performed well. A major ingredient in ONUB's success was the clarity of its mandate and the availability of adequate resources. Behind the different tasks of a rather elaborate mandate, was the principal of monitoring and ensuring the ceasefire, promoting protection and human rights, carrying out national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of programmes, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Transitional Government of Burundi, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, to name but a few. ONUB's primary task, as seen internally, was to assist and advise the electoral process. If compared to the mandates of other UN peacekeeping missions, its mandate was very straightforward, falling in the realm of work in which the DPKO had an expertise and for which benchmarks were set. Thus, in the case of ONUB, the UN found its concrete and measurable role in 2004 and concurred with one of the Brahimi recommendations for an achievable mandate. Elections were supported and organized by ONUB, which together with the national organization, the UNDP and bilateral missions,

coordinated work and achieved timely, fair and secure elections in an extremely tight deadline. As we have seen, at the withdrawal of AMIB and eight months before the elections were to start it had still been unclear what would be the follow-on peacekeeping arrangement.

An impressively quick deployment of ONUB was possible because the replacement for the SRSG Dinka had been identified. Pending the adoption of the resolution, the replacement Carolyn McAskie, had already started bending the infamously slow process and rules of the DPKO recruitment thorough her personal engagement. McAskie was unlike a number of SRSGs, an internal UN staffer and, as such, very familiar with the bureaucracy of the UN and the DPKO which is often a cause of slow mission deployment and slow recruitment. Another comparative advantage of ONUB, critical to its smooth start and early efficiency, was the fact that it inherited AU peacekeepers who were only "rehatted" under the UN flag along with some core political and other staff from UNOB. This mission, like many others before and after saw the advantages and disadvantages of the continuity of the personnel, which can also pose a quandary for bilateral diplomatic missions. The advantage is the faster immersion in the work, defined by the SC mandate. The disadvantage is that the inherited staff can be questioned for potential proximity to ruling parties and local authorities because they have spent a long time in one country. One of the major challenges is striking the right balance

between the two. The preferable option would be a gradual replacement of old-timers.

In addition to capable management and other core mission staff and a hard-working SRSG, one of the advantages of this mission was the timing of its deployment. The moment was ripe and the enthusiasm of Burundians for peace and new government was high. Its predecessor, AMIB, had created relatively good security conditions and did not leave behind many loose ends to deal with.

Nevertheless, this entity made a number of presumed missteps. Some of the errors it supposedly made are debatable. Others should be seen as typical UN dilemmas or shortcomings. They were: the failure of its 5,000-strong force to disarm the remaining rebel soldiers of FNL, the conduct of its soldiers (Krasno, 2006), its slowness in taking position and assisting in the situation associated with 20,000 asylum seekers from Rwanda coming to Burundi, the absence of reaction to protect 180 refugees massacred in Gatumba in 2004, its siding with Frodebu which did not win the elections, and a lack of integrating of its work with that of the UN System in Burundi. Some of these are due to the misperceptions about each other, namely, DPKO vs. UN agencies, funds, and programmes resulting in high expectations from one another, as was the case with the anticipated political and humanitarian support by ONUB to asylum

seekers. The same goes for integration of the UN System's work in Burundi where, though prescribed as a way to work together in an integrated manner, definitions and benchmarks had not been drawn by the UN as ONUB started. There are "cultural" differences between DPKO missions and the UN Country Teams[7] which are basically entrenched in the nature of organizations (perceptions of a "military" organization vs. humanitarian, etc.), better results were difficult to achieve. Only with more effort and good will on both "sides", with more time invested in getting all on board, and clearer expectations of integration at the onset of a mission, could more be achieved.

ONUB's major flaw was the failure to prevent the massacre of Tutsi-associated Congolese civilians at Gatumba refugee camp, near Bujumbura by the FNL and Congolese forces. It produced negative publicity with Burundians. ONUB's mandate had a clear provision for intervention in such a case "without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi…to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (UN Document: SC/8857). According to one of the rare external studies of ONUB's work, the information that a massacre was happening or was about to happen was not there. This indicated a flaw in collecting intelligence in liaison with the UN Mission in DRC, MONUC (Jackson, 2006) that was implied in this case too. This problem, compounded by the fact that

[7] The UN Country Team is the decision-making body formed by all UN agencies, funds, programmes and organziations in one country that supports and advises the Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator.

the UN was unprepared when the Government, in late 2005, after successfully organized elections, requested it to close down, indicated two major weakness of ONUB: the absence of strategic analysis and incollecting intelligence. The fact that ONUB was taken by surprise when the Government requested it leave in August 2005 shows the combination of both weaknesses. Again, the interpretations of this act by outsiders were many but can be summarised by views that ONUB's SRSG governed the transition period with a firm hand and with the creation of some of the structures without involving the Government such as Partners Forum/(Mobbek, 2006). An additional issue would be that the SRSG might have outshone the new president afterthe success of the elections, and that the newly elected Government considered ONUB an "occupation" force (Zeebroek, (2006). The relationship between Burundi's army and ONUB forces remained complex throughout the period of the mission, which should be no surprise in a country with a long history of military oligarchy, and paranoia over foreign interference. Paradoxically, many Hutu Burundians and their parties did not forgive the UN for not coming in 1993 to ward-off Tutsi killers.

The situation was aggravated in the second half of 2006 when the GoB requested the SRSG to leave the country as a *persona non grata,* while never giving real and concrete reasons. ONUB might have pre-empted the attempted "expulsion" through better analysis

of the situation, gathering information, and fostering stronger relationship with actors and stakeholders in Burundi. In addition, ONUB could have itself developed its exit strategy with succession options after the elections and presented it to the Government on time, offering a change of mandate.

For the strong and continuous involvement of the Security Council as well as the S-G himself in the Burundi affairs, it was positive to see that the expulsion of the acting SRSG did not take place nor was the withdrawal of ONUB as abrupt as expected when it was first requested in September 2005. Instead, focused negotiations took place in both cases, with some donors, diplomatic missions, both on the ground and at the UN headquarters in New York, playing an important role. The phased withdrawal of ONUB forces took place in a newly negotiated period[8] and the UN handed over different activities and equipment to succeeding arrangements and started planning for a follow-on BINUB set-up that was expected to come in force on 1 January 2007.

In August 2004, the Government signed agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions planning for the stabilisation of the macroeconomic situation and creating the basis for poverty reduction, according to the Poverty Reductions Strategy Paper

[8] By 2006.

developed by the Government with the UN assistance. The sentiment of donors grew gradually and noticeably, along with the improvement of security in the country and the transition to democracy in the period 2000-2007. Burundi experienced two types of paradoxes as regards donations. At different times the pledges made were high but their actual realisation was low; donors were ready to transfer funds but found that the government had low fund-absorption capacity and inadequate structure to receive and monitor the flow of funding. Additionally, national strategies were not honed and proposed budgets did not reflect real needs. Because of uncertainties of transition to democracy, donors were at the same time adopting a wait-and-see strategy. Meanwhile, UN agencies and programmes were stretching resources to address both the humanitarian and development needs. An example is an innovative UNDP community-based recovery programme launched in 1999 that married recovery, peace-building, human rights and economic growth while waiting for larger sums of money and engagement to arrive for the fuller reconstruction of Burundi.

II: Ad hoc Group for Burundi

On the other hand, the trends of proliferation of regional organizations and individual states' initiatives created bigger gaps in coordination of their activities and different chains of commands and

responsibility. Both DPKO affiliated missions maintained dialogue with donors through different fora that they set up and coordinated. The role of the Ad Hoc Group formed for Burundi was significant, as was that of ONUB and, later. BINUB and the PBC. Based on the ECOSOC's resolution of 2002, according to which any African country emerging from conflict can request the formation of an ad hoc advisory group which includes representatives from that country and looks into development and economic support in a comprehensive way, one such group was created for Burundi. It worked from 2003 to December 2006. The Group contributed to strengthening collaboration within the UN System in support of the country, between the Untied Nations system and the Bretton Woods Institutions and, at the intergovernmental level, between the Security Council (UN Document E/2006/53). In 2007 the activity is being picked up by the PBC. It should be recognised that these bodies did good advocacy work with donors.

The UN's role as coordinator of the DPKO-run offices is headed by multi-hatted officials who, beside their duties in running the peacekeeping/peace building offices and representing the S-G in diplomatic dealings with the Government, are instrumental in bringing the UN System in Burundi together and working in a coherent way with the Government, civil society, donors, private sector etc. This has primarily originated in an effort to streamline

peace consolidation efforts, align existing activities, and ensure that strategic frameworks and needed resources are do not overlap. The UN entrusted this precise role to BINUB which is now the major coordinator of humanitarian and development assistance in the country. Since April 2006, and during ONUB's tenure, all stakeholders have been working on developing a peace-building strategy that comprises aspects of development, security, human rights and national reconciliation.

Before the arrival of the DPKO in Burundi, the UNDP-affiliated resident/humanitarian coordinator led weekly Contact Group meetings aimed at donors, NGOs and UN agencies as well as the plethora of sectoral groups coordinating the work of all actors in their sectors. Similarly, the resident/humanitarian coordinator in 1999 developed a community assistance programme aimed at reinforcing peace and the community at "grass-roots" level.

III. BINUB coming into being / peace building

The UN created BINUB on the model of post-war Sierra Leone's integrated peace building office, UNIOSIL. According to the Security Resolution 1719, BINUB's two-year mandate is to support the Burundian Government in maintaining peace and stability by ensuring coherence and coordination of the UN agencies under the

leadership of the Executive Representative of the S-G (UN Document: SC/8857). The UN chose both Sierra Leone and Burundi as major focuses of its newly established PBC. Additionally, some major lessons learned from UNIOSIL, such as a joint strategy for action and an integrated structure, were built into BINUB. What gives additional strength to BINUB in comparison to usual UN operations is its very role as a focal point for PBC and PBF. BINUB assisted the government in the creation of $35 million in peace-building projects. It will keep assisting both the GoB and the PBS in their implementation and monitoring. The DPKO or the DPA seldom play this role in the field. For the implementation of these projects a series of integrated sections have been created in BINUB which is unusual for the simple fact that a DPKO-run operation has some programme funds to run, even on behalf of somebody else, bearing in mind that DPKO is not an operational body. An important, unintended, positive consequence of this set-up should be to capitalise on this newly opened avenue to build a new type of relation with the GoB, oriented more toward building managerial, administrative or other capacities which do not exist in public institutions. Burundi does not have enough qualified cadre of its own due to a long-standing brain drain. One of peacekeeping's and now peace building's contradictions is that the mandates prescribe activities and actions that in a post-conflict set-up require substantial funds for their long-term implementation. This is not to say that the

UN in one country should be the only actor. However, higher leverage would have been achieved had some programme budgets been approved by the General Assembly, which does its work after, and independently of, the Security Council which creates mission mandates. Programme budgets, in addition to the operational budget, would cater for a number of needs that cannot be addressed by UN agencies in the current division of institutional mandates (security, political affairs, for instance) etc. but are anyhow left to peacekeeping missions to deal with. The UN does not approve such budgets because the DPKO is not meant to be an implementing body. BINUB has managed, in a short time, to become a modern office that encompasses principles highlighted in the UN reform agenda. If it quickly delivers good results in the implementation of PBF projects and develops a consultative political relation with the GoB instead of a leading one, for which the GoB criticised its predecessor, ONUB. Furthermore, its chief, ERSG Youssef Mahmoud, a former deputy head of ONUB, embodies the leadership quality rarely found in the UN and very appropriate for peace building: his long experience with the UN has been on both the developmental and the political sides (SG/A/1021 BIO 3809).

There are plenty of planning documents put together by the UN entities and the GoB and they presumably serve different purposes. However, the master key would be to simplify this and come up with

a formula applicable to different stages of peace consolidation. It should not be forgotten that the UN is starting a new phase in which it not only deals with peace building (which is not new to the UN[9]) but is starting it in a new coherent and harmonised way, involving all the stakeholders. This process will eventually result in the adoption of best planning documents and frameworks of implementation reducing the amount of work to the needed minimum. At present, there is the Consolidated Appeal Process for Burundi which is exclusively a tool for raising funds for emergency humanitarian needs. There is , in the case of Burundi, the two-year[10] UN Development Assistance Framework which is a main "business" plan suggested by UN agencies working in development. There is a Peace Building Strategy; there is a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper developed by the Government (with the UN help), there is a Peace Building Priority Plan, to name but a few (http://www.binub.org). Each agency has its annual, bi-annual or five-year planning documents depending on its paternal agency's funding and programming cycles. The UN System in Burundi has been learning from Sierra Leone and its peace-building experience in an integrated-UN environment, of course, in a different political environment created by the GoB.

[9] Other UN peace buidling operations currently running are in Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic and Tajikistan (*UN Peace Operation, Year in Review 2006*).

[10] Usually it is for five yars in other countries but was aligned in Burundi with the expected life of BINUB.

A benchmark of peace-building could be found with Marshall and Gurr:

"We rate a country's peace-building capacity high insofar as it has managed to avoid outbreaks of armed conflicts while providing reasonable levels of human security, shows no active policies of political or economic discrimination against minorities, has successfully managed movements for self-determination, maintains stable democratic institutions, has attained substantial human and material resources, and is free of serious threats from its neighboring countries" (Marshall & Gurr, 2005, p.3).

To achieve this, the root causes must be tackled by the rehabilitation of the legal system, building state institutions and good governance, which is a long-term objective. Gradually, the UN had grown into a type of peace building that combines post-conflict rehabilitation through economic recovery and development and security to prevent a relapse into conflict. Peace building is a highly political concept, hence the choice for a leading body-to-be a combination of the DPA and DPKO.

However, the present mandate of BINUB is for two years, which causes nervousness about what will happen afterward. The long-term process has just started in Burundi. The political and peacekeeping involvement of the UN in Burundi started with a small political office, a big presence of humanitarian actors, a gradual entry of development organizations, the WB, and the IMF. If security holds and if the Government finds mechanisms to stop making the opposition into outcasts and starts including it in democratic

processes, reinforces its capacities and begins attracting qualified Burundians from the diaspora, the UN will again change the nature of its presence. From a political office that grew into a peacekeeping office, which turned into a peace-building office, the UN could again have a political office but this time combined with equally important domains of development, economic progress and good governance. Furthermore, the UN and other actors should pay particular attention to reforming and reformatting the political, as well as the police, cadre of Burundi. Through this it could avoid what we had already seen and what the International community tolerated in a search for quick fixes in other new democracies born out of long-term bloodshed – recycling the same politicians with blood or crimes on their hands. In the end, this has a dangerous potential for undermining confidence in democracy in the countries that are trying to learn what democracy is supposed to be. Though the FNL which was the last party to sign the Peace Accord and which is still in opposition is considered by all one of the major threats to stability in Burundi, we should not forget that an equal threat lies with the party that won at the elections in 2005, CNDD-FDD. Understandably, its members and the president elected from within do not have skills required to run a state. The scope for mistakes is huge in a fragile post-conflict environment. BINUB's political role, even though not explicit enough in its SC mandate, will be of great importance, even

more than the big and explicit political mandate that ONUB fulfilled when tasked to organize the elections in Burundi.

Streamlining and harmonising resources, strategies, programmes, and objectives have been the UN's major internal preoccupation in recent years. Better harmonisation/integration of the UN System mainly at the level of field operations, integration of civilian and military components of peace operations, integration of peace building work, are believed to be bringing results and to be the only right way to achieving Millennium Development Goals and working as one. These principles, approaches and rules have been universal and have been adhered to in Burundi.

Dilemmas that have troubled the UN in Burundi are commonplace elsewhere: whether to pursue a military or a negotiated option; whether to use aid money as a push and pull mechanism for the objectives of the West, e.g. democratisation; whether to link the full cessation of hostilities with the deployment of peacekeepers; whether to link development investments with the full cessation of hostilities; whether to link the degree of achieved democratisation with donor pledges, and now, whether to use the PBF as carrots and sticks or to leave this role to the WB and the IMF. Nonetheless, hope of change is there with the PBC, whose main objective is to fill in the gaps in funding and attention in the early phases of a peace process

and to prevent a quick relapse into conflict. In Burundi, the PBF comes on top of other process that started between 2000 and 2006. The PBF here, like in Sierra Leone, is not the only or the major vehicle of peace consolidation. It is there to fill in the gaps in funding and to find solutions for problems not foreseen in the planning of others in the v peace building. For this, the PBF must guarantee and quickly disburse the funding.

Every conflict is different and this is why there cannot be one approach to finding a solution, nor one benchmark of the success. The results of UN reform and new approaches are very visible in the case of the UN in Burundi. There has also been an overall positive element of reviving the interest of the international community in enhancing the UN peacekeeping. There is no doubt that recent academic and scholarly works of Professor Paul Collier, the team of the Human Security Centre, the RAND Institute, the International peace Academy, the Oxford University and many others contributed to the idea of a potential relapse into conflict five years aftera peace agreement. This, as well as the finding that military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the most cost-efficient means of reducing the risk of conflict in post-conflict societies has had a positive effect on the UN. These studies also established that the specific effects of UN actions are difficult to determine, however, the acknowledgement has been made that the UN has been a leading

actor of the corporate effort of the WB, donor states, regional and non-governmental organizations (HSR, 2006). In Burundi, the UN had a supporting role in the Arusha peace process, a distinguished leading role in organizing the elections in 2005 and facilitated a good transition. The Burundian-thus-far-success story ties in firmly with the combination of all the actors and all the factors.

Refugees and the internally displaced are not yet returning in big numbers. The current focus of the GoB and the UN is on the land reform and judicial system, while the WB and the IMF are focusing on consolidating the micro-economic situation. The PBC is there to maintain momentum and ensure the continuum of peace building activity in Burundi and other countries. There is a lot of hope for Burundi now.

Conclusions

The UN was late in taking actions in Burundi despite the high-pitched exclamations such as "…after the genocide in Rwanda, the international community must not again be caught unprepared" (UN document S/1996/116). The indications of the genocide in Rwanda and massacres in Burundi were there but the Security Council did not spot it nor the S-G sufficiently analysed or passed on the information about them in a timely manner. Genocide did not take place in Burundi but massacres and other severe violations of human rights did. We can only assume that the UN and other actors did have an important role in preventing genocide in Burundi in 1994 and later.

Missed opportunities in the preventive actions: The UN did not entertain a military option to prevent watershed in 1993 and in 2002 to keep fragile peace when two factions signed a cease-fire agreement. Violence continued in both cases and neither the AU nor the UN peacekeeping troops arrived. Military intervention in 1993 was suppressed and in 2002, the UN wished to see a full cease-fire

while the AU did not know if it would have sufficient money to maintain AMIB.

UN is primarily an instrument of its member-states: the UN ignored the upsurge of violence in Burundi in 1993 and did the decent minimum there, but stopped short of mounting a peacekeeping mission. Instead, it opened a petite political office in Bujumbura, when the AU dispatched a small monitoring mission. They have not been very generous with the military or monetary support in Burundi. The AU's pioneer mission to Burundi that was financially dependant on donor countries from the developed world was shut down because the funding dried out. Deployment of ONUB replacing AMIB was a sign of the recognised steady, albeit belated, commitment of the international community to the peace process and testified to the need for the UN involvement even if it chose not to deploy troops in Burundi after the 1993 coup. Trust and confidence in the UN had to be built in Burundi gradually.

UN did not have capacity to mediate: the UN put itself in a position of a mediator through its SRSG Ould-Abdullah for which it might not have been all that qualified in the first place, lacking the flexibility and the speed of its decision-making organs, as well as, importantly, the leverage. The SRSG Ould-Abdullah was negotiating

on behalf of the international community, e.g. the UN while the commitment about the extent of assistance by the international community had not been assured beforehand nor capacities and expertise of the entire UN had been put at his disposal.

Repeated delays: The International Commission of Inquiry arrived with over two years of delay to investigate the 1993 assassination of the president; AMIB's deployment was six months late due to the lack of resources; the SRSG Dinka whose mandate was to lead the IMC process, arrived with a one-year delay.

Africans do keep in mind that the UN peacekeeping was equally late in Sierra Leone and Liberia and that it did nothing in Rwanda. The problem did not evaporate in Burundi and the UN peacekeepers had to come ten years later.

Positive outcomes of the UN's role are major and were the result of a focused attention of the UN, namely its headquarters, on Burundi from 2000 onwards. Unlike before in its history, the Security Council came several times down to the field, which had a multitude of positive effects on both the country and the UN. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat's prime document – the S-G report turned institutionally after the Somalia operation into a tool serving almost as an assessment and creating the information basis of the

resolutions and mandates that follow. Such was the case with the S-G Reports S/2004/210 March 2004 before ONUB was established.

While the bilateral aid was blocked due to the sanctions in the nineties and due to enduring conflicts, **the UN was a major supporter to the peace process in Burundi.** It had an active political engagement, as well as humanitarian and developmental through a number of its representatives be it from UN agencies, programmes, and funds or political and peacekeeping departments. The UN interventions saved a number of lives.

The Security Council was kept abreast of the developments in Burundi regularly through the S-G reports that in the later stage had the periodicity of three months. These reports contain information, observations and the recommendations pertinent to the political, security, development, humanitarian, human rights, DDR and a number of other areas.

The ECOSOC was informed and was active about the progress in economic and development field in Burundi through the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Group for Burundi and left a strong marking in Burundi.

The UN served as a venue and a coordinating agent to the peace process. It convened donor meetings, coordinated its work

with UN agencies, run the IMC, and JCC to coordinate military issues pertinent to the implementation of the ceasefire agreements.

Efficiency of elections: elections planned and implemented in such a short time was an excellent example of efficiency thanks to good UN personnel and material set-up.

After the momentum was gained, the international community had a pivotal role in Burundi in maintaining peace and keeping the peace process on right track. Academic research as well as the recent history of post-conflict countries asserts that half of the countries emerging from conflict return to violence within five years, and that a high amount of predictable financial assistance is needed for up to ten years to ward off the trial of post-conflict recovery (Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom, 2006). **Burundi has been getting a lot of attention** in the period 2000 – 2007 even if not always the financial one.

The UN System and major actors have been learning lessons about their cooperation and level of integration in search for a harmonised work and well used resources leaning on the experiences of AMIB in 2003/2004, ONUB 2005/2006 and BINUB 2007. The peace consolidation in Burundi by the UN has shown a remarkable will to learn and apply lessons from the past and to explore all the venues.

What can be a common **denominator of the success** of all resolutions is the return of refugees and internally displaced people to their country or the places of origin, establishment of sustainable democratic institutions and prevention of the relapse into conflict.

Over-enthusiasm about current peace: enthusiasm and evaluation of the current situation in Burundi as a success, as often heard in the media, are premature, although there is a multitude of good reasons to see it that way. Beside the improvement in the security situation and achieving what seems so far a workable, even through a fragile political framework instead of chaos are not good enough benchmarks to measure the success. But any situation where people stop killing each other should be considered a success, which is the process where the UN had a helping hand.

A country's own political will is the key for changes and the GoB's readiness to take responsibility for creating the peace environment.

Annex 1

Chronology of major events in Burundi From 1993 onwards:

1993 First phase of mediation initiatives (Zartman, 2006)

1993 Voluntary repatriation of 1972 refugees started

1993 The first Hutu & democratically elected president, Ndayaye killed

1993 SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, appointed for Burundi

1993-2004 UNOB operation

1994 Convention of Government negotiated

1993 First military coup by Pierre Buyoya

1994 UNHCR and Unicef established the presence related to Burundi

1994 OAU established MIOB / OMIB

1994 UN International Committee of Inquiry following the Ndayaye's assassination established

1994 The second Hutu president killed (with Rwanda president)

1995 The International Commission of Enquiry to investigate the assassination of Ndayaye established

1995 Special Rapporteur on Burundi appointed

1995-1997 SRSG Marc Faguy appointed

1995 Regional Peace Process Initiative for Burundi set off

1995 Nyere appointed a Facilitator of peace talks

1996 Second phase of mediation initiatives begins (Zartman, 2006) or Arusha I

1996–2003 military coup and governance of by Pierre Buyoya

1996 Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Appointed

1996-1999 Economic sanctions by the Regional Initiative

1997 Buyoya established a multiparty system

1997 UN appointed advisor for peace initiative in Burundi

1997–2000 SRSG Cheikh Tidiane Sy appointed

1998 OCHA opened the office in Burundi

1998–2000 Third phase of mediation initiatives (Zartman, 2006) or Arusha II

1999 Senior UN Political Advisor to the Facilitation appointed

1999 Mandela succeeded the facilitation of the Arusha peace process

2000 Signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

2000 Signature of Cease-fire Agreement signed by thirteen parties

2000–2002 SRSG Jean Arnoult appointed

2000 IMC established under the UN auspices

2001 South African Protection Service Detachment deployed

2003 Signature of Ceasefire Agreement by five parties

2003 Joint Ceasefire Commission established

2003 *Ad hoc* Advisory group on Burundi established

2003–2004 SRSG Berhanu Dinka appointed

2003 Transitional government established

2003 AMIB deployed

2004 ONUB deployed and a new SRSG Carolyn McAskie

2004 Burundi Partners' Forum set up

2005 Elections supported by ONUB

2006 Signature of Ceasefire Agreement by the remaining party FNL

2006 PBC established a country-specific group for Burundi

2007 BINUB relieved ONUB and an ERSG Youssuf Mahmoud appointed

2007 Peace Building Fund established

Annex 2: Map of Burundi

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