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The Imperial Component in Iran’s Foreign Policy
Towards Arab Mashreq and Arab Gulf States

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Under Supervision of

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This work is dedicated

To those behind prison bars

and

To those who have sacrificed their lives

for the freedom of their people

and

for their human dignity
Declaration

I, hereby declare that this research is my own work and no part of it has been copied from any other previous work on the subject, except in such instances where acknowledgement has been duly made.

Nabil Ali Shehada
Abstract:

One of the most important developments the Middle East has witnessed in the 20th century was the success of the Iranian revolution of Islamist ideology, with ambitions to control. Perhaps the roots of these ambitions refers to the Persian Empire, however, the revolution reflects an ideological factor, granting itself a world-wide mandate.

The Imperial Component in Iran’s Foreign Policy Towards Arab Mashreq and Arab Gulf States, is mainly discussing the expansionist ideology, expressed in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its foundations in Shiism and in the constitutional provisions. The study went through a century of Iran’s history to review evolution of political thinking. In addition, the study handled different approaches to study international political relations to understand mechanisms of foreign policy decision-making in Iran, and the influences that contribute to that, and the impact of ideology and personal factor of political leaders entitled to that mission.

The study concludes that Iran, either through thinking or practice, is ambitious to expand seeking to create a new model of imperialism, both in the region and across the world, pursuant to the principle of “Export of the Revolution”, the backbone of the Iranian political thinking.
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The Imperial Component in Iran’s Foreign Policy
Towards Arab Mashreq and Arab Gulf States

Introduction: An Interpretative Overview

This dissertation deals with what has been referred to as the ‘imperial component in Iran’s foreign policy towards Arab Mashreq and Arab Gulf States. Its primary focus is on Iran's political history, the structure of its political system after the 1979 Islamic revolution, and the Shia’s spiritual and ideological values and their impact of the country’s foreign policy in the region. This brief introduction provides an interpretative overview of the subject and underlines the main aim, the key research-guiding question, the principal hypothesis and the main argument of the analysis. It also sketches the methodology and the organization of the dissertation.

There is probably little doubt that the events in Iran and the role of Iran in the international arena following the Islamic revolution have attracted the attention of the entire world, in view a number of inter-related factors. To start with, there is the strategic geographic location, in terms of Iran's centrality in the Mashreq region that has long been the focus of much of
the colonial powers throughout history. There is also the crucial role of oil in international relations and international political economy. Moreover, there are other reasons for the great interest in Iran’s internal developments and its foreign policy in academic spheres and in policy-making circles, which could be summarized as:

- The dramatic fall of the Shah's empire with its strong domestic level of control, powerful army and notable external political and economic ambitions, which projected the Shah of Iran not only as the most dominant figure of the country, but also as a prominent actor in the entire Persian or Arabian Gulf region, and beyond.

- The emergence of a new force that named itself the Islamic Revolution, which sought to exert full control on the internal affairs in Iran through the excessive use of violence that possibly exceeded the level associated with the Shah regime, in addition to over-emphasizing the traditional religious/ideological principles in all social, political and economic domains.

- Nearly a decade after the Islamic revolution in Iran, when the government managed to stabilize the country internally and eliminate domestic opponents - following eight years of
devastating war with neighboring Iraq - the international system witnessed the spectacular fall of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Block in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was generally feeling comfortable with the demise of the Shah, which was considered a citadel of the American hegemony and Western imperialism. Following the collapse of the Soviet system, the Islamic revolution came to view as a major threat to the international system that had enjoyed relative stability within the bipolar system at the time of the cold war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It seems that the collapse of the Soviet Union provided a potential for the emergence of an ambitious Islamic Republic of Iran determined to play a greater role in international politics, particularly at the regional level of both the Middle East and Central Asia, in view of its revolutionary slogans together with the demographic, ethnic and religious characteristics of the Asian republics that were once part of the Soviet Union. The Iranian leaders might have found themselves in a position to seek to assume the role of the legitimate heir of the Soviets.

- The events of September 11th attacks on the US and the invasion of Afghanistan by the US and Western allies with the start of the international war against terrorism, in addition to the outbreak of
the conflict in Iraq - which started in 1991 following the Iraqi occupation of the State of Kuwait - brought Iran's significant role in the region to the forefront of the attention of many scholars, observers, politicians and policy-makers in numerous countries.

- The internal situation in Iran. It is true that the revolution in Iran in 1979 has united most sectors of the Iranian population behind one goal: to bring down the Shah. However, the euphoria of victory faded quickly, as new developments posed serious challenges to the most important goal of the revolution: the disposal of the tyrant. The kind of the forces that took control of the revolution, which were the religious elites, and the nature of the slogans, ideology and policy measures prevented the development of all kinds of modern democracy in Iran. The ‘new’ system imposed its strict rules and regulations, and became extremely dominant with the suppression of freedom continuing, and becoming at times even more deadly, in comparison to the earlier period of the Shah.

The scope, hypothesis and argument of the analysis

The aim of this dissertation is to seek to provide answers to its central, research-guiding question: Could the principle ‘Export of the Revolution’
which constitute the back-bone of Iran’s political thinking, as well as of Iran’s strategies of foreign relations, be considered, in certain way, as a kind of traditional exercise of imperial thinking and practice?

The main argument put forward here is that in Iran, where the Persian community constitutes more than half of the Iranian people, and the Shia Islam has for centuries been the mainstream religion, the Emam (The Supreme Leader) maintains a powerful spiritual authority in bringing about a notable public consensus in favor of rejection of injustice, while promoting a great devotion for the support of the oppressed believers everywhere.

The idea is that the government in Iran, like all other governments, in line with the mandate entrusted by, in terms of preserving and safeguarding the national interests, has been exerting every possible effort to accomplish two major objectives. First, to maintain broad internal social, political, economic and other form of stability and security, and second, pursue in its external relations a foreign policy directed towards accomplishing its national objectives, whether short, medium or long term.
The main argument here is that Iran's expansionist intentions, both in the region and beyond, have found expressions in a range of political actions in various stages during the course of Iran's contemporary history, not only in more recent stages after the success of the Islamic Revolution in the late 20th century. The understanding is that in any analysis of any type of states’ actions towards external domination with expansionist policies, in whatever referred to as colonialism, hegemony, or imperialism, it is very important to explore the foundations, tools and instruments undying that process or phenomena.

The term imperialism traces its origins to the Latin word ‘Impriuem,’ which means power, authority or sovereignty. The historical context defined it in terms of the creation of an empire, which would impose its total or partial sovereignty on the territory of a State outside its recognized borders. Similarly, it is widely accepted that colonialism means putting a group of people under the direct or indirect control of foreign (or external) power, with partial or complete domination through military, political or economic ways and means. It deprives the dominated people from their right of self determination.
It might be a difficult task to adequately differentiate between colonialism and imperialism. However, imperialism probably involves less direct and more indirect mechanisms of control imposed on other countries, in a form of remote control that exploits the country’s comparative advantages. Nevertheless, what is important to notice is that exploitation, in both cases, is not limited within spheres of politics and economics, but is also greatly manifested and consolidated through dissemination of ideas and beliefs, including religious interpretations and explanations, along with the universalizing of particular norms, values and principles.

More recent developments in the international system, and the worldwide spread of the crucial value of basic, fundamental human rights, have certainly made it more problematic (and less acceptable) the institution of most traditional forms of colonialism and imperialism across various countries. They, however, also made it necessary for colonial and imperial powers to formulate ‘new’ forms of domination and device ‘new’ instruments and mechanisms.

In order to test the hypothesis of this dissertation, which assumes that the ‘Export of the Revolution’ by the Iranian Islamic leaders could be seen as a form of traditional exercise of imperial thinking and practice, it seems more appropriate to follow a qualitative research methodology.
This study examines the historical background of the Islamic revolution in Iran, reviews the theoretical perspectives in terms of theories of International Relations, and explores the dynamics of Iran's foreign policy, its components and its ideological and political foundations. More specifically, this study looks into Iran's political history over the past century, before analyzing the composition and structure of its political system after the revolution, and its impact on the foreign policy of the country, in order to demonstrate the expansionist nature of the regime in Iran in its relations with neighboring countries, particularly the Arab Mashreq (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) and the Arab Gulf States.

**Methodology and organization of the study**

This dissertation is based on a review of available official documents, together with an assessment of the Constitution of Iran, minutes of meetings, official and public statements and relevant political positions and developments. This dissertation, which started with a brief introduction and a broad overview of the main ideas of the analysis, moves on in chapter 1 to present a historical review of the Shia’s spiritual values, and their impact on the political thinking and practice of the leaders of the Iranian revolution in dealing with the main issues in the international system. In chapter 2, it examines International Political
Relations, in terms of various approaches to the study of IR, both traditional and more contemporary. Chapter 3, on Iran After the Islamic Revolution, looks into the main institutions that determine decision-making process in Iran’s foreign policy. It also highlights the fundamental principles of Iran’s foreign policy. Chapter 4 deals specifically with the major directions and ingredients of Iran’s foreign relations with the Mashreq countries and the Arab Gulf States. The dissertation ends with concluding remarks.
1. Chapter One: Historical Background

(This chapter will handle a historical background of the Iranian state with some emphasis on the origins and foundations of Shiism and the role of these foundations in political life in Iran. Focus will be on the political history of Iran in the twentieth century, as this period has witnessed a very important events in the region and the world on the one hand, and to meet the specific purposes of research on the other hand)

1.1. Iran before Islam:

What was called Persia, Iran was the land of civilizations untill afew centuries before the Christ. Persians had a very high sense of self esteem, and maybe racial intolerance to a degree that some of their philosophers believed that they are the direct decidants of Adam, the father of mankind. Even befor Islam, Persians gave much weight to religion in their life, therefore, the class of religious people was on top of the social classification. The River Euphrates, and since the beginning of the first century AD, is the boundary between the Roman (Byzantine after them) and
Albarthanion (Sassanids after them), and was always a disputed area. Have focused most of the fortifications and battles that took place between them in the mountainous north, Where the Syrian desert separates them in the south. The only danger was expected from the south is some of the invasions of nomadic tribesmen. Both countries have fortified themselves from such invasions from the Arabs create a semi-independent states allied to them at the border. They are allies of the Byzantines Ghassanids, either Manathira they were allies of the Persians. They were always in on-going-confrontations with each other making it easier that they belong to those empires,

1.2. Iran after Islam:

The Islamic conquests to Iran began with the invasion of Iraq led by Khalid ibn al-Walid in 633 AD, and moved on Khalid bin Waleed to the war on the front of the Romans, Persians Vangd the Islamic Army in Iraq and regained what they lost. Three years later a second campaign to Fatah Persia led by Saad bin Abi Waqas began, resulted in a decisive victory of the Army of the Islamic conquest in the battle of Qadisiyah and ended the rule of Sassanid the Western Front of Persia, and later in the year 644 the Fatah of Persia was comprehensive, ending completely the ruling of the Sasanian.
In early Islam, in time of Prophet Mohammad, no such classification were exist between Shia and Sunna, but it seems that the roots of division was origially established then. Conceptually, Shia the second largest denomination of Islam, and in contrast to other schools of thought, Shia believes that Ali Ben Abi Taleb, Prophet Mohammad’s cousin, and his son in law, his wife Fatima, his decedents and certain individuals among his descendants, who are known as Imams, have special spiritual and political authority over the community, must compulsory and faithfully followed by all Muslims. Shia Muslims further believe that Ali, Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was the first of these Imams and was the rightful successor to Muhammad. (Toropov, 2004, p. 135) and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three, Abu bakr, Omar bin El Khattab and Othman Ben Affan. (Attabari, 309 Hijri).

Moerover, Shia consider that there is no defference between Shia and Islam. Namely, Shia is Islam.

Although Shia was originated with the Arab Muslims, was not thus initially an Iranian religious movement, but it has come to be identified closely with Iran (Information on Iran, No date, Iran Chamber Society) and along different periods in history, Shia became the main religion of Iran, where
the religious elites play the most significant role in leading the public against dictators and unjust governments, namely, resisting the civic state. This was not only of political dimension, but derived from the main aspect of Shia belief that the sole power of state must be entrusted by the Imam, who enjoys full protection by Allah, “God” from committing mistakes. With the disappearance of the Twelfth Emam, Mohammad Al Mahdi, in year 874, Shia believe that also legitimate exercise of power become of no existence, and therefore, the Shia matter of state became of usurpation and inalienable nature. (ErRayyes, 1989, pp20+)

Therefore, the religious elite of the Shia used to maintain strong spiritual influence over the public, making use of the numerous religious occasions and festivals. On top of that is the Karbala memorial of Imam Hussein assassination.

1.3. Iran in the 20th Centaury:

Iran have had a long history that made it a center of attention to different colonial powers. But for the purpose of this research, we will handle the main features of this history during the 20th centaury, since it had the most significant role that set the way forward to the Islamic revolution of 1979.
1.3.1. Before the Constitutional Revolution:
Prior to 1906, Iran was under the rule of the Qajar State, which, among other things, facilitates foreign interference in Iran through foreign investments. This interference was faced by strong opposition from some Iranian national entities who found it as an obstacle of emerging a modern Iranian economy. This has led to a matter of conflict between those entities, (merchants, religious elite, tribes and big land-lords and farmers) and the Qajar State. Each one of the above mentioned found the Qajar’s policies as a direct threat to his own interests, therefore they gathered and constitute a strong opposition that led to what was called later as the Constitutional Revolution. (EsSabki, 1999, p.9)

What had the most influential role on the public was the attitude of the religious elite towards the Qajar State. The attitude derived from the principles of the Shia Twelvers against the civic state and for the struggle against oppression. Therefore, they enjoyed being capable to formulate general public opinion and direct the people to revolution, making use of the many religious occasions such as the Tazea, which is the Karbala memorial of the Emam Hussein Assassination.

1.3.2. The Constitutional Revolution:
As the Cholera prevails across Iran in 1905, which led to shortage of agricultural production and a temporary stop of trade with the neighboring Russia, prices have jumped significantly, while the government imposed additional taxes and commissions on merchants and manufacturers.

In the same year, Iranian demonstrated in three occasions. First was for deportation of a drunken Belgian Chief of Customs, who was claimed to insult the religious Emams in a masquerade. The Shah Mozaffar agreed to deport the man, when Russia threatened for severe measures if customs management became out of “good hands”. (EsSabki, 1999, p.20). But after renewal of demonstration adding new demands in favor of the foundation of the “Council of Justice” and direct application of the Islamic Sharia (rules), at the end, the man was expelled from Iran, but the Shah rejected the other demands.

The second wave of demonstration was in mid 1906, when the police used violence against demonstrations, and the religious emams went on strike, and declare a very important Fatwa (an obligatory opinion) that the Qajar “are equal to Yazid Ben Moaaweya, who accused of killing the Hussein, the son of Ali Ben Abi Taleb”. The result of that wave of demonstration was agreement by the Shah to constitute a constitutional committee to draft the first constitution of Iran, which was declared a year later.
The third wave was when a conflict of interests arose between the Shah and the newly elected Council of Representatives on the limits of powers between the elected members and the Shah, ending by deporting the Shah and appointing his son of twelve years old and formulate a new national government with wide range of constitutional reforms.

1.3.3. Iran during the World War I:

As the preliminary outcome of the First World War, Great Britain started to plan for strengthening its role in Iran, in a step to replace the Russian role after cancellation of the treaty of 1907 and its protocols on Iran. The main purpose of the British trend was to make Iran as a first defensive wall that protects the British interests in Iraq, Afghanistan and India, against the newly emerged power of the Soviet Union after the Revolution of October, 1917 in one hand, and to secure the oil supply. Making use of the facts on the ground, where Germany was defeated, while Ottoman Empire collapsed and the new Bolshevik revolution was totally involved in internal affairs, The conclusion of the British efforts was an agreement with the United States of America to give Britain the upper hand power in Iran, through the Agreement of 1919 between Great Britain and Iran “the Anglo-Persian Agreement”. The main themes of that agreement were the responsibility of Britain to reorganize the finance and
the customs of Iran, besides restructuring the army. In addition, Britain gained monopoly on roads and rail projects. (EsSabki, 1999, p.47)

The Iranian opposition found the agreement as colonial dominant on Iran by Britain, which was expressed by a public strike and it was widely spread that the Iranian Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance and Interior has received bribes, which was later confirmed by an official British document released on 1923, confirming that three top Iranian officials had received a total of USD 110000. (EsSabki, 1999, p.49)

According to the rising public opposition to the agreement, the government of Iran had resigned, the new government also failed to convince the House of Representatives to ratify the agreement. Therefore, Britain found that it is necessary find a person who can absorb public anger, that person was the Cossack officer Reza Khan Pahlavi, who led the first military coup in history of Iran. (EsSabki, 1999, p.49)

Evidences confirm that the coup of Reza Shah was fully coordinated and supported by the British embassy in Tehran. Moreover, it is of high credibility that the embassy has participated in putting detailed plans of the coup. Edmond Ironside, a British officer mentioned in his diary that he believed that only a strong military dictatorship can prevent Iran from being under the Bolshevik revolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, he has hold a meeting with Reza Khan on January 31st, 1921, who notified
the officer of his decision to launch a coup. Twelve days after, he met him again and showed his support of the step under only one condition on Reza Khan, not to depose Ahmad Shah, which he was assured about. Later, Ironside had met Ahmad Shah and advised him of collaborating with Reza Khan.

As the Princeton scholar Richard Ullman has written in his careful account of the events of 1920–21: “It is idle to speculate upon whether or not he would eventually have come to power had Ironside not singled him out; but it is clear that Ironside and his British colleagues were largely instrumental in placing Reza Khan in a position to bring about the coup d’état of 21 February 1921 which put effective power in his hands” (Brysac, 2007, How Reza Shah Won and Lost His Throne …)

Reza Khan’s Internal Policy towards National Minorities:

In his early beginning, Reza Khan has faced a strong insurgencies from the north and south tribes, and with that he used many means to persuade them, but he eventually resorted to military repression to subdue the tribes of the north and south. He used excessive force to the extent to bombing the rebels by aircrafts in Khorram Abad, which was occupied by his troops on the seventh of March 1924, and has exiled men or arrested them.
Since the beginning of the modern age at the time of Reza Shah Pahlavi, form of racism in the era of the Pahlavi that the means and goals have changed completely; First: The main objective of the ethnic nationalities are not religions and sects; for the first time appeared the policy of conversion of the minorities to become more and more of Persian nature culturally, as he is still the main objective. Secondly: It was not the goal of the Shah to practice the political control only likewise rulers who preceded him, but hatred and enmity for non-Persian ethnic minorities was the most important driver who shaped his policies. Third: In order to erasure Persian cultures the Shah prevented minorities from wearing traditional clothes and reveal the veil for women was compulsory and forcing men to wear clothes designed and allocated by the government. Forth: : For the first time in the history of Iran after Islam, the Shah has adopted a policy of settlement of the Persian nationals in the Arab provinces. Reza Shah remained the ultimate goal is to unite the tribes and the state by subjecting the non-Persian tribes to the authority of the central state forcibly. As handling the Arabic language being banned, so was the Kurdish language, names of Kurdish cities has changed to the Persian names. Armenians suffered the same treatment, their schools were closed, and they were accused of collaborating with foreign powers, faced defamation. **In 1938 changed the name of the Persian state to Iran.**
In order to impose control, the Shah continued to restrict on opposition and suppression of freedoms and the closure of newspapers, speaking on behalf of the opposition, which was talking about corruption and bribery. Inside the palace of the shah, a state of fear and suspicion has prevailed between the Shah and his advisors, and between him and the foreign ambassadors who were talking about an upcoming public revolution against the Shah and the coup by the army. This has resulted in a sharp jump in the Shah's authoritarian rule which made him to speak out against the only party that supported all his decisions, the Liberal Democratic Party, accusing the party of blocking his efforts in front of the Iranians, especially after the negative effects of his little reforms that increase anger of the religious and tribal leaders. Minister Plenipotentiary of the British government wrote to say that the Shah became the subject of hate and can no longer rely on the support of his army and the removal of the Shah in person or even the removal of his empire will be popular and needed. (EsSabki, 1999, p.97)

The legend of Reza Pahlavi has ended three weeks after the Anglo-Soviet invasion to Iran in September 11th, 1941, and left Tehran to the island of Mauritius on board of a British battleship, then to Johannesburg in South Africa where he died in 1944, and was buried in Cairo five years and then his body was transferred to Tehran in 1949.
1.3.4. Iran during the World War II:

The strategic location of Iran, in addition to the growing importance of oil during World War II (after the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, making Iran's oil the only reserve to the Allies in the East), has made the Allies to take a decision to get Iran involved in that war. Thus the Allies have got Iran integrated in their military activities, despite the fact that Iran has officially declared a position of neutrality. In the end, Britain and Russia occupied Iran in August 25, 1941. On September 17 Reza Shah was forced to abdicate to his son Mohammed, and being sent to exile to the Mauritius island. In the end of the war Britain had promoted the idea to enable Iran to enjoy its right to self-determination, and withdrew its troops from Iranian territory while Russia had kept its occupation of northern Iran. Iran submitted a complaint to the Security Council of the United Nations in 1946, and later the Russian Representative to the United Nations had announced the withdrawal of Russian troops out of Iran after the approval of the Iranian government to establish a Russian-Iranian Oil Company, after intense pressure exerted by Russia. Russian interference in the internal affairs of Iran led to dramatic increase in the role of the United States in Iran.
Iran’s relations with the United States of America:

During the first years after the war the military considerations occupied the first place. In 1947, Iran has received its first American financial assistance in the form of a loan of $25 million U.S. dollars to buy weapons and ammunition from the United States followed within months by the approval Iran's parliament on loan of ten million dollars to buy weapons as well.

With the growing popular resentment of the exploitation of Britain to Iranian oil. By the end of 1949 Britain decided to draft a supplementary agreement with the Iranian government by which Iran would gain half the profits from oil, but Iran's parliament refused to ratify this agreement. The name of Mohammed Mossadegh, the opposition leader MP and Chairman of National Front party became very familiar, which called in His famous speech in February 1950 the need to nationalize Iran's oil industry. After two months of debate, a special parliamentary committee's adopted a decision of nationalization and the parliament ratified the draft nationalization decision in April 1950. A year after Mossadegh was elected as prime minister with overwhelming parliamentary majority, the next day the decision of oil industry nationalization was put in effect. For its part, Britain has mobilized its diplomatic and military efforts to deter
Iran from implementing its decision on nationalization. But the military efforts did not evolve to an actual confrontation. It was not clear whether that was due to pressure exerted by the United States or because of fear of Soviet reaction as this will be understood as a grave violation to the British-Soviet agreement on Iran.

Later a diplomatic battle began between Britain, backed by the United States, and Iran mainly on oil, later on, the matter to become more likely a boycott, under the control of the World Oil Cartel, against Iran’s oil export. Mossadegh tried the re-organization of the Iranian economy to reduce its dependence on oil revenues after the rejection of President George Eisenhower’s aid to Iran under the pretext of not being able to convince the tax payers unless agreement is reached between Britain and Iran. Later, economic embargo imposed on Iran, Britain has taken a decision to remove Mossadegh from power. Although this decision was not fully compatible with the United States policy at that point of time, but it provided a great service by imposing economic and financial blockade against Iran. And things dramatically moved up to deadlock and diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain were cut off, more and more the American convinced that the best solution would be the removal of Mossadegh from power in Iran
The Shah left the country and leave things in the hands of the CIA, which orchestrated and funded a popular uprising and General Zahedi returned to appear as a leader of the coup and Mossadegh was and the Shah returned to Iran on August 22, 1953. (Niroumand, 1981, pp. 45-67)

Thus, the royal family returned to Iran as stronger than ever before, and continued to derive the legitimacy of its rule of divine right and derived from the legacy of centuries of tradition. Shah had enjoyed the power of God, especially in the rural areas. Gradually, the power in the hands of the Shah's became not only the embodiment of the depth of national feeling of the Persian empire, but also a translation of the religious feelings.

Shah was smart enough to associate himself with great kings of the Persians in ancient history: Darius and Cyrus, He established the idea of celebrating the memorial of two thousand and five hundred years from the history of the Iranian state from Cyrus to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, this supported the emergence of the Shah as the strongest man of Iran whom the free world must support, and it seems that he persuaded the United States to do so.
Said the U.S. President “Lyndon Johnson”, in a statement: "We love the Shah and we consider it of my dearest friends”. Between 1954 and 1963, the United States has granted this friend the amount of USD 946 million, and in turn the Shah put his country in the service of the United States and became part of the U.S. system of imperialism, Iran has become part of important role in the Baghdad Pact, and formed a strong arm of the United States on the periphery of the Soviet Union.

Confrontations of views between the Shah and his ally, the United States was one of the most important factors that worked against him, while the United States wanted policeman working as a dealer for them in the region, aspirations of the Shah began growing, and he began to see a bigger role to Iran in its territory and then in the world. (EsSabki, 1999, p.194).

Things got worse when Iran canceled the oil agreement with Britain, which made the British launched a propaganda campaign in support of the Iranian opposition, including religious elite. Other external factors have played against the Shah's statement made by the candidate for the U.S. presidency at that time, Jimmy Carter on the fundamental freedoms of peoples and the importance of helping to achieve these freedoms. As the Shah’s violent response against demonstrators, along with the reported severe torture in secret prisons, the UN High Commission on Human Rights released a report on human rights violations in Iran. All
these factors together, made some western consensus that its about time to remove the Shah.

On the domestic front repression practiced by the Shah has increased, at the same time the internal opposition to his regime and to his alliance with the United States has also increased, poverty and unemployment has also jumped up. By early 1960s, the name Khomeini, a religious Shia leader who has came out in March 1963 carrying a Koran in one hand and the Constitution of 1906 in its other hand to announce that the Shah had betrayed Islam and the Constitution, which prompted the Shah to suppress demonstrations violently in June 1963, Khomeini was exiled to Turkey in late 1964 and moved later to Najaf in Iraq.

The actual beginning of popular revolt against the Shah's regime was the beginning of the year 1977 in protest of the students at Tehran University. In November 1977 the Shah visited Washington, and United States allowed his opponents to demonstrate against his visit, and it seems that the Shah had read the message behind it. The Shah acted contrary to the expectation the U.S. administration began using the national language and expressions of condemnation of colonial interventions in his country and promising reforms.
In return the French newspaper Le Monde gave a unique platform for Ayatollah Khomeini in which he introduced an integrated vision for the situation in Iran, and his ideas and vision for the solution. France provided some advice to the Shah in order to go out of the crisis but he ignored them, saying foreign intervention is rejected. Britain, and through its strong media instrument, the BBC, was fully supporting the removal of the Shah.

1.3.5. The end of the Shah’s regime:

The United States has become convinced of the inevitability of the demise of the Shah's regime, but they want concerted end. Debate within the Administration in Washington ended up with the U.S. spokesman statement of December 7, 1978 through which the United States declared that it would not intervene in Iranian internal affairs. This was the strongest statement of the United States leaving its closest ally in the region to his fate. (EsSabki, 1999, p.216)

Finally the Shah decided to meet the people’s demands as he saw them, and promised to form a national government and take the lesson from the mistakes of the past, and formed the government led by Gholam Reza Azhari, which practically began to undermine the regime of the Shah, Azhari ordered the arrest of the chief of the Secret Security Service of the
Shah “the SAVAK” and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior and thirty other political figures. In January 1979 the Shah dismissed Azhari’s government and nominated Chpour Bakhtiar head a new government. (EsSabki, 1999, p.219).

Week after the government of Bakhtiar, U.S. Secretary of State announced that the Shah will leave Tehran on a brief vacation, without specifying the date of return, and already have left the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Tehran on January 16, 1979, while Chpour Bakhtiar fled later to Paris with the approval of the United States of America, Was the formation of the regency headed by Jalal al-Din Tahirani. Khomeini announced from Paris that the Trusteeship Council is illegitimate and that he is coming to save his people's rights from the oppressors. While the United States, represented by General Hauser has made sure that the Iranian army will not enter the game. Khomeini returned to Iran, the dawn of the first day of February 1979 amid cheers of the masses that “the soul of Hussein is coming back”, “the doors of paradise have been opened again’ and “its time for martyrdom”.  

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2. Chapter Two:

International Political Relations

(In this chapter, we will look at the theory of International Relations in general, and to study the different approaches that explain the behavior of states during the management of its external relations. The aim is to try to understand the political behavior of Iran, at the regional and international arena and what are the influences that make up this behavior)

2.1. General Overview:

In the past two centuries, the world has witnessed a deep change in the nature of relations between communities and nations. Therefore, any study of political relations between countries must be aimed at a thorough analysis, as possible, to the realities of the international situation in its historical context, And that by identifying the forces that control the formation of political trends of States towards each other, and analyze how these forces interact and to identify the effects and reactions they are having on the conditions of the international community.

While study of international relations in its comprehensive sense, there are several factors that should be taken into account, namely:
1. Steady increase in the volume of communication between the States as a result of the technological revolution in communications media, the revolution that removed all forms of isolation imposed by the question of geographical distance or natural barriers or national or ethnic differences.

2. As a result of the communication revolution a sort of overlapping interests between States appeared, so that the increased interdependence between the States in sensitive areas such as national security matters, including agreements for the common defense and economic exchange and also issues of international cooperation in areas of technical, scientific and cultural cooperation.

3. With the development of the concept of human rights and the subsequent development of international legal system, including a wide range of treaties and international conventions and declarations, there is a big question mark on the traditional understanding of the meaning of independence and of the meaning of an independent state. Perhaps what the world has witnessed since the World War and after, has shown an unprecedented development in sense of influencing and being influenced. This is also applicable in the cases of interactions and disturbances within the borders of one state on other states. The concept of
humanitarian intervention and the exercise of this intervention has become a prominent feature in international relations in recent decades.

4. As a result, there is no single state that can live in isolation from the rest of the members of the international community, as well as, there is no longer a state that is able to distance itself from the interactions and events on the international arena, given that this would affect, either directly or indirectly, its national interests, sovereignty, political thinking or culture of its people.

2.2. What is International Relations?

There is no rigid definition of the concept of international relations, but several definitions of the term had been issued from different academic or professional places, however, all definitions have remained close to a large extent. As the following are some of these definitions as quoted came from the source:

**Britannica Concise Encyclopedia:** International relations: Study of the relations of states with each other and with international organizations and certain sub-national entities (e.g., bureaucracies and political parties). It is related to a number of other academic disciplines, including political science, geography, history, economics, law, sociology, psychology, and
philosophy.... The study of international relations has always been heavily influenced by normative considerations, such as the goal of reducing armed conflict and increasing international cooperation. (On definition of international relations according to Oxford Dictionary of Politics, American Heritage Dictionary, No date)

**Oxford Dictionary of Politics:** International relations: The discipline that studies interactions between and among states, and more broadly, the workings of the international system as a whole. It can be conceived of either as a multidisciplinary field, gathering together the international aspects of politics, economics, history, law, and sociology, or as a meta-discipline, focusing on the systemic structures and patterns of interaction of the human species taken as a whole.... When spelled wholly in lower case, the term refers to the totality of interactions within the international system. The emphasis is often on relations between states, though other collective actors such as multinational corporations, transnational interest groups, and international organizations also play an important role. (On definition of international relations according to Oxford Dictionary of Politics, American Heritage Dictionary, No date)

**Colombia Encyclopedia:** International relations, study of the relations among states and other political and economic units in the international
system. Particular areas of study within the field of international relations include diplomacy and diplomatic history, international law, international organizations, international finance and economics, and communications, among others. In addition, increased attention has been paid in recent years to developing a more scientific understanding of the international system as a whole… Two schools of thought quickly developed. One looks to strengthened international law and international organizations to preserve peace; the other emphasizes that nations will always use their power to achieve goals and sees the key to peace in a balance of power competing states. With increased importance attached to a theoretical understanding of the whole international system, there has been a growing use of concepts and modes of analysis developed in the natural sciences in an attempt to improve the verifiability and applicability of theories. (on definition of international relations according to Oxford Dictionary of Politics, American Heritage Dictionary, No date).

As a conclusion of the above definitions, we can conclude that there is no rigid template or a specific definition of international relations in isolation from the study of all the circumstances, as well as the historical context which helped in building the foreign policies of individual states, which make up what we call international relations. Therefore, it is of great
importance to have a brief look at the theory and the different main approaches of international relations.

2.3. Approaches to Study International Relations:

There are two sets of approaches in the interpretation and study of international relations, the first set known as a Traditional Approaches, while the second group known Contemporary Approaches.

Traditional Approaches include the following: the Historical Approach, the Legal Approach, the Approach that provides Platform for realistic analysis in the framework of power politics, the Approach for national interests, and the Ideal Approach.

The set of Contemporary Approaches contains the following: Theories based on the analysis of the international political system and its subsystems, Equilibrium Theories, Foreign Policy Decision-making Theory in, and the Game Theory in international relations analysis. (Hareedi, 2003, p. 13).

It is essentially useful to conduct a little study and research on the contents of these different approaches so that we can understand the basis
and the circumstances that have helped and influenced the formation of Iran's foreign policy in the historical period that preceded and followed the emergence of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

2.3.1. First: The Traditional Approaches:

2.3.1.1. The Historical Approach: It is the most common traditional approaches, and is mainly to give the greatest weight to constitute system of international relations on the basis of the evolution of diplomatic history, considering that contemporary international relations is an extension of the events and historical events and relations of the past. Hatred, conflicts and wars are in the eyes of this approach of the major forces that control the identification of trends in the foreign policy of States. It is known that the course of international relations is the sum of the product of the foreign policies of individual states.

This approach suffers weaknesses, Perhaps abundance of historical events and the complexity and overlap makes it very difficult to differentiate the size of influence of any of these events, and therefore difficult to identify the major forces that contributed to the shaping of international relations at every stage of its development. There is also another weak point is that the events of history have different interpretations that might be unbiased,
in favor of certain hypothesis at the expense of other hypotheses. (Meqled, 2006, p. 15)

2.3.1.2. The Legal Approach:

This approach analyzes international relations from the legal point of view without paying attention to the mechanisms of political, national, propagandas or ideological factors. It is therefore focuses on aspects of international law that bind nations together and regulate their relations.

This approach focuses on the actions and legal instruments that must be established to resolve disputes between States, through the foundation of international institutions and Bodies that organize and pool the efforts of States in the pursuit of international peace and security.

Despite the importance of the legal side, but the influence of forces and mechanisms that guide the movement of international relations has nothing to do with the legal side, more than in terms of organization. What controls these relations in fact is the supreme national interests of States, including aspects of security, strategic, economic and also the ideological side, in some cases. (Meqled, 2006, pp. 17-18).
2.3.1.3. The realist Theory:

This theory is one of the most relevant theories to the international realities. Hans Morgenthalinau, the professor of international relations, is considered as one of the leading proponents. Main tow elements in this theory are the **Idea of Power** and the **Idea of Interests**. Interests, according to Morgenthalinau, are determined by power which is determined by control and influence.

In other words, the political power to which they pertain to this theory of realism is the extent to which the relative influence exercised by States in their mutual relations, and thus can not be synonymous with forms of physical violence and military exercise, but in a broader context than that. It is the final output, at a given moment of time, for a large number of variables tangible and intangible. The interaction that takes place between these variables is the one who determines the degree of power of the state, according to this degree of power, its capabilities for political influence is determined against other states, bilaterally or multilaterally. (Meqled, 2006, p. 19). In practical terms, this theory realism considers the international community as a battlefield in which states conduct international relations in the form of the continuing conflict towards increasing the power of the state, and take advantage of this power and this influence in the manner dictated by its high interests and strategies,
regardless of the negative effects they might having on the interests of other states.

Despite the importance of the interpretation of power in its comprehensive concept of international relations, but this theory has suffered several failures. This theory did not distinguish between the possible conceptual differences in the interpretation of Power, it did not distinguish between Power that comes as an output of political activities and Power that comes as an instrument, and of course each of these interpretations explains a specific concept and arranges for results and highlights facts are different in nature and content of each other. Therefore, without integrating all these concepts in a single, comprehensive one, any in-depth analysis of all the dimensions of this phenomenon appears incomplete.

Realist theory did not provide an adequate and in-depth analysis to the concept of national interest as well, but provided an easy explanation as long as the interest always determined in the framework of power only. According to Stanley Hoffman, has taken Morganthinau conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and disseminated through which his theory, ignoring perhaps unintentionally that this analysis is suitable only in stable conditions where the competing parties are planning to achieve
to achieve limited objectives by using limited means free of any internal pressure may spoil the parties competing plans and moves.

Even if we assume that the form of power struggles which determines the course of international relations, the realist theory overlooked the dynamic nature of this form and constant change in its nature and its expressions. There is also a major contradiction in the theory, that is the permanent desire of States to consolidate the principles of international cooperation, particularly in the presence of international institutions and bodies that are appropriate forums for the exercise of forms of international relations. (Meqled, 2006, p. 22).

2.3.1.4. National Interests Approach:

This approach puts the question of national interests as the main driver of foreign policy of the State, therefore it gives much attention not to resort to fabricate justifications for the actions in purpose to deceive public opinion, whether internal or external. Therefore, handling national interests in this format ensures a kind of continuity and stability of the main determinants of the foreign policy of the state even in the event of a change of political leadership.
The criticism of this approach is the exaggeration in the development of foreign policy goals such a degree of idealism, knowing that the facts of history proved that many foreign policies and vital decisions have been implemented to oppose as required by the national interests of the State, but rather influenced by the character of the political leader or the commander, especially in absence of transparency and the proper system of government within the state. Even though this approach is valid for rare cases have passed or are currently on the international scene, however, limiting it to the factor of national interest likewise the interpretation of Power, make it remains as minor and contrary to the realities which proved that a change of ruling regimes, for example is followed in most cases, by a change in the ideologies and thus a change in foreign policy, tools and objectives. (lerche and Said, 1963, pp. 25-26).

2.3.1.5. Idealism Approach:

Which is similar to the legal approach in that it provides a model of what should be the international system and international relations, using a framework of moral values and ideals that does not reflect the true track by which international relations is conducted in practice.

2.3.2. Second: The Contemporary Approaches:
From the previous presentation, and the practice in international arena, it is clear that there is no single approach alone can explain the phenomena of international relations, which characterized by diversity, complexity and dynamism. As a result of this understanding trends emerged to set up a theory based on a scientific basis for the study of international relations so as to achieve the largest possible linking and integration between the many key factors that affect international politics, amongst, motives of states and also in the trends of leaders responsible for setting foreign policy and its implementation

This trend of the analysis of international relations called the **Behavioral Approach**, which use Social Psychology and Political Psychology and Social Anthropology in order to understand the factors surrounding the change in social compositions change of States and the reflection of this change on its political power, and also in the analysis of surrounding conditions, emotional and cultural factors that control the behavior of groups and nations and to identify trends of political thinking, which in turn determine the forms of its foreign policy formulations. (Meqled, 2006, p.25).

Means used in this analysis are: the study of national character and identity, carrying surveys on public opinion attitudes towards certain
international current and conduct assessment as to monitor the public reaction and expectations, and matching these expectations with the actual output of that crises, and studying the impact of propagandas campaigning on the relations among States.

Contemporary approaches can be detailed in four major approach:

2.3.2.1. **System based on the analysis of the international political system and its sub-components:**

Adapted from a systems theory applied in the social sciences, leading scientists advocates for the application of this approach in the analysis of international relations is Morton Kaplan, who explained this theory in his book "System and Process in International Politics". The main objective, says Kaplan, is to reach the laws and recurring patterns in the work of political systems and identify the sources and manifestations of regularity, as well as to reach general conclusions about the factors of balance and imbalance that govern the evolution of the major international systems and its transition from one form to another. Examples of systems of International Politics are the System of Balance of Power, Bipolar System and The Multiplicity of Decision-Making Centers in International Politics. (Meqled, 2006, p. 26)
2.3.2.2. **Approach that analyzes international relations in the framework of equilibrium theory:**

The meaning of balance according to this approach is not purely static, but is another type of features as the main preacher says George Liska of this approach two main two capacities: it is a realistic equilibrium of the side and the dynamic equilibrium of the other. This equilibrium can be defined as a realistic dynamic state which remains temporary candidate of change and disruption under the influence of certain factors, thus paving the way for the emergence of a realistic balance dynamic new temporary. (Liska, p137-150). State of equilibrium, according to the Liska, exists under the following conditions: **first:** the general acceptance of all States the terms under which this equilibrium is achieved by the International System, **second:** that there is a positive correlation between the influence exercised by the State and the size of its real power, **third:** that States are willing to take their responsibilities and **forth:** compatibility of the functions exercised by this International System with the major needs of the acceding States.

Stanley Hoffman criticized this approach as attempts by some analysts in favor with making an equal evaluation between international relations and other topics such as economics. They may look at the political dealings between nations likewise international trade and look at the
elements of political and national power same as their look to the factors of production, these attempts often end with distorted assumptions that sound inconsistent with the nature of the topic you are trying to analyze and explain. (Hoffman, 1980, pp. 50-52).

2.3.2.3. Decision Making Theory:

One of the most important theories in the study of international political relations, interested in analyzing all the factors and effects that surrounding the drafters of foreign policy when issuing certain important decisions. Pilot of this approach of analysis is Richard Snyder, the American professor of international relations.

Snyder believes that the process of decision-making is of sequential nature that includes a number of parties and units interacting in “Decisional Setting”, This decisional setting contains all units responsible for the external decision-making. Interacting parties and units are affected by certain factors such as: motivation, areas of expertise and competence, dominant communication style and methods of data interpretation….. Etc. But all this does not happen haphazardly and randomly, but it happens in the framework of the considered logical and rational selection of goals and objectives and means and instruments to be used to achieve them. Through the interactions that occur between all the
considerations, foreign policy decisions resulted in its final form. (Golembiewski, p. 341).

This approach did not specify the mutual influence between the key variables during the decision-making process, not enough to identify the variables, but must determine their interactions and their effects. (Hoffman, 1980, pp. 52). As remedial measures, Snyder called for: first: classification of political objectives and the establishment of a series of theoretical hypothesis that link the different procedural models in decision-making and between each of these types of political objectives. Second: classification of decision-making units and create a link between each unit with certain model. Third: set a practical procedure to determine how to analyze the impact of personal characteristics of the drafters of foreign policy decisions on their judgments and estimates. And four: the application of this above mentioned model on a number of cases of decision-making of foreign policy under different circumstances of the impacts of the international arena. (Golembiewski, p. 342).

2.3.2.4. Game Theory Approach:

This approach is considered as one of the most contemporary approaches in the field of theoretical analysis of international relations. This theory is
based on imagination of hypothetical existence of international crises, real or fake, and the distribution of roles among a number of key players, as to analyzing all dimensions of that crisis and to prepare a wide range set of decisions and alternative decisions that could serve to resolve these crises.

After all this quick study of international relations analysis approaches, whether traditional or contemporary, we can conclude that the study of international relations is not easy or simple task, since the international political system components are different from the components of the internal political system in a way that it represents a heterogeneous group of political systems and values, attitudes and ideologies that make the process of change within that system as unpredictable.

In the third chapter of this study, we shall have a deeper look into Iran’s foreign policy, making use of what I had learned from this chapter as a necessary tool to analyze the roots and the dynamics of Iran’s decision making on external level.
3. Chapter Three:

Iran After the Islamic Revolution:

(It may be helpful before going into the details of political life in Iran in terms of foreign policy and the dimensions of these policies and of the potential for expansion and hegemony abroad, it is useful to examine quickly the mechanics of government in Iran, and who makes the decision where and what is the map of the balance of power in this The country which is governed by the theory of absolute rule which, as we say the theory of Vilayat el Faqih. (The Guardianship of the Jurisprudent). This chapter will consist of two parts; the first part shall be on Institutions of decision-making process in the foreign policy of Iran while the second part shall be on Iran’s Foreign Policy, its principles, foundations and objectives, and its different stages of development over the period since 1979).

3.1. Part I:

Institutions of decision-making process in the foreign policy of Iran:
In most countries formulating foreign policy is mainly mandated of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which can utilize other parties, such as centers of research, advisers or some government agencies including the Head of State. Monitoring the implementation of that policy is normally entrusted by the Parliament as a representative of the People. In Iran, the situation is different, as the policy-making is directly under the authority of the Supreme Leader (el Valei el Faqih), and in the executive branch (the President and the government) and legislative power (Parliament and other legislative institutions). The Constitution identified the entities involved in Iranian foreign policy decision-making in, and defined their roles, even if at least theoretically. In the next part of this study will highlight on these entities and their roles:

3.1.1. First: The Supreme Leader (el Valei el Faqih) (The Guardian, the Jurisprudent):
The position of the leader is the most supreme in the hierarchy of power in Iran, and the strongest in the decision-making, which acts on behalf of the Hidden (absent) Imam in the management of affairs of the Muslims. Obedience to the Leader, who has similar capabilities to handle affairs of the administration, care and politics for all Muslims, as those capabilities
owned by the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, is obligatory. (Khomeini, 1996, p. 39)

Ayatollah Yazd said that even if what comes of provisions of the *Wali al-Faqih* seem like a violation to the Sharia (The Islamic Rules), it does not deviate from the norms of this Sharia, but becomes one of its laws and its provisions. (abd El-Momen, 1994, p. 54)

Article V of Iran’s Constitution states the following:

“During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah(The Islamic Nation) devolve upon the just ('adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.”

(Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 5 …)

The most important issue about the leader has been stated in Article 110 of the constitution, and shows the wide range of authority and power he enjoys, which enables him to hold all the keys to governance in Iran, including foreign policy decision, article 110 states the following:
Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:

1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation’s Exigency Council.
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda.
4. Assuming supreme command of the armed forces.
5. Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.
6. Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of:
   1. The fuqaha’ on the Guardian Council.
   2. The supreme judicial authority of the country.
   3. The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
   4. The chief of the joint staff.
   5. The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (The basadran).
   6. The supreme commanders of the armed forces.
7. Resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of their relations.

8. Resolving the problems, which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation's Exigency Council.

9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the Presidency], by the Leadership;

10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution.

11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation [to that effect] from the Head of judicial power. The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 10 …).
In addition to the above mentioned powers and responsibilities, the Supreme Leader has another element that supports his powers, this is the representatives of the Leader, whom he personally appoints or approves. They are stationed in all ministries and government institutions and in all revolutionary bodies, and they are Imams in Friday prayers in the provinces. In fact, they are more influential than the ministers and senior officials of the State. (Buchta, 2000, p. 71).

3.1.2. Entities directly linked to the Supreme Leader:

3.1.2.2. The Nation's Exigency Council: An advisory body to the Supreme Leader, but has importance in the formulation public policies to the regime and give an opinion regarding the differences between the Guardian Council and the Islamic Shura Council (Islamic Consultative Assembly), including differences on overall foreign policies. The Supreme Leader appoints all the members of the Council, temporary or permanent. Recommendations and resolutions taken by the Council must be submitted to the Supreme Leader for approval. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 112 …).
3.1.2.2. Supreme Council For National Security: Article 176 of the Constitution reads as follows: “In order to safeguarding the national interests and preserving the Islamic Revolution, the territorial integrity and national sovereignty, a Supreme Council for National Security presided over by the President shall be constituted to fulfill the following responsibilities:

1. Determining the defense and national security policies within the framework of general policies determined by the Leader.

2. Coordination of activities in the areas relating to politics, intelligence, social, cultural and economic fields in regard to general defense and security policies.

3. Exploitation of materialistic and intellectual resources of the country for facing the internal and external threats.

(Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 176 …).

It is clear the size of power granted by the Constitution to the Supreme Leader both domestically and on foreign policy.
3.1.2. Second: The Executive Authority:

It consists of an elected president and the government includes ministers appointed by the President and being given confidence by the Islamic Consultative Council.

3.1.2.1. The President:

Article 113 of the constitution states that: After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the country. His is the responsibility for implementing the Constitution and acting as the head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with (the office of) the Leadership. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 113 …). (Note the exception, which keeps a window for the Leader to monopolize the power of the President at any point of time, which reflects the actual struggle for power in such authoritarian regime). This understanding ensured in Article 122 which states: The President, within the limits of his powers and duties, which he has by virtue of this Constitution or other laws, is responsible to the people, the Leader and the Islamic Consultative Assembly. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 122 …). Note that the articles in the constitutional that define the mission and functions of the President, 123 125 126, 127 and 128 show that the
functions of President of the Republic in Iran, are merely of executive and administrative nature.

3.1.2.2. The Council of Ministers:

Article 133 of the constitution states that: *Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence.* (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 133 …).

Moreover, Article 134 states that: *The President is the head of the Council of Ministers. He supervises the work of the ministers and takes all necessary measures to coordinate the decisions of the government.* ... *The President is responsible to the Assembly for the actions of the Council of Ministers.* (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 134 …). Articles 138 and 139 explain the procedural executive and administrative nature of the work of the Ministers without any special consideration to the work of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is supposed to be responsible for developing and implementing the foreign policy of his country, which will come on detailed later in this study.

The only meaningful intervention of the President in foreign policy lies in the fact that he enjoys of the power to nominate the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the selection and appointment of Iranian ambassadors abroad, otherwise it remains the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader, whom
the executive authority exists to implement the mandate he derived from God, and from Prophet Muhammad and the Imams after him, and then down to the Hidden Imam.

3.2.3. Third: The Legislative Authority:

Legislative authority in Iran consists of the Islamic Consultative Council and the Guardian Council.

3.2.3.1. The Islamic Consultative Council:

being elected by the people in a direct secret vote the Islamic Consultative Council enjoys wide legislative powers within the Constitution. The Council contributes to the foreign policy through its power to ratify all international treaties and conventions acceded to by Iran. The Council is the body which has the power to take the decision-on any change on the borders of the territory of the state and to obtain or grant loans or call foreign experts. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 181 …). The Council also has the power to give confidence and withheld from the Government or part thereof, and this also gives it some control over the work of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Council
also has the power to monitor the work of the government and is capable to question the President in his capacity as Chairman of this government as well as the any of its ministers. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, articles 188-189 …). (This gives the Council additional influence on the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

3.2.3.2. The Guardian Council:

The role of the Guardian Council, mainly is matching what is ratified by the Islamic Consultative Council with the articles of the Constitution and Islamic law (Sharia), and consists of twelve members, six of them are scholars (Foqha’a) and selected by the Supreme Leader, and six Muslim specialists jurists nominated by the Head of the Judiciary and endorsed by Islamic Consultative Council. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 91 …).

The Article that makes the Guardian Council's mandate has a superior mandate over the Islamic Consultative Council, which is elected by the people, is the Ninety-fourth Article, which states: “All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the
criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed enforceable.”. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 94 …).

Article 93 clearly states that: “The Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence, except for the purpose of approving the credentials of its members and the election of the six jurists on the Guardian Council.”. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 93 …).

Articles 93 and 94 are putting the Islamic Consultative Council practically under the jurisdiction of the Guardian Council, and even foreign policy matters that fall within the mandate of Islamic Consultative Council, as we mentioned earlier, remains subject to the approval and ratification of the Guardian Council.

More than that, The Council of Guardians has the right to reject the candidacy of any person for membership of Islamic Consultative Council and stand for election, and also has the right to withhold voting results for one candidate or more on the grounds of fraud or non-constitutional and illegal voting. In case of escalation of the dispute between Islamic
Consultative Assembly and the Council of Guardians, the dispute shall be resolved by The Nation's Exigency Council, which is usually under the control of Conservatives in Iran, and associated to the Supreme Leader,. The Supreme Leader himself remains enjoying his eternal right to reject any law or refuse to discuss it without giving reasons. (Abd El-Momen, 1996 pp. 50-51).

3.2. Part II:

Iran’s Foreign Policy:

As we have seen, the structure of decision-making on the policy of Iran's foreign policy is distinct from other foreign policies of other countries, as it usually is assumed in all systems of the world or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is addressing the decision-making at the external level, However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iran may not address alone to do such a role as much as address it other institutions. Perhaps the most institutional political change that the Iranian revolution made was at the level of the foreign policy of the state. Take into account the religious nature of the new system and the of ideological origins, and because of the multiplicity of power centers in Iran and the nature of the new political system, several institutions and bodies, has been engaged in political decision-making at the external level. Before getting into the
political decision-making process at the external level, it may be important and necessary to fulfill the purpose of this study to look at the basis and goals of Iran's foreign policy and then access to the institutions in the making of this policy.

In many countries political decision may be derived from the content of the Constitution of those countries, but the situation in Iran is different and perhaps reversed. With the success of the Iranian revolution, the new system has developed firm foundations for the foreign policy of Iran in the Iranian constitution itself. Everyone knows how the stability of the Constitution and the difficulty of change. Therefore, these foundations have become part of the nation's political doctrine, which has unanimously adopted the dominant political elite, particularly in a state where multiple sources of decision-making, the multiple centers of power and where the supreme leader “Vilayat el-Faqih”, (Khomeini putting foundations of the newly emerged Islamic Revolution in his speech 1979 …) as we will discuss later, enjoys absolute authority beyond the level of debate.

Perhaps the item that is no less important than the process of formulating foreign policy is the tools and instruments by which such policy shall be executed. In the next part of this study will address the objectives as well as the basis of Iran's foreign policy as contained in the Iranian
constitution, in chapter X on foreign policy and study its dimensions in terms of the tendency to authoritarianism and expansion in the region and across the world.

3.2.1. Objectives of Iran’s Foreign Policy:

Article 152 of the constitution is read as follows: “The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonies superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Article 152 …).

Based on this article, Iran has given itself the responsibility to defend the rights of all Muslims all over the world, which implies interference in the internal affairs of States, without respect to the territorial sovereignty or its cultural, ethnic or religious composition. Also, the term non-belligerent states is a broad term flexible according to the level of harmony or conflict between the foreign policy of those States and the foreign policy of Iran.
Article 154 elaborates more on that and states that: “The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad'afun against the mustakbirun in every corner of the globe”.

Talking about the establishment of a government of truth and justice in all parts of the world reflects the dimension of the expansionist foreign policy of Iran. Iranians are through this article first appointing themselves as a government of truth and justice, and they are the model that should be followed, and that until that government to be established, Iran held the obligation and gave itself the right to defend those vulnerable “mustad'afun” against what it called what it called the arrogant “mustakbirun”. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, p. 26 …)

Before that, In the Article 2 on general Principles, the Constitution set the principles on which the Republic is based on, and states that:

*The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:*
1. the One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;

2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws;

3. the return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of man's ascent towards God;

4. the justice of God in creation and legislation;

5. continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam;

6. the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with responsibility before God; in which equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and national solidarity are secured by recourse to:

   1. continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha’ possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on the basis off the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Ma’sumun, upon all of whom be peace;

   2. sciences and arts and the most advanced results of human experience, together with the effort to advance them further;

   3. negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction of and the submission to it, and of dominance, both its
imposition and its acceptance. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, article 2 ...).

Here it is once again the tendency to use religion and the Shiite faith as a starting point among the general people, where there is public consensus, in order to establish a system of governance and lay the foundations of the state.

Fifteenth paragraph of Article III of the Constitution, and as the means to fulfill what is provided in the previous Article 2 provides: “the expansion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood and public cooperation among all the people;”. (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, p. 25-27 ...).

Paragraph 16 of the same Article states that:” framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the mustad'afiin of the world.”

Here also allow Iran to take the necessary measures, which inevitably will include intervention in the affairs of States, to support the “oppressed”. Here, it goes beyond the vulnerable Muslims, but included all the oppressed. Also, the concept of expansion of Islamic brotherhood viewed with suspicion in most Muslim countries that follow the Sunni sect,
which sees the principle of obedience to the mandate of the Velayat-e faqih, “clerical rule” the basis of Shiism.

On the other hand, the regulations governing the work of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the fourth paragraph of the Act 1983 requires the Minister to take the necessary measures to assist the vulnerable, especially the Muslims among them, by all means necessary to enable them to defend themselves against the arrogant all over the world, without interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

3.2.2. Foundations and principles of Iran's foreign policy:

The Iranian foreign policy goals and objectives is a natural result of the ideology of the Iranian revolution, which was founded on the principles of Islamic Shiite used Twelver Shiite doctrine to serve its objectives. The following principles of the most important foundations of Iran's foreign policy, namely:

- The principle of Islamic nationalism:

The issue of the unity of the Islamic nation has been figured prominently in the thought of the first leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, and therefore he considered that the
establishment of the revolutionary Islamic state in Iran is the first introduction to this unity. Khomeini, of course, uses religious context to explain that if Muslims around the globe left the controversy and disagreement and to uphold unity under the banner of "No god but God" shall be able to win what he called the enemies of Islam. The most critical point in the thinking of Khomeini's on Islamic unity is that he believed that this unity must be carried out under the mandate of the jurist “Velayat-e faqih”, the most controversial concept in the history of Islam between Sunnis and Shiites, which demonstrates clearly the expansionist ambitions of the ideological revolution of Iran in terms of presenting itself as sole representative of all Muslims despite the fact that Shia constitute a minority in the Islamic societies in general. (about the concept of Islamic unity in the thinking of Khomeini, Alrased Network, no date).

- **The Principle of Neutrality: “No eastern or western”:**

Khomeini's view that Muslims should not be subject not only to powers Eastern and Western, and although he classified the world into arrogant and vulnerable, but it is also classified the arrogant to different levels, referring to the Great Devil, the United States, and to smaller ones.
- **The Principle of Export of the Revolution:**

Exporting the revolution from the standpoint of Iran is to export Iran's enthusiasm for Islam, thus inform the Muslim communities around the world about the principles of the Iranian revolution and thus arise the public awareness in those communities against corrupt regimes toward creating domestic revolutions as a way of establishing the One nation of Islam. Although Khomeini repeated in several occasions the need Export the Revolution not be linked to violence, coercion, domination or interference in the affairs of others, but he called on in the first festivity of the Iranian revolution upon the oppressed peoples to rise up against their governments, he attacked the Muslim countries and considered that Islamic history has been witnessed only two Islamic states, the Islamic Government of Iran and the Caliphate of Ali ibn Abi Talib.

It should be noted that Iran, by endorsement of the principle of exporting the revolution, is working for achieving objectives set out in the Iranian constitution and discussed above in this study, which is defending the rights of all Muslims, and support the struggle of the oppressed against the arrogant anywhere in the world, and obligations of brotherly towards all Muslims and support them wherever they are. But how can this be done while keeping the respect for the principle of
“non-interference in the internal affairs of States”, stipulated in the Iranian constitution?

In this regard, the Bezn Yazdi in his book: *An Introduction to Foreign Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, the Iranian constitution to prevent the regime in Iran from interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, and not in the affairs of other States. Therefore, the interference in the affairs of States in order to rescue the oppressed from authoritarianism their governments is not inconsistent with this principle. (Mattar, 2007, difference between interference in nations’ affairs and states’ affairs ..).

For the importance of the principle of Exporting the Revolution as one of the most important principles and in the same time objectives of Iran's foreign policy, it will later be elaborated in the chapter on the practical application of Iranian foreign policy through its foreign relations with key parties regionally and internationally.

3.2.3. Stages of development of Iranian foreign policy:

It is natural for any revolution, which came mainly to make a radical change in the status quo, it is also natural to make the necessary
evaluation of the situation at every stage, and therefore set up the policies to be followed paying attention to adjust those policies on the necessities of each stage. However, the situation with the Iranian revolution was not that degree of clarity in the ability to change policies as required, as the ideological factor that controls this revolution, in addition to the multiplicity of decision making bodies and entities in Iran, has made the ability to make policy adjustments as required apparently out of reach to a large extent. However, it is necessary to consider the stages of the evolution of the foreign policy of Iran since the revolution, and so far, divided into the following stages:

3.2.3.1. Stage I: Iran, the Revolutionary State, between 1979 and 1988:

The first era of the Iranian revolution was marked by the domination of revolutionary slogans on all other concepts. Although, Iran has raised the slogan of its desire to establish good relations with other countries, but it confirmed in clear terms, in all the speeches and literature, its vision on arrogance and vulnerability, dividing the world into two camps, the arrogant and vulnerable, and thus gave itself the right to support liberation movements in the world. Here came the role of the Revolutionary Guards, which was used as an important tool of Iranian foreign policy tools in that period is clearly over entrust the task of
exporting its Islamic revolution. The Revolutionary Guards are of great significance in the protection of the Iranian revolution, has proved its worth in the protection of Khomeini and his regime in its first beginnings and helped to quickly get rid of the opponents. (Abd El-Momen, 1996, p. 86).

Although the general features of the Iranian regime in that era were revolutionary, but that the principle of “Self Interest”, the principle inherent in the religious Shiite, the source of principles for the Iranian revolution, this principles was still present, and perhaps the clearest evidence of this was during its war with Iraq, when Iran exchanged arms shipments from U.S. for its assistance in the release of Western hostages in Beirut during the Lebanese civil war. (Mattar, 2007, the existence of self-interest principle in Iran’s foreign policy ..). Another clear evidence of that, is the neglect of Iran, in that period, to the principle of loyalty and enmity ‘Al Wala’ Wa Albara’”, which means go closer to the believers the good humans and get away of alienate the infidels, evidence of this was Iran's relations with the Soviet Union after the revolution, and the group of agreements held with, although the Soviet Union was considered from the viewpoint of the believers, and not only Muslims, the State of atheism and disbelief in God, Same argument applied to Iran's relations with Cuba and Nicaragua and all the countries of Eastern Europe at the time. (Mattar, 2007, The concept of Al Wala’ Wa Albara ...).
3.2.3.2. Stage II: Review of foreign policy: 1989 – 1997:

Basically this stage started by the end of the Iran-Iraq war, where Iran found that it is necessary to reconsider the system of its international relations through the amendment of what is necessary in its foreign policy, in the hope of rebuilding what was destroyed by the war, which exceeds its own capabilities. That was the beginning of the stage when Iran's shifted from the Revolution to the State.

The President of the Republic Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani considered that the tensions with other countries hamper the development and transfer of technology to his country, so he felt the need to exert effort in the framework of the three principles of: Dignity, Wisdom and Interest, to build confidence with the world and reduce the confrontation. Rafsanjani reduce the sharpness in the theory of vulnerability, which is the backbone of Iran's foreign policy. Making between the camp of arrogance and vulnerability camp a third camp that allows the transfer of “arrogance” or some of them to that camp, and thus reduce the severity of the contradiction between them and Iran. (Mattar, 2007, President Rafsanjani on third camp between arrogants and vulnerables ...)

In his first term Rafsanjani reduced the work on the external level, and reduced intervention in the affairs of States by reducing the support of Islamic movements and put this support subject to many reviews. Procedure, which is the most important and meaningful is the separation between the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards and the withdrawal of the representative of the Revolutionary Guards, at that time, Mohammad Besharati, and was Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and appointed him minister of the interior, and replaced him by his brother to complete the separation process and reduce the role of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran's embassies and diplomatic missions abroad. This was helped by the presence of Ali Akbar Velayati as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who applied his belief in the Shiites Mu'tazilah thinking who believe that the perpetrator of the great sin (guilt) must be put in between infidelity and faith, and had not declared an infidel, Velyati has applied that to relations of Iran with other States. (Mattar, 2007, Iran avoiding entering hot spots ...).

Aware of his country has ambitions beyond its borders, Velayati, therefore seeks to maintain this ambitions in consistency with world realities, as well as he believed that Iran should not follow its ideology to the extent that causes the system crash, therefore, Iran, under his term in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, avoided access to the hot spots by force, and
coordinated work with other States who also have some interests, even though the United States, just as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq in the war of 1991. (Albayenah Encyclopedia on Shia, Mohammad Es Saeed Abdel Moemen, Jan, 2005, The World Welcoming the project of dialogue among civilizations …).

3.2.3.3. Stage III: Removal of the tension in Iran's foreign policy: 1997-2005:

This stage has labeled the term of the reformist Mohammad Khatami as the President of Iran. Although this stage is considered as an extension of the previous stage in terms of the tendency to reconcile with the world and remove the causes of tension, but its willingness to promote development made it more clear in its terms and constitute a recognition of the need to deeper sustainable relationship with the other States. The project Khatami for dialogue among civilizations came as a reflection to his vision, and constitute a major paradox of the positions of Iran after the revolution. Khatami says, (the meaning of the words should be noted): “The World Welcoming the project of dialogue among civilizations is a great success for the Iranian people. Therefore, as the Iranian ambitions to be achieved in its all aspects, we should make it a cultural and national affair. (Abd El-Momen, 1998, p. 22).
Khatami believed that the sustainability of the Iranian regime depends on preserving the principles of Iran's foreign policy on the one hand, on the other hand the response to the developments through the thought of open-organized cultural revolution, and cooperation between the seminary (The Hawza) and universities, and Khatami re-adhere to three principles, pride, wisdom and interest commensurate with the history of Iran and its civilization, its Geographical location and economic potential. (Abd El-Momen, 1998, pp. 21-22), (Note the emphasis on the history and culture in political thought even the most Iranian leaders and centrist and moderate, which is an indicator of national nostalgia to Iranian history of the great empire in Persia).

A comparison of the texts of the Iranian constitution with the behavior of Iran in the Khatami and immediately preceded, show that the commitment of Iran's foreign policy to these texts was subjected of being transformed by influences of international circumstances, and motivator as internal changes in Iran itself with the assumption of reformists the government and the presidency in Iran. This transformation was not, at any time, at the expense of the values of the Islamic Revolution (in order to maintain the delicate balance between conservatives and reformers to prevent the outbreak of internal affairs at a time where Iran was seeking to succeed at the international level), and also not at the expense of the
national interest of Iran. (And here note the contradiction between the slogans of Islamic brotherhood and to defend the vulnerable, and the nationalism which inevitably contradict the universality of Islam). (Abd El-Momen, 1998, p. 34).

3.2.3.4. Stage IV: Iran once again back to a policy of confrontation:

Analysts consider the term of Mohammad Khatami is the period of opening a window in Iran’s relationship with the rest of the world through a wise foreign policy, but for internal reasons, mainly, because of the nature of the regime in Iran, and the multiplicity of authorities and mechanisms of decision making in this country, and considerations of the internal contradictions between conservatives and reformers, Khatami became a target of many domestic enemies, by the end of the game, Muhammad Khatami and the reformist stream have lost the 2005 elections, putting an end to the climb of the reformists and the conservatives once again led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who returned the Iranian political discourse to the language of confrontation and extremism.

Iranian experts have confirmed for the "Al-Watan" Saudi newspaper that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took the deviant behavior from the
behavior of Rafsanjani, in his relationship with the Arab and Islamic countries, particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council. They argue that Khatami was more open in relation to diplomacy with Iran's neighbors, where Gulf-Iranian relations have seen as a spring season. (No author, 2011, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took the deviant …).

The professor at the University of Tehran Ali Ckshaoorzai that Ahmadinejad's foreign policy, especially in relations with the Gulf had badly damaged the values of the revolution. And compare between the governments that came after the Iranian revolution, which emphasized that President Khatami after he came to power in 1997 Iran began to take the path of the path moderate more than that of Rafsanjani and before, where he expressed his desire to be a practical mounting in the return of Arab-Iranian relations are developed through his visits to All Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, Egypt, Sudan and Algeria. (No author, 2011, Ahmadinejad's foreign policy …). President of the Islamic Culture Center, Tehran, Mohammad Azizi believes that President Ahmadinejad has destroyed the bridges of friendship with the countries of the Cooperation Council established by Khatami. He added that the Iranian interference in the affairs of the Gulf leave fingerprints on the negative Arab-Iranian relations. (No author, 2011, Iranian interference in the affairs …).
It would be important to consider a significant step taken by Ahmadinejad at the beginning of his second presidential term when dismissed his Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, inappropriately, during the latter's visit to Senegal in a mission to deliver a letter from President Ahmadinejad himself to the President of Senegal.

Saleh Muhammad Sedkian Director of the Centre for Arab Iranian Studies in Tehran, Mottaki was of close relationship with of the President of the Islamic Consultative Council, Ali Larijani, who was in conflict with Ahmadinejad on many files, and this dismissal of Mottaki probably came as a result to political struggle for power within the Conservatives camp (Mottaki was of close..., Yemen Media Center, 2010).

In Tehran, they believe that these developments are only part of the appeared difference between Ahmadinejad and Mottaki, however, that what was hiding under the umbrella of this controversy, is that Muttaki, the close man to President of the Islamic Consultative Council (parliament) Ali Larijani, the Iranian president's rival. In their view, the dismissal Mottaki eliminate the last strongholds of Larijani in the government, after it was much clear the competition between Ahmadinejad and Larijani, since the exclusion of the latter from his post as secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security in 2007, and
the appointment of Saeed Jalili, a close associate of Ahmadinejad in his place. (No author, 2010, In Tehran, they believe that these developments …).

The government has sought to focus the talks with the six countries (USA, Great Britain, France, Russian Federation, China and Germany) on Iranian nuclear file, exclusively in the hands of the Supreme Council for National Security and Jalili, and excluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that Ahmadinejad dismiss the representative of the Ministry in the negotiations, in contrary to the past experience. (No author, 2010, The government has sought to focus the talks …)

It is clear from the above mentioned in this part of the study that there is in Iran, a unique state of autocratic rule, there are organized structure of institutions, the Constitution have, more or less, a clear-cut boundaries among those institutions, but in the end there is a single ruler of the country, is the Supreme Leader, el Valey el faqih, whose resolutions and ordinances must not be opposed, because such opposition is violation of to the provisions of Islam. It is clear that the trend of foreign policy in Iran, drawn by the commander and those associated with it, and that follow conservatives. Any observer of the evolution of the foreign policy of Iran can notice that the Supreme Leader sometimes resort to balance
between the different bodies involved in decision-making in Iran, in order to avoid deepening the divisions between reformists and conservatives.

A major blow to the relationship between the President and the Supreme Leader Khamenei is taking place in Iran these days. As this relationship is in its most difficult shape after President Ahmadinejad's dismissal of intelligence minister in his government. Unfortunately, the Supreme Leader refused to ratify this decision, while Ahmadinejad didn’t comply to the opinion of the Supreme Leader and insisted on the dismissal of the Minister of Intelligence. since April 22, Ahmadinejad has declined to public appearance the day after the dispute with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Moslehi close to Khamenei and the conservative wing radical in the regime, has already dismissed one of his deputies close to the presidency. (A major blow to the relationship between the President and the Supreme Leader Khamenei …, Eilaf Electronic magazine, May, 6, 2011).

These conflicts that sometimes appears on the surface showing crisis of relationship between the institutions of government in Iran, which is reflected in its foreign policy priorities proving the essentiality of the impact of the personal factor of the Leader (el- Valiey al-Faqih) in determining these policies.
4. Chapter Four: Iran’s Foreign Relations:

(This chapter is the most practical part that touches reality. After studying the historical background in the first chapter, then the theoretical framework of international relations in the second chapter, and the foreign policy of Iran in the third chapter, we come in this chapter to study the application of foreign policy through Iran’s foreign relations with countries of the Arab Mashreq and Arab Gulf states, in order to examine the Iranian expansion behavior at the expense of those countries through interference in its internal affairs by various means).

The international relations of a State is usually known as a process of putting foreign policy into practice, as foreign policy, according to "Marcel Merle, is: "that part of government activity directed towards the outside” (Yahya Bou-Zeidi – 2008, that part of government activity…), ad as we all know that foreign policy is to be carried out through foreign or external relations, in order to accomplish its goals and objectives using tools
owned by this State, whether these tools economic, military, ideological, human or otherwise.

In this context, Iran is characterized by some of the comparative advantages compared with most Third World countries which Iran is seeking to interfere in its affairs and to achieve a breakthrough in their communities. There is no doubt that Iran has a substantial financial capacity coming from its huge oil reserve, which makes it able to provide financial support to countries, parties and Islamic movements whom, with no doubt, need such support. But the most important factor, which characterizing Iran is the spiritual impact, as after the success of the 1979 revolution, Iran began introducing itself as the leader of the Muslim world, particularly the Shiites all over the world, in the same time the Shiites themselves, in general, began look at the Imam Khomeini's triumph over the Shah's regime as a Savior to them. Still, the religious factor remains the soft power of Iran in its foreign relationships, Said Hamid Reza Dehghani, director of the Centre for Persian Gulf and Middle East Studies at the Iran’s Foreign Ministry's think tank, commenting on the removal of Saddam Hussein by the United States. (Porter, 2008, the religious factor remains… ).
A paper on the "Shia Factor" in Iran's regional policy, published in November, 2008 by the Centre for Strategic Research, a think tank that serves Iran's Expediency Council, acknowledges that Iran is now cultivating Shia allies, especially in Iraq and Lebanon, in pursuit of its national security objectives in the region. The author, Dr. Kayhan Barzegar, an international relations specialist at Islamic Azad University in Tehran, argues that Iran's close relations with the Shi'a in the region are aimed at "building a strategic linkage for establishing security..." (Porter, 2008, Iran's close relations with the Shia ...).

Although they are a minority of some 150 million in a region of almost 400 million and the larger Islamic community of 1.3 billion, the Shia dominate the region to the east of the Suez Canal. They are a strong majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Yemen, and Bahrain. The Shia now form the largest single Islamic community in Lebanon and cluster along the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia. There are substantial Shia minorities in Kuwait (35 percent), Qatar (15-20 percent), the United Arab Emirates (six percent), Pakistan (15 percent), and Afghanistan (15 percent). Since the Alawites, who provide the current ruling dynasty of Syria, are an offshoot of the Shia sect, (walker, 2006, ethnic composition of Syrian People...).
As an instrument of foreign policy, it seems that Iran adopt a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, it seems so similar to Israel's policy in this regard, Iran seems determined to produce fuel cores, but only that its nuclear programs are entirely peaceful, then return to instigate procedural problems with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the inspection of its nuclear facilities. Perhaps this policy of ambiguity can give Iran the necessary deterrent power during the management of its external relations, both in the region or in the world.

In the following part of this study will focus light on the practice of Iran’s foreign policy with special attention to the most important themes of Iran’s relations with the Arab Mashreq and the Gulf, particularly Iran's foreign relations with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian issue, in addition to the Arab Gulf States.

4.1. Iran and the Iraqi affairs:

Iraq is the country of most special nature in its relations with Iran for a variety of reasons, including:

1. Iraq is the closest country to Iran and considered as its gate to the Middle East, therefore any actual penetration of Iran must need Iraq as a corridor that secure contiguity between Iran and the Gulf states as well as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Iraq is a country with a composition of the population constitute
the vast majority for4 the Shiite community, knowing that Iraq is
the country in which the Shiite sect was founded, and the most
shrines sacred to Shiites are located there, whether the tomb of
Imam Hussein and Karbala and Najaf. This keeps the eyes of the
Iranian regime on Iraq, as a potential field for intervention.

3. With a Shiite majority in Iraq, governed by the Sunni minority,
together with the negative attitude taken by Iraq after the Islamic
revolution in Iran, making Iran to adopt as part of their strategies to
get rid of the Iraqi regime and work for empowerment of the Shiite
majority of governing the country.

Before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, after a year
and a half of the success of the revolution in Iran, the Shiite opposition in
Iraq represented an element of tension between Iraq and Iran. The leaders
of the Iranian revolution has announced the explicit support of the Shiite
Islamist movement in Iraq, the opposition, which the Iraqi regime was
engaged in a hidden war that arise sometimes and at other times subside.
Former Iranian President Ali Khamenei, (the present Supreme Leader, el
Valey e Faqih,), and two years after the start of the Iran-Iraq war,
stressed the essential need to export the Iranian model to Iraq. (Ibrahim,
A more concrete understanding was expressed by the Iranian officials states that:

The future government in Iraq must be an Islamic Shiite government, and the principle of clerical rule (*Velayat e Faqih*) will be the principle for the future of Iraq. The Leader of the Islamic nation is the Imam Khomeini, there is no difference between the two peoples of Iran and Iraq to accept the Imam as their Leader and follow his commands, governments and states are bounded by international borders, but the Imam is not limited by any frontiers. (Ibrahim, 1996, p. 409).

Without going into much details, it appears, in practice, that Iran has succeeded in making a transformation in the behavior of Shiites in Iraq, and perhaps who study the ideology and practice of the tow leading Shiite factions in Iraq, the Dawa Party and the Organization of the Islamic Action, can see signals and impacts of this transformation during and after the Iranian revolution.

For example, the Dawa Party, has been far from armed action against the government and the Baath Party in Iraq until the fall of 1979, the year of the success of the Iranian Revolution, and began its armed operations inside by establishing an armed organization under the name of “The
Forces of the Martyr al-Sadr”, after the execution, by the Iraqi government, of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, leader of the Party. (Ibrahim, 1996, p. 411). Iraqi government response to the operations of the Dawa Party was politically stated in a speech of President of Iraq, at that time, of Saddam Hussein, who said: "The conspiracy against Iraq is becoming much ferocity of violence and terrorism, carried out by Iranian agents entered Iraq with the help the Iranian authorities, by Iranian support to the Iranian citizens residing in the Iraq and persons of Iranian origin. (The conspiracy against Iraq is becoming…).

Organization of the Islamic Action in its part fully agreed on the principle of clerical rule (Velayat e faqih) and the Iranian policy (Ibrahim, 1996, p. 416), which means putting itself in direct contradiction with the Iraqi Government itself, and arise the principle of loyalty.

Iraqi Shiite Dawa Party and the Organization of the Islamic Action, were not the only in the partisan arena, but Iran sought to establish other Shiite groups seeking to find a better alternatives in Iraq (As Dawa Party became the, for example, away to a large extent on the vision of Iran's on the question of Iraq, which led eventually to leave most of the party leaders of Iran, and later split the party in 1988 to two (Ibrahim, 1996, p. 428)). Thus, creating a movement of Mujahedeen Scholars (el Ulama al
Mujahedeen), led by Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim, whom Iran succeeded to make the leader of the Shiite opposition in Iraq. And also founded the Soldiers of God (Jund Allah) and allowed them presence on Iranian territory (Ibrahim, 1996, pp. 416-417).

With the achievement of some successes in the war with Iraq, Iran has become more convinced by imminent fall of the Iraqi regime, so started preparing the ground in Iraq to face all the possibilities, including the establishment of a loyal government. Therefore, Iran helped the formation the “Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution” in Iraq to include most of the Shiite opposition groups. The declaration statement of the Council was issued in November 17, 1982. (Ibrahim, 1996, p. 417).

The most explicit in the expression of the expansionist ambitions of Iran to dominate Iraq was in the calls of many of the leaders of Iraq's Shiite opposition for a future integration of Iran and Iraq in one Shiite state. These the remarks have emerged during the years of the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 (el Sheikh, 1998, p. 25).

Leaving the era of Iran-Iraq war and until the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, accompanied by an Arab great anti-Saddam trend comparing with the ultimate Arab support given to Saddam Hussein during the war with Iran,
remains the most notable development is the shift that took place in Iraq after the Gulf War and U.S. occupation of Iraq, the emergence of Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated regime. Hamid Reza Dehghani, director of the Centre for Persian Gulf and Middle East Studies at the foreign ministry's think tank, left no doubt in an interview that the transformation of Iraq from mortal enemy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to a friendly state represents an epochal shift in Iran's security position in the region. (Porter, 2008, said Dehghani, "mostly from the Ottoman empire…). "For the past 400 years, we've had problems with our western neighbors," said Dehghani, "mostly from the Ottoman empire and from the Iraqi regime after independence." The climax of that historical security problem was the eight-year war against Iran launched by Saddam Hussein's regime in 1980. (Porter, 2008, For the past…). Ali Akbar Rezaei, the foreign ministry's top official said: “We have natural influence in the region” (Porter, 2008, Ali Akbar Rezaei, the …).

Iran Strengthened its relationship with Iraq, in light of the new government dominated by Shiite representation, in September of the year following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime the Iran-Iraq diplomatic relations resumed, and jumped to an advanced level under the government of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Where the government issued an order to pardon the Iranian detainees in Iraqi prisons as a signal to welcome the
visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi to Baghdad. (Mohammad Abdelati, Feb, 14, 2007, Iranian Arab Relations Between Two eras).

The line graph of relations between Iran-Iraq continued on the rise even after the departure of al-Jaafari government for Nuri al-Maliki as prime minister, who initiated to visit Iran, and was received by Iran's new President Ahmadinejad. During that visit, Ahmadinejad announced Iran linked its security to the security of Iraq, saying that his country is ready to bring full security in Iraq, because Iraq's security is Iran's security. (Mohammad Abdelati, Feb, 14, 2007, Iranian Arab Relations Between Two eras).

Perhaps such clear statement of the Iranian president on a sensitive topic such as the issue of security makes the tendency of the Iranian domination on Iraq seemed to be more outspoken and the Iranians became of more ability and willingness to bluntly express it in clear terms, in what appears like a game run by Iran's leaders to compete for influence in Iraq and the region with the West and particularly with the United States. What supports this assumption is the set security and defense agreements reached between Iran and the governments headed by the Shiites in Iraq. July, 2005 a remarkable event for bilateral relations between the two countries when an Iraqi delegation headed by Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi, visited Tehran, the delegation apologized
to the Iranian government and people for what he described as crimes of Saddam against Iran. The outcome of the visit was the signing of an agreement for military cooperation in the fields of defense and combating terrorism. (Iraq Culture Network. July 6, 2005 - Jaafari in Tehran with delegation of ten ministers). Also during the visit by Ibrahim al-Jaafari to Tehran, the most prominent results of that visit was the signing of a joint security cooperation agreement under which countries to form joint committees to coordinate security and border control and to assist in the rehabilitation of the Iraqi army. (Abd-el Ati, 2007, during the visit by Ibrahim al-Jaafari to Tehran) (Perhaps the question which needs to be answered, how can a country like Iraq that was, at that time under full U.S. control, be able to hold a security and defense agreements with the country that was apparently in a state of hostility with United States of America? Wasn’t that an indication on the coordination, division of labor or at least an American turned blind eye to a growing role for Iran in Iraq?).

With America's involvement in Iraq beginning to wind down, many Westerners share the concern of Arab leaders that the big winner will be Iran. Maliki's domestic opponents, the Sunni hardliners especially, already complain that his Shia-led administration is a proxy for its coreligionists in Tehran--that "an Iranian government" controls Iraq. And the fact is that the Iranians now exert more influence inside Iraq than they
have for centuries. The leverage takes many forms: not only cross-border trade and direct lobbying by envoys in Baghdad, but also covert links to Shia militants and assassination teams. (Kaplow and Ali, 2009, The leverage takes many forms…)

Almost every Iraqi Shi’a faction has received Iranian money, support, arms or Pasdaran training at some stage, most notably through the powerful Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri). The spiritual leader of Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani, is Iranian born and still speaks Arabic with a heavy Persian accent, and Iran is counting on the loyalty of its co-religionists in the region, particularly in Iraq. (Darwish, 2007, Almost every Iraqi Shi’a faction has received Iranian money…)

Note that the Iran-Iraq relations have seen a lot of tension under the government of Iyad Allawi as a result of the latter accusing Iran of interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq, came up to Jaafari’s government to restore the warmth of those relationships. (Abd-el Ati, 2007, Iran-Iraq relations have seen a lot of tension under the government of Iyad Allawi). (Note that the deterioration of relations between Iran and the Iraqi temporary came under the government of Allawi, who follows the Sunni sect, and this shows Iran’s strategy to penetrate in other countries’ affairs through the Shiite sect followers).
4.2. Iran-Syrian relationships and the interference in Lebanese and Palestinian affairs:

Iranian-Syrian relations are relations of the most experienced Middle East stable. Perhaps the most important reason behind this is the common interests of the two countries in the turbulent Iraq, the vital role of the Shiites in Lebanon and perhaps mutual interest between the two countries and their interest together in Lebanon goes back to the time of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and perhaps the relations between Iran and the Shia Lebanese through social ties with the Lebanese population resident of area of Jabal Amel (The historic homeland of the Lebanese Shia). (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, pp9-10).

The most recent disputes between Syria and Iran goes back to the fifties and sixties of the last century due to concerns of the imperial Iran's of the nature of radical Arab Nationalism, and its potential impact on the stability of the region in general and of Arab areas inside Iranian territory in particular. The prevailing views of the regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, at that time, were that Iran is only an element in a Western strategic plan, includes Israel, aims to contain and defeat the Arab Unity. (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, p.10).
There was a mutual need between the Syrian Alawites sect, that led the Baath Party to power in Syria in 1963 and the Shiites of Lebanon. On one hand, the Alawites were in a bad need for the recognition of them as part of the Shia Twelver, and on the other hand, the Shiites of Lebanon were also in a bad need but for an external ally to support them to make the needed balance in the Lebanese arena. This mutual needs has led to the Fatwa (Religious binding opinion) of Imam Musa Sadr, in September 1973, (who was then leader of the Shiites of Lebanon and a personal friend to the Syrian President Hafez Al Assad), that the upper part of the Shiite sect. (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, p.13).

Perhaps the success of the Iranian revolution came at a time best suited to Syria which was in need to get out of isolation after being left alone as the spearhead in the face of Israel after Egypt came out from the battlefield with Israel after signing the Camp David Accords. For its part, Iran was in need of new allies through them can create a new alliance after the success of the revolution which opened the door to the possibility that Iran play a new role in the region in order to create a new regional order as Iran in its center (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, pp.21-22).

It remains the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the biggest opportunity available to Iran's involvement in the affairs of Lebanon and the region,
For the first time available to Iran the opportunity to contribute directly to the war effort against Israel, sending Iran a unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (basdaran) of approximately thousand fighters, Syria has allowed their entry through its territory to settle in Shiite city of Baalbek, located in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley. (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, p.31).

From the viewpoint of Iran, its new presence in Lebanon gives the opportunity to stay in contact with the largest Shiite community outside Iran and Iraq, which will be giving Iran the opportunity of playing leading role in the affairs of this community, and a base to extend its influence into the heart of Arab-Israeli conflict in light of great debate, in Iran, about methods of exporting the revolution. However, the first Iranian presence in Lebanon has received full support from the most radical wing in Iran represented by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador to Syria at that time, who was responsible for the Lebanon’s affairs as well. (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, p.32).

The recent Iranian interference in Lebanese affairs, based mainly on the relations between Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (The Party for God) which was founded in 1982 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Since
then, Hezbollah enjoyed the full support of Iran, the party leaders are students of the Iranian school of religious thinking and practice. Khomeini’s ideas inspired a generation of young Lebanese Shiite clerical students in the 1970s who became the leaders of Hezbollah. Naeem Qassem, Deputy Chief of Hezbullah said in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor: “*We believe in the leadership of the [supreme leader].*. "*This is a religious issue as far as we are concerned. All those who want to be part of Hezbollah have to commit themselves to its [doctrinal] code, and Vilayet al-faqih is part of this.*" (Interview with Hezbollah deputy chief on leadership in Shia …, Blanford, Christian science Monitor, 2009).

Hezbollah is the only organization outside of Iran that adopting the Iranian theory of governance in full. Party leaders used to seek advice and opinion of the Supreme Leader in necessary cases. For example, in 1992, and after the end of the civil war in Lebanon, a heated debate erupted inside Hezbollah over whether to submit candidates for the 1992 parliamentary elections or to maintain its ideological rejection of Lebanon's sectarian political system. Unable to reach internal consensus, Hezbollah sought Khameini’s advice and he decreed integration into Lebanese (On Shia involvement in Lebanese affairs …, Blanford, Christian science Monitor, 2009).

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Hezbollah receives substantial funding from Iranian religious endowments, known as Bonyads, which are controlled by Khamenei, according to Amal Saad Ghorayeb, a Lebanese expert on Hezbollah and author of a book on Iran's relations with Syria, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Hamas movement. Hezbollah refuses to discuss the amount of funding it receives from Iran, although it is thought to amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. (Hezbollah receiving funds from Iran…, Blanford, Christian science Monitor, 2009)

The Relations of Hezbollah with the State:

over the past years, Hezbollah was able to establish a wide range of institutions for social services, economic, education and media, which made the party appears more like a state within a state. The services that the party was presenting to the public and especially in southern Lebanon, helped increase its popularity, since the party was, and still active in the administration of schools and charities dealing with the wounded and the families of the martyrs, and these institutions, for example:

- Foundation (Jihad for Construction) which was founded in 1988 and includes many of the engineers, technicians and workers and
specializes in the drilling of wells and preparation of training courses in the field of agriculture and veterinary medicine are interested in now is especially reconstructing what was destroyed by the Israeli aggression on Lebanon in July 2006 has made much progress in that. (Wikipedia, No date, Jihad Foundation for Construction…).

- Organization (Islamic Health) and has several branches amounted to 47 branches spread in the Bekaa and the south as well as Beirut. (Wikipedia, No date, Islamic Health Organization…).

- Association (Good Loan) was founded in 1982 to provide non-riba (zero interest) loans to the needy. (Wikipedia, No date Good loan Association…).

- Association (Islamic Charity for Supply) was founded in 1987 and is working to help families become self-sufficient, and care for orphans, the disabled and widows. (Wikipedia, No date, Islamic Charity for Supply…).

- Foundation of Ash-Shaheed (The Martyr) and its mission is education and educational activities in the families of the martyrs. (Wikipedia, No date, Martyr Foundation…).

- Foundation for Islamic Education, established in 1993 and interested in building schools in all Lebanese regions and paying
special attention to make priority of enrolment in those schools for the children of martyrs. (Wikipedia, No date, Islamic Education…).

- Commission (the Islamic Resistance Support), which raises funds and hold seminars and exhibitions to establish greater awareness of the importance of the resistance. (Wikipedia, No date, Foundation for Resistance Support…).

- The party has its own institutions for sports, culture and information centers such as Imam Khomeini Center, A Ahd Newspaper (the promise), al Nour Radio station and Al Manar television station. (Wikipedia, No date, other Hezbollah supportive organizations…).

For example, between 1982 and 1986 and the Martyr's Foundation distributed approximately $ 90 million of Iranian aid to families of martyrs and wounded. In the period 1985-1987 alone, Hezbollah announced the establishment of two big hospitals, sixteen specialized health centers, three pharmacies and six centers of civil defense in the areas of the Bekaa and the southern suburbs of Beirut of Shiite majority. In 1989 alone 700 000 persons were received in one hospital for women and children. (Agha and Khaldi, 1995, p.44).
Therefore, the number of institutions that are owned and operated by Hezbollah and the diversity and magnitude of the projects, which necessarily a strong financing body to stand behind, which strengthens the assumption about the massive funding from Iran to Hezbollah, the fund that the party used to assemble supporters and to deeply penetrate and become of more influence on grass-rooted level in the Lebanese scene, particularly within the Shiite community. But Iranian officials have different opinion on this subject.

An adviser to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who agreed to be interviewed on the condition that he is not be identified, observes that the conventional Western portrayal of Hezbollah as an instrument of Iranian power misses the role of shared Shia spirituality in the Iran-Hezbollah nexus. "Hezbollah is not just a group of Western-style commandos," he said. (Gareth Porter, 2008, Iran Hezbollah relations).

Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has been able to mobilize the support of Lebanese Shia population, according to the adviser, because he possesses the two main sources of power in Shia communities: spiritual and Islamic legal power. (Gareth Porter, 2008, Hezbollah gains spiritual and Islamic legal power).
the position of supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas movement took an important part of the debate during the campaign of the presidential elections in Iran in 2009.

Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the candidate - according to what the Iranian political analyst, Ali Montazeri - criticized Iran's foreign policy, and called for addressing the priorities of the country before addressing the management of the world. Mousavi reiterated slogan that raised a lot of debate in Iran when he emphasized that "We must not be talking about the dignity of Lebanon and Palestine, and ignoring the dignity of Iran", in reference to his views that meeting the needs of the Iranian people must be a priority ahead of meeting the needs of other parties abroad. Mousavi added that any contribution to the management of the world must come after building a strong economy and address the daily problems of the Iranian citizen. (Es Smadi, 2009, electoral debate on Iran’s foreign support).

On the other hand, Mehdi Bakhtiar, politician attached to Amadi-Najjad, attacked Mousavi’s comments on Palestine, said that Mousavi knew since he was prime minister, "the position of Imam Khomeini in this regard and that the struggle of the Palestinians can not be considered as an external subject".
He added that Mousavi’s "claims to always walk on the line of the late Imam, " However, "what is offered for Palestine and Lebanon does not hinder the construction of Iran, " and pointed out that the Iranian support for Lebanese and Palestinian resistance is "moral support rather than material, " stressing that the support of the resistance "is in the heart of Iran's interest and strengthen its regional and international position”. (Es Smadi, 2009, Foreign support strengthen Iran’s position).

The best evidence of this is the increase of Hamas financial capacity, the Sunni movement (Although part of this money is not of Iranian origin), has enabled the establishment of an infrastructure of social, educational and relief institutions, enabling the movement of gain supporters for its policies, and when the confrontations between the movement and the Palestinian Authority erupted, Hamas has took control, by armed force, to the entire Gaza Strip. The movement and remained on the excellent relationship with Iran.

On his part, Hezbollah used Iranian support, as we said, to set up its infrastructure, which escalate the growth of its strength at the social, military, creating an imbalance of power in Lebanon, the country of a sensitive population structure and of a political system, where power is
shared between the different sects. Perhaps the military confrontation witnessed in Beirut between the seventh and the ninth of May 2009 has proved, without any doubt, the use of Hezbollah to its military power to impose its political will on the Lebanese parties, and consequently on regional and international key players, despite the opposition, which extended to Hezbollah's attack on Beirut on the Arab and international levels with the exception of Syria And Iran. (Pro-Government Condemns Hezbollah Cope in Lebanon, (BBCARABIC, 2008)…).

Perhaps these observations are signs to the way how Iran is looking for influence in the region, using its support to the resistance movements to achieve that. It’s the most clear model ever, where the concept of Exporting the Revolution with its two dimensions of social (grass-rooted) and military is practiced. Perhaps the growth of military capabilities of both Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas movement has reshaped political maps at the domestic level in both countries.

4.3. Iran and the Shia in the Arab Gulf States:
The 1980s has witnessed very poor relations of Iran with the Arab Gulf States. As Iran achieved some victory in 1982, those States placed their full support behind Iraq. Iran also sought deliberately to destabilize Gulf monarchies through support of Shia groups, particularly in Bahrain and
Saudi Arabia. Radical activists also regularly sought to disturb the annual Hajj in Mecca, which has dramatically resulted in the seizure of the Great Mosque in 1979. (Dannreuther, 2003, p.32, Iran continues to express their ambitions in the Persian Gulf).

Since early twentieth century Iran continues to express their ambitions in the Persian Gulf, as we mentioned in the first part of this study, Iranian politicians have played on the ethnic factor in the marginalization of non-Persians. The most severe expressions about Iran's ambitions emerged in the Middle forties of the twentieth century. As stated in a statement by the Prime Minister of Iran (Haji Mirza Agaji) in 1944 that "the Persian Gulf from the beginning of the Shatt al-Arab to the Masqat of all islands and ports without exception belong to Iran". (Al-Kash, 2011, the Persian Gulf without exception belong to Iran). Iranian Foreign Minister called on the United States in 1945 to stop the oil exploration in Bahrain because his country has rights there. (Al-Kash, 2011, stop the oil exploration).

Khomeini said ": The Arabs ruled the Muslims as well as Turks and Kurds, why not ruled by the Persians are deeper chronology and civilization? (Al-Kash, 2011, Arabs ruled the Muslims as...). Ali Larijani, seerga narI" :dias ytiruceS lanoitaN rof licnuoC emerpuS eht fo yraterceS gnibane rof nruter ni dna ,emmargorp tnemhcie rnuinaru sti dnepsus ot


In 2004, Iran's deputy oil minister accused Qatar of producing more than "her right share" from a natural gas field shared with Iran. Three years later, Hossein Shariatmadari, head of the government's flagship publication Kayhan Daily and an appointee of Iranian supreme leader 'Ali Khamenei, wrote that Bahrain was more a province of Iran than an independent country. The theme has persisted in Iranian discourse. Just this past February, for example, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, the influential former speaker of the Iranian parliament, repeated Iran's claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. (Knapp, 2010, p.49-59, an appointee of Iranian supreme leader 'Ali Khamenei, wrote that Bahrain…).

Iran often underestimates such statements, and tends to keep the bridges of trust between them and the Gulf states, particularly Qatar, Oman and Kuwait, especially after the changes that have occurred in the region following the second Gulf War in 2003. However, the Gulf-Iranian relations remained experiencing fluctuations according to the nature of the wing, who are in power in Iran. While the these relations experienced…
some calm and stability under Mohammad Khatami and, to a lesser extent under Rafsanjani, but it returned once again to tension since the conservative wing, led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005.

**Points of controversial nature between Iran and the Arab Gulf States:**

1. The second issue in dispute between Iran and the GCC countries is the issue of Gulf security. As soon as the Damascus Declaration in March 1991 on the issue of security of the Gulf was issued, Iran has strongly
rejected this declaration on the basis of the existence of two from outside the Gulf region, Syria and Egypt. In the same context, Iran has rejected all security agreements held by the Gulf States with international powers, especially with the United States of America. Still, the Gulf States, together or individually, perceived that the legacy of Iranian ambitions to attain regional hegemony, alongside the presence of substantial Shiite communities in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, has tied the external threat posed by Iran to issues of internal security within the GCC. (Ulrichsen, 2009, Iran has rejected all security agreements held by the Gulf states with international powers…).

3. **The third issue of dispute** is the subject of the development of military capabilities of Iran (Especially ballistic missiles and nuclear program), a point that is largely tied to the previous point. Although Iran asserted that it is not aimed against the Gulf States, but the apparent imbalance of power between Iran and the Gulf states makes their concerns reasonable and justified. Perhaps the Iranian threat in early 2002 to hit oil wells in the Gulf if the United States wages to target Iran in the context of its war against terrorism, constitutes an example of possible Iranian behavior in the case of Iran came under military threat, and illustrates the dominant mentality of the ruling elite in Iran. (Awad, 2003, the subject of the development of military capabilities of Iran…).
4. **The fourth issue in dispute** is the question of Iranian interference in the affairs of the Gulf States, Bahrain, for example, have criticized Iran's support for the violence that erupted in the country in 1994. Council of Ministers, in a statement issued on June 3, 1996, officially accused Iran of supporting a terrorist plan aimed to carry out a coup in Bahrain. Resulting in the withdrawal of Ambassador of Bahrain from Tehran and reduction of diplomatic representation to the level of charge d'affaires. (Othman, 2002, p.92).

Perhaps the recent crisis in Bahrain shows, to a large extent, Iran's ambitions to interfere in matters of the Arab Gulf States.

Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said that the presence of Saudi forces in Bahrain, will lead to the destabilization of security and stability in the region. He denounced at the end of a cabinet meeting on Tuesday, March 29, 2011, Saudi security forces intervene in the internal affairs of Bahrain and said: "States must preserve the lives and money and the independence of its people not to invite other nations to suppress and kill its people. He added: such actions will lead to increased tension and instability and
insecurity in the region and would damage the interests of the peoples of the region. (States must preserve the lives…, Al-Aalam TV Station, 2011).

In his speech on Saturday, April 24, 2011, Ayatollah Khamenei Commenting on the events of Bahrain and the rest of the area, saying: that the Islamic Republic of Iran, and contrary to the desire of arrogant power, is not in a position just to watch over the developments in the region, and the people and the government and political elites in Iran will not remain a bystander about the injustice exercised by the Arrogant powers. “People's anger may explode again at the time the government can not do anything about it.” (Ayatollah Khamenei Commenting on the events of Bahrain…, Islamic Revolution website, 2011).

On Monday 04/04/2011 The Chairman of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy in the Iranian parliament Alaeddin Boroujerdi, said his country "recommends taking decisions based on current realities in the region.". Boroujerdi made the remarks in response to the statement of the extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers of the GCC countries, which they held in Riyadh one day before that statement. The new Boroujerdi was quoted by the Iranian news agency support for the statement issued by the commission, headed by Parliament on developments in Bahrain, said: "We issued the statement
because Bahrain is an independent country and a member of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.” He added, "To see countries deploying its troops to repress its people by the heavy weapons that will be unacceptable not only by Iran but throughout the world based on human rights and international norms. He concluded his remarks by saying Boroujerdi: "Gulf Cooperation Council will recall that when Saddam's forces occupied Kuwait, all of these countries was concerned, although backed by the Islamic Republic, regardless of those countries to help Iraq in the war with us, estimated at tens of billions of dollars. (Iran affirms positions despite Arabs condemnations, Alwatan, 2011)…) He added: "We hope that members of the Cooperation Council to adopt a realistic view of the decision-making and the statement of their views."

The foreign ministers of the GCC countries have condemned, at the Riyadh meeting, the Iranian interference in the affairs of the Gulf States and demanded that Iran desist from such policies. The Ministers considered that the Iranian interference in the affairs of Kuwait, and Bahrain is a violation of international law, and stressed the legitimacy and existence of the Peninsula Shield forces in Bahrain, and denounced the accusations that the statement of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy in the Iranian Islamic Consultative Council on Saudi
Abia, considering it a hostile attitude and provocative interference in the internal affairs of the GCC countries. (Arab Gulf States condemns Iran’s interference,( Alwatan, 2011)…).

5. The issue of official name of the Gulf remains a symbolic issue of dispute between Iran and the Gulf States, Iran, and paradoxically, the United States and the West and Israel, insists to be called the Persian Gulf while the Arab countries emphasize the name of the Arab Gulf.

In general, although Iran has kept its strategic vision about the relations with Arab Gulf states, both in terms of goals or in terms of determinants and means, these relations have experienced significant fluctuations, whether it is due to self-Iranian domestic factors, relating to the nature of the ruling elite, conservative or reformist, or related to the nature the evolution of Iran's foreign policy as explained in Chapter III of this study, or whether because of regional factors relating to radical changes in the region, such as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait or the Gulf War and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, which has made Iran seem more important in terms of role and in terms of forging alliances. temporary and permanent, These fluctuations, whether subjective or objective, has made Iran's relations with Arab Gulf states take different forms of improvement at times and deterioration at other times,
depending on the map of interests and the size of threats, and also depending on the margin by which Iran sought to preserve its interests and to expanded it in the region on the one hand, and a desire from the part of Arab Gulf States to carry out a dialogue with this controversial neighbor at times, and intentions to avoid him and seek other powers’ assistance to counter him at other times. It seems that Iran's relations with Arab Gulf States will remain open to all possibilities, at least for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion:

After this review through the four Chapters of this study, where I have gone through the historical background of the Iranian state over a century ago, then a quick review of the framework of the theoretical approaches to study international relations, in purpose of reaching an interpretation that explains the conduct of States during its administration of its foreign policy through international relations, and then going into the third chapter in the views decision-making foreign policy in Iran, with a review of a map of power in this country, and reviewing of the different stages that the Iran's foreign policy have passed, and interpretation of difference and change that policy across all stages, and then completed in the fourth quarter to study Iran’s foreign relations with the Mashreq and Arab Gulf countries, and in light of the above we can conclude the following:

That the expression, by Iran through its foreign relations, of its ambitions have arisen not only after the Iranian revolution in 1979, but much earlier
when the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and before him, his father, Riza Khan, were dreaming to spread their influence and extend their hegemony in the region. Later, in 1979, the revolution came to establish a different framework to those expansion ambitions through the use of the concept of Export of Islamic Revolution, using, as much as possible, of the factors or tools, whether physical (money, arms and oil) or moral (national aspiration and religious factor that has been expressed in this study by the Shiite factor).

If we apply this to the theoretical part of the Approaches of International Relations study, we can say with certain level of confidence that if we wanted to analyze and interpret the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran and accepted or even before by the Empire of Iran, we can say that the motives and reasons of expansionist behavior is originated from historical factors that have roots and repercussions throughout history concerning great empire ruled the area from Central Asia to the outskirts of the Mediterranean Sea, either directly or indirectly, which makes the idea of reviving the empire, and the trend here is clear, purely nationalist tendency and merely unrelated to any religious dimension.

On the other hand we can say that Iran's expansionary conduct in its foreign policy decision making leads us to focus on the Realism
Approach in analyzing the behavior of Iran, as Iran is focusing, during its application of its expansionist policies, on the elements of Power and Interest, whether in the period before the revolution, where the Shah had shown clear interest to be part of the Western Imperialism, or after the Revolution by using of the concepts of Pride and Dignity and Interest, especially during the presidency terms Rafsanjani and Khatami as contained in chapter IV of this study. By showing such perception, Iran was, to some extent, in a direct contact with the international realities, but this contact was being affected by other factors, being mixed together, producing a unique output of Iran's foreign policy. In other words, the personal dimension was there during political decision-making, which elaborate more and clarify diversity of foreign policy stated objectives during different periods depending on the nature of the person or persons of influence in decision-making. Perhaps the fluctuations in the foreign policy of Iran, between the years 1980 to the moment, show credibility to this argument.

It would be useful to say that, even under the ups and downs experienced by Iran's foreign relations with its neighbors, particularly the Mashreq and the Arab Gulf countries, but Iran's ambitions of expanding their influence and hegemony has not changed, even in the warmest period of Arab-Iranian relations, during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami,
that these ambitions have remained rooted in the thought and the conscience of the Iranians, expressed in the Constitution, as in the historical and cultural heritage. Therefore, Iran's relations with the Arab Countries, in general, and with the Mashreq and the Arab Gulf Countries, are more likely to remain tense and open to every possibility.

“End”
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