SOCIOLOGY OF DIPLOMACY
INITIAL READING

MILAN JAZBEC (Ed.)

ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BRIC	- *Brazil, Russia, India, China*
CEDAW	- *Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women*
CEE Country	- *Central and Eastern European Country*
CFSP	- *Common Foreign and Security Policy*
CIA	*Central Intelligence Agency*
EC	- *European Commission*
ECOSOC	- *Economic and Social Council*
EDP	- *European Diplomatic Program*
EEAS	- *European External Action Service*
EEO Program	- *Equal Employment Opportunity*
ERGOMAS	- *European Research Group on Military and Society*
EU	- *European Union*
FSU Country	- *Former Soviet Union country*
GI	- *Government/General Issue*
GIA	- *Gender Impact Assessment*
HTS	- *Human Terrain System*
HUMINT	- *Human Intelligent Factor*
ICT	- *Information and Communications Technology*
ILO	- *International Labour Organization*
INSTRAW	- *International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women*
LN	- *League of Nations*
MFA	- *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*
NATO	- *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
NGO	- *Non-Governmental Organization*
OAS	- *Organization of American States*
OECD	- *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development*
OSCE	- *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*
RC01	- *Research Committee 01*
SFRY	- *Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*
SES	- *Senior Executive Service*
TECHINT	- *Technical Intelligence*
TTP	- *Translating/interpreting services, teaching at the university, or publishing articles*

UK	- *United Kingdom*
UN	- *United Nations*
UN Charter	- *Charter of United Nations*
UN GA	- *United Nations General Assembly*
UN SC	- *United Nations Security Council*
UNESCO	- *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*
UNIFEM	- *United Nations Development Fund for Women*
US	- *United States*
USA	- *United States of America*
USSR	- *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*
WTO	- *World Trade Organization*

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

The expanded English version of this scientific monograph comes out after its original Slovene version not much later than a year. But it is far from being just a translated version, since there are four new original contributions in this edition (out of fourteen in total), prepared by Uroš Svete and Jelena Juvan, Tina Vončina, Diana Digol, and Janja Rebić Avguštin. Three original contributions (Introductory Study; Diplomacy and Gender Inequality; Australia: Women in Diplomacy) were slightly revised and upgraded for this edition, too. Introduction to the English Edition was prepared by David Criekemans.

There have been many persons working together with me on this project and I would like to express my sincere thanks to everybody. Firstly, I would like to extend my gratitude to all of the contributors, of course. They all, including myself, present their own personal views on the subject. Next, there were three translators, working on the original Slovene texts, namely Luka Jazbec, Daša Lovšin, and Polona Mertelj; Daša also did the polishing, together with my assistance. I am extremely grateful to Sara Jud and Eva Goričan for doing the proof reading; also Barbara Kopač helped at certain stages of preparing this volume. A special thanks goes

to the publisher, Istanbul Kultur Universitesi, it was a pleasure working with them on this project. Not less grateful I am to Başar Arioğlu, the Slovene Honorary Consul General in Istanbul for his consistent support and friendly encouragement.

Last but not least, there is a number of colleagues and students with whom I was discussing this topic during the last couple of years. Everybody showed interest in the subject what was for me both as an editor and as an initiator of the area, additional encouragement. Needless to mention, for a career Ambassador, dealing also with scientific contemplation, it makes a special privilege and honour to be able to present a piece of academic work in the country of accreditation.

The saying goes that we remain students throughout our lives. We always look back to the sources of our primary inspiration and forward to new horizons. Therefore I have to point out my particular gratitude to the late Professor Emeritus Vladimir Benko. His professional and friendly attitude, methodological approach and theoretical dwelling have remained a firm inspiration for my work from my early student years on. Offering the two last pieces that he wrote in his long life to the English speaking audience in this monograph is the least that a humble student can do to commemorate his nestor's memory.

Ankara/Istanbul/Ljubljana, Spring 2014 M. J.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

David Criekemans

Sociology and Diplomacy, a tale of exploring the outer rim and inner circle of the diplomatic world in a rapidly changing "sociosphere"

Diplomatic Studies has come of age. No longer banned to the outskirts of International Relations, its scholarship is multiplying in many promising directions. Murray et al. listed in their foundational article 'The Present and Future of Diplomatic Studies' the current status quaestionis of the field (Murray, Sharp, Criekemans, Wiseman & Melissen, 2011). One of their main suggestions concerned engaging with the other human sciences so as to come to a real cross-fertilization. Analyses of today's diplomacy sometimes limit themselves to making an inventory of the instruments employed by 'diplomats'. But the context in which they operate, the environment that molds them, the customs that guide practitioners of diplomacy towards implicit assumptions or certain ways to conduct business, are sometimes tucked away within Diplomatic Studies. That is a pity, because in it a wealth of social phenomena is encapsulated, which could help students of diplomacy reach a deeper level of understanding the phenomenon of diplomacy. Looking only at these dimensions within their social context de-instrumentalizes diplomacy and brings back the 'human' element as a core of the diplomatic equation. Because diplomacy in its essence is a human endeavor; a sociological phenomenon rich in history, in cultural variety and complexity, in engrained customs and etiquette, etc. Yet, at the same time diplomacy sometimes has an estranged relationship with the actual societies and political realities within which it operates. What a vast area of intellectual investigation to explore and come to terms with!

The evolution of Diplomatic Studies

It is rather odd that it took until the late 20th century, beginning of the 21st century before some scholars like Milan Jazbec proposed an area of study labelled 'Sociology of Diplomacy'. But at the same time that is very understandable. Diplomatic Studies as a body of intellectual scholarship had to come to terms with itself in the previous period, establishing itself as an intellectual domain. Diplomatic Studies always had the feeling it was the minor brother or sister to the much further developed field of International Relations. Moreover, most of its scholarship was inductively inspired rather than deductive (e.g. the great IR theories of Realism, Idealism, etc.).

Diplomatic Studies also had to come to terms with the fact that the diplomatic profession underwent a serious and fundamental transformation during the last decades; from the classical national state-diplomats to a myriad of diplomatic practitioners today (ranging from non-state actors to private individuals). Diplomatic Studies needed to establish and redefine its own field of study, its methods of empirical research and its own theory-building. In many ways, that process is still going on. But there is a difference; over the last fifteen years, the scholarship within Diplomatic Studies has reached a critical mass. At many international congresses one can find panels exclusively devoted to this subject matter, several associations and international journals now exist with serious academic reputations. And thus it is not a coincidence that exactly today scholars are looking to take the next step by proposing to investigate both the outer rim and the inner circle of the diplomatic world in a rapidly changing 'sociosphere'. Developing a special Social Science or subfield called 'Sociology of Diplomacy' then comes as a quite natural next step.

Exploring the 'external' and 'internal factors' that may affect the 'Sociology of Diplomacy'

Let us, by way of introduction to this unique introductory book on the subject, virtually explore this new subfield 'Sociology of Diplomacy' a bit more. What factors and trends are we talking about, and what could be possible venues for future research? Within the Sociology of Diplomacy, one can in essence make a distinction between the 'external factors' and the 'internal factors.'

When we think of 'external factors' and their interaction with the sociology of diplomacy, one could tentatively categorize them under the labels 'space', 'time', and the changing fabric of the international environment.

When we think of 'internal factors' and their interaction with the sociology of diplomacy, one could tentatively categorize them under labels such as 'democratization,' 'gender,' 'professionalization,' the altering nature of diplomacy itself and the rapidly changing 'sociosphere' (and their interaction).

External factor nr. 1: how 'space' affects the 'Sociology of Diplomacy'

With 'space' we mean the factor of 'territoriality' and how it affects diplomacy, and more specifically the 'sociology of diplomacy' today. In the 1990s some scholars believed the world was becoming one village, and thus territoriality ceased to be a factor of any relevance. Today, the reverse seems to be true.

Currently, multiple processes of 're-territorialisation' can be identified. This concept can be understood as a series of "developments which occur when certain territorial entities diminish in importance, in favour of other territorial configurations" (Scholte, 2000: 60).[1] Thus, geopolitics has not

1 The concepts 'deterritorialization' and 'reterritorialization' originally stem from the psycho-analytical work. 'A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizofrenia' by Deleuze and Guattari on the impact of capitalism (1988). In today's geopolitical literature, both concepts are often utilized as metaphors for cultural, social and spatial change.

vanished: different types of re-territorialisation are altering the fabric of international relations and, inevitably, such processes are also influencing the practices and conduct of modern diplomacy (Criekemans 2009). Four recent occurrences of re-territorialisation highlight these processes and suggest a promising area of scholarship in the area of the 'Sociology of Diplomacy'.

The first occurrence concerns changing spheres of political influence, both at a regional and global level. The BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – are of particular relevance here. They all combine steady economic growth (somewhat hampered by the economic crisis of 2008–2009) with a more prominent geopolitical role, both individually and as a group (for example, via the new G-20 regime). In some cases, there is even a desire to translate this newfound geo-economical and geopolitical influence into a more prominent geo-strategical one. Via diplomacy, countries such as China or Brazil 'test' their relationship vis-à-vis each other and, more importantly vis-à-vis the hegemon, the United States of America (USA). Today, diplomacy constitutes an integral part of the geopolitical and geo-economical shifts taking place both at a regional and global level and thus demands academic attention. This also affects the diplomatic relations as such, more importantly its sociological bases in terms of commonly shared (codified or informal) beliefs and values. In the future, countries such as China may also try to introduce their 'Asian values' in the global multilateral diplomatic scene. From the point of view of the Sociology of Diplomacy, that constitutes a very challenging new development to try to grasp. Hence, this new subfield will likely investigate how diplomacy deals with the alternative beliefs and values of non-status quo powers. Will this lead to 'integration' or 'confrontation'? How does it affect diplomats in the way they conduct their business? Will there e.g. be increasing pressure upon the universality of (originally Western) internationally codified human rights?

The second example of re-territorialisation relates to the first. The international relations system is evolving from a uni-multipolar world (which saw its dawn in 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated) to a possible duo-multipolar world (the USA and China) or even a multipolar world. What implications will these tectonic shifts have on diplomacy? How, also, will the diplomatic apparatus of Western countries cope with the changing international order? In most cases, one can detect a serious 'lagging behind-effect,' in which the national diplomats still consider Paris, Vienna, London or Berlin more important than Beijing, New Delhi or Brasilia. Some countries seem to adapt better and in more flexible ways to the changing geopolitical and geo-economical currents, while others seem to have a diplomatic network and priorities which more resemble the world in 1945 instead of 2013. Re-territorialisation will also affect multilateral diplomacy, but in some fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)[2] or International Monetary Fund (IMF) the 'translation process' of geopolitical and geo-economical power shifts seems to move quicker than in the United Nations Security Council (UN SC). When and under what conditions do changing power relations affect the rules and practices of diplomacy itself? These trends will force diplomatic studies to lessen its traditional Western focus and contemplate an emerging world beyond the doorsteps of Washington and London. Again this will probably affect the sociological dimensions within diplomacy itself. The diplomatic practices of Western countries will also likely have to take into account the sensitivities and perceptions of non-Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe (OECD)-countries if they want their diplomatic endeavours to be successful within the newly emerging global power distribution.

A third form of re-territorialisation concerns the increasing role which geographically located, scarce resources (oil, gas, coal and other natural deposits of various kinds) have on international relations and diplomacy. As more people enter the global economy, they will have a profound impact. The demand for natural resources will increase, making some countries or regions relatively more important than others. The resulting power shifts may be facilitated or slowed down by diplomacy. An area for future theoretical and practical exploration, therefore, would be to study how these shifts in power relations impact the diplomatic strategies

2 Some important, yet at this time unpublished work on this phenomenon, has been developed by Braz Baracuhy, a diplomat at the WTO Agricultural Desk of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO in Geneva (Baracuhy, 2012).

of producer, transit and consumer countries in a world with ever scarcer resources. There exists an intricate link between the energy mix and structure of a country and its diplomatic sway and influence in the world. Often that relationship is very subtle indeed, but it exists. This links the material power and energy regimes of countries with the sociological dimensions of diplomacy. Granted, studying these links from a scientific point of view will not be easy because it is hard to identify the crucial 'independent' variables and correlations. Nevertheless, the sociology of diplomacy demands us also to investigate these kinds of interactions in the future.

The fourth and final example concerns the relationship between re-territorialisation and non-state actors. Both above and beneath the state level, territorial entities become relevant, and generate their own external relations, foreign policy and diplomatic practices. Europe constitutes an interesting testing ground in this regard. On the one hand, the new Lisbon Treaty has led to the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by EU High Representative Lady Ashton. The impact the EEAS will have on diplomacy remains to be seen, but already some national diplomatic services of the twenty-eight European Union (EU) member countries are facing an existential crisis and will have to adapt. At the same time, national diplomatic services will be partially integrated and fused with the existing diplomatic services of the European Commission (EC). This experiment will impact European and possibly global diplomatic practices.

On the other hand, Europe has been and still is a nursery for sub-state diplomacy. Different regional sub-state entities in Europe such as Flanders, Wallonia, Catalonia, Scotland, Bavaria and others engage in international relations on their own merits, and conduct a foreign policy parallel, complementary or sometimes in conflict with their state diplomatic counterparts. The days when diplomacy was exclusively associated with national states are gone. Since the late 1990s, the spectrum of diplomatic instruments and the strategies that accompany sub-state entities have become more diverse and complex (Criekemans 2010a; Criekemans 2010b). To a certain extent, today's diplomatic practices resemble a pre-

Westphalian world in which realms of different territorial sizes generate their own diplomatic identity and practices. Diplomacy has become a multi-level endeavour, in which different policy levels (macroregional, national, cross-border, substate: regions and cities) each generate specific types of diplomatic activities reflecting particular needs felt at their respective territorial levels. The question here then is when and under what conditions are diplomats of the macro-regional, national and sub-state level able and willing to cooperate with one another? This line of thinking mirrors the complexity of societal questions relating to the EU experiment and would add another layer of knowledge to diplomatic studies.

Re-territorialisation challenges the study of diplomacy, particularly in terms of its research questions and objectives. The potential for exploring the nexus between ‘geopolitics’ and the ‘sociology of diplomacy’ is valuable but multifarious. This is true empirically, but also in regard to developing deductive frameworks or theories so as to advance further diplomatic knowledge and the field of study. Probably the best way forward is not to try to develop a ‘grand theory’ of diplomatic practice, but rather to develop middle range theories that can be empirically tested within defined settings, and build further from there.

External factor nr. 2: how ‘time’ affects the ‘Sociology of Diplomacy’

The external factor of ‘time’ is probably one of the most understudied variables in Diplomatic Studies. Yet, for those scholars who in the future will further develop the subfield of the ‘Sociology of Diplomacy’, it could become a very interesting variable to further investigate. In the 1860s, the then British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston is on record of responding in the following fashion after having received the first telegraph message; “My God, this is the end of diplomacy.” Some 150 years later, one can safely say that his prediction has proven to be wrong. Diplomacy is still here, and has transformed in even more complex forms as we will hint to later on. However, the nature of diplomacy has changed dramatically as a result of technological advances, both in travel and in communication. ‘Time’ has become a crucial factor to deal with in international affairs.

The British geopolitical scholar Halford John Mackinder was the first to state in 1904 that the world in the post-Columbian epoch was one of a 'closed political system'; everything that happens can in time affect all other continents in the world. The American geopolitical scholar Daniel Deudney hinted at the existence of a 'geo-technical ensemble'; each technological progression has led to a changing geopolitical order. In the field of International Relations, we use the term 'space-time compression' to conceptually grasp this phenomenon. But this is not the end of the story. Advances in travel and communication also deeply affect the diplomatic profession and its ways of 'conducting business.' It affects the interactions both within Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), their dealings with other ministries in coordination and implementation phases, and – last but not least – it affects the way in which states and non-state actors diplomatically engage on the formal diplomatic fora of the world, and also in their informal contacts. More than ever, time has become a strategic resource. Managing it, is crucial. Small or complex federal states may experience real problems in trying to influence international affairs in a world where diplomacy has to operate as a 'real time' event.

In the past, the "natural pauses" of communication and travel delays gave diplomats a unique opportunity to manage crises or dossiers. The diplomatic elites had more opportunities to take hold of the problems, and devise elite answers and responses. Increasingly, that has become more difficult, but diplomacy did not always adapt. To make matters even more complex, small states have serious problems to manage all the dossiers of world politics. The volumes are enormous, the time is always pressing. Bigger states can use time in their own advantage. Sometimes they might also deliberately be flooding the diplomatic capacities of other countries with (other) dossiers, so that they can set the agenda. The increased technicality of dossiers combined with 'time pressure' are also very acute problems in diplomatic dossiers at the multilateral level; for instance in European integration, within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or at big United Nations (UN)-related international conferences. Time is always a crucial factor in negotiations; one can put pressure on certain parties in negotiations if one is clever in dealing with the factor 'time'. Most of the 'time', this is all done in very subtle diplomatic ways, but the results are real, and may have very gripping political effects – internationally and internally for certain partners around the negotiating table. If one wants the diplomatic activities of a country or non-state actor to be successful, one has to strategically manage 'time' and also deal with one's own limitations. This may also mean choosing niches (hence; 'niche diplomacy') so as to still be able to have some impact. Another more recent phenomenon concerns the 'darker side' of the new communication technologies that have brought so many advantages. In those domains where diplomacy manages the national state secrets of countries, some countries are backing away from electronic information networks since they can be so easily hacked. The Russian Federation is e.g. apparently considering returning to traditional type writers to manage the most secret of their national state interests.

The diplomatic profession continuously has to find a new 'modus vivendi' to deal with the various problems and opportunities the factor 'time' has to offer. It is not so difficult to understand that these trends deeply affect the sociological dimension of diplomacy. Studying them from a scientific point of view may however be another challenge. Yet, bringing the 'time factor' explicitly into the scientific analysis could sparkle a flourishing debate and new theoretical reflections on the way the 'clock' ticks within the sociology of diplomacy today, and what challenges may await the profession beyond the horizon.

External factor nr. 3: how the 'changing fabric of the international environment' affects the 'Sociology of Diplomacy'

A third 'external' factor to consider for students of 'Sociology of Diplomacy' is the changing fabric of the international environment. We already discussed the geopolitical dimensions earlier, but what about the societal international context in which today's diplomacy has to operate? Society has become more complex over time, and this will not alter, rather the reverse. Many scientific fields point to the delicate interrelatedness of various societal realms. At the same time environmental researchers are looking into the interconnectedness between our economic system, the environment and the energy regime which supports this. Macro policies such as neo-liberalism are also having an effect upon the psychology of nations and individuals. When one thinks ‘out of the box’, the potential for cross-fertilization is multifarious. Network theory, chaos theory or other approaches may help us conceptually to better grasp this, and operationalize these ideas in upcoming studies. But the analysis does not end here, the diplomatic world itself is of course deeply affected by this increasingly perceived interconnectedness and complexity. Most, if not all dossiers in today’s diplomacy are transversal in nature. This means that they are horizontally interconnected across many domains. In order to diplomatically solve problems, one needs a close cooperation between technical specialists among different ministries; budget, economy, ecology, energy, home affairs, etc. together with the foreign ministry. The traditional administrative models work in a top down-way, and ministries of Foreign Affairs used to have all the ‘external capacity’ of countries within themselves. Today, the profession has changed deeply; the diplomat is an information manager who works with technical specialists at one time during negotiations, and then later with other people in different phases; e.g. in the implementation. How to deal with the ‘transversality’ of international dossiers constitutes a major challenge for diplomacy, not only in multilateral but also in bilateral affairs.

Another aspect of the international environment is that the composition of the societies of countries themselves has changed. Because of increased travel and communication, the demographical and sociological international sphere is different compared to a few decades ago. States do not fully reflect that reality and often have difficulty to come to terms with the fact that they are no longer the complete ‘containers of society’ they once were. Again this affects the very nature of diplomacy, and hence also the scientific quest to deal with that specific density of the international societal environment via diplomacy.

This last element neatly brings us to ‘internal’ factors that may affect the sociology of diplomacy.

Internal factor nr. 1: how 'democratization' and 'gender' affects the 'Sociology of Diplomacy'

The sociological composition of the diplomatic personnel has changed dramatically over the course of the last century. Exactly a century ago, just before the First World War, the diplomatic corps was an elite. Often coming from nobility, a very tiny group of men from wealthy backgrounds with close economic and political ties, constituted the vast majority of the diplomatic profession. Specific sociological backgrounds were necessary to make it in the profession, in an era in which honor, family and standing defined the course of men and countries. This 'diplomatic-military-industrial complex' committed 'suicide' by engaging in the Great War. After the war, the world would never be the same. Kings fell, empires were split up, a democratizing movement would gradually also affect the sociological composition of the diplomatic personnel, be that with a delay of several decades.

The profession of diplomacy was gradually opened up; first for men of other backgrounds, later in sociological terms and today also in gender terms – be that not always fully. That process is still going on. It affects the diplomatic profession from the inside out, as it places into question some of the old habits and assumptions, while re-affirming other traditions. That in itself has of course a major impact upon the sociology of diplomacy and how the diplomatic corps engages with other actors, state or non-state. It also affects the way in which ministries perceive their environment, sets priorities and operates. Although already important academic work has been done on this issue, and this monograph also entails several very detailed analyses on the topic. The scientific road is however still long in order to come to terms with all these internal sociological changes of the diplomatic profession.

Internal factor nr. 2: how 'professionalization' affects the 'Sociology of Diplomacy'

A second 'internal' factor to consider for students of 'Sociology of Diplomacy' is the professionalization which is going on in the MFAs. Especially in budgetary difficult eras such as the last five years, the diplomatic profession comes under additional scrutiny. Questions are asked what diplomats contribute to the country. Of course, there are real political and economical benefits of maintaining a diplomatic network and apparatus, but the daily efforts diplomats undertake may not always be so easy to 'measure'. MFAs today come under pressure to do more with the same money, or the same with less. They need to adapt the way in which they work. As society becomes more complex, so does the nature of their work. At the same time the diplomatic career and the entrance exams in most countries have undergone changes to try to attract the best possible people. In the past decades also management techniques and structures were introduced into the MFA's, sometimes with success, sometimes with problems. The very nature of foreign policy of course makes it difficult to transpose classic management techniques into the business of the international affairs of countries. Internal coordination takes up much more time in a diplomat's day compared to a few decades ago.

All these trends and developments point to existential questions. Why do countries still need diplomacy? What are the goals diplomacy should strive for? Can success be measured? How to make sure to attract and retain the right kinds of people for the job at hand? The list goes on. The professionalization of diplomacy also creates new (in)formal rules and regulations, processes and interactions which deeply affect the sociology of diplomacy. These can be studied on their own merit or in interaction with some of the other variables mentioned in this Introduction. The volume of academic research on the various aspects of the professionalization of the profession has over the last fifteen years multiplied in a very dynamic way. Often these kinds of studies were of a policy oriented nature, with clear recommendations for individual countries. The fundamental academic research still has additional grounds to cover in order to understand more fully how the sociological dimension of the diplomatic profession is transforming in different countries around the world.

Internal factor nr. 3: the altering nature of diplomacy itself and the rapidly changing 'sociosphere', and their interaction

A third 'internal' factor to consider for students of 'Sociology of

Diplomacy' is the way in which diplomacy itself is transforming in interaction with the rapidly changing 'sociosphere'. The 'sociosphere' is the social mirror of the 'biosphere' and the 'economic sphere' in which humans operate (together or sometimes in opposition to other living beings). It is the human translation of the other spheres, which points to a close inter-relatedness. The 'ociosphere' encompasses the interrelated social institutions, associations, lobby groups, and all other social structures which make up the 'human world'. Human problems in the 'biosphere' and 'economic sphere' also impact the 'sociosphere'. Environmental problems and climate change may for instance sparkle migration, which then also becomes an international and diplomatic problem. The economic crisis today may well be a crisis of a certain way of looking at the relation between humans and the planet and/or a crisis related to the internal solidarity amongst humans. Looking at the economic crisis from that point of view, one can see a clearer connection with the 'sociosphere'. It suffices to walk in the streets of Athens, Lisbon, Madrid or Rome today to see that these links exist, and that they generate clear and present issues in today's international relations and diplomacy in Europe. Some even pose the question whether the EU really is a union. One can think of many other examples which illustrate that the 'sociosphere' does not stand by itself, and that it hence also affects diplomacy today.

Conversely, the possibilities for diplomacy to influence or steer the 'sociosphere' in certain directions, has proven to be limited. The days are over when a few heads of state met in a far away country to agree upon a new treaty, for instance on European integration. All kinds of social dynamics want a piece of the action, raise their voice, make a contribution, which makes working in diplomacy today a very challenging undertaking indeed. The success or failure of a diplomatic apparatus may rest with the way they engage and create dialogue with the 'sociosphere'. If diplomats only talk to other diplomats at cocktail parties, receptions, in corridors or at formal meetings, then one can ask the question whether they really grasp the social dimensions of the issues they are actually trying to solve. In this, one of the most gripping challenges may lie for diplomacy today. This brings us to the very core of what the germinating field of the

'Sociology of Diplomacy' could bring to both the study of Sociology and International Relations/Political Science. In it lies a quest to try to discover how diplomacy could be the oil that contributes to the search for new ways to organize the world's 'sociosphere', 'economic sphere' and the way in which humans interact with their 'biosphere'. Or, how the world's second oldest profession still has something fundamental to add to the future.

Final introduction to this monograph

In many ways this monograph 'Sociology of Diplomacy' edited by the Slovenian diplomat and academic Milan Jazbec opens up this vast new and emerging subdiscipline. It is written in an accessible way and readable to both a specialist and a generalist audience, interesting for both and practitioners of diplomacy alike.

The book combines the need for clear conceptualizations and definitions with more concrete case studies. It is interesting that Central European authors have taken the lead in making this important contribution to Diplomatic Studies and Social Science. Slovenia often tries to portray itself as a (modest) bridge between East and West in Europe, but one could say that this academic work also to a certain extent radiates this feel. Various aspects of the factors identified earlier in this Introduction are further developed in the chapters of this book. Of course, this book does not tackle all of them, and every reader will have one or another idea for additional studies and themes. But that was precisely the intention; to generate interest and to start a more fundamental debate among both scholars and diplomats on these themes.

The hope is that this edited book can be seen in the future as one of the first contributions that sparkled a whole new and dynamic 'Sociology of Diplomacy'. Academia and diplomacy are in my opinion not only ready for that. Such a vibrant debate would be a valued contribution that goes beyond reproduction but tries to discover new paths to understand the vibrant diplomatic world.

Antwerp, August 2013

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE SLOVENE EDITION

I was never interested in diplomacy, and it was by pure coincidence that I found myself in it more then twenty-five years ago.

In the private sector, where I worked before, the work itself and the ways of going about it were very different, and it took about a year that this bureaucratized, consistently calculable, though at times improvisatory, mostly impersonal but also changing activity became at least somewhat close to me, and that I somehow found my way in it. Well, afterwards, in the years that followed, I dedicated myself to it entirely, without really planning on doing so: at first practically, then theoretically and publicistically, later through scientific research and most recently also in a literary fashion.

The term sociology of diplomacy I used first – without hearing it before elsewhere (which does not mean it did not exist prior to that, though I have found no evidence for this) – in the spring of 1992, when Dr. Josef Langer, Professor of sociology at the University of Klagenfurt, and I discussed the thematic framework and field of my doctorate. This I still understand as one of the fundamental inspirations for the mentioned field, while it was in my doctorate where I first wrote about the possibility of, and need for, constituting this field. When, in the autumn of 2002, a good decade later, I was invited to start lecturing at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, by Professor Dr. Bojko Bučar, saying that through my doctorate I had acquired the tools of the trade and by being published numerous times, along with my other activities, I fulfilled the formal criteria, I suggested to him that my field of research be named – of course – the sociology of diplomacy. He immediately took a liking to the suggestion and by June 2004 I was inaugurated as an Assistant Professor for the named field. By coincidence, it was a mere two days later when I held my first lecture at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, Colorado. Dean Dr. Tom Farer, being otherwise a Harvard Professor, thought that the combination of diplomatic practice and academic engagement is highly beneficial to both fields. I later lectured on the sociology of diplomacy at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. In the autumn of 2005, Professor Emeritus Dr. Borut Bohte invited me to describe this field in its basic features. He would present this, he said, in the book he was co-authoring, "Diplomatic and Consular Law". This work was published in December 2006, and thereby the term sociology of diplomacy and the appropriate scientific field were officially noted by another author.

The present book attempts to lay the foundations for this field. For this reason I am particularly glad that it collects contributions from authors, some of whom I have been meeting and working with for decades, and others with whom I have worked with for the past few years. All together, they have such rich theoretical knowledge and numerous experiences as well as practical engagement and enthusiasm, which, in the scope of ambitions of this book, presented in a pioneering fashion to an inquisitive public. All contributions reflect the personal views and positions of their respective authors and not the institutions where they are employed, nor those with which they are associated. I am very grateful to all involved for their contributions.

Special thanks go to the Faculty of Social Sciences Press that has for years been publishing my books, and to Professor Emeritus Dr. Maca Jogan for including the monograph in her collection "Essential Sociological Reading". I also express my thanks to the both reviewers, Professors Dr.

Rudi Rizman and Dr. Iztok Podbregar, as well as the sponsors that have supported the book's publishing. It gladdens me that some of those closest to me have, for a long time and with much patience, been listening to my musings and have in this way supported me in materializing this monograph and in conceptualizing this field. Any mistakes or embarrassments that may appear in the book are a result of my potential inconsistency and lack of familiarity with this field in the making, which I have in its basic traces been shaping slowly for practically two decades.

For the past five years, I have been occupying myself intensively with this monograph in particular with editorial work and gathering contributions, as well as thinking about defining this new scientific field and its delineations vis-à-vis other related disciplines. This last year was, on the basis of several preliminary debates and contemplations, dedicated as a sort of final lap, in particular as far as conceptualizing and the writing of my own two contributions is concerned. The topic was presented at the 23rd Slovenian Political Science Association Days in June 2012 in Portorož and sparked a lively debate.

The book, which was published on the twentieth anniversary of the international recognition of the Republic of Slovenia and thereby also of its diplomacy, is dedicated to Professor Emeritus Dr. Vladimir Benko. In light of his great scientific prestige and rare human virtues and given our professional and amicable co-operation (I was one of his undergraduate students in 1976/1977, and his graduate student in 1984/1985), it is completely unnecessary to emphasize the personal and professional gratitude I feel towards the late Nestor. I have had the great honour and rare opportunity to refine my knowledge under a scientist of world-class stature.

Dr. Benko is the author of the initial disposition and the theoretical contribution: soon after his 89th birthday in July 2006, we began discussing his participation in the project (which I had shortly before that presented to Dr. Bučar at the Slovenian Political Science Days). Nearly three years later, in spring 2009, his disposition for studying the field dealt with here was formed, and shortly before his 93rd birthday he sent me his contribution (April 2012). To the best of my knowledge, these are the last two contributions written by Dr. Benko and which are published for the first time in this monograph. The highly distinguished colleague and respected pedagogue, a person of the highest ethical and professional standards and outlooks, the founder of the science of international relations in Slovenia, who died in the spring of 2011 (born 1917), had created an exceptional and fundamental, structurally branched, demanding and invaluable opus which remains a precious inspiration for the intellectual restlessness of future generations of social scientists.

His intellectual and scientific reach is of a global nature. This is however not apparent at first glance, as his works are practically accessible only to that audience which has mastered the Slovenian language. Yet regardless, our late colleague Benko was a contemporary of the great names of international relations, such as Morgenthau, Kaplan, Aron, and others, and with his creative thinking was an equal among them. This is borne witness by his works, which in Slovenia have been – and continue to be – the starting point, inspiration, and challenge for studying international relations and the disciplines associated with it.

The present contemplation on the sociology of diplomacy, in any case, stems from and is inspired by these vibrations.

Ankara/Ljubljana/Pohanca, April 2012 M.J.

Addendum: The monograph on the sociology of diplomacy belongs to the author's so-called Pohanca cycle, in which he on the one hand dedicates himself to studying local family and place history, and on the other to theorizing about diplomacy. He draws much of the inspiration for his creative work from the village where he was born.

A SOCIOLOGY OF DIPLOMACY – FROM AN IDEA TO AN ATTEMPT AT CONCEPTUALIZATION

Milan Jazbec

Introduction

The sociology of diplomacy is a science that can be placed among the special sociologies.

We believe that this how one must begin an introductory study of a scientific field that may formally not yet exist but for which there are, in our view, several indirect and direct indicators that make possible the constitution of such a field and the justifications thereof, whilst keeping space open for academic scepticism with regard to that same possibility and endeavour. This introductory study and monograph advocates the possibility and necessity of such a field, that is, the constituting of a sociology of diplomacy as a special science; furthermore, it tries to provide and offer a concrete contribution, i.e. a theoretical reflection and empirical material towards for its constitution. This monograph also tries to prove that it is necessary to begin somewhere, at some point, and that this is not an arbitrary endeavour, independent of the assumptions needed, but that it is a scientifically sound, deliberate, and justified contemplation.

Before we take a more detailed look at the sociology of diplomacy, as seen especially by the editor and the other contributing authors, we mention a few words on the purpose and structure of this monograph.

Its purpose is to present a contemplation on a set of themes from the field of diplomacy, in whichever way we understand it, given the numerous definitions thereof, none of which can be understood or applied in practice without meaningful sociological reflection, or its methods, its scientific apparatus, and its process of treatment and research; moreover, we believe that this is impossible to attempt and accomplish sufficiently only within diplomatic studies, and that such contemplation and reflection must be transferred also into sociology, and in particular into a sociology dedicated only to diplomacy in the widest sense of the word and all theoretical and practical consequences and causalities that are linked to and which stem from it. In short, the purpose of this monograph is to introduce and support contemplation on the possibility and necessity of constituting a new scientific discipline, that is, a special sociology – the sociology of diplomacy, and to lay the foundations for this through concrete scientific contributions, both theoretical and empirical. Furthermore, it aims to promote the establishment of the *Ljubljana School of International Relations Vladimir Benko*.

The text is organised in the same manner as had been done in the treatment of the contribution of Slovenians to diplomatic theory and practice (Jazbec, 1998a), in two substantive segments.

The first of these is dedicated to theoretical contemplation and discussion. In it, we first present (Vladimir Benko) a theoretical look at the sociology of diplomacy and the reasons, needs, and determinants of constituting it. This is placed in a wider socio-historic context and shown through the dynamics and approach of inclusion science into the study of diplomacy (history, law, political science, sociology). This is followed by an exhaustive presentation (Albin Igličar) of the role and importance of sociology and the formation of special sociologies, together with some concrete illustrations as to what the sociology of diplomacy should be and what it should deal with, as compared to some other special sociologies. Thereby, we have tried to argue for the possibility and necessity, as well as the method, of constituting a new scientific discipline. Next is a presentation (Uroš Svete and Jelena Juvan) of the development of the military sociology as a special sociology. Systematic study of armed forces as an organization or war as a social process is primarily a result of the Second World War and Cold War eras. This is followed by two more concrete yet still overwhelmingly theoretical discussions, of which one (Polona Mal) is focused on diplomacy as a vocation, indicating that the sociology of diplomacy is close to the sociology of work, while the other (Darja Gruban Ferlež) looks towards the diplomacy of the EU, which is – the EU, that is – a typical integrative result of the processes of globalization, possibly the formation of a global society, indicating a closeness to the sociology of globalization. The last contribution in the first part focuses on the structure of the international community and is discussing the position of the individual within it. (Tina Vončina) There is an impression that the diplomat both as an actor and as an individual is well defined, but the definitions do not suffice social and historical changes in the environment, in which the diplomat operates. All in all, theorizing about the sociology of diplomacy is seen as a crucial condition for starting discussions about the discipline and the search for and production of contributions that would, or could, substantiate this field.

The second segment is dedicated to practical cases or those case studies that concretely cover practical experiences and likewise show the necessity and possibility of constituting a sociology of diplomacy. The first contribution (France Bučar) deals with the dynamics and dialectics of the emergence of the Slovenian state and its diplomacy. We could say that we are dealing with certain uniqueness, since diplomacy is a phenomenon tied to a (nation) state and as a rule does not emerge simultaneously with it, as was the case with Slovenia. This is followed by a contribution (editor) that deals with promotion in diplomacy as one of the processes typically receiving sociological attention, this time in an exclusive and narrow diplomatic context. Promotion to the position of ambassador is in any case something which is in a practical sense incredibly important for every diplomat, and in a theoretical sense represents a research challenge that should treat aspects, trends, and backgrounds, and thereby may yield a recipe for the practical execution of such promotions, which should be based on certain processes and rules of the game and to the smallest extent possible be a result of improvisation and inputs of personal preference. Two contributions follow, which focus on the question of diplomacy and gender inequality, and the representation of women in this activity, to summarize in a very general manner. The first of these (Maca Jogan et al.) presents a wider view, combined with some practical cases and experiences and includes a brief analysis of women in the diplomacy of the US (United States) , while the second (Moreen Dee and Felicity Volk), more concrete, is entirely dedicated to the position of women, in particular as ambassadors in Australian diplomacy. Next to it (Diana Digol) we dwell with the process of diplomatic elite transformation in post-communist countries, aiming to reach the portrait of a diplomat, as a reflection of concrete social and historical circumstances. The composition of the diplomatic elite and its members show some similarities across countries, although some striking differences are obvious as well. The last contribution (Janja Rebić Avguštin) discusses the outer face of diplomacy – the diplomatic protocol. The author argues that with the codification of diplomatic and consular relations and bureaucratization of international relations, the varieties and differences in the ceremonies have become minimized or even significantly inexistent making the ceremonial part of protocol in fact irrelevant. One could even claim that changes in society are no longer reflected in the magnificence of the ceremony.

The monograph is introduced by a disposition for a discourse on the sociology of diplomacy (Vladimir Benko), which in a practical manner presents the theoretical framework for thinking about this special sociology, and it is concluded by a brief commemorative look (Milan Brglez) at the Professor Emeritus Vladimir Benko, the late pioneer of the science of international relations in Slovenia. This contribution has the aim of drawing the reader's attention to the sociological-politological-diplomatic contemplative opus of professor Benko.

The aim of this introductory study is to, through an array of perspectives, elements, and views, outline and highlight as well as delineate the field of the sociology of diplomacy and through this to lead to an attempt at presenting its approximate definition. The path towards a more explicit and precise definition will be laid out by the theoretical contributions, which will, on the one hand, clarify this definition and map out its perception in its specificity and narrowness or narrowing with regard to general and other special sociologies, and by the empirical contributions that follow, which will, on the other hand, strengthen the field as a subject of theoretical sociological treatment, and constitute the basis for theoretical verification of trends and rules, that is, for their generalization. Here we are aware of the fact that several empirical contributions will be necessary just for the purpose of progressive and direct crystallization of the boundaries of the field and the boundary themes as well as themes to be treated which are already the object of diplomatic attention but not to such an extent, or not in a sociological sense, and that through such graduality, important clarifications of the field of the sociology of diplomacy will be attained.

Let us now, in the continuation, present a series of views on different perspectives of the sociology of diplomacy and unfold our understanding thereof.

Presentation of elements and perspectives for defining the sociology of diplomacy

The general view

The operating field of the sociology of diplomacy, which also covers its definition, is in our view determined on the one hand by understanding diplomacy particularly as an activity, as knowledge, as a skill, a science, an organization, and as foreign policy (in the sense of its shaping and implementation) and on the other hand by understanding its social basis and conditionality. Perhaps for this reason it is appropriate to mention, here in the introductory and by no means perfect enumeration and consideration of different conceptions of diplomacy, that we understand diplomacy in its broadest sense as a dynamic social process which ensures foreign policy communication between subjects of international public law, and is above all dependent on the changing social situation in a concrete historical context and is in primary relation with the institution of the nation state. Perhaps we could add to this that only knowing and understanding a concrete sociohistoric situation enables knowing and understanding a concrete form of diplomacy correlated with such a concrete situation (certainly, in our view, the existence of the latter is not possible without the existence of the former). And perhaps it would be possible to think in the opposite direction – namely, that through clear knowing and understanding of the concrete form of diplomacy, we know and understand (or at least understand to a greater extent) also the concrete sociohistoric situation. As we will try to demonstrate in later parts of this study, the explosion of globalization after the end of the Cold War has led to the point where an understanding of diplomacy is no longer possible without sound sociological consideration within a special sociological framework.

Such a view of diplomacy could, in our opinion, at least in its broader sense represent that crucial understanding which is necessary for theorizing diplomacy, its meaning and substance.[3] It is our view that its theorizing is urgently necessary, as it, amongst others, enables and argues its various and numerous understandings (some of which we have just mentioned). Placing this theorizing in a sociological framework, which consequently may lead to constituting a sociology of diplomacy, seems to us methodologically feasible, theoretically justified, and practically, that is, empirically verifiable.

Alongside this, for an introductory argumentation for the necessity of a sociology of diplomacy, we add our view that diplomatic studies do not share the sociological methodological and research apparatus, with which they would involve themselves in studying the social conditionality and dependency of diplomacy understood in the broadest sense of the word, e.g. in those of its parts that strongly touch upon sociological understandings of diplomacy and its current social conditionality. A certain role in this is certainly played by the so-called youth of diplomatic studies as an independent scientific discipline (cf. Brglez, 2011, and Murray et al.,

3 We could even say that our theorizing on the sociology of diplomacy (if we understand diplomacy in the way just noted) at least partly rests on Mahalgaes' contemplation on the pure concept of diplomacy (1988).

2011), which, if not temporally parallel to the formation of the sociology of diplomacy, at least did not precede the latter by much. This can be determined just by comparing our attempt at constituting a sociology of diplomacy with the formation or the development of diplomatic studies, where for the latter it can be said that they were emancipated from the science of international relations and hence not constituted as a special science within a wider scientific framework. Perhaps a certain interdependence between the formative processes of both scientific disciplines can be noted, although diplomatic studies certainly lead in scientific production, which has become evident in the last decade. Thus, in our view, we can list as outstanding works for the constitution of diplomatic studies (in alphabetical order): Brglez (2011), Bučar (2007), Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), Jönsson and Hall (2005), Jönsson and Langhorne (2008), Leguey-Feilleux (2009), Rana (2008) and Sharp (2009), while as far as the sociology of diplomacy is concerned: partly and indirectly Benko (2000) and Devin (2008), while concretely Jazbec (2000, 2001, 2002, 2007a) and Jazbec et al. (2009 and 2011) as well as Neumann (2012).[4] Perhaps it is more logical from a developmental point of view that we see a certain temporal advantage in the process of constituting of diplomatic studies as compared with the sociology of diplomacy. The former is a gradual process of an increasingly clear and special routing of scientific attention towards the study of diplomacy, where we see the key point as being the question of interdependence between diplomacy and the (nation) state and the question of substituting territory or the territorial component of diplomacy with (European) integration processes (Benko, 1998; Jazbec, 2007a), the solving of which is making diplomacy become an institution of the international community and not only the (nation) state. With this, we also notice a departure from the predominant explanation of diplomacy as e.g. an art, a skill, and an activity, towards pure theorizing or theoretical contemplation on the nature, content, and meaning of diplomacy. The latter is a continuation of the process of constituting particular (special) sociologies, of which the present, i.e. the sociology of diplomacy, directs

4 The difference in the number of both works and authors is evident at first glance. More on the works of Jazbec (2000, 2001, and 2002) as well as Jazbec et al. (2009 and 2011) in later parts of this introductory study.

its attention towards the social conditionality and interdependence of diplomacy, where we consider social conditionality and interdependence to reflect both the (nation) state as well as the international community. Both disciplines have in the period after the end of the Cold War acquired dynamics in their complexity (more on that in later parts), which in our view makes room for the constituting of both diplomatic studies as well as the sociology of diplomacy.

The sociology of diplomacy, in our view and generally speaking, deals with the study of phenomena, relations, and processes in diplomatic organization and its environment. The latter we understand as that social organization in the foreign policy and diplomatic field which is composed of the foreign ministry (in Slovenian jargon the 'internal service') and the network of diplomatic-consular representations or the network of representations or the diplomatic network (in the same jargon the 'external service').[5] When we speak of diplomatic organization, we say that such an understanding of diplomacy presupposes or concludes that "in it are governed and implemented social processes, which is pointed out by the social nature of organizations, which are a result and a limit of social relations" (Jazbec, 2009a: 127). In addition to this, we can note "that the fundamental activity through which a diplomatic organization ensures the implementation of foreign policy tasks and diplomatic functions is the transmission of foreign policy information. This we determine by understanding diplomacy as the organization which ensures the implementation of formal and indirect communication between subjects of international public law" (Jazbec, 2009a: 159). Petrič (2010: 307) places particular emphasis on the meaning of communication when he says that "the essence of diplomacy is communication between states with the aid of

5 We have introduced this expression as the designation "diplomacy" or "diplomatic service" is too narrow and too imprecise for a clear and agreed upon professional, not to mention scientific, understanding and studying of a defined whole (Jazbec, 2001: 147–150, 2002: 173–177 and 2009a: 127–129). At the same time, we emphasize that the term "diplomatic-consular representation" is partly inadequate, since with consulates we do not speak of their representative nature and of carrying out a representative function (although also consulates, through their activities, at least indirectly represent their state or, more specifically, through their appearance and behavior in fact carry out part of the representative function in the sense of social operation and projecting an image of the sending state in the receiving state on a symbolic level), as is the case with embassies and missions to international organizations. Yet the aforementioned expression is widely used in jargon as well as in professional circles.

special staff" and adds that "communication with diplomats of other states and with officials and the foreign policy bureaucracy of foreign states as well as with officials and bureaucrats of international organizations is the essence of diplomatic activity". Practically the same, only with different words, is said by Jönsson and Hall: "Without communication there is no diplomacy." (2005: 37).

The above stated is a further introductory attempt at a wide and general definition of the sociology of diplomacy. Yet this breadth and generality in our view does not assume simplicity and facility when we reach deeper for a more concrete attempt at defining the field. Perhaps the above stated understanding is at the same time the widest frame or *differentia specifica* which determines the external borders of the function of the sociology of diplomacy as a special science. The same basic determination of the external boundary of this field lies, in our view, at the outer limit of general sociology and within some special sociologies, particularly those of work, organization, law, globalization, and especially the sociology of international relations. The special sociologies just mentioned are a starting point and indirectly, by the very nature of the issue, and to a certain extent, define the sociology of diplomacy in its distinct manifestation, and at the same time contain or deliver the components for shaping its definition and its manifestation as an independent field.

Diplomacy, like other social systems or sub-systems, activities, professions, organizations, phenomena, etc., does not exist outside a social frame, i.e. outside a concrete, specific society, functioning in the frame of a (still) nation state, and to an increasing extent in the frame of an international, i.e. global (still in the process of forming and being shaped) society. This means that all the above mentioned is a subject of study by sociology, or sociological study in different contexts and with different goals, but all these research attempts have in common the knowing and understanding of the functioning of social phenomena and consequently the design of possibilities for predicting their operation. Langer thus notes that August Comte had in mind the capacity of sociology to predict and forecast (so-called "foreseeing") the actions of social groups and entire societies, in order to prevent undesired consequences (1992:1).[6] Similarly, Bruce says that in daily life we always try to observe, describe, understand, and explain our own actions and those of others; sociological explanations differ from general observations in that sociology recognizes the socially constructed nature of reality, identifies the hidden causes of actions, and describes the unintended consequences of these actions (2000: 99–100). It is the same with the sociological study of diplomacy understood in its widest sense.

In accordance with the above mentioned we could say that the diplomat is the basic and probably the initial object on which research attention in the sociology of diplomacy is focused, as it is his/her activity and behavior which creates relations and constructs the social/diplomatic reality within the subject area. The diplomat is also among the basic objects (or units of analysis) on which attention is focused in diplomatic studies (Criekemans in Murray et al, 2011: 716). For our approach, the diplomat is important not only as the object on which research is focused but also his socially (and individually) conditioned activity and its results. As Sharp says (Murray et al., 2011: 718), diplomats are those who "construct and sustain ambiguous collective identities within a thin social context", by which he refers to the current international community. The ideas mentioned can be supported with Jambrek's contemplation that sociology is "directed towards man as a whole and social being" (1992: 11) and therefore "from this starting point it investigates *the social conduct of man*, his effects on society, his social conditionality, as well as the most varied networks of interpersonal relations (…) " (ibid., italics P.J.).

In short, who and what a diplomat is, what his/her characteristics are (features and other aspects characterizing him as typical), how s/he behaves and acts, what the results and consequences of his/her actions are, what the relations, interactions, and networks s/he co-creates through his/her actions are, what his/her education, social origin, and attitude towards other diplomats are, as well as horizontal and vertical promotion and others, are the fundamental questions for knowing and understanding diplomacy both as a profession and a science, as well as for creating a quality diplomat,

6 Or, to quote Comte: "Savoir pour prevoir, prevoir pour prevenir" (ibid.).

while these and other questions cannot be answered without knowing and using sociological knowledge, instruments, and research methods and applying these within a sociological research framework. After these come questions regarding the nature and conduct of relations between diplomats in the diplomatic organization. Further questions deal with the relations between diplomats in different diplomatic organizations, when they meet and work in the diplomatic environment, be it in the international community, at an international organization, in a nation state, both in the framework of diplomatic assembly and international organizations, and last but not least in the framework of representative diplomatic activity of the international community in the subject of accreditation. If we continue our enumeration, it is about studying the interactions of diplomatic activity by actors who are not necessarily diplomats or diplomatic but occasionally involve themselves in such activity and thereby contribute to diplomacy in its different meanings. Thus we notice the increasing involvement of e.g. non-state and non-governmental actors in diplomatic activity, e.g. the preparation of negotiations, mediation and the convergence of positions.

This, then, means that for the study and understanding of diplomacy in its different meanings and perspectives, approaches in the framework of the science of international relations and the framework of emerging diplomatic studies are not sufficient, and a sociological component is necessary, to be used explicitly and independently for such study. This component is important also due to the developed and branched set of special sociologies, which, on the one hand, indicates the capability of concrete and narrow sociological focus on a precise object of research and, on the other hand, highlights the flexibility of sociology as a science, adapting as it does with its internal diversification to social changes and responding to them with the methods of its scientific attentiveness and capacity for research.

As far as forming and shaping a sociology of diplomacy as a special sociology is concerned, we can say that the above mentioned certainly speaks in its favor. As is evident from the contributions in the present monograph and from this introductory study, it can be noted that for such application there certainly stand out the sociology of work, organization, law, globalization, and international relations, as they deal with fields encompassed also by an understanding of diplomacy in its numerous and varied definitions, while the sociology of international relations can already be understood as a sociological transition from the science of international relations to the sociology of diplomacy. We speak more about this in later parts of this study.

For the current – and not temporally arbitrary – formation of a sociology of diplomacy, in our view there are two reasons which stand out, namely the intensification of the globalizing process and changes in the functioning of diplomacy.[7]

On the one hand, it is a fact that the globalizing process permeates and connects the current international community into such a degree of interdependence that its understanding is impossible without sound and detailed sociological contemplation.[8] Diplomacy as a factor for transmission and for connecting actors and ensuring their formal and indirect communication, when speaking of state or governmental actors in this global community, is thus an integral component of this sociological attention. Furthermore, we believe that it is precisely in the degree of entanglement and interdependence where we can look for a basis or starting point for its sociological study, i.e. its interpretation and contemplation.

Here, on the other hand, it is our opinion that diplomacy has in the past period of perhaps two decades, basically since the end of the Cold War, undergone such changes (these were indicated earlier, but had only been decisively aggregated by the globalizing integration surge at that moment) that the understanding thereof – again – is impossible without a sociological approach.[9] We could even note that the understanding of the social basis and role of diplomacy in its current phase of development is impossible without understanding and knowing globalization as a process (its key characteristic being "progress towards greater interdependence and

7 Bučar (2007: 863) lists the development of science and technology, as well as the development of socioeconomic relations, Leguey-Feilleux (2009: viii) in the same sense deals with the influence of technology, the role of non-state actors, and changes in the diplomatic profession.

8 Steger speaks of a "complex chain of global interdependencies" (2009: 4), where he notes "interdependence" in the plural and thereby emphasizes the degree of structural entanglement.

9 According to Benko (1998: 40), diplomacy is in a function of the historical situation, which likewise draws attention to the need for a sociological approach to its study, its understanding, and its application.

connectedness" – Steger, 2009: 10).[10] In favor of a sociological approach to such research, it must be added that the extent, variety, and structural entanglement and complexity of globalization make precisely sociology the key science that enables knowing and understanding of globalization. This is supported by noting that globalization is probably "best understood as a multidimensional set of social processes resisting their understanding through any individual thematic framework, as the transformative power of globalization reaches deep into economic, political, cultural, technological, and environmental perspectives of modern social life" (Steger, 2009: ix–x). And that which has been mentioned opens up space for a sociological contemplation on diplomacy, its social role and meaning.

Diplomacy is also no longer simply an institution of the nation state,[11] that is, a territorially defined institution, and is becoming – or is at least appearing as – an institution of the international community, undoubtedly demonstrated by e.g. the emerging diplomacy of the EU. Likewise, diplomacy is markedly changing its staff with regard to their social origins, that is the sociologically understood origin of its members – from the prevailing aristocracy of just a century ago, characterized predominantly by social proximity to the ruler and the features stemming thereof (reliability, confidentiality, international connections), to its current basis in professional affiliation, which consists of appropriately trained individuals who have chosen the activity as their profession and from which stem those features of the vocation once typical of its aristocratic basis.

We can therefore say that the intensification of globalization after the end of the Cold War had such a strong and important influence on the mode of diplomatic activity that it not only necessitates a sociological approach but also a sociological framework within which the study and understanding thereof is to be ensured. To simplify and partially

10 As emphasized by Eitzen and Zinn, globalization was enhanced in the last decades of the twentieth century and experienced an acceleration at the beginning of the twenty-first. (2009: 7).

11 However, it is clear, as Petrič says, that "diplomacy (…) is still the most important organ of the state for foreign affairs. Diplomacy is the only organ of the state which exclusively, permanently, systematically, and professionally deals with the foreign relations of the state. It is a specific activity primarily because of its subject (foreign policy or international relations), because of the territory on which it operates (abroad), because of sensitivity (the issue of confidentiality) and because of its own technique or its own modus operandi" (2010: 341).

summarize, this is exhibited firstly in the nature and dynamics of social changes or changes in society (interdependence, structural complexity, the question of the existence of an international community, influence), secondly in the changes directly concerning diplomats (the already mentioned transition from the aristocratic to the official: aristocrats held the influence, connections, and mandates to decide, they were an international elite acquainted with each other in advance, while officials do their work and it is questionable to what extent they are decision-makers and whether they even want to be, their mandates are narrower, there is the question of their access to and influence in both domestic and foreign circles, in short, themes connected to sociological origins) and, lastly, in the consequent changes in diplomacy as an activity, a process, and an organization.

The theoretical view

We first ask ourselves what conditions or criteria need to be fulfilled in order to be able to claim that an intellectual endeavor is meaningful (enough) in order to become a science (general or special), in our case a social science or a special sociology.[12]

We speak of at least four basic conditions, namely: first, each 'good' science must be systematic, i.e. internally consistent, and may not through its premises and their implementation lead to contradictions. Second, the science must be supported with empirical evidence which must be gathered in a demanding, systematic, and rigorous manner. The degree of difficulty thereof is what separates science from the general, for example from pseudo-scientific activity. Third, a science is continuously changing. Scientific knowledge is never final and ultimately valid, and is always possible to be improved and developed, to be built upon. Mistakes or errors are identified or are recognized through conclusions yielded by new empirical validation and research. Science adopts such findings by modifying or adjusting its theoretical concepts, or rejects them altogether with at least equally weighty conclusions and explanations as to why they are unacceptable.[13] In addition we may note that "on a general level, the process by which

12 In our view the sociology of diplomacy is a special sociology, thus a scientific discipline within the frame of general sociology. We may also use the term special science or sub-discipline.

13 Summary of Bruce, 2000: 1–3.

scientific sub-disciplines are institutionalized (that is, constituted – M.J.) is composed of two phases. In the first, a particular theoretical framework is needed as a means of defining and persisting with the new specialization (sub-discipline – M.J.). And in the second attention is directed towards broadening the initial basis for shaping the new specialization, and for carrying out both research as well as institutionalizing this specialization, whereby the principles 'practicality' and 'relevancy' assure the growth of empirical production" (Hunt, 2001: xi).

On a general level we may say that sociology represents a consistent scientific effort directed towards the study of society and which concerns itself with the systematic study of the operation, organization/organizing, development, and types of human societies. Sociology does not exist as an exclusive, tightly connected and whole discipline, since within it there exist a wide range of subjects that deal with all aspects and all kinds of societies.[14] This is expressed in the different special sociologies, such as the sociology of family, education, culture, youth, mass media, sport, art, science and knowledge, if we add to those already mentioned (Jary and Jary, 2005: 588–589). We add to this that "we can describe sociology also as a study of social structures and social institutions" (Bruce, 2000: 18), where it is necessary to keep in mind that "reality is always socially constructed" (ibid., 30). Sociology distinguishes itself, firstly, by aiming to be balanced and disinterested, secondly, by being led by empirical evidence, and thirdly, by dealing with the general and the typical and not so much with the specific (ibid., p.49). This means that sociology studies the essence of all social phenomena and thereby human society as a whole and – understandably – also its development. Sociology defines the concept of human society as the entirety of all social phenomena, after this the laws of linking all these phenomena into a whole and the laws of development of society as a whole (cf. Jambrek, 1992: 20). Sociology therefore appears as a wide, general science, directed at the study of human society as a whole and internally specialized into different parts, fields, and themes of study. And – or especially – as Jambrek points out, "sociology is a

14 At the same time we know of efforts and attempts to create a so-called grand sociological theory, which through its approach and methodological apparatus would be capable of encompassing social totality. Cf. e.g. Langer, 1992.

discipline about *man as a social being* (italics P.J.), it is a discipline about his effects on society and about his social conditionality. At the same time, it is a discipline about all those more or less complicated and composite, larger or smaller networks of interhuman relations, groups, communities, associations and affiliations *which are unique phenomena* (italics P.J.), different from a simple sum of their parts" (1992: 26). Sociology therefore is, as Langer emphasizes, "...a method of self-interpretation of modern society (…), some sort of processed, collective self-awareness (…) it is scientific self-understanding of man" (1992: 1). This scientific reflexion is, on the one hand, directed at man as an individual and, on the other hand, at society as that whole composed of individuals and the by these individuals established institutions through which social relations and processes are conducted, which allows us to know and understand the operation of both man as well as society and may enable us at least in part to predict and at least hypothetically prevent unintended consequences of actions. Whenever we are studying specific sections or phenomena instead of society as a whole, then we are dealing with particular or special sociologies (cf. Jambrek, 1992: 71).

To justify a special science, as we believe the sociology of diplomacy is, one must define terminology and methodology, the field and the object of research, as well as identify the scientific work done to date and, in particular, ensure its continuation. At the same time it must be known that "on the one hand special sociologies and the appropriate empirical studies adopt their cognitive conceptual instruments (means, apparatus) from the common stock (fund) of general sociological theory, and on the other hand this general sociological knowledge is supplemented through their original theoretical findings" (Jambrek, 1992: 74). With this, we have at least in principle a small part of the answer to our previously posed notion of fulfilling the necessary conditions for constituting a special sociology. With this argumentation we may seek the aid of Murray, who says that in an optimal sense "diplomatic studies could learn and borrow a lot from international relations" (Murray et al., 2011: 722).

Without sufficient determination of the presence of the aforementioned conditions we cannot speak of the existence of a concrete special sociology, but we can – if we determine an approximating of their fulfilment – speak of shaping the conditions for its formation, i.e. its constituting. Or, to summarize following Gurvitch, they represent "the precise frame of this new discipline, its *object* and its *method*, as well as the fundamental *problems* to be solved" (2001: 60–61; italics M.J.). Alongside theoretical contemplation, empirics, as has been noted, are of crucial importance, as sociological "theories and explanations must be based on clear observations of the real world" (Bruce, 2000: 98). Here we must keep in mind that "special sociologies mean the use of general sociological theory for solving problems presented to the sociologist by the commissioner of the study or by his own scientific interest" (Jambrek, 1992: 70).[15] Yet the object of scientific attention in special sociologies are not only concrete areas of human/social engagement as such (e.g. diplomacy) but "human social behavior in any way linked to them" (ibid.).[16] Here we also see the criterion for distinguishing between diplomatic studies and the sociology of diplomacy, which as independent and differing (constituting) scientific disciplines are therefore in a complementary relation, and each with its realizations not only contributes to its own strengthening but also towards the strengthening of the other. Diplomatic studies, generally speaking, deal with the study of diplomacy, its methods, means, and ways of operation as well as the content thereof, while the sociology of diplomacy focuses primarily on diplomacy as the result and consequence of the actions of diplomats and institutions that produce the social relations within this framework and which are characteristic for diplomatic activity and with the circumstances and consequences connected to it. When studying diplomacy as a result and consequence of the mentioned operation, the processes and circumstances that enable this result are of course included in this study.

The general starting points mentioned must be taken into account when shaping or establishing each scientific discipline. When speaking of a

15 We assume that it is evident from this introductory study that our attempt to constitute a sociology of diplomacy as a special sociology is based on 'own scientific interest'.

16 The field of research is thus at least approximately defined by diplomatic activity, which is a result of the activities of diplomats, and these are the relations and processes taking place, on the one hand, within diplomatic organization and, on the other hand, between it and its diplomatic as well as general environment.

sociology of diplomacy and its establishment, we have it somewhat easier, as we can draw on the methodological sophistication of general sociology and the interactive relationship between it and the special sociologies, and rely on the existence of a whole series of the latter. By knowing their definitions, we can help ourselves to define the sociology of diplomacy (which we will demonstrate in the continuation of this introductory study).

Thus we can essentially say that the sociology of diplomacy uses the terminology and methodology developed by general sociology and which is used in some other special sociologies. In the next step, we draw attention to the specific object of study of the sociology of diplomacy, and for its delineation the intersection with related disciplines, in particular with some special sociologies (as prominent we have already mentioned the sociology of work, of organization, of law, of globalization, and of international relations). Going further, we must note any potential specific methods of research, if these are already known or determinable at the time of formation of the new discipline. A particularly demanding criterion is the existence of a certain minimum of scientific work, in order to be able to even speak of a new discipline or determine the possibility of its establishment. Last but not least, we must develop and ensure a capability for generalizing the conclusions drawn from studying concrete, i.e. specific and particular phenomena, and its spillover into generally valid trends and laws which are then available for continuous validation.

And yet, as we are at the very beginning of the process of constituting a sociology of diplomacy and as in our view there are several parallels with certain other selected special sociologies, we believe that ensuring empirical production, that is, concrete research, even if it is not exactly or at all defined to which scientific discipline it belongs or into which it can be placed, is at least as important for the development of the new discipline as ensuring theoretical contemplation on the sociology of diplomacy. As Devin says or is convinced, if we look at a related special sociology, then "the treatment suggested by the 'sociology of international relations' necessitates above all the development of empirical studies" (2008: 14).

In any case, we believe that sufficient advice and a possibly applicable methodological starting point for initial theorizing on the sociology of diplomacy can be found in Bučar's comment (although its concrete content deals with his definition of regions), which in our view is also useful in a general methodological sense, namely, when he says that one could "agree that the definition of a region depends on the author of the definition. And the author is always limited by the field in which he works (which he studies), by the scientific discipline in which he writes, by the dimensionality he deals with, by the field about which he writes, and by the structure he adopts" (Massart-Pierard in Bučar, 1995: 6). With this, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the sociology of diplomacy does not have a theoretical concept designed in advance (and could not have one) nor a methodological apparatus, yet with regard to both it at least initially draws on and starts from – as has been mentioned – the hitherto developed arsenal of both general sociology as well as at least some, for the purposes of our contemplation, noteworthy special sociologies.[17]

The object and methods of study

We add to the aforementioned on the subject of the sociology of diplomacy (phenomena, relations and processes in diplomatic organization and its environment, including the diplomat as the central actor) that the objects of study are also the relations and processes that arise and are conducted between the subjects and institutions, i.e. between the players – carriers of different social roles – and the organizations in which these carriers are active. These players are the diplomats and the organizations are the foreign ministries that, together with the network of diplomatic-consular representations, we understand or define as the diplomatic organization. This is that field determined by the diplomatic frame of the nation state, to which must be added the field determined by the frame of

17 At the same time we do not wish to say or indirectly indicate that we are in a dilemma regarding either a theoretical concept or a methodological apparatus – although even if we were, this dilemma would be no greater or smaller than those present in any attempt at constituting any kind of new special sociology. The difference lies, in our view, only in that the growth in number of special sociologies to a certain extent facilitates conceptual and methodological approaches for constituting new special sociologies, since for both one can draw on the intersections, overlaps, and verifications of preceding attempts of the sort. Yet the aforementioned is of no use if the constituting of a new special sociology lacks a basic idea, an outlined subject area and problems which this sociology is to treat and thereby gradually constitute itself. We believe – and demonstrate this in this study – that in the case of the sociology of diplomacy, the basic conditions for such an endeavour are fulfilled.

international organizations (in particular those like the UN, the EU, NATO, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the like with developed structures also for diplomatic and not only bureaucratic activity). Both levels are intertwined and this creates a new interactive or network space in which the mentioned relations are conducted from an additional perspective. The latter is, for the states which are members of the EU, becoming increasingly internal diplomatic space, while typically external diplomatic communications and interactions are transferred to the space outside, and are conducted in relations with third subjects (e.g. the regular summits of the EU and the USA, the Russian Federation, the states of Latin America and the Caribbean, China, and Japan). Between the aforementioned spaces or levels it is not possible, nor probably necessary, to always draw clear boundaries.

As diplomacy is an activity that is being realized in the international environment or through communication between the representatives of national and international institutions in the international environment, this must be taken into consideration when determining the area of operation of the sociology of diplomacy and defining the aforementioned subjects or players. The interweaving of these environments and the mobility of players in a thusly outlined frame represent the crucial setting for studying the aforementioned relations, and thereby also one of the key focal points producing cases for empirical work in the sociology of diplomacy.

In this sense, it is therefore necessary on the one hand to speak of the diplomatic environment and on the other hand of the diplomatic community. The former consists of the environments in which diplomats work (the sending state and the receiving state, as well as international organizations, that is, in subjects of accreditation and in their intersections) while the latter consists of the diplomats which work in these environments. Thus we can speak of the relations and interactions between diplomats within particular environments and between particular environments as well as interactions between not only diplomats as individuals but also different (social, national, interest-based, etc.) groups of diplomats in different environments. The diplomatic community and environment in which diplomats work is therefore understood as a flexible network of social relations in which the aforementioned interactions and relations take place and which represent the object of study for the sociology of diplomacy.

This, on the one hand, utilizes sociology's methodological toolbox in order to study the phenomena, relations, and processes that are formed and conducted on that field of human activity expressed through involvement with diplomacy (in whichever understanding of it), and, on the other hand, which focuses on the contents that diplomats deal with when shaping and implementing foreign policy, and the method of executing these tasks (diplomatic functions) in particular social, naturally international, environments.[18] This essentially determines the way they behave in the intersection of the national and international environment or in the social structures which are becoming increasingly dependent on processes in the globalized community.

The set of methods utilized by special sociologies, including the emerging sociology of diplomacy, stems from the general methodological toolbox of sociology. In principle there cannot be any particular differences here, except for perhaps the frequency of use or the more or less specific applicability of different methods. Accordingly, it should be sufficient for the purposes of this study, with regard to general familiarity with at least the fundamental sociological methods, to note four selected sociological methodological references among many, namely Jambrek (1992: 28–62), Fulcher and Scott (2011: 69–108), Ragin (2007) and Toš and Hafner-Fink (1998).

The importance of some other special sociologies

We can claim with certainty that the meaning of some other, for our contemplation prominent, special sociologies lies predominantly in their contact and distinctiveness in relation to the sociology of diplomacy. Through this, we on the one hand learn and identify the boundary between them, and on the other hand identify their meeting points, as it is the same general sociological frame within which scientific specialization, dependent on the object of study and its specifics, occurs. It would be difficult to say that the processes of scientific realization in the different

18 Given the increasingly accelerated permeation of the internal with the international, the latter emphasis may be so self-evident that it need not be mentioned.

special sociologies have nothing in common, even though there are different special sociologies, as there exists a substantial similarity and also a certain equality of utilization of the same scientific and research methods, as well as a transfer of approaches in addition to theoretical and empirical guidelines on how to tackle different fields and objects of treatment, and certainly also on how to constitute new special sociologies. This also means that with each new special sociology and with the progress of research processes within them, the scope and substance of general sociological methods and approaches as verified in specific concrete cases is increased. In our view also this is a useful reference for the use of the same methods in new special sociologies.

We have already mentioned the special sociologies which we believe hold prominent importance for defining the sociology of diplomacy, these being the sociology of work, of organization, of law, of globalization, and of international relations. In the continuation we therefore present some basic views on their understanding and comment on them as well as summarize them, in order to determine their specialty, and to extract from them those emphases and aspects that could help us in designing the elements for defining a sociology of diplomacy, and thereby contribute to supporting our position in justifying its constituting.[19]

The sociology of work has at the core of its scientific consideration the sociological analysis of work and its organization (and organizing), where the general object of scientific consideration is analyzed or treated in a wider comparative social context, in particular through interactions with social, economic, and political institutions. It is possible to emphasize two other prominent aspects, these being, first, the importance of vocational specialization (e.g. professionalism) and second, the division of labor as the central unifying theme.[20] For the framework of our study, a noteworthy emphasis may be on the influence of the globalizing process on the changing organization and methods of work, and its introduction into the sociological study and interpretation thereof of new questions and aspects which are reflections of the complexity of the dynamic and

19 As we are listing the general characteristics and looking for their specific aspects and those they have in common, our basic source in this section of the study is Jary and Jary, 2005.

20 Ibid., 598.

interlinked nature of working conditions.[21] A similarly deep influence is exerted by globalization also on diplomacy (changes in the methods of work, new contents that diplomats deal with, and changes in the ways of representation),[22] and this is where we see the junction of the two special sociologies.

The sociology of organization is defined by the use of perspectives, approaches, and discourses on themes close to the central themes of general sociology and are derived primarily from Weber's understanding of the ideal type of bureaucratic organization. Attention is centered on studying all types of organizations in order to develop a general theory of organizations, to develop a typology of organizations, and to explain the similarities and differences between organizational structures.[23] Here we must particularly consider the fact that it is very difficult to draw boundaries between the interdisciplinary studies undertaken by organizational theory and the sociology of organizations. Thus Jary and Jary (2005: 594 and 438), in their treatment of the sociology of organization and organizational sociology, refer to organizational theory, which represents sociological and multidisciplinary analysis of organizational structures and the dynamics of social relations in organizations. Prominent among the themes dealt with are structures (formal and informal), the decision-making process, management, professionalism, and organizational changes. The interdisciplinarity of these studies is particularly linked to disciplines such as psychology, economics and management and administrative sciences and theories. [24]

The sociology of law represents the sociological study of the social context, development, and functioning of law as a system of rules and sanctions, special institutions and personnel as well as different forms of law, which make up a legal system in complex societies (along with equally complex systems of morality and mechanisms of social control).[25] Igličar states that the sociology of law is that special sociology "which deals predominantly with legal relations, that is, with those actual social

21 Cf. e.g. Pettinger, Parry, Taylor and Glucksmann, 2006: 1–36.
22 Cf. Jazbec, 2009a: 53–56, and Neumann, 2007.
23 Jary and Jary, 2005: 438.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 593.

relations into which legal norms reach and which they help shape. The sociology of law must derive from the knowledge of general sociological theory and use sociological methods in explaining law as a social phenomenon" (2004: 11). He continues to add that "the vantage point of the sociology of law covers law as a stratified and constructed social relation, as a social fact and experience. Sociology can treat law as one of many social phenomena through the use of sociological research methods and through the application of general sociological theories on legal phenomena" (ibid., 14).

The sociology of globalization has been constituted in recent years in a dual sense, namely, on the one hand, as a common denominator for different traditional sociological sub-disciplines, and, on the other hand, as a theoretical endeavor or project.[26] Due to this it is not unexpected that we deal with a special sociology of immense complexity, with a heterogenous range of research themes and fields which have in common a sociological contemplation on the probably most typical, prominent, and crucial as well as rich, perhaps even contradictory, characteristics of modern (global) society.[27] This complexity, both as a phenomenon and a field of research, is confirmed by the fact that globalization represents exceptional social and economic change, where societies and states strive to adapt to an increasingly interconnected but also unpredictable and uncertain world.[28] For this reason the sociology of globalization is certainly in a different position than other special sociologies, as its object of study is universal and global and thereby an unavoidable object of the scientific attention of other, not only sociological, disciplines. Yet for our discussion on the sociology of diplomacy, it is an important special sociology, as it studies that current phenomenon which to a large extent influences the marked social conditionality of diplomacy in its current phase of development,

26 Robinson, 2009: 5.

27 For understanding the sociology of globalization, important are, at minimum as a starting point, e.g. Rizman (2008) and Sassen (2007), and for globalization e.g. Eitzen and Zinn (2009). And Benko e.g. says that among "the definitions of globalizations the most suitable is the aspect that understands this process as a relative qualitative widening of social relations onto the entire world without regard to borders and distances." (2000: 15).

28 Jary and Jary, 2005: 252.

due to which the necessity of its sociological study is significantly more obvious and unavoidable than has been the case in the past.

The sociology of international relations certainly may derive from the assumption that "international relations are to be treated as a social given" (Devin, 2008: 13) and that in our view an understanding of international relations necessitates "a linking of analysis of international facts with the realizations of general sociology" (ibid., 14). Benko emphasizes the importance of implementing "sociology and sociological methods in the research field of international relations" (2000: 8), which means "the research of relations between society and state also in this field" (ibid.). According to his understanding, the "sociology of international relations – as a branch of sociological science – is in essence a sociology of the global community, its historical and structural assumptions, its evolution from embryonic stages to the period in which we are now living, when the trends of globalization predict that we are nearing the point" (ibid., 11) when a "closed, all-encompassing world" (ibid.) is emerging. Support for a sociological study of international relations can be found in the structure of the international community, "with the processes and relations taking place in it, as well as the actors that give it life" (ibid., 49), and in the fact that there exists a "sociological interpretation of the state as an international factor" (ibid., 164). These are the remarks from which we can derive the relevance of a sociological understanding and treatment of diplomacy, which is in its basic intention still primarily tied to the (nation) state or a society organized as a state. The fact that we understand diplomacy, as has been mentioned, as a social process of shaping and implementing foreign policy, confirms in this the possibility and necessity of a specific sociological contemplation on diplomacy.

We add to this general and brief overview of five special sociologies, in our view most linked to the sociology of diplomacy, some remarks on the sociology of education, of arts, of knowledge, and of science. We believe their definitions, particularly methodologically, to be additionally useful for attempting to define a sociology of diplomacy and for its constitution.

The sociology of education represents an application of sociological theories, perspectives and research methods to the analysis of educational processes and practices, in the centre of attention of which is the study of educational institutions that in modern societies are specialized for ensuring education.[29] The sociology of art is an area of sociological analysis that deals with studying different forms of art and focuses predominantly on organizational and institutional analysis of the functioning of agencies involved in artistic and cultural production as well as their relations with the public.[30] The sociology of knowledge is a branch of sociology that studies the social processes which are included in the production of knowledge and the processes taking place between general forms of knowledge and structures. Generally speaking, the sociology of knowledge is included in numerous grand sociological theories, its boundaries are not strict, and it overlaps with other special sociologies such as the sociology of science, of religion, of art, and of literature.[31] The sociology of science is likewise a branch of sociology dealing with the study of social processes included in the production of scientific knowledge and its social implications.[32]

If we now, with an interim methodological step, at the conclusion of our look at some selected special sociologies and their influence on and importance for the sociology of diplomacy, were to summarize the prominent elements from these presentations and contemplations, we could say that they represent the basis for a comparative justification of a sociology of diplomacy.

All examples deal with sociological treatment of the subject matter (work, organization, law, globalization, international relations, education, art, knowledge, science), whereby this treatment is formulated as e.g. sociological analysis, the study and application of a sociological approach both to the object of study as well as to its interactions with the environment, be this direct or through the institutions that produce a concrete object (education, art, bureaucratic organization, etc.). The study is conducted within a social context and focuses for example on the processes, relations, institutions, and personnel, as well as on their social implications. We have noticed an emphasis on the incompletely defined boundaries of special

29 Ibid., 590.
30 Ibid., 589.
31 Ibid., 592–593.
32 Ibid., 595.

sociologies (e.g. of knowledge), because of which its field of research partly overlaps with the research fields of other related special sociologies. As far as defining the sociology of diplomacy is concerned, we believe that it is in essence the same approach, that is, a sociological study of diplomacy and its social conditionality, its process nature, and its relations to the social environment (diplomatic, political, general) through diplomats and the institutions that produce and project the results of diplomatic activity, including the treatment of their social implications.

An overview of some definitions of diplomacy and their sociological aspects

As we believe that our shaping of a definition of a sociology of diplomacy can be aided by an overview of the definitions of diplomacy, we list and comment on a selected few in what follows, and summarize those perspectives from which we can, in our view, draw a connection to an understanding of the sociology of diplomacy. In this we focus on those definitions already dealt with and with which we are therefore already familiar.[33]

Satow lists (1994: 3) the following four elements for a definition of diplomacy:[34]

- Diplomacy is the *management of international relations* through negotiations.
- Diplomacy is the method by which ambassadors and delegates regulate and manage these relations.
- Diplomacy is the business or the skill of *diplomats*.
- Diplomacy is competence or performance in implementing international dialogue and negotiations.

Emphasized is the perspective through which Satow understands diplomacy as the management of international relations (through negotiation), thus as a social process, and the stress on the diplomat as the actor in this process.

33 Summarized following Jazbec, 2009a: 19–21. How diplomacy is understood by Jönsson in Hall (2005), and where we see reinforcement for constituting a sociology of diplomacy in their work, will be tackled in the concluding section of this study, where we present and comment on some publications and statements from the field considered.

34 The use of italic font in this segment is of the author.

Nicolson (1963/1988: 3–5) lists the following five elements for a conception of diplomacy:

- Diplomacy is a synonym for 'foreign policy'.
- Diplomacy means negotiations.
- Diplomacy is the *processes* and the means by which these negotiations are carried out.
- Diplomacy is part of the foreign ministry.
- Diplomacy is an abstract ability or talent.[35]

Nicolson, too, places special emphasis on understanding diplomacy as a process of negotiation (not only in an operative but also in a substantive sense). The diplomat as an actor can be indirectly detected in the last aspect.

Barston (1988/2006: 1) places as the starting point of his analysis of modern diplomacy the following definition of diplomacy: "Diplomacy deals with the management of *relations* between states and between states and other factors. From a state perspective diplomacy deals with *advising, shaping, and implementing foreign policy*. As such it is the means by which states, through their formal and other representatives as well as other factors, express, coordinate, and ensure their partial or general *interests*, employing for this cables, private talks, the exchange of views, convincing, visits, threats, and other similar activities."

Also in Barston we can recognize at least an indirect understanding of diplomacy as a process, when he speaks of advising, shaping, and implementing foreign policy. With this, the author includes an understanding of relations and interests. The diplomat is understood or seen as a formal representative of the state.

Morgenthau (1948/1995: 660–667) begins by saying that with diplomacy in its widest sense one can understand "*an entire range of foreign policy activities,*"[36] and then says that diplomacy has for its operation two instruments at its disposal, these being the foreign affairs service in the capital city of its own state and the diplomatic representatives sent to the capital cities of foreign states. A *diplomat* according to him is predominantly a symbolic representative of his own state, and must as such

35 Both classics do not actually present complete definitions of diplomacy, but label it with the listed elements which they, later on in their texts, elaborate upon and study in more detail.

36 This emphasis is added to the reference of his definition in Jazbec, 2009a: 20.

incessantly exercise symbolic gestures and expose himself to the symbolic gestures of other diplomats and the foreign state in which he is accredited. These gestures are on the one hand a test of the prestige enjoyed by his state abroad, and on the other hand a test for the prestige with which his own state regards the state in which the representative is accredited (cf., 663).

An understanding of diplomacy as a process is quite obvious in Morgenthau, and at the same time he explicitly speaks of the diplomat as the actor in this process.

Benko (1998: 40), with emphasis on the substantive and particularly the methodological sense, says the following: "Diplomacy is an institution of a society organized as a state, which was formed alongside the emergence and development of international relations with the task to *represent* the state and its interests on an indirect and formalized level, to translate these into oral and written agreements, and by the instrument of negotiations coordinate cooperative and resolve conflicting relations between them."

An understanding of diplomacy as a process derives from the emphasis on representing a state and by the inclusion of relations between states in the definition.

Bohte and Sancin (2006: 25–26) state four different perspectives on the concept of diplomacy:

- first, the concept of diplomacy is in its widest sense used as a synonym for foreign policy and the *activity* of the state in international relations;
- second, in numerous countries the term diplomacy is defined in a positive sense as tact, attention, politeness or manners, and sometimes negatively as duplicity, dishonesty, immorality, and cunning;
- third, diplomacy denotes skillfulness, the mastery of the knowledge and methods of this activity when performing in international politics,
- and fourth, diplomacy means a profession, a career (diplomatic service), and includes all *functions* carried out by a *diplomat*.

Understanding diplomacy as an activity of the state indicates it as a process that includes all functions carried out by a diplomat, that is, by the actor of this process.

Brglez (1998: 61) says that "diplomacy can be operationally defined as the instrument of peaceful *mediation* among subjects of international law and at the same time as a form and *process* of their mutual communications".

Diplomacy is understood as a factor of mediation and as a process of communication, which indicates its social conditionality.

Last but not least, our understanding of the definition of diplomacy (Jazbec, 2009a: 21) could be summarized by saying that diplomacy is, on the one hand, a way of *managing relations* between sovereign states (and other subjects of international law) in a peaceful manner (talks, negotiations), while, on the other hand, diplomacy is as an *organization* (the foreign ministry and diplomatic-consular representations) a means for implementing this management of relations between sovereign states (and other subjects of international law) and their foreign policies. To the emphasis mentioned, we add an understanding of diplomacy as a way of managing relations carried out through diplomatic organization.

If we were to summarize the key emphases of the mentioned definitions of diplomacy, and attempt to find in them a basis for its social conditionality and thereby highlight the therefrom derived potential understanding of a sociology of diplomacy, we would stress that in each definition we find an interpretation of diplomacy as a social process (managing international relations, the negotiating process, advising, shaping, and implementing foreign policy, foreign policy activities, representation of a state and the relations between states, a process of communication, a method of managing relations), and in most a reference to the diplomat as the actor of this process (or at least an indirect hint towards him). With this, we would like to draw attention to the breadth of the mentioned definitions of diplomacy that enable the inclusion of a sociological approach to the study of the social conditionality of diplomacy and also its constitution in the form of a special sociology. We believe the aforementioned to be additional support for the possibility and necessity of its constitution.

We now add to the aforementioned a few short remarks from current perspectives on diplomacy, as found in some prominent authors and which we have until now not mentioned.[37]

37 By this we mean both the present introductory study as well as the other works of the author mentioned in it.

Sharp (Murray et al., 2011: 717) understands diplomacy as "the institutions and processes by which states, and to a growing extent others, represent themselves and their interests to each other in international and global company". Wiseman (ibid., 711) summarizes the English school of understanding diplomacy, noting that it is both an order-creating institution of the international community, as well as a process that includes the rules and practice for managing interstate relations. Criekemans (ibid., 715) stresses that "diplomacy has become a multilevel project, in which different policy levels (macroregional, national, cross-border, sub-state: regions and cities) generate specific types of diplomatic activity that reflect the specific needs as they are perceived on different territorial levels". As a synopsis we could note three emphases that we see, in what has briefly been mentioned, as important support for the concretization of the necessity for a sociological approach in the study and understanding of diplomacy, these being firstly, diplomacy as a process, secondly, diplomacy as an institution of the international community, and thirdly, diplomacy as an activity that reflects the needs of different territorial levels. In connection with this we add that sociological study and understanding is explicitly mentioned by Murray, when he notes the "neglected philosophical, sociological, and psychological study of diplomacy" (ibid.,720), and by Melissen, who says that "one can only guess whether economists, sociologists, and others will leave their mark on the study of diplomacy" (ibid.,723). We would not like to go too far in our contemplation and argumentation, but let us still note Sharp, who says, when speaking of the changes in the method of representation in the functioning of diplomats, that "the modern international community of states can be understood as one of the most important, radical, and transformative products of its activity" (ibid.,718).[38]

Some other selected aspects

We assume that the present social conditionality of diplomacy could additionally be supported by an understanding of the concept of multi-

38 With the just twice noted emphasis on the meaning of the diplomat and his activity, we additionally supported the importance of the diplomat as the initial and basic object of attention of the sociology of diplomacy, about which we have contemplated in the introductory part of this study.

track diplomacy. This encompasses nine levels or tracks of operation directed towards peacebuilding, whereby the first track is governmental and the rest are non-governmental (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 1–5).

They are: track one is governmental (establishing peace through diplomacy); track two is non-governmental (establishing peace by professional activity of experts for conflict resolution); track three is business action (the use of business subjects and approaches); track four is the activity of private persons or individuals (their personal inclusion and activity); track five is the activity of experts from the fields of research, training, and the educational system (peacebuilding through education); track six is the activity of activists (activists as proponents of particular values, concepts, ideas); track seven is action through the aid of faith; track eight is action through aid by collecting financial means (e.g. donations), and track nine is action through the media (ensuring and spreading information, shaping public opinion). To this we add the remark that the entire concept was developed from studying the activity of non-governmental actors (i.e. original first-track and second-track diplomacy), that is, from the "methods outside the formality of the government system (…) which refers to non-governmental, informal, and unofficial contact between individuals, or groups of individuals, or non-state actors" (ibid.). The goal of these multivector postmodern diplomatic activities is three-fold, this being firstly, to reduce or resolve conflicts between groups or nations, secondly, to reduce tensions, and thirdly, to affect the conceptualization and functioning of governmental diplomacy and thereby establish the basis for more formal negotiations (ibid.).[39]

We believe that the aforementioned can represent a step forward in the direction of constituting a sociology of diplomacy and that such a step would not have been possible e.g. in the middle of the 20th century or even earlier due to significantly different sociohistoric circumstances (a bipolar world order, a substantially lower degree of media development, and significantly lower interdependence and intertwining of the international community). In the present period, however, we observe a markedly enhanced and structurally broadened as well as more demanding social

39 The part dealing with multi-track diplomacy is summarized following Jazbec, 2011: 111.

background for diplomacy, and thereby also its social conditionality.

Aside from knowing and understanding at least a certain number of definitions of diplomacy and those aspects thereof that point towards sociological study of its social conditionality, we believe it is necessary to know and understand diplomatic functions (or the functions carried out by a diplomatic mission) and their development in the past few decades, which coincides with the development of communication technology. For the purposes of our study we examine this from two perspectives, namely, by on the one hand taking a cursory glance at the concrete social conditionality of specific functions, and on the other by looking at how diplomatic functions and their implementation have changed and are changing in the past period.[40]

The diplomatic functions, as noted in article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)[41], are as follows:[42]

- First, to represent the sending state in the receiving state.
- Second, to protect the interests in the receiving state of the sending state and its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law.
- Third, to negotiate with the government of the receiving state.
- Fourth, to ascertain by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state, and to report thereon to the government of the sending state.
- Fifth, to promote friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.

Certainly, we can say in general that both the diplomatic and the wider social environment in which the implementation of diplomatic functions occurs have changed a lot since the middle of the 60s of the previous century, when the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was accepted. The reasons for this are known and some of them we have already mentioned in this study.

40 Such an overview can in this study be only partial and general, although it certainly deserves a wider elaboration, which is in preparation.

41 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations – Dunajska konvencija o diplomatskih odnosih*, accepted on 18.4.1961 in Vienna, in force since 24.4.1964.

42 Cf. e.g. also Feltham, 1994: 3, and Jazbec, 2009a: 21.

To briefly comment, we can note that e.g. the function of representation has been greatly facilitated by the development of media technology, as the knowledge of the average inhabitant of the planet of most, but especially of the most important, states, has greatly improved due to the permanent accessibility of information, yet the diplomat remains indispensable as his presence, not to mention activity, represents the sending state in the receiving state physically, in concrete space and time, at concrete (diplomatic) events. If the former makes carrying out this function a lot easier, the latter does not become any less important, perhaps even more so, since the participants of such events can more critically and precisely measure and validate their (media) impressions of a concrete state on the basis of the behaviour of its diplomat. Next, the protection of interests is perhaps facilitated by the greater accessibility of the individual enabled by communication technology and by e.g. the fact that the citizens of the EU can turn to any diplomatic representation or consulate of any member state for help, yet the need for the protection of interests is continuously growing because of increasing flows of tourism, business, and migration; in short, globalization markedly increases the mobility of individuals and the aspects associated with it, including the need for increasing provision of interest protection. Further, the negotiating function is experiencing, due to the proliferation of diplomatic themes or topics on the diplomatic agenda, a remarkable evolution. We could say that because of the aforementioned and because of the inclusion of new topics on the diplomatic agenda, as well as non-diplomats in diplomatic activity, the negotiating function, while increasing, is more and more being carried out by non-diplomats and less and less by diplomats.[43] Further, the function of observing and reporting has probably experienced the most and the biggest changes, as a diplomat must more than ever select and validate information instead of just collecting it, while this information must be significantly more in the function of understanding as well as of exercising of various forms of persuasion and related influencing of the receiving state. Simply ensuring information on the subject of accreditation is to a large extent doable simply by using the internet and similar sources of information. The promotion of

43 For more on the negotiating function, see e.g. Meerts (1999).

friendly relations between states, as the last of the diplomatic functions listed, is also experiencing many changes, as numerous factors are including themselves in the establishing and deepening of friendly relations, from the governmental to the non-governmental to the individual, which may not substitute diplomatic activity though it greatly and in an important way supplements it.

We believe it is possible to write that the social background which both conditions and influences the implementation of diplomatic functions triggers a series of additional and different aspects of the conditionality of diplomatic functions and affects them with regard to their implementation, in particular with regard to that part which concerns the reflexion and outwardly projection of an entire society, not only the sphere of government and its politics (which to a certain, if only slight, extent is changing through new and different ways of forming government coalitions or governments following the latest parliamentary elections). To this we add that the essence of diplomatic functions remains unchanged; what is changing is the method and form of their implementation and the structural clarity and complexity of their sociohistoric background.[44]

We may add to all the aforementioned a brief thought on the future of diplomacy and the aspects of its social conditionality and interdependence that stem therefrom, and examine how and whether this can aid us in our research project. It is possible to note the assumption that in a period when a state makes more room for non-state actors in diplomatic activity,[45] the future of diplomacy – and thereby its social conditionality – reveals itself through the following five characteristics:[46] First, the present state of diplomacy as an institution can be designated as fragmented, as its competences are spread out over a large number of state and non-state actors and institutions; second, diplomacy is simultaneously becoming more public: the global public area is connected through social and technological networks and this strengthens the development of diplomatic capabilities; third, the new diplomacy is at the forefront of engagement, stems from great potential for mobilization, and emphasizes a managerial 'policy'

44 For changes in diplomacy in the 21st century, cf. e.g Bučar, 2007.
45 Cf. Jazbec, 2010.
46 Jazbec, 2011: 120.

approach; fourth, official diplomacy is and will remain predominant in the field of responsibility and legitimacy and will continue to utilize its access to policymakers; fifth, the new diplomats are competing with governmental activities and are gaining ground due to governmental inactivity (Kelley, 2010: 294).

The aforementioned distribution of specific competences of diplomacy and the increased public character of its functioning and responding (in particular due to the strengthening of social networks), which to a certain extent must impact on increasing its potential for mobilization or at least enables it, expands its social conditionality and broadens it from a relatively narrow governmental field to different social segments. In short, the widening of the social space from which the new or additional diplomatic (although non-governmental) actors come certainly enlarges the social conditionality of diplomacy.[47]

An overview of some publications from the sociology of diplomacy and references to the field

How then, on what basis, to constitute a special science, which does not exist and which lacks a sufficient empirical basis, at least not the kind that could easily be ascertained? We believe that what is needed is a relatively clear idea about the field and the method of its argumentation, that is, a particular theoretical starting point that could initiate a certain primary scientific production. We also believe that this is the approach that must be used (or that we are using) when constituting a sociology of diplomacy. If there would exist a noticeable scientific production dealing with the topic, we would theorize and generalize its practical basis and use it as a starting point, but as things stand, we must rely on offering a theoretical conceptual impulse to encourage potential scientific production, and thereby on the one hand strengthen our theoretical contemplation and on the other verify it.

In short, after the previously presented theoretical contemplation, let us turn to its empirical basis.

In our contemplations thus far, we have already mentioned our initial

47 Cf. also Jazbec, 2009a: 275–277, and Riordan, 2003: 129–136.

finding with regard to this issue: scientific production in the field of the sociology of diplomacy is at best very modest. This is nothing strange, as the term itself is very rare in sociological and diplomatic discourse, which is a consequence of the fact that – at least in our view – it is a scientific discipline in the making. Even when a discipline is already formulated and accepted in academic space, a certain amount of time must probably elapse in order to consolidate it and to accumulate the necessary quantity of empirical findings and material for scientific activity. We will be able to speak about this special sociology in a finalized manner only when a sufficient fund of texts will be in existence, and until then it will be a branch of science in the making (which does not impede us e.g. in its designation).

In what follows, we will in brief strokes present first those works and publications that in our view justify our initial contemplation on a sociology of diplomacy and which are known to the editor of this monograph.

We believe that of initial importance are three works by the editor of the monograph (Jazbec, 2000, 2001, and 2002), followed nearly a decade later by a thorough and very concrete empirical study on equal opportunities in Slovenian diplomacy (Jazbec et al., 2009 and 2011).

The first three publications present, in the framework of a comparative study of the establishing of diplomacies of new small states (Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) after the end of the Cold War, research contemplation on the sociological and organizational aspects of the functioning thereof. The themes treated and in individual parts upgraded and expanded are the following: the groups of which the diplomacies of small states are composed (particularly those that emerged after the end of the Cold War), the relations between these groups (cooperation and competition), the phenomenon of youth and feminization of diplomacy, the lack of resources (staff, finances, etc.), recruitment and mobility of diplomats, vertical and horizontal mobility as well as the promotion of diplomacy in diplomatic organization, recruitment of diplomats, the professionalization of diplomacy and relations between diplomats, etc. The most typical section of all three publications, as far as constituting a sociology of diplomacy is concerned, deals with the study of the groups which the aforementioned diplomacies were composed of at the beginning of their operation. This section of the discourse presents a typology of the groups, the relations among them, and the development of the groups and relations among them, and sets up certain generalizations in the form of models. We believe that for this reason, this section could represent an attempt at an initial and practical justification for the sociology of diplomacy in one of the possible segments of its manifestation and by the use of some of its fundamental research and interpretive methods, while simultaneously it offers the presented models as a starting point for similar studies.[48] These are in our view those topics that we understood in the treated period as crucial for constituting a sociology of diplomacy, though they are by far not the only ones, not then and not today.

All three listed sources present in different wording and to different extents contemplations on the mentioned topics, while the first two (2000 and 2001) explicitly refer to naming the new field as the sociology of diplomacy.[49] The second already presents a view of this field as "an approach and starting point for further theoretical conceptualization and empirical study of new diplomacies, based on a broad selection of methods to date developed by sociology for the study of social phenomena, and on the extensive practical experiences which these new diplomacies have in the first decade of their operation contributed to this scientific field" (Jazbec, 2001: 207–208). The aforementioned cannot be designated as a definition of the sociology of diplomacy, but in our view it, together with the noted set of topics, contains a series of elements for both understanding this new field as well as for an attempt at defining and conceptualizing it.

For the discussion on equal opportunities in Slovenian diplomacy (Jazbec et al., 2009 and 2011) we can already say that it represents the first entire and complete research endeavour dedicated to an exclusively diplomatic topic, and which involved sociological reflexion. On the basis of extensive empirical research and an appropriate methodological apparatus and theoretical background within an interdisciplinary framework, the

48 Cf. Mal, 2009.

49 As has been mentioned in the editor's preface to this monograph, the first mention in a different source of the term sociology of diplomacy as an explicit name for a new scientific field is in Bohte and Sancin (2006: 30-31).

views of Slovenian diplomats on equal opportunity and the causes of inequality were examined, and suggestions for improvement presented. We believe that it was, on the one hand, a pioneering research project not only in the Slovenian but also the wider (diplomatic) environment, and, on the other hand, a very important contribution to the constituting of a sociology of diplomacy. The key topics dealt with in the mentioned monograph are: gender as a factor of differentiation, other factors of differentiation, the partners of diplomat abroad, and interpersonal relations. Other interdisciplinary contributions treat diplomacy as temporary work abroad in the grip of gender dichotomy, equality and equivalence, as well as with the issue of equal opportunity between illusion and reality.

Amongst other works and publications related to the sociology of diplomacy or which mention it, we refer to the following: Jönsson and Hall (2005), Stinchcombe (1994 and 1995), Allott (2002), Digol (2010) and Defrance and Chamot (2008).[50]

As was mentioned at the beginning of this study, the work of Jönsson and Hall (2005) is among those that in the previous decade decisively paved the path of emancipation of diplomatic studies from the wider interdisciplinary field of the science of international relations. The authors, by focusing on studying diplomacy predominantly as an (international) institution and not so much as a (diplomatic) method (ibid., 3), emphasize the need for and intent to theorize diplomacy or about it, and with this touch upon the complexity of diplomatic operation and at least to a certain extent go as far as discovering and arguing its social conditionality. Moreover, we believe that they do so by noting three key aspects of diplomacy, namely "communicating, representing, and reproducing international society" (ibid., 4), which they use as a (methodological) part of their theorizing on diplomacy. This is evident in their contemplation on the historical sociology of both international relations and diplomacy, already in the initial part of their study.[51] The authors suggest an understanding of diplomacy according

50 The browser Google lists the works mentioned, aside from Jazbec, 2001, most frequently in the first 68 hits on the first seven pages, from altogether 4080 hits for the search term 'Sociology of Diplomacy'. Among these hits, the works mentioned repeat themselves (6 works repeat themselves 50 times in 68 hits, 27 of which is Jazbec, 2001), as they are advertised by different publishing companies (Google, 2012).

51 This being in the second chapter with the title "Analytical frame" (24-38), the second section

to which it "plays a crucial role in mediating between universalism and particularism and thereby actually *constitutes* and *produces* international society" (ibid., 37, italics author). The mentioned third crucial aspect (reproduction) "refers to the way in which diplomacy contributes to the establishing and continuing of a particular international society" (ibid., 38), where with "reproduction they understand the processes by which polities or their groups maintain themselves *as such*" (ibid., italics author). As in the continuation they emphasize a "process approach" (ibid.), we believe that the mentioned work represents an important reference for the transition from diplomatic studies to a sociology of diplomacy, although the latter is not elaborated upon.

Stinchcombe, in his article (1994), later published in a book (1995), immediately announces that it is his "intention to develop a theory of the sociology of diplomacy, so as to be useful in explaining the diplomatic isolation of Haiti in the first two thirds of the 19th century" (1994: 1). In his book he additionally uses the formulation "political sociology of diplomacy" (1995: 235), although in neither of his two works does he explain the term (political) sociology of diplomacy. The author of the mentioned works presents the international circumstances, the course and results of Haitian independence, that is, a political analysis of events and processes, and does not contemplate diplomacy.

Allot (2002), too, indicates in his work an intention to come closer to a sociology of diplomacy, but he does not discuss the term nor does he explain it.[52] The mentioned section of the study deals with the sociological origin of selected influentials (aristocrats) who in the 19th century tailored the European political (and military) order in such a manner that they transposed onto the international space their internal social power and instrumentalized it. For this reason, we can conclude that his analysis of representative aristocracy is a contribution to the set of studies that in a sociological way illuminate different aspects of diplomacy.

Digol in her study (2010) presents and analyses the process of transformation of diplomatic elites in 27 European states after the end of

titled "Towards a historic sociology of diplomacy" (30–33).

52 The thirteenth chapter, entitled "International law and the international *courtly* mafia – Towards a sociology of diplomacy" (380–398), italics author.

the Cold War and in this discovers a series of similarities but also marked differences. Outstanding is the finding that political revolution was not followed by a revolutionary change in elites, particularly not of diplomatic elites. Given the theme and context of the research, we can undoubtedly claim that it is an important contribution to the set of empirical references of the sociology of diplomacy, although the author herself does not use this term.

Defrance and Chamot (2008) focus on a sociological treatment of sport as a potential factor (and thereby a diplomatic instrument) in the case of France in the period after the Second World War. This treatment is for us interesting as it confirms the possibility, to stop short of saying necessity, of sociological treatment of different themes and areas that appear in diplomatic work and on its agenda, as a sociological approach, in particular when done in the framework of sociology (general or special), sheds additional light on their social backgrounds and meanings.

Last but not least, we believe that there certainly exist a range of texts that touch upon this field from other scientific disciplines, e.g. international relations (legal, politological and sociological aspects), law, international security, defense themes, history, communicology, and others. In any case, it would be useful for the development of this field to register and gather them, as well as to examine them and study their contribution to its constitution.

An attempt at defining the sociology of diplomacy

In the concluding summary of our introductory contemplation on the sociology of diplomacy we could say that we have reached some conclusion that in our view represents a relatively ordered initial view – for both its further development as well as its contestation – of a new scientific discipline. Above all these ideas should offer a sufficient set of elements to enable us, in this starting phase of constituting a sociology of diplomacy, to also present its approximate definition.[53]

53 Although it may be sufficient, in this starting phase of constituting a sociology of diplomacy, to only present a set of elements for its definition, from which this definition could be derived. Yet it is our intention (and *insistence*, to take from the already quoted Hunt) to be more concrete, as we wish in any case present its approximate definition.

The sociology of diplomacy is a science that falls among the special sociologies and which in our view deals with the study of phenomena, relations, and processes in diplomatic organization and its environment. Consequently, we could say that the diplomat is the basic and probably also initial object of research attention in the sociology of diplomacy.

It must also be said that the intensification of globalization after the end of the Cold War has such a strong and such an important influence on the mode of diplomatic operation that it necessitates both a sociological approach, as well as a sociological framework within which its study and understanding must be ensured. To simplify and partially summarize, this is demonstrated first by the nature and dynamics of social changes or changes of society (interdependence, structural complexity, observation, influence), then by the changes that directly concern diplomats (the evolution of social origins of diplomats: from aristocrats to officials), and, last, also by the consequent changes in diplomacy as an activity, a process, and an organization.

The sociology of diplomacy, on the one hand, uses sociology's methodological toolbox to study the relations and processes that emerge and take place on that field of human activity expressed through involvement with diplomacy, and, on the other hand, focuses on the substance with which diplomats concern themselves with when implementing foreign policy and the way in which these tasks (diplomatic functions) are implemented in particular social, of course international, environments.

We now add a summary of the basic realizations attained by looking through the definitions of some selected special sociologies and the sociological aspects of selected definitions of diplomacy, in order to facilitate a culmination of our understanding of the approximate definition of the sociology of diplomacy.

All mentioned cases of special sociologies deal with the sociological treatment of the subject matter (e.g. work, organization, law, globalization, international relations), where this treatment is formulated as e.g. sociological analysis, the study and application of a sociological approach both on the object of study as well as its interaction with its environment. This study takes place in a social context and focuses on e.g. processes, relations, institutions and personnel as well as on their social implications. We have also noted an emphasis on the incompletely defined boundaries of a given concrete special sociology, due to which its field partially overlaps with the fields of other related special sociologies. As far as defining the sociology of diplomacy is concerned, we consequently believe in the applicability of essentially the same process, that is, a sociological study of diplomacy and its social conditionality, its process nature and its relations to the social environment through diplomats and the institutions that produce the results of diplomatic activity, including a treatment of their social implications.

And to summarize the key emphases of the definitions of diplomacy that have been discussed, we note that in them, we find an interpretation of diplomacy as a social process, while most also designate the diplomat as the actor of this process. This highlights a breadth of discussed definitions of diplomacy, which enable the inclusion of a sociological approach in the study of the social conditionality of diplomacy and also its constitution in the form of a special sociology.

In short, to conclude our introductory contemplation on the sociology of diplomacy, we would say that we understand it as:

- a subfield of sociology (that is, a special sociology) which deals with the study of the social conditionality of diplomacy;
- the sociological study of the social context, development, and operation of diplomacy;
- a branch of sociology that studies the social phenomena, relations, and processes which are included in the shaping and implementing of foreign policy, and which deals with understanding and explaining diplomacy as well as relations between general and other social structures that emerge through this process or participate in it, and the interactions that are thereby produced;
- sociological and multidisciplinary analysis of diplomatic organization, its structure, and the dynamics of social relations within it (in particular the shaping and implementing of foreign policy, managing processes, organizational change) and the relations that take place between it and other organizations or institutions that

deal with the shaping and implementing of foreign policy and with diplomatic activity, referring in particular to bureaucracy as a special form of organization; and

- the study of the connectedness and interdependence of organizational structures and technological complexity to that extent and scope that includes diplomacy.

And let us repeat the following: the aforementioned can be observed in the junction and intersection of understanding diplomacy and sociology, as the latter represents the starting point of such study and ensures it or offers it a methodological toolbox and a scientific apparatus which are, in comparison to what is offered by diplomatic studies, of primary importance. In this we also try to see what is the *differentia specifica* of our (sociological) discourse, in this concrete case directed at diplomacy.

We believe that with this, we have sufficiently fulfilled the basic conditions and can argue in favor of the possibility and necessity of constituting a sociology of diplomacy. We believe that the contributions in this monograph, which follow this introductory study, will additionally support this claim, but we also expect argumentative articulation of scepticism, which we will attempt to understand as an aid towards a clearer look on what has been presented, and towards further elaboration. It is usual that every research endevour has the intention of "increasing the level of detail in order to put the phenomenon studied under larger magnification, yet it simultaneously strengthens a greater challenge of academic disagreement with regard to definitions" (Steger, 2009: 10). An attempt at constituting a new scientific discipline, also in our case, is not and cannot be an exception.

Part One – Theoretical Elaborations

DISPOSITION FOR A DISCOURSE ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF DIPLOMACY[54]

Vladimir Benko

1. Defining the subject of the debate.

How, and why, to answer the question on the possibilities and needs of constituting (the institutionalization of) the sociology of diplomacy.

2. Diplomacy as a constituent institution of the international community.

Diplomacy in time and space (the process nature of the institution of diplomacy).

3. How to theoretically justify the link between social sciences and diplomacy?

To study diplomacy in the 'function of historical situation'- 'parallels'

54 The author sent me this disposition in the spring of 2009, when he was not sure if he could write a longer contribution due to health issues. Given that he did manage to prepare a longer contribution later, and that the disposition itself is, on the one hand, a summary of his views on the sociology of diplomacy and, on the other hand, that it gives a broad view over the range of fields and themes involved, it was necessary to publish his disposition as an introduction to the monograph. All emphasis is that of the author.

between the operation of diplomacy and reflection in the scientific imagination (history, law, political science, sociology?).

4. Interpretations and functions of diplomacy.

Formalistic, general, restrictive, reduced to its basic elements (communication, observation, negotiation), diplomacy as a process or as a tactic, method, technique, procedure, the 'bullets' of political (sociological) understanding of diplomacy in interpretations and definitions. How to conceptually and analytically define diplomacy.

5. How to investigate and differentiate diplomacy from other concepts (disciplines) that enter the bounds of international relations science?

6. Diplomacy and foreign policy as the subjects of study. Conceptualization of foreign policy (theories of foreign policy).

Preparation, formulation, and realization of foreign policy and the role of diplomacy in this process, distinctions and correlations between one and the other, controversy about the separability and inseparability of both (Nicholson, Burton).

7. Thesis: If we treat diplomacy as a process consistent with foreign policy, it is inevitable that we include the study thereof in the streams of social science.

International processes do not proceed independently of social processes and the study thereof.

8. The scene for diplomacy in the modern international community.

The specificity of stratification and differentiation of the human population in the present, historical changes and the changed structure of the 'global community', consequences of the industrial, communication, technological, and scientific revolutions, globalization and the all-encompassing modernization of the world, etc., and diplomacy.

9. For a science of international relations in general, and the elements and changes specifically relevant for diplomacy.

The compression of time and space, effects that the ever-strengthening reduction of distance introduces into co-dependence, internationalization of production, migration flows, a complex system of interactions between subjects in the international community, their density, multilayeredness and intensity (etc.), new problems that arise before diplomacy (ideologizing in foreign policy, the arms race, etc.).

10. How do these changes reflect in the functions of diplomacy?

Defining functions, presenting, informing (observing) and negotiating and their sociological relevance (Merton), scrutiny and relativization of each with regard to actuality.

11. Thesis: Changes in the social structure of the world (the international community) are reflected in the activity of diplomacy mainly in the functions of informing (observing) and negotiating, but with a difference between the two.

Justification: While observation function is directed predominantly towards the structure of power in the partner state and is only partly limited by the activity of other states and non-state institutions, the realization of the negotiation function is limited by the growing attention of the public, in particular the vigilant and the critical (from secret to public diplomacy, etc.).

12. What should be understood with the 'structure of power' and why is the function of informing relevant and, to a certain extent, a novelty for the activity of diplomacy?

In the period of so-called classical diplomacy, the observation of the structure of power was more or less impressionistic and not systematic, in terms of its 'scientific subservience', directed mainly toward the sphere of 'high politics' and the 'solving' of military capacity, etc., while modern diplomacy faces the challenge of observing and determining both existing and potential sources for the structure of power in a 'sociological perspective', and the structure of power is exposed to a complex structure of society of a state being observed, in all senses, not just the political. What is needed is 'scientifically supported' analysis and interpretation, and here space opens up for the sociological imagination. Here, we also observe the shift from an elitist and professional to a structural diplomacy.

13. Power, its incidence and treatment in the science on international relations and sociology.

14. The changing scene of the world, the need for a sociological perspective in the activity of diplomacy, substantive and organizational questions.

Trends: general and (or) specialized ‘education’ of the diplomat, the diplomat ‘en poste’ and the expert diplomat, specialist (multilateral) diplomacy, area studies.

15. Understanding fundamental problems in modern international relations in the sense of the role and tasks of diplomacy towards resolving them requires more than just the knowledge and skills represented by the professional and ‘technical’ sides of this institution – what is required is knowledge transmitted by social sciences, sociology among them.

16. Among them we include above all – for the observation function – methods that contribute to training capabilities for analysis and interpretation of observation, such as content analysis, roll call analysis, interview techniques, observing political events such as elections, etc., basically practising a scientific way of observing.

17. In the period following the Second World War, the number of international governmental organizations [international organizations?] has vastly increased, and with it the need for diplomats specialized in different fields, which holds even more true for those being negotiated, the so-called hot issues such as defence, disarmament, ecology, etc. The majority of these require specialist knowledge that has to be transmitted by sociology as well (communication theory, conflict detection, conflict resolution, conflict control, etc.).

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DIPLOMACY[55]

Vladimir Benko

Introduction

The discourse on the need for and possibilities of constituting a sociology of diplomacy is introduced by defining the following fundamental characteristics of this institution, which give it significance as a constituent actor in the structure of the international community, namely:

55 The contribution came to be on the basis of several years (2006-2010) correspondence between the author and the editor. The author sent it to me in April 2010. As I was beginning to prepare for my departure for Turkey, the author and I did not meet again to debate his contribution. For this reason, from an author's point of view, the article is unfinished. This can be noted in some missing references in the text, and some missing comments. From his manuscript, it is not evident what these references and comments should be; the first are noted with empty brackets (), others only with a number in the brackets, e.g. (23). The references with empty brackets are left in the text, as composed originally, as are the numbered comments, for which no references are made in the author's manuscript. For purposes of authenticity, the text remains as the author prepared it, and as editor I have also attempted for the contribution to reflect, as much as possible, the original and outstanding style of the author, and for this reason, stylistic and editorial interventions have been kept to a minimum. This article is, along with the preceding disposition, the first translated text by Professor Emeritus Vladimir Benko, an authority of the science of international relations in Slovenia and definitive theoretician of the discipline.

- First, the institution of diplomacy exists since the beginning of authentic international relations and will persist as long as there will be a pluralistic international community of sovereign states. We speak of its lasting continuity.
- Second, the institution of diplomacy is in both its role and functions exposed to changes. The reasons for this are seen in shifts in the structure of the international community and its dynamics. These changes are a function of the historical situation.
- Third, detecting these changes is, with regard to their depth and breadth, focused on the structure of the modern international community, which is developmentally incomparable with its predecessors.

The need for, and possibility of, clarifying these are to be seen through the application of the knowledge and methods of social sciences, among them sociology, in particular when exploring the social functions of diplomacy.

With the appearance of territorially defined global groupings, which already are structured wholes, differentiated in themselves and hierarchically organized, were sown the seeds of international relations. These were already communities of production at such a level of development of productive powers that this lead to a social division of labour, to the phenomenon of private property, and to differentiation between the class of exploiters and exploited. This stage of development created the conditions for the 'crystallization' of social processes into social institutions within a state. The state took over the task of setting the rules of conduct and the passing of laws, which it itself sanctioned with violence over which it had acquired a monopoly. The state took over control over the use of society's material resources and, at last, the state, equipped with these attributes, also took over the task of explaining the needs and interests of society to the outside. Even at the beginning of diplomacy in the real sense of the term, the state for this needed special organs, which should in relations with other 'political' subjects work as intermediaries through communication and interaction. With growing communication, of which the basic guiding principle was the promotion of the interests of the participating subjects, their role acquired a formalized and institutionalized character.

The need for starting with the state in any representation of the development of international relations arises from the following:

- "The state is in its essence an emanation of the exclusivity of territorialized social groups, one against the other,
- the state appears as the representative of one society against the other and fulfils this role on an indirect institutionalized level, which means it also sets the framework for interactions on an indirect non-institutionalized level." (Benko, 1997a: 14)

What is the basis for the exclusivity of this global social group against the other? We answer this by putting on centre stage territory; from the possession of territory was derived the right to it and monopoly over it. This also meant the appropriation of the right to and monopoly over exploiting resources for survival and material exploitation as a subjective possibility, while at the same time, the declaration of this monopoly represented a denial of the right and monopoly of other global social groups. Essentially, we speak of asserting sovereignty over a territory possessed by a given territorialized global social group. Yet, as the material conditions for production in a given geographical space are not equally distributed and do not give each global social group sufficient possibilities for survival, conflict has arisen between people and their political organization in states ever since the beginning of permanent settlements. War is for this reason one of the primary activities of these indigenous communities, both to limit possession as well as to acquire it (Marx, 1974: 183). At this point, we meet the two central social-theoretic categories in explorations of the phenomenon of international relations and, in particular, of diplomacy – the categories of cooperation and conflict.

Ever since international relations began to be conducted, its subjects' aspirations have arisen and have been asserted, these being that questions of common interests and mutual welfare are to be dealt with in institutional frameworks, when these exist or are established by conditions of convergence. In early periods of the development of international relations, we include the geographical factor in the sense of proximity or distance of settled human agglomeration. The establishment of convergence among political subjects led to cooperation as a universal social process, and the institution of diplomacy was assigned the central role of harmonising interests on the basis of consensus.

In order to understand the role and meaning of cooperation, we must include in our deliberation the category of conflict. For, as long as we lack sufficient conditions for establishing a convergence of interests and as long as against this arise aspirations for the use of force, conflict appears.

The categories of cooperation and conflict are the starting points for the formation and activity of diplomacy, towards opening formal institutional pathways of communication between political subjects meant to regulate their relations, and these give the institution its lasting character. However, this does not mean that its role and substantive content remain unchanged through centuries; on the contrary, both change as a function of the historical situation.

Overview of key developmental periods

In the development of international relations and the international community, one can identify mutually differentiated periods. The criteria for their differentiation are given by social sciences, namely, political science, sociology, and history, as well as political economy. In the simplest sense, the essence of their criteria is to be recognized in the degree of the development of the international phenomenon. For purposes of our discourse, we use the text by which Marx situated the modern human community among its predecessors. In the Introduction to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, he noted that "bourgeois society is the most advanced and complex historical organization of production. The categories which express its relations, and an understanding of its structure, therefore, provide an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all formerly existing social formations the ruins and component elements of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society. Some of these unassimilated remains are still carried on within bourgeois society, others, however, which previously existed. Only in rudimentary form, have been further developed and have attained their full significance, etc. The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape. On the other hand, rudiments of more advanced forms in the lower species of animals can only be understood when the more advanced forms are already known. Bourgeois economy thus provides a key to the economy of antiquity, etc.”. (1961: 618)

If we use these words of Marx for exploring the development of the international community as a key to understanding the anatomy of preceding international communities, for which we used the method of degression, we arrive at the following conclusions:

- the modern international community is universal and its framework captures the entire world we live in. The basis for this universality is the global market, the political articulation on the indivisibility of peace, and the legal perspective is expressed in the quantitative and qualitative universality of international law. By comparison, preceding international communities were of a regional nature, the interactions between them were more or less non-systematic, conditioned by the factor of geographical space.
- The modern international phenomenon is a global phenomenon. This means that within it, different dimensions with different valences connect and combine, from political, economic, ideological, military, technological, to legal, scientific, cultural, and others. And not only this: there exists a narrow permeation of the internal and the external, their dialectic. We see it in the syndrome of transferring internal conflict to the international sphere, and international conflicts to the internal sphere. This permeation is evident on all levels of institutionalized and non-institutionalized interactions, particularly of cooperation and conflict, in the influence of universal ideologies on the processes within particular societies, their aspirations to project the international community onto their model, etc. From this, we arrive at a relatively broad political and organizational background for conducting international affairs in individual societies, the procedures developed and the space that consensus has in them.

  By comparison with the modern international community, the international phenomenon of the past did not have a global character. Interactions were limited to the political and economic spheres, the associations of international relations and processes within particular societies were weak, and, it follows, the level of political and organizational development was not high.

- The defining feature of the socio-economic basis of the modern international community is its heterogeneity, that is the existence of states with different socio-economic systems and different levels of social and economic development. For preceding international communities, this generally does not hold.
- The modern international community is highly structured. This is evident from numerous indicators, such as: the number of subjects, their different functions, goals, and roles, the difference in their specific weights and of course the difference of their interactions. In a narrow sense, there is thus a plethora of legal and political mechanisms for organizing them.

  By contrast with these designations, the characteristics of preceding international communities – particularly those associated with the breakthrough of the capitalist system of production – are a low level of structuration, a lower number of subjects, the predominant expanse of political interactions between states, a modest input of the environment into international space, a modest fund of legal and political mechanisms, etc. (Benko, 1987: 12–13)

In our periodization of the development of international relations and the international community, we have as the lowest level of development of both the socio-economic basis and degree of institutionalization the international system of regionally limited international communities, spanning the space of China, India, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, while as a idiosyncratic paradigm we include the Greek microcosm of city states., by which we have highlighted the determining factor of space for the possibility or impossibility of establishing interactions between the then-existing political structures. More concretely, on the space of China, India, and the other politically defined territories and regions mentioned, geographic proximity enabled the establishment and development of interactions between the members of such a region, but not with political subjects outside it. For the majority of these regions, we can determine that their relatively developed political structures arose on the basis of large basins, where extensive irrigation systems created fertile ground for agriculture, and allowed the organization of a strong state.

This period gives us, as far as the development of international relations and diplomacy is concerned, particularly interesting examples that reach beyond the then-existing socio-economic and political bases of societies of the time. For example, the regional community on the territory of Mesopotamia established political relations with Pharaonic Egypt. While it is true that these relations did not take place in a fluid, institutionalized form, and were more or less sporadic, they did in at least one case mark themselves in the form of a peace alliance treaty between the Hittite ruler Hattusili III and the Egyptian Pharao Ramesses III. This treaty remains in its form a model for international treaties until today. (Benko, 1997a: 18–19)

The regional communities of China and India have for the understanding of the then-prevailing levels of development of international relations left us interesting testimonies, the first through relatively intensive forms of diplomatic communications – by sending diplomatic deputies and organizing international conferences, and the second through the contemplations of its statesmen on the essence of international politics and the leading thereof. Yet for the history of international relations and for the diplomacy embedded in it, the most important example is the Greek microcosm of city states. (Ibid.)

The Greek regional international community is a splendid example of the development of diplomacy, embedded in the international relations of a relatively narrow, yet also culturally convergent space. These two aspects, the possibility of relatively intensive communication between the constituent parts of this region – Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and others - in view of the narrow geographical space, supported by both the complementarity and the competitiveness of its actors, are the elements that gave impetus to resolving institutionally and in a formalized manner mutual issues. Diplomatic practice in the Greek microcosm, so to speak, predicts the future of diplomatic communication and international relations. This microcosm namely represented a relatively highly structured and differentiated international system, in which the interests of the actors within it were linked and intertwined, confronted and resolved, just as it happened many centuries after, more concretely in the 19th century. If we apply to this system the model of Aron's multipolar system arrangements, in which exist multiple competing centres of political, military, and economic strength, we are near to the conclusion that the involvement of diplomacy in this system was inevitable, be it in order to resolve disputes or in order to create alliances and thereby pave the path to war. In view of this, it is not risky to claim that, as such, it realized all three functions following the definition of diplomacy, namely, representation, observation, and negotiation. On the level of representation, it developed and consolidated the symbolic and mythological elements contained within it in favour of the exceptional, privileged, and divinely protected person of the 'diplomatic' deputy, meant to possess the necessary knowledge and capabilities to advocate the interests of their state. The multitude of interests thereof is evident not only from the content of the treaties made – both of peace and alliance – but also of those that were meant to regulate trade routes. It must be emphasised that the concern for realizing the accepted and in the treaties contained obligations is expressed not only in the 'pacta sunt servanda' clause, that agreements must be kept, but also in the 'rebus sic stantibus' clause. With the latter, one must understand the circumstances which permit the obligations accepted not to be realized, provided that they have changed significantly. As in the already mentioned example of the treaty between Hattusili and Ramesses, so too the Greeks left their rich diplomatic practice as a form of inheritance to the future. (Benko, 1997a: 23–26).

In the prehistory of international relations one may also, though with restraint, include Imperial Rome. In history, it is justifiably treated as a unitary political system that did not recognize nor permit independent and equal subjects alongside itself, but in a discourse on international relations and in particular on diplomacy it is an interesting case when compared to the structures of the feudal social system that followed it. For Rome and its political power, it was decisive that authority was concentrated in one point, be it the Caesar or the Senate, which was not the case for the feudal system. The dispersion of authority in the feudal socio-economic systems, which existed as such both horizontally and vertically, did not allow for the development of international, and particularly diplomatic, relations to an extent comparable with the Greek microcosm of city states, except if we exclude the diplomatic practice of the political space of the northern and central parts of the Apennine peninsula and the city states located there.

As a step in the development of international relations and diplomacy, the comparison between the Greek microcosm and the Italian system of city states is interesting from many angles. Firstly, its economic and therefore political basis was more developed. The rise of commerce and with it banking, followed by the orientation of some cities in this system to navigation by ship, particularly towards the east of the Mediterranean, opened their horizon towards the ocean by training for navigation of the high seas. A strong incentive for such development was provided by consolidating, based on the traditions of Greek diplomatic practice, the functions of its synchronous working as dictated by Machiavelli, and, last but not least, it is from this space that originate the models for diplomatic practice gradually accepted by political subjects in the West and the East of Europe.

The Congress of Westphalia in 1648 opens a period lasting until the Congress of Vienna in 1814. It can be treated as a sort of prelude to the 19th century, which is in our view critical for understanding the structure of the modern international community. If we explore where the difference between it and the preceding international system, and its link to the 19th century, lies, it is in our view by the weakly expressed dialectic of the 'internal' and the 'external' in the preceding international system, which was already existing but in comparison with the processes in the 19th century unstructured in its whole. Decisive for this period was the breakthrough of the capitalist system, the appearance of a national market with a national state as its political framework, the expansion of Western European states into overseas territories, which with their economic and political effects predicts the global market and the universality of the international community.

For the institution of diplomacy, this period is important for a number of reasons. If it was possible to claim for the preceding period of the international system that institutionalized international communication remained within the confines of the sporadic and would with time lose the need for permanence, then it must be said for the period marked by the Congress of Westphalia that international diplomatic communication became a continuous practice of political subjects, enthroned with the institution of sovereignty, the basis of which was territory.

The period we are dealing with was loaded with different political configurations and constellations, in the framework of which European states confronted one another. The essence of these confrontations is to be found in political and economic competition, while the regulation of these confrontations was left to a large extent up to the institution of diplomacy, which was already operating during the consolidated 'parallel coexistence' of states on the level of bilateral and emerging international relations, supported by the rules of international law.

The industrial revolution, the germs of which reach to the period of the 18th century, triggered in the history of human society processes through which progressive quantitative advancement became a qualitative transformation (Ibid.). It can be substantiated as deep changes in communication, technology, science, etc., that warrant an understanding of a world expressed through ideas, keywords and phrases such as the ' global village' and the emanation of global co-dependence of the world population The consequences of the industrial revolution reached their decisive swing in the 19th century, when its power of transformation was linked to the ideas of the French revolution and the long march of political emancipation stemming from it, with the consolidation of the nation state and with the appearance of new political subjects reared on the heritage of the national idea. In the 19th century, the second phase of colonial expansion by Western European powers reached the consolidation of colonial domination and incorporated these territories in the structural needs of metropolises. In this century, the first international organizations of a functional character appear as an incomprehensible expression of growing co-dependence, encouraged by the rise of industrial technology and communications. The institution of diplomacy as a function of the historic situation appears as trending towards a higher degree of professionalism, in a still slight shift from choosing personnel from the ranks of the aristocracy, but already working in the ensemble of the foreign policy system as an important part of the state apparatus. With that, it in fact opened up against the 'watchful' public and indicated its social role and base.

This short account of individually emphasized international system was in this course intended to, on the one hand, confirm the lasting continuity of diplomatic activity and, on the other hand, the identification that the dynamics of the development of international relations changed the role and content of its functions. Within these dynamics, the factor of space as an important sociological category kept its position in the interpretation of the appearance and globalization of diplomacy, but alongside this, to a larger and larger extent, the factor of the international division of labour, through the inclusion of an ever-increasing number of subjects into it, appears and pronounces itself. The institution of diplomacy responds to this through economic servicing in its working with the inauguration of clauses intended to regulate trade flows in the international community.

The study of diplomacy and the role of social sciences

By virtue of its structure, the international community, the processes and relations that transpire in it, and the actors that give it life, have been the subject of study of various disciplines, among which – according to weight – stand out political science and, in the latter half of the previous century, also sociology. Thus political science had relatively early pushed history out of the treatment of the international phenomenon, mainly by redirecting individual analysis of events and their instruments towards complex and collective analysis and articulated these in the theorem of power. Essentially, political science has from the early beginnings of international relations until present day ensured its primacy by being the first of the social sciences to take on the task of academic research, verification of its results for pedagogic purposes and, with the theory of realism, also the function of fulfilling the needs dictated by political practice, that is, the function of 'policy science'. The place of diplomacy has, in studying its appearance, development, and current position, remained in the framework of discerning the practice of foreign policy and its methods.

Up until recently, the place of sociology in the analysis of the international phenomenon was in the background, and sociological dimensions regarding theoretical reflections on the phenomenon were weakly expressed. This is even more true for the sociology of diplomacy.

We believe that both the primacy of political science as well as the lagging behind of sociology in analysing international relations and especially the institution of diplomacy can be explained. The development of the international community must be followed from the already mentioned Greek microcosm of city states or the regional system in the Indian subcontinent all the way through the post-Westphalian system and the breakthrough of mercantilism into international relations, in order to determine that international – but in an inter-state sense – relations took place either on a bilateral basis or on a multilateral basis but within a regional international system. In one case or the other, the basic rule in these relations was 'political' articulation, more specifically in the syntagma of power. The attention of the few authors that would have systematically dedicated themselves to analysis of the international phenomenon was directed towards the functioning of this syntagma both on the level of observation and the thereof derived explanations as well as, in specific cases, prescriptions. Thus both the state and society remained as hardly distinguished sociological categories in the study of international relations, if, for the moment, we neglect that part of historical sociology that until the middle of the 18th century had begun to make inroads into discovering the historical development of different societies and through them – rudimentarily and in a fragmented manner – highlighted the relation between the internal and the international spheres.

Essentially, the same reasons that explain the 'absence' of sociology in studies of the international phenomenon – this allegation holds at least for the period until the end of the Second World War – also hold for sociology and its treatment of the institution of diplomacy. First, we must note the conjointness of researching diplomacy by analysing and interpreting foreign policy, where this field loses the status of an autonomous subject of study, particularly alongside the not negligible understanding of diplomacy as merely a method or tactic in the implementation of foreign policy. Furthermore, in the case of the lagging behind of sociology in the study of diplomacy, the position of the American theoretician Angell is not unjustified, namely that "scientists were avoiding this field of study, as they did not dare risk their careers by reaching into such a deceptive field" (1966: 6).

There exist different definitions of sociology, amongst them for example that of Giddens, who states that it is a "social science, the main focus of which is directed towards the study of social institutions that were formed in the period of transformation with the industrial revolution three centuries ago" (1979: 230). Alongside this, he draws attention to that there is no clear division of labour between sociology and other fields of intellectual endeavour in social theory, nor that there should be. Yet even this concise but by the broadening towards other social sciences 'inoperable' definition only highlights the direction of where to find the place for sociology in the study of the international phenomenon. The industrial revolution, which was given by Giddens the key position in the transformation of society, social institutions and social relations, was, along with its predecessor, the political revolution in the form of the French revolution, of key importance also for the development of international relations, as without the aid of sociology, we cannot find answers to numerous questions important also for the institution of diplomacy.

By isolating the deep changes in the structure of the modern international community and confronting them with examples of its predecessors, we have come closer to the question of what consequences can be noted in the functions of diplomacy. We have answered with the examples of the functions of representation, observation, and negotiation. For all three, it holds that in their content and role, we can deduce a strong drive in the direction of searching for their social content, which can also be noticed in the shift away from treating the institution of diplomacy as mere procedure, technique, practice, or similar, to which we dedicate more space in the chapters which follow. Precisely the empirically verified search for a social content in the function of diplomacy is in our view most evident in the function of informing, and can be seen in the changing relations between the study of diplomacy on the one hand and social sciences on the other. If the role of historic and politological studies in past periods with regard to explaining processes in the international community was relatively modest, and that of sociology entirely negligible, the period after the end of the Second World War showed that without the aid of other social sciences, such as political economy, anthropology, and especially sociology, progress is unthinkable. For our discourse, the case of international relations is exemplary, as in this period it tended towards its sociologizing, which is evident from the appearance of new paradigms inspired by the sociological imagination, such as the behaviouristic, systemic, or communication theory approach.

The changing relationship between diplomacy as a subject of study in sociology is evident in the ever-increasing need for the use of concepts, theories and methodologies developed by social sciences and in particular by sociology. This is true, in different degrees, for realizing all three functions of diplomacy. It is thus possible to claim that the function of informing is impossible to carry out without resorting to the sociological instrumental techniques of observation, analysis and interpretation, and this is more or less the case for all three roles of diplomacy mentioned in the preceding chapters. Without the methods developed by sociology, it is impossible to expect progress in the fields of conflict detection and prevention, while methods of 'bargaining conflict resolution' are available for realizing the function of negotiation. It would seem that the reality of the need for sociologizing the functions of diplomacy is least apparent in the case of the representation function, where we encounter the factor of personnel implementation of the institution, yet it turns out that without the aid of the sociology of organizations, the social need for explaining the human factor in this field cannot be satisfied. It is precisely in this field, the staff implementation of the modern institution of diplomacy, that one can see the shift from an elitist to a structural diplomacy as a condition for the continuity of the informing function, and this is in our view notable evidence for the influence of changes that have occurred in the structure of the modern international community.

The modern international community as the working space of diplomacy

With the unconditional surrender of Germany and that of Japan a few months later, the Second World War ended, and entered the history of international relations as the until now most destructive and, as far as geographic dimensions are concerned, the widest military conflict with massive human and material losses. For this reason it was justified to expect that the tragic experiences of the Second World War would contribute to the awareness of humanity and would create conditions for a system of international relations built on peace, security, co-operation, and progress of all subjects. Furthermore, these expectations had to be based on a declared, recorded in documents, democratic and free character.

These expectations were not fulfilled. From the end of the Second World War up to present day, the development of international relations has been burdened with latent and manifest conflicts and conflict situations, be they relics of both phases of the Cold War or be they new creations, as is the case in some areas of Eastern Asia. In this sense, they form a so-called uninterrupted and according to their intensity a gradual continuum of processes that were launched into the international space by the industrial and communication revolutions and the aspirations of individual great powers to claim their results for their own benefit.

Yet alongside such a general but empirically verified assessment, it must be noted that since the end of the Second World War, a significant and unexpected increase in the development of productive capacity has taken place. Statistics show that global industrial production per capita in the last hundred years has increased by 2.6 %, compared to 0.18 % in the pre-industrial era. Furthermore, if we take into account that in these hundred years, the global population has nearly doubled, then the increase is really 30 to 40 times higher, if we neglect agricultural output where massive changes also occurred by the introduction of mechanization, the application of artificial fertilizers, and other agrotechnical measures.

It is not risky to claim that the transport-technological revolution, which began in the 19th century, is continuing. This is especially true for air transport, which saw increases in speed due to internal combustion engines, through the invention of rockets – as far as military means are concerned – and by the conquest of space, which represents the rise of vertical mobility and the march of mankind to extraterrestrial expanses. Ever since the industrial revolution, there exists a tight connection between science and technological development. The number of inventions needed for the economy is constantly increasing and, this being of particular importance, the time lag between an invention and its practical application is increasingly shorter.

Enormous change came about as a result of a third, the digital revolution, which is understood as the development of new high-level technology, such as microelectronics, optical electronics, cybernetics, robotics, teleinformatics, biotechnology, etc. For all these fields, it can be expected that their development in coming decades will lead to even deeper changes not only in the development of global production power but also the global division of labor, global capital flows, social stratification, and incentive structures for workers.

The engine of this development was the USA, which emerged from the Second World War as the strongest state. If we note only its economic power from economic indicators, we see that the gross national product of this state amounted to 88.6 billion dollars in 1939, increased by wartime expenditure during the course of the war to 135 billion dollars and then reached 220 billion dollars. Wartime production was solving unemployment, and to it were saddled institutions in the search for new weapons of high technology. One of the important results of this search was the invention of automatic weapons with consequences not only for the period towards the end of the Second World War, but for the future of the world, as such technology simply cannot be erased from the human brain.

Part of the world latched itself onto this economic and technological progress, particularly the countries of Western Europe which came out of the war severely weakened socially, politically, and economically as a result of human and material losses. Due to specific political circumstances, which we will elaborate later, this progress included the defeated powers, both Germany and Japan, which in the twenty years after the end of the war experienced an unexpected economic and technological reconstruction, known as the German (Erhard's) and the Japanese miracle.

Part of the world did not partake in this reconstruction. This was the case mainly for Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union the helm, that is, the state that in this war had suffered the largest, mainly human and material, losses. Our discourse has reached the point where it is necessary to speak of a change in international relation which is justifiably considered revolutionary.

The Harvard professor Hoffman in his attempt to identify and delineate international systems noted two types, the moderate and the revolutionary. The characteristics of the first are moderation in defining the goals of individual states and moderation in the means used for realizing these goals. An empirically verified case of such a type of international system would be the international system of the 19th century, with the European concert of great powers, which directed and coordinated the behaviour of states in a way that did not allow any of them to ascend to hegemony. The instrument primarily used for such politics was diplomacy aided by international law, which in this period reached a position of quantitative universality (Hoffman, 1961).

The character of the second type of international system is marked according to Hoffman as 'revolutionary', seen in the selection of total goals along with a totality of means for their realization by the state-actors in this system. Empirical examples of this type would be Revolutionary and then Napoleon's France, which from the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century assaulted all social and political institutions of Europe with the weapons of a military and ideological character.[56]

Empirical and theoretical interpretation of the periods after the end of the Second World War suggests that some of them in fact contained characteristics of the revolutionary international system. By looking for these, we first focus on the 'totality of means', as this will lead us quickest to the role of diplomacy in their selection and will also bring us closer to an actual or at least tentative definition of 'total goals'.

56 We assume that the author meant 'the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century'.

Understanding Hoffman's definition of the international revolutionary system in the sense of total goals and the totality of means used is, in our view, not possible without combining the appearance of blocs and the appearance of the Cold War. In both cases, their carrier and protagonist was the state, even though it is true that Cold War manifestations were intertwined also institutions that were not identified with it, for example the radio programmes directed by Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, etc. In any case, they worked in coordination with the politics of governments, even though these, as a result of different situations, acted more aggressively.

For the period of peak crises around the time of the Korean War in 1951 and the Berlin Blockade it is often said that the world was on the edge of war. In fact, military confrontation between the blocs, that is, the USA and the Soviet Union never happened, yet all the conditions for such a confrontation to arise had been fulfilled. Among these conditions we include:

- Since the beginning of international relations, the function of diplomacy in sustaining formal and institutionalized communication among political subjects has become unavoidable and continued practice. In the period of peaks in the Cold War was not eroded, yet it was still lowered to the lowest possible degree. The protagonists of the Cold War did not communicate with each other in a way of maintaining information and harmonizing interests, but instead through mutual accusations, formal and informal protests, threats and extortion. One of the primary means of this sort was the formal denial of legitimacy to the regimes in Eastern Europe installed through the presence of the Soviet army. The newly created UN was also drawn into the Cold War atmosphere, which on the one hand was subordinated to the US through the voting mechanism, and on the other hand exploited by the Soviet Union for blocking those initiatives, few as they were, that would benefit the realization of the programmes of this universal organization.
- The conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union, that is the blocs, took place on all levels, including armaments. The arms

race between the two was not only a function of the search for quantitative and qualitative superiority over the opposing side, but also of economic attrition, where the Soviet Union was in the inferior position. The numerous proposals aimed at stopping the race and gradually disarming were mainly for purposes of propaganda and more or less a method of psychological warfare, rather than a real political programme.

- The negotiation function was, so to speak, wholly eroded. The numerous international conferences meant to resolve the questions of the post-war organization of Europe yielded no results or their 'results' can be seen in one-sided acts by states, such as for example the alliance pact between the US and West Germany in 1952 (Benko, 1997a: 281).
- For our discourse on the needs for and possibility of constituting a sociology of diplomacy, the function of representation in the periods of the Cold War is important, yet in this context we must highlight the informing function. Its role was programmatically included in psychological warfare, meant to weaken and demolish the internal structures of the opposite side.

The development of international relations after the end of the Second World War occurred, as far as political processes are concerned, in four phases temporally distinct enough to be distinguished, with the characterisations of:

- The appearance of bloc structures (bipolarisation), the appearance of the Cold War and the process of decolonization (1945–1955).
- The consolidation of blocs, changes in the power relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, the cyclicality of crises in international relations, the development of the politics of non-alignment.
- The establishment of dialogue between the US and the Soviet Union, implementation of the UN, the emergence of triangulation of the US – Soviet Union – China.
- The renewal of the Cold War and consequences on the global scale of international relations (1978–1986).

With the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the so-called Vanderberg revolution, the first phase of building the Western-European military-political and economic system was carried out, institutionalized on the one hand in the North Atlantic treaty and on the other hand through the European Economic Community. A few years later the Warsaw Pact was made, although even before that Eastern Europe saw processes and relations of identical bloc behaviour as in Western Europe (Benko, 1997a: 287–289).

The fundamental conditions for the emergence of bloc structures were laid directly after the end of the Second World War, when it was necessary to draw a new political map of Europe and to take into account the position of a defeated Germany and the changes in Eastern Europe where the Soviet Union, resting on the presence of its armies, installed satellite regimes. That these were serious contradictions between former Allies is testified by the 'dialogue' between them. Thus, immediately before the establishing conference of the UN in Washington, the new American President H. Truman met with the foreign minister of the Soviet Union V. Molotov. The American diplomat Ch. Bohlen, who was in charge of the minutes of the meeting, wrote that he had never heard a statesman use the kind of expressions used by Truman when speaking to Molotov. Even before this, the American Statesman discovered that "our negotiations with the Soviet Union have reached a dead end, which we must stop, now or never. He decided that he would realize the plans in San Francisco, and if the Russians would not come closer, let them go to hell." (Merton, 1968)

These words were early markers of the changed and twisted relations between the leading powers in the world, a testament to two new phenomena in international relations, that of the bloc structure and the Cold War, which nearly eroded to the foundations the role of diplomacy in its fundamental functions, such as representation, information and negotiation.

In the development of international relations, the creation of alliance relations between political subjects was a constant, particularly in the so-called multipolar constellation. Bloc groupings in the international system after the Second World War were politically, economically, and militarily far more integrated than alliances in multipolar constellations.

In the latter, these were built more or less on the short term interests of its member states, whereas bloc structures are built on long-term interests with ideological motivations. In bloc structures, there exists a clearly expressed hierarchy among members, with the dominance of the head protagonist who formulates both the military and political doctrine of the bloc and its application to the 'outside world'. In times of sharp inter-bloc confrontations between the years of 1949 and 1955, the rigidity of the bipolar structure was made evident in the aspirations to divide the world into black and white, by denial of the institute of neutrality and by the exploitation of the UN for promoting bloc interests.

As explained in the preceding paragraphs, the period from 1949 to 1955 saw deep changes in the relations between former allies in the anti-fascist coalition which were in the history of international relations marked as bloc politics and the Cold War. Thus one and the other phenomenon represent a novum and an unicum in the practice of international relations both in their geographic and in their political dimension, with the latter a result of its ideological basis and instrumentalization. The novum is to be understood as a so-called consistent derivation of the extreme dimensions of a conflict on the edge of war. The manifestations of hostility between the conflicting powers reached from the reduction of the levels of formal communication in the function of representation to the practical blocking of the function of negotiations, which in the practice of the Cold War represented a caricature of approaches for consensual management of inter-state relations and the solving of open questions, while the function of informing was abused for the benefit of weakening the political, military, economic and ideological structures of the opposing side.

For this period, we use the label controlled Cold War. It is true that despite the high level of hostility between the main protagonists of bloc politics, it did not come to armed conflict between them and that there existed a form of control over the use of means of extreme coercion. Yet with 'control' one should not understand any formal oral or written agreement, but simply recognition of the fact that a military conflict between the blocs would lead to escalation and with that the use of nuclear weapons.

The realization that disputes between the leading powers were not possible to be solved with the use of weapons finally re-introduced the means of diplomacy, amongst them also the revival of communication between quarrelling political subjects and the re-introduction of negotiations to the agenda. This essentially did not solve the crucial questions of the period (the division of Germany, armament, etc.) but did contribute to upholding continuity in communication, which helped the US to accept, via the words of then-President Kennedy in his famous 11th June 1961 speech, that "Americans must become aware of the fact that the Soviet Union and socialist countries exist and that the USA cannot simply step out of the Earth only because such a situation does not conform to its ideals". With this, some ideological and crusading intonations in the foreign policy of the US from the times of J. Dulles began to lose weight, and in this sense we should understand the transition to a politics of détente and dialogue between the Soviet Union and the US. Yet both détente and dialogue remained on "the strategic foundation of politics from a position of force". This politics did not exclude options offered from historical experience by diplomacy with its functions, including the approach of secret diplomacy in the style of H. Kissinger.

The functions of diplomacy

The literature defines the functions of diplomacy in different ways, although basically these are not contradictory. Thus for example Morgenthau speaks of three functions, the "legal, symbolic, and political" ( )[57], and in numerous texts on foreign policy we find the remark that diplomacy possesses the functions of representation, information, and negotiation ( ).[58] The difference between both can be seen by the fact that Morgenthau in his definition includes a symbolic and legal function which in other definitions are 'covered' by the function of representation, and that Morgenthau fills the function of politics or politicization with the content of information and negotiation. Yet Morgenthau's definition has a certain primacy over the other mentioned, which is in our view important for discourse but which we will cover later. After listing all three functions, he

57 A reference is made but not listed.
58 Ibid.

continues, "*together with the foreign ministry it shapes the foreign policy of its country, which is by far its most important function"* (cursive, V.B.). The writer thus understands diplomacy not only as method, practice or technique, but also as a link in the process chain that captures both the formulation and implementation of foreign policy goals.

What is to be understood under the term function? We answer this question by the aid of sociology, which understands it as "the realizing of needs of a certain social sub-system to maintain and successfully reproduce itself" ( ).[59] In the relation of this sub-system to the system, the latter keeps primacy, which means that changes in the system structure are reflected in changes of the sub-system.

From here it is possible to continue in the direction of looking for a social basis and substantive character of the functions, as they are actually or potentially reflected in the cited definitions and in particularly in the light of changes in the structure of the modern international community. In our view the definition offered by the American theoretician offers a suitable starting point for this search. As the third function he notes the "political", into which he subsumes all three functions noted by the other cited definition. Politological analysis and interpretation of these functions confirms this, whereby the political strength of both the informing and negotiation functions is relatively clear while the function of representation is 'politically' less exposed, which is clear from the emphasized terms found in numerous definitions, be they "represents the state outwards", "maintains the foreign relations outside its own territory", "promotes and protects the interests of the state and its citizens outside its territory", etc., which cover up the social basis and substantive character of the representation and thereby highlight the alleged more or less formalistic definition of this function. In truth such allegation does not hold up against more careful analysis, which we cover in the following paragraphs of this discourse.

Meanwhile, by comparison with the function of representation, the function of informing is in politological reflexion completely evident. The use of the functions of informing and negotiation from the side of political subjects – states – is dictated by interests.

59 Ibid.

Among the theoreticians of international relations, it is Morgenthau who places the category of interest alongside the category of power on the key position for explaining the phenomenon of international relations. In the work "Politics among Nations" he wrote that it is the power available to a state in a certain period which is the objective reality on the basis of which it is possible to define what is in a state's interest and what is not: "... interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed...", that is, "one guiding star, one standard for thinking and one rule for action, that is the national interest" (Morgenthau, 1969: 38).

It is not our intent in this discourse to delve into the question of the use of the category of the national interest in analytical purposes of defining it, its structure, its carriers, but we would give attention to political action. Our view or our premise in the search for argumentation both for the need for and the possibility of constituting a sociology of diplomacy or its sociologizing is to see this in the analysis and interpretation of the syndrome of power in realizing the functions of diplomacy, particularly that of informing and negotiation. Or, in other words: the syndrome of power is that reference point that justifies the role in modern diplomacy of the function of informing, directed to the structure of power of a certain political subject. While it is true that since the beginning of international relations decision-makers applied some form of calculation regarding the 'structure of power' of the opposing side in certain concrete situations, often of conflict, it was not until the gunpowder and industrial revolutions that the military technology of the time did not demand more demanding methodologies of calculation. The structure of power has on a holistic level of social, political, and international relations changed through the flow of centuries to reach the level evident in the present, where this category integrates the achievements of all revolutions. For our discourse on the need for and possibility of constituting a sociology of diplomacy, these changes are of key importance, as also the institution of diplomacy has to confront them in all three previously mentioned functions.

The structure of power, its use and its origins

Burton, one of the theoreticians of the discipline of international relations, wrote "that probably there is no greater common factor defining considerations on the international phenomenon than the assumption that states, when it comes down to their existence, depend on the power they wield with the intention of fulfilling their national interest, and that the central problem that must be resolved is that of power."[60] Such an understanding of the category of power must be linked to its definitions, delivered to us by theoreticians such as Max Weber with the words that "the use of power is that option which can be exercised within a given social relation even when it is being resisted, regardless of on whom this option is exercised" (Weber, 1956: 28). R. Merton understands power as "no more and no less than the *observed and announced capability of a side … appearing in such action*" (cursive V. B.) (Merton, 1968: 426).

Among the theoreticians of international relations there exist differences in conceptualizing the category of power, which in a simplified form can be expressed through the positions espoused by the proponents of the realist theory of international relations, that is the "singularity" of the use of power, and the proponents from other schools of thought on international relations, who argue for its "plurality".

The difference between the concept of power advocated by realist theory in Morgenthau's interpretation, and that of other theories, particularly from the so-called pluralist circle, lies in the *"singularity of power*" (cursive V. B.), advocated by the former, and its "*plurality*" (cursive V. B.), which is the position held by the latter.

In the realist theory of international relations, the postulate of power is integrated in the interest of a state, and in each case in the same form, which essentially means recourse to a rough form of coercion, that is, the use of force. Such a use of power for the benefit of realizing the so-called national interest is allegedly directed in a milder form through the intention to influence, which already can be understood as a 'resignation' from singularity. And this resignation or, rather, this deviation from the one-dimensionality of above all military use of power is even more evident in the position of the pluralists, which we briefly present.

If we follow the elaboration of the syndrome of power in the interpretations of the theoreticians Keohane and Nye (2001), their central point is the broadening of the spectrum of use to that area of international

60 From the author's manuscript, the reference or listed source is not discernible.

relations that remained outside the attention from the realist school and its preoccupation with security and survival and balance, which is in our view a realistic view of the problematic differentiation in interactions between states. Thus, they are confronted with a plethora of problems, which they are meant to resolve consistently with their interests, but the weighing of these problems differs, and this means that the use of force is also dosed differently, both in a quantitative and qualitative way. Both theoreticians justified the resignation from the realistic 'view' on power in international relations with the changes in the international community, which occurred after the Second World War. Among these, they count the density and quality of interaction between the various subjects in the international community, including non-governmental international organizations. The result of such changes is seen by them in the relativization of the role of power, which is ascribed to the growing mutual dependence, an important category in their understanding of the present, and which should be an analytical response to realist theory.

M. Mann belongs to the circle that applies historical sociology, which chains the syndrome of power into a direction close to sociological discourse. It is articulated in three groups, namely power of a distributive and collective nature, extensive and intensive power, and authoritative and 'diffuse' power. His interpretation of power leads to the consideration that its use is plural, that it differs depending on different goals and different situations. Close to this interpretation is that of Deutsch, who defines the use of power by the area it is aimed at, the goal it is meant to reach, and the range of its use. In particular the thesis on the 'distributiveness' of power is echoed by writers of the pluralist school, such as the previously mentioned Keohane and Nye (17).[61]

Finally, we note the course of thought of some other writers who draw attention to the problem of endogenous dynamics in individual societies with regard to the structuration of power and its sources on a "temporal and spatial path". For this reason, we believe that the solving of these questions needs Giddens' division of the sources of power, which he separates into allocative and authoritative sources. Among the former, he counts the

61 From here on out, the references are only numbered, as no sources are discernable in the author's manuscript.

material characteristics of a specific environment (raw material and sources of material power), the means for material production and reproduction (productive means and technology), and produced goods created by the interactions between the just mentioned allocative sources, while among authoritative sources he counts the organization of a specific society in time and space, the production and reproduction of both organization and the relations between people within its reciprocity, and the organization of life options for self-development (18).

That a categorization of the sources of power as presented, aimed at the study of specific societies and their structures, is broader than the category offered by realist theory and the theoreticians of its circle, is obvious. This however does not mean that individual elements of this categorization cannot be used for uncovering the relations between the elements of the sources of power, as their differentiated use for realizing goals and interests in the foreign policy of states is both an expression and part of generally non-simultaneous accumulation of these elements in a broad range of the development of individual societies, where our attention is drawn above all on the process of accumulating and increasing individual material sources of power. These are, as Giddens says, of fundamental importance for the expansion of power and its use. Yet there remain differences between individual societies with regard to the process of accumulating and increasing the material sources of power. These differences can be explained with the factor of unequal distribution of natural endowments, but empirical cases show that the accumulation and increase of material sources of power is of decisive importance for the positioning of authoritative sources of power and for the changes that occur in their dynamics.

Such attention to the syndrome of power and its actual and potential sources as was given to it in this part of our discourse was due to the reason that we advocate the thesis that it is in power and its structure where we see that reference point which justifies the role and content, in modern diplomacy, of the functions of representation, information, and negotiation. Alongside the changes in the structure of the modern international community, which we have mentioned in preceding paragraphs, these functions cannot be sufficiently performed without reliance on the knowledge and methodology provided and developed by social sciences. If we were able to determine that in previous periods in the development of international relations, all three functions – even if not to the same extent – held a political charge, then the analysis and interpretation of the modern international phenomenon requires sociological reflexion. This is also true for the institution of diplomacy.

The functions of diplomacy in sociological reflexion

Can the function of representation be a subject of sociological research and reflexion? A question thus put suggests that there exist doubts that it can be explained by such understandings of this function as arise from some definitions of diplomacy – "represents the state outwards, maintains foreign relations of the state outwards, accelerates and protects the interest of the state and its citizens, etc." – which are not only wholly nonsociological, but to which not even 'politological' can be ascribed. It is a formalistic approach which obstructs the meaning that the institution of diplomacy has for society and foreign policy as its sub-system.

An attempt to find the social incidence of the functions of diplomacy must in our view begin at the point of the creation of the state and its inclusion in the international community along the path of its recognition by other states, by respecting and using criteria of international law, that is the so-called constitutive elements of territory, the population in an organized community on it, and a government that is capable of ensuring internal and external functioning of the state. Yet the existence and verifiability of effective state formation do not guarantee said state recognition by other subjects of international law, as recognition is a discretionary right of states. When a certain state acquires recognition by other states, this recognition – when rendered de jure – is irrevocable and also retroactive, although this does not mean that the recognized state does not have to at all times strive to keep its place in the international community. There exist examples from the history of international relations when, according to the criteria of international law, 'statehood' was granted to the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but recognition was denied by some states due to reasons interpreted as ideological. This repeated itself after the Second World War in the case of some Eastern European states by the lack of recognition of its governments. These examples tell us that we must treat the function of representation in a wider and not a strictly formalistic framework, as it possesses a certain social basis and role as a part of the sub-system dedicated to maintaining and reproducing the foreign policy operation of states.

The need for a politological and/or sociological interpretation of the function of representation is inevitable when we confront the changes in the structure of the international community after the Second World War. The institution of diplomacy was in this period faced by a different social and political stage of that community when compared to preceding ones. The question of the suitability of, and the skills possessed by, classical diplomatic professionals drawn from the social elites had, sooner or later, to reach the agenda.

The American historian A.M. Schlesinger states that the former US President Kennedy critically assessed the profile of the American diplomat as not being suitably adjusted to changes in international relations. “They often know little about the country where they are accredited, are indifferent to the language and the habits of the populations of where they work, and cannot present their country America. And they spend their time at tennis lessons and cocktail receptions” (19). The turn towards a transition from an elitist to a structural diplomacy must be read in the sense of this critical assessment of the American diplomat, not only in the U.S. and their diplomatic corps but also in other states (20).

The shift from the classical elitist to a structural diplomacy, temporally situated in the period after the end of the Second World War, must be, with slight distance to its manifested characteristics, understood as the sociologizing of diplomacy. The starting point we note in the fact that the diplomat of the 20th century found himself in front of a social form different from that dealt with by his predecessor in the period of classical diplomacy. By use of the term structural diplomacy we aim at the shift from the routine, representative, and mediative nature of this institution to a professional understanding of the structure of a political subject, based on politological and sociological knowledge. The consequences of the revelation that a form of harmony must be achieved between the changed form of international relations and the form and content of the functioning of diplomacy are most evident on a staff and organizational level of the functioning implementation of foreign policy. Thus it is possible to determine that the diplomatic profession is to an ever-increasing extent filled by sociologically, politologically, and economically educated candidates, who work in diplomatic representations, intergovernmental organizations and in ministries, which in our view contributes to the integration of the formulating and implementing levels of foreign policy.

The transition from the classical-elitist to the structurally-oriented diplomat is condition for maintaining and upgrading the informing function and its key position in the disposition placed on diplomacy by foreign policy. Its political charge is by comparison with the two other functions the most transparent and as such to a large extent covers the understanding of Morgenthau's definition of the political function alongside the symbolic and the legal.

In the literature, there are generally no differences regarding what belongs to the agenda of the informing function. Thus it is not controversial to understand by the realizing of this function the maintenance of formal and informal communication between states, aimed at the exchange of opinions and positions to specific events between them and in the international community as a whole, in order to obtain the necessary elements for carrying out foreign policy activities. Be it formal or informal communication, in both cases we can ascribe to them the use of 'techniques' that are meant to present the diplomat as a skilful and successful operative who can cover up his own moves and motives while discovering those of others. The second level where the informing function is carried out is found in the tasks of diplomacy and diplomatic representatives in the host country, namely to observe and inform their home state about important processes, events and phenomena in different areas such as politics, economy, culture, etc., which have been assessed as politically relevant for choosing strategy and tactics. Already on this level of observation as a technique for carrying out the informing function, we find the possibility of crossing the line between what is permissible and what is inadmissible, with the latter referring to diplomatic illegal gathering of information. This possibility appears to a greater extent on the third level of the informing function, which are orientated towards the goal of exploring the structure of power in a certain state. What is to be understood as the structure of power and its elements and sources has been explained in the preceding chapter, and in the context of this discourse and its programme it is the third level carrying out the function of informing that is most important, as it requires alongside politological knowledge and applications also sociological knowledge and applications. It is in the latter where we find a series of sociological methodologies and applications that are suited for the structure of the modern international community as an inevitable object of sociological reflection.

The complexity of modern foreign policy relations and the need for it to be serviced with suitable staff has introduced into the organizational structure of diplomacy a new type of diplomat – the specialist. They should cover particular fields of international relations which require narrower and deeper knowledge than those possessed by diplomats of a general profile. In diplomatic organization diplomat-specialists are deployed within representatives or to missions accredited to international governmental organization. In particular, their role comes into play in institutionalized forms of multilateral negotiations in fields considered hot-issues, such as disarmament, monetary politics, economic cooperation, and the like. For our discourse, the emergence of the new profile is interesting if it contributes to the sociologizing of diplomacy in view of the need to solve the relations between the diplomat of the general profile, who to a certain extent possesses the 'heritage' of the classic professional, and the 'newcomer' using the aid of the sociology of organizations. We cannot neglect the fact that between the two types of diplomats, there are certain frictions that need to be relaxed, a result of the quicker career advancement of specialists due to the knowledge they possess and their flexibility in confronting different situation.

While the function of informing operates through the publishing, analyzing, and interpreting those processes and events in international relations necessary for the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy goals of a particular political subject, the function of negotiation is intended to manage and coordinate the interactions between them, particularly when these turn into relations of latent or manifest conflict. In its appearance, the function of negotiation was from the very early beginnings of international relations in the foreground of international statehood and is as such still perceived today. It was exercised and is still exercised in the process of managing two central social categories, these being cooperation and conflict. The perception of the social and political profile of a diplomat has since always been expressed in his capability and skill to negotiate to the degree that a diplomat, when successfully fulfilling negotiations, finally sees himself as accepted into the diplomatic world.

The question is whether contemporary reality in international relations wholly accepts such a perception. Thus some exposed theoreticians in the field of international relations claim that the institution of diplomacy is increasingly less important compared to its form in previous periods, a phenomenon they note as occurring in the fall of importance of the function of negotiation. Two reasons lie behind such a view, namely the role of modern communications, the use of which lowers the autonomy of the diplomat-negotiator, while attentive public opinion critically follows the activities of this institution even if it is hidden from its eyes. The dictum of former US President Wilson, directed against secret diplomacy and for open covenants openly arrived at, is to a certain extent still relevant.

By contrast with the preceding form of the diplomat-negotiator, who held this position above all due to capability and skill in negotiating, modern international relations and the emergence of the so-called structural diplomacy has a need for the use of knowledge granted by social science. Negotiations today are to a far larger extent than in the past confrontations of opposing structures of power, complex by their very nature, and must therefore be served by knowledge that corresponds to this complexity. This is particularly true for so-called hot issues agendas, such as disarmament, arms control, monetary politics, ecology, etc., which are all highly technical and require not only knowledge from economics, law, and political science, but also psychology and sociology.

The institution of diplomacy is anchored to the process of formulating and implementing foreign policy, as a factor with a social basis and the functions that stem from it, and a role that is in our view best expressed in the functions of informing and negotiation. The question of constituting a sociology of diplomacy relative to the sociologizing of its studying and its teaching must in our view rest on this point.

Conceptualization of diplomacy

The process of forming sociologically supported knowledge of the institution of diplomacy as a phenomenon with its own ontological and epistemological existence became theoretically 'achievable' only in the second half of the previous century. We risk to claim that on the level of existing discourse on diplomacy, this became noticed with the term of the so-called structural diplomacy, which represents a substantial shift from realizing its role in the thus far traditionally solidified practice directed towards decisive political and social elites rather than the structures of observed societies. The shift from so-called elitist to structural diplomacy is in our view conditioned by the deep changes that occurred in the international community and individual societies after the end of the Second World War, and is a result of the recognition that these changes require a profile of diplomat different from that which existed in previous centuries, and that the complexity of the stage entrusted to the diplomat, particularly as far as the informing function is concerned, must be supported by recourse to the social sciences. We believe that this shift towards structural diplomacy has its parallel in the process of sociologizing the science of international relations as an expression of the necessity to approach the study and explanation of the complexity of the international phenomenon with new, in particular sociologically based paradigms.

The emergence of structural diplomacy is a shift to a search for a social content and basis of diplomacy. As such, we cannot understand it simply as "practice, procedure or skill" ( ),[62] but we may grant it the status of a science, and the road to justifying this status leads to resolving the following questions:

62 A reference is made but not listed.

a) the operational field of diplomacy and its distinctness in the face of other social concepts that realize its agendas on it,
b) their relation towards diplomacy, or how they 'define' it,

what the relation of the theorem of foreign policy towards diplomacy is, in particular in view of understanding foreign policy as subjective and diplomacy as procedural work. We answer this by stating that diplomacy is ranking itself amongst the subjects of study of international relations, which in relation to other disciplines that intersect with it, such as history, law or political economy, is sufficiently distinct and differentiated by definition in the view of the "existence of a particular social sub-system that covers the field of international relations, the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is decentralized and that power in the international community – contrasted with the state – is divided among numerous, with each other competing, and independent groups, that the environment in which international relations develop has no highest authority, no highest judicial organ nor police, that it has numerous centres of decision-making and that at least until recent each subject had the right to the use of force" ( ).[63] The existence of this field and the subjects of its study is delineated from other concepts and disciplines, whilst still containing space for the discipline of diplomacy with the conclusion, generally accepted, that "the institution of diplomacy is a constituent part of the international community" ( ).[64]

If by using Aron's definitions we have distinguished the science of international relations from other social science disciplines and in it found space for the study of diplomacy, the next step in conceptualizing this field necessitates approaching the answer to question b, that is, the question of how the institution of diplomacy is situated in face of individual sectors of the study of international relations in the science of international relations.

We will attempt to find the answer to this with the aid of the definitions that in the science of international relations identify diplomacy.

For this we can discover that they vary in their degree of precision and in how operatively suitable they are for determining its social content. Thus at the top of definitions without such qualities and which must be treated as more or less formalistic, we rank those found in encyclopaedias on

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.

international relations. For example, some understand diplomacy as "the business or skill of carrying out international communication" ( ),[65] "the use of accredited officials for carrying out intergovernmental relations" or "as both a skill and a science that should help states attain success in foreign policy at the limit of deciding for armed conflict" (20). Some definitions reach further by noting the ways of realizing representation, and define it as "administrating international relations by way of negotiations" ( ),[66] which is close to reducing its role simply to the function of negotiation, which is also evident from the understanding of the institution of diplomacy as "maintaining official communication between states".

For purposes of our discourse, it is important to note two definitions that indicate an understanding of the social nature of diplomacy. Thus the definition of diplomacy according to the interpretation of the French sociologist Aron states that "diplomacy is together with strategy a complementary aspect of the unitary skill of politics – the skill of conducting relations with other states with the goal of promoting national interests" (23). The social-scientific content of the function of diplomacy is even more emphasised in the definition offered by Morgenthau, which states: "A diplomat carries out three basic functions for his country, that is the symbolic, the legal, and the political. A diplomat together with the foreign ministry shapes the foreign policy of his country. That is by far the most important function ( ).[67]

The above interpretation of diplomacy solves multiple questions. Firstly, it is evident that such an understanding of the role of diplomacy does not serve a narrowing of its tasks to "representing the state outside its territory, maintaining foreign relations with the outside, promotion and protection of the state's interests, etc.", which can be found in the regulative acts of Foreign Ministries and what we have noted as a formalistic approach, as it does not note the meaning that should be ascribed to diplomacy for every society, more specifically, its social function. In Morgenthau's definition, the syndrome of "politics, politicalness" is evident, in which we see an indicated approach to a sociological understanding of the function, to which

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.

we drew attention in the chapter on functions. Furthermore, Morgenthau uses the expression "a diplomat *shapes foreign policy together with the foreign ministry*" (cursive V.B.), which excludes an understanding of diplomacy as simply a "method" (24) in Wright's interpretation ( )[68] and in the extreme reduction to procedure or technique. Finally, his interpretation brings us closer answering an, for our discourse, important if not key question regarding the relationship between diplomacy and foreign policy.

There exist numerous definitions of diplomacy, but for purposes of our discourse we use that of Vukadinović, "foreign policy is that organized activity of the state through which it aims to maximize its values and interests in its relations to other states and other subjects that function in its external environment" (25). A theoretical and empirical interpretation of this definition in our view emphasises the state as the carrier of this organizational activity, and this in the name of the society from which it emanates. The subject of foreign policy is society, organized in a state.

If we now pose the question on what the goals and values of this society are and which are advocated by foreign policy to the outside, then we look for the answer by analysing its social, political and legal structure. Foreign policy is therefore the medium through which the essence of a state is expressed, but not as a pure replication of internal social processes, given that the state appears in the sphere of international relations as a complex representative of society, which means that it must to a certain extent consider the interests of classes and layers not represented in the structure of authority.

The goals of a given state towards other states are in the ambience of the international community relativized by necessity. By this we mean the factual and legal aspects of this relativization, as in the process of realizing its interests the state meets the interest of other states, which are often incompatible with its own.

The realization of the goals of a given foreign policy takes place in an institutionalized process, where the internal part is located in the MFAs while the external part is located in diplomatic and consular representations. Given this division in the apparatus of foreign policy, we speak of foreign

68 Ibid.

policy formulation as a substantive and simultaneously distinct separation from the implementable and simultaneously correlative side of the role of diplomacy. Such a “separation”, the extreme formulation of which can be seen in an understanding of diplomacy as simply a “method”, “technique” or “practice” obstructs the actual role of this institution in modern international relations as a process with political and social content. We must accept the position expressed by J. Burton in his polemics with H. Nicholson. The latter had separated the substantive part from the implementable part of foreign policy, as the former can be understood as “legislative” while the latter is expressed in the function of negotiation ( ).[69].Burton does not accept such a position, since a “distinction between formulating and realizing foreign policy was never reasonable” ( ).[70] Being open to the changes that have occurred in modern international relations and the functions of diplomacy that have been the subject of this discourse, we believe that diplomacy can be defined as a dynamic political process, meant to maintain formal institutionalized relations between states, containing both substantive and procedural politics and which functionally maintains the continuum of formulation and implementation of the goals of a given foreign policy.

Conclusion

At the outset of our discourse on the need for and possibilities of constituting a sociology of diplomacy, we outlined theses on the lasting nature of this institution and its exposure to changes in the structure of the international community. That this community is pluralistically organized, which means it has no supreme authority, is from the development of international relations up until now empirically verifiable, and therefore necessitates a mediating role in communication among sovereign political subjects and as such will consolidate itself until the death of this pluralism. Similarly, a quick historic recapitulation of exceptional periods in the development of the international community confirms that the role and content of the institution of diplomacy have been changing without having lost its lasting mediating nature.

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.

As all other institutions in the structure of the international community, so too has diplomacy been a subject of social reflexion to the degree ascribed to the level of development of each period. This is especially true for history, which already in earlier periods in the development of international relations noted exceptional events and happenings, while law at the beginnings of an authentic international community recorded prescriptions on regulating relations between its subjects. Both political science as well as sociology have in this reflexion lagged behind.

We have drawn attention to this lagging behind and in the case of the sociology of diplomacy posed the question, why and from where this lagging stems and where to find the 'space' for 'entry' of sociological reflexion in uncovering the complexity of the modern international phenomenon.

The modern international community embodies the complexity of this phenomenon, the role and function of diplomacy, as established by the practice of international relations, to a certain extent reflect this complexity, which is served by political science through discovering and uncovering political constellations and processes, and by which they have also reached into the field of diplomatic activity, while all until recently sociology has remained in the background.

Our contribution to a discourse on the need for and possibilities of constituting a sociology of diplomacy has been built on an attempt to uncover that part of the role and functions of diplomacy, where in our view its social character, reaching beyond its political expression, appears. We have highlighted some elements of this appearance in the function of representation, while the weight of the uncovering was given to the function of informing. We approached it with the hypothesis that the "input" of sociological reflexion is determined by the share given by this function to the structure of power of the observed object. From here, our considerations lead to broadening the hypothesis, that is, that a condition for reproducing the function of informing is its shift towards introducing a structural diplomacy. This documents the social basis and meaning of this institution.

With this shift, diplomacy is losing its role which some definitions attribute as being 'method', 'technique', 'procedure' or 'practice', and is gaining a sociologically supported understanding as part of the process of formulating and implementing foreign policy, which due to the complexity of the international phenomenon requires aid and support from sociology.

DEFINING SPECIAL SOCIOLOGIES

Albin Igličar

Introduction

Universal processes of labour division, which take place not only in the material but also the spiritual realm of a person's creativity, continually promote and stimulate the development of new fields of social relations studies. From the most general science regarding a society, its structure and development, i.e. its structure and dynamics, derive narrower and more specialized studies of individual segments of the global society with more narrowly defined subjects of study and special cognition methodology. Therefore the general sociological theory continually branches outwards — together with the accumulation of appropriate empirical studies — to new special sociologies and mid range theories. In the field of sociology, we are in general witnessing a certain form of stagnation in creating exhaustive theories and a certain dynamic in the field of sociological methods and special forms of sociology.

These processes are a reflection of the dialectic nature of the natural world, society and the individual himself/herself. They are also a reflection of dialectic categories in objective reality, namely as a consequence of the relationship between individual, special and general level, bearing in mind that individual phenomena take place in general through the specific. In the objective social reality we therefore meet general phenomena (society), as well as special (a family as an institution) and individual (the family AB). Global society[71] as a generality of course never appears in its pure form, but in concrete individual forms of integration which can be organised into special institutions or subsystems. Research in social studies thus have access to not only general, but also to special and individual social phenomena, without the danger of going into the extreme of recognising only the existence of the general or individual, respectfully.[72]

So we see concrete empirical sociological studies on the level of individual and the common findings of these studies find their place in special sociologies, mid range theories and last but not least, in general sociological theory.[73] The special sociologies and mid range theories thus appear on the level of special. Special sociologies are in-depth studies of individual segment of global society (family, local community, religion, law, etc.) and by researching special social phenomena and their relation to the entire global society, horizontally cut through the global society, while the mid range theories cut through the global society vertically and research a phenomenon which is present in all special social segments (power, stratification, changes, etc.)

In a simplified schematic model we could, for better presentation show the relations between empirical studies, special forms of sociology, mid range theories and the general sociological theory (paradigm) in the following table.

71 The term global society signifies the largest and the broadest entirety of social relations, which is identifiable as a closed system (Goričar, 1975: 77).

72 In medieval philosophy, these two extremes show as nominalism, which acknowledges only the existence of individual, and as realism which acknowledges only the existence of general.

73 Compare: “Actually can all general sociological theories and mid range theories be potentially applicable in any given special form of sociology...” (Jambrek, 1997: 74).

Table 1 – Levels and relations within the sociological paradigm

GENERAL	General sociological theory →	Global society
SPECIAL	Mid-range theory →	Power, stratification, changes
	Special sociologies →	Family Local community Religion
INDIVIDUAL	Empirical studies →	Family x, local community y

Source: Own.

On the general level, major social paradigms or general sociological theory are created. This theory encapsulates main concepts, concept relations, models, hypotheses and (scientific) laws. The most important parts of a theory are the scientific principles, as a proven measure of accuracy in the operation of a phenomenon or as a relatively permanent and repeating cause relation between two or more phenomena. The greater number of these principles is included in a certain part of rational thinking, the more developed a scientific field is. Everything of course takes place in the sense of asymptotic approach to the truth, where we are always closer to the truth but we can never attain it in its absolute sense. Due to the variability of the object of study and the variability of the observer himself, we can establish the so-called "relative truths" or truths for our time and space, but not absolute ones. Establishing the truth — in the Aristotelian sense of compliancy of our ideas with reality — is more or less the crucial social function of science.

In the process of creating special sociologies and mid range theories, the above mentioned procedures often take a deductive path. General sociological theories or paradigms have served as a basis from which different independent special sociologies gradually developed. The accepted point of origin for this development was a general definition of sociology as a science regarding social aggregates and groups, institutions and their organisations and about causes and effects of changes in said institutions and organizations. Therefore, the main fields of sociological research are social systems, social institutions and structures; social relations in aggregates, groups and organizations and the relationships between them (International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968,1).

After sociology had gained the status of an independent scientific branch and separated from philosophy in the second half of the 19th century, it moved its focus from the most general aspects of the structure and development of the global society to more individual forms of connecting people and their organisations, which has lead to the gradual creation of special sociologies.

Special sociologies are defined by the field of subject of research and by a specific method of research.

The research subject of special sociology

The subject of study in special sociology is defined by the aspect of integrated sets of social relations, which are shaped around certain social actions of an individual.[74] They are sporadic and — for the existence of an individual and society — important parts of social life, which are interlinked and incorporated into the entire global society. Special sociologies are focused exactly on such parts of social reality[75]. From the aspect of contemporary sociology or systemic theory (sociological paradigm), we could talk about individual subsystems within a social system. These subsystems are at the fulcrum of attention (in the forefront) of special sociologies.

A system has to integrate all elements into an independent entity. Differentiation occurs when the number of elements increases to such an extent that it becomes impossible for each element to be interacting with all other elements in every single moment (Mali, 1996: 236). Consequently, new systems or subsystems within the entire social system develop, and

74 This term, 'Soziales Handlung', is used for a key term in his social theory by Max Weber in Economy and Society - Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , published in 1922 (compare Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vierte Auflage, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen 1956).

75 Similarly: "Their speciality lies in the fact that they as a rule study only a certain section or phenomenon and not the society as a whole." (Jambrek, 1992: 71).

under this dynamic and differentiation they are brought into otherwise homeostatic social relations.

Another characteristic of systemic theory is that it does not give any advantage or special emphasis to any of the social subsystems, such as economic, political, legal or cultural. All are equally important and thus none of them has a determining position towards any other. Equally, there is no subsystem which would represent society as a whole, which as a consequence disintegrates into a series of partial and self-absorbed systems (Adam, 1996: 233). All these systems are independent and completely equal to each other.

The political system, is in this sense in principle only one of the partial social subsystems. But if we start from the political system in its entirety, we can follow subsystems, such as political parties, interest groups, state institutions, etc. within it. Nevertheless, the political system in comparison with others, responds more to the changes in the environment of a system. At the same time, the political system is a very relevant environment for other systems. System explanation of a society still claims that politics can be perceived as a hierarchically higher system in modern society, but only as one of the functional subsystems, although we can acknowledge a certain special importance to the politics and institutions within the political system in creating conditions for the operation of other subsystems and a special role in coordination among them (Makarovič, 1996: 257).

The prevalent idea in contemporary systemic theory is one of "decentralised society" where social connectedness is established only through the action of partial social systems. For modern society, we therefore cannot search only for some segment which would fatally determine the happenings in other segments and the entire global society as a whole.

Modern society should therefore be strongly multi-centric. Individual systems develop irregularly and independently. Nevertheless, this is not true for relationships within a system. Within a system, created by each concrete structure of social relationships (Levy, 1968: 26) individual systems are strongly interdependent. Patterns of social behaviour and actions within a system can be preserved only if they adapt to the system's functions and needs.

Some theorists even emphasize that a system produces its own elements itself (autopoiesis). It achieves this by selecting all environmental influences according to its needs and organization. The system reduces the entire social actions to those elements which suit the expectations of actors within the system. Thus the entire communication of the system with other systems is done through chosen information. The entire communication becomes a selection within different possible information (Škrlep, 1996: 28).

A system is integrated with the operation of functional subsystems. Only functional differentiation and not the causality relationships are at the forefront of society as a whole. The system environment does not have purely determining but only a stimulating effect. The integration of global society takes place in such a manner that each individual system performs certain activities or functions for the entire global society. Thus, each partial subsystem contributes to social stability.

Each partial subsystem can represent a 'problem field' of a special sociology, while the integration of functional systems in the entire social system creates 'a problem field' of general sociology (general sociological theory).

The research method of special sociology

For a certain special sociology, not only the subject of study but also the specific method of research is significant. This specific is not always obvious. It is noticed only with a closer and in-depth relationship with the topics of a certain special sociology. The mode of research is in the initial approach an inevitable part of the general way of searching for the answers to questions regarding individual segments (subsystems) of a social system.

Also within the framework of a special sociology, this research takes place in four basic steps (phases) within the research process: definition of a problem, creation of hypotheses and the use of methods and data collection and evaluation of hypotheses (confirmation/rejection).

In the first step (in defining the problem), we set the field of research, define key concepts and conceptual relationships (denonative, connotative, structural, functional and operational definitions) and chose the appropriate measuring procedures in order to assure that they be as valid, reliable and accurate as possible. Special sociologies will have more denonative functions, which state all important characteristics of a social phenomenon and less connotative definitions which capture only the key feature of a phenomenon. At the start of creating a special sociology, the so-called "operational definitions" will prevail. They are valid only for an individual empirical study and does not have any ambitions to be regarded as valid for a general sociological theory. We must not overlook the internal structure of a special social phenomenon (structural definition) and its function in relation to other phenomena and the entire society (functional definition).

Nevertheless, all studies have to focus on relatively permanent and repeating strings of social relationships and their typical characteristics. Unique, coincidental or very rarely repeating relationships amongst people (in the sense of the actions of one individual regarding another) are not suitable for sociological research, since they are not relevant either for the fate of the individual or for the fate of the entire global society. More important for an individual and the entire plethora of their integration are the social relationships of an existential nature, which often recur and into which enter the subjects as holders of social roles. This creates the so-called 'circles of interrelations' which are the objects of empirical studies and special sociologies. Their findings are postulated by general sociological theory.

The feature of measuring procedures, i.e. validity ensures that the acquired and represented findings are as truthful as possible or that our concepts comply with reality. The social function of science and the entire expertise within this field and scientific practices lies in finding the truth. While doing this, we process social facts in compliance with the established methodical approach and with as much objectivity as we can (as things)[76]. The reliability of measuring procedures allows us to obtain − providing the circumstances are unchanged − the same results. The accuracy of the procedures depends upon the purpose of a study. Research approaches can sometimes be more rudimentary − as for initial stages in developing

76 Similarly as Emile Durkheim demanded in his famous work Les règles de la méthodes sociologique, dated 1895 (Durkheim, 1999, 33).

special sociologies – or we need more accurate and differentiated answers to our questions.

It is important to know at the beginning of a research study whether we want to do only an exploratory (pilot) study or it is our intention to make longitudinal or a long-term research project. Only when they are thorough and fully exhausted all avenues can they provide a reliable and responsible creation of a certain special sociology. In this area, we can see a relatively high level of impatience and hastiness expressed in the desire to have an established sociological discipline, only after a few empirical studies (of a rather exploratory nature). Numerous pilot (exploratory) studies which help us to highlight the research issue more thoroughly will of course be prevalent in the initial stages, but they won't have any pretentions to present themselves as a new independent field. Only an exhaustive body of longitudinal studies enables us to begin creating a special sociology as an independent scientific field.

The above mentioned measuring procedures help us to obtain more reliable, more accurate and more truthful data regarding certain social processes than we can establish from our everyday observations, experiences and other people's descriptions. Saying this, I don't wish to claim that life experiences, journalists' reports and artistic presentation cannot shed light on important aspects of an individual's social activities. Of course they can, and they often meet the objective reality. Scientific studies differ only in the consistent use of all stages in a research process and in the use of methods and research techniques, which all give us hope that the findings obtained in this way will be more reliable, accurate and true.

Hypotheses (assumptions, presuppositions) arise from life experiences, intuition, existing theories and normative frameworks of social relationships. They are usually made in an affirmative form as not yet verified claims about the existence of a phenomenon, its size and connectedness with other phenomenon and its causal connection with another phenomenon. The content of hypotheses is in the field of special sociologies determined mainly through long-term life experiences and normative concepts.

When studying a law phenomenon, we will for example on the basis of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia make the hypothesis: "Slovenia is a legal and social state." Then we will test this claim (using appropriate methods and research techniques) within our research. Thus we would verify the hypothesis regarding the existence of a phenomenon.

If we were determining the size of a phenomenon, we would for example design a hypothesis: "Slovenia is a more social state than it was 10 years ago." Regarding the hypothesis regarding the connectedness of the two phenomena, we could for example make the assumption: "If a state is legal, it is also social." While regarding the hypothesis about the causative connectedness between the two phenomena, we could form the presumption: "A functioning legal state increases people's trust in state institutions."

The hypotheses are then put into relation with the transformative qualities of social or legal phenomena. When they are part of a study, they serve as independent or dependent and also intervening variables. The first, independent variables represent causes, while the second, dependent variables represent the consequences of the social and legal processes.

When creating a new special sociology, we usually begin from the society as a whole, which acts as an independent variable and study a special social phenomenon (family, law, religion, politics, diplomacy) as a dependent variable while subordinately observing numerous intervening variables. Thus, we study causes for the appearance of a special social phenomenon, its origins and determinants in broader social environment, as well as the reciprocal influence of the phenomenon on the cause of its origin.

Defined hypotheses direct the study of the chosen problem and the interrelated social facts and therefore need to be set with qualified deliberation and great consideration.[77] They are particularly exposed in initial studies, where they can be designed more generally or more accurately in a form of an initial general hypothesis and thoroughly elaborated work hypotheses.

When choosing methods and research techniques we usually start with various techniques of observation (open, covert, with participation or

77 Similarly: "A hypothesis thus usually appears as a conditional, initial claim about the interrelatedness of phenomena and it helps us when choosing and integrating facts. At the end of a study it can be confirmed, rejected or modified." (Flere, 2000).

without it, structured or unstructured) and reference study or critical study of already obtained findings.[78] In the early stages of creating a special sociology, this is undoubtedly the initial approach for observing and describing certain social processes. An unstructured observation which captures the entire phenomenon will therefore be more in the forefront in the early stages of creating a special sociology, while structural observation, with a thorough study of individual sections and traits of a set of social relations will be more often used for an already established special sociology. The content of a special sociology further depends upon the selection of the mode of observation, whether open or covert or with or without participation. When studying activities within legal institutions, the appropriate mode of observation would be the one without participation (when, for example, we monitor the process of adopting a bill in a parliament where the principle of publicity applies), while in studying social dimensions of diplomatic negotiations, observation with participation would be more fruitful, because the observer himself is an integral part of the observed process. On the other hand, we can carry out observations of public social processes without the knowledge of directly involved participants (covert observation), while the participants in social processes of a private or secret nature (silent diplomacy, for example) should be notified that they are observed for the purposes of scientific studies and therefore the observation must be open.

We continue social studies with an extensive canvassing of the participants of social processes (a subject of study), collecting appropriate material, historical and legal sources and with additional intensive research into the chosen issue. We achieve the latter mainly with the aid of a directed interview as a micro-sociological instrument, while we use a survey as a macro-sociological research instrument when gathering an extensive amount of perspectives. An analysis of secondary material (statistical data, formal reports, minutes, judgements, material for international agreements, orders and newspapers and other mass media formats, fiction, etc.) can be very useful when analyzing the actual flow of social processes.

All the above mentioned should be integrated into the general method of approach, which observes the dialectic nature of objective reality and a

78 For more information, see Toš and Hafner-Fink (1998).

person's thoughts with the appropriate use of dialectic principles (unity and fight of opposites, the relationship between quantity and quality, negation of negation) and dialectic categories (general − special − individual, essence − phenomenon, cause − consequence, etc.). They point to the changeability of nature, society and the individual, to a merely asymptotic approach to the truth or to the validity of findings for our specific time and space. Since we are aware of the absence of absolute truths and of the changeability of the world and the individual, we have to focus on the practice process as a testing ground for a theory, because the practice process allows us to verify the relative truth of established theoretical findings, laws and categories. When we professionally and scientifically study (also) social phenomena, we have to abide by the common wisdom that a theory without practice is sterile, while practice without theory is blind.

The end of the research process or study of a chosen social issue is followed by the synthetic presentation of the findings, and the complete or partial rejection or confirmation of our hypotheses. The final discoveries of a research effort should present real social relations which took place in a segment of the social sphere and imply possible solutions to social issues in the future. We have to sum up the established findings in the final part of the empirical study and in establishing proven scientific principles in a certain special sociology. It is advisable to pay special attention to an appropriate balance between the presentation of already established findings and the new contributions to professional or scientific discoveries. On the one hand, we need to present only those established discoveries which are crucial for our particular issue at hand, and on the other we need to talk more exhaustively about new discoveries, suggestions and a critical evaluation of the existing knowledge.

Exploratory courage and creative doubt

When creating synthetic findings and presentations in individual special sociology, we have to bear in mind that all social phenomena are multifaceted and complex. Hence the society is often defined as a totality of social relations.[79] Such an integral approach is present in the end

79 For example in Jary and Jary 1995: 627.

findings of a special sociology, while in the central segment of the study, we analytically break up a phenomenon into its elements in order to know it better and more thoroughly. The two basic motifs for this are creative doubt and exploratory courage.

Exploratory courage is connected with necessary critical thinking and reservations when announcing a new sociological discipline. As pointed out before, only the more exhaustive set of discoveries, clear concepts and definitions and above all, verified principles and plausible hypotheses justifies the independence of a certain special sociology. Some fields are understandably more developed than others, but we can nevertheless say that a minimal scope of systematically settled information about a certain segment of society (subsystem) is a precondition in order to talk about a special society. It is still reasonable to start out on Durkheim's rationale on sociology as a science about social facts which need to be studied as objects.[80] Only by strict observation of this directive we are able to say how sound is the extensive list of special sociologies and pick out − according to the strict scientific rules − justified[81] from more fashionable[82] special sociologies.

The conceptualization of a special sociology depends in many ways upon the chosen general sociological frame or from the so-called 'sociological paradigm'[83]. As late as the 1980s, two basic sociological paradigms dominated the social sciences. One was the functional structural theory, with its continuation in system theory and the other was the Marxist or conflict theory of society.

80 From the Introduction (by Rade Kalanj) to the Croatian edition of Durkheim's The Rules of Sociological Methods (1999).

81 Collins Dictionary of Sociology for example lists the following special sociologies: sociology of art, of education, of development, of criminal and deviation, of health and medicine, of local communities, of consumption, of industry, of science, of law, of mass communications, of music, of organisation, of religion, of sport, of body, of environment, of family, of work, of economy (Jary and Jary 1995); similarly in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (1998).

82 For example in the study course Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Science (UM): sociology of partner life, sociology of genders in the third life period, clothing culture, sociology of media culture, etc.

83 Kuhn (1998) describes paradigms as accepted cases of actual scientific practices, "which include law, theory, application and instrumentalisation together ... and provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research". Harlambos (1999: 867) further explains that a paradigm is "...a complete theory and a framework for scientific work. It determines which observations we collect and how we analyse and interpret them."

Functionalism and system theory focused their attention mainly into integration (conjunctive) social relations[84] which connect the members of various forms of integration in such a manner that social stability is maintained and a certain social order is preserved. Marxism on the other hand pointed towards the disintegration (disjunctive) of social relations,[85] which tear people apart. Fights between them, which sprung from such forms of disintegration display the dynamic side of social activities or social changes. Functionalism studied how an individual adapted to the system, while Marxism called for changes to the social system. The functionalist social paradigm therefore emphasized an evolutionary development, while Marxism predicted revolutionary changes. The difference in the initial orientations are of course the result of the functionalist emphasis of spiritual culture and values in a person's individual and communal life and the Marxist glorification of the economic basis or the so-called "mode of production of material life" as the last determinant and cause of state in the social, political and cultural sphere of society.

Nevertheless, some initial differences between these two sociological views are regardless the obvious striving to converge, both dominant sociological paradigms at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, and are still present in the existing and emerging special sociologies. One or the other paradigm always reflects in every single one of them. Thomas Kuhn understands this as "universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers" (Kuhn, 1998: 9). Exactly this "model problems and solutions" from one or the other sociological paradigm is the quality, which leaves a mark on a special sociology. Special sociologies in the social sphere obviously adopt initial concepts, definitions and theorems from general sociologic theory and in return give it back its own discoveries and findings to use and generalise. Special sociologies are also always a testing ground for general social theory claims.

84 Formal sociology (Tönnies, Simmel, Park, Ross) include among integration social relations, especially the relations of socialisation, cooperation, accommodation, assimilation and exchange. (Compare Andolšek 1996).

85 Disintegration of social relations or distancing relations includes competition, opposition and conflict. Even exchange relations can contort into disintegration relations, when the conditions of free and voluntary exchange are not met (Compare Andolšek, 1996).

The differentiation of sociological disciplines therefore must not disregard the discoveries regarding the accumulation and integration of sociological knowledge (Jambrek, 1997: 88). This warning emphasizes the need for a dutiful and correct incorporation of up-to-date or past discoveries, with respect to a person's social activities from both general social theory and its individual parts (accumulation of knowledge), as well as the integration of these discoveries from the international or global environment into appropriate scientific efforts at home in a national environment (integration of knowledge). The basic criterion regarding the integration and selection of past and global sociological discoveries and their incorporation in a certain special sociological discipline is given by confirming theory into practice. Nevertheless, practical applications of theoretical discoveries should not be judged only from the pragmatic point of direct usefulness, expressed in person's skills.[86] Broader aspects of the indirect influence of scientific discoveries on an entire person's behaviour and conduct in the material and spiritual production need to be taken into consideration as well.

Connections of a certain special sociology with relevant fundamental scientific disciplines in exploring a social phenomenon are established in their own original way. Educational science for example fundamentally deals with the fields of education and schooling, while special sociology of education and schooling improves this field with discoveries regarding networks of mutual relationships, emerging amongst the participants of both the education and schooling processes. Various sciences from the medical world fundamentally deal with medical treatment, while the sociology of medicine explores human interrelations emerging within the medical sphere. Legal norms are the subject of studying the theory of law and positive law sciences, while the sociology of law adds its own

86 Creators of study programmes and research plans for individual courses at university level study in individual cases also link the application of acquired knowledge with the search of connections with practice. Nevertheless, practical aspects of acquired skills derive from a critical evaluation of compliancy between theoretical models and practice and from a person's own understanding of theory and practical experiences. The application of acquired knowledge, arising from "the understanding of concepts, laws and principles, theories, phenomena, structures, processes, relations, procedures, etc." (The study programmes presentation at the University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana 2006) then manifests itself in the comprehensive work process and a person's active attitude to the natural and social environment.

discoveries about social sources and social effects of legal norms, as they are expressed in the processes of adopting and exercising legal norms in everyday life ('living law').[87] Historical, legal and political sciences are fundamentally dealing with the international activities of a state, while sociology of international relations shall again design discoveries about the forms and content of social relations present in the reality of these circles and methods of integrations. Within this framework, the sociology of diplomacy will deal in an in-depth manner with the content of social relationships and processes within the operations of the MFAs and diplomatic missions and consular posts of a given state.

Conclusion

In all the above mention cases and in many others, special sociologies act as a supplementary practice to a fundamental scientific discipline which studies a certain important field of human activities. In this sense, we could often describe a special sociology (without derogative connotations) as an auxiliary to the fundamental ('base') scientific discipline. Together, they both contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon and its complex exposure. This is especially true, if the principle of continuity without the nihilistic attitude towards classical and established scientific disciplines is taken into consideration. Self-criticism and reservation of emerging special sociologies is often appropriate and more helpful for their assertion than an eventual arrogance and contemptuous attitude towards original scientific environments. Besides, special sociologies should be always careful not to stray into a cabinet dogmatism, which does not strive towards empirical evaluation of its findings, or into a pure positivism which does not generalize and synthesize findings from individual empirical studies.

When a special sociology is in the making and in the process of defining, the connection with the political sphere is established as well. Activities of a state, political parties and interest groups often target the same population as a sociological study or a certain special sociology. Politics in the narrower sense means a direction of a society with means of

87 Compare the title of the German textbook for the sociology of law "Das lebende Recht, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft" (Raiser 1999).

legitimate political system (Thornhill, 2006: 83). Political activity arises from the critique of the existing state of affairs and offers suggestions for its change. Such a constructive critical approach is typical for any special sociology and especially for the so-called ‘action studies’ within it.

This field is the meeting point of politics and social science, because science itself makes critical analyses of given social circumstances and offers suggestions for changes of reality in its conclusive findings.

Some form of competition is therefore necessary. This sort of connection inevitably calls for a certain degree of mutual tolerance and understanding and also for the acknowledgment of different approaches from one or the other side. Critical findings of a special sociology most not be forced upon political actors as the only possible way of problem solving, because political views are often broader and conditioned by appropriate democratic decision procedures. On the other hand, scientific views or views of a special sociology are strictly disciplinary and integrated in only a partial explanation of a specific problem.

Science uses the power of argument and political arguments of power. Nevertheless, both fields have its place and eligibility in this modern democratic society. If politics integrated a certain special sociology in its ideology and used it for apologetic justification of its own concrete measures, the development would take a wrong turning. The same can be said if a special sociology tried to enforce its solutions at all costs, while contemptuously disregarding political measures and interest and democratic components of social life.

Legal environment incorporates in this scene in its own way. Legal institutional frameworks of the state can together with political regulation provide appropriate foundations for democratic policy and freedom of scientific endeavour.[88] Within this layout, a certain national scientific policy takes a crucial position, as performed by competent state authorities. Only broad legal premises, democratic political conditions and appropriate material foundations enable − in constant labour division and differentiation processes − a formation of new scientific disciplines or new

88 See for example Art. 59 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia: “The freedom of scientific and artistic endeavour shall be guaranteed” (*Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia – Ustava Republike Slovenije*, Official Gazette 33/1991, accepted on 23.12.1991.

special sociologies in the sphere of spiritual culture. Last but not least, social needs which are expressed in the public political sphere as interests, serve as the strongest motivational factor for scientists to develop special sociology and to determine the field of their function.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE MILITARY: INCREASED INTERDEPENDENCE

Uroš Svete and Jelena Juvan

Introduction

For two centuries, sociology as a discipline and the armed forces as social institutions have paid minimal attention to each other. With a few notable exceptions, such as Herbert Spencer's hypothesized evolution of modern societies from military to industrial forms, Emile Durkheim's consideration of the potential impact of military service on suicide, and Max Weber's use of the Prussian Army as the prototype for his ideal-typical bureaucratic organization, classical sociological theory had little to say about the armed forces as organizations, or war as a social process (Segal and Ender, 2008: 3). Developers of military doctrine have likewise been relatively mute on potential contributions of sociology to understanding military organization and the social processes of combat and war, although in some countries (like Germany), military sociology has been perceived as an important part of military science (Militärwissenschaft).

However, even as the armed forces came to find the behavioural and social sciences useful in the twentieth century, they initially depended primarily on psychometrics for the development of selection and classification tests in support of military conscription processes, and later on labour economics for predictions of manpower supply, as conscription was increasingly replaced by volunteer military forces in the late twentieth century, rather than on sociology (Segal and Ender, 2008: 4). However contemporary military sociology is primarily a result of the Second World War and Cold War eras. These events initiated the systematic study of military sociology, though it stands to reason that the relationship between the military and society would predate these events.

There are numerous topics within military sociology, and it is important to note that its scope is not exclusively limited to the military institution itself or to its members. Rather, military sociology encompasses areas such as civilian-military relations and the relationship between the military and other military groups or governmental agencies. Other topics within military sociology include the dominant assumptions held by those in the military, changes in military members' willingness to fight, military unionization, military professionalism, the increased utilization of women, the military industrial-academic complex, the military's dependence on research, and the institutional and organizational structure of the military (Siebold, 2001). Siebold (2001:145–146) emphasised the following categories, which are deemed key, and where to find or build the theories and issues central to military sociology. First there are factors internal to the military (the military as profession of arms, the military as social institution, including its values, roles and organizational structures and the military as an organization, with goals and ways of operating) and secondly factors external to the military, like relations between the military and wider society(ies), in which it is located, especially civil military power relations and relations with other military, governmental or non-governmental organizations, including relations with coalition partners and adversaries.

(Military) Sociology is the primary tool for investigating the military world and its relations, interactions, and affairs with other social groups

(Caforio, 2003a: 3). During the times, a special sociological sub-field dealing primary with the military world and its relations with the civilian world has developed.

The development of military sociology as a special sociology

Military sociology,[89] which is often also referred to as the sociology of the military, is a rather young sub-field of sociology. With the Second World War, the necessary research impetus for the development of a special sub-field emerged, and military affairs became a recurrent object of sociological research. "But the rise of a special sociology dedicated to the military, determined by an important fact of social life (Second World War), certainly did not follow any academic planning, but displayed a development that was fully marked by autonomy, diversity, and, at times, also by contradiction, often as a result of concrete, pressing requirements." (Caforio, 2003a: 4).

Although a research entitled "An American Soldier"[90] marks the beginning of the firm establishment of military sociology as a sub-field, this does not mean that military organization and military affairs have not been given any research attention before the Second World War. "Sociological investigation of the military preceded it by nearly a century, and was contemporaneous with the first studies commonly considered sociological" (Caforio, 2003b: 7). The new sub-field has embraced previous contributions to thought and research and has also carried them further. According to Caforio (ibid.) Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz have offered their own solutions to the convergence/divergence dichotomy between the armed forces and civil society already evidenced by *Alexis de Tocqueville* in the 19th century, while Charles Wright Mills' model of the power elite is clearly indebted to the studies of Gaetano Mosca at the end

89 The terms 'military sociology' and 'the sociology of military' can be used interchangeably, however, if we quote Caforio (2003a, 2003b) there is a difference in meaning: the sociology of military means the military organization is being researched by sociologists coming from outside of the military organization, by civilians. And the use of term military sociology implies research done by personnel of the military organization, the "insiders". For the purpose of this article a term military sociology will be used.

90 More on research "An American Soldier" to follow in the continuance of the article.

of the 19th century. So, it would be mistaken to say that research of military affairs started with the Second World War.

Military sociology starts with sociology "if not as a specification of a scientific factor, at least in the treatment of the subjects that would later be characteristic of it." (ibid., 8). *August Comte*, founder of sociology, has in his works dealt with a number of topics that would today be included in military sociology. Comte's analysis of the crisis of society of his time led him to construct a social history of humanity, a history built according to an evolutionary, linear conception itself, based on a principle of the progress of human species. And, as Caforio notes (ibid.), in this construction, the military, along with religion, plays a fundamental role, especially before the emergence of the industrial, bureaucratic, and civil aspects of society in a pluralistic sense. Comte observes (ibid., 8): "Mans' first tools are weapons and the first authority established in a group is that of the military chief….War acts on primitive microsocieties by diverting them in two directions: on the one hand, individual human aggregates tend to increase numerically to better meet military necessities; on the other, there is an extension of human association through the subjection of defeated groups to victorious ones.

According to Comte (ibid.) the first institutional situation is the polytheistic primitive society, where the eminent man is the eminent warrior, the dominant society is the one that dominates militarily, and power is the prerogative of the warrior caste. The polytheistic age is followed by the monotheistic one, which is characterized by a markedly defensive military attitude. This leads to a number of social changes, fraught with consequences for the military. As a result, according to Comte (in Caforio 2003b, 8), warfare gradually loses importance, the military leader is stripped of all religious power, armies shrink until they become elitist, and the military spirit declines until it becomes something internal to the military (esprit de corps).

With the modern age, the military underwent some radical changes. First, military leaders began to lose part of their temporal power. Second, the internal structure of the military was modified; standing armies replaced feudal militias, military leaders came under civilian authorities, and the question of political control over military arose. Military activities themselves were gradually subordinated to the commercial interests of the nascent national state. Comte (ibid.) sees the conscription, which was instituted during the French Revolution, as the decisive element that would reduce the military system to a subaltern task.

Caforio (ibid.) discovers that that Alexis de Tocqueville's chapters devoted to the military and war depart from the same outlook that inspired Comte's work and would later also inspire Spencer's work. Alexis de Tocqueville believed it was important to study the social makeup of armies and the behaviour and tendencies of those who compare them (ibid., 9). Caforio believed (ibid.) that with these findings, de Tocqueville has created the central object of what will later be the sociology of military. He has also identified and explored some other important topics, such as relations between the armed forces and society, social origins of the officers, military profession as an instrument of social ascent and careerism. In his analysis of the relationship between the armed forces and society, according to Caforio (ibid., 10), de Tocqueville takes on "what will be the great themes of debate and research in the sociology of the military in the second half of the 20th century" – the divergence/convergence of military society and civil society and the question of political control over armed forces.

Another very important scientist to have had significantly influenced the development of this special subfield was Herbert Spencer, who has also dealt with the military affairs in his fundamental work, Principles of Sociology. Spencer's interpretation of society is similar to that of Comte (ibid., 11). Spencer has also identified a primitive society, typically military, and a more evolved one – an industrial one. Societies, which have been involved in long term fighting and wars, develop their own internal structure to become more centralized and militarized, and the rights of an individual become subordinate to the interests of the state. According to Spencer, this is military society, while the opposite is the social industrial type (Spencer in Jelušič, 1997: 11), which is superior because it aims at individual well-being (Caforio, 2003b: 11).

Gaetano Mosca was the first scholar at the end of the 19th century to treat a single, specific theme of this special subfield. "Mosca goes beyond the positivist optimism regarding the disappearance of war with the advent of positive (Comte), industrial (Spencer), or democratic (de Tocqueville) society, clearly pointing to the fact that it is not the military institution that causes war" (ibid., 11). War is one of many manifestations of the human nature and for that reason military function will not seize to exist in every type of society. Mosca, according to Caforio (ibid., 11–12), reinterprets the evolution of the military establishment of industrial society. "In the modern state, the problem of supremacy of civilian power is solved in part by the makeup of European armies, where diverse social elements are represented and balance each other out, but more particularly by the inclusion of the officer class into what he calls the "power elite"." (ibid.) In every society there are two classes of people, the governing and the governed; the governing class is a small minority, but it is able to dominate because it is organized. And it is the officers' inclusion in the power elite – the organized governing minority – that ensures the armies' loyalty to the state and their subordination to civilian power (ibid., 12).

For Max Weber, the analysis of the military is central to the definition of the modern bureaucratic state. "He defines the modern state as the human community which, within a certain territory, successfully believes it holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force" (ibid., 12). Weber creates typologies of military orders, which are not linked to single historical periods or geographic regions or inserted into a process of linear, necessitated social evolution. Among the different typologies, the one of most interest to our field of research is the military institution of the modern state, where it reaches its full development. The officer is only a special category of the functionary, he too must obey a norm, which is formally abstract, and his right to power is legitimated by rules that precisely define his role (ibid., 12). The loyalty of the institution is ensured by the fact that the officer is a professional functionary chained to his activity with all his material and spiritual existence and yet with no power to substantially modify the complex bureaucratic machinery in which he is nothing more than a single cog (ibid.). "This gives birth to military discipline, which is the source of discipline in general, because it also constitutes the ideal model for the modern capitalist company" (ibid., 13).

Based on the analysis of Mosca's and Weber's attitudes, Caforio notes (ibid., 13) the profound difference between Mosca's elitist view on the role of the military professional and Weber's bureaucratic view, which later gave rise to two distinct schools of thought.

After Weber's studies, the sociology of military in Europe seemed to have undergone a period of low interest. While in the USA, this discipline still had to find the concrete need that would stimulate a specific study and research.

After the First World War, numerous works and studies on sociological characteristics of war have emerged, which is, according to Jelušič (1997: 21), distinctive for all post-war periods in order to achieve the neutralization of the effects of war. Among influential and often-quoted authors from this period we can find Harold D. Lasswell and his theory of the *garrisson state*, which emerges as the consequence of the decline of the civilian supremacy over the military.

Second World War, and especially the USA's entering into war, marks a new era in the development of military sociology. The US armed forces were forced to transform from an army of a few hundred thousand med into a force of over seven million individuals, and this has posed problems for the military that had never been faced before" (Caforio, 2003b: 13). So, in order to find solutions to their problems, armed forces have turned to the social sciences.

Military and social sciences

In 1942, the US army drew up a Troop Attitude Research Programme and formed a Research Branch, to which it has summoned a large team of specialized collaborators, especially sociologists, anthropologists, and social psychologists. The team was led by Samuel A. Stouffer. "At the end of the war, this group of specialists published a summarizing work, which to this day remains the singular testament to the most extensive field research ever conducted in the social sciences" (Caforio, 2003b: 13). The research was entitled *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*. Volumes 1 and 2 are better known under the title *The American Soldier*.

This research assembles the results of over 200 reports and interviews with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, conducted during the 1942–45 period. Many of the researchers who were part of the research team later became leading authors in the military sociology, e.g. Morris Janowitz, Charles C. Moskos, Kurt Lang.

The American Soldier was of great importance not only to military sociology, but also to common sociology, since the research team has developed several new research methods and techniques (Jelušič, 1997: 23; Caforio, 2003b: 15). Second, the American Soldier has offered some general conclusions useful also for the comprehension of other institutionalized collectives and not only armed forces. Today, military sociology uses not only research techniques and methods developed in the American Soldier, but also assumptions confirmed during the Second World War and during later wars. For example, each soldier participating in combat develops a special rationalization in order to comprehend the meaning of war. And the American Soldier research team had identified that the Second World War soldiers have embraced war as fair and inevitable, however no thoughts were given to the ideological background of the war (Williams in Jelušič, 1997: 23).

During and after the Second World War, an American school of military sociology has offered not only the first great empirical study of the military but also the first great theoretical systematization of the special sociology that studies the military. “This occurs with Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State” (Caforio, 2003b: 25). According to Huntington (1957) civil-military relations reflect the political relationship between the state and the officer corps, so for that reason he has mainly dealt with the officer corps. Huntington has defined the features of the profession and applied them to the officer corps. Features that distinguish a profession from an occupation are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. “There is a specific sector where officers exercise exclusive expertise – the management of violence” (Huntington in Caforio, 2003b: 16). The responsibility of a military professional essentially lies, according to Huntington, in the fact that managed violence must be used for socially approved purposes – the client of an officer corps is a state and his main responsibility is to the state.

Huntington’s main contribution to military sociology lies not only in the characteristics of the officer corps, but also in his thoughts on civilian control over military power. According to Huntington (ibid., 16), there are two types of political control that can be exerted over the military – subjective and objective control. “The former is exercised by maximizing the power of one or more social groups over the armed forces; the latter is chiefly based on the recognition of autonomous military professionalism and on a rigid separation of the latter from the political sphere” (Caforio, 2003b: 16).

Huntington’s work in the theoretical and structural organization of the sociology of military has provided fertile ground worldwide, especially due to the extensive use of his systematic structuring of the subject, delimitation of fields and identification of problems by subsequent scholars. And it has also raised criticism and negative reactions, particularly in regard to the political control over the armed forces. In the years to come, two theoretical approaches have developed in the American school of military sociology. First, led by Samuel Huntington, and second, led by Morris Janowitz, who has in his work The Professional Soldier laid the groundwork of a different and opposing model of political control over the armed forces.

Janowitz’s central thesis is that the military institution must be examined in its process of change because it must necessarily change with the changing conditions of the society to which it belongs (Caforio, 2003a: 17). In the period following the end of the Second World War, the international context was deeply modified. The first change in the military recorded by Janowitz (ibid.) was a new way of exercising authority. This was closely bound to the specific role of the armed forces where new conditions have accentuated decentralization, dispersion in the field, and autonomy of command at lower levels. Profoundly changed was also the recruitment of the professional soldier, who was identified by Janowitz as a career officer. Janowitz has identified the widening of the officer recruitment base in the USA. Consequently, officers were no longer a representative entity of a particular social stratum, but rather a separate organism working as a pressure group. Janowitz (in Caforio, 2003b: 17) defines a professional as someone who, as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill that enables him to render specialized services. Janowitz is also well known for his typology of a military professional – the heroic, managerial, and technical type. All three typologies are present in a modern army but are differently balanced. The emergence of the managerial and technological types has, according to Caforio (ibid., 18), narrowed the difference between the military and the civilian. “In this convergence, it is the military that draws closer to the mainstream of the society to which it belongs, gradually and continuously incorporating the values that gain broad acceptance in society” (ibid., 18). So, for Janowitz, and this marks the difference compared to the Huntington’s standpoints, officers must not constitute a separate body from a civil society, but must be profoundly integrated in it. (ibid.).

As part of the American school of the military sociology, some additional authors’ work has also influenced the development of this special sociology. Charles Wright Mills and Erving Goffman are among them.

Charles Wright Mills is important for having developed an elitist conception of power that had a wide following in the 1960s and included the officer corps (in Caforio, 2003b: 18–19). Certain men came to occupy positions, from which they have been able to look down on the lives of “ordinary” men and women and influence them with their decisions. In contemporary society, these men can be found in the corporate, political, and military sector. Membership in these power elites is determined not so much by birth, but by direct personal selection carried out by the current ruling class.

Erving Goffman is known for his theory of total institution, which is not exclusively a military topic, but has been widely applied to it in subsequent studies and research. Goffman has developed his theory in the 1950s, in the period in which theories of organization became firmly established. For Goffman, “a total institution is a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered routine of life”. (Goffman in Caforio, 2003a: 20). Goffman gave five examples of total institutions: psychiatric hospitals, seminars, prisons, barracks, and ships.

Attempts to reconcile divergence/convergence theories were made through a pluralistic theory in the USA in the 1970s. Numerous scholars contributed to these efforts to reconcile the two theories, but one author has made an important contribution: Charles C. Moskos Jr. (Caforio; 2003b: 21). Moskos (ibid.) proposed that a historical transformation of the military can be interpreted as a dialectic evolution in which institutional persistence (divergent) reacts against the pressures toward assimilation to civilian life, (convergent) present in a society at large. In this process of change, the military establishment passes through historical phases of divergence and convergence with respect to civil society. Moskos has developed a series of sociological indicators capable of concretely measuring the "institutionality" or "occupationality" of the military organization. His main hypothesis was that elements of both tendencies (institutional and occupational) are present in every military organization; however, it is the proportion between them that changes (Jelušič 1997, 126). Application of Moskos's scheme to a concrete situation has raised much interest among military sociologists, not only in the USA, but also all over the world.

In the development of military sociology, one important scholar also has to be mentioned. Kurt Lang published in 1973 an annotated bibliography with 432 sources from the military-sociology-field, published between 1963 and 1968 (Jelušič, 1997: 25). With this bibliography, Kurt Lang has set the boundaries of the field of military sociology. And it has divided it into five (5) sub-fields, which have remained basic sub-fields of military sociology up to today. Those sub-fields are: military occupation, military organization, military system, civil-military operations and studies of war (ibid.). With the end of the Cold War and the dramatic changes in the international community during the last few decades, a shift in the roles and tasks of the armed forces became obvious. The focus of the armed forces' activities has gravitated to participation in peace support and other-than-war operations. This has also resembled in military sociology, so one additional sub-field can be added, i.e. the sub-field of peace operations.

The development of the American school of thought in the military sociology has encouraged research and numerous studies around the world. The development of military sociology in other parts of the world is strongly marked by the historical development of three international institutions: Research Committee 01, Inter-University Seminar on Armed

Forces and Society, and European Research Group on Military and Society. These institutions have gathered military sociologists and other scholars from all over the world and have significantly influenced the development of the contemporary military sociology.

Scientific Associations

Research Committee 01 (RC01), named Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution, is one of the 55 research committees[91] into which the International Sociological Association is subdivided. Initially RC01 was called *Armed Forces and Society* (Caforio, 2003b: 24), but it was renamed in 1980 when its programme was expanded to include also the field of conflict research. Objectives of RC 01 are: (1) to stimulate research on armed forces and conflict resolution, (2) to establish and maintain international contacts between scientists and research institutions, (3) to encourage the exchange and discussion of relevant research findings, (4), to support academic research and the study of military-related sociology, and (5) to plan and hold research conferences (ibid., 25). Members of the RC01 meet regularly on a biannual basis; the last RC 01 biannual conference was held in July 2012 in Maribor, Slovenia, and was hosted by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana and the Slovene Armed Forces.

The most important issues discussed within the framework of this scientific association are definitely updated to recent social and professional challenges, which modern militaries are facing. Military sociologists therefore analyse and research how to manage the armed forces in times of austerity, when the economic crisis was followed by military downsizing and changes, especially among North Atlantic allies. Another significant topic is connected with abolishment of conscription, which was in some countries perceived as a special socialisation tool for many years. The end of conscription was legitimised and approved because of the technological and social development, but also for economic reasons. But sometimes, good intentions are more likely to pave the road to hell then lead to the solution of the problem. Therefore military sociologists warn of the privatisation of the military (and security) – the military is becoming

91 Complete list of all research committees is available at International Sociological Association's web site (ISA).

similar to other enterprises and institutions by competing for employees on labour market. With professional all volunteer forces also some traditional sociological issues (for instance the military family, women in the military or recruitment and retention) got completely different sense. The public perception issue is not just a tool condemned for testing social/functional imperative theory as well. Nowadays it is (for military authorities especially) more an indicator for measuring military reputation in the society, since public perception is important for mid and long-term retention and recruiting.

But more than by any other factor, the modern military and its profession was influenced by asymmetric warfare as prevailing conflict type after the end of the Cold War, and peacekeeping operations and multinational cooperation as the most frequent military engagement type. As Thornton (2007), among others, wrote, “In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare, radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the West’s air power, sea power and land power are open to attack by clever yet much weaker enemies.” Two parallel trend lines now pose a strong challenge to the militaries of the civilized countries – the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web. Both in cyberspace and in warfare, a public dimension has assumed increasing importance in only a few years (Rid & Hecker, 2010).

To better define the new scenario, we can use the classical definition that Kaldor (1999: 9) gave for this phenomenon, which she has called ‘new wars’: “A typical new phenomenon are armed networks of non-state and state actors. They include: para-military groups organised around a charismatic leader, warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells, fanatic volunteers like the Mujahadeen, organised criminal groups, units of regular forces or other security services, and mercenaries as well as private military companies.”

Asymmetry represents such an important issue among others for military sociology because of its influence on the education of military professionals, public perception of military activities, new military units (special forces) successfully used against the asymmetric warriors, and, last but not least, because of the changed relations among particular subsystems of national security.

Such questions are of course discussed within the RC 01 academic forum. If we consider asymmetric warfare as a military sociological issue, we also have to stress the question of methodology. Military sociology shared (with other sociologies) Comte's positivistic tradition for a long time, but in the case of asymmetry, qualitative research also brought important advantages. The methodology today known as 'qualitative' has been used for centuries, although under different names (e.g., fieldwork, ethnography, etc.). Over the centuries, participant observation has been used by anthropologists and sociologists who believed that the best way to gain insight into people's attitudes, relations, etc. is to live with them and observe them.

Researching a military organization has proven to be extremely challenging. For example, it is very difficult to gain permission to enter such an organization, and even harder to be given access to some specific units (special forces, military intelligence). Even after researchers enter the military, they are confronted with yet another obstacle, namely, gaining the trust of the servicemen/servicewomen. The researcher's presence itself presents another problem. It is almost impossible to ensure the 'normal' functioning of the military when an 'intruder' is present. This can be partially overcome if the researcher is a member of the military organization. However, this could also raise the issue of trust, since other servicemen/women might have strong reservations about discussing their problems with someone who is part of the same institution due to fear of such information reaching their superiors. This might be a problem in particular if the researcher has a higher rank (Vuga and Juvan, 2013). Despite these obstacles, the qualitative approach analysing the asymmetry has one very important advantage. While quantitative analysis aims to verify or disprove existing theories, qualitative analysis often derives theory from data gathered in the field (e.g., grounded theory). And because studying military organizations shows that the use of more than one method is crucial due to one of its specifics, which is a closed environment (Vuga and Juvan, 2013: 117).

The Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) was founded by Morris Janowitz in 1960 in Chicago. It constitutes an international "invisible college" that includes academics, military officers, students, and researches from a variety of institutional settings, both public and private. They represent various disciplines including political science, sociology, history, psychology, economics, international relations, social work, anthropology, law and psychiatry (Caforio, 2003b: 25). IUS was the first international organization to bring together scholars of the military sociology from different countries; however, it has always been American-led and has moved according to patterns and research themes of fundamental interest to the American school (ibid., 25).

As an opposition to the American school of military sociology, European scholars established the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) in 1986. ERGOMAS has brought together scholars from different fields according to their common research interest and not according to their area of expertise. Some European scholars have emerged (Martin Edmonds, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, Jacques Van Doorn) and contributed to the development of European military sociology (Jelušič, 1997: 26). "The founding philosophy of ERGOMAS was to create an organizational framework, suitable for promoting the constitution and activity of international thematic study groups within a European framework" (Caforio, 2003b: 26). The association is composed of a centralized organizational body, directed by a chairperson, and several research working groups, which operate in a coordinated manner but are completely independent from the scientific standpoint. ERGOMAS currently consists of ten (10) working groups: Military Profession; Public Opinion; Mass Media and the Military; Morale, Cohesion and Leadership; Military Families; Civilian Control of the Armed Forces; Gender and the Military; Warriors in Peacekeeping; Blurring of Military and Police Roles; Violence and the Military, Recruitment and Retention.

»Human Terrain System (HTS)« - Misuse of social sciences in military operations?

Although we have started this article with the emphasis on a growing gap between (military) sociology and the armed forces, some recent asymmetric conflicts show that social sciences are being (mis)used to gain advantage in the battlefield. The USA's concept of applicable social science the HTS falls into this category. The HTS is a US Army military intelligence support programme employing personnel from the social science disciplines – such as anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies, and linguistics – to provide military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population (i.e. the "human terrain") in regions where they are deployed.

Despite the fact that the interventions by the US and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq were not supported by wider international community (some countries even openly opposed the interventions), these two military operations have thoroughly changed the rules of war fighting. Not only that, they have caused main military actors in the contemporary armed conflicts to change. Armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been marked by a stronger and influential role of private military and security companies, and also stronger involvement of intelligence services in covert operations. Another phenomenon, which can be identified in connection with Iraq and Afghanistan, is the role of social sciences (and also of sociology) in counterinsurgency operations. The debate on the role of social sciences and scientists in military operations has gained much public interest, especially with the Human Terrain movie by James Der Derian. The question, which arises here, is whether embedding social scientists in immediate combat support is a novelty, and a moral as well as a scientific issue. One can note a parallel with embedded journalism, which was controversial at the beginning, but later became a "normal" form of war journalism. And it has also raised less controversy than embedded social scientists.

All counterinsurgency operations are undoubtedly human directed, since their main goals are not to gain control over the environment but over humans. The main element of the counterinsurgency operational framework is therefore to gain understanding of the opponents' human factor. In order to achieve these goals, the US Ministry of Defence has engaged social scientists (anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists) to assist commanding officers in the field in contacting and communicating with the local population. The US army has embedded social scientists to assist them with their activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in order to comprehend these kinds of activities, a broader understanding of the relation of social sciences, especially anthropology, towards security sector, has to be introduced. The history of this relation is more than two hundred years long, at least in the USA. Its Ministry of Defence has recognized the importance of culture as a factor in warfare already during the times of the Indian wars of 1861–1865. As acknowledged by Hinsley (in Winslow, 2010: 2), placing emphasis on the analysis of the enemy has been of great intensity. At the beginning, military officers were mainly ethnographic observers with the goal of gaining knowledge of unknown cultures. However, since anthropologists were considered to be the "real" experts, they were also recruited into war efforts, especially after the civil war. During the First World War important and gifted ethnographers such as Richard Burton and Snouk Hurgronje were engaged as spies for the British and Dutch armed forces (Pels and Selemink in Winslow, 2010: 3), with also other social scientists engaged on all sides. The well-known sociologist Emile Durkheim engaged in writing propaganda pamphlets for the French government, German anthropologists took pictures and conducted measurements of soldiers in prisoner of war camps in order to identify specific national racial features (Price in Winslow, 2010). After the First World War, Franz Boas, founder of the first American department of anthropology at the University of Columbia, condemned the anthropologists recruited by the US government for espionage during the First World War and called it a "prostitution of science" (Boas in Winslow, 2010: 3). Due to his efforts, Boas was expelled from the American Anthropological Association.

However, despite some opposition, anthropological contributions to the First World War have paved the way for the next generation of ethnographers during the Second World War. The Second World War became a total war also in the sense of all the different kinds of scientific results used in order to gain advantage in the battlefield. Many prominent anthropologists, such as Clyde Kluckhohn, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Gregory Bateson assisted the war effort. Some wrote pocket guides for GIs (general issue, government issue), gave classes to GIs on ‘primitive societies’, worked on war problems related to refugees, domestic war production problems, intelligence analysis, and the internment of Japanese Americans (González, Gusterson and Price in Winslow, 2010: 4). Psychologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists were also used to analyse the impact of Allied bombings of enemy military and civilian populations (Price in Winslow, 2010: 4). In the meantime, involvement of German and Japanese social scientists was also significant. German wartime anthropologists reinforced the pseudo-scientific racial philosophy of the Nazi regime, while Japanese anthropologists supplied information that aided in the occupation of China (Winslow, 2010: 4).

Anthropologists have also played an important role during the Cold War. As Price noted (in Winslow, 2010: 4), they were publicly and privately persecuted, not because of their communist believes, but because of their social activism, particularly for racial justice. Numerous anthropologists cooperated with intelligence services. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has openly funded anthropological projects as Human Relations Area Files (Winslow, 2010).

Conclusion

Cooperation and involvement of social science and the security sector has always been present, however, it became even more obvious and necessary with the changing character of the contemporary armed conflicts, with the involvement of great powers in asymmetric conflicts, which forced them to develop counterinsurgency tactics. These tactics have always been based on the human intelligence factor (HUMINT), since in counterinsurgency operations, crucial information is gained through human interaction (Skelton in Winslow, 2010).

Especially the recent armed conflicts have proved that great powers with their sophisticated and high-tech intelligence, tracking, control, and other technical intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities cannot enter the minds of opponents. In order to improve this, development of human intelligence capabilities is necessary. In 2005, an American anthropologist Montgomery McFate, one of the principle architects of the HTS, has published two controversial articles defending the use of anthropology in counterinsurgency operations (in Winslow, 2010: 8). She argued that new adversaries and operational environments "necessitate a sharper focus on cultural knowledge of the enemy", and, in order to achieve victory in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is equally important to understand the people and their culture. (ibid., 8). This lack of cultural consideration is, according to McFate, a result of the Powell-Weinberger doctrine, which "institutionalized major combat operations over counterinsurgency" (ibid., 9). Although this doctrine was eroded during the years of Clinton's presidency, during peace operations in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as during the Second Gulf War, no alternative doctrine emerged to take its place until the General Patreus' Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2006. This manual renders the importance of the cultural awareness and the word "culture" is cited more than 80 times in the manual (US Army in Winslow 2010, 9).

HTS as system of direct engagement of anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists in combat units was strongly criticized by different academic associations, however number of Western armed forces who have included the knowledge and issues of cultural awareness in their educational and training system is growing. Even the US president Barrack Obama has emphasized cultural awareness as one of the basic elements of the contemporary armed forces, which must not be based solely on technological superiority.

Armed forces must invest in human intelligence services and in gaining knowledge of foreign languages and of foreign cultures. Only by doing this it will be able to face new challenges and missions. But, it must be capable of performing cultural operations with its own capabilities. So, we have to agree with Donna Winslow that HTS as it was established for armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as more of an ad-hoc shortcut to gain social knowledge. According to Winslow it would be more appropriate for civilian social experts and scientists to study armed forces and intelligence services, while educating military and intelligence personnel about different cultures and societies. Only in this manner, armed forces would be capable of conducting their own 'cultural intelligence operations'.

DIPLOMACY AS A VOCATION

Polona Mal

Introduction

In modern society, the individual's vocation is one of the elements, which determine his or her social status. But today, vocations are not permanent – the individual can change his or her occupation or vocation. The individual's vocation is, in this aspect, almost or even completely equated with his or her position of employment. One of the consequences of the fact that the concept of vocation and the vocation itself have already existed for several centuries is also the historical development of understanding this concept.

The same applies to diplomacy. The classics had already written on this topic, though diplomacy was referred to by other terms. While the term vocation is relatively easy to define, the term diplomacy is much more complicated, because it has a number of definitions; it could even be said that the number of definitions of diplomacy is equal to the number of authors who study it. This is the precise reason why it is necessary to consider different understandings of diplomacy – the word is polysemous; it denotes both the institution and the activity, but also a vocation. It is also important to note that the understanding of diplomacy as a vocation is much younger than both diplomacy itself and the historical emergence of vocations.

When discussing diplomacy as a vocation, we are referring to male and female diplomats. In the study of the diplomatic vocation and when attempting to define it, one encounters different issues, influences and nuances of the operation and formation of diplomacy. Many other social institutions play a key role in deciding who is or who will be a diplomat, one of them being politics. The perception of the highest-ranking diplomatic posts (especially the post of Head of Mission) as prestigious attracts many individuals who are not necessarily professionally qualified to perform the (demanding) duties at diplomatic missions to diplomacy.

In this paper, I attempt to explain what diplomacy exactly is as a vocation, whereby I derive from the assumption that diplomacy has been professionalized, meaning diplomats should be trained for their profession. The fundamental concepts in the study of diplomacy as a vocation are presented in the following paragraphs. The paper introduces the theoretical concepts, which are of central importance to this paper, namely diplomacy, vocation, and civil servants. Vocation and the process of professionalization associated with it are one of the more significant concepts in modern society and considerably determine the individual and his or her social status. In relation to diplomacy, which is basically the main subject of this paper, vocation applies to diplomats and their work. The concept of public administration is introduced because it represents a link, as diplomats are civil servants and thus a part of public administration. The conclusion contains the findings and a deliberation on the open possibilities.

On vocation and profession

Malačič (1979: 215) writes that a vocation is "a type of activity representing a person's source of livelihood". But, as Kramberger points out (1999: 42–43), the concept of vocation is a semantically complex and multi-relational concept in the Slovenian language. The term is understood as and used for both a person's education and occupation. It appeared in the seventeenth or eighteenth century and, as in foreign languages, it originally denoted the posts of high court officials. This understanding of the term can bee seen in the fact that it signified professional jurisdiction rather than the capacity to perform work. In the nineteenth century, the term vocation began to be used also for the posts of minor state officials, priests and probably teachers. It began to be used more generally – vocation as the duties one performs – precisely in the in the nineteenth century. This was also the period in which Slovenian terms were derived from German nonstandard words applying to work and vocation (Kramberger, 1999: 45–51).

The meaning of the term has broadened in the twentieth century. After the First World War, the term vocation began to be used for working practices in all social strata; it also gained particular meanings, which were bound to the reputation and prestige of the classes, and began to replace the word class (ibid., 54). In the period between the World Wars, vocation "already referred to different jobs and posts. […] The broad meaning […] probably expanded and was included into everyday vocabulary in the first four decades of this (twentieth, author's footnote) century" (ibid., 58). After the year 1945, technical colleges were renamed vocational schools and consequently, "vocations" began to be awarded along with professional titles. But the labour market had reacted completely differently – a split between education and vocation was occurring. After the reform of the school system and the implementation of targeted education, the meaning of the term vocation became broader in the 1980s. Education and duties – both are still denoted by the term vocation – continued not to be distinguished from one another in the last decade of the previous century (ibid., 59–62) and even today.

Kramberger points out that the common problems in linguistics and communication do not occur as often in the languages of more industrialized societies. The difference between the terms professional title and vocation is most obvious in English, because the labor market does not recognize the link between education and vocation in Anglo-Saxon societies. The terms occupation and vocation are both used, but the latter refers in this case only to crafts. A similar difference is present in the German-speaking world, where they distinguish between vocational education (*Ausbildungsberuf*) and vocation (*Beruf*) as occupation (ibid., 65–67).

With all the linguistic confusion surrounding the term vocation in the Slovenian language, it is necessary to add another distinction, namely between the terms occupation and profession (as a vocation for which high training is required). In the pre-industrial age, the term profession denoted vocations that provided a means of livelihood for people without them having to do physical work or trade – among these were vocations from the fields of law, medicine, academic teaching and religion (Waddington, 1996: 677; Siegrist, 2001: 12155). A change in the understanding of the term profession took place in the following centuries, along with the social changes, which were a product of professionalization. Parsons (1968: 563) claims that "the development of vocations and their increasing strategic importance probably represent the biggest change in the employment system of contemporary societies". Along with the process of industrialization came many changes in the structure of the existing professions, because new vocations (in the sense of occupation), which eventually acquired the status of professions, began to emerge (Waddington, 1996: 667). The role of universities and education changed coincident with the social changes regarding professions. The modern system of employment related to professions developed therefore within the context of "the intellectual disciplines – the sciences, both natural and social – and around their general importance in contemporary societies and cultures" (Parsons, 1968: 536). In the last twenty years, the professions and their status as professionally trained individuals on labour markets and in the workplace have changed due to the changes in world economy. Particularly noticeable are the changes in the relationship between two parallel social processes – professionalization and bureaucratization. The importance of knowledge is growing in modern post-industrial societies, which also affects the relationship between the two aforementioned processes (Hinings, 2001: 165).

The abovementioned process has also influenced the sociological study of professions and the attempts to identify their central characteristics

(Waddington, 1996). If we agree with Parsons' above–cited opinion that professionalization is one of the most important changes in contemporary society, it is completely understandable that the study of professions represents one of the more important areas of research in sociology and social sciences in general.[92] The study of professions in relation to other social phenomena thus increased, one of these areas being the status of professions in organizations.[93]

Professionalization is an important process, associated with professions. If we attempt to define it despite its complexity, we can determine at least a few of its main aspects. According to Adam (1992: 9–11), the characteristics of professionalization, and indirectly also of professions, are: the use of (technical) skills based on theoretical knowledge; the acquisition of specific skills and knowledge in the process of education and training; the competences and qualifications gained by successfully completing studies and, later on, through practical work, reputation, and a career in a specific profession; the establishment or the existence of a professional association, which represents the interests of members, banns unqualified persons from the profession, and sets the desired standards of conduct with a code of ethics; state or social legitimating of the professional association or profession; and professional ethics. Parsons (1968: 536) lists three basic criteria, which determine a vocation as a profession. These are formal training and education, the development of appropriate skills along with the cultural tradition of a profession, and the existence of an institution, which ensures socially responsible application of the knowledge of a profession. Waddington (1996: 677) lists six most common characteristics of a vocation, cited by different authors. These include "the mastery of skills, which are based on theoretical knowledge; prescribed training

92 More on the study and meaning of professions and professionalization through time in Siegrist, 2001.

93 More on the study of the relationship between professions and organizations in Hinings, 2001. The author lists three basic areas of research. The study of the position between professional workers and bureaucracies, where the main emphasis was on identifying the characteristics of professions and their increasingly important status in bureaucracies, began in the 1950s. The second period in the study began in the 1970s, when researchers focused mainly on the effect of professionalization on the labor markets of organizations. The last phase of study, which began in the eighties, focuses on the so-called professional organizations, in which the majority of employees have high professional qualifications.

and education; testing the competence of members; an organization which brings together members of a profession; compliance with the code of ethics, and altruistic action". Hinings (2001: 12160) divides the characteristics of professions into two categories, namely into structural and value characteristics. Under structural characteristics he lists full-time employment, the educational system, and the system of certification, the existence of a professional association, and a code of ethics. Value characteristics are the cultural aspects, including values, among which are self-control, autonomy, and cooperation with professional colleagues.

Both concepts – vocation and profession – are extremely important in social studies. Nevertheless, it is more than obvious that defining them causes much difficulty. The aim of this paper is not to provide a detailed overview of the definitions of these two concepts, which is why I am presenting the existing conclusions here. It is reasonable to again draw attention to the many meanings of the concept of vocation in the Slovenian language. It means both the individual's professional title and his or her occupation or position of employment. As it is evident from the previous paragraph, various authors disagree over the basic characteristics of professions. Nevertheless, at least a few elements appear in all definitions; these are the educational system, the existence of a professional association, and a code of ethics or a code of conduct. Only the term vocation will be used hereafter, whereby the term will denote an occupation, because in Slovenian, the term diplomat is not used to signify educational attainment.

I would also like to mention a few other particularities of political professionalization, because they partly apply also to diplomacy and diplomats, as it will be shown later on. First, political professionalization takes place within a specific structural framework, where being elected, which requires not only professional but also political competence, represents the basis of a political career. The professional activity of a politician is particularly subjected to public scrutiny. Furthermore, politicians have to ensure the operation of two functional segments with their work for the democratic governance of a country – creation of a consensus and effectiveness of the state and its institutions (Adam, 1992: 11–14).

On state administration and civil servants

State administration is part of the wider administrative system,[94] which is denoted as public administration. Public administration is "part of the public sector, which carries out social activities with the aim of protecting the public interest" and consists of the already-mentioned state administration, and of local self-government as well as public services (Haček, 2001: 29–30). Numerous definitions of public administration can be found in literature, which more or less differ. But despite the abundance of definitions, some elements can be found in all of them, namely at least six: first, public administration is part of the executive branch of government; second, the implementation of public policies is the duty of public administration; third, public administration handles many fields of human activity; fourth, public administration differs in many ways from the private sector; fifth, public administration provides public goods and services; and sixth, public administration is aimed at the implementation of laws, because it is part of the legal system (Haček and Krpič: 2005, 24).

Haček and Krpič (ibid.) write that public administration is "the entirety of administrative activities which belong to the executive, administrative, and business functions of public administration" regardless of who carries them out.[95] They differentiate between public administration in the material and formal sense. The former concerns the process of social decision-making and the latter a system of bodies that decides public matters. Public administration operates according to non-market principles, which is one of the most important forms of distinguishing it from the private sector. The duty of public administration is primarily to ensure the accessibility of certain goods.[96] In practice, public administration carries

94 More on administration and administrative systems in Haček (2001: 8–28). Haček (2001: 22) understands administrative systems as systems of people collaborating, which are connected in the form of administrative organizations in such a manner that they ensure the optimal achievement of mutual goals. These systems have a considerable influence on people and their lives, because they operate in socially important spheres.

95 The main aim of executive functions, among which are organization, issuing of orders, execution, coordination, and control, is the achievement of already defined and adopted »most general goals of society«. Administrative and business functions apply to the direct technical implementation of goals (Haček, 2001: 29).

96 Bučar (in Haček, 2001: 31) divides these goods into four categories, namely goods, which have to be at the disposal of all people; goods, which have to be imposed on people for the common good; goods, which cannot be individualized, and goods, which are produced by manufacturers

out administrative processes, which are prescribed by law. Administration itself does not have jurisdiction; its jurisdiction derives from the sources of law. Regardless of all the functions of public administration, it is essential that its activity reflects the public interest (Haček, 2001: 32–33).[97]

As already mentioned, state administration is, in the narrower sense, one of the four fields of public administration and represents "the main territorial administrative system and an instrument of the state for the performing its functions as an authority, with which it regulates social relations." (Haček and Krpič, 2005: 25). State administration was first developed in the period of absolute monarchies in Europe. Its role changed through time – the most after World War and the decline of parliamentary monarchies. Montesquieu's model of First separation of powers represents the legal and political theoretical basis of state administration, whereby state administration represents the executive (administrative) branch of government. The model of separation of powers changed significantly after 1918, which also affected the status of state administration. State administration now represents "the means for the implementation of its (the government's) policies, as well as laws and other decisions of the head of the legislative branch of government" (Haček, 2001: 37).

In sociology, the German sociologist Max Weber laid the theoretical foundation for the vocation of the official or, in his words, of the bureaucrat in his works on the ideal types of rule.[98] According to Weber (1922/1990: 126–7), bureaucratic authority is the most pure form of legal rule. Weber's theoretical model of bureaucratic rule is a hierarchical organization in which appointed or elected officials abide by legal rules. An official is

who are in a monopolistic position due to the nature of the matter. Šmidovnik (in Haček, 2001: 31–32) divides the duties of public administration into five categories. These are police duties and promotional and developmental duties, public service management, concern for the existence of a system, and the creative role. (Šmidovnik: 1985, 135–9).

97 Concerning the public interest itself, which is otherwise the central concept of the field of public administration, let us only add that it is shaped by the state and that the organization of society is essential for its realization. Various factors influence the shaping of public interests, such as public opinion, ethical principles, tradition, etc. (Haček, 2001: 33–36).

98 Weber's (1922/1990: 126–33) types of rule are based on types of authority. In his opinion, there are three (theoretically pure) forms of legitimate rule, which base on different forms of authority. The first form is charismatic rule, which bases on emotional loyalty to leaders and their (supernatural) abilities. The second form is traditional rule, whereby individuals believe that systems, which have existed since always, are sacred and inviolable. The last form is legal rule, which is based on generally applicable sets of rules – laws.

trained for his work, his work – "administration is a vocational activity on the basis of rational professional duty; its ideal is "*sine ire et studi"*, action […] should be strictly formalistic, in line with rational rules and […] "rational" expediency aspects" (ibid., 126).

Almost at the same time, Weber (ibid., 127) emphasizes that "no rule is strictly bureaucratic, i.e. it is not exercised only by contracted and appointed officials" – highest leaders or rulers base their power on the other two forms of legitimate rule, i.e. charismatic and traditional. Weber (1919/1992) stressed in his lecture Politics as a Vocation that the charismatic type of authority and legitimate rule is the most important for those who see politics as a vocation (ibid., 23). This is also the essential difference between a politician and an official – while one builds his activity on charisma and the image of a leader, the other builds his activity on a set of rules and laws.

Weber (ibid., 23–6) also points out that political leadership is a characteristic phenomenon in the West and that the first professional politicians were people who decided to take service under political rulers, but did not aspire to become rulers themselves. Being professionally engaged in politics gave them both a source of income as well as a life motto. Weber claims that those who strive to make politics a lasting source of income, make a living out of politics as a vocation, but those who do not strive for the same, live for politics.

On diplomacy and its development

The concept of diplomacy has numerous different definitions. Both the word diplomacy as well as the word vocation have many meanings. According to the Slovar slovenskega knjižnjega jezika (2009), diplomacy is "1. The activity of managing foreign policy, international politics […] 2. Diplomats […] 3. The ability to deal with people skillfully and as appropriate under the circumstances". Considering additional theoretical views on the concept itself, the word diplomacy has, in a way, too many meanings.

No definition of diplomacy is generally accepted among academics – nearly all authors define diplomacy differently. Satow (1994)[99] and Nicolson (1963/1988)[100] list six and five elements, respectively, among the most frequent elements of these definitions. Statow lists the following as the basic elements of these definitions: first, the management of international relations by negotiation; second, the method employed by ambassadors and envoys for said management; third, diplomatic skill; fourth, the qualifications for conducting international dialogue and negotiations; fifth, an academic course, and sixth, diplomatic career. Nicolson lists five meanings of the word diplomacy: a synonym of foreign politics, a synonym of negotiations, the processes of and the means for conducting negotiations, part of the MFAs, and the individual's skill or talent (Jazbec, 2009a: 19–20).

Diplomacy has a long history as an activity with many functions and forms, though it is not certain, when exactly diplomatic activity first emerged. This can be explained also by the constant discoveries of new historical evidence on the beginnings of diplomatic activity in early classic antiquity and even in pre-antiquity. The attempts of establishing communication between tribes can be seen as the beginnings of diplomatic activity (Jazbec, 2001: 77), especially when "human societies decided it was better to listen to the message than eat the messenger" (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 7). The oldest physical evidence of diplomatic practice originates from the eighteenth century B.C. from West Asia (Munn-Rankin, 2004: 1); Mesopotamian archives contain documents on the rules for relations between countries and the rights and duties of envoys. Diplomatic practice spread from West Asia across Egypt and the Middle East to Ancient Greece (Cohen, 2004: 50–53).

Diplomatic engagement therefore developed and spread through history. Historians of diplomacy list notably the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions in the system of Italian city-states in the fifteenth and sixteenth century (Jazbec, 2009a: 33), the system of European resident ambassadors in the seventeenth century (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 35), and the emergence of MFAs in the seventeenth and eighteenth century

99 Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 1994, ed. Lord Gore-Both in Jazbec (2009a: 19).
100 Nicolson, Harold. 1988. Diplomacy in Jazbec (2009a: 19–20).

(Berridge, 2005: 5) as the significant events in the development of modern diplomacy.

Diplomacy faced numerous additional changes in the twentieth century, particularly after the Cold War ended (Jazbec, 2009a: 40–41). These changes were so extensive that we can – at least within Europe – talk about postmodern diplomacy (Jazbec, 2007a). In this process, diplomacy changed in three components – the content, working methods, and the number and heterogeneity of actors.

Postmodern diplomacy faces important changes in the international agenda. Nowadays, diplomats not only address topics concerning bilateral international relations and narrower regional interest, but more and more often and in depth also topics of global importance (Jazbec, 2004: 232). These are primarily issues concerning general living conditions (environmental protection, climate changes, health, production, and food distribution), safety (new forms of security and new forms of security threats), migrations (migrations themselves, international criminal, protection of interests), and energy security (Jazbec, 2009a: 54). At the same time, the line between internal and foreign affairs is blurring. This applies particularly to the member states of the EU. Diplomats of the EU member states encounter, at least partly, the entire spectrum of common policies covering a wide range of topics. Moreover, the role of the diplomatic organization in transnational policies is restricted foremost to maintaining coherence between national negotiating positions and "ensuring that the priorities of other ministries are considered" (Spence, 2005: 20). The broadening of the diplomatic agenda has two direct consequences for diplomacy. The first is the increased number of issues and the other the recruitment of specialists, who are essentially not diplomats, to the diplomatic organization (Jazbec, 2009a: 54).

The form of diplomacy as an activity has also adapted to the growing diplomatic agenda, as new forms of diplomacy are emerging in diplomatic relations. These new forms can differ from the "usual" international communication concerning issues of "high politics" in content or actors who conduct them. The first significant aspect, which is not new to postmodern diplomacy, is the development of multilateral diplomacy.

International organizations are a forum for discussions on cross-border problems in the ever changing and increasingly interdependent world. The share of multilateral diplomacy in the entire diplomatic activity is growing despite its complexity and changing nature due to the number of participants (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 217–219). Other state representatives whose primary responsibility are not foreign relations are increasingly entering international relations with their activity. An example of this is the participation of government officials in the work of the EU; not only do diplomats from the EU member states encounter the content of other ministries, but other government officials also participate actively also in the work of the EU. The sessions of the Councils of the European Union and its working bodies are merely an institutionalized form of international (multilateral) negotiations.

Aside from the new forms of diplomacy, other processes also influence the working methods in the diplomatic organization. The role of MFAs is changing due to a greater dispersal of state representation at the international level. As already mentioned, MFAs, or rather diplomatic organizations are primarily becoming the coordinators of external action and are therefore loosing their monopolist role in shaping foreign policy. The change in the status of Foreign Ministries is a reaction to the expanding scope of multilateral international relations. The role of MFAs is reducing also due to the development of international connections in other ministriesMFAs react to this by increasing their activity in the field of consular relations, with which they justify the large (and expensive) network of diplomatic missions, and also by expanding their role as coordinators. Another reaction to the changes in their role are the new forms of work management, which are being adopted by MFAs, such as the managerial forms of governance (Coolsaet, 2004: 12–16). The main method of managerial governance employed in MFAs is performance management. These methods are used notably in diplomatic missions, in human resources management in diplomatic organizations, and in the conduct of (primarily domestic) public diplomacy (Rana, 2004: 1–3).

The telecommunications and information revolution probably had the most important impact on the changed working methods of diplomatic organizations. "As a result, diplomacy became less a traditional type of craft with the emphasis on negotiating skills and "winning", and more a process of managing the actors, who are working towards reaching agreements through the process of adapting" (White, 2005: 401). The development of technology has in general facilitated more diplomatic meetings, real-time communication, and the logistic organization and execution of multilateral conferences. The information revolution has also changed the diplomatic practice. Due to the rapid flow of information, diplomacy is no longer the main channel for cross-border contacts and communication. But an even more important consequence is that the gathering and disseminating information is no longer the main function of diplomacy (Jönsson, 2008: 31–32). Information analysis and the prediction of its consequences are stepping into the foreground instead of information gathering. Diplomats are able to collaborate on the decision-making processes in MFAs directly from abroad because of faster forms of communication (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 86). The influence of the media on the diplomatic practice is visible not only in information gathering,[101] but also in the public conduct of diplomats itself, particularly in public appearances.

The last major change in postmodern diplomacy is the entrance of new actors. Aside from the representatives of other state institutions, new non-state actors are also beginning to emerge. They can be divided into sub-national, supranational, and non-state actors. Regions and federal units stand out among sub-national actors. Regions play a very important role within the EU, as they – among their other activities – participate in the work of European institutions within the framework of the Committee of the Regions. The EU has the most visible role in the group of supranational actors. It already acts as a diplomatic actor and has its missions in third countries and the EEAS. Delegations of the EU have a different role and different duties than the missions of national states, though some of their duties overlap. The EU is, of course, not a supranational actor, as other international organizations, especially the UN, are also endeavoring to

101 The influence of the so-called »CNN factor« has a special place in the diplomatic gathering of information in crisis situations, because by covering events live and reacting quickly to them – also by appearing on CNN – the time for finding agreements is being shortened and the escalation of crises is accelerated (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 87–88).

establish certain forms of diplomatic activity – the UN GS occasionally appoints his special envoys. Non-state actors are the last group of new actors and include transnational companies and non-governmental organizations. Transnational companies are seeking to influence other actors with their diplomatic activity in order to ensure the achievement of their interests. Non-governmental organizations have assumed a much more significant role in the last twenty years – they often collaborate on organizing international conferences and take part in general debates. Non-governmental organizations are also more and more willing to participate in conflict management (Coolsaet, 2004: 7–10).

During diplomacy's long existence, its parameters and those of diplomatic activity have changed several times. The changes in the last two decades have transformed the mode of operation, the form, and the content of diplomatic activity. Diplomats – as the persons appointed to conduct diplomacy – also have to adjust to that.

On diplomats

In the previous chapter, diplomacy was discussed primarily as the activity of state representation in relations with other actors in the international community. But the conduct of diplomacy can also be perceived as a vocation.

Diplomats – as the persons appointed to conduct diplomacy – emerged as a particular vocation along with the concept of the modern international system in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. With the emergence of a new vocation, new questions concerning the necessary skills of a diplomat began to arise. Numerous so-called diplomatic handbooks, which have existed in Europe since the seventeenth century, answer these and similar questions.[102] Their authors are often (former) diplomats, who wish to share their knowledge acquired through practice in this way. The definitions of a good diplomat and his characteristics are therefore not new.

102 Diplomatic handbooks often provide guidelines for activity, which are burdened by values (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 7–9). Opinions are divided on whether or not diplomatic handbooks deserve a place among the examples of diplomatic theory (comp. Berridge et al., 2001: 2; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 68–71), but nevertheless, one can claim that they can provide a basis for further systemization and analysis.

These requirements are changing with postmodern diplomacy. Specialist expertise possessed only by specialist from individual fields isnecessary for successful negotiations in individual areas of the modern diplomatic agenda. The true value of a diplomat does not lie in "any sort of specialist expertise, which he might have, but in his communication, negotiating, and persuasion skills" (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 232). On the contrary, diplomatic specialists – individuals with specialized skills who enter diplomacy – can truly understand all the complex nuances of the questions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda (ibid.). The status of special attachés within the framework of diplomatic missions abroad reflects the authenticity of diplomatic specialists. The most common type is the military attaché, but attachés for other areas, for example agriculture and economy, are also emerging (Feltham, 2005: 14).[103]

The entering of diplomatic specialists into diplomacy is particularly noticeable in the EU member states. One of the clear examples of the entrance of specialists into the diplomatic service is the personnel composition in the permanent representations to the EU in Brussels, where "officials of domestic ministries comprise the majority of the employees in permanent representations" (Spence, 2005: 22–23), although heads of missions remain diplomats and the missions' structure is similar to the structure of an embassy. Due to the strong integration of other ministries into international relations, it can be said that the MFA has already lost its monopolistic role in the conduct of a country's foreign affairs (Spence, 2005: 23).

The entrance of specialists into diplomacy is especially necessary in the relations with international organizations and with delegations on international conferences, which address specific technical matters.[104] The

103 Aside from the recruitment of specialists into diplomacy, the appointment of politicians to the posts of ambassadors or Head of diplomatic and consular missions is also common. This is controversial form the aspect of the diplomatic organization, because it prevents deserving professional graduates from being promoted and occupying ambassadorial posts. There is an interesting opinion that the appointment of political employees to prestigious diplomatic posts is one of the rare possibilities, which new states without diplomatic organizations have (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 141–142).

104 The issue of the relationship between diplomatic specialists and universal diplomats arose immediately after the Second World War ended, when special UN agencies and, in particular, economic and military organizations were being established, which strengthened transatlantic relations (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 203–204).

integration of individuals with specialized training also influences the work of professional diplomats and the conduct of diplomacy. Expert members of delegations usually do not devote attention to the political aspects of international negotiations (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 145). The general involvement of other sectors in the foreign affairs of a country increases the amount of coordinative tasks of diplomats, which they handle aside from their professional work (Jazbec 2009a: 54).

The question of education and of the significance of knowledge for diplomats and diplomacy also arises in light of all this.[105] It has long been thought that for diplomats, the study of "history, the languages, and law" suffices (Kappeler, 1999: 91). The basic academic knowledge of political science, history, economy, and law represents the springboard for employment in diplomatic organizations, which is then usually followed by training in diplomatic skill. Aside from receiving official training, diplomats must often be also capable of gaining specialist knowledge, which is required for their work, in a short period of time. Diplomats who have that capability can be perceived as universal diplomats, but those individuals who work primarily in one field are specialists (Kappeller, 1999: 92).

This chapter discusses the broadening of the diplomatic agenda with global issues, which was defined as a consequence of the increasing interdependence in the diplomatic community. With the broadening of the diplomatic agenda, the need for specialist knowledge, which diplomats usually lack, is growing. As a consequence, specialists are being employed in diplomacy, usually permanently. Particularly obvious is the participation of specialists in the diplomacy of the conditions of EU membership, where specialists represent a large share of the employees at permanent representations. The role of MFAs is also becoming particularly visibly less significant in the conditions of EU membership, its role in EU issues

105 As it has been already shown, knowledge is of great importance for diplomats. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the diplomat's knowledge differs from ordinary knowledge; diplomats must increase their knowledge of other fields and the knowledge of others, aside from gaining knowledge in their own field. Based on the obtained information, which represents an important part of the diplomat's knowledge, they must be able to foresee the future development of events (Trigona, 1999: 95–96).

often being coordination. Along with a broader and more specific agenda, the question of permanent education for diplomats also emerges.

Conclusion

The title of the paper contains two concepts – diplomacy and the vocation – which are polysemous. One could even claim that their meanings are too broad. For the purposes of this paper, the focus has to be placed on those meanings of these concepts, in which connections are being established between the two concepts. In the changed circumstances of globalization, the practices of operation are changing both in diplomacy as well as in the processes associated with the vocation, which also affects the changed understanding of concepts.

Diplomacy, as any other vocation, demands certain knowledge and skills, which the individual has to gain to successfully perform professional duties. The range of knowledge and skills has also changed due to the numerous changes that the world has faced in the last twenty years. Due to the changes in the mode of operation, content, and range of diplomatic activity in MFAs, diplomats require new knowledge in order to adapt to the changed working conditions. The remaining essential dilemma is whether it is more important for diplomats to develop specialized skills or try gain as much general knowledge of the issues on the international agenda as possible in order to work successfully.

THE EUROPEAN UNION: A NEW TYPE OF DIPLOMATIC ACTOR?

Darja Gruban Ferlež

Introduction

The EU is a sphere for the intense diplomatic engagement of the EU member states and institutions, but at the same time, it is already developing into and operating as an independent diplomatic actor. Internal diplomatic interaction and intense processes of socialization are taking place within the highly institutionalized and legal framework of the EU. Gradually but persistently, the EU is developing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which is leading to the further development of institutions, i.e. the political capacities and diplomatic instruments, with which it takes on contemporary international challenges. The EU is developing its own diplomatic organization and culture in order to strengthen its role as a credible diplomatic partner. The question is in what way does it develop its diplomatic capacities. The EU is a particular type of political entity in the making, which is neither a country nor the usual international organization, but nevertheless, it is entering the diplomatic system and establishing diplomatic relations with international partners. Another question is how does the process of European political integration affect the diplomatic practice and whether it is introducing a new pattern of diplomatic activity.

Due to the delegation of specific powers, or rather the exercise by the member states of a part of their sovereignty to the supranational level, the EU is often considered as an entity, which presents a challenge to the key principles of the Westphalian interstate system.[106] Bátora (2003: 1) concludes that considering the simultaneous development of the Westphalian system and modern diplomacy, which remain mutually constituent institutions, the assumption that the EU poses a challenge to diplomacy is legitimate. The only question is in what way or to what extent.

The purpose of this paper is a theoretical and analytical discussion on the EU's emerging diplomatic identity – also as a result of a new stage in European integration, which began with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon – and less a critical analysis of the EU's actual external action or effectiveness. The emerging organization, or rather the dynamics, will be the subject of a wider critical evaluation after the year 2013, when the first review of the operation of the EEAS, chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, is scheduled.

A new paradigm of diplomacy

The EU's external activities and responsibilities in different areas of international activity are growing in number. The same applies to the expectations and demands of the EU's international partners and the European public, which supports the idea of Europe as an active actor in international politics. In the conditions of the modern international community and the high level of interdependence, the analysis of the development of the EU's common foreign policies and the efforts to

106 The main principles of the Westphalian system are: the principle of sovereignty of the state and its determination within a territory, the principle of legal equality between sovereign states, and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state. "In the prevailing practice of maintaining a balance of power and force, diplomacy became the main political instrument for regulating relations between states, along with the use of means of force" (Benko, 2000: 73).

institutionalize its own diplomatic ambitions creates a need for a new conceptualization, or rather a further development, of classical concepts. The nature of foreign politics, diplomacy, and the modern state itself in the twenty-first century is changing.

State-centric definitions of diplomacy are common, because the creation and development of diplomacy are associated with the creation and development of a sovereign state, i.e. with the development of the Westphalian system of states, when diplomacy became its key institution.

Diplomacy is usually defined as peaceful means for (the conduct of) foreign politics, with which a country strives to affect or influence the international environment in accordance with its objectives (Benko, 1997: 227, 256; Jazbec, 1998b: 23; Russett and Starr, 1992: 245). But a definition of diplomacy cannot be restrictive, if it is to encompass the true nature of the duties of diplomacy and its role in modern international relations, when taking into account the conclusion that diplomacy emerges and develops in “the function of the historic situation” (Benko, 1997b: 256).

The increasing complexity of international relations and the growing importance of the non-state subjects’ role in international politics have influenced diplomatic activity. Diplomacy does not only take place within the framework of relations between sovereign states. The importance of the dialogue between various subjects of international relations is growing. These subjects include various entities, from regional, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations to local governments, etc. Furthermore, it has an agenda with a wide range of topics (not only the questions of war and peace, but a large variety of issues – economic, environmental, social, etc); it is exposed to public control, media attention, and the effects of the development of information and telecommunication technologies. European integration is certainly one of the processes, which have affected modern international relations and the diplomatic activity of international subjects.

Today, we are facing transnational challenges concerning safety (terrorism, the fight against drugs and organized crime, violation of human rights, ethnic conflicts, etc.), which require multilateral solutions and the collaboration of various actors, not only governments. Globalization, interdependence, and technological development have changed international relations by reducing the significance of national borders and the classical definition of the power of states (McCormick, 2007: 5–6). In the modern multilateral world, relying on military power or economic and other threats does not suffice anymore. The importance of soft power, i.e. the ability to obtain the desired results because others want what you want or the ability to get attention, is growing in comparison to the means of coercion due to the more transparent nature of the international community (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 220). Soft power has already been recognized as an important element in international politics, because it strengthens the credibility and legitimacy of international actors.

Whitman (1998: 234) concludes that the relative decline in the importance of high politics, the spread of economic diplomacy, and the broad definition of safety increase the international influence of an actor, such as the EU. The EU follows notably principles and values, which reflect its civil-force character, and works towards becoming an important diplomatic actor in the modern international community. Vukadinović (1995: 12) concludes that the political cooperation in the EU is "the finest example of the new form of diplomatic activity of the member states, which act as a unified political participant in international relations on different occasions".

The governments of sovereign states cannot shape foreign policies completely autonomously based on narrowly defined national interests. The collaboration and coordination of internal and foreign policies in the achievement of transnational objectives is becoming increasingly relevant in the global world. The member states of the EU struggle to find common solutions to the vital questions of national interests, but they have nevertheless recognized the benefits of acting collectively – they coordinate and take one another's interests into account during regular communication, as well as define common goals and policies. During this process, they have faced many obstacles that were caused by the complexity of the internal dynamics, pillar structure, and unclearly defined jurisdiction and legal status of the EU and which reflected the issue of consistency, effectiveness, visibility, and recognition. The solutions were outlined in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Reform and summarized by the Treaty of Lisbon – they stressed the need for a change in the then system and the aspiration for the strengthening of the EU's role in the world.

Modern European Diplomacy

European diplomacy is usually discussed from the aspect of a foreign policy analysis, where the subject is primarily the foreign policy decision-making process. There are numerous case studies, which are based on the analysis of the results of European foreign policy and attempt to evaluate the (non)existence and effectiveness of the EU's external action, usually from the perspective of a state (state-centric approaches). Foreign policy is still considered to be a field traditionally reserved for countries, because it reaches into the core of national sovereignty. This complicates the conceptualization of the EU as a political actor, which is not a state and the status of which is often defined as *sui generis*.

The EU is a complex subject of relations in the making, which has a political effect – on various levels – on other actors in the international sphere and numerous international issues. The EU's foreign policy can be defined as the content of the EU's relations with third countries, groups of countries, and international organizations, and also the goals that the EU is trying to reach with these relations. The EU's diplomacy is, above all, a process of communication, political dialogue, negotiation, foreign representation, and establishing diplomatic relations between the EU and third countries, as well as a set of norms, rules, and principles, which have a common organizational basis and regulate these processes. These two concepts are related, because the EU's development as a diplomatic actor – including the creation of a common EU diplomatic service – is not possible without the appropriate foreign policy in the broader sense.

The definition of European diplomacy and of the EU as a specific diplomatic actor requires an adequate analysis of its foreign policy development and action, but especially the appropriate conceptual framework, which would fully encompass the EU's complexity as an emerging political entity. The EU as a case study dictates the use of an analytical model, which is based on theoretical pluralism and the complementarity of various theoretical approaches. The traditional state-centric approaches, which emphasize sovereign states as the only important actors in international politics and are a result of the predominant rationalistic approach to the study of international relations, do not provide a complete insight into the development of the EU. At the same time, we are not denying the importance of the intergovernmental approach and national interests, which are a significant part of the European reality in the process of shaping foreign policies, as well as of institutional dynamics, and are able to impede the further development of integration in this area.

European diplomatic interaction

Power politics – as it is defined in realist thought – remains an important determinant of modern international politics. Though realist theory does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the processes in the contemporary international community, it has established itself as the dominant way of thinking in the Western political tradition and remains the dominant mode of operation in the world, also die to policy performance being the prevailing political standard, which is applied when discussing international relations. This theory is also important for the understanding of the EU's foreign policy action, if the intergovernmental approach is maintained and policies are defined from the perspective of their performance, usually according to the criteria for the functioning of the state.

In the context of the EU's highly structured legal and institutional order, one should consider that states function in a way that prevents them from maximizing their power, defined in the material sense, when realizing their narrowly defined and static national interests. The activity of international actors, especially sovereign states, is tightly related to the concept of power and interest, but the way in which we define power and realize interests has changed in the conditions of increasing interdependence, the development of technologies and the non-governmental actors' intrusion into international politics. As the already classic theoretician of realism Morgenthau (1948/1995: 673) concludes, the interest of the individual actor is becoming achievable only along with the interests of other actors.

Hence diplomacy has a new duty: “To create and maintain new institutions and procedures, in which new common interests of nations are being achieved” (ibid.).

The rationalistic approach in international relations neglects the social shaping of international life. Contrary to rationalism, which offers methodological individualism and a static understanding of the interests and identities in international politics, constructivists stress the collective constitution of the material and social world, as well as the significance of norms, rules, and values in the international arena. The EU as a firmly institutionalized environment functions as a natural entity for the application of constructivist theory (O’Brennan, 2001: 173). Constructivism is particularly appropriate for the analysis of European integration, because it stresses the process of changing identities and interests as the result of the interactions in a wider institutional environment, which is influenced by norms and discursive structures (Czaputowicz, 2003: 27).

Rational actors do not only try to maximize the benefits, they also perform roles, which function according to the principle of the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998). This means that in the process of deciding, the context and expectations are examined first and then the decision is made. In the process of socialization taking place in the EU, the member states are more likely to recognizemutual interests and collaborate in order to achieve them (Smith, 2003: 105). Nevertheless, the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms still reflect a certain tension between the desire to strengthen the collective identity in international relations and the desire to preserve national interests in foreign policy (Smith, 2004: 204).

The CFSP is perceived as a traditional EU inter-state activity, yet it represents an entirely new approach to cooperative collective diplomacy. The member states have undertaken to promote a common understanding of international issues through regular exchanges and consultations (Aggestam, 2004: 88). The process of foreign policy decision-making in the EU is dynamic, which forces the member states to consider and understand the status of identities, preferences, and interests of European countries and the influence on their shaping. There is something more to policy-making than only loyalty to national interests, which are not determined from the outside or fixed but are shaped through intense processes of interaction and socialization.

The intergovernmental approach has been maintained and countries formally retain control over decisions; nevertheless, the processes of socialization[107] and institutional dynamics, which are especially intense at the committee and working group level, have their effect. A sense of collegiality and solidarity is developing among diplomats (Bátora, 2003: 17; Westlake, 1995: 289–290). Diplomatic interaction at the level of the intergovernmental structure influences the formation of ideas, expectations and norms (Pinakas, 2004: 2–3). In the intense and constant interaction within the defined legal and institutional framework, national interests are changing. Moreover, Jørgensen (2004: 38) concludes that the institutional structure of the decision-making system is largely defined by the European superpowers, giving importance to the neorealist perspective with its concepts of the balance of power and the role of superpowers. The EU's common multilateral foreign policy system can be bypassed in crisis situations and is then replaced by the European superpowers as in the case of the contact group, which was formed for a more effective management of the Balkan crisis (Jørgensen, 2004: 38, 52). The member states naturally continue to take their own national interests into consideration, but the assumption that these interests were formed or changed within the complex institutional dynamics has to be discussed.

Sjursen (2001: 204) concludes that the most important element of the analysis is not necessarily the intergovernmental nature of the common foreign and safety policy, but the quality of the processes, which take place within this framework. The question here is whether these processes contribute to mutual understanding based on argumentation, as well as to the formation of a common European identity (ibid.). At this point, Habermas' theory of communicative action can be introduced into the analysis.

107 Socialization is a process of internalizing rules and norms, which affect the actors' perception of themselves and their interests (Risse and Wiener, 1999: 778). In the social framework of the European foreign policy, social interaction is hidden in the term socialization (Pinakas, 2004: 11).

The theory of communicative action is used to describe diplomatic communicative interaction, in the context of which cooperation is understood as a social relation that takes place within the complex network of intersubjective social structures, principles, norms, and rules produced and reproduced in communicative interaction between countries (Lose, 2001: 180). Diplomatic interaction is defined here as the behavior directed towards a common understanding, where perceptions of reality, interests, preferences, and the desirable behaviour are subjected to the collective process of interpretation, which is guided not only by instrumental but also argumentative rationality. In the dialogue established through communicative action, demands are justified on grounds of rational arguments, legitimate social norms, and subjective intentions (ibid.). Three elements form the essence of communicative action: behaviour, directed towards a common understanding, argumentative rationality, and the appeal for common interests, rules, and principles ibid., 190). The conditions of communicative action are mutual recognition of communication partners, equal access to the discourse, and the ability to empathize, as well as change personal views and take the views of partners into account (Müller, 2001: 161). A certain overlap of lifeworlds, or rather, of common collective patterns of understanding is also significant (Lose, 2001: 186, 194).[108]

Not only can the EU be characterized as a regional lifeworld, it also meets the requirements for ensuring formal equality of member states, which is apparent in the consensual style of reaching decisions and the right to veto. Moreover, the member states are contractually bound to common action based on the principles of loyalty and solidarity, but at the same time, each member state is guaranteed that its fundamental national interests will be respected. Since the establishment of European political collaboration, the member states, or rather their representatives, have developed – in the process of socialization – the ability to consider the interests of their partners and, if necessary, take them into account. In light of the abovementioned requirements, the EU has the potential for communicative action. The question is to what extent the EU approximates

108 Lifeworld is the sum of shared and inherent experience and culturally inherited models of interpretation, which are reproduced in the process of interaction (Lose, 2001: 194–195).

the assumptions of diplomatic communicative interaction as an emerging political community and contributes to the formation of contemporary international society.

The English School and its understanding of international society and the institution of diplomacy has a special position in the analysis of diplomacy. Wight (1994: 180–205) developed a political and philosophical approach to the theory of diplomacy, which represents the classical view on the role of diplomacy at the level of the international community, in the 1950s. Wight differentiates between Machiavelli's, Grotius', and Kant's conception, which are associated with three forms of international relations (international system, international society, world society).

The international system, as defined by realists, is an anarchic system. The interaction that exists between sovereign states provides the basis on which countries consider the interests and possible behaviour of other countries in the decision-making process, though the prevailing logic is to comply with the narrowly defined self-interest based on power politics (realpolitics). On the contrary, countries in international society[109] are aware of common interest and values. Countries in the international system take their own interests into account, but they can form an international society in which they take mutual interests into account, provided they are part of an environment, which is characterized by norms and interdependence (Czaputowicz, 2003: 11–12). The international society model rejects the perception of the world from perspective of a state. While international society is based on the principle of political equality between subjects, world society is characterized by functional differentiation, in the context of which the division of geopolitical territory into countries has been surpassed.

The conceptual framework developed by the English School is suitable for an analysis of the EU, if the EU is considered as the most developed example of international society (Andreatta, 2005: 32) or as

109 International society is the fundamental concept of the English School. Bull and Watson (in: Wiseman, 2002) defined international society as "a group of countries (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities), which represents a system, in which countries not only calculate each others activity, but also establish a dialogue and accept common rules and institutions in the management of relations and acknowledge the common interest for maintaining a system of this sort.

a regional international society, which is part of a wider international society (Czaputowicz, 2003: 32). The EU's essential characteristic is that the elements of international and world society are interwoven within it. The discourse of international society is based on particularism and the intergovernmental approach to integration, whereby the member states continue to play a decisive role, while the discourse of world (transnational) society is closer to the federalist understanding of integration and institutions (Czaputowicz, 2003: 32). Both the deepening of international society as the result of the creation of new norms and their implementation as well as the transfer of powers (part of sovereignty) to the transnational level are key to the process of European integration (Czaputowicz, 2003: 35). The elements of world society, which are present in European discourse, enable the formation of a deeper international society and collaborate in the process of shaping the identities of European actors (ibid.).[110]

Bull (in: Lose, 2001: 187) says that international society is formed when foreign policy decision-makers internalize general (intersubjective) principles, norms, and rules. Diplomacy plays a key role here because the decision-makers collaborate on the social construction of the international reality through diplomatic interaction (ibid., 187–188). Diplomatic interaction is aimed at the development a collective understanding of interests and goals, which countries try to translate into norms and rules that should guide behavior. The general interest is revealed as the collective understanding in the process of diplomatic communicative interaction and formed through discussions, information gathering, and the desire to coordinate behaviour in order to reduce interstate friction (ibid., 188–189). This is especially noticeable in the multilateral forms of cooperation resulting from negotiations, conducted with the purpose of reaching an agreement.

Two aspects are key to the analysis of the diplomatic action of the EU as an independent political entity. The first aspect concerns the way in which the EU is developing diplomatic structures and establishing itself in the diplomatic system, and the second the nature of this emerging diplomatic

110 In order to participate in the complex international society, the identification with the EU's goals and interests and the willingness to adopt binding rules are necessary, but not formal membership (Czaputowicz, 2003: 34).

actor. The question is, in what way does the complex internal diplomatic dynamics influence the nature (not only effectiveness) of the EU as a diplomatic actor, its distinctive international identity, and its contribution to the formation of international, or rather, world society.

In Sjursen's (2004: 68) opinion, the EU has a particular effect on the international environment, because the nature of the EU as a hybrid actor influences the style of managing foreign relations, whereby values play a central role. The EU has a highly developed power of attraction, which derives mainly from its values (Nye, 2004; Leonard, 2005). The main focus is on the "soft" dimension of the EU's diplomatic action. This is the reason why it is usually perceived as less biased and, at least in this aspect, carries greater credibility than the superpowers, which very clearly stress their own narrowly defined self-interests. The EU's normative role is usually justified with the argument that it does not have any other means for active action in international politics at its disposal (eg. Kagan, 2003). Such an understanding is too narrow in the conditions of the contemporary international community; therefore an alternative approach, offered by the theory of communicative action, is sensible.

The relations within the EU are defined by law, distinctive diplomatic interaction, and the dynamics of regulating interstate relations. Smith (2003: 109) concludes that the EU is trying to export principles and experience, which have made Western Europe safe and successful, as a collective entity. It is striving to transfer the principles of the EU's political, social, economic, and interstate system with its foreign policy (Keukeleire, 2003: 47). The key characteristic here is the emphasis on communication and argumentation, as actors exchange views and arguments in constant interaction and endeavour to reach agreement (Jørgensen, 2004: 12). The European actors coordinate their plans based on argumentation in order to establish mutual understanding, whereby they can pursue material interests or refer to the sense of common identity, principles, or the common understanding of good (Sjursen, 1999).[111] The EU acts strategically when

111 Sjursen (1999) points out that the concept of the communicative actor should not be confused with the altruistic conception. Hagerman's socially constructivist dynamics is based on the assumption of the actor, who possesses the ability to critically evaluate his own understanding of reality, interests, strengths, and maxims of conduct; the ability to evaluate the consequences for others if he should follow his own interests; and the ability to participate in the discourse

complying with its own interests, but it has also set numerous foreign policy objectives (to encourage regional cooperation, the respect for human rights, promote democracy and the rule of law, prevent violent conflicts, fight against organized crime, facilitate sustainable development, support the UN and other multilateral organizations, eradicate poverty, and disarmament), which transcend the narrowly defined self-interest. By achieving these goals, it is attempting to establish distinctive foreign policy principles, which are based on the collaboration with partners on achieving international goals and reflect the preference for multilateralism and the respect of international law.

The EU uses diplomatic instruments to persuade partners through dialogue and has a principled reluctance towards the use of negative measures. Relations with third countries are based on legal agreements and institutional dialogue concerning political and security issues as well as economic and social issues, though human rights issues and issues concerning democratic principles are especially significant. The EU's diplomatic instruments reveal particular characteristics of European discourse. This is, above all, a unitary discourse emphasizing that the EU is a single international actor with its own interests and policies (Larsen, 2004: 69). Declarations and demarches are not adopted "on behalf of the member states" but solely "on behalf the EU". The discourse of the civil force prevails in diplomatic communication with third countries. The stress is on the EU's principled adherence to liberal values, which the EU defends in international relations. The element of conditioning is being established, through which the EU is trying to influence international partners to change their behaviour.

The EU's common foreign policy is the result of the complex internal European diplomatic action/interaction, which is taking place within the EU's legal and institutional order. Its duality reveals itself on two levels of decision-making and action, namely the community and intergovernmental. The further development of the CFSP is instrumental

with others regarding the interpretation of interests and norms for the coordination of conduct and interaction (Lose, 2001: 184–185). In this, he does not neglect his own strategic interests. Therefore, a critical stance towards the assumption that the EU is distinctive as an actor, if it takes global interests and universal values into account, is sensible.

in the institutionalization of the EU's diplomatic ambitions. The dynamics of (foreign) policy decision-making is relevant for the understanding of the EU's complex nature, its institutional structure and the consequences, which this understanding has for the effectiveness[112] and nature of the EU's activity as a diplomatic actor and its further development in this area. Internal diplomatic activity can be defined as successful when it contributes to the formation of common interests or, more precisely, to the strengthening of the EU's international identity in international politics per se, which also enables it to act as the exporter of norms and values of international society. It is not important that currently, European diplomacy is focusing less on the balance of powers than on the balance of interests and the process of shaping common interests based on mutual understanding.

The EU is developing a distinctive diplomatic persona based on the principled rejection of power politics and the regard for European values in creating the international environment where it is active, which is, not lastly, a reflection of the EU's institutional structure and internal institutional functioning, as well as its development as a political community. It is striving for a long-term shaping of the international environment by using soft power, because – considering the dynamics of development – it is more effective to strengthen the economic and political ties with individual countries and facilitate the process of internal changes than to use force and threats.[113] Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 34) conclude that the EU is creating a distinctive role in foreign policy, which enables it to contribute to the development of the international system by taking its own values and principles into account. "In the long term, the EU can contribute to the change of the international system by strengthening the elements of international society, such as international law and interstate collaboration, as well as by minimizing the elements of power politics" (Smith, 2003: 108). This is the strengthening of the elements of international society,

112 Simoniti (1995: 9) concludes that multilateral diplomacy is successful when the majority of actors believe that that the existing system ensures the achievement of their particular (i.e. national) as well as common interests.

113 This clearly evident in the process of integrating the countries of Middle Europe and Eastern Europe, but it is also obvious in the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans or in the efforts of the European Neighborhood Policy.

as the English School defines it. In the process, the EU is facing internal difficulties. The member states and the institutions therefore set the objective of improving the EU's capacity to operate, which includes the institutional reform of foreign policy.

The Treaty of Lisbon and the way forward: The new institutional architecture

With the Treaty of Lisbon, a new institutional modus operandi is being established, with which the EU should efficiently address the flaws of the former institutional system and the challenges of the enlargement and the contemporary international community. The Treaty of Lisbon reflects the EU's long-term goal in the area of international action, i.e. to strengthen the EU's capacity to act uniformly and operate harmoniously in international politics. This includes the efforts by the EU to achieve greater consistency, effectiveness, and visibility of European foreign policy. The main driving force behind the suggested reforms is precisely the strengthening of the EU's international identity, i.e. the further development of the EU as not only an independent economic, but also a political actor.

The Treaty of Lisbon contains provisions, which grant the EU an international legal personality, create the post of the President of the European Council and the Foreign Minister, rename the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and stipulate the establishment of the EEAS and the restructuring of the Representations of the EC into EU Delegations. The fact (and notably the intention of the member states) that the EU's legal personality was not explicitly recognized by treaties until the Treaty of Lisbon was perceived as an important legal obstacle to the development of the EU's diplomatic organization. A clearly defined legal status of the EU is crucial for the development of its international identity and further emancipation from the member states. It simplifies certain key characteristics of the EU as a diplomatic actor, mostly its capacity to enter into international agreements and establish international relations, which allows it to implement objectives and fulfil responsibilities defined in treaties autonomously and efficiently. This is a key characteristic also from the perspective of the EU's network of diplomatic missions.

The two most innovative mechanisms of the EU's emerging structure, which can improve the way the EU engages in international relations, are the appointment of the High Representative and the establishment of the supporting EEAS. The High Representative connects *ad personam* two bureaucratic cultures of the EU (the intergovernmental and community culture), because in his dual role as Vice-President of the EC and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. At the same time, the High Representative replaces the role of the member state holding the Presidency in external representation as the main discussion partner in international circles, where he represents the EU and conducts the political dialogue with third countries. Furthermore, the High Representative exercises authority over the network of EU diplomatic missions in third countries and at international organizations and is assisted by the EEAS[114] in performing his duties. The EEAS was established at the end of 2010 and comprises officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission and the staff from national diplomatic services of the member states.

The external (diplomatic) service is to a certain extent an upgrade of the External Service of the EC (including its delegations around the world), but its advantage is that it systemically connects three different dimensions of European foreign policy under the single authority of the High Representative: the external dimension of the Community (the Community dimension), the CFSP (the intergovernmental dimension) and national diplomacies (the national dimension). Its main objective is to strengthen the singleness of the EU's external representation as an independent working body under the authority of the High Representative, and improve the effectiveness and coherency of EU's external action. Its institutional position, personnel composition, size, and mandate have to adapt to the fact that the EEAS is a body, which has to ensure the coherence of EU's external relations.

The process of establishing the service will presumably last until 2013, when it should be fully staffed. Internal recruitment procedures are currently underway, based on merit, eligibility, the appropriate geographical balance

114 The General Affairs Council adopted the Council Decision establishing the organization and action of the EEAS on 26 July 2010.

and gender balance, and the important representation of citizens of all member states. At least a third of the staff should come from the member states in 2013, when EEAS will start operating fully and all posts will be filled. This is an important political commitment, because the internal legitimacy and the reputation of the EEAS largely depend on it. The sense of all member states being sufficiently included in the process of establishing the service or joint ownership and with it internal credibility, external recognition, and visibility are essential for the future evaluation of the emerging service.

The complex issues regarding inter-institutional relations and competences as well as the vision of the EU's future structure have been, and continue to be, emphasized in the process of establishing the EEAS. This led to difficult technical and political negotiations over the operation and organization of the service and reflects also in the process of its establishment. The main issue is the relationship with other national diplomacies of the member states. Moreover, the role of the state holding the Presidency, the inter-institutional dynamics, and the relations between the key actors of the EU's external action are being redefined as well.

Added value of the new structures will be primarily in the strengthened communication and the creation of an environment for mobilizing and channeling the political will of the member states to cooperate. It will be apparent in more consistent external action and greater visibility of the EU in international relations, as well as in the intense coordination and the strengthening of coordination between policies and actors. Furthermore, Petersen and Sjursen (1998: 179) emphasize that strengthened institutions do not lead to a coordinated foreign policy, if they do not promote mutual/shared identity at the same time. The main importance of the new structures will be in their contribution to the formation of identity and strengthening the EU's action of as an independent entity. They could contribute to the common understanding and consequently also the definition of European interests as well as to the shaping of common policies. The processes of socialization, collective understanding, and consequently action will be essential here.

The EU's goal is to form a clear identity on the international scene and advocate collective activity, whereby the emphasis is placed on liberal values, which the EU should advocate in international efforts. In this context, the strengthening of collective identification and consequently collective action is of key importance. This is the reason why I agree with Tonra (1999), who says that the structures, which have the purpose of shaping, developing, and expressing common identity, are more important for the analysis of the EU's external action than marginal changes in the decision-making processes in the sense of using the qualified majority in the policy-making process. The abovementioned institutions are comparable to national institutions and have similar functions. Hence the process of establishing institutions traditionally characteristic for national foreign policies could be detected in the EU (Smith, 2004: 18). In view of the historical and legal development of the EU's foreign policy action, it is evident that this action is developing in the direction of increased Europeanization[115] and institutionalization[116]. This can be seen in the development of institutional structures, regular communication, and the coordination between different foreign policy portfolios, as well as in the increased coordination of the Community's instruments and the EU's wider foreign policy objectives.

The reforms represent a new stage in the institutionalization of the EU's foreign policy and diplomatic ambitions associated with the EU's conscious development into a global political actor and reflect two features. Firstly, the political will of the member states and institutions to overcome the flaws of the existing system and improve the effectiveness and the coherence of the EU's external action (the pragmatic element – institutions are being developed because they provide practical benefits to the member states); and secondly, the wish of the member states to retain final control over policies (the political element – the intergovernmental character of

115 For the purpose of this paper, I am only interested in Europeanization as the institutionalization of a distinctive system of government at the European level with shared institutions and the authority to shape and implement European policies (Olsen, 2001; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 3). The stress is placed on the development of the EU's organizational capacity for collective understanding and activity.

116 Jönsson and Hall (2005: 40–41) define three levels of institutionalization: the creation of a common language and inter-subjective structures of understanding and interpreting words, actions, and symbols; mutual expectations and agreed rules and procedures; formal organization and professionalization of diplomacy.

foreign policy is preserved).[117] Institutional reforms reflect the complexity of the EU's external action and attempt to overcome the traditional dichotomies between foreign and domestic policy, high and low politics, and intergovernmental and community policy in order to ensure greater effectiveness of the EU as an important diplomatic actor in contemporary international politics. They represent an improvement of existing practices and will be – based on previous experience – implemented gradually and will gain significance slowly. Their success depends on the current political will of the member states and the personality and professionalism (as well as compatibility) of the holders of key posts.

By establishing a new institutional modus operandi, the EU is entering an advanced stage in its development, i.e. the stage of formal organization and professionalization of its own diplomacy. In this process, it is copying the classic mechanisms of diplomacy. It is developing diplomatic structures in a similar way as new countries, which are trying to establish themselves in the diplomatic system (Bátora, 2003: 24). This creates expectations that the EU will perform functions, comparable to those of states, but the problem lies in the fact that the EU is not a state (ibid.). It might even be perceived as a foreign body in the diplomatic system, which is dominated by sovereign states, though various actors enter it. The constitutive units of the EU – the member states – retain their diplomatic services concurrently and remain independent diplomatic actors, but their activity is being the least coordinated with the EU in the conditions of European integration and to a certain extent leads to the convergence of diplomatic practices, which is mostly influenced by the constantly present processes of socialization and Brusselization.

The extent to which the institutional innovations will fulfil expectations will also depend on the willingness of the member states to support the efforts of the High Representative and participate in the formation of a permanent, professional, and highly qualified diplomatic service that would contribute to the emergence of a common European diplomatic culture and consequently to the strengthening of the EU's international

117 Declaration No 13 and Declaration No 14 on the common foreign and security policy annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference, which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon (OJEU 2010/C, 83/02, 30 March 2010).

identity (the symbolic element – creation of a European diplomatic *esprit de corps)*.

European diplomatic culture

The double nature of diplomacy as an institution is visible in its role in considering the interests of individual countries in relations with other countries and its role as a system of transnational principles, norms, and rules of conduct for the interaction between state representatives (Bátora, 2003: 6–7).[118] The definition developed by Jönsson and Hall (2005: 25–28) represents a step forward. Jönsson and Hall understand diplomacy as an institution, which shapes not only relations between countries, but also polities. Diplomacy can be defined as an institution of international society that creates relations between polities, which are not necessarily national states. In international society, order is established as a result of common interests, rules of conduct, and institutions (Bull, 1995: 63).

Diplomatic culture is an important element of diplomacy as an institution of international society, whereby its socializational effect should not be overlooked. Bull (1995: 304) defines diplomatic culture as "the common set of values and ideas of official state representatives", while Wiseman (2002: 409–410) defines it as "the accumulated representative and communicative norms, rules, and institutions (of universal character), which have the purpose of improving relations between mutually recognized polities in interaction". Diplomacy symbolizes the existence of international society and maintains and strengthens it (Bull, 1995: 166). European diplomacy is an institution symbolizing the existence of a unique mixture of international and world society, which is noticeable in the status of the EU as a distinctive diplomatic persona, separate from the member states (more than the sum of its constituents).

118 Bátora (2003: 7) lists the following features of diplomacy as an institution: a transnationally accepted set of legal rules, shared professional values and identity, professional language, shared norms and principles, and transnationally distributed working methods and standard operating procedures. In this context, Bátora (ibid.) stresses the double socialization of diplomats. According to Bátora, diplomats are socialized both into national communities and into the organizational culture of their own MFA as well as into a set of transnational norms and values. Diplomatic representatives in the EU are also exposed to the process of socialization, which is specific for the European integration process.

Diplomatic culture has at least two aspects. One aspect concerns professional culture, which is associated with the diplomatic profession and has become global with the universalization of diplomatic practices and the codification of practices. The professionalization of professional culture took place simultaneously, as well as the development of the diplomatic organization (MFAs and networks of permanent diplomatic missions). A shared common professional culture strengthens the process of self-identification and the understanding and perception of self and others. Another aspect highlights the significance of a common diplomatic culture (and values) that would help strengthen the sense of common interests in the context of symbolizing the existence of international society. With diplomatic activity, countries try to pursue their own interests not through negotiation and persuasion, but by collaborating in the achievement of common interests (Bull, 1995: 170).

Processes of socialization, or rather, of establishing and accepting specific norms, rules, and types of behaviour, which define the distinctive European diplomatic culture, are underway in the internal diplomatic interaction. There is not only the collaboration in realizing common interests, but also intense communication processes, through which common interests are created and the approach to their realization is determined. In the long term, the development of a common EU diplomatic service, where the representatives of institutions (European bureaucrats) and the representatives of the member states (national diplomats) will collaborate closely, would advance the understanding of action at the European and national level. Furthermore, such a service would lead to the formation of a professional diplomatic culture, where the European and national level will not be exceeded but would be combined and enhanced by the others advantages and experience.

Selecting professional staff as well as joint training is key to the success of this process. The development of the professional EU diplomatic service follows the logic of the previous institutional development. The formation of “a common diplomatic culture” was already the objective of the proposals on the professionalization of the Commission’s EEAS, training of diplomats, and the revised career structure. Such efforts of the Commission were supported by the member states, but the European Parliament is also particularly active. The emphasis has been placed on the joint training of EU diplomats (of the Commission, the Council, from the member states), which would lead to the development of common practices and a common culture for the staff employed in the external services of the member states and in the EU. The Political and Security Committee took the decision to establish the European Diplomatic Programme (EDP), which is aimed at advancing the idea of a common European diplomacy, as early as in 1999. The Parliament also advocated the establishment of a "professional, permanent diplomatic service" in the resolution on a common (European) diplomacy from the year 2000 and suggested the founding of the Academy of European Diplomacy, where the staff of the Commission and the Council of the EU as well as diplomats of the member states would receive thorough training in the study of diplomacy and international relations.[119] Monar (2000) similarly concludes that a diplomatic academy with a programme, which would be based on best practices of the EU's member states and institutions and would include innovative elements at the same time, would contribute to the development of a common culture of the EU EEAS, thereby strengthening the role of the EU as an international actor.

Professional training certainly exceeds the purely technical transfer of knowledge. Processes of socialization take place also during diplomatic training (Hocking, 2005: 8; Allen, 2005: 10). Moreover, programmes such as the EDP emphasize the development of a sense of a common European purpose along with the collective solving of problems and strive to improve the capacity of perception in relation to European and national interests.[120] In this process, the training with the purpose of creating a common foreign policy culture is particularly important and crucial to the success of the CFSP, aside from political will and the institutional set-up.[121] This is certainly a challenge, which the EEAS has to properly address, if it wishes to have professionally trained *European* diplomats, committed to European

119 *The European Parliament resolution on a common Community diplomacy*, A5-0210/2000, 5. 9. 2000.
120 European Commission. 2006. *European Diplomatic Programme, Brochure 5th Edition*.
121 Ibid.

interests of the EU as a whole.[122] The EU has the unique opportunity to ambitiously design the European diplomatic training, which will reflect not only a new stage of European integration, but also new realities and the new challenges of the contemporary international community. The EU diplomatic service not least reflects the EU's image, in relation to third entities.

In terms of meaning, the concept of European diplomatic culture does not only concern the universalization of diplomatic practices and the institutionalization of diplomatic ambitions, or rather the formation of the European diplomatic organization, but also symbolizes the process of creating common interests and strengthening the international identity of the EU as independent actor, who exceeds the framework of the classic Westphalian system.

Conclusion – The contribution of European diplomacy to the contemporary paradigm of diplomacy

The development of the EU's diplomatic capacities does not yet represent a revolutionary shift in the development of European integration in the field of foreign relations or a radical intervention in contemporary diplomatic practice. Nevertheless, it offers a new deliberation on the nature of diplomacy in the twenty-first century, as well as the nature of the EU as a political and diplomatic actor. Both will be presented from two perspectives.

Firstly, there is the effect on the process of European integration. The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon is a turning point from the perspective of the further development of the EU's diplomatic mechanisms, though its proposals are mostly based on previous experience and good practices. Institutional innovations reflect the real need for a change in the old system and show that the political will and the means for strengthening the role of the EU in the world exist.

These innovations also reflect the member states' preference to improve the effectiveness of procedures while at the same time retaining final control over policies. The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP remains

122 The Decision of the General Affairs Council of 26 July 2010 specifically states that the staff of the EEAS takes only the EU's interests into account when performing its duties.

intact. The duality in the institutional structure and decision-making has been preserved as well. The elimination of institutional flaws will not automatically increase the effectiveness of the EU's external action; the political will of the member states is necessary in order to unify positions and develop a coordinated and credible policy. The EU's effectiveness as a global actor therefore continues to be determined by political will and the solidarity of the member states as well as by their willingness to collaborate in the sensitive field of foreign policy; the relevance of the EU diplomatic service depends on this as well.

The question is to what extent can new institutional mechanisms address the dilemmas concerning the coherence and visibility of the EU's external action. The diplomatic service under the authority of the High Representative is a sensible and desired innovation, which is strengthening the diplomatic identity of the EU, but cannot enhance the EU's effectiveness as a global actor by itself. The High Representative can contribute to the successful functioning of the single institutional framework and fulfil expectations, providing that the operational rules are clear, appropriate working relationships are established and maintained, and political will is ensured.

The contribution of the institutional reforms to the greater effectiveness of the EU in international politics is tied to internal diplomatic interaction in the long term – to contribute to the mobilization of political will and the building of mutual trust, increase the feeling of belonging, and encourage the collective understanding of the situation and the formation of common interests. The new function of the High Representative could help accomplish these goals with its broad mandate and the support of the permanent and professional EEAS, which will bring together representatives of European institutions and member states and should have as its primary function the achievement of common interests. The added value of the proposed institutional innovations is therefore mostly in the improved coherence, partial abandonment of the pillar division, and greater effectiveness of policy implementation, where the EU's common interest exists and individual interests of the member states are not emphasized. The key contribution in this respect will the development of a European *esprit de corps*, which arises from the constant, intense and institutionalized cooperation of all actors, and, finally, the potential development of a diplomatic culture and a European *corps diplomatique*, which could strengthen the EU's collective identity. In this context, the institutional innovations could represent an important step in European integration.

The establishment of new institutional mechanisms remains the indicator of the current political situation and the balance of powers (between institutions, between countries, and between countries and institutions), as well as of the ideas on the future political development of the EU and the willingness of the member states to take further steps towards increasing the EU's weight in its global role.

The EU's development as a credible political power is desired from the perspective of the contemporary international community, because it provides the possibility for the establishment of a more balanced international system and a wider implementation of the elements of international society. The EU is already functioning as an independent diplomatic actor and developing a distinctive style of managing diplomatic relations reflecting its civil character.

And secondly, there is the effect on the diplomatic system. The development of the diplomatic capacities of the EU as a *sui generis* subject of international relations is an interesting innovation in contemporary diplomatic practice that effects the diplomatic activities of the member states and other international subjects, but it is not a revolutionary innovation. The essential characteristic of diplomacy is its adaptability. The global diplomatic system, dominated by sovereign states, is adapting to the new patterns of diplomatic practice, enabling an actor such as the EU to operate as a classic diplomatic actor, comparable to countries. It should not be disregarded that the EU is an exception without comparison in the contemporary international community and that it is developing a diplomatic organization simultaneously as and in tight cooperation with national diplomacies of the member states. International partners recognize the EU as a partner in diplomatic dialogue (e.g. they grant full diplomatic status to EU delegations, enter into international agreements with the

EU, etc.), but at the same time accept the EU's diplomatic structures as supplements to, not substitutions for, national diplomacies.

The EU is a complex international actor, who is developing his own diplomatic capacities similarly as states themselves. The step forward towards formal visibility of the EU as a diplomatic actor has been made by granting it legal personality and introducing classical diplomatic mechanisms – the Minister for Foreign Affairs (the High Representative for the foreign and security policy), the MFA (the EEAS) and the network of diplomatic missions (the delegations of the EU). The EU is striving to become a legitimate member of the contemporary diplomatic community with its complex, yet innovative reproduction of classic structures. By doing so, it does not radically intervene in the established patterns of diplomatic practice. It would be unrealistic to say that the EU's missions have replaced national diplomatic missions, though the member states have recognized the functional benefits of diplomatic structures at the European level. But the extent to which national diplomacies will adapt to new realities will become clear through time. The political reality, and with it the weight which individual national diplomacies carry, nevertheless remains unchanged even with the emergence of the new institutional structure of the EU.

In short, the EU's diplomacy does not represent a threat to traditional interstate diplomacy, but a challenge to the classic models of diplomatic practice and theory. These models derive from the assumption that the state is the only legitimate actor in the diplomatic system and therefore neglect the significance of the EU as an international actor, its capacity to develop a common and coherent foreign policy and the mechanisms of collective diplomacy (development of a specific diplomatic external service) as the means for its conduct, thus disregarding the symbolic and socializing role of diplomacy in creating a specific international society and encouraging a collective understanding of the world.

DIPLOMAT AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY[123]

Tina Vončina

Introduction

The theoretical approach to international relations has not only changed in the last century, it has also followed the actual changes in the international community. The end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles brought new power relations and new actors into the international community. But the international community was not yet prepared for a different system despite peace negotiations and the founding of the LN. The first international organization, in which 193 countries around the world are members today, was founded after the Second World War. The UN were not the first attempt of forming an international or a world government, which would create and maintain international peace, as such attempts already existed earlier in the form of the Holy Alliance and the LN (Morgenthau, 1948/1995: 580), but not

123 The article is based on the study carried out by the author as part of her master's thesis and continued in her doctor's thesis.

at such a universal level. All these forms have in common that they unite countries as the main actors in the international community. Permanent membership in the UN SC assigned the at least ostensible leading role in the maintenance of international peace to five countries: the USA, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and France. Two world powers, which influenced the relations in the then international community based on their ideological thinking, became the centre of action. The Cold War period and the consequentially bipolar world order ended at the beginning of the nineties of the twentieth century with the fall of (most of) the communist regimes and the Iron Curtain. The number of new countries grew, most of which emerged with the split of the multinational states. The nature of conflicts has changed, as they are no longer only interstate conflicts, but also international, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious, followed then by an increase in their number. New questions also emerged and countries and international organizations began – as an answer to the changes – to formulate new policies and concepts, such as the fight against terrorism, human safety, and the effect of environmental changes on international safety, as well as to restructure the existing organizations with the aim of adapting to the changes within the international community and solving the existing problems more efficiently.

Many non-governmental organizations, which have different objectives but generally aim at improving the state in society or the immediate environment, in which individual non-governmental organizations operate, are becoming involved in the processes of addressing international issues. An increasing number of visible individuals and variously organized groups of people, who cannot not be overlooked in the process of tackling issues because of their contribution or visible presence in the media, are taking part in addressing such issues, partly also due to the changes in the manner of communication.

The purpose of this article is to delineate the structure of the contemporary international community from the perspective of its smallest constitutive part – the individual. First, the most visible organized forms of non-state actors in the international community will be briefly outlined. The article continues with the discussion on the position of the individual within these actors, and ends with the basic question of the diplomat in the contemporary international community.

The structure of the international community

States have ceased to be the only subjects of action in the international community quite some time ago. From the perspective of organized action, governmental and non-governmental organizations are most frequently mentioned in the twentieth and the twenty-first century, and from the perspective of economic activity also transnational companies. The description of individual organized forms represents the basis for a more detailed outline of the contemporary international community.

Non-governmental organizations are non-profitable, which is in principle one of the commonly accepted characteristics of such organizations, despite the fact that they are difficult to define. Gordenker and Weiss (1996a: 18) provide examples of terms, such as the voluntary sector, organizations of transnational social movements, and non-state actors, which could be understood as an attempt of an (insufficient) definition, whereby the variety of the manner and the content of operation of such organizations is taken into account. Non-governmental organizations are as such mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) in connection with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which "may make suitable arrangements for consultations with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matter within its competence" (UN Charter, Article 71)[124]. Non-governmental organizations are defined more in detail in Part I of the Resolution 1996/31, adopted by ECOSOC, but this is still a fairly general definition of non-governmental organizations, both from the perspective of the content of their action and their structure. This was summarized by Willetts (2002) into four main characteristics: such organizations are independent from the direct control of any government, they are not constituted as political parties, they are non-profitable, and they are not criminal groups. Looking from the perspective of their presence in the international environment, it is not necessary that every non-governmental organization is on itself an actor in the international

124 *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, signed 26 June at San Francisco, entered into force 24 October 1945.

community – this depends on its operation. Gordenker and Weiss (1996a: 19) conclude that most non-governmental organizations operate at the local level and do not take part in transnational activities. Though this does not mean that they do not address issues in the international community, for instance, in relation to the governing structure in this country, it cannot be said that they are therefore actors in the international community. Willetts (2005: 426–427) thus lists international non-governmental organizations and single-country non-governmental organizations with significant international activities under political actors in the global system.

Individual non-governmental organizations are more widely known than some smaller countries precisely because of their activities (ibid., 435). Among the reasons for this is also their encouragement of the formation of international standards and international treaties and the establishment of international organizations, as well as the changing of the behaviour of states (Charnovitz, 2006: 346). Gordenker and Weiss (1996b: 212–213) thus conclude that most non-governmental organizations exist with the purpose of influencing, setting guidelines, or operating in areas where governmental structures do not operate and that some non-governmental organizations have accumulated a significant amount of professional knowledge. In other words, by drawing the attention to individual issues, non-governmental organizations are the first to be involved in determining the daily agenda, influence the outcome of negotiations, grant legitimacy, and carry out solutions (Simmons, 1998: 84–88), which is in various contexts connected in different ways. Despite the fact that – unlike international governmental organizations – non-governmental organizations are not subjects of international law (Degan, 2000: 422), some non-governmental organizations gained the rights normally held by intra-governmental organizations (Charnovitz, 2006: 356). The mentioned attempts of explaining the role of non-governmental organizations in the international community have in common that sooner or later; they encounter the limitations of such explanations. Charnovitz (2006), for example, focuses on the international aspect; Simmons (1998) builds his presentation on describing individual examples of operation of non-governmental organizations. Several studies with similar approaches i.e.

individual and rarely general studies of operation can be drawn on the examples of non-governmental organizations, which operate in individual areas, such as human rights (e.g. Gaer, 1996), humanitarian issues (e.g. Natsios, 1996), environmental protection (e.g. Conca, 1996; Raustiala, 1997), but most ultimately face the question of presenting the relationship of non-governmental organizations towards other actors, notably states and international governmental organizations. It is therefore about the (active) presence of non-governmental organizations as a type of actor and therefore the consequentially the actorship in the international community, a role which neither states nor international governmental organizations can neglect.

When searching for the characteristics that governmental organizations share with other actors, one finds that they share the most with notably two actors. International non-governmental organizations and governmental organizations resemble one another first in their basis, i.e. a certain document, which determines the area and the procedures of operation, as well as the structure. But, in contrast, governmental organizations have some of the characteristics of states due to being international legal subjects and having the rights, associated with that status, e.g. the organization of relations towards states and other governmental organizations, including the signing of agreements and diplomatic representation (Schermers and Blokker, 1995: 1053–1184). International organizations are inclined to operate from the perspective of diplomacy – very similarly as states (White, 2005: 400). Regarding the question of activity of governmental organizations in the international community, the (actual) relationship towards other groups of actors as well as within the group (set) itself, i.e. between governmental organizations themselves, is of key importance.

While in the relationship towards non-governmental organizations, the objectives of both governmental and non-governmental organizations are fairly significant – first for the establishment of cooperation and then for its continuance – the relationship towards states is actually completely different. This relationship can be presented in several directions, namely from the centrality of the aspect of study. The first direction uses the state as the starting point of interaction, whereby governmental organizations are put in the relationship of depending on the will of the states. In light of this, one can understand Sarooshi's (2005: 41–42) justification of ending the relationship between the state as the leader and the organization as its representative, whereby the leader holds the right to end the relationship, while the representative does not possess that right. But because the state has the possibility of transferring its authority to a governmental organization, the change in the relationship itself is far more complex (Sarooshi, 2005: 109–120), though the state still plays a greater role than the organization. The other direction is completely opposite. Barnett and Finnemore (1999/2001: 408–414), for example, defend the independence of actorship of governmental organizations, which is justified by the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority of governmental organizations and the control of professional experience, knowledge, and information, whereby precisely the bureaucratic apparatus of the organization plays quite a significant role. But governmental organizations primarily emerge from the will of states, which, not lastly, determine their purpose, objectives, structure, and manner of operation in the founding document, with which they basically limit their actorship.

Governmental organizations therefore cannot be completely independent actors despite their own bureaucratic apparatus, which in practice enables (can enable) them to be more independent (Šabič, 2007: 953). Their actual role in the international community has to be approached differently, namely through their sphere of activity. The third direction thus places the starting point of the study outside the state and at the same time also outside the international organization. Šabič (2007: 942–953) concludes that international governmental organizations are important actors in some areas, but this does not apply to political and security questions. "High politics remain the domain of states, which usually discuss the issues of international peace and safety at the bilateral and multilateral level, selectively, through the prism of national interests" (Šabič, 2007: 945). The diversity of international organizations as well as international organizing reflects in the theoretical approaches that are, not lastly, only an approximation of realty – an approximation urgently necessary to "explain the global phenomenon" (Bennett, 1995: 22). For example, the theory of regimes considers international organizations more in the light of structure than in the sense of actorship (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999/2001: 480). The emergence and development of international organizations is best explained in the direction from the outside towards the inside. International cooperation therefore supposedly first came into existence in other areas and the process should end in the political area (Bennett, 1995: 17). But in view of the actual dynamics of the development of international governmental organizations, this approach is also insufficient (Šabič, 2007).

The existence of the actorship of the state in the international community cannot be denied, as it has been unquestionable since the establishment of the Westphalian system of sovereign states. States and their environment – the international community – also underwent changes during this time. But, despite that, territory, population, and organized political authority remain the basic conditions for a state (Degan, 2000: 227–228). In an overview of the characteristics of individual sets of actors, the state is the only one directly linked to all sets of actors. I agree that states are "the central actors in the international community" (Šabič, 2007: 956). The reasons for this centrality can be described in at least two ways. The first is the historical development and the gradual formation of groups of actors in the international community and with it, the areas of the actors' operation and the reasons for international cooperation, associated with it. The emergence of new actors and their tendency for greater autonomy are also essentially important (Coolsaet, 1999/2004: 7–11). The second and most difficult way of explaining best presents the centrality of the state, namely with the question of sovereignty. Many authors have dealt with this issue (see e.g. Werner and De Wilde, 2001), also from the perspective of the (possible) changing (or reducing) the sovereignty of the state with the emergence of other (sets of) actors in the international community. If the understanding of the sovereignty of states in mutual relations as the independence towards the outside or the notion that the state is the highest form of political organization towards the outside and inside is considered as the starting point (Schermers and Blokker, 1995: 5; Werner and De Wilde, 2001: 290) and is then "applied" to the relations with other actors, we get the (actual) image of the position of the actors in the international community, which is but simple. Generally, sovereignty is associated solely with states, except when states transfer it to other actors (international governmental organizations) to the extent, to which it is transferred. The decisions which effect individual segments of the international community as well as the international community as a whole are thus still made by states – also through international governmental organizations, but international governmental organizations cannot do that without the (initial) agreement of states. Nevertheless, it should be stressed (again) at this point that the already complex image of the position of (the sets of) actors in the international community represents only a framework for individual deliberations on actors, whereby the image changes (can drastically change).

The emergence of transnational companies and international non-governmental organizations is, similarly as the existence of international governmental organizations, a consequence of the dynamics in the international community (Svetličič, 1996: 27–70; Devin, 2007/2008: 27). In other words, the shaping of an environment, which facilitates the existence and operation of both transnational companies and non-governmental organizations, began notably with the technological development. Though these two types of actors seem quite different at first glance, they have (at least) two common characteristics. First, neither transnational companies nor non-governmental organizations emerge directly from the state (i.e. the state is not the founder), which does not apply to international governmental organizations. Furthermore, both operate in the international community in accordance with their own interests, which are more narrowly oriented in comparison to those of states and/or international governmental organizations. A transnational company therefore primarily takes care of its existence, development, and growth or expansion, and with that also of its position on the (world) market. Theories, which discuss international economic relations, attempt to explain the behaviour of such companies. Every explanation includes to a certain extent the state from the economy of which the company emerges, as states, not lastly, enable (prevent) its operation in the sphere of the state with its resources and legislation. A company therefore does not operate completely independently, but within the framework of rules and conditions, set by the state (adopted after Svetličič, 1996). Individual countries should handle the promotion and protection of interests of their economies with the so-called economic diplomacy. But the significance of transnational companies at times exceeds the state in influencing world trade and, not lastly, the economy of individual states, also by setting uniform economic and technological standards and with "the ability to influence politically sensitive indicators (balance of payments, employment, investments)" (Devin, 2007/2008: 31). Bennett and Oliver (2002: 277–282) also agree that multinational corporations can influence a government or even bypass it, which raises philosophical and ethical questions, such as the possibility of threats to democratic values.

The presented organized forms of actors share two facts: 1) their operation is closely connected with the state, which is still the central actor in the international community; 2) their existence depends – aside from the will of states – also on their smallest constitutive parts (ingredients) – individuals.

The structure of the international community, diplomacy, and the individual

The activity of the mentioned organized forms of actors in the pursuit of shared goals in the international community would be impossible without mutual communication and, consequently, cooperation. Diplomacy is the basic form of operation of a central actor in the international community – the state – towards the outside. The understanding of diplomacy is challengingly unclear (White, 2005) also due to the broader (spectrum of the) use of the word diplomacy and its various definitions.

Based on different understandings and explanations, three stages in the broadening of the meaning of diplomacy can be summarized. In the first stage, diplomacy is regarded as the implementation of the foreign policy of states (Satow, 1979: 3; Nick, 1997: 43; Bolewski, 2007: 5; Kleiner, 2008: 321; Berridge, 2010), what is most commonly used in realist and neorealist approaches (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 16–17) and what Magalhães (1988:

59) calls the pure concept of diplomacy. This rather narrow explanation has, from today's point of view, at least two difficulties – it is limited to *political* relations among *states*. The second stage still limits the relations to one sole type of actors (states), but broadens the understanding from political relations to other areas of cooperation, as Griffiths and O'Callaghan (2002: 79) state: "the entire process through which states conduct their foreign relations." The third stage of understanding or explaining diplomacy is focused on its three core functions: representation, (Morgenthau, 1948/1995; Sharp, 1998 and 1999; Jönsson and Hall, 2005; Devin 2007/2008; Jönsson, 2008), negotiation (Bull, 1977/2004; Holsti, 1995; Morgenthau, 1948/1995; Devin, 2007/2008; Leguey-Feilleux, 2009; Berridge, 2010) and communication (Bull, 1977/2004; Jönsson and Hall, 2005; Jönsson, 2008; Kleiner, 2008; Petrič, 2010). These three are not limited to states in their relations towards other states, but also towards international (governmental) organizations and non-governmental actors and are used by other types of actors in international relations as well (Bolewski, 2007; Kleiner, 2008; Leaguey-Feilleux, 2009). While none of these three stages can be proven to be completely wrong, the fact is that not one of them can be seen as more universal than the other. For example, the first stage cannot explain all diplomatic relations in the twenty-first century. While the relations between states within the EU can be explained at least to a certain degree in the framework of foreign and security policy, the first stage cannot explain the different types of cooperation among states, as well as with non-governmental actors in some other fields, such as agriculture, environment, and education. The third stage seems more appropriate for these cases.

Apart from the basic differentiation between classic (also old), modern (also new) (White, 2005; Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011), and contemporary diplomacy (Langhorne, 2009) or occasionally also post-modern diplomacy (Jazbec, 2007a and 2009a: 44–46), there are numerous adjectives used with the word diplomacy today: bilateral and multilateral (Jazbec, 2009a), summit (Dunn, 1996/2004; Melissen, 2005), conference (Kaufmann, 1996), ambassadorial (Kihl, 1970), public (Gonesh in Melissen, 2005), media (Gilboa, 2001/2004), military and defence (Jazbec, 2007b), economic (Udovič, 2009), cultural (Nick, 1997; Jazbec, 2009a), science (Jazbec, 2009a), parliamentary (Osolnik, 1998; Jazbec, 2009a), structural (Keukeleire, 2003). Perhaps the most natural and simple questions would be what are the differences between all these 'types' of diplomacy or, to put it otherwise, – is there only one diplomacy or can we talk of more diplomacies. Yet all that different authors suggest reflects in a disagreement over whether diplomacy has changed and why so. On the one hand, the prevailing opinion is that diplomacy today is a great deal different than in previous centuries (Barston, 1988/2006; Langhorne, 1997/2004; Coolesaet, 1999/2004; Manjolovic and Thorheim, 2007; Sucharipa). On the other hand, the novelties in diplomacy are overestimated and should not be confused with the overall progress in the globalizing world: "Qualitatively and quantitatively, the circumstances have indeed changed, but the functions, nevertheless, remain the same" (Bučar, 2007: 875). This can be attributed to the fact that human nature remains unchanged (Cambon v Magalhães, 1988: 64), while the changes have emerged in the environment as well as in society.

Thus diplomacy can today be comprehended as a result of the changes in international society, which constantly demanded a reaction and therefore an adjustment to the specific historical moment; while doing so, the dynamics has upgraded classical diplomacy to a more complex diplomacy.

Changes have influenced the essence of diplomacy or the way we perceive diplomacy today, but their influence has also affected other integral parts of international society. As already mentioned, the question of actors in the international society is broadly acknowledged. Up until the twentieth century, the relations in international society were conducted within the so-called Westphalian system with sovereign states as only a type of actors. Already in the second half of the nineteenth century, a certain growth of cooperation within the framework of international conferences can be noticed, followed by the framework of international conferences (Šabič, 1999: 67–94). Today, not many would argue that the state is the only influential actor in the Westphalian sense of understanding (Zielonka, 2008: 472). Nevertheless, there are different perceptions on who, besides the sovereign states, are the actors in the structure of today's international society. According to Russett and Starr (1992/1996: 139–147), the non-state actors are intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations. Benko (2000, 152–168) identifies the following subjects in the structure of international society: states, international institutions, international governmental organisations, international regimes, and non-state social groups in international relations. According to Benko, the understanding of relations in international society is limited to the holders of political power. However, the author leaves the possibility of the complexity of modern international community going beyond that open, which is seen as placing focus on the issue of influence as well as the discussion on non-state groups. Devin (2007/2008: 26–27) presents a slightly different understanding of actors, limited in time from the end of the 1960's onwards. To the already-mentioned groups of actors he adds transnational movements with cases such as migration, trade, tourism, and terrorism, while also mentioning the individual. His definition of an actor is focused on "active participation in relations, established beyond state borders" (ibid., 19). While it seems that Devin attempts to broaden the possibilities of participation to an (almost) unlimited level, which in fact is a benefit in the complexity of today's international society, the idea itself is not further elaborated. If we continue this idea, the question of cooperation in its broader sense could involve also the individual as a tourist outside state borders – an actor. Thus all interpersonal relations among citizens of different countries could at the same time be regarded as international relations, causing profound changes in the substance of the meaning of international relations as we know them.

At this point, it is necessary to specify the meaning of actors and agents. Kajnč (2006, 65–66) distinguishes an agent from an actor, whereby an actor is only a player performing a certain role, whereas an agent represents an actor who decides how he would perform a role. This explanation is reasonable, as it enables actors in the international society to be discussed individually as well as answering the question of the complexity of international society from that point of view, which cannot be solved simply by listing different types of actors. An actor in the international society can therefore be identified by his role in that society and the influence of his (non)action on this international society. This includes also other individual groups, which are not part of any abovementioned groups of actors, such as liberation movements and terrorist groups. However, this does not mean that the differentiation between individual actors and groups of actors is no longer needed as a general concept. On the contrary, it is still necessary. First, an important argument can be found in the distinction between states, namely their classification according to size as well as other attributes, such as population, territory, resources, power, and (self)perception. Differences can also be found among governmental and non-governmental organisations (Vončina, 2009: 33).

It seems that foreign policy is foremost the activity of the state in relation to other states or the international environment, in which various types of actors, which differ from foreign policy no only in their names (e.g. mission, purpose, objective of the organization), but also in the vastness of its activity and the particularity of the areas in the international community, in which they operate. From this perspective, it can be said that foreign policy is "something more" and that it is related to the central position among the actors. If sets of actors are related to the question of diplomacy, international governmental organisations stand out the most, aside from states. When explaining diplomacy, it seems that, at first glance, the state stands in the foreground from the perspective of actorship and especially from the perspective of the classical understanding of diplomacy, and that all relations in the international community derive from its operation. Classical diplomacy is therefore limited to states, while multilateral diplomacy and the diplomacy of top meetings include also international organizations. If taking into account that diplomacy is not the only way of operating on the outside or that the state has also other means of implementing its foreign policy at its disposal, one can conclude the following: firstly, the state is part of the international community and is not outside it; and secondly, the differences in the understanding within an individual element derive from the presentations of the actors and diplomacy. Despite the fact that the classical understanding of diplomacy applies to states, other actors also use the elements of the broader understanding. Even the fact that, for example, transnational companies are connected to states (at least) through economic diplomacy should not be overlooked. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations can be found also within the framework of (the expanded) multilateral diplomacy. This is taken into account in figure 1.

Figure 1: The structure of the international community from the perspective of the presence of various groups of actors in relation to diplomacy



Source: Adopted after Vončina (2009: 44).

In figure 1, both the centrality of the state in the international community (represented by the concentric circles) and the presence of other sets of actors are taken into account in the sense of actorship. The perception of conducting diplomacy is, as can be seen in figure 1, directed out of the country. In this way, the differentiation between classical diplomacy, which still represents the basis of diplomacy as such, and the new/modern/

contemporary diplomacy in terms of supplementing and/or upgrading classical diplomacy, is presented. Precisely the new diplomacy is connected with both the state and other actors. But precise boundaries cannot be set, also due to the disregard of defining actors through the singularity of their operation, therefore outside of various sets.

Though the importance of non-governmental organizations should not be denied in individual areas of international cooperation and the resolving of individual issues, which are high on the daily agenda in the international community, as they are the first included in determining the daily agenda by drawing attention (to issues), as well as influence the outcomes of negotiations, grant legitimacy, and carry out solutions (Simmons, 1998: 84–88; see also Cooper, 2002; Malone, 2002), but various other forms of actors are also emerging. These are various *ad hoc* partnerships, strategic alliances, or mixed coalitions of actors, which can be a result of or an encouragement towards the cooperation between various types of actors in a certain area or with a certain aim (Sollis, 1996; Cooper and Hocking, 2000/2004: 87–92; Neumann, 2002; see also Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Slaughter, 2009; Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011) that can be based (or is based) also on the differences between various actors. Among the discussed actors in international relations, examples of individuals, celebrities as a form of informing and disseminating information in the wider public can be found increasingly more often. Cooper (2008) thus discusses the concept of celebrity diplomacy, while Stein defines such actors as cosmopolitan individuals, who operate transnationally in support of the right and for the benefit of "their co-citizens of the world" (2008, iii). The citizen-diplomat – the autonomous agent in international relations – is defined similarly, though more broadly (Sharp, 2001/2004; Bolewski, 2007: 69–71; Rossow, 1962, already draws attention to this possibility). From the perspective of the question of actorship in international relations, such definitions become too broad in their aim to encompass the actual state, which then opens new questions, foremost of depth and detail. Devin (2007/2008, 26–27), for example, broadly defines the actor as "he who actively participates in the relations, formed outside state boarders." With this he opens the possibility of a larger number of actual actors in international relations being included into the definition of actors itself, but at the same time, he opens the question of these actual actors, their division into sets, which, not lastly, requires that (new) boundaries are set. Two-track or even multi-track diplomacy discuses the question of including non-state actors into processes that take place within the framework of the international community, but outside of formal structures or even simultaneously with them, similarly, though from the perspective of the concepts of diplomacy (McDonald, 1993; Diamond and McDonald, 1996; Kaye, 2005; Barnes, 2006).

The individual, who cannot be preliminarily defined as an actor in the international community despite the greater possibility of travel and encountering new cultures and thereby also representing his own cultural-civilization circle – as is has already been stressed –, is the furthest from the role of the state in the international community. The individual is a constitutive part of actors, who represent an organized group of some fundamental units, whereby these can be both other actors and individuals. The representation of actors is, ultimately, carried out by individuals as well as their representatives. Put simpler, actors in the international relations cannot function without the individual. Nevertheless, the question of the individual as an actor remains open – namely, can the individual be an actor in the sense of a special set of actors without "mediators" or intermediate stages of organized "operation". This would mean that the individual does not represent (or play the role of) any other actor, except himself. Cooper's (2008: 2–3), consideration on a particular type of diplomacy – the so-called celebrity diplomacy – at first glance indirectly leads to such an understanding. The author explains the concept of celebrity diplomacy with the differentiation between the manner and the means employed by celebrities for solving problems and striving for the necessary activities regarding global problems, with the activity of politicians and diplomats whereby he denotes such manners as a mix of public diplomacy and advocacy (ibid., 11). Cooper's approach admits the insufficiency of the classical understanding of diplomacy, but, at the same time, he sheds light on some of the possibilities offered by public diplomacy. But the fact that individuals – regardless of whether they are celebrities or former high representatives of states and international governmental organizations –

are still (mostly) representatives of other actors or are marked by them and come into the foreground due to their public visibility, should not be overlooked. From this perspective, individuals are more difficult to be discussed in their actorship as a group or set of actors and much more appropriately individually. Moreover, an individual can be regarded as an actor only when he is recognised as one. An individual can thus not be characterized as an actor in advance, which would only mean that each individual would automatically be an actor, but can be named as such only through his individual actions. On the other hand, international governmental organisations, international non-governmental organisations and transnational corporations (the abovementioned suggestion of Russett and Starr, 1992/1996) can be characterised as actors in its broader sense. They are not denied the possibility of individual verification of their agency, but at the same time a more general debate on such types of actors in international society is made possible. It is this duality of agency that (Devin, 2007/2008: 31) indicated when he pointed out the elusiveness and simplification of the status of many non-state actors in international relations. This, on the other hand, can also (still) be regarded as an important distinction between states and all other types of actors by assigning a unique role in international relations to states.

The study of the different actors in international relations is directly related to the manner of studying the activity of an individual in international relations today, who is, not lastly, increasingly more perceived as an independent actor as well as a member of other organized actors. Figure 2 presents the individual as the basic unit of action in the international community, who functions (mostly) in an organized form of other actors, or (to a lesser degree) individually, but at the same time, (more or less permanent) cooperation forms among them. From the perspective of studying international relations, the question how to study the activity of the individual today arises, which presents a special challenge.

Figure 2: The structure of the international community from the perspective of the position of the individual



Source: Author's design.

The individual as a diplomat

In literature, the study of the individual as an actor in international relations is present in two directions. The first is focused on individual examples of operation of primarily higher state representatives and/or international governmental organizations, which has recently included also individuals, who have in recent times drawn attention to the problems in the international community, above all through governmental and non-governmental organizations. The other direction of study of individuals is centred on the individual as a special category of representatives – diplomats as state representatives. Both directions are interlinked, but at the same time also very different. With the rising number of diplomats in the international community from the perspective of the organized forms of operation, the question who are diplomats today consequentially arises. The logical continuation of the thoughts on the centrality of the state among other actors would defend the thesis that diplomats are state representatives, who play a central role among the representatives of other actors in the international community. From this perspective, every representative of any of the actors in the group is similar to the diplomat, who participates in the implementation of foreign policy of the state, which he represents, in his characteristic of defending the mission, aims, and objectives of his actor. Due to the development within the international community and, consequentially the development of diplomacy and its complexity, changes in the perception of diplomats and their work are to be expected.

In the search for the answer to the question what is the diplomat today supposedly to be like, the idealization of his image is at the same time also the common factor of the characteristics of the diplomat in general. The collocation the "ideal diplomat" presents a challenge. It may not seem significant at first glance. One often hears the term "good diplomat" in conversations, but the term is not necessarily directly related to the individual who performs this profession. In terms of understanding the diplomat as an official state representative abroad, the use of the collocation a "good diplomat" can be understandable for those diplomats who are recognized as such in their working environment or in the wider environment. In a wider sense, Henry Kissinger, for example, is generally recognized as a good diplomat; just as for example Ignac Golob is in Slovenia. Gaining this title is actually attainable by performing one's work well or even standing out positively in the performance of one's work in comparison to other diplomats.

With the "ideal diplomat", one can no longer speak about a particular individual, but about the (ideal) image to which diplomats should strive in performing their profession. But even this image is referred to differently by various authors. Ten discussions on the role of ambassadors and the envoys of the Pope from the second half of the 15th and the first half of the 16th century are known, which were both of practical and legal nature. Most questions revolve around determining who is an ambassador and who has a right to an ambassador (Behrens, 1936: 617–620). Though several authors wrote on diplomacy before the 18th century (Behrens, 1936; Mattingly, 1937 and 1955/1988; Berridge, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d; Keens-Soper, 2001), the most famous (and cited) today are Abraham de

Wicquefort, François de Callières, Jules Cambon, Sir Harold Nicolson, and Sir Ernest Satow, who all tried to encompass and define diplomacy of that time itself, whereby the definitions often also contained the definition of the "ideal diplomat", his characteristics, and skills, necessary to perform the diplomatic profession. Several authors followed their example and numerous handbooks (or textbooks) on operating in diplomacy contain the definition of the "ideal diplomat" (Vukadinović, 1994/1995; Mikolić, 1995; Nick, 1997; Feltham, 2005), as well as other texts related to diplomacy, in which at least partial definitions of the (ideal) diplomat can be found (Said et al., 1995, 71–72; Osolnik, 1998: 136–139; Andrić, 1999; Rana, 2004; Bohte and Sancin, 2006; Petrič, 2010). Nicolson (1963/1988: 55–67) writes about the ideal diplomat, while Callières (1716/2010) defines the ideal negotiator and Jules Cambon a good diplomat. It is similar with newer definitions – Vukadinović (1994/1995: 132–151) discusses the virtues of a successful diplomat, Nick the profile of the ideal diplomat (1997: 13−24), Marjan Osolnik (1998: 136–913) the characteristics of a good diplomat, while Mikolić (1995: 9–14) and Feltham (2005: 22–23) discuss the diplomat without using any adjectives. Though the ideal diplomat is mentioned, if not discussed more thoroughly, more than once in diplomatic textbooks from the perspective of the ideal image, which the diplomat should strive to attain or which is necessary to perform his duties, he is limited to a historic period, which has already ended. In 1716, François de Callières defined the characteristics that were most desirable and needed in diplomats, based on sources from previous centuries. Sir Harold Nicolson (1963/1988) based his work on Ottavian Maggi, Jules Cambon in Niccolo Machiavelli. Radovan Vukadinović (1994) cited Nicolson, Callières, and Ivo Andrić. Though Mario Mikolić (1995), Marjan Osolnik (1998) and Ralf George Feltham (2005), for example, do not refer directly to the mentioned authors, the impression that the image from 1716 has actually not changed much exists due to the content of the image of the diplomat itself. In face of the fact that changes are precisely the only constant in history, one could discuss the rigidness of the image of the diplomatic profession.

The question what is the ideal (or at least a good) diplomat like is of great importance in if not the key to conducting diplomacy. Any strategy of foreign policy of a certain state, even a well prepared one, is of little use without adequately trained diplomats, who would conduct it. From this perspective, diplomatic textbooks, which are based on the diplomatic practice of an individual state, can be an important tool for building the diplomatic tradition in that state. The biggest flaw of these textbooks after 1990 was the low response on the changes in society itself as well as (consequentially) in diplomacy in practice, which took place in two directions: the emergence of an increasingly growing number and types of actors, and the emergence and development of different types of diplomacy, labelled with various adjectives (environmental, public, etc.) This void has been partially filled by scientific texts and discussions on the development in contemporary diplomacy, the study of the activity of individual statesmen, higher-ranking diplomats, and representatives of international organizations from the past, as well as the memories of more visible representatives of actors in the diplomatic sphere, who sense the speed of changes, but deal with it individually and not comprehensively. The changes in the duties of a diplomat also logically follow the development and the changes in diplomacy (Galtung and Ruge, 1965/2004; Neumann, 2008), and, with that, in the expectation who and what is the "ideal diplomat". The definition of the "ideal diplomat" at the beginning of the 21st century thus derives from or depends on the understanding of diplomacy and the structure of the international community, in which diplomacy is conducted. Diplomacy has undergone such immense changes, which the study within the framework of diplomatic studies cannot follow to a sufficient extent.

Conclusion

The outline of the structure of the contemporary community opens questions and diplomatic studies cannot follow the study of these with sufficient speed, which would enable quality coexistence of theory and practice. The question of the structure of the international community itself offers a wide palette of opportunities for further research from the perspective of its actors. Such an example is certainly the discussion on the position of the individual within these actors, and the differentiation between actors themselves also from the perspective of the centrality of the position of the state in this structure and consequently the differentiation between the representatives of actors themselves.

The individual in the sense of actorship is changing from the state representative – the diplomat in classical diplomacy – into the representative of non-governmental actors and individual ideas as well, which, as a consequence, forms new adjectives in the study of diplomacy (celebrity diplomacy, citizen diplomacy). Though this kind of discussion on the phenomenon of the operation of (visible) individuals is necessary, as is a balanced study of other individuals – representatives of the actors in the international community. It seems that, due to the historical development, the diplomat is best defined, but the definitions do not suffice the changes in the environment, in which the diplomat operates.

Part Two – Case Studies

THE DYNAMICS AND DIALECTICS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE SLOVENE STATE AND ITS DIPLOMACY

France Bučar

Introduction

The Cankar Publishing Company Lexicon lists under the term diplomacy 1) the means used by states for managing official relationships; 2) negotiating skill; 3) the whole range of institutions and people entrusted with the foreign politics of a country.

From the perspective of content, all these definitions of diplomacy remain more or less only formal. They do not include the concept of diplomacy as part of or the whole set of relations of a social community – generally countries – to the social aggregates, – again countries – in its environment. These concepts are vitally important for any community. No community can exist isolated, as if in an empty space. If it does not formulate these conceptions or if they are incorrect, it lacks the requisites for a lasting survival, because it is incapable of reacting to the challenges of its environment, which is always dynamic.

The concept of diplomacy overleaps with the concept of foreign policy from the perspective of content. The term foreign policy is associated with the state in everyday use. No social community can survive without its specific foreign politics, because it is the integral part of the social community's being. In this respect, the concepts of foreign policy and diplomacy can be promiscuously used as synonyms – both may be used from the perspective of formality or content and both are subject to the dynamics of the changing space and time.

From the dissatisfaction to the parliamentary elections

Slovenia could not have had its own formal diplomacy in the time of the emergence of its state, because it was not a country yet. But having its own foreign policy was inevitable in the sense of a clear understanding of the relations with its environment – of course not in a formalized form – and it thus had to develop its capacity to communicate with that environment, which was mostly averse to it, often even hostile – a process that therefore demanded also specific "diplomatic" skills.

When the term "Slovenia" is used, it is a term that is borrowed from the statehood, which had been achieved later. But in the time of Slovenia's emergence, it was only a movement for the democratization of Slovene society, and, as such, often in explicit contradiction with not only the Yugoslav organization of the state, which – in the eyes of that movement – was not democratic enough to ensure at least the basic human rights protection, but also with the official Slovene politics, which supported and implemented that same encroachment of basic civil rights as part of the uniform totalitarian system. The entire activity of the movement was aimed primarily at changing the relationship between the state and the social community, the latter being represented by this movement, although yet without formal authorization. The movement was neither recognized as a discussion partner by the state in its early beginnings, nor could it formally put forward its demands, which would exceed the limit allowed by the existing legislation. Exceeding these limits necessarily led to state sanctions.

Even the movement itself had not precisely fully formed its demands or its identity in the beginning. It emerged in various parts of the social fabric as an expression of the unease over the existing system, which slowly turned into clear dissatisfaction, but certainly not as a resistance or a revolt. There was definitely no cohesion, nor did the movement emerge as the result of a consideration on the expediency of the wider social order or the sustainability of its ideological foundation. But the dissatisfaction, or at least unease, had to lead to a certain turning point in thinking, when it had to face its wider aspects and visibility. These were mostly informal intellectual circles, which acted in this function as analysts of phenomena from the aspect of their adequacy and compliance with the general social order or even of the social order itself. Because of that, they always collided with the existing social order and – in the totalitarian state – always with the monopoly, where the state does not allow unauthorized persons to enter. This is the reason why such evaluations always remained covert, suspicious to the state and under the constant supervision of the secret police. Seen as suspicious and dangerous, they almost always ended in this phase.

Such intellectual confrontations gained much wider attention, but were at the same time far less original and straightforward, if they were able to join formally organized intellectual circles or even by collaborating with journals, which had already had the mission to analyze social phenomena. It is understandable that due to greater visibility, they were necessarily exposed to increased state control, which restricted their analytical scope. But only when they gained wide attention, enabled by means of public communication, individual groups were able to emerge and influenced the shaping of public opinion, with which wider social circles could identify. This process did not lead directly to a clearly predetermined goal, but it was certainly constantly impeded and even temporarily hindered by the measures of the authorities, which kept close watch of journals to see if they were overstepping their designated role or at least the role allowed by the authorities. Most of them were closed before they gained wider attention and their authors were even legally prosecuted or at least socially discriminated against (i.e. the journals 57 Journal, Perspectives, Space and Time, scientific and professional meetings and symposiums, etc.). But even in such instances, the issue concerned mere ideas, which differed partially or in individual aspects from official opinions. There was no possibility that a movement for the change of the social system could emerge, nor did the deliberations on the social dysfunctions of individual phenomena reach a point, where they would turn into the demand for a reform of society or even the abolishment of the Party's leading role – not in individuals and especially not in any attempted organized form. The Party especially took notice that no type of organization emerged, which would be established without the Party's consent or inspection of the organization's operation and programme. Dialogue, if any, was replaced by self-censorship and Aesopianism at the most.

The gap between the demanded and expected actions of state institutions and the expected and actual results of the functioning of the state constantly grew wider. It became increasingly clear that the obligations, which the state has to its citizens, as well as their lawful expectations as the holders of the basic human and civil rights, could not be fulfilled on the basis of the existing organization of the state and the pattern of action. At this point, the country was in a rigid state; it, or rather its leaders could not abandon their ideologically structured social order without that action signifying their withdrawal from the legitimacy of their demand for the leading position in society; and maintaining this demand meant that they opposed every single demand for the state and its action to adapt to the changed circumstances within society and its environment. This situation could not continue. The initial unease and careful criticism turned into a publicly expressed demand for a reform of the state and a critical evaluation of the ideological basis of the existing order. Still, no type of organized activity aimed to reform the organization of the state emerged. Despite the growing number of problems, the leading state-party structure was still strong enough to set the limits of acceptability on the public expression of opinion. Nevertheless it had to allow discussions. Though it formally did not have a partner, who would accept it as a discussion partner, it was already polemicizing – though still patronizingly – with various public views. It especially could not arrogantly arbitrate on the permissibility or impermissibility of individual views, at least until they did not turn into demands for a reform of the social order.

Though organized social movements had yet not truly existed, several centres had already emerged around individual journals and radically intervened into the analysis of the state of society and thus at least indirectly demanded changes by proving the impossibility of the existing state. The most visible journals were Nova revija (New Journal) – as the journal of intellectuals, and Mladina (The Youth) – as the journal of the organization of the same name. Nova revija primarily emphasized that the possible development on the basis of the then prevailing Marxist ideology was logically unsustainable, while Mladina notably candidly revealed various anomalies in the existing state as well as the unacceptable actions of various holders of authority, whereby it did not even refrain from criticizing the President Josip Broz Tito himself. But the Rubicon had not been crossed yet. When Nova revija published the Contributions to the Slovene National Programme in its 57th issue, this still represented only an in-depth critique of the existing state and did not constitute a direct proposal for the reform of the existing structure of the state, though it provoked a stormy outrage within the political elite. But it is an indirect proposal, because a justified critique indicates changes with its own logic. A critique contains the criterion, which determines the acceptability or unacceptability of the subject of critique.

The authorities themselves crossed the line by opening the discussion on the necessary reform of the constitutional organization. With this, they basically admitted that the previous course of development was no longer possible, or rather, that it was leading straight towards social disintegration following the nearing social catastrophe – the centralization of the state, which was – due to the multinationality and extraordinary developmental and cultural diversity of its constituents – possible only by denying that diversity and establishing unity regardless of their individuality, which was acknowledged by the authorities, and the rights deriving from said recognition. Until then, the democratic centralism of the Party provided the basis for policies, which led to this state; now the authorities saw a solution in intensifying that same organization, though under a partially modified mask of quantitative democracy, which is in its essence based on unity.

It all began with the attempt to establish cultural unity. The basic school education was intended to be based on the so-called common cores – the teaching content should have reflected the history and culture of individual nations in proportion to their share in the total population. The identity of smaller nations, which was anchored in their culture and history, was reduced to a marginal curiosity. For Slovenes, this would mean the end of their existence.

It is understandable that the proposal for the common cores caused such an outrage in Slovenia that even the existing governing elite could not avoid it. To survive politically, it had to join the general mood of its citizens, which basically changed the circumstances in politics. The governing elite could not act against every single public critique of the attempted centralism in advance, because it would be supporting the centralist tendencies, which were threatening that same elite. Thus began the precarious role of the Slovene political leadership; the role which remained characteristic of said leadership throughout the entire time of its existence – it was bound by the federal authorities, on which its status depended, but at the same time, the proposals for the constitutional amendments clearly put in the position of an insignificant crop of provincial politicians, who were more an administrative than political leadership, as well as in a state of dependency on the Slovene population, which was in no case willing to accept the position, determined by the federal authorities.

In this uncertainty, it attempted to resolve the situation by bowing to the federal authorities and giving its consent to the proposed federal constitutional amendments and, in this context, achieve some mitigation, which would prevent a complete separation from the Slovene public. This inconsistency naturally did not produce the desired result; therefore the Slovene political leadership made the only possible decision – to decisively and definitively take the side of the Slovenes. Nevertheless, this occurred only right before the end of the common state, when the Slovene political elite was also left with no other possible choice. Meanwhile, a political sphere emerged, in which, formally, the question was whether to accept the proposed constitutional amendments or to revolt. It signified that the Slovene political leadership had already lost the monopoly over the decision concerning Slovenia's fate and had to permit political freedom. From here on, federal authorities and the military force in its hands presented the only threat and obstacle to this freedom. Political parties began to form in Slovenia – at that time formally still under the politically neutral name of various movements and associations, which had nevertheless already issued political demands. The existing authorities did not even attempt to restrict them in any way or even ban them, but they did try to indirectly bring them under their influence by offering them formal independence within the socialist federation, which was itself an extension of the socialist elite (following the successful pattern set by the Liberation Front in the National Liberation War, which was no longer possible). Though the Party attempted to maintain its stands and justify giving in to federal proposals on the constitutional amendments, it failed because it did not have the necessary arguments. More importantly, the authorities, or rather, the Party assumed the lower position of the discussion partner, not the prosecutor, in public confrontations with the then still informal opposition and thereby actually, though not formally, acknowledged it as a partner.

The Slovene political authorities were no longer the opponent of Slovene political movements, neither were they their discussion partner; these movements were now opposed directly by the federal authorities, particularly the Yugoslav People's Army. Henceforth, the existing Slovene authorities played a side role, rather than shaped Slovene politics, and it were already adopting the demands and stands of the Slovene democratic parties, which were "packed" into the Party's views, and acted as the mediator between the Slovene public and the federal authorities. These same authorities opened up the legal possibility for Slovenia to decide whether to separate itself from the federal state by amending the Slovene constitution; it opened the possibility for the first free parliamentary elections; and, finally, the break with the Yugoslav Party on its last congress, caused by the demand for the independence of the Slovene Party and the elimination of the monopoly of the Party was in accordance with the demands of the Slovene democratic public. The Slovene public began to face the federal authorities increasingly more directly, though the previous legal Slovene authorities were the mediator in the mediation. The Slovene authorities – as an important political factor with its electorate – remained only a competitor in the next free elections.

After the "elimination" of the authority of the Party's from Slovene politics in the sense of content (or the Party's "absorption" into the prevailing Slovene democratic atmosphere), the new Slovene political public faced a "new old" opponent – the federal authorities – for which it was neither prepared in terms of organization nor equipped in terms of ideas by having a clearly defined stand regarding its demands and its future. The Slovene public only knew that it wanted to live in a democratically organized state with clearly protected rights of the citizens. But it did not gain legitimacy until its victory in the parliamentary elections. The prerequisite for this victory was that all the new political parties form a united electoral bloc (the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia – Demos).

The victory of the opposition and post-election issues

With this victory, Demos became the legal authority in Slovenia as part of the united Yugoslav government, but was at the same time also a foreign body within that government, because its basic political views and objectives were in direct contradiction with the federal. It was able to establish itself as the actual authority only after it decisively stood up to the opposition of the federal authorities and all its basic political views. The prerequisite for this victory was the victory over the formal outpost of the federal authorities in Slovenia, which was represented by the former Party authorities that then became an integral part of the new government in Slovenia with its victory in the free parliamentary elections, though in the role of the opposition.

The new situation was the reverse image of the former. Demos became the holder of authority and the former Party (or its successors) assumed the role of the opposition – but with substantial differences. Demos had won with its demand for the democratization of society. It scored this victory even before the formal elections, which then also legalized it, thus ensuring that the free elections even took place. Though it still had the status of a formally unrecognized movement, Demos won with its demands, which were to a large extent unacceptable to the existing authorities. This dissonance was eliminated in Slovenia with the formal victory of Demos but it remained present and even sharpened between the new Slovene and the federal authorities. Yugoslavia continued to formally exist in its institutions and – according to the existing constitution from 1974 – had the right and even the duty to eliminate all discrepancies between the federal and the republican legal system and especially to coordinate the actual action of the republican bodies with the federal constitution.

The essence of the Slovene demands for the democratization of society was limited only to Slovenia, but its consequences concerned the entire state. Slovenia's influence considerably affected relations in the entire country. The proposals regarding the federal constitution were a consequence of the general, state-wide realization that the state of the country had to be fundamentally changed. Differences existed between the proposed changes regarding how to save the country as a whole – either through greater centralization or through the greatest possible decentralization. Only when it became clear after various attempts that a compromise was not a possible solution, but either one or the other, views became more extreme and the breakup of the state a possibility, consequently making the two possible choices, which were supported by individual republics according to their own interests, more radical.

This process was certainly not completed with the free parliamentary elections and actually represents only a phase in the final solution. The question was, which of the both possibilities would in fact be realized. The Serbian part of the state, along with the non-Serbian population, which was under the control of the Serbs, had not abandoned its ambition to enforce their views throughout the entire state The Serbs enjoyed the support of the federal administration, including the army; and the benefit of only preserving the existing integrity of the state, which had the full support of the western allies and the USA as well, and the legal protection provided by the existing constitutional order also worked to their benefit. Slovenia gained nothing from this, except for certain circumstances – that Yugoslavia was incapable of continuing to exist with its then status, reforms became inevitable and centralization proved itself as an unacceptable solution, but also as that centralization was the precise reason for the imminent state collapse. Serbian domination was, as it seemed, obvious and therefore there was no willingness to give in on their part.

Slovenia searched for a solution for its situation in asserting the natural right of a nation to decide independently on its own destiny, also based on the amended Slovene constitution, which explicitly determines the right to separation. It interpreted this right and derived the conclusion that it had all the original rights, held by sovereign states, and that the Federation therefore held only those rights, which the individual republics entrusted to it to exercise in the common interest. Slovenia was originally to determine its internal organization and its status in relation to the Federation in its constitution. Following this, it prepared its proposal for the constitution and submitted it to its republic assembly to be adopted. The Federation reviewed the proposal in the first phase, but had not yet made the final decision.

At this point, the key question arose if Slovenia had already overstepped its rights, which it held based on the federal constitution, with this act and whether the Federation would thus have the duty to start a military intervention in order to ensure the integrity of the state if necessary, which the army already anxiously awaited. It is important to also consider the USA's stand, which was to support – with full understanding and even fondness – any action of the Federation that would ensure the integrity of Yugoslavia as a lawful state in accordance with international law; but that logically requires that such an action is legal. The drafting of the legislation, which could consequently lead to the separation from Yugoslavia, is in itself not an act of separation and therefore does not yet provide a legal basis for an intervention by the Federation – not even in the circumstances, in which Yugoslavia as a whole was itself searching for a solution to the situation. No proposal is lawful or unlawful in itself, as long as it exists at the level of a proposal. This status was essential for Slovenia, but at the same time, it represented a danger if Slovenia established the legal basis for a federal intervention with a reckless act. The numerous amendments to the existing Slovene constitution, which were aimed at strengthening the autonomy of Slovenia and which the Federation, particularly the Army, strongly opposed, but tolerated, had yet still not represented acts, which would contradict the federal constitution.

The situation in the state was becoming critical, because it was impossible for two systems of governance, which are mutually exclusive, to exists in one state. Due the continuing state of indecision and the aggression of the centralist block, which was becoming increasingly obvious, Slovenia was forced to push for the only solution that was acceptable to it in face of Serbia's relentlessness – the decision for autonomous statehood.

The idea to establish Slovenia's state independence with the new constitution was not implementable due to procedural problems in the consideration of the text of the constitution. But there was no time. Furthermore, the decision for state independence was in any case subject to the consent of the entire population and not only to the decision of the representative body. A plebiscite was necessary in order to form a legitimate basis for such a decision. Even if statehood had been established through the constitution, the constitutional decision would have been subject to the subsequent plebiscite. It was therefore reasonable to hold the plebiscite, which is an independent act of will of the population beyond the constitutional procedure itself, and that the necessary constitutional acts then take effect on this basis. In Slovenia's case, it was urgent to hold the plebiscite as soon as possible.

The plebiscite, which in itself represents the will of the population and the most legitimate basis for the subsequent constitutional acts, is in itself not yet a directly executable act. Because of this, the Federation could not oppose it on the basis of legitimacy. But the decision for the plebiscite was, due to its significance, tied not only to the established decision-making process in the assembly, but also to the majority, which should reflect the more or less general agreement on the meaning and purpose of the plebiscite. The opposition in the new assembly was legitimately tied to Demos succeeding in its demand for the democratization of society, although it was not entirely clear what that ultimately meant. The awareness that statehood was the only possible alternative established itself only slowly also in Demos itself and was accompanied by many concerns regarding the Slovene's capacity for autonomous statehood and the danger of establishing an autonomous state. The question is whether the opposition was tied to Demos's views on the realization of Slovene statehood from the perspective of loyalty. A positive answer is not necessary in itself. The decision for the plebiscite was in these circumstances not only a procedural question, but qualitatively a new decision, which had yet not been reached in the then course of mutual contributions: we all agree on the independence of Slovenia as an acceptable alternative, which depended on the will of the Slovenes expressed through the plebiscite. With this decision, the legal opposition gained its legitimacy as a constituent of the new structure of governance.

This decision was made only after long and in intense negotiations. The common decision for the plebiscite encompassed also the decision that the plebiscite would be held already that same year (1990). In the given circumstances, agreeing on such a short deadline signified that the participants actually wanted the plebiscite to succeed, which would be otherwise seriously threatened by the decision-making process and delay and the threat of an counter–action by the Serbian bloc that had the support of the international public. But the cooperation of the opposition legitimized that decision in order to demand as well as finally succeeded in the demand that the plebiscite is defined as successful only under the condition that the qualified majority of all eligible voters vote for it and not the only the qualified majority of those who would participate in the vote. By accepting the opposition's demand for such a high quorum, and especially with the compliant actual result of the plebiscite, a moral obligation arose for it to actively participate in the future process of establishing Slovenia's independence and that delaying this process would be interpreted as a withdrawal from its moral undertaking.

Based on the perfect success of the plebiscite, the assembly adopted a special law, with which its government (then still the executive council) was assigned to develop all organizational measures and, above all, to formulate all the necessary proposals for the legal system, which will enable the Republic of Slovenia to function as an independent state after six months. The task was extremely demanding, because the existing Slovene system of governance did not have the authority and the appropriate organizational structures precisely in all those areas, which are of essential importance for the independence of the state, particularly foreign affairs, finance, tax and financial system, customs system and external trade operations. At the same time, it had to establish its military defence practically out of nothing. The biggest issue was that all areas were – according to the already mentioned constitutional provisions – under the exclusive authority of the Federation, which had the duty to ensure compliance with the federal constitution. Any activity of the republic in these areas without the consent of the Federation represented a direct violation of the constitutional order and the Federation would have the duty to intervene. Slovenia found itself on the thinnest ice, which could crack at any moment – with unpredictable consequences.

Slovenia established a strong foundation with the result of the plebiscite, but as already said, a plebiscite is only proof of will, but does not permit enforcement in itself. Even the Federation could not object to its legitimacy, but it did object to its enforcement. The exclusion of Slovenia from the common state did not concern only Slovenia but also the other states and was therefore only possible with their agreement, which they did not give.

The question is, how would this feat turn out favourably for Slovenia from the legal perspective, if there had not been for a series of favourable external circumstances, which enabled Slovenia to succeed. In the process of gaining independence, Slovenia's drew immense support notably from the equal efforts of Croatia. Croatia followed Slovenia step by step, though often following quite far behind and not with the expected solidarity, as well as without the necessary coordination of individual activities despite the initial attempts to cooperate. Nevertheless, the fact that Croatia was taking the same path as Slovenia represented such a major issue for the centralist camp that it could not dismiss Slovenia as unimportant. Any action against Slovenia would lead the same reaction in Croatia. The entire structure of Yugoslavia was disintegrating. The central state governance, which was gradually being taken over by the Serbs the state authorities, no longer had the necessary power to enforce its will throughout the entire former state. After the initial successful attempts to forcefully remove the existing bodies of lawful authority in individual republics with the so-called "meetings of truth" and replace them with their own, they seemingly contented themselves with writing Slovenia off after the final unsuccessful attempt in Ljubljana and slowly, but systematically and violently settling the score with Croatia.

The Army remained untouched as well but its situation was also becoming increasingly unbearable. The duty and purpose of the Army is to defend the state, which is its constitutional role. But whom should the Army defend if that state is disintegrating before its eyes. While the collective federal presidency existed, the Army had its supreme commander. But when the internal disagreements in the presidency led to opposition when it was time for to the Croat Stjepan Mesić to assume the presidency (middle of May 1991), the presidential sit remained empty for a while and, what is significant in this aspect, the Army remained without its supreme commander. Should the Army determine its role and activity based on its own judgment now? Not even the federal government could legally use it for its interventions and the Army itself did not have that right, because such an intervention would constitute a military coup. The army could not afford such an action in those circumstances despite the fact that the US Foreign Secretary James Baker and Jacques Delors on behalf of the European Community came to Belgrade to intervene.

Independence and international consequences

When Slovenia declared independence with the special constitutional act (The Founding Document on the Independence of the Republic of Slovenia) after the six-month period ran out, something had to change in the country. With its independence, Slovenia put the entire Yugoslavia in a state of dependence. Due to its geographical position, Slovenia gained control of the flow of all goods and financial means, especially from customs duties, which flowed into the federal treasury. Just before that, the President of the new federal government, the Croat Ante Marković, made his last attempt to get Slovenia out of the blind alley by abandoning communism and establishing democracy and market economy. Slovenia blocked his plans economically with its independence. Marković was not as much hurt by Slovenia's independence itself as by its control of the former borders towards Western Europe. He could not accept this fact and formally gave the order for a military intervention, though primarily not with the aim of subduing Slovenia but to once again regain control of all border crossings (with which the military commandership reproached him as an unforgivable strategic and tactical mistake).

The invasion of Slovenia was an illegitimate act from the legal perspective, for which Marković had neither a legal basis nor legal authorization – no one could have even given him that authority. A military action could have been decreed only by the state presidency as the supreme commander of the army. But there was no presidency because it did not have its president and formally had ceased to exist or was incapable of acting legally at best.

But the European Community did intervene with the agreement of the USA. These were the powers, which determined the organization of post-war Europe and had emerged victorious from the Cold War. The collapse of Yugoslavia was seen as a threat to their plans for the future stabilization of Europe, which was in their opinion completely unacceptable. Yugoslavia was to be the guarantor of stability in South-eastern Europe, because it had proven to be that immediately after First World War and was an important geostrategic factor against the Soviet tendencies in the Balkans as well as during the Cold War, and played a significant role also in the then fragile balance in this area. The first order of business was to immediately end the military conflicts, or more precisely, the hostility between the victorious Slovene army and Yugoslav army. The mission of the EC achieved this despite the dissatisfaction of the Slovene military commandership, which thought that this deprived them of the fruits of their victory, and the resistance of the Yugoslav army, which saw the truce as an imposed humiliation.

The meeting between the EC representatives, whose delegation was led by the Dutch Commissioner Hans van den Broek, the Yugoslav representation, which included the representatives of the federal civil authorities, Slovenia, and Croatia, followed immediately after the truce. This was not a meeting, where the opposing Yugoslav federal authorities and the separated Slovenia and Croatia would try to coordinate their views with the mediation of the EC, but an order, issued by the EC. The main objective was to preserve Yugoslavia as a whole, but the preliminary step towards the achievement of this objective, which was to be its content, was that the Yugoslav army returns to its barracks and refrains from any military activity; that Slovenia and Croatia waive the exercise of their declared independence for the period of three months; and that the Yugoslav presidency is established in its function (the Brioni Plenum). In this project, the essential assumption, which could not be formally limited but represented the core of all expectations concerning this project, was that – with their power, the support of the army and international aid – three months should be more than sufficient for the federal authorities to definitively deal with the centre-fleeing powers, primarily Slovenia and Croatia, ensure the continuity of Yugoslavia, and establish a new democratic order in the country.

These expectations could naturally not be fulfilled. The entire structure of governance was so dismantled that it was no longer capable of ensuring the normal functioning of the state. The fundamental reason for this was the same as the one, which also led to this situation – the state was not able to base its existence on a unifying idea, which would be common to all its nations. Everyone was searching for an exit based on their own judgment and according to their own conceptualization of their benefits. Slovenia was able to peacefully await the end of three-month moratorium without anything occurring to it and then continued on its path to independence. The truce even directly benefited Slovenia by protecting it from the intervention of the Yugoslav army and at the same time ensured its transit status of inviolability in international relations. The Yugoslav army had no right to be in Slovenia in these conditions and left the country in the following months.

In accordance with its expectations and understanding of the situation, the EC continued its efforts to prepare Yugoslavia for the role, which the EC intended for it. It was clear to the EC as well that Yugoslavia was not capable of playing that role in the former system. It therefore designed the project for its complete reform in accordance with the model of the western democratic states and the important autonomy of its constituent nations. It organized a series of consultations with the presidents of the presidencies of the former Yugoslav republics in Haag, which were led by the Englishman lord Carrington, in order to reach an agreement on the possibilities and the form of the new coexistence in the state. These attempts failed as well; notably Serbia was against it – it did not agree to a role, which would not ensure its domination in the new state, even with this mediation.

Conclusion

Yugoslavia was as a state – even at the time of its emergence – the typical product of the concept, which was known as the constitutive principle of international cooperation ever since the Westphalian system in the seventeenth century – interstate order is determined by the power of individual states. The state that holds greater power dictates the relations to the others. The result of this concept is the constant competition for greater power – including the two world wars – and the subduing of the weaker. The organization of Europe was established on this concept after the First World War, as well as the organization within individual states. The concept had preserved itself also after the Second World War and determined the relations notably in the following Cold War. It also remained in the heads of statesmen, who tried to preserve Yugoslavia in its integrity and its role in the local arena. But Yugoslavia collapsed precisely because of the concept that if one is more powerful, mostly in the physical sense, one can determine the relations of superiority towards others. Considering this notion, Slovenia is also a foreign object in the existing European community and a disturbing factor as a small country, which emerged in complete contradiction with "the right of the stronger". It does not have a place in the European community nor did it ever have one throughout history. It therefore cannot be accepted nor acknowledged. It must return to Yugoslavia to its assigned place.

Slovenia did not win its acknowledgement and acceptance with its power or with "dignified behaviour" or humble obedience to those who were stronger – even when it did not have its own diplomatic service. How could it even have had a diplomatic service? But it did have legitimate, strong "diplomacy" in the biggest names of the newly emerging world – scientists, artists, writers, great intellectuals, who saw the changes brought by the great technological development in the world as well as the necessity of changes regarding relationships in the human community and in its relationship towards nature before politicians did.

A characteristic of contemporary society is its complexity, which derives from internal cohesion and interdependence. Interdependence does not tolerate the domination of power, it demands cooperation; the higher the level of complexity, the greater the interdependence. New social relations demand cooperation. In mutual interdependence, both small and large countries have their place; the small are also necessary for the whole with to their function.

This conclusion essentially led to the gradual formation of the idea of Europe as a community of equal nations, which can meet the challenges of the contemporary world only as a community. Considering this notion, Slovenia is no longer a foreign object in the family of European nations, but its integral, even vital constituent. This notion had not developed from any particular fondness of Slovenia – on the contrary, it created an understanding for Slovenia's needs and its new status in contact with it. This intellectual elite directly influenced the change in the views on the new organization of Europe. The Slovene intellectual elite of course also played an immensely important and direct role in the shaping of these new views and importantly contributed to the international recognition of Slovenia. Visible Slovene intellectuals, who had personal contacts with their professional colleagues, coworkers, and friend from abroad, were to use their connections and friendships to direct the attention of the influential world elite to Slovenia's problems and establish new views on the need for international cooperation.

The decision for the international acknowledgement of Slovenia therefore emerged as the result of the new notions on international coexistence. It did not primarily emerge as a result of international negotiations, but as the conclusion that the European community itself should be based only on cooperation as the consequence of the new findings concerning the possibilities for survival and development; particularly when it became clear that the numerous problems, which humanity was facing, exceeded the scope and capacity of individual countries and could be solved only with wider international cooperation. As soon as this realization established itself as the basis of international coexistence, it enabled Slovenia's acceptation and acknowledgment as a logical necessity. On the basis of the then outdated concepts, not even large countries could participate equally in the European community and have become the victims according to the notions of the Versailles system, notably Germany. They were therefore not only the first to acknowledge Slovenia in their interest, but also brought on the recognition of others.

PROMOTION TO AMBASSADOR: CHARACTERISTICS, TRENDS, AND BACKGROUNDS IN SLOVENE DIPLOMACY

Milan Jazbec

Introduction

In each and every diplomatic service, the position of ambassador has a special place. Ambassador is the highest diplomatic class and represents the most that a professional diplomat can achieve in his career. The ambassador represents the head of state of the sending state in the receiving state (more specifically, the subject of accreditation), leads the work of the embassy (or diplomatic mission), his behavior to a great deal affects the image of the state he represents and the development of inter-state relations, basically, it is a post or position that imposes a special, great responsibility on a concerete person and at the same time bestows a certain honour upon them and demands a certain respect, and presupposes expression of respect in the receiving state (or the subject of accreditation). For these reasons it is understandable that it is the natural ambition of each diplomat in each diplomacy to become ambassador, that is, to reach the top of the profession's pyramid.

In this contribution, we focus on the aforementioned topic – promotion to the post of ambassador, particularly in the concrete case of Slovenian diplomacy. Generally speaking, we are interested in the aspects, trends, and backgrounds of promotion to the post of ambassador in Slovenian diplomacy in the past two decades of its operation. We proceed from the professional or staff origins of ambassadors and the aspects, phenomena, and trends connected with how they appear through the prism of promotion to ambassador. This means that we study ambassadors in Slovenian diplomacy as a particular target group or population, while we focus our attention on the trend of its professionalization.

For studying the professional background of the observed ambassadors before their entry to Slovenian (and in some cases already in Yugoslav) diplomacy, we use the following categorization into groups and subgroups: first, diplomats from the Federal Ministry of the former state (political and official subgroups), second, employees of the Republican Secretariat for International Cooperation (experienced and inexperienced subgroups), third, newcomers in the diplomatic service (subgrups: complete novices, recruits from politics, universities, business, and elsewhere, in particular from culture, media, education, etc.), fourth, emigration, and fifth, re-activated diplomats (Jazbec, 2001: 98, and Jazbec, 2002: 142).

The aforementioned target group of ambassadors is observed in three periods, namely, the yeas 1992/93, 1997/98, and 2009/10, with attention paid to the shaping of the core of professional ambassadors. We believe that in these three periods, the core of professional ambassadors was strengthened. For the purposes of this study, we therefore do not observe the entire group of ambassadors as it was shaped throughout the past two decades, but only during the mentioned points in time. With such an approach we intend to, amongst others, to shape a methodological framework and pattern for later study of the entire ambassadorial and the entire diplomatic population.[125]

125 The mentioned study was announced in Jazbec, 2001: 219, note no. 15. The present contribution is the first longer and detailed research in that sense, while later application, particularly methodologically, on the entire Slovenian diplomacy is its logical continuation. The here presented I understand as one of the important foundations for the concretization of the sociology of diplomacy from an empirical standpoint.

Theoretical-methodological framework

Our contemplation begins by identifying the groups which composed the new diplomacy at zero hour. With this point in time we understand the period until the end of the calendar year in which the former federation fell apart, this in the Slovenian case being the year 1991 (Jazbec, 2001: 93, and Jazbec, 2002: 137). This means that our starting point for classifying ambassadors into individual groups and subgroups at entry into the diplomatic service is the zero hour.[126] Thereby we determine their professional origin, and use this data in our later observation, analysis, and commentary.

Given the starting point of the present contribution, we will first take a brief look at the aforementioned categorization of staff or professional groups, which composed the new diplomacies at zero hour, and their basic characteristics.[127]

As mentioned, we are dealing with the following five groups:

- employees of the diplomacy of the former multinational state, originating from that administrative-political sector of the former state that became the new state (political and official subgroup);
- employees that in the previous republican administration (in the Slovenian case, the Republican Secretariat for International Cooperation as part of the Republican Executive Council) dealt with international activity, understood in the widest sense of the word (experienced and inexperienced subgroup);
- newcomers who were employed in the diplomacy of the new state at its creation (complete novices and recruits from politics, universities, business, and other fields, in particular culture, media, and education);
- persons recruited from emigration;
- re-actived retired diplomats

126 Here the third group – newcomers – is an exception, as recruitment of newcomers to diplomatic service takes place throughout the entirety of its operation. Newcomers enter diplomatic service throughout the entirety of its operation and depending on their professional background at the moment of entry they are categorized in different subgroups of the third group.

127 The listed categorization and characteristics are summarized following Jazbec, 2001: 92–110, and Jazbec, 2002: 136–156.

We now describe the key characteristics of these groups and subgroups.

The first group includes diplomats active in the diplomacy of the former state. This was practiced in all three states, the dissolution of which resulted in the emergence of new states in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, although the scope and development of this practice and the recruitment of staff for the federal service in the individual republics differed from state to state, just as the practice of accepting these diplomats into the diplomacies of new states differed (in the continuation, we present only the Slovenian case). Within this first group we distinguish between two subgroups: the political represents those people who were politically recruited directly into higher diplomatic functions, generally to management positions, while the official represents persons who were recruited officially to lower and mid-level positions (through appropriate staffing measures, e.g. entry exams, without formal political decisions, etc.). The political subgroup represents persons who came to diplomacy generally without previous diplomatic knowledge but acquired this to a certain extent later while performing the job. The mentioned persons had behind them a particular political career, varying education both by extent and type; they were generally older and were, aside from rare exceptions, all male. The official subgroup was generally composed of people of middle age, with a certain small percentage of women, but their basic characteristic was that they entered the diplomatic service at the time in relatively low positions (or at the very beginning) and went through various forms of training. Those working in this service for a longer period of time became professional diplomats. When entering the diplomatic service, these persons, unlike the political subgroup, had to prove basic knowledge of diplomatic techniques and theory, which later, in a longer timeframe, affected their greater professional competence. Their accumulation of knowledge and experience was greater, while the politically recruited subgroup occupying higher position was characterized by vague accumulation of specific diplomatic experiences, which were not based on detailed knowledge and mastery of diplomatic technique.

The second group includes employees (with a markedly higher share of women than the first group) who dealt with international activity, understood in the widest sense of the world, in the republican administration of the former state. Persons in this group, unlike those in the first group, did not deal with classical foreign policy or diplomatic activity, as republican administration lacked objective opportunities for it, given that foreign policy was the exclusive competence of the federal administration. In a substantive sense we can here also distinguish two subgroups. The first subgroup, the experienced (smaller in number), includes persons who occasionally and for a specific time worked in federal diplomacy (and in its diplomatic missions) and then returned to republican administration. These persons had some diplomatic knowledge and experience, due to which they probably occupied higher positions in the hierarchy of this subgroup. The second subgroup, the inexperienced, includes the remaining persons, who had practically no connection with foreign policy or diplomatic activity. Their so-called international activity was probably limited to participating in various international meetings, but probably not carrying the status of governmental representative of the former state unless included in governmental delegations.

The third group, representing complete newcomers to the new diplomacy, is internally the most heterogeneous. The first subgroup is composed of complete novices: university graduates with varying educational profile, with women at the forefront. Characteristic and common to all was a lack of, or very little, working experience and they were therefore all very young – in any case, without any diplomatic experiences. The next subgroup is formed of newcomers to the diplomatic service who have in common the fact that they all have some particular working experience, but from a wide variety of fields, and are not complete novices as they already have fully formed working habits obtained through education and supplemented in different ways through practical experience. Among these persons are politicians recruited into diplomacy by the government and political parties, then individuals from academic circles (professors, researchers, etc.), businessmen, and others (culture, media, education, etc.).

The fourth group is composed of individuals recruited from emigration. What is meant is a practice of the return of some emigrants to their home and their recruitment into politics and the administrative apparatus. We are dealing with a small number of individuals which join this service.

The fifth group is composed of re-activated diplomats, who otherwise were already retired when the new state was created. This is a smaller number of individuals who are experienced career diplomats, yet their particular contribution to the functioning of the new diplomacies was noticeable and important.

Simply considering this brief overview of groups which formed Slovenian diplomacy (and also some others) at zero hour highlights the fact that the professional origin of ambassadors, regardless of whether diplomacy was their profession at the start of their ambassadorial work or not, is in Slovenian diplomacy very diverse. If we take into account the development of Slovenian diplomacy in the past two decades, we can expect changes in the structure of the ambassadorial population and in its characteristics.

As stated, we identify the professional background of ambassadors with regard to the groups just mentioned as the basis of our categorization of Slovenian ambassadors, and the characteristics we thereby determine (e.g. gender, age, degree and type of education, number of ambassadorial postings, from what working environment they were promoted to ambassador, and the like, in different time periods).

We study and identify the above, as already mentioned in the introduction, in three points in time, this being the beginning, or the years 1992/93, and the years 1997/97 and 2009/10. The first point is the focus of our attention as it is the beginning of operation of Slovenian diplomacy (at this time, the first generation of Slovenian ambassadors was formed and 18 diplomatic missions were opened, and at the end of 2011 Slovenia had 44 of them), and the latter two because they represent the points in time when the share of professional diplomats among promotions to ambassadorial positions was the highest (we observe, as said, a professionalization of ambassadors and the characteristics associated with this profession).

Alongside this we use the group of Slovenian ambassadors thus far to test two hypotheses, set a decade ago with regard to the entire Slovenian diplomatic organization, namely, we expect, firstly, a decrease in the presence and influence of the political subgroup, and secondly, the formation and strengthening of a core of professional diplomats which includes members of the official group, a larger part of the experienced group, and an increasing share of complete newcomers (Jazbec, 2002: 155). We believe that the period of two decades of operation of the Slovenian diplomacy is an appropriate timeframe for determining a general trend, here directed only at the population of ambassadors which in the three points in time studied amounts to 85. Their total number is higher, with an approximate estimate of 250, but this difference is one of the methodological limitations of this study (the others are noted in the third section of this contribution, where we present and comment on the practical aspects of the studied topic).

In order to generalize the findings which refer only to ambassadors and their promotion, the observed population of ambassadors or heads of missions does not include neither general consuls nor *charges d'affaires (ad interim* or *en titre)* in the time periods studied. For them the rules of promotion – as well as their position and meaning, in particular the symbolic – are different, we can say simpler, less politically marked, which consequently means less explicit competition, as the procedure is shorter and less demanding (general consuls are appointed by the government, *charges d'affaires en titre* by the foreign minister, and *charges d'affaires ad interim* by the head of the mission). While it is true that all the aforementioned are heads of diplomatic missions and consulates, where the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations[128] notes in article 14 that it is not possible to distinguish between heads of missions on the basis of class, except for orders of precedence and etiquette (the diplomatic convention does not mention the heads of consulates, but we believe that due to the generalization in this contribution we can apply the same approach to them), we are interested only in the characteristics of ambassadors and their vertical promotion because of the specificity and demands of this promotion (the reason for distinguishing between ambassadors and other heads of missions).[129] In

128 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 1961, adopted 18 April in Vienna, entered into force 24 April 1964.

129 In emphasizing this we follow the principle that the diplomatic and in particular the ambassadorial function reflects the principle of two sovereignties, while the formalistic legal aspect of such a promotion generally appears in parliamentary democracies as a process beginning with a nomination by the foreign minister, a decision by the government, a discussion in parliament and with a final act – the nomination by the head of the sending state. Cf. Petrič, 2010: 313–314.

this contribution, we use the general term diplomatic mission or simply mission, except when we wish to express a particular emphasis or finding through the use of a concrete term (embassy or permanent mission at an international organization). As a general expression for head of mission we use the title ambassador (missions at international organizations are usually headed by diplomats of ambassadorial rank, and are simultaneously the permanent representatives).

To summarize, the target group is observed at three points in time because we focus on the study of questions and characteristics concerning and stemming from the professionalization of Slovenian diplomacy. With this, we refer to the fact that in the "overwhelming majority of states, diplomatic service is a profession, demanding certain, in any case academic, education and the fulfilment of other criteria" (Petrič, 2010: 323).

For this reason we have intentionally chosen the other two points, as we know that they have contributed the most to a quantitative strengthening of the core of professionals in Slovenian diplomacy and thereby to the size of the observed population and a greater reliability of the observed trends and aspects. Our findings therefore relate to the population formed during these three points in time. We expect that the general sociological characteristics of Slovenian diplomacy and also the full ambassadorial population will be at least partially different from those which we will determine in this contribution. But the subject of study of the wider or the entire Slovenian diplomatic population is not part of our present contemplation, although we believe that the findings of this contribution may help the observation of the characteristics, operation, and behaviour of the entire Slovenian diplomatic and ambassadorial population.

Aside from the methods of analysis, comparison, and synthesis, carried out in a historical timeframe of two decades, the method of observation through participation (Gilli, 1974) is also important, as the author of the contribution is himself a professional diplomat. Only publicly available information is quoted in the contribution, while others are used as background information for concluding and predicting trends and phenomena and are not cited by the author, by which the need for protection of classified information is satisfied. The latter is achieved by making it impossible to infer the mentioned information from the findings published here through reverse reasoning.[130] The aim of the contribution is the study and identification of trends, phenomena, and characteristics, as well as their generalization, including potential patterns, in the twenty-year formation and shaping of Slovenian diplomacy.

Characteristics, trends, and backgrounds

Presentation of some general characteristics

Our observed population consists of 85 ambassadors at three different points in time during the operation of Slovenian diplomacy. In the following, we take a look at some concrete data and characteristics, which we then use for contemplating the characteristics, trends, and backgrounds of the promotion of individuals to ambassadorial positions in Slovenian diplomacy. First, we take a look at their professional origin, with regard to the aforementioned groups, and their gender, both for all three mentioned points in time.

130 Here it must be noted that the author of the contribution is of course not the only one in possession of this information. It is known to everyone who has been part of Slovenian diplomacy since its beginnings, if of course they remember it.

Table 1: Characteristics of ambassadors based on professional origin and gender.

	Zero hour	1992/3			1997/8			2009/10			Total		
		Σ	M	F	Σ	M	F	Σ	M	F	Σ	M	F
1.Federal ministry													
1 A Political subgroup	Strong	4	4	–	3	3	–	–	–	–	7	7	–
1 B Official subgroup	Strong	1	1	–	5	5	–	5	4	1	11	10	1
2.Republican secretariat													
2 A Experienced subgroup	Medium	–	–	–	2	–	2	6	3	3	8	3	5
2 B Inexperienced subgroup	Strong	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
3.Newcomers													
3 A Complete novices	Medium	–	–	–	–	–	–	14	9	5	14	9	5
3 B Politics	Medium	5	3	2	9	7	2	7	6	1	21	16	5
3 C University	Weak	3	3	–	3	3	–	–	–	–	6	6	–
3 D Business	Weak	2	2	–	4	4	–	3	3	–	9	9	–
3 E Other (culture, media, education, etc.)	Weak	1	1	–	2	2	–	4	1	3	7	4	3
3 F Administration (new subgroup)		–	–	–	1	–	1	5	3	2	6	3	3
4.Emigration	Weak	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–
5.Re-activated diplomats	Weak	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–
Σ – Total		18	16	2	29	24	5	44	29	15	91	68	22

Source: Jazbec, 2001: 98.

The first finding to be emphasized stemming from the statistical overview of the studied population above is that we have created a new subgroup within the frame of the third group, this being “administration”. This refers to ambassadors whose professional origin upon entry into Slovenian diplomacy would be difficult to place in any of the groups and subgroups presented in the introduction. Their common characteristic is that they did not join the Foreign Ministry when it was formed, but later, from different departments of the state administration. That means that during the transition, they were not employed in the former Slovenian Republican administration in the former state nor in the Federal administration thereof. The new subgroup therefore captures those individuals that joined (or are joining) the diplomatic service after the formation of the Slovenian state, from various departments of its state administration. Altogether they number six, of which three are women (one in the second period, two in the third) and three are men (all in the third period).

The example above clearly confirms the fact of change and development in the structure of the professional origins of diplomats (and ambassadors) in Slovenian diplomacy: two groups (emigration and re-activated diplomats) and one subgroup (political) cease to exist, with the possibility of the same happening to the subgroup university, while a new subgroup (administration) is formed. We expect that the professional origin of Slovenian diplomacy (and its ambassadors) will continue to change and structure itself, but probably in a more narrow scope. The zero hour claimed a broad personnel outfitting of diplomacy, without tradition, without formulated personnel profiles, without a practically verified legal basis, whereas now the professional origin of diplomats is quite mapped out and its legal basis is established, which presupposes a narrower frame for structuring Slovenian diplomacy.

A general look at the presented table tells us that in the years 1992/1993, Slovenia had 18 open missions, in the next point (1997/1998) there were 29, and in the third point (2009/10) there were already 44. In other words, there were in the eighteen years so far altogether 50 missions, if we include those active only for a certain amount of time.[131] Of the previously noted 85 ambassadors, in the periods observed 65 were men, active in 69 locations, and 20 women, active in 22 locations, and altogether we deal with 91 locations (we thus distinguish between the number of ambassadors

131 The embassy in Singapore was operative for a few years in the latter half of the nineties of the previous century and was then closed. The permanent mission at the OSCE in Vienna for a while operated as an independent mission, for a while the ambassador to Austria was accredited at the OSCE, and at the moment the mission once again operates independently.

and the number of locations where they were active).[132] At the first point in time, the ratio between the genders was 16 men and 2 women, at the second it was 24:5, and at the last point in time it was 29:15.

If we look at some basic trends based on the characteristics of ambassadors, we find that in terms of number of positions, three subgroups stand out where ambassadors have served in more than ten locations. This is politics and complete novices (both in the third group), and the official subgroup. From the total of 91 locations, 21 ambassadors were recruited from politics (16 men and five women), while their number slightly decreases in the third period despite an increase in the total number of embassies. There were 14 complete novices (nine men and five women) and all were named ambassador in the third observed period. From the official subgroup came 11 ambassadors (10 men and one woman), of these only one in the first observed period and five each in the two latter periods (including one woman in the third period). This is followed by the business subgroup with nine ambassadors (no women), the experienced subgroup with eight (three men and five women), seven ambassadors from the political subgroup (no women, although the third period observed no longer has at all from this subgroup) , and seven from the subgroup "other" (third group) with three women (all in the third period), and the university with six (no women) although none in the third period. From the fourth and the fifth groups, one ambassador each originated, both in the first period.

We now comment on the findings from the table through the meaning and role of the foreign minister.

Simply put, the foreign minister has the most influence in promotions to the position of ambassador. From this we could conclude that the most important factors for promotion of a given diplomat are acquaintanceship with and a personal as well as party-based proximity to the minister.[133] Such a method of promotion is, after all, understandable, as it is the foreign minister who in the Slovenian case (and most states which are

132 To repeat, we are dealing with 85 ambassadors and 91 locations. The numbers differ, as in the observed period some were posted as ambassadors more than once (this being a general trend, not only in Slovenian diplomacy). When commenting on table 1, we use the numbers contained therein, including the total number of 91 (69 men and 22 women), not the number 85 (65 men and 22 women), except when stated otherwise.

133 Cf. Pirnat, 2009: 75–79.

parliamentary democracies have the same practice) proposes to the government acceptance of suggested ambassadors (regardless of the fact that the minister beforehand informally coordinates the suggestion with the prime minister and the president). Other proposals for filling ambassadorial positions (e.g. political interventions) all sooner or later land on the minister's desk. It could probably be said that political interventions influence a potential lack of knowledge and mastery of the craft, both for those originating from politics as well as e.g. for those professional diplomats whose promotion to ambassador is supported by politics so as to be attained faster than others of the same generation or diplomatic population. Such cases represent promotional deformation, but certainly have no negative impact for the further promotion of these ambassadors.[134]

The following held the post of foreign minister in the three points in time dealt with: the first had two, this being Dr. Dimitrij Rupel (professional politician) in 1992 and Lojze Peterle (professional politician) in 1993, the second likewise had two, this being Zoran Thaler (professional politician) in 1997 and Dr. Boris Frlec (diplomat with political origins) in 1998, while the third had Samuel Žbogar (professional diplomat).[135]

As the first period was a time of independence and the emergence of

134 So we can say that early promotion to the position of ambassador, despite a lack of experience and regardless of the reasons for it, means at least theoretically that such a person will in his future career have higher chances of becoming ambassador multiple times than those promoted to the position of ambassador later on (several such cases exist in Slovenian diplomacy). Such correlation may be looked for by comparing the age at first ambassadorial posting, the professional origin, and the position from which said person became ambassador, as well as the foreign minister in whose term this occured. Regardless of how the first promotion to the position of ambassador is achieved, the second time such an individual is in the running they possess a clear advantage when compared to other, even if older and more experienced, candidates who lack the title of ambassador, since they already hold this title, and in such cases it is rare for someone to pose questions on experience and maturity and how the first promotion was achieved (even if such questions are asked, it is doubtful whether the answers matter). This of course begs the question as to what is more important for the promotion to ambassador and for a high number of recurrences – promotion through connections regardless of experience, or promotion through collection of different experiences and gradual progression. The answer is for most individuals probably quite clear, but for diplomatic organization and for effective diplomacy it is equally clear how this vertical promotion should be performed to achieve the best results for diplomatic organization and its efficiency (the best criterion for measuring the latter is a comparison of parameters with other diplomacies). Cf. Jazbec, 2009b.

135 There were two foreign ministers in the first case because of a change following parliamentary elections, while in the second case they were a result of the resignation of minister Thaler.

Slovenian diplomacy, political pressure was very strong, and the number of embassies was relatively small (in two consecutive years altogether 18). For this reason, the number of direct appointments from politics (five) is certainly understandable; perhaps it is not even that high. If we take into account ambassadors with origins in the political subgroup (who at the time were already diplomats for a while, although overwhelmingly politicians according to their career), this increases to nine and amounts to half of all nominations in the first point in time. Simultaneously, promotion to ambassador took place without any personal experiences or patterns, so that the Law on Foreign Affairs probably did not have any particular influence on recruitment. We do not know how much influence the fact that both ministers were strong political personalities had on the number of political recruitments. But certainly the structure of promotions to ambassadorial class was influenced by a certain political resistance to those diplomats (first group and in particular its political subgroup) who prior to the creation of the Slovenian state and diplomacy were active in Yugoslav diplomacy.

The second period was already the time of the third Slovenian government, when the initially strong political pressure somewhat subsided, and we can probably conclude that promotion to ambassador had become a usual part of governmental staff arithmetic. Neither Minister had strong political or party backing, which meant they had to take into account or accept political recruitment, and an equally important role in promotion to ambassador was played by the Syndicate of Slovenian Diplomats established in 1996. In our assessment, there were two strong and opposing tendencies at play – recruitment from politics and recruitment from the ranks of professional diplomats. With an increase in the number of missions by half (from 18 to 29), the number of ambassadors from politics increased by half as well (from five to nine), with almost the same number of ambassadors from the political subgroup (three, that is one less than in the preceding period – although their diplomatic experience was by far larger than in the first period, by which we mean that in terms of experience, their diplomatic profile was increasingly dominant over their initial political origin). And we notice the first two appointments from the inexperienced subgroup, while the number of appointments from the official subgroup increases to five (in the first period, there was only one). Thus, in the second period, there are seven ambassadors out of a total of 29 who are professional diplomats, important progress in the direction of professionalization of the ambassadorial group. The number of ambassadors originating from university circles remained the same (three), while the number of ambassadors originating from business (from two to four) and from media (from one to two) increased. We also find that the second period saw a certain increase in recruitment from politics, while at the same time a noticeable core of professional ambassadors was formed. To this contributed, to a certain extent, reference to the Law on Foreign Affairs, as support for the professionalization of diplomacy and thereby also of ambassadors.

The third period is marked by a minister who spent his entire career working in the diplomatic or the international arena.[136] The key feature of promotions to the position of ambassador in this period is a pronounced increase in the number of professional diplomats among ambassadors. To this contributed in a formal manner at that time amended Law on Foreign Affairs, which reduced the possibility of recruitment to ambassadorial positions from outside professional diplomatic structures to a minimum (two per year). Three trends within this broad finding appear salient in light of our discussion. First, there appears a large group of ambassadors from diplomats who began their careers as members of the subgroup complete novices – of 44 posts, 14 are occupied by members of this subgroup (a third). Second the number of ambassadors from the experienced subgroup increases (from previously two to the present six; there were none in the first period) and the number of ambassadors from the official subgroup remains the same (five; there was only one in the first period). Both

136 Although both ministers dr. Frlec and Vajgl were diplomats before their ministerial appointments, they both entered the diplomatic service from politics. Minister Žbogar embarked on his professional path at the Governmental Agency for International Exchange of Students and continued in the Republican Secretariat for International Cooperation (second group), followed by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade and then in Slovenian diplomacy, so he was at all times in the international arena, and this as an official and not a politician (unlike e.g. minister Thaler, who was at all times active in the international arena but as a politician).

trends powerfully strengthen the core of professional ambassadors (more than half – 25 out of 44). Third, the number of recruits from politics decreases somewhat (from nine to seven – these being not new names but ambassadors with that professional background), and there are no recruits from the political subgroup (the reasons predominantly being retirement and an age limit of 65 years, after which deployment to external service is no longer possible in accordance with the new law on foreign affairs). Likewise, the number of members from the subgroup media, education and culture increases (from to two four), the number of members from the subgroup business decreases slightly (from four to three), while there is no recruitment to ambassador from university circles. Only in the first period do we note recruitment from the groups emigration and re-activated diplomats, with one ambassador each.[137] In the third period, there appear some ambassadors; there was only one in the previous period) whose professional origins belong to the new subgroup "administration" within the third group (as presented in table 1), which captures those individuals who entered diplomatic service in the time after the creation of the Slovenian state, from its various administrative departments or institutions.

The third observed period is most notable for its marked increase in the number and share of women in ambassadorial positions. To this, and to the question of education in relation to promotion to ambassador, we turn our attention in the continuation.

Women ambassadors

To the aforementioned general findings on women ambassadors in

137 Here we note the salient fact that one of the most renown, and among the most experienced in general, Slovenian re-activated diplomats, Ignac Golob, who was ambassador several times in the period of Yugoslav diplomacy (New York, Vienna – OSCE, and Mexico twice) and who was State Secretary several times in the Slovenian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was never appointed Slovenian ambassador. Moreover – when changes in the Yugoslav Federal Presidency led to the opportunity for Slovenia, in accordance with rotation, to hold the post of Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1988, (uncontested and by far the best candidate was Ignac Golob), Slovenian political leadership, for reasons unknown to the public, gave its turn to Croatia (the last Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs thus became Budimir Lončar). This turned out to be a massive political and diplomatic mistake, since a Slovenian in the position of Yugoslav Foreign Minister at the time of independence would be an invaluable source of information for Slovenian political leadership and influence in the operational elite of Yugoslav foreign policy, which at the time strongly counteracted the independence efforts of Slovenia and Croatia.

the studied population and points in time we add in the following some concrete findings.[138] Table 2 lists the diplomatic locations with women ambassadors at the mentioned time.

Table 2: Diplomatic locations of women ambassadors

	1992/93	1997/98	2009/10
1) Austria	x	-	-
2) Belgium	-	-	x
3) Brazil	-	-	x
4) Czech Republic	-	-	x
5) France	-	-	x
6) Greece	-	-	-
7) Ireland	-	-	x
8) Israel	-	x	x
9) Japan	-	-	x
10) China	-	-	x
11) Hungary	-	x	x
12) Macedonia	x	x	-
13) OSCE Vienna	-	-	x
14) UN New York	-	-	x
15) Portugal	-	-	x
16) Romania	-	-	x
17) Russian Federation	-	-	x
18) Council of Europe	-	x	-
19) Sweden	-	x	-
20) The Vatican	-	-	x
Total – 20 /	2 (18)	5 /4/ (29)	15 (44)

Source: Own.

138 In this contribution, we do not address the reasons for such representation of women in the population of ambassadors and in Slovenian diplomacy as a whole. For that, see e.g. Jazbec, 2001: 121-126, Jazbec, 2002: 168-173, Kajzer-Stefanović, 2009, Lukšič-Hacin, 2009, as well as Edwards, 1994, and more widely e.g. Paxton and Hughes, 2007, and Vianello and Moore, 2004. The topic is treated generally also in Čebašek-Travnik, 2009.

As said, the three points in time observed include 20 women among 85 ambassadors in total, active on 20 diplomatic locations.[139] From the three periods together we find that two locations had women as ambassadors at two consecutive points in time (in both cases the second and third period). This was the case in Israel and Hungary.[140]

Looking at the recruitment origins of women ambassadors, we find the following. Most come from the subgroup complete novices (3A – all three points in time), this being five and a quarter of all women ambassadors. Four women ambassadors each come from the experienced (2A - two in the second and two in the third period) and the political subgroups (3B – one in the third period and two each in the first two periods; the same person in Macedonia in the first and second period). Three each come from the subgroup other (3E – all in the third period) and administration (3F – one in the second and two in the third period), while one comes from the official subgroup (in the third period). Such a distribution across temporal points is in our view an indirect consequence of the fact that the political subgroup (1A) at zero hour contained no women, and that the official subgroup (1B) had very few (which we have already mentioned and for which appropriate sources were indicated in the second part of this contribution).

As already mentioned, the third period sees a remarkable increase in both the number and share of women in the observed ambassadorial population. The first period had two, the second had five (doubling), and the third had 14 (nearly tripling). Despite this, the ratio of men to women in the third period is still 2:1, namely 29 men and 15 women.

As said, the women ambassadors worked in 20 locations. These are, to summarize, the following: France, China and Russia as permanent members of the UN SC, then OSCE Vienna, UN New York and the Council of Europe Strasbourg (three prominent multilateral centres), the neighbouring states of Austria and Hungary, the Vatican,[141] three states in south-eastern Europe, namely Greece, Macedonia, and Romania, one state each from central Europe (Czech Republic) and the BRIC states (Brazil), as well as Belgium, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Portugal, and Sweden. Proceeding from the criteria

139 According to the table, there are 21 locations, but the mandate of the ambassador in Macedonia lasted from 1993 to 1997. It is thus counted as one ambassador and one mandate.
140 For clarification with regard to Macedonia, see the previous footnote.
141 Among the first to recognize Slovenia.

for forming a model of a network of representation (Jazbec, 2001: 190, and Jazbec, 2002: 206), we can say that a large part of the listed locations belongs to those important for Slovenian foreign policy and diplomacy: two neighbouring states, European and global political centres, multilateral centres, and south-eastern Europe. With regard to the diplomatic location in the three periods studied we can in spite of the mentioned numerical disparity nonetheless determine that women ambassadors have occupied not only important but the most important diplomatic locations.

Education of ambassadors studied

A standard criterion for admission into diplomatic service is a level of education equal to that required to enter state administration in general, that is, university education in an appropriate field.[142] The diplomatic service is among those which require from graduates continuous additional education and improvement, although in the Slovenian case this is not formally prescribed and is not required as an additional condition affecting a diplomat's promotion, even to the position of ambassador. Further training is therefore not a condition, nor is it foreseen as an advantage, for promotion (although this does not exclude the possibility that it would be important in some concrete case).

A general overview of attained education in the observed ambassadorial population yields the following basic findings. From altogether 85 ambassadors, a good two thirds have university education, this being 53 of them.[143] After that, one ambassador has specialized education (diplomatic academy), 12 have a Master's degree, and 19 have a doctorate (PhD). This latter group is the second biggest group from the perspective of education, and encompasses nearly a fourth of all ambassadors. Among these nineteen more than half, precisely 10, are habilitated. We find that in the observed ambassadorial population, there are a total of 32 with a level of education higher than that required, and nearly a fourth possesses the

142 The Law on Foreign Affairs lists as appropriate education the following – quote.

143 Of course all ambassadors have university education, by which they fulfill one of the basic conditions for admission into diplomatic service and for working within it. Yet the stated information tells us that many have a higher education than that prescribed, which is what we investigate in this part of the contribution, namely, how many possess a level of education higher than that prescribed and which level this is.

highest academic education. We believe this to be an important indicator of the education of this population.[144]

In the following, table 3 looks at the educational group with doctorates (the mark H is used to denote 'habilitated'). We are interested in their gender, professional origin, and the locations where they were active. The population is too small to draw reliable correlative conclusions, but we nonetheless take a look at whether it may be possible to derive conclusions of the sort (if for no other reason than as a potential starting point for a later study of the entire ambassadorial population).

Table 3 – Ambassadors with PhD

		1992/93	1997/98	2009/10
1.	Argentina	-	H m 3 C	-
2.	Austria	H f 3 B	-	-
3.	Australia	-	-	H m 3 B
4.	Egypt	-	-	m 3 A
5.	EU Brussels	H m 3 C	m 3 C	m 3 B
6.	France	-	H m 3. B	-
7.	Iran	-	m 3. D	-
8.	Canada	-	m 1 B	-
9.	Germany	m 1 A	-	-
10.	OECD Paris	-	-	m 3 D
11.	UN New York	H m 3 C	H m 3 C	-
12.	UN Geneva	H m 3 C	-	-
13.	Turkey	-	m 3 D	H m 1 B
14.	The Vatican	m 4	-	-
15.	USA	H m 1 A	H m 3 B	-
	Total – 15	6 M – 7 – 1 F (H 5)	8 M – 8 – 0 F (H 4)	5 M – 5 – 0 F (H 2)
	15 locations – 19 PhD – 1 f – 10 H			
	20 ambassadors PhD (one twice)			

Source: Own.

In the statistical commentary to the table, we start of by noting that the 19 ambassadors with a doctorate served on 15 locations, with one appearing in the first and second time period due to mandate extension,

144 For further study of Slovenian diplomacy and also of the ambassadorial population, it would be useful to discover the motivation driving these individuals to further their education and to obtain the highest academic titles.

bringing the total count to 20 ambassadors. Of these 19, 18 are men and one is a woman, and altogether 10 are habilitated professors. Their number is distributed relatively equally among the three time periods: the first contains seven (six men and one woman), the second contains eight men, and the third contains five men.[145]

Looking at their professional origins, we find the following representation: the most numerous, five, are from the politically recruited subgroup (3B) and the university subgroup (3C), then three from the business subgroup (3D), two each from the political (1A) and official (1B) subgroups, and one each from complete novices (3A) and emigration (4).

We have mentioned that these ambassadors served in 15 locations. To summarize, these are: France and the USA as permanent members of the UN SC, New York and Geneva (UN headquarters), missions at the EU in Brussels and at the OECD in Paris (multilateral centres), the neighbouring state Austria and the key European state Germany,[146] followed by the Vatican,[147] and two states with a strong Slovenian diaspora, namely Argentina and Australia, as well as Egypt, Iran, Canada, and Turkey. The permanent representatives of Slovenia at the EU in Brussels were in the three periods three consecutive times ambassadors with doctorates. This happened two consecutive times at the UN in New York (the same ambassador, in the already mentioned case of mandate extension) as well as in Turkey and the US. To again proceed from the criteria for a model of a network of representation (Jazbec, 2001: 190, and Jazbec, 2002: 206), we could say that the majority of listed locations are among the more important for Slovenian foreign policy and diplomacy: a neighbouring state, European and global political centres, multilateral centres, and the Slovenian diaspora. However, we do not know the specific reasons why these particular ambassadors were posted to the mentioned locations.[148]

145 In the population and the points in time studied, this is the only woman with a doctorate and is also habilitated, having achieved both before entering the diplomatic organization. In any case, from the 19 doctors 16 ambassadors were in the same position, 9 of which were habilitated. Three ambassadors obtained their doctorate while employed in the diplomatic organization, one of which was habilitated.

146 A third of Slovenia's external trade is conducted with Germany.

147 Among the first to recognize Slovenia (see footnote 16).

148 This contribution intentionally avoids summarizing media and behind-the-scenes speculations on these reasons, although the author is of the opinion that some of them are very plausible, if not entirely valid.

Due to this, it would be difficult to form a reliable empirically validated concrete recommendation for future recruitment to key ambassadorial positions in Slovenian diplomacy.[149]

We can, however, state that it follows from the commented overview that ambassadors with a doctorate were posted to important, including the most important, diplomatic locations. Among these ambassadors, with regard to professional origin, the politically recruited stand out, as those from 1A and 3B make up slightly more than a third, altogether seven. Nearly a quarter come from university circles (five), and three come from business. Regardless of professional origin, there are three cases where ambassadors achieved their doctorates while serving in the diplomatic organization, that is, they advanced their formal education by imbuing it with their own experience and knowledge. Two (one habilitated) come from the official subgroup (1B), both former secretaries of state, one at present, and one comes from the complete novice subgroup (3A).

The number of ambassadorial mandates

We now look at some findings derived from an overview of the number of ambassadorial mandates achieved by ambassadors in the course of their careers.

In our introduction, we wrote that it is the ambition of every diplomat to attain promotion to the position of ambassador. To add to this, we may here state the assumption that it is the ambition of every ambassador to repeat the ambassadorial mandate and to achieve a high number of such recurrences in the duration of their diplomatic career (next to the ambition of achieving a high position in the structure of the MFA while working in the internal service, as this has a large influence on easy, fast, and, with regard to location, better recurrence of the ambassadorial mandate).[150] We can also state, without the ambition to validate our assumption,

149 On the level of principle, the recommendation is relatively simple: experienced diplomats with years of seniority in internal and foreign service, tested in appropriate positions, widely educated, reliable and powerful personalities, with reputations in the diplomatic service and in the professional public (cf. e.g. Bohte and Sancin, 2006, Bučar, F., 2009, Čačinovič, 1994, Feltham, 1994, Jazbec, 2009a, Osolnik, 1998, Petrič, 2010, etc.).

150 The expression "better" recurrence of a mandate is relative and difficult to quantify. It would be easier to write that it is such that it corresponds best to the personal expectations of the candidate.

that the number of ambassadors with a higher number of accomplished mandates indicates how experienced, verified, and effective a diplomacy or diplomatic organization is. Perhaps this is the reason why the indicator of number of ambassadorial mandates accomplished is the factor deciding the competition, promotion, and the entire nature of relations at the top of diplomatic organization.

For this reason it seems important to analyse the cumulative number of mandates of the 85 ambassadors in the observed population in Slovenian diplomacy. We add that for the observed ambassadors, we have included the total number of accomplished mandates of each ambassador, that is, not only the mandates in the three observed periods (including ambassadorial mandates achieved in Yugoslav diplomacy), but only for those 85 ambassadors observed in the three time observed periods. Analysis and study of the total number of all ambassadorial mandates of all ambassadors in the entire period of the past 18 years we leave to further research.

Table 4 lists the professional origin of ambassadors and the number of identified mandates (one, two, three, four) with numerical indication of individual recurrences.

Table 4: Number of mandates

Group	One	Two	Three	Four	Total
1 A	–	–	5	1	6
1 B	6	5	1	–	12
2 A	–	5	2	–	7
2 B	–	–	–	–	–
3 A	13	1	–	–	14
3 B	13	6	1	–	20
3 C	5	–	–	–	5
3 D	3	3	–	–	6
3 E	3	–	1	–	4
3 F	5	4	–	–	9
4	1	–	–	–	1
5	–	–	–	1	1
Total	49	24	10	2	85
Total: m – f	37 – 12	17 – 7	9 – 1	2 – 0	65 – 20

Source: Own.

From the 85 ambassadors (65 men and 20 women), more than half held one mandate each, more precisely 49 (37 men and 12 women). Nearly a third of ambassadors, more precisely 24 (17:7), held two mandates each, while 10 achieved three ambassadorial mandates each. Two diplomats (both men) attained four ambassadorial mandates each, of these one (subgroup 1A) held a mandate in the Yugoslav diplomacy and the other (re-activated diplomat) held three mandates in the diplomacy of the former state.[151] In addition, one ambassadorial mandate in Yugoslav diplomacy each was held by four individuals, each with three mandates in total, from subgrup 1A, as well as by one individual with two mandates in total, from subgroup 1B. Such a mandate was thus held by five ambassadors from subgroup 1A and one from subgroup 1B, as well as by one ambassador from the fourth group, making the total seven.[152] Given the method of recruitment to the diplomatic service in the former state and given the age profile of diplomats in subgroup 1A in particular, it was to be expected that its members would have had a mandate in the previous state. Evidently, subgroup 1B as a whole is too young to have attained an ambassadorial mandate in that time (with one identified exception, which by age exceeds all others in the group by approximately a decade).

Looking at the number of attained and repeated mandates by professional origin, the following picture is painted.

Among the 49 ambassadors with one mandate, 13 come each from the subgroup complete novices (3A) and from the politically recruited subgroup (3B), which altogether amounts to more than half of all mandates (or 26 out of 49). Six come from the official subgroup (1B), and five each from the subgroups university (3C) and administration (3F). The subgroups business (3D) and other (3E) contribute three each, and the group emigration (4) contributes one.

Among the 24 ambassadors with two mandates, six come from the politically recruited subgroup (3B), and five come from each the official subgroup (1B) and the experienced subgroup (2A). Four come from the subgroup administration (3F) and three come from business (3D), while one comes from the subgroup complete novice (3A).

151 Both are no longer active in the diplomatic service.
152 Čačinovič (1994: 120–124) presents a named list of Slovenians serving as ambassadors of Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991.

Among the 10 ambassadors with three mandates, half come from the political subgroup (1A). Two come from the experienced subgroup (2A), while one each from the subgroups official (1B), politics (3B), and other (3E).

We repeat the already mentioned for both ambassadors with four mandates – one from the political subgroup (1A) and four from the re-activated group (4).

Let us now examine which subgroups are dominant, in terms of number of attained mandates within a particular number. Prominent in one mandate is the subgroup of complete novices and the politically recruited (with 13 individuals each), and also noticeable are the official and administration subgroups with half the number of individuals (six and five). For two attained mandates, the politically recruited subgroup again stands out (six) while the official and experienced subgroups are also prominent (both five each). The subgroup of administration is also noticeable (four individuals). For three attained mandates, the political subgroup is by far most prominent (five individuals), while also noticeable is the experienced subgroup (two individuals).

If we assume that the attainment of multiple ambassadorial mandates requires more influence, then the most influential are the individuals from the following subgroups: political (1A), official (1B), experienced (2A), and politics (3B); all have attained multiple mandates. For one mandate only, we note the prominence of complete novices (3A) and politics (3B).

If we generalize by combining ambassadors with political backgrounds at the moment of recruitment (1A and 3B), we arrive at a very strong grouping, numbering 26 out of 85. Yet looking those entering diplomacy from non-political groups (although we do not know what was crucial for their appointment as ambassador, perhaps it was precisely political leverage), this being the official (1B) and experienced (2A) subgroups as well as complete novices (3A), this turns out to be the strongest grouping numbering 33 individuals. If, in these two groupings, we take into account only ambassadors with two and three attained mandates, we find that the political grouping has 12 and the other has 14. These are evidently two very strong trends and groupings, the political and the so-called non-political (although the latter would be better served by being termed the official, career diplomat grouping), if we judge them by the three observed points in time. It would be difficult to say which of the two is more influential, and one must also keep in mind the fact that both have important and equal backing or potential in the group with one mandate only (13 individuals each). This highlights the fact that a trend of less direct recruitment from politics has begun, or that it has been equalized with recruitment from other, in particular the three just mentioned so-called career diplomat, subgroups. However, this in our opinion does not mean that the influence of politics on recruitment to ambassadorial positions has weakened. This influence is becoming less obvious, and depends above all on a given individual's personal and in particular political connections, rather than on his professional origin.

Perhaps a later analysis on the entire population of ambassadors will bring additional findings with regard to the mentioned characteristics.

Some particularities

When comparing the data on the growth of the network of representations (missions) and the number of ambassadors as well as identifying their belonging to specific groups, we can identify some less general but equally salient findings. They stand out because they relate to the particularity in the method and location of promotion.[153]

In Slovenian diplomacy (and in that of numerous other states), an ambassador (as well as other diplomats) returns to the internal service at the end of his mandate, and works there for two to three years, after which he continues his service in the external service.[154] Direct transitions from location to location, including interim promotions to ambassadors, are exceptions.[155] Likewise, diplomats should during their career serve in

153 Much about the backgrounds of the treated promotion can be learned in a relaxed and memoaristic manner in Ure, 1994.

154 When a diplomat is in the internal service for more than three years, it is usual to assume that he himself does not have an interest in being transferred to the external service, or that he is being actively hindered or blocked. The system of diplomatic promotion should be organized in such a way that each diplomat after a certain period of time, e.g. at least after three years, has his turn for transfer to external service. This would maintain diplomatic rotation and ensure permanent variety and frequency of accumulation of diplomatic experience.

155 How much of an exception this truly is, is borne witness to by the fact that the system of

many different locations, as this is a key condition for the accumulation of different diplomatic experiences which enables diplomatic maturation and greater competence for working in unpredictable circumstances. For this reason, it is not customary nor is it a rule that a diplomat is appointed ambassador to a location where he has already served, especially if this was the last location before promotion to ambassador. The findings mentioned refer to such cases in Slovenian ambassadorial practice. Likewise, it is not customary that a diplomat is promoted to ambassador in his present location.[156]

We find that the observed population of 85 ambassadors contained six (no women) which had their mandates extended in the same location. With regard to origin, one comes from the political subgroup (first group), two from the subgroup politics, and one each from the subgroups university[157] and business, and one from the group emigration.

Thereafter, we noticed two cases where diplomats (both women) advanced to ambassadorial rank by being transferred from the diplomatic location where they worked (one as deputy head of mission and one as *charge d'affaires a.i.*) and posted to a new diplomatic location in the status of ambassadress, without interim work in the internal service (a minimum of one year), which is otherwise standard practice and is rarely violated or breached. We have also noticed that seven ambassadors (including four women) first advanced to this rank at the same location where they had in the past served as deputies or lower diplomats. In both trends, one ambassadress appears and is also the only one to be ambassadress at a location where she once served, this simultaneously being her first ambassadorial posting.

promotion to ambassador makes it practically impossible for a diplomat to advance to ambassadorial class on the basis of work only, let alone that he would succeed in this at the same time as in being directly transferred from one location to another.

156 One such case exists in Slovenian practice, but not in the time periods observed.

157 The former president of Slovenia Dr. Danilo Türk was ambassador – head of the permanent mission at the UN from the year 1992 onwards. Because of lobbying for non-permanent membership of Slovenia in the SC and because of the realization of this goal, his mandate was extended, as it was judged that this would lead to the best professional result in the performance of the non-permanent membership. We could say that this was an acceptable reason (even if not a necessary one) for mandate extension. The term of Ambassador Dr. Ernest Petrič was extended for a similar reason, as he was as permanent representative at the UN in Vienna (simultaneously the Slovenian Ambassador to Austria) in the autumn 2006–2007 period presiding over the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors.

Both mini-groupings are with regard to professional origin variable. One of the diplomats to become ambassadress by direct transition from location to location comes from the subgroup ‘other’ in the third group, and the other comes from the new subgroup ‘administration’. From those who were first-time ambassadors at the same location where they had served in the past, three come from the official subgroup, two women from the subgroup ‘other’, and one woman each from the experienced subgroup and the subgroup complete novice.

In direct transitions from one diplomatic location to another, we also note five cases (no women) where existing ambassadors, during their mandate or at its conclusion, moved in this rank directly (also without interim service in the internal service) to another location. Two of these come from the politics subgroup (third group), and one each from the political, experienced, and business subgroups.

To briefly comment on the above mentioned and consolidate the findings presented, we note that ambassadors in the three periods observed come from different groups and subgroups (except for the inexperienced subgroup). Important is also the finding that their initial origin, referring to the five years before zero hour, is becoming more and more obscured. We also believe that the promotion of diplomats to ambassador is dependent on several factors directly connected to their origin, as well as on the origin of those diplomats occupying high positions in the MFA or who have in these places their colleagues and supporters. In short, advancement to ambassador is achieved by those diplomats who are personally close to the leadership of the Ministry. The formation of attitudes towards these diplomats in the circles of the president and the prime minister is also influenced directly through this. The maintaining of continuous contact with individuals from these circles is of key importance for advancement, regardless of changes in government outfits. Perhaps we could add the presumption, to some extent quite certainly reflected in the consolidation of the study of the mentioned characteristics, that advancement to an ambassadorial position is not directly dependent only or predominantly on the results of work, experience, and knowledge, and is very difficult to secure without connections.

Here it is in our opinion very important to mention, although it reaches beyond the framework of our current contemplation, the fact that the so-called career aspect by itself does not presuppose nor ensure a quality ambassador. If we understand the career aspect as being the vocation or more precisely service in the diplomatic organization, then this is not professionalism understood as "high competence, professional quality of work" (Petrič, 2010: 324); the latter case deals with persons who "are 'professionals' in their knowledge of international issues and according to their education" (Petrič, 2010: 325) and the therefrom derived superior results. We could therefore just as well make the presumption that a career or service or employment in the diplomatic organization does not as such automatically presuppose that a given diplomat will advance to the position of ambassador only because that is his vocation or profession.

With this, we have reached the concluding phase of this contribution, in which we summarize our findings and pose a number of questions which have formed throughout the research process and are worthy of attention in future related research.

Conclusion

In this contribution, we have studied the promotion to ambassadorial positions in Slovenian diplomacy. Let us, due to the contribution's saturation with concrete facts and detailed findings, review that we observed the target group of ambassadors in three time periods, namely the years 1992/1993, 1997/1998 and 2009/2010 (initially discovering that the ambassadorial population contains 85 individuals, of which 65 are men and 20 are women). On a general level, we were interested in the characteristics, trends, and backgrounds of promotion to ambassadorial positions of the target group in the observed period, whereby we tried be aware of the professionalization of this group. As professionalization is linked to the professional origin of the individuals prior to entry into Slovenian (or previously into Yugoslav) diplomacy, we used, as presented in the introduction, the following categorization into groups and subgroups: first, diplomats from the Federal Ministry of the former state (political and official subgroup), second, employees of the Republican Secretariat for International Cooperation (experienced and inexperienced subgroups), third, newcomers to the diplomatic service (subgroups: complete novices, recruits from politics, universities, business and elsewhere, in particular from culture, media, education, etc.), fourth, emigration, and fifth, re-activated diplomats. As we do not study the entire population of ambassadors as it was formed from zero hour onwards, but only at the three points in time mentioned, we have tried to use an approach that formulates a methodological framework and pattern which would be useful for later examination of the entire ambassadorial and the entire diplomatic population.

In our research, we examined, as said, two hypotheses posed a decade ago, namely, we expect, firstly, a decrease in the presence and influence of the political subgroup, and secondly, the formation and strengthening of a core of professional diplomats which includes members of the official group, a larger part of the experienced group, and an increasing share of complete newcomers. We also believed that the period of almost two decades of operation of Slovenian diplomacy is an appropriate timeframe for determining a general trend on the basis of the ambassadorial population.

As far as the first hypothesis is concerned, we determine that in the population studied, the presence and thereby the influence of the political subgroup decreased and practically subsided, whereby this hypothesis is confirmed. There is no longer any active ambassador or diplomat coming from the political subgroup (1A) in Slovenian diplomacy. This is certainly to a large extent a consequence of biological factors (the age of that subgroup's members) that would set in sooner or later, although without it being predictable when precisely it would happen. That this subgroup held much actual influence in the past period of operation of Slovenian diplomacy is borne witness to by the fact that from it came two Foreign Ministers (both ambassadors with three mandates each) and one State Secretary (ambassador with four mandates). The data on the number of ambassadorial mandates also bears witness to a reliable transformation of the members of the political subgroup in the direction of the diplomatic profession.

Also with regard to the second hypothesis we have clear confirmation. In the past period, a strong professional core was formed and strengthened in Slovenian diplomacy, as measured through the observed population of ambassadors. If, according to the second hypothesis posed, we include in it ambassadors from the official subgroup (1B), the experienced subgroup (2A), and the subgroup complete novice (3A), this amounts to 33 ambassadors out of a total of 85. This grouping, which we understand as the basic core of professional diplomacy given its origins, is the largest of all individual groupings. If we add to it the ambassadors from the new subgroup administration (3F – six), this number increases to 39, while adding the ambassadors from the subgroup other (3E – seven), we obtain 46 out of 85 ambassadors. Even if some of the members of the latter two subgroups were appointed as ambassadors through political intervention, we can count them, at least after one completed mandate, as members of the professional core of Slovenian diplomacy.

As we comment on the validity of both hypotheses, we must to the examination of the first add the remark that the largest subgroup is the one composed of politically recruited ambassadors (3B), composed of 21 individuals (a quarter of the total). For three out of seven in the third observed period it is the first ambassadorial mandate, although each had previously worked for at least some years in diplomacy or at the Foreign Ministry, which means that, despite their initial political professional background upon entry into diplomacy, they possess a concrete collection of diplomatic experience (with the partial exception of one). By this we try to emphasize that even this group, marked by politics in the most direct way, is experiencing an important transformation towards professional diplomacy in a large share of its members.

Similarly, to the examination of the second hypothesis we must likewise add a remark confirming its validity as far as the professional core of Slovenian diplomacy is concerned. The by far largest subgroup in the third period, according to number of members, is the subgroup complete novice (3A), counting a total of 14 ambassadors. Each attained their ambassadorial mandate in the third period, as the first two periods contain no ambassador originating in this subgroup.

The noted rise of this subgroup is to a certain extent a consequence of the absence of competition for ambassadorial positions from the political subgroup, yet the aforementioned nonetheless confirms the greater general prospects of members of this subgroup. We also mention the notable though numerically less prominent importance of the official (1B) and experienced (2A) subgroups. The former has 11 ambassadors and the latter has eight. Their significance, too, will in the future decrease steadily due to biological factors, but its contribution to the professional core in Slovenian diplomacy was and still is just as important. Two former state secretaries (one of which is also the present state secretary) come from the former, while one former foreign minister and one former woman state secretary come from the latter.

We still observe two main trends in Slovenian diplomacy, judging by the findings from the observed ambassadorial population, these being the trend of professionalization, which is growing and becoming stronger, and a trend of recruitment from politics. Yet we believe that the latter is quantitatively fading due lower numbers as well as due to the professional diplomatic transformation of those of its members working for a while in the diplomatic service. The aforementioned does of course not mean that politics and the decisions made by it do not intervene in diplomatic and especially ambassadorial recruitment, but we expect this recruitment to develop in the direction of political influencing on concrete choices of promoting an ever-increasing number of professional diplomats with or without political support. Consequently, this will have less and less of an influence on the professional activity of specific diplomats, and more and more influence on relations within diplomacy (competition, promotion, etc.).

To our concluding remarks we add that during our research process, we have noticed and formed a new subgroup, this being "administration" (3F). It contains those members of Slovenian diplomacy and the observed ambassadorial population that have entered it or are entering it after the creation of the Slovenian state, from different departments in its state administration. Because of the timing of entry, which does not coincide with the zero hour, we cannot place them in any of the categories presented in the introduction. The subgroup administration has six ambassadors, of which three are women (one in the second period, two in the third) and three are men (all in the third period). We also find that simultaneously, the groups emigration (four) and re-activated diplomats (five) have ceased to exist. This, too, is a practical consequence of the already mentioned biological aspect. Yet we must note the general fact that the few members of these two groups played a very important role in the creation and formation of Slovenian diplomacy, although this was not prominent in our observations or, better said, our research did not go so far as to study such aspects.

Towards the end of our discussion, we mention some of the questions which arose during the study of the titular topic. With them, we would like to highlight in the conclusion of our contribution some aspects which reveal themselves when studying the characteristics, trends, and backgrounds of Slovenian diplomacy and which deserve attention in the future but which were not the object of our study, although we may have indirectly indicated possible answers.

It is necessary for the quality functioning of Slovenian diplomacy to know what promotes an individual to the position of ambassador, regardless of whether decision-makers take such empirical findings and recommendations into account. Indirectly connected to that is the question of what it is that makes (molds) an ambassador of quality. Going further, there is the question of whether both of these overlap in those who have been ambassador the most times and who have served at key diplomatic locations. Large looms the question of how to measure this precisely and empirically, although in each diplomatic organization – including the Slovenian – it is known, insofar as it is not too large, who the good diplomats are and whether they achieved an ambassadorial mandate on the basis of the results of work or other reasons. Last but not least, there is the question of how it can be assured that the number of ambassadorial mandates and the significance of the location to which an individual is posted is assigned to individuals with competence who have demonstrated results, and not on the basis of whether he has political or personal connections or not.

The ambition to reach the top of the professional pyramid of diplomacy should not overwhelmingly, or completely, be stimulated by the desire to reach this top as soon as possible, through shortcuts. The rise to the top must be a result of professional growth and personal maturation, which is possible only through the gradual accumulation of knowledge and experience. The general practice of modern diplomacies shows that promotion to the position of ambassador, assuming that the individual has gotten to know the work well enough, has gained the necessary knowledge and breadth and appropriate personal qualities, requires around twenty years of service in the profession. This, too, is one of the numerous topics for empirical study in Slovenian diplomacy and thereby for a concrete contribution to the set of observations and conclusions that will strengthen our presumption on the necessity of a sociology of diplomacy.

DIPLOMACY AND GENDER INEQUALITY

Maca Jogan, Milena Stefanović Kajzer, Maja Božović

The (in)visibility of women in diplomacy[158]

Diplomacy as a significant and inseparable ingredient of managing relations between states is on of the most prominent areas of political activity. Particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, this activity was gradually loosing its traditional aristocratic characteristics in light of the changes in the socio-political environment and due to its increasing functional diversification (Jazbec, 2002: 168, 169), as well as its explicitly single-gender composition, but is still highly reputable. Recent studies show that the level of reputation is also related to the content of gender inequality. To put it simpler – women represent a small proportion in the most reputable areas such as defence, finance, and foreign policy or are even not present in these areas, despite their already visible presence in political decision-making in the world. Though the state has been improving particularly in the last ten years, gender asymmetry in the disposal of political power still prevails in most countries. Women are

158 Prepared by Maca Jogan.

therefore usually left with areas such as health, social and women's affairs, upbringing, family, culture, etc. (Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 98)

Aside from science and economy,[159] diplomacy as the instrument of world politics is still regarded as a typically 'male domain', which the initial feminization only began to loosen. This is noticeable in mass communication as well as in professional and scientific discourse. 'Male diplomats' act as the self-evident key actors in diplomacy, who are accompanied by the 'ladies'; under this assumption, the feminization of professional diplomatic tasks can be explained as a consequence of the lack of 'staff resources', especially in young diplomacies (Jazbec, 2002: 168). Such stereotypical perceptions of diplomacy as a male fortress are still present even in the education of the future key actors in this important activity.

Women are, for example, reduced to the aesthetic accessory in textbooks on diplomacy and are therefore mentioned only in the rules, which specify 'the lady's dress' (Jazbec, 2009a: 236). This manner of including women into the depiction of diplomatic life is highly reduced and even completely neglects the informal domestic social role of 'the lady', which is otherwise understood as her normal duty. Though women play an irreplaceably useful role as the wives of diplomats and the supporting 'actresses', this role remains mostly invisible as the 'natural' duty of women.

The invisibility of women in world politics was co-created and established also by the science of international relations[160], what is increasingly becoming the subject of critical assessment due to the effects of feminist research. Smith and Owens (2007: 362) thus emphasize: "After all, it was not true that women were actually absent from world politics but that they in fact played central roles, either as cheap factory labour, as prostitutes around military bases, or as the wives of diplomats."

159 According to the assessment of the Austrian researchers Kreisky and Schröcker (1984: 403), the acronym for the typically male areas of activity is 3W (German: Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft, Weltpolitik or Economy, Science, World Politics), as opposed to the acronym for the typically female areas of activity, which is 3K (Kinder, Küche, Kirche or Children, Kitchen, Church).

160 As different studies have shown in the recent decades, creating the social invisibility of women in "male" (public) spheres, which were the only ones interesting and appropriate for the "rational" science, was a general characteristic of male-biased sciences (Jogan, 2001: 115–121).

This assessment can be accepted as the 'pure truth' and not only as one of the possible interpretations of the illusive and fluid reality,[161] because without women's care work, no (political) activity would even be possible. Simply, *conditio sine qua non* of the existence of human society in general is the reproduction of the species, whereby the natural assumption is the existence of two genders and types of activity, which are regulated by social rules.

The question of the invisibility of women in politics is thus inseparably related to the prevailing culture, the content of regulatory rules, the rule-makers, and the implementation of said rules in individual states or social communities. Discrimination against women is an important common characteristic of all cultures, despite the global cultural diversity. It is necessary to find the answer to the question why care[162] ('female') activities remain in the shadow of the acts of the 'statesmen' at the beginning of the twenty-first century despite their immense and lasting overall benefit. This concerns the questions what would greater social gender equality bring, how to ensure it at all levels and in all areas and why its effects often do not comply (enough) with the expectations regarding the elimination of social gender inequality.

The resilience of the traditional distribution of work and of discrimination against women

When any area of human activity is analyzed from the gender aspect, the signs of inequality between men and women are certain to be found. The asymmetrical distribution of power in favour of men is particularly significant, the effects of which are visible both in the public and private sphere. The data from the large international study[163] on the characteristics

161 This means that the post-modernistic approach, which sees any different approach as "suspicious, because it states that it has uncovered some basic truth about the world", has been consciously abandoned (Smith and Owens, 2007: 367).

162 The concept of "caring" has been established in the more recent sociological literature, written in English (e.g. Crompton, 2006).

163 In the comparative study on the political end economical elites, which included 27 of the most industrialized democratic countries (also Slovenia), the data was collected between 1993 and 1995. 60 people combined were interviewed in each country. 30 people were among the holders of power in senior posts (15 men and 15 women) and 30 were members of the economic elite (with the same composition). S.v. Vianello and Moore (2004).

of political elites shows that women are encountering obstacles, which derive from the role traditionally attributed to them, even in the most senior posts in politics at the end of the twentieth century. For instance, characteristically less women than men in this category have a partner (76,4 % : 92,2 %); men have more children than women (on average 2,24 : 1,87); women are more burdened with the family or do not have a family at all (and thus at least partially avoid their traditional role); women often have to sacrifice their personal life. And the key finding of the group of female and male scientists, who conducted the study – where affirmative policies for the achievement of gender equality are adopted, the possibilities for women increase (Vianello and Moore, 2004: 188).

This can be also seen in diplomacy, because e.g. diplomatic activity is the most open to women precisely in the Nordic and the former socialist countries. At all rates, women – 'novices' generally encounter various obstacles in every aspect of diplomatic activity despite their professional qualifications, both in the domestic diplomatic organization as well as in missions abroad and are therefore often in a more difficult position than men (Jazbec, 2002: 169).

The discussion on discrimination against women is thus not outdated. The answers to the question on the reasons for this phenomenon are often too simple and/or lead to the emphasizing of a single dimension, for instance that discrimination against women is the consequence of stereotypes, socialization, capitalism, etc. If a single key factor really would exist, the issue of discrimination would have been probably quickly resolved. If one attempts to answer the above-posed question more thoroughly, one must consider culture as a whole and the entire social structure as well as their functioning at all levels – from the shaping of personal identity and the social role of the individual, to the various administrative and finally supervisory institutions in society. But traditionally, the social structure is not the product of humanity in general – its shaping is (was) sexist[164] and its functioning is tailored particularly to one gender – the male. A brief outline

164 The concept of sexism does not encompass only one dimension of social activity; it is – similarly as racism – a wider concept in terms of content. Sexism is the term denoting the entirety of beliefs, views, patterns of activity, and practical everyday activity, which are based on the strict distribution of activities between the genders and attribute particular unequal characteristics based on gender (Jogan, 2001: 1).

of the type of organization of society, which has prevailed in (in Western society) for several thousands of years, is therefore necessary in order to understand the contemporary phenomenon of gender discrimination.

Though many outer manifestations of the male-centric culture are less visible or no longer exist in the contemporary world, that does not mean that androcentrism[165] has been eliminated. Androcentrism as the spiritual basis of regulating everyday life and as the binding element of human relations is extremely resilient, complex, and all-permeating in its routines. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one can only speak of the early phase of the erosion of this type of sexism. This erosion is by no means a consequence of some 'natural' evolution or automatic moral conversion of the holders of top positions, but the result of the sustained and strenuous organized activity of primarily the subordinate gender in the last two decades and especially in the recent ten years of the twentieth century.

It cannot be at all surprising if (and when) new indicators of the effects of the former distribution of work, which undoubtedly cannot be understood merely as some coincidental leftover, are discovered. The distribution of work and the gender-specific personality characteristics have always been (in all systems of government) strictly delimited, reinforced, and controlled so that the public sphere and the hierarchically higher position and the superior role were assigned to men not only in the public but also in the private sphere. All benefits are (were) institutionally ensured to men, though unequally according to their social position, to which the American sociologist Messner (1997: 59), among others, draws attention.

Socially necessary and permanent activities, which ensuring the existence of the individual and the species, were labelled as female work and were less valued compared to public (male) activities. Emphasizing the advantages of women's activity and their characteristics served as a justification for the instrumentalization of women and their exclusion from the public sphere. Women were assigned the role of a domestic(ated) creature, who is ('in

165 The concept of 'androcentrism' is more appropriate than 'patriarchate' (which is still used by many female and male sociologists), because it encompasses the entire male gender, regardless of the paternal role; men had certain advantages over women as the members of the gender whether they were fathers ('patriarch') or not.

her nature') primarily a mother and a housewife as well as the mediator of (gender-unequal) patterns of upbringing. Generally, it was desired and necessary that women behaved as instruments – as 'walking tools', but even as tools, they were verbally restricted. The image of concentrated feminine sexuality ('the sinner'), which functioned as guidance for the internalization of the first socially beneficial role, represents the opposite of the role of the desexualized woman-mother (and domesticated servant), who is responsible for 'creating people', in the Western civilization. Similarly as the male advantages, the female disadvantages are (were) institutionally safeguarded and unequally extensive with regard to social position (Jogan, 1990: 33–45).

The last decades of the twentieth century have been particularly characterized by the dominance of the unbalanced social and cultural determinants of everyday life, which presents a particular, additional burden to those assuming new, untraditional roles. This burden is, of course, again unequally distributed: while with women, the material and moral overburdening is most frequent (the "double" or even "triple" role), moral overburdening is more present with men.[166] As a rule, women entered the public sphere according to the addition principle (= traditional + new role), meaning that their integration into the public sphere was conditional. This simply means that women can be publicly active in various areas under the condition that they are aware of their primary role (in the private sphere).

This model of the female social role is still – despite some changes – quite strongly rooted as the more or less self-evident assumption regarding the entire organization of life. The realization that the women's entering into public activity was not (and is not) accompanied by the men's equally extensive entering into the private sphere is being established in contemporary times. The addition principle as the self-evident imperative of the organization of life does not generally apply to men. And the (still rare) individuals who begin to fulfil the new role, often receive notably negative moral "rewards" in the form of mockery and humiliation in imbalanced circumstances. Such rewarding roots in the institutional order, which does

166 An example of this is the mockery and obstruction of those men, who want to divide the parental leave with the mother and exceed the number of days, which are designated to men and not transferable.

not yet sufficiently include the redistribution principle, according to which both genders have evenly assigned responsibilities and duties in all areas of activity – from partnership, family to ‘high’ state and world politics.

Due to the above described gap between the female and male patterns of activity and of personal identity, most women encounter the tension, which is maintained on the one hand by the notion of independence and autonomy supported by the legal acknowledgment of equality, and on the other by the actually worse position (overburdening) in the distribution of all necessary existential work. But the elimination of this tension (and conflicts) does not only depend on the individual’s non-sexist orientation and the willingness to change, but on the simultaneous effects of all elements of the “objective” institutional organization.[167]

In order to understand the contemporary characteristics more easily, it is necessary to know how the androcentric order with the included division of spheres and social roles as well as personal identities has been established throughout the centuries. This process is illustrated by the Figure 1.

Figure 1 – The reproduction of the androcentric social order



Source: Jogan (2001: 2).

167 It is worth mentioning the fact that the sociologist Georg Simmel wrote down the equation ‘objective = male’ already in 1911. Decades long, no one in sociology or in other social sciences took an interest in this honest scientific finding, or rather, admission.

Considering the complexity and durability[168] of the institutional effects on the shaping of gender-different identities and roles, it is no coincidence that a variety of indicators, which show that women are deprived (discriminated against) in various areas of public activity. While women became more educated in the second half of the twentieth century, their deprivation can be seen primarily in their low participation in political activity. But that is the precise area, which is decisive for the determination of the crucial primary (legal) basis for the organization of everyday life.

The insufficient representation (underrepresentation) of the female gender in political activity is a world phenomenon and reflects both in the proportion of women in parliaments, governments, and other decision-making bodies in individual countries, as well as in the neglect of those social issues, which are seen as publicly unimportant because of being perceived as the women's 'authority' and are therefore pushed away to the private sphere by statesmen. The exclusion of women from politics is often also justified with their special 'nature' (identity), implying they are too emotional, not enough rational, and above all, that the "gentle sex has to be 'protected' from the harshness of politics.

It is therefore certainly not a coincidence that women had to struggle for a long time for the basic civil political rights, such as the right to vote (after that right had already been acknowledged to men), in all social environments. The struggle lasted for decades and in some areas they still do not have that right. In Slovenia, a good forty years passed (from 1902 to 1942 in the liberated territory and in 1946 with the federal and Slovene constitution) between the first clear demands for the right to vote and the statutory right.

168 Religious explanations, or rather churches, have practically had the monopoly role in the shaping of the female identity and the social role of women through the centuries. Focusing only on the most significant world religions, one can notice that women are strictly defined as dependent on men (the father, the husband and the son) in 'sacred' texts everywhere, and therefore as obedient and subordinate (Smrke, 2000: 83, 175; Jogan, 1986a, Jogan, 2005). Despite some differences in the religious doctrines and practices regarding the attitude towards women within individual religions, which can affect the level of actual gender inequality (e.g. in Christianity, the Catholic orientation has a more hostile attitude than the Protestant - Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 108–113); religious explanations are a convenient and established means for defending the andocentric tradition. In the time of secularization, the role of religions was partly overtaken (especially) by social science (Jogan, 1990: 46–68, 151–189). But in the last two decades, the fundamentalist movements of some religions (particularly Islam and Christianity) have become very active again.

The acquisition of political rights is (was) therefore not some evolutionary circumstance, which was created by 'modernization' on itself, nor is (was) it a gift of the kind-hearted holders of social power and authority. In view of the complex interrelation between the entire social activity and the 'male norm' and bearing in mind the domination of the traditional division of labour, it is understandable that the legal determinations of the political right of women is the first crucial condition for a fuller integration of women into political decision-making. If these rights are not supported by a comprehensive system of measures, which ensure and control their actual implementation, the established andocentric order continues to function.

An argument in favour of this realization provides the 'normal' of many 'old democracies', as well as the more recent historical experience of the post-socialist countries. With the elimination of socialist support measures, which contributed to a more extensive integration of women into political activity, the participation of women in political decision-making obviously lowered everywhere in the period of transition. (Antić, 2000: 127–139) In spite of the differences[169] in the development of Slovene society in the second half of the twentieth century, the same characteristics of 'modernization'[170] and 'Europeanization' have revelled themselves in Slovenia with the change of the political system as in "Eastern Europe": women were almost completely excluded from political activity, as their proportion in the National Assembly has decreased to less than ten percent (after the elections in 1996, the percentage was 7,8 %) and is increasing again extremely slowly (with the elections in 2004, the percentage of women rose to 12,2 %, remained at this level in 2008 and reached a third only at the early elections in 2011). The fact is that women already

169 An important advantage of Slovenia over other former 'real-socialist societies' is (was) the self-management socialist system, in which various forms of the "democracy from bottom" were developing in the seventies and the eighties, whose function included also the goal of greater gender equality (this could be seen also in the direct efforts to build kindergartens, senior homes, clinics, etc., as well as in the financial support – voluntary contributions of the citizens); and women began to participate increasingly more in political activity (in the political discourse of that time, the increase in political participation of women was achieved due to the "structure", which is basically the same as when it was expressed through 'quota').

170 Concerning gender inequality, it was primarily an attempt to nullify everything that had been already accomplished in the socialist period (an in some cases even before the issue became subject to public political discourse in "developed" European countries – particularly the EU – e.g. the issue of reconciling work and family, Jogan 2000: 9–30).

participated in the Republic Assembly with a proportion ranging from one quarter to even one-third (per individual Assembly) in the eighties. Scandinavian countries are nearing balanced participation, but Sweden already represents the model for countries around the world with its achieved gender-balanced participation.

Can women's entering into political activity bring anything new?

In view of the various efforts of the UN and other organizations to increase gender equality in all areas and at all levels in the contemporary world and bearing in mind the role of political decision-making, the question if and how would a higher number of women in the leading political positions even contribute to a change in (world) politics arises. The answers, which are based on individual examples of women in senior political in some countries[171] from the recent decades, are not uniform and also cannot be such. The contributions of women who are leading politicians range from those close to simplified expectations that all women are good on themselves and altruistic, to those which surpass the characteristics of the male leadership pattern (and thus actually nullify the need for increasing the number of women holding the leading positions in politics)[172]. This simple fact points out that the contribution of the leading women in political decision-making cannot be separated from other determinants, such as class, race, religion, and other affiliations.

Despite the differences in the variety of the content regarding the political orientations of women in leading positions in politics, some studies have revealed particularities of female activity, which are worthy of attention in general, but especially from the perspective of the regulation of cohabitation according to principles of sustainable (durable) development. According to the research data of the study on the political elites in twenty-

171 Women in leading positions are (were) an extremely rare occurrence. For instance, in 1980, there were only five women among the 1000 leaders in the world. In the recent decades (from 1960, when Sirimavo Bandaranajke became the leader of a modern country, to 2006 inclusively) there were only 30 women in such positions (minister presidents or presidents of the state) (Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 80–85).

172 Margaret Thatcher could serve as an example of a female leader, who actually seemed very masculine. She had many known monikers, e.g. »Maggy Thatcher the Milk Snatcher« (because she made an effort to cancel milk lunch in schools). More on differently oriented female leaders in Paxton and Hughes (2007: 90–96).

seven industrialized countries from the end of the twentieth century (Vianello and Moore, 2004), women are less market-oriented than men and more in favour of state measures for a more equitable distribution of resources, more democratic and equality-oriented, as well as more sensitive to discrimination; and according to the study from the USA (Conover and Sapiro in Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 95), American female leaders are less in favour of the USA participating in military interventions in the twentieth century.

The following data also shows that women in senior political positions are less aggressive (what is otherwise an expected characteristic of male politicians): in ten international crises between 1960 and 1990, which also hit countries with women in the leading positions, female leaders never caused the crisis (Caprioli and Boyer in Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 95). It is worth to learn about this experience, because even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the viewpoint that "men are better political leaders" than women is most widely accepted – among all western, industrialized countries – precisely in the USA (according to the data of the World Values Survey, 2000, in Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 115–116).

In spite of the orientation of women in leading positions in political decision-making, most "newcomers" - novices face various obstacles. The more difficult position is also characteristic for women, who entered the relatively young Slovene diplomacy as active holders. This position of women in the diplomatic organization at home as well as in missions abroad is additionally burdened by the characteristics, which derive from the "youth" of Slovene diplomacy itself and the manner of managing this activity. The correlation between several factors of unequal gender position of gender in Slovene diplomacy has been revealed also by the study entitled Equal Opportunities in Slovenian Diplomacy (Jazbec et al., 2009).[173]

173 The study was conducted by the Sector for Policy Planning and Studies within the MFA of the Republic of Slovenia in cooperation with the Institute for Slovene Emigration Studies within the Scientific Research Center of the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts from November 2008 to February 2009. Dr. Milan Jazbec, Dr. Marina Lukšič Hacin, Žiga Pirnat and Milena Stefanović Kajzer participated in the study, which was carried out in two phases: first, the differentiating factors, both in the MFA as well as when working abroad, were determined through interviews (with 11 diplomats, 5 male and 6 female); in the second phase, a survey was conducted, in which 37,3 % of all employees in the internal and external service of the

Among the many findings, the following are particularly important from the perspective of the genders:

- More than half (57,8 %) of all the respondents have already experienced “tangible discrimination due to gender or other reasons” (Jazbec et al., 2009: 47), the proportion rises with age in both genders, but a difference is apparent (which is statistically not typical, but nevertheless obvious), as 61,9 % of all women and 50,5 % of all men have already encountered discrimination. 42,2 % of all respondents answered with “NO”.
- The proportion of those who have already encountered sexual harassment in the workplace is large (28,2 %), but among them are twice as many women (35,4 %) as men (17,0 %) (Jazbec et al., 2009: 58).
- 68,8 % of all respondents are convinced that women have bigger problems with reconciling their professional and private life due to their gender (Jazbec et al., 2009: 57–58); but within this category are 86,0 % of all women and 43,5 % of all men (which is a statistically typical link). The proportion of those (1,3 %), who believe that men have bigger problems, is insignificant. 29,9 % of the respondents of either sex chose a negative response to this question.
- Statistically typical differences exist between the genders with regards to the assessment of the length of the workday and the manner of communicating (too male/female): a longer workday is a greater obstacle for women than men; communication, which is too male, also presents an obstacle.
- The determination of the characteristics of a ‘successful diplomat’ shows a stereotypical notion, because a successful diplomat is more a man than a woman (Jazbec et al., 2009: 60).
- The likelihood of being promoted is smaller for the female gender than the male despite the immense importance informally acknowledged criteria for promotion (e.g. connections to important politicians or diplomats, party affiliation), (Jazbec et

MFA participated (N = 235: 55,3 % women, 40,4 % men; 4,3 % n. a.).

al., 2009: 98). Put simpler, 'glass elevators' are often used when promoting men.

- The acknowledgement of 'occupational requirements' (which is actually self-evident for professional jobs, e.g. in the field of construction engineering, medicine, etc.) is 'in rule not exercised' in diplomacy, which is why women can be disadvantaged (despite their adequate or even higher education) (Jazbec et al., 2009: 99).

The EU's political orientation includes the implementation of the equal opportunities policy in all areas and at all levels of activity, therefore the revealed obstacles for women (and in some instances also for men) were followed by a package of proposal on the measures in order to improve the state. The most significant is the reduction of the influence of individuals on the decision-making process and the increase of the automatisms, which are established through acts, followed by:

- the organization of kindergartens and afternoon day care for the children of employees,
- the change in the general mentality/elimination of stereotypes, and
- the implementation of positive discrimination against women (Jazbec et al., 2009: 69).

The fact that the Department for Education, Family Policy and Career Planning has already began operating within the Personnel Service of the MFA of the Republic of Slovenia, signifies that the proposals for the measures will not remain at the level of recommendations and that the efforts to improve the status of women will continue in view of the general social changes for the elimination of gender discrimination (Jazbec et al., 2009: 82).

The findings on more serious monitoring and provision of equal opportunities (and equal results) for women and men in all spheres of life and work has become one of the priority issues of world politics and – often also as a consequence of this fact – more or less part of political activity of individual countries and unions of states. The UN and especially some of its bodies have played an important role in raising the awareness regarding social equality between the genders in the world.

International organizations and the elimination of discrimination against women[174]

The beginnings of international action

The elimination of the subordinate position of women has become one of the goals of the advanced social movements in the nineteenth and especially in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, many countries are still far from harmonizing the relationships between the sexes in the twenty-first century. Social, cultural and economic circumstances, in which human rights were implemented and developed very differently, have affected the social position of women throughout history. Their subordinate position was justified as the consequence of the natural, or rather biological, difference between the genders. Women were presented as the representatives of nature, as the universe of the things to which women belong. They have been the 'nature mother' thought history – either nature with the idealized attribute of purity or nature in its perverted (erotic) sensuality. Women are always presented as the imperfect humans (Rener, 1987).

The path from the explicit subordination and androcentrically-determined second-ratedness to equal rights and equality of opportunity began with the French bourgeois revolution.[175] More effective efforts for women to enter the sphere of public activity and public life continued in the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Countries gradually began to amend their legislations and treat women as equal members of society[176] under the influence of advanced social movements of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it was not until the thirties of the twentieth century that equality began to be perceived as a need, which has to be transformed from an idea into action, or rather from programme objectives of political parties into written, obligatory norms of national and international law.

174 Prepared by Milena Stefanović Kajzer.

175 Women publicly demanded equality for all people regardless of gender at the end of the eighteenth century. The Girondists and the Jacobin Club rejected their demands and Olympe de Gouges, the author of the Declaration of the Right of Woman and the female Citizen (1791), was beheaded.

176 The first countries to declare the principle of gender equality in their constitutions were: Luxemburg, in the constitution from 1867 (Article 52); Colombia, in the constitution from 1886 (Article 15); Australian, in the Constitution of Commonwealth from 1900 Articles 16 and 34), and – at the beginning of the Second World War – the Dutch Constitution in 1915 in Articles 83, 85, 87, 91 (Čok, 1963).

The Organization of American States (OAS) was the first international organization to establish a commission on women. The Member States adopted the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1933).[177] The US Congress had previously already amended its Constitution with the Nineteenth Amendment, which stipulates that "the right of US citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the US or by any state on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation". The Constitution of the USSR from 1936 was very advanced in this area: "…women have an equal right as men to vote and stand as a candidate".

The League of Nations (LN) discussed the issue of the legal status of women several times between the years 1934 and 1938. The organization began to accelerate the discussion on the regulation of the status of women in public and private law more systematically in 1935 through the separately established Council. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome conducted one of the first studies on the status of women in private law[178] on the basis of the efforts of the LN (Osmanczyk, 1990). The International Labour Organization (ILO) was also very active during this period. Since the beginning of its operation, it has focused also on the regulation of the working conditions of women, particularly on the status of pregnant women and women after childbirth, the protection of women regarding night work and women working in health hazardous and life threatening work places. The ILO therefore adopted a few important conventions concerning solely the regulation of women's rights already at its first few meetings. One of these conventions is the Convention (No. 3) on the Employment of Women Before and After Childbirth (1919),[179] which was amended by the Convention No. 103 (1952)[180] and by the Convention No. 183 (2000).[181] The key objective of the Convention is that

177 *Convention on the Nationality of Women***,** 1933, signed 26 June in Montevideo, entered into force 29 August 1934.

178

179 *Convention (No. 3) on the Employment of Women Before and After Childbirth*, 1919, signed 29 November in Washington, entered into force 13 June 1921.

180 *Revised Convention (No. 103) on the Employment of Women Before and After Childbirth*, 1952, signed 28 June in Geneva, entered into force 7 September 1955.

181 *Revised Convention (No. 183) on the Employment of Women Before and After Childbirth*, 2000, signed 15 June in Geneva, entered in force 7 February 2002.

each woman, who is in an employment relationship, is entitled to a period of maternity leave of no less than fourteen weeks[182].

The most extensive, thorough and, above all, effective campaign concerning the regulation of the international status of women began after the founding of the UN.

The regulation of the legal status of women as part of human rights

At the time of the founding of the UN, obvious gender inequality was both a fact and a general rule. The UN began its important and extensive work regarding the regulation of human rights at the beginning of its operation; the first phase included the elimination of various circumstances, which contribute to the creation and reproduction of gender differences. Experts have identified precisely gender-based discrimination as the most characteristic feature of social inequality of the twentieth century. The assumption that gender can be decisive in the selection of candidates for a particular post or in other similar situations more than contradicts the principles of equality and human rights.

In accordance with the set objectives of – among other topics – eliminating also the sexist patterns of behaviour at the level of rules, two documents were adopted in the first five years of the operation of the UN, namely the Charter of the UN (1945)[183] and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN GA, 1948)[184], both of which introduced an innovation into the former prevailing notion of human rights and the legal status of women – the standpoint that the state of human rights in one country is of legitimate concern to all. Both documents provided the basis for the further development of the protection of the individual. Before, the relationship of the state towards the individual, or rather the citizens, was – with a few exceptions – strictly the domain of individual states and in no way the subject of interstate relations.

182 With the Convention from the year 2000, the number of weeks of maternity leave was extended from twelve to fourteen. Only twenty-two countries ratified the Convention by November 2011, among them also Slovenia.

183 *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, signed 26 June at San Francisco, entered into force 24 October 1945.

184 UN GA, 1948. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948, RES. UN GA 217 A (III), adopted 10 December in New York.

The UN declared equality between men and women already in the UN Charter, in which (Chapter I, Article I, The Purposes of the United Nations) the objective that justifies all later efforts for the elimination of discrimination is emphasized: "… to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, an in promoting and encouraging respect of human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion … ." Article 8 of the UN Charter expresses openness towards both sexes: "The UN shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs." This article signifies the acknowledgment of equal right for women – the right to vote and stand as candidate for the highest political functions in this international organization. The previous actions of the ILO also contributed to this, which will be discussed more thoroughly later on. Despite its clear policy, it should be stressed that the UN GA has still not had a 'female General Secretary' after more then half a century of the UN's operation.

The UN has constantly worked towards the achievement and implementation of human rights. Numerous resolutions, declarations, conventions, and agreements have been adopted with the aim of improving the individual's status and the status of the community. Aside from including the notions of complete gender equality into the documents, which are important for the development of the international community, the UN formed particular views and decisions and determined the measures, which were to influence the elimination of gender discrimination and advance equality between men and women. The ECOSOC was therefore authorized to, among other things, provide recommendations, which would ensure the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the first meeting of the ECOSOC in 1946, the Commission on Human Rights was established and, within it, the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women. The Sub-Commission was renamed the Commission on the Status of Women (UN Women, 2009) that same year and still operates under this name.

Many changes in the area of the promotion of women's rights and the elimination of discrimination were the result of the serious and hard work of the Commission on the Status of Women. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN GA, 1948) was a contributing factor as a starting point, which unambiguously prohibits any form of discrimination based on gender (Article 2). But the Declaration alone of course could not solve all of the issues concerning the legal status of women through its demands, placed on the international community. The Declaration provided the general framework and guidelines, which were to be the starting point for the drafting of the internal legislations of individual countries. It also emphasized that women should be given an equal status as men and that the then existing basis for discrimination should be rejected. Furthermore, all other issues were to be resolved on the common basis of human rights. Equality between men and women in marriage, which is defined by the Declaration and was not regulated until then in most legal systems, is extremely important (Article 16)[185]. It has to be stressed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged in the specific circumstances after the Second World War, when measures had to be taken in order to restore human dignity and the faith in a better future of every individual. At the same time, the growing divide between the two ideological–political blocs in the time of the Cold War reflected foremost in the area of human rights and freedoms, their respect and implementation.

It is needless to emphasize that the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are unevenly implemented in the contemporary world. Nevertheless, the importance of the Declaration and its influence on the further development of events regarding the advancement of the individual's status in the last sixty years have been immense. Its content was the starting point for numerous activities of the UN and for many adopted international conventions, with which the signatory states assumed new and more precisely defined obligations concerning the promotion, implementation, and protection of human rights and freedoms.

Other acts, which regulate the legal status of women as part of human rights, have contributed to the advancement of the elimination of

185 Article 16: "… Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.".

discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was amended by two covenants, which were adopted later: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)[186] and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)[187]. They contain special provisions, which provide procedures for the implementation of human rights that were already devised in the Universal Declaration as well as the necessary sanctions for violations. This was also the main reason why some UN member states were hesitant about signing these very binding documents, which delayed the ratification processes. Both documents explicitly demand equality between men and women as well as women's rights in particularly sensitive segments, but above all the equal right of women to equally enjoy all forms of civil and social rights. The rights that certainly stand out are: the right to just and favourable conditions of work (Article 3, Part III) and the right to paid maternity leave (Article 10, Part III).

It is clear from what has been already said that the international instruments mentioned so far equally apply to both women and men. These are notably universal international human rights instruments, which directly regulate women's rights. Some areas, in which discrimination against women is particularly explicit, were addressed separately by the competent UN bodies and specialized agencies. The fact that discrimination against women has become a problematic phenomenon all over the world has lead to the special regulation of the legal status of women, or rather, of individual categories of human rights by the UN at the beginning of the fifties. Thus emerged international conventions and other UN legal acts, the implementation of which should facilitate the elimination of discrimination.

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186 *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, 1966, RES. UN GA 2200A (XXI), adopted 16 December, entered into force 3 January 1976.

187 *International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights*, 1966. RES. UN GA 2200A (XXI), adopted 16 December, entered into force 23 March 1976.

The legislative activities of the UN in the area of regulating individual rights

The promotion of women's rights with the aim of achieving actual equality demands many various instruments and strategies, whereby the rights protected in legal documents represent a particularly important basis. The documents adopted internationally – often after years of persistent convincing and lobbying – are highly significant.

The legislative activity of the UN was particularly effective between the years 1952 and 1979, when major conventions, which apply directly to women's rights, were adopted. The initially adopted conventions on individual rights were important for the legal status of every individual: political rights, the regulation of the issue of nationality and marriage. At the same time, the Commission on the Status of Women produced recommendations for the improvement of the status of women in the area of economic rights and private law, while also striving to generate interest in women to participate more in vocational, technical, and educational programmes. Recommendations regarding how to enable women to receive higher education were provided and it was demanded that mothers have the same rights as fathers in raising children. The Commission on the Status of Women focused its activities on the preparation of new international instruments from the beginning, which resulted in three conventions: the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952), the Convention on the Civil Rights of Women (1957), and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962).

The regulation of general civil and political rights – the struggle for the right to vote, the regulation of the issue of nationality and the activities of the UN in the field of private law

An insight into the genesis of the struggle for women's suffrage reveals that these struggles were long and complex as well as the cause of a series of political disagreements, which led to a social split. At least three should be briefly mentioned: 1) the split within the ruling bourgeois class into the liberal supporters of women's right to vote and those who strongly opposed it; 2) a similar split within the organized movements into those who categorically denied women's right to vote or opportunistically sacrificed it and those who struggled for it; 3) the split between women themselves into those who rejected the right to vote or were content with their work as a compromise and those who demanded the right to vote without any particularities (Rener, 1987).

The intensity of the struggles for women's suffrage and the time of its recognition differ in individual countries. The extension of the right to vote at the local level represents the first success at the state level. The period of acquisition of the right to vote can be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, or rather, until the First World War. This phase began with the acknowledgement of the right to vote in New Zealand in 1893 and continued in Australia in 1902; then followed Finland in 1906 and Norway gradually from 1910 to 1913. The second phase began with the First World War and lasted until the end of the Second World War. The notion of the natural inferiority of women had therefore changed greatly under the influence of the First World War and this change crucially affected the acknowledgement of the right to vote in many countries.[188] The majority of women gained universal suffrage in the third phase, which began after the Second World War and is still underway, as women have yet not achieved the right to vote in Saudi Arabia, partially Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates[189]. Even in Europe, women achieved the right to vote only in 1984 in the Principality of Lichtenstein. The provision of equal rights to all regardless of gender was approached in an organized

188 A few US states (twelve) extended the right to vote and to stand as a candidate to women already in 1914. Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, and the USSR also declared themselves in favor of the acknowledgment of this right. Canada even adopted the Wartime Elections Act and the Military Voters Act, under which women employed in the army had the right to vote, which was limited to wartime. This "temporary rule" was introduced into Canadian domestic law in 1918, which meant that all women of full of age gained the right to vote. UK acknowledged universal suffrage for women over thirty. Luxemburg acknowledged this right that same year, followed by a few more countries in 1919: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Germany. Moreover: USA fully regulated the issue of women's right to vote in 1929, Sweden between the years 1918 and 1931, followed by Hungary, Belgium, Ecuador, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Brazil, Thailand, Uruguay, Cuba, Turkey, India, and the Philippines (Stefanović Kajzer, 1993: 29–30).

189 The Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah granted the right to vote to women in 2011, which they can exercise at the next local elections. Women will also be able to stand as candidate for the consultative parliament - the Shura, at its next appointment.

manner with the establishment of the UN, the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women. A consequence of these efforts was the already mentioned Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952),[190] which had the purpose of ensuring political rights to women on equal terms as men[191] – the right to vote and to stand as a candidate.[192] Through its mechanism, the UN encouraged countries to sign the Convention, which at the time signified notably a step forward or a starting point for the countries that were undergoing reforms of the legal system in order to achieve equality between men and women after the Second World War.

The issue of the nationality of married women or the effect of marriage on the change of nationality is relatively more recent. To substantiate this view, it can be said that the institution of nationality is an innovation of modern time. Regardless of the fact that a number of countries has amended their laws or regulations on nationality so far and adopted the principles of independence of the nationality of women at the same time, one can conclude that there has been no consistency in the process of resolving this issue. Due to this fact, international instruments (e.g. bilateral agreements) began to be used with the aim of lowering the number of stateless persons or persons with multiple nationalities. One could argue that these were the precise reasons led to countries taking an organized approach to resolve the issue of nationality at an international level.

Thus the LN registered ten bilateral agreements in the area of regulation of nationality between the World Wars, including those, which regulate the issue of the effect of marriage on the nationality of a woman (two agreements). The Convention on Nationality of Women (1930) was adopted

190 *Convention on the Political Rights of Women.* 1952. RES. UN GA 6490 (VII), adopted 20 December in New York, entered into force 7 July 1954. The UN GA adopted Convention based on the recommendation by the Commission on the Status of Women. The SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) ratified this convention on 26 April 1954; the Republic of Slovenia notified the convention on 6 July 1992.

191 Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention stress that women should be enabled "to vote in all elections" and "on equal terms as men."

192 Two practical examples are interesting from the history of gaining the right to vote. In Egypt, women could be elected to all public offices without having the right to vote. A similar phenomenon was present in France during the time when French women did not have the right to vote. In 1936, three women were appointed as state secretaries and therefore entered the 'world of men'(Stefanović Kajzer, 1993: 34).

at the International Conference for the Coordination of International Law in Hague 1930, which applied also to the contradictions in the legal regulation of women's civil rights. On the initiative of some of the member states of the UN, the General Secretary later invited nine international women's associations to cooperate, which then founded the World Committee on the Regulation of the Issue of Nationality. The LN adopted the first Convention,[193] which declared the principle of equality between the genders in the area of regulating nationality, under the influence of this Committee on 26 December, 1933. Another convention was adopted that same year, which represents an improvement to the already existing Convention. The UN took regard of precisely the principles of these two conventions as the starting point for the regulation of the issue of the nationality of married women. After a period of complex and extensive work, the Commission on the Status of Women achieved the adoption of the proposal for the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957)[194] by the UN GA on 20 February 1957. The Convention contains – aside from the main objective of ensuring the right to nationality to all in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – also a particular 'safeguard' in its provisions, due to which it did not completely fulfil expectations. Article 3 states that the "grant of nationality may be subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the interest of national security or public policy". Providing the principle of state sovereignty is disregarded, one can say that the possibility of referring to national interests led to the disregard of the main principle of this Convention and to the differences in the regulation of the nationality of married women in national legislations.

The Commission on the Status of Women established at the very beginning of its operation that thorough changes in the field of private law were necessary in view of the level of discrimination. The issue of regulating marriage, custody, nationality, legal capacity, and domicile were chosen as the focus of its activity at the Commission's second meeting in 1948. Based on research data, the Commission on the Status of Women

193 Laws Concerning Nationality, UN, New York, 1954: 568–528.

194 The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women was ratified by 74 countries by November 2011 the Republic of Slovenia notified it on 6 July 1992.

concluded that the phenomenon of polygamy[195] and child marriage still exists in practice regardless of domestic legislations. Between 1958 and 1960, the Commission dealt with the problem of setting the minimum age for marriage. The result of these efforts is the adoption of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962)[196] and of the Recommendations to the said Convention (UN GA 1965)[197] in 1965. The aim of the Convention was to ensure equality between spouses within the framework of state legislation (internal law). At the same time, these measurers represent the first international legal acts regarding the regulation of women's rights in the area of marriage, adopted by the UN.

From the Declaration[198] on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women to the Convention[199] – The organized regulation of women's rights and joint efforts by the Commission on the Status of Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

In 1967, the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women was adopted after a short delay in the work of the Commission on the Status of Women. It represents the starting point for a more organized approach to the advancement of the status of women and the elimination of all forms of discrimination. Despite the UN instruments and the campaigns of its specialized agencies, it became clear that a wide gap still exist between the declared rights and the actual life of most women. UN member states are at different stages of economic development and have different cultures, traditions, and political systems. It was therefore necessary to devote much effort in order for such different

195 Polygamy – marriage between one person and several persons of the opposite sex; there is a distinction between polygamy or the practice of having more than one wife and polyandry or the practice of having more than one husband (Leksikon Cankarjeve Založbe, 1988).

196 *Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages*, 1962, RES. UN GA 1763 A (XVII) adopted 7 November, entered into force 19 June 1964. 55 countries ratified it by November 2011. The Federative Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the Convention on 19 June 1964.

197 UN GA. 1965. RES. 2018 (XX), adopted 1 November.

198 *Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women*, 1976, UN GA RES 2263 A (XXII), adopted 7 November 1967.

199 *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*, 1979, RES UN GA 34/180, adopted 18 December, entered into force 3 September .

countries to adopt uniform principles in resolving the status of women in social and family life. They reached an agreement on the acknowledgment of political rights quickly, whereas in other particular situations of discrimination – such as the question of marriage, the rights within the family and at the workplace – much patience and coordination in different UN bodies was needed to ensure a minimum consensus. Because of this, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women necessarily represented a minimum for some countries and a development programme for others.

The reports on the world social status at the end of the seventies indicated that the situation was worsening despite the efforts of the international community. The Commission for Social Development and the Commission on the Status of Women quickly drafted proposals for countries on how to include women in national and international development programmes and consequently facilitate development and enable women to benefit from its results. With Resolution 3010, the UN GA proclaimed the year 1975 as the International Women's Year, which was dedicated to the campaign for the advancement of equality between men and women, the provision of women's full integration into joint development efforts, and promotion of women's involvement in strengthening world peace.

In Resolution 3520 from 1975, which was adopted by the first World Conference of the International Women's Year in Mexico City, the UN GA gave its support to the action plan for fulfilment of the objectives of the International Women's Year and at the same time proclaimed the years between 1976 and 1985 as the UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace. For the first time in history, more than 6000 representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGO) attended the forum, which took place along with the conference. The documents adopted at this immensely important conference reflected the progress already made in the approach and understanding of the causes of gender-based discrimination, but the evolution concerning the proposed ways, which should lead to positive changes, is particularly noticeable.

This decade was certainly primarily characterized by the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (1979),[200] which, above all, defined the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights more precisely from the aspect of women's rights. This Convention is without doubt an important milestone in the area of protecting women's human rights at the international level, but the Optional Protocol to this Convention (1999)[201], which allows the submission of individual claims of violation of rights protected under the Convention, represents another step forward.

Among the obligations imposed on the contracting states by the Convention are also the following: to formulate measures and policies for the elimination of discrimination against women (Article 2), to adopt the legislation for the suppression of all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women (Article 6), to ensure to women the right to vote and to participate in governmental and non-governmental activities (Article 7), to grant women equal rights regarding their nationality and the nationality of their children. (Article 9), to ensure to women equal rights and access to education and employment (Article 10 and 11), to ensure to women equal access to health care and equality before the law (Articles 14 and 15).

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)[202] was established to monitor the progress in attaining the objectives of the Convention. The contracting states undertook to regularly report to the Committee on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures, which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Convention as well as on their progress in a timeline, determined by the Convention[203]. The Republic of Slovenia presented its third periodic report at the CEDAW 29th session, which took place from 30 June to 18 July,

200 According to official data, 187 countries ratified the Convention by November 2011. The Republic of Slovenia ratified it on 1 July 1992.

201 UN GA. 1999. RES 54 A (IV), adopted 6 October, entered into force 22 December. According to official data, 103 countries ratified the Optional Protocol by November 2011. The Republic of Slovenia ratified the Optional Protocol on 15 May 2005.

202 CEDAW is a professional body, established in 1982. It consists of 23 male and female experts on women's rights.

203 Article 18 of the Convention provides the timeline for the report by contracting states, which shall be submitted: a) within one year after entry into force for the state concerned; and b) at least every four years and further whenever the Committee so requests.

2003[204]. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women is one of the longest operating UN committees – it celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2007. The Committee's recommendations are among the key factors in the promotion of the status of women. The Committee was the first to provide recommendations regarding the protection against the HIV infection/AIDS and recommendations regarding the elimination of violence against women, equality in marriage and women's health rights. The election of Violeta Neubauer, the Coordinator of International Cooperation at the Office for Equal Opportunities of the Government of Slovenia, as member of the Committee[205], is immensely important for the Republic of Slovenia.

The Committee is authorized by the Optional Protocol to receive and consider the reports of the claimant country. The Protocol also allows the Committee to launch an investigation into mass and systematic violations of women's rights in a contracting state. It is very difficult to objectively assess the Convention's contribution to the changes in the status of women or its contribution in the sense of eliminating discrimination against women. The reports of the states parties to the Convention indicate that internal legislations are being amended according to the provisions of the Convention and that major campaigns have been carried out for the implementation of women's rights. But the reports also show that considerable differences still exist between the legal provisions and their actual implementation.

The second World Conference, held in Copenhagen in the middle of the UN Decade for Women (1980), adopted the Programme of Action for the Second Half of the Decade for Women, which was dedicated to the employment, health care, and education of women. The obstacles that made the integral developmental approach to the issues of the status and role of women in society impossible were thoroughly discussed at the conference. Because of the wide economic gap between wealthy and poor countries and the growing military and political tensions in the international community, many plans were not carried out during the Decade for Women.

204 The Republic of Slovenia submitted its fourth periodic report in 2007, which was not formally considered.

205 Violeta Neubauer became member of the Committee for four years on 1 January 2007.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)[206] is undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements of the decade. The main aim of establishing the Institute was to find ways to accelerate the advancement of the social status of women. The work of INSTRAW is directed towards the advancement of women through research, the training of human resources, and the provision of information in the sense of promoting women and their active participation in all dimensions of development. INSTRAW cooperates closely with the voluntary UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM),[207] which supports projects that contribute to greater gender equality by providing financial means and technical support.

The UN Decade for Women ended with the third World Conference in Nairobi, which evaluated the achievements of the Decade and adopted the Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000. Priority was given to "the particularly vulnerable and underprivileged groups of women". Regardless of the great significance of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, it was established in 1985 that the status of women in the world is deteriorating in most political systems. Revolutionary changes in science and technology caused a higher number of women to become employed in professions, which were previously unusual for women, as well as a rise in general and women's unemployment.

The unfavourable international situation had a crucial effect on the further steps and the delay in the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1967), which required more than a decade of strenuous work of the Commission on the Status of Women and CEDAW. The Declaration stresses, among other things, that violence against women constitutes a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and it precisely defines violence against women. The post of the Special Rapporteur was introduced within the framework of the UN in 1994. The Roman Statute of the International Criminal Court from the year 1998 also represents significant progress, as a number of forms of violence against women – including rape – were included in the

206 INSTRAW's seat is in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic.
207 UNIFEM's seat is in New York.

Statute as a war crime and a crime against humanity. The UN Resolution on the Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women[208] from 2003 without doubt additionally contributed to the protection of women's rights, because it already defines violence against women as "any act of violence against women, that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." The Resolution emphasizes the importance of breaking the silence around violence within society, notably the taboo of domestic violence, as well as the necessity of discussing violence against women from the perspective of women and striving to promote their status.

One of CEDAW's greater achievements is undoubtedly the fourth UN World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995. The Conference adopted the Beijing Declaration, with which the contracting states (among them also Slovenia) undertook to implement equal rights and inherent human dignity of women and men, ensure the full implementation of women's human rights of women and of the girl child, empower women and advance their status. The Conference also adopted the Platform for Action, which aims at accelerating the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women and removing all obstacles to women's active participation in all spheres of public and private life with a full and equal proportion in the economic, social, cultural, and political decision-making. Both documents were adopted by 189 countries, which is a consequence of the extensive work of the three previous conferences and, foremost, of the UN Decade for Women. The presence of numerous representatives of non-governmental organizations primarily signified that the international women's movement had developed and adopted a strategic approach to the formation of the international programme of action for making a change in the world of women.

On the basis of the commitments and the findings of the Beijing Conference, CEDAW adopted multiannual programmes of action for the period between the years 1997 and 2001 and between the years 2002 and 2006.[209] On the recommendation of the Commission on the Status of

208 UN GA, 2003, RES 58/147, adopted 22 December.
209 ECOSOC, 2001, RES 4, adopted 21 July; ECOSOC, 2005, RES E/CN.6/2005/2, adopted 7

Women, the UN GA dedicated the 23rd session (Beijing +5), which was held in the year 2000, to the issue of implementing the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action[210]. The Declaration and the further steps for the implementation of the Beijing commitments were adopted at this session. The UN GA considered the ten-year report on the implementation of the Beijing documents at the 49th session[211] (Beijing +10) and adopted the declaration, in which it urges international and regional organizations, all spheres of civil society, non-governmental organizations as well as men and women to be more decisive and engage in the implementation of the Beijing commitments. In March 2010, the UN GA considered the report on the implementation of said Beijing commitments (Beijing +15) at a special session.

Protection of women in the employment relationship

The ILO's statistical data[212] shows that the number of employed women has grown drastically in the last decade, while the American Bureau of Labour Statistics[213] foresees that the proportion of female labour force will increase slightly by the year 2018. It is expected that women will constitute 46,9 % of the world's labour force. This phenomenon crystallized the issue of women as workers. The fact that most women perform both professional duties and household chores and that they are often solely responsible for the family has increased their hours of work and had an indirect effect on their social status.

An important characteristic of "the world of employed women" is that their work is often considered as less valuable and thus paid accordingly. Women are still legally prevented from practicing certain professions and do not have equal opportunities for training and developing their talents. In many social systems, the nature of the jobs performed by women still reflects a clear distinction between "women's" and "men's" work. Though these differences are slowly fading, most women are still employed

December 2004.

210 The 23rd UN GA session took place under the slogan: "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 21st Century", New York, 5–9 June, 2000.

211 Considered at the 49th UN GA Session, 28 February–11 March, 2005, New York.

212 ILO, 2009.

213 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009.

in low-income professions or are in general paid less than their male colleagues.

It is without doubt that the ILO has contributed greatly to the regulation of many issues in the area of women's economic and social rights, which derive from the employment relationship, with its work over the years. Viewed historically, the Swiss National Council gave the initiative for an international conference on the issue of work at the end of the nineteenth century, where the ban on work in workplaces, which are harmful to health, for young persons and women and the restriction of night work of young persons and women were discussed among other topics. Though the German Emperor Wilhelm II rejected the initiative of the Swiss government, his fellow – German Bismarck – in fear of the organized working class – carried out the international conference on the advancement of the status of the working class a few years later, where the issue of women's work was also under discussion. No important improvements in the advancement of the status of workers were made at the conference, but it was significant as the first international meeting where the issue of women's work was discussed.

Right at the beginning of its operation, the ILO managed to adopt two conventions, which dealt with two issues, at the conference: the general ban of night work in industry for women and the ban on the use of white phosphorus in matchstick manufacturing. These conventions came into force in 1912 and were also important for Slovenia, most of which was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy - the ban on night work in industry for women[214] came into force that year in Slovenia. When child labour was restricted and partially also eliminated due to the strong intervention of the English working class and the proportion of women working in industry increased at the same time, employers focused on exploiting the remaining labour force, women in particular.

The ILO joined the international campaign aiming to eliminate extreme forms of exploitation of the female labour force. Among the many standards adopted by the ILO, which apply to female workers, three standards focus particularly on the elimination of discrimination against women by setting

214 More in: Kyovsky/Radovan, 1975: 18.

the economic and social standards for the evaluation of women's work. These are the following standards: 1. equal pay for work of equal value; 2. elimination of discrimination in employment practices; 3. social policy towards workers with family responsibilities. Other issues are addressed separately and apply to: 1. the night work of women; 2. women's work in workplaces, which are life-threatening and harmful to health; 3. maternity protection.

As part of its extensive work, the ILO adopted numerous conventions and recommendations for the special protection of women in the employment relationship. Considering that the topic of the protection of women covers many fields, only a few key issues regarding its regulation will be discussed, namely "equal pay for work of equal value" and the special social protection of women.

"Equal pay for work of equal value"

After women won their economic autonomy by gaining the right to work, they were still encountering numerous obstacles in the form of discrimination in all spheres, also at work. They strived to improve their working conditions and achieve the ban on night work as well as a shortened workday, and demanded many other improvements in the status of the working class. "Equal pay for work of equal value" was emphasized among this multitude of problems, which were presented to the international public. The issue became one of the central areas of the ILO's work. At the same time, the Commission on the Status of Women with the UN wrote down the following under the objectives of socio-economic nature at its first session in 1947: "Women must have equal rights as men regarding work, pay, leave, and other socio-economic norms."

The Convention (No. 100) on Equal Remuneration of Male and Female Labour Force for Work of Equal Value[215] was adopted at the 34th session of the international labour conference as the international instrument for the ultimate elimination of the differences in the remuneration of men and

215 *Equal Remuneration Convention (No.100)*, 1951, signed 29 June, entered in force 23 May 1953. The Convention was ratified by 168 countries. The Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the Convention on 15 June, 1952. The Republic of Slovenia notified the Convention on 29 May, 1992.

women. Aside from setting out the commitments of the states parties to the Convention to promote and guarantee the implementation of the “equal remuneration” principle into their national legislations, the Convention also succeeded in achieving a consensus on the means for accomplishing this objective. This is presented separately in paragraph 2 of Article 2[216]. Each state party to the Convention regulated “equal remuneration” in their own way through the national legislation. Although some countries included this principle in their constitutions, most regulate the issue with special laws.

Great differences still exist between the pay of men and women. Though some of these have diminished in the recent years, full equality of pay with men has yet not been achieved.[217] The increasing women’s employment has had little effect on the elimination of professional segregation, which is the basis of the unequal status of the genders. Women are mostly still employed in a limited range of professions and in positions with less responsibility and are therefore also paid less. A relatively low number of women – primarily from developed countries – acquires supervisory and management positions.

Special protection of women

The international community is making an effort to provide social security and special protection of women through various measures. The process of special protection of women is taking place in two forms: a) from the perspective of medical protection, it should create special working conditions according to women’s work capacities (the ban on night work, the ban on work in particular workplaces, special sanitary and technical protection, etc.); b) a specific form of protection, such as maternity protection or protection, which is closely related to the reproductive role of women (the protection of employed women before and after childbirth, maternity leave, etc.). Women’s role as mothers is one of the specific forms of the difference between the genders and requires special protection.

216 a) With national laws; b) with all other systems for the regulation of remuneration set forth or acknowledged by the national laws; c) with collective agreements between workers and employers; d) with a combination of these means.

217 In October 2011, the Finnish Centre for Statistics presented data, which shows that women in Finland continue to earn 18 % less than men for work of equal value (Helsinki Sanomat, 2012).

The ILO adopted the Night Work for Women Convention, (No. 4)[218] in 1919, which was amended twice – with the Convention (No. 41)[219] concerning Employment of Women during the Night in 1934 and with the Convention (No. 89)[220] concerning Night Work of Women Employed in Industry in 1948. The main principle of the Convention (No. 4) is: "Women without distinction of age shall not be employed during the night in any public or private industrial undertaking." Focusing solely on the 1948 Convention, it can be established that the Convention defines the term "night" very precisely: it signifies a period of at least seven consecutive hours between ten o'clock in the evening and seven o'clock in the morning and is prescribed by the competent authority. Perhaps this precision represented an obstacle for countries, which did not express wide support for the Convention or decide to accede to the its signing and ratification, but that does not mean they did not take the provisions and restrictions of the Convention into account in their national legislations.

Interestingly, the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the countries, which often received warnings regarding the violations of certain provisions from the ratified Convention, though statistical data showed that the number of women employed during the night was constantly growing. The Convention (No. 45)[221] concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work in Mines of all Kinds from 1935 is important for the regulation of the working conditions of women. The main principle of the Convention is: "No female, whatever her age, shall not be employed on underground work in any mine" (Article 2).

The type and level of vocational education is most important for the implementation of the "equal remuneration of women for work of equal

218 *Night Work (Women) Convention (No. 4.*), 1919, adopted 28 November, entered into force 12 June 1921. The Convention was ratified by 27 countries.

219 *Revised Night Work (Women) Convention (No. 41.*), 1934, signed 19 June in Geneva, entered into force 22 November 1963.The Convention was ratified by 16 countries.

220 *Revised Night Work (Women) Convention (No. 89*), 1948, signed 9 July in San Francisco, entered into force 27 February 1951. The Convention was ratified by 45 countries. The Protocol to the Convention was ratified by only three countries, namely India, Madagascar, and Tunisia. The Republic of Slovenia notified the Convention on 29 May 1992.

221 *Underground Work (Women) Convention (No. 45),* 1935, signed 21 June in Geneva, entered into force 30 May 1937. The Convention was ratified by 70 countries. The Republic of Slovenia notified the Convention on 29 May 1992.

value" principle. Many ILO recommendations were thus formed, for example the Recommendation (No. 57) concerning Vocational Training, which foresees equal rights of access to vocational training for both genders. The Recommendation also warns women about professions, which could be harmful to their health and advises them against them. A number of other Recommendations[222] have significantly contributed to a more organized approach to the regulation of women's rights in the employment relationship.

It has been already mentioned that maternity protection is a special form of protection of women and one of the more important international instruments for the regulation of the status of women in labour law. The ILO posed the question of maternity protection already in 1919. The Convention (No. 3)[223] concerning the Employment of Women Before and After Childbirth was adopted that same year and amended with the Conventions (No. 103 and No. 183)[224] concerning Maternity Protection in 2000. The key objective of the Convention is that every employed woman has the right to at least twelve weeks of maternity leave, which was then increased to fourteen weeks with the Convention from the year 2000. The Convention stipulates in Article 4: "While absent from work while on maternity leave in accordance with the provisions of Article 3, the woman shall be entitled to receive cash and medical benefits." The cash benefit cannot be lower than two thirds of her previous income and is provided by means of compulsory social insurance or public funds, which is determined by national laws so as to ensure the full maintenance of the mother and the child in hygienic conditions and at a suitable standard of living. The provision of Article 5 concerning women's entitlement to interrupt her work for the purpose of nursing, which has to be prescribed by national legislation, seems interesting.

222 For example No. 101 concerning Vocational Training in Agriculture; No. 45 concerning Unemployment among Young Persons; No. 83 concerning the Organization of the Employment Service.

223 *Maternity Protection Convention (NO. 3)*, 1919, signed 29 November in Washington, entered into force 12 June 1921. The Convention was ratified by 29 countries. The Republic of Slovenia notified the Convention on 29 May 1992.

224 The Convention 103 was ratified by 28 countries (The Republic of Slovenia notified it on 29 May, 1992), and the Convention 183 by 22 countries.

The Department of Women's Labour Issues was founded in 1976 within the ILO to resolve the very complex and difficult status of women at the international level. The Department coordinates the activities of the ILO regarding the work of women within the organization and out of it.

Equality in the field of education

Preventing education is not a consequence of the lack of access to schools but primarily of restrictive stereotypes regarding women's access to knowledge. The traditional link to the stereotypes in the upbringing of boys and girls is noticeable also in the field of education. Girls are mostly still being educated to practice "traditional" professions, such as those in the field of health care and education, or they become saleswomen, administrative personnel, workers in the textile industry, etc. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) deals with the issue of education at an international level. It cooperates with the ILO and the Commission on the Status of Women in the formulation of the strategies for the education of women and their integration into various educational programmes.

The adoption of the Convention against Discrimination in Education[225] in 1960 was most significant for the regulation of women's rights in the field of education. The Convention was aimed at the elimination of discrimination in education and the provision of equality of educational opportunity, regardless of differences based on race, gender, religious and political beliefs, social status, etc. The states parties to the Convention agreed to unify national laws and regulations to ensure equality of accesses to educational institutions. At the same time, the states undertook to develop a national policy, which will provide access to free basic education to everyone, regardless of the abovementioned differences. Article 7 of the Convention stipulates that the states are obligated to submit periodic reports to UNESCO on the measures they are taking in order to implement the provisions of the Convention. UNESCO has attempted to devise a strategy for the further changes in the field of education. A special commission,

225 *Convention against Discrimination in Education*, 1960, signed 14 December, entered into force 22 May 1962. The Convention was ratified by 97 countries. The Republic of Slovenia notified the Convention on 5 November 1992.

which handled various issues, including the resolving of disagreements between states parties to the Convention, was established with this aim on 10 December, 1962.

Thoughts on the future

Experience from practice around the world shows that the legal norms, which ensure equality, are not sufficient despite their significance. It is therefore necessary to continue to encourage not only regional campaigns for the elimination of gender inequality, but to also encourage individuals – both men and women, governmental and non-governmental organizations – to the joint regulation of conditions in all spheres of society in an even more organized manner. Among the reasons for the decreasing efficiency of the international mechanisms in the elimination of discrimination are notably: the complexity of the international community, the multitude of different cultures, enormous economic and social differences, differing interests of individual help centres, and, not lastly, the process of globalization, which has forced countries to compete for the primacy.

The issue of discrimination against women receives too little attention precisely because of numerous global problems, which pose a threat to world peace and order, as well as because of the constant hunger of individual lobbies (economic and political) to overtake the "leadership" in the international community. The ruthless competition for the domination on the energy market, where tensions between culturally and economically different countries are mounting, presents a threat to every individual. The accumulation of global problems and the new "battle grounds", which are emerging, are creating circumstances, in which human rights are easily violated, particularly the rights of the weaker members of society – children and women.

International organizations, specialized agencies and numerous civil movements face more challenges, which require an organized and systematic approach to the regulation of conditions, each day. The changed worldviews have fundamentally contributed to the emergence of modern values, which actually take the focus off of the individual's role in the era of high technology and communication. It can be presumed that the most productive era of the regulation of women's rights has already ended (towards the end of the twentieth century), because it will not be possible to achieve much more than what has already been achieved in such complicated international and economic circumstances.

The European Union: The integral strategy for the provision of gender equality[226]

The principle of gender equality – reduced to the economic dimension – was included in the programme of European integration already at its launch. As Roth concludes (2003: 66), the leading politicians of integration were partially under the influence of the ILO and the UN, which were already demanding equal pay for work of equal value. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (1957)[227] already stipulated this norm and therefore encouraged the efforts for the adoption of this principle and a wider legal regulation of equality in the member states. Economic reasons played a more important role here than gender equality – France enacted equality of pay already in 1940 and if other member states had not done the same, its competitiveness would have decreased.

The foundation for a wider legal regulation of equality in the EU was laid with this provision, though this was not an intentional consequence (Roth, ibid.). The Article nevertheless did not play an important role for almost two decades (Gerhard, 2003: 44). Only after it was invoked in cases of obvious discrimination (to which the female workers on strike in Belgium, for example, drew attention), the first Directive 75/117/EEC (Council of European Communities, 1975)[228] on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, was adopted and came into force in 1976[229].

226 Prepared by Maca Jogan.

227 *Treaty of Rome*, 1957, signed 25 Match in Rome, entered into force 1 January.

228 Council of European Communities, 1975, Directive 75/117/EEC, 10 February.

229 Article 1 of this Directive clearly defines the meaning of the "principle of equal pay", which was set forth in Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (elimination of gender discrimination in pay for equal work or work to which equal value is attributed) and further on the commitment of the member states to introduce the necessary measures for the implementation of said principle into their legislations (Article 2). The Directive also demands that all laws and regulations, which contradict this principle, are abolished or amended (Article 3) or that they are declared null (Article 4); the member states have the duty to protect employees by taking the necessary measures in cases of violations

Later, other directives followed, which contributed to the equalization of conditions in the workplace[230] and – according to the changes in the EU's strategy – also in other spheres of life. The Council Directive 2004/113/EC (Council EU, 2004)[231] (was to be included in the normative legislations by the member states no later than by the end of the year 2007), which is aimed at ensuring the basis for equal treatment between men and women and the elimination of gender discrimination, therefore precisely defines, among other issues, different forms of gender discrimination (direct and indirect) and harassment – including sexual harassment (Article 2, Equality…, 2006: 22).

The efforts for the equal status of women in the workplace strengthened in the seventies and eighties, but women in the EU were becoming dissatisfied with the achieved level of rights and therefore expanded the framework of political activity in the eighties and nineties and associated women's rights with human rights, which was becoming an increasingly popular framework. The EC reacted to this challenge by formulating and strengthening the policy on equal opportunities for both genders, which was more precisely defined.

A comprehensive legal basis for the provision of equality of opportunity and equality of treatment for both genders was formed through the *Treaty of Amsterdam* (1997),[232] which came into force on 1 May 1999. With this Treaty, the EU undertook to implement and encourage equality between men and women (Article 2) and to strive to eliminate inequality in all its activities and policies (Article 3). Aside from ensuring the full implementation of the gender equality principle into all EU activities (gender mainstreaming), the provisions of the Treaty also contain the adoption of measures for the elimination of discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, religion or other beliefs, disability, age or sexual

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of this legislation (Article 5) as well as to bring to their attention the appropriate regulations (Article 7) (Equality for women and men, EEC 2006: 67–68).

230 To mention just a few: Directive 76/207 EEC on Equal Treatment For Men And Women as regards Access to Employment, Promotion, and Working Conditions, Directive 96/34/EC on Parental Leave, Directive 97/80/EC on the Burden of Proof in Cases of Discrimination based on Sex.

231 Council EU, 2004, Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 13 December.

232 *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 1997, signed 2 October, entered into force 10 November 1997.

orientation by the member states (Article 13) and the commitment that the EU supports or supplements the measures of the member states for equal opportunities on the labour force market and for equality of treatment at work (Article 137).

Article 141, which stipulates that each member state must »ensure that the equal pay principle will be applied to employed men and women for equal work or work of equal value« is especially important in view of the significance of women's economic independence (Special measures ... 2003: 35). The provisions of the Treaty thus supplemented a number of special measures for the encouragement of equality (positive, incentive, and programme measures) with precisely determined responsible operators (»actors« – from employers to international organizations) and indicators (criteria) for assessing the implementation of equality and the elimination of discrimination, which were already adopted by the European Council on 13 December, 1984.

Several factors undoubtedly influenced the development of policies regarding gender inequality in the EU from the explicitly one-sided market orientation to the approach to all areas and levels of social activity. These factors range from the UN strategy to the efforts of various formal and informal groups and associations. Women's groups from Europe became more engaged in the work of the UN, particularly during the Decade for Women (1976–1985). The principle of gender integration was introduced into the developmental policy as an objective at the Nairobi World Conference (1985). This objective, which the member states have the duty to implement, was formally introduced into the final documents ten years later at the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995).[233]

In 1995, Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined the EU. Sweden[234] and Finland already had much experience with equality and the implementation

233 Based on the *Beijing Declaration*, the comprehensive activities are interpreted in detail in the Platform for Action (ECOSOC, 1996: 21–189).

234 Sweden can be used as an example for the achievement of greater gender equality in practice, which is based on the open rejection of the traditionally male-centric culture. Sweden adopted a new model of development after several years of discussions already at the end of the sixties. The basic premise of the model was that everyone – regardless of gender – should enjoy "equality of practical opportunity not only in education and employment, but also equality of responsibility in principle. Furthermore, the responsibility for childcare and homecare should be divided… Childcare should also reflect in a higher participation of men in the caretaking of children" (Jogan 1990: 129–130).

of the equal opportunities principle and therefore also had quite an effect on the development of the policies in the EU. To put it shortly, a change in the paradigm of EU policies occurred – the main aim of activity is no longer to help women adjust to male structures but to make gender specific structures more women-friendly. This can be achieved by making comprehensive changes of the institutional order to facilitate the implementation of the equal opportunities principle for both genders in all spheres and at all levels of activity. The principle became a fundamental principle of the EU's activity with the Treaty of Amsterdam after the intervention of the European Women's Lobby. Its implementation, which must be carried out in the member states, is supervised by the EU. The principle is also an integral part of *Acquis communautaire* and (was) therefore mandatory also for the new member states from the post-socialist community.

Two strategies for the elimination of inequalities supplement each other within the EU strategy since the principle of integration of equal opportunities for both genders has been adopted: gender-specific measures should support women by eliminating the existing inequalities, whereas the integration of equality of opportunity at all levels and in all spheres aims at the restructuring of institutions (gender mainstreaming). As S. Roth concludes (2003: 68), the first strategy type is "oriented backwards" and the second "towards the future". The assessment of potential (negative) gender-specific effects of individual measures in the phase of their formulation and the attempt to eliminate them already at this stage is also a component of the second strategy type[235].

The efforts to eliminate different types of gender inequality in Europe do not remain only at the level of written plans, resolutions, directives and recommendations[236] – these document themselves contain important

235 The acronym GIA (Gender Impact Assessment) stands for this process, which is used for assessing whether government policies are emancipative and non-discriminative. As an *ex ante* analysis, this means should help reveal possible discriminatory effects of individual political measures and facilitate their reduction or neutralization. The actual GIA instrument was first developed in the Netherlands (1994) as a result of the coordinated activity of the female and male feminist researchers and "femocrats", as well as parallel with the example provided by the assessment of the effect on the environment. The instrument was presented to the wider European professional public at the 3rd European conference on feminist research in Coimbra in 1997.

236 The key documents (or parts of them) are available in print in the vast publication (European Commission, 2006).

milestones, which concern the manner, time, and operators of the implementation assessment. The systematic implementation of the equal opportunities policy is being carried out in accordance with the programmes of action, divided into shorter periods – from the beginning of the eighties of the twentieth century through medium-term programmes of action.

The first medium-term programme for equal opportunities for men and women of the Commission of the EU (1982 -1985) has been aimed primarily at changing the legal order – at abolishing all legal provisions, which defined inequality. This was only the first necessary condition for the provision of equal opportunities, which was already proved by the second medium-term programme (1986-1990). Its purpose was to thoroughly reveal and gradually change the wider social circumstances that function as women-unfriendly. The findings regarding the unequal burden (women's overburden) of biosocial reproduction, which is the key element in reproducing the disadvantaged status of women, became the center of interest. This is the reason why the alteration of interfamilial relations was adopted as one of the key objectives of the future policy in Europe, which rejects the ideology of the single provider for the family. The involvement in work outside the home of both parents (and the division of responsibilities in familial and domestic activities) should provide the primary basis for the formulation of the social security policy. Work that is more flexibly organized as well as various service activities should facilitate this process of ensuring a higher quality of life, along with a more fruitful use of the available human capacities of both genders.

The realization that the entire system of social order has to be reformed and that the integration of women into the existing circumstances certainly does not suffice was the basis for the third medium-range programme (1991–1995). The issue of the comprehensive provision of the circumstances for the reconciliation between the professional and family role was the focus of the next, namely forth, medium-range programme (1996–2000), which was aimed at facilitating progress in the area of legislation and the effective development of the gender-mainstreaming principle and to support and formulate special measures for the implementation of equality of opportunity. (European Commission, 2006: 317).

The EU's systematic efforts to provide equality between women and men continued also in the first decade of the twentieth century due to various reports from the end of the nineties, which indicated the existence of several types of gender inequality. The first among these efforts was the Programme concerning the Community framework strategy on gender equality (2001–2005), which was prolonged until the end of the year 2006. The programme, which was designed as "one of the necessary instruments for the implementation of the comprehensive Community strategy for gender equality" (ibid., 79), included the policy of integrating gender equality and special measures for achieving gender equality. This orientation can be seen in its main objectives, which are: a) to implement and spread values and practices, which provide the basis for gender equality; b) to improve the understanding of the issues concerning gender equality, including direct and indirect gender-based discrimination and multiple discrimination against women by monitoring the implementation of policies and evaluating their effects; c) to develop trained actors to effectively implement gender equality, particularly by facilitating the exchange of information and best practices and by establishing networks at the Community level. (ibid., 80)

The efforts to achieve the actual equality between women and men have continued in the second half of this decade in accordance with the Roadmap for equality between men and women (within the framework of the Progress Programme), which was adopted on 1 March, 2006 for the period between 2006 and 2010. The objectives and the campaigns for the implementation of gender equality in six priority areas are detailed in the Roadmap: equal economic independence for women and men, the reconciliation between professional, private and family life, equal representation in political decision-making, the eradication of all forms of gender-based violence and human trafficking, the elimination of gender stereotypes, and the implementation of gender equality in foreign and developmental policies. All activities are based on a clear premise: "Gender equality is a fundamental right, a common value of the EU, and a necessary condition for the achievement of the EU objectives of growth, employment, and social cohesion" (Women and men in decision-making, 2007: 5).

Since spring 2003, the EC has to – upon request of the European Council – report yearly on its progress in the implementation of the principle of equality between women and men in all member states. The already fifth report, which was issued in March 2008, unambiguously emphasizes, aside from signs of improvement, the need for the member states to reduce inequality between women and men in all areas and at all levels of activity through various measures in the future. The implementation of the EU egalitarian strategy is financially supported and the responsibility of several sectoral bodies. The European Court of Justice (with the seat in Luxemburg) has also played a significant role in the implementation of the equal opportunities policy as the supervisory institution and as a source for the formulation of new standards in the implementation of this policy. (Gerhard, 2003: 45).

A clear strategy and a more precise and protected legal order are without doubt two necessary requirements in order to reduce gender discrimination; but, as it was necessary for their formation, so is the active participation of women in the processes of political decision-making irreplaceable also in their implementation. As Gerhard (2003: 48) emphasizes, the historical experience shows that "as long as women are underrepresented in democratic representative bodies, progress regarding women's rights, especially actual improvements of the social and legal status of women, has as a rule not emerged as an automatic consequence of the spreading democratization…". The achievement of a balanced representation of men and women in representative bodies remains one of the important tasks of the (near) future in most countries – particularly the young, though the integration of women into various EU political bodies is increasing. But the basis has been formed, which is noticeable in several areas and in various forms of activity and networking.

The changes of the recent years until the year 2007 can be illustrated with some data. The proportion of women in the EU member states parliaments has increased from 16,3 % in 1997 to 23,6 % in 2007. Though these two proportions are larger compared to the world average (round 10 % in 1995 and 17 % in 2007), the proportion from 2007 is still under the critical mass, which is 30 %. At the same time, large differences exist in individual EU member states with upward deviations (e.g. Sweden with 47 %, Finland with 42 %) and downward deviations (e.g. Ireland with 12% or Slovenia with round 11 %). The proportion of women in the European Parliament has increased from 17,3 % in 1984 to 31,2 % in 2007. Though the power of the European Parliament has somewhat strengthened, it is not such a decisive political body as the EC. In the EC, which is also known as the "motor of Community policies" (Borchardt 1999:45), the proportion of women has increased from 25 % in 1999 to 29,6 % in 2007.

A necessary requirement to achieve parity[237] and, finally, fairness between genders at the European level is the "critical minimum", which is more than a 30 % representation of women in representative bodies. Additional committees were therefore established within these representative bodies. The Committee on Women's Rights (now the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality) has operated with the European Parliament already since 1984. It prepares proposals for directives and has succeeded in introducing the equal opportunities principle into the key objectives of the Parliament's activity; the Council supports the EU bilateral strategy in the provision of equality of opportunity – special positive measures and gender mainstreaming.

This is a strategy, which – as European Parliament Member L. Groener concludes (2002: 4) – was demanded by Zetkin as early as 100 years ago. The Equality Working Group has also operated with the EC since 1995 and the special Helsinki Group[238] for the implementation of the principle

237 This is the name of the political formula for an effective policy towards women in modern France.

238 A special group of male and female experts and/or civil servants, formed by female and male representatives of 15 EU member states and 15 non-member states (mostly candidate states); the group is known as the Helsinki Group on Women and Science, in which the Slovene delegation has had its seat since the founding of the Group.
The document National Policies on Women and Science in Europe, which is based on national reports on the state in all 30 countries (HG member states), was drafted and issued in March 2002. The key findings of the document are:
discrimination against women in science has been confirmed (this has also been established in the recent document of the Commission of the EU (European Commission, 2003: 266);
great differences exists between policies concerning science (infrastructure) and gender equality;
a mutual characteristic of all member states is the lack of gender balance in the policy on science and in scientific activity itself;
individual countries use different measures to improve the state, particularly positive measures (e.g. support networks for women in science, facilitating the development of

of equal opportunities for men and women in science and research has been active since 1999. It is also necessary to mention the European Women's Lobby, which was founded in 1990 and includes more than 3000 organizations in fifteen member states[239] and is striving to express various women's interests (political, cultural, social) at all EU levels. This lobby has great credit for the implementation of the integral strategy of gender equality in the EU. A special network unites women in post-socialist countries. Aside from that, a whole structure of networks, publics, and communication streams has developed, which is creating its own life. Various female political scientists (Gerhard, 2003: 53) therefore conclude that a parallel process of integration is taking place along with the process of European legal integration through formal and informal citizenship practice.

Some studies also show the significance of women's movements in individual EU countries, which are striving to implement guidelines, e.g. concerning equal pay. Joyce M. Mushaben (after Gerhard, 2003: 54) holds the opinion that a special female-oriented culture should develop based on the formal and informal networks, because the EU created a culture of rights, which exceeds the state sphere, through its legal order.

The Council of Europe, which unambiguously supports the operating strategy for the achievement of actual equal opportunities for both genders and is addressing the gender equality issue within the framework of the protection of basic human rights and freedoms, has certainly also contributed to the exceeding of the state sphere. The most significant documents are the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the revised European Social Charter (adopted in 1996 to replace the European Social Charter from 1961).

The Council of Europe dealt with the issue of gender inequality in "the division of powers, responsibility, and access to resources" at four ministerial conferences in Strasburg in 1986, in Vienna in 1989, in Rome in 1993, and in Istanbul in 1997. Important amendments were made to the Declaration on Equality between Women and Men from 1988 at the Fourth Ministerial Conference entitled Democracy and Equality between

models and mentor plans) as well as the means for the integration of the equal opportunities principle into all policies and programmes, as well as into organizations and their cultures.

239 The Slovene Women's Lobby was founded in Slovenia as an EWL member in 2007.

Women and Men (Istanbul, 1997). These amendments contain the various necessary activities of all important and responsible participants (from governments and political parties to NGOs) for the achievement of greater gender equality in political and private life, in economic and social activity, and in family life.

Particular attention was devoted to men at the 1997 Conference, because they are the key actors, who determine social progress and whose gradual transformation is a necessary condition in order to strengthen the new roles and pattern of activity, which would include gender impartiality and gender equality. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe D. Tarschys convincingly justified such an orientation by saying: "Focusing on the role of men is becoming an increasingly important issue of equality, but this is only possible if men and women will cooperate… Women and men live in different worlds to a large extent – men in the public and women in the private world. Such a society is unbalanced and prevents women and men from developing all aspects of their personality and capacities." E.g. the member states should therefore "encourage men to promote equality in the area of their authority by including the aspect of gender equality into their everyday work…".

Recommendation 1413 on equal representation in political life (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council Europe is also worth mentioning with regards to a greater integration of women into political activity in the future – among its recommendations are (Special Measures … 155–156):

"The Assembly therefore invites its national delegations to urge their parliaments to introduce specific measures to correct the under-representation of women in political life, and in particular:

i. to set up parliamentary committees or delegations for women's rights and equal opportunity;
ii. to institute equal representation in political parties and to make their funding conditional upon the achievement of this objective;
iii. to adopt dispositions aiming to reconcile family and public life…"

Considering that men constitute the majority in almost all parliaments and governments in European countries, one could conclude by examining the state and the already adopted guidelines for the future development that the provision of balanced participation of both genders in public and private life, particularly the issue of adequate participation of women in politics at all levels, is not merely a “women’s issue”, but notably a “men’s issue”.

Diplomacy as a ‘male fortress’[240]

A historical overview of the ‘pioneer’ era of women entering diplomacy

The question of the status women in US foreign policy has always been a research subject which has been ignored and neglected for too long. Historically looking, diplomacy has always been a male domain. Women were prevented from taking up diplomatic and consular posts until 1933, when thirteen countries, among them also Nicaragua and Turkey, had also female representatives in their diplomatic ranks. Most women were indirectly included in diplomatic life through their husbands, who occupied diplomatic positions. They took care of residences, diplomatic receptions, established connections with the wives of diplomats form other countries, etc. (Chang Bloch, 2004). The British MFA thus prepared a study in the late thirties of the previous century, which was concluded with the thought: “Considering that women are already employed for free in the diplomatic network as wives and daughters, why should they be paid?”

The world history of female diplomats includes names, such as Katarina Stopia, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow between 1632 and 1634; Renee du Lac, French diplomat, who was sent to Poland in 1646; Aleksandra Kollontaj from the Soviet Union, who held office in Oslo between 1921 and 1924, in Mexico from 1926 to 1927, again in Oslo from 1927 to 1930, and in Stockholm from 1930 to 1940; Hungarian diplomat Rosika Schwitter, who was sent to Geneva in 1920; Vidžaja Lakšmi Pandit from India, who held office in Moscow from 1948 to 1949, in the US between 1949 and 1950, in Mexico from 1950 to 1951, and in the UK from 1954 to 1956; Golda Meir from Israel, who held office in Moscow between 1948 and 1949; Bodil Begtrup from Denmark, who held office in Reykjavik from 1948 to 1955 and in the UN from 1956 to 1959; Alva Myrdal from

240 Prepared by Maja Božović.

Sweden, who was sent to India in 1954; Agda Rossel, also from Sweden, who took up her post in the UN in 1958; Johanna Mondschein from Austria, who was sent to Oslo in 1959, etc. (Ketokoski-Rexed, 2004: 29).

Looking more closely at the example of US diplomacy, one can see that foreign politics has always been a male domain. Examples of women, who played an important role in US foreign politics, are difficult to find. US diplomacy is approximately 80 years "old". In 1922, Lucile Atcherson was the first woman to pass the diplomatic service examination, thus procuring herself a position in the Foreign Ministry. It took 25 years until US diplomacy got its first female ambassador; President Truman appointed Eugenie Anderson to the ambassadorial post in Denmark in 1949. Nevertheless, Eugenie Anderson, who held office as Ambassador until 1953, failed to play a more visible role in foreign politics and to lead women into US foreign politics (Sharma, 2003). But the "femina non grata" policy did not apply to administrative staff, as very few men were interested in administrative work, which was therefore always a female domain.

In the period after the Second World War, women, who otherwise had no connection to politics, began to appear in foreign politics. Among them are notably movie stars and other women, who opposed the Vietnam War. The increased number of women in the so-called more influential professions, such as journalism, also contributed to increasing the number of women in foreign politics. To provide an example – Freda Kirchway, the editor of the liberal newspaper "The Nation", was very active in US foreign affairs (Božović, 2004: 6).

One of the key pioneers in US diplomacy was Eleanor Roosevelt, who presided over the UN Human Rights Council from 1945. With her help, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflected also women's interests for the first time. She also contributed to the adoption of said Declaration by the GA in 1948. When Dwight D. Eisenhower became President in 1953, he opposed the Declaration of Human Rights and wanted to "protect the USA from Eleanor Roosevelt". But she nevertheless continued her work and revealed many issues of the international community, which are still current, to the global public (ibid).

The beginnings of Women establishing themselves in the US Congress, or more precisely, in its Committee on Foreign Relations, which plays a significant role in foreign politics, were also strenuous and modest. According to the study of the Centre for American Women and Politics Rutgers from 1989, it should take 410 years until the percentage of women in Congress would be in accordance with the proportion of women in the entire US population, based on the then tempo. The US Senate, which has special authority in the field of foreign politics, never had more than three female representatives until 1993. The proportion of women between the years 1960 and 1992 was between zero and two percent. No woman has ever presided over the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The proportion of women in senior positions in other areas in the US administration is modest as well.

An *ad hoc* committee, which was aimed to advance the status of women in foreign politics, was established within the State Department in 1970. One of its members was Mary S. Olmstead, who was the first of six women to occupy a post in the US diplomatic service in 1945. Olmstead was the first female US ambassador to Papua New Guinea. She witnessed many cases of gender discrimination during her time in office. She became the President of the Women's Action Organization, which advocated the advancement of the status of women in foreign politics in the seventies (Božović, 2004: 7).

Homer Calkin came to the result in his study on the State Department from 1978 that no female career diplomat had been elected to an ambassadorial post to one of the senior diplomatic positions (called Class I Post in US diplomacy) since 1987. The proportion of women in US diplomacy even decreased from 8,9% to 4,8% between 1957 and 1970. The proportion of women holding senior posts in the State Department was 3,3% (Jeffreys-Jones, 1992: 175).

The data on the underrepresentation of women notably in senior posts in the State Department led to a lawsuit. The State Department was accused of gender discrimination (Paragraph VII of the 1064 Civil Rights Act) in all areas: assignment of jobs, promotion, work assessment, remuneration, dismissals, etc. A prior agreement was reached with some of the female employees, who held lower and middle positions. Based on these agreements, the State Department had to appoint a certain number of women who have complained, namely at all levels, before the end of 1986. For the other lawsuits, proceedings were held before the District Court in Washington in May and June of 1985. The State Department was accused of, among other things, appointed too many women to consular posts and a disproportional number of women to political posts between the years 1976 and 1983.[241] The Court ruled that employees of the State Department had not gathered sufficient evidence of gender discrimination in September 1985. The fact that the State Department started its Mid-Level Affirmative Action Programme and Junior Officer Affirmative Action Programme in 1985 was of great help for the defense. Both programmes were aimed at increasing the number of women and minority representatives in the diplomatic service. The District Court thus concluded that the State Department was making sincere efforts to improve the status of women in diplomacy since 1976. The State Department also successfully reacted to numerous individual and group complaints filed by female employees of the State Department (Hoff-Wilson, 1992: 177–178).

The status of women in the executive branch was also not very optimistic at the beginning of the twentieth century and their proportion in US foreign politics was still very small. Though the then President Ronald Reagan appointed Jean Kirkpatrick as US ambassador to the UN in 1981, she herself stated later that she felt quite left out and that her position in the then administration was not powerful. This applied particularly to the meetings concerning foreign policy, which were held in the "Situation Room" (Jeffreys-Jones, 1995: 174, 175).[242]

The emergence of self-made women in US politics and the downfall of widows in politics increased the possibility for women to gain greater influence on US foreign politics, although there was still quite a large proportion of women with familial background.[243] Some studies – for

241 Consular posts are traditionally less prestigious than political posts.

242 Jeane Kirkpatrick stated concerning this topic: "I don't think there has ever been a woman in that room before because the male monopoly had been so complete."

243 For example, the Republican Nancy Landon Kassebaum was a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. She was the daughter of Alfreda M. Landona, a liberal Republican, who was the Head of the Foreign Relations Committee on African Affairs

example the study carried out by Nancy McGlenn and Meredith Reid Sarkees – showed that “traditional” women support peace, whereas women in power are prepared to play the same game as their male colleagues. It is certainly necessary to consider here that women in the US State Department and in the Department of Defence were influenced by loyalty to their male superiors during the Reagan and the Bush Sr. administration. The situation was a bit different concerning women who were appointed, because they were accountable to the people who voted for them and not only to the governing elite. But they also followed the trend of adopting male views with years, which was present in the eighties of the twentieth century (Jeffreys-Jones, 1995: 189).[244]

George Bush Sr., Vice-President during the Reagan administration, won the elections in 1988. Though his “hot” war in the Persian Gulf did initially bring him much popularity, it was a bad decision for him in the long term. President Bush Sr. had a quite unfavourable attitude towards women in areas such as health insurance, prosperity, maternity leave, and abortion. Women constituted 54 % of the entire elective body and Bush Sr. paid for his women-unfriendly policy mostly with his defeat at the next presidential elections in 1992, which were won by the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton. He received 45% of the votes of women and 41 % of the votes of men.[245]

Bill Clinton thus appointed the first female State Secretary, the former State Secretary Madeleine Albright, who introduced a somewhat different perspective – which was influenced by the fact that she was a woman – into US foreign politics. Aside from that, Albright, who was the US ambassador to the UN in New York before she became State Secretary,

during the US administration. Nancy Landon Kassebaum later participated in the shaping of the policy on the limited economic sanctions towards South Africa. This was an attempt to pressure the South African government into ending the politics of apartheid and racial discrimination (Jeffreys-Jones, 1995: 187).

244 Quite a few women strove to make their image more ‘male’ oriented. The California Senator Dianne Feinstein, for example, publicly supported the death penalty in 1992. The future Governer of Texas Ann Richards appeared in TV commercials dressed in hunting clothes and wearing a weapon. She wanted to show that she was as good as any man in Texas (Jeffreys-Jones, 1995: 189).

245 At the 1992 presidential elections, the Republican candidate and then President Gerge Bush Senior received 38 % of women’s votes and the remaining 17 % went to the independent candidate Ross Perot (Jeffreys-Jones, 1995: 194).

stressed women's issues during her mandate as no other State Secretary before her. President Clinton left many activities regarding foreign relations to his wife Hillary Clinton, the first lady, who travelled around most of the world with State Secretary Madeleine Albright and presented US foreign policy views and advocated the respect of human rights with an emphasis on women's rights. The Republican President Bush Jr. also caused quite a surprise by appointing Condoleezza Rice as the first female National Security Adviser (Božović, 2004: 7). When President Bush Jr. won also the second presidential elections in 2004, Condoleezza Rice became the second female State Secretary in US history.

"Good practices" experience – the advantages of a gender balanced functioning of diplomacy

A higher number of women in foreign politics is of key importance for the global safety of humanity, particularly recently when the foreign politics of the central world powers, notably the USA, is oriented primarily towards military combat and conflicts. Women could contribute to the safety of all through their activities and with a different approach. Women, their values, needs, and creative solutions are almost absent from the key foreign policy areas, which affect the life of all people (war, arms trafficking, global commerce, international investments, etc.).

An analysis of the state in the US diplomatic network points to the existence of continuity in the orientation, which is connected with vertical gender discrimination, or rather, with the fact that women do not occupy the more influential ambassadorial posts within the US diplomatic-consular network. No woman has held an ambassadorial post in a country, which is economically and politically of greatest importance to the US (e.g. China, Russia, Germany, South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, India, Spain, Canada, Mexico) or has not been Head of US missions with the EU and NATO in Brussels as well as with international organizations in Vienna and Geneva.

It is evident from official sources of all US presidents who have held office in the US in the last two decades that they have supported the role and the status of women in US politics. Unofficial data shows a bit different picture, particularly concerning George Bush Jr. But it is without doubt that the role of women was most visible during President Clinton's administration. The largest contribution in this area goes to the grand advocates of women and their rights – the then First Lady Hillary Clinton and the then State Secretary Madeleine Albright. The latter achieved with her speeches that the issue of women's representation in the US administration and the status of women around the world was given as much attention as possible. Sadly, even she did not succeed in placing the female issue to the centre of US diplomacy. Madeleine Albright is known for »pushing« the US to Kosovo and the Balkans (NATO attack). The conflict is known by many as »Madelein's war«.

Women, such as the Head of US administration with the UN during the Reagan administration Jeane Kirkpatrick, the first female candidate for the post of US Vice-President Geraldine Ferraro, the former First Lady Hillary Clinton[246], former State Secretary Madeleine Albright, and President Bush Junior's National Security Adviser and later State Secretary Condoleezza Rice contributed through their activity to the changes in the traditional patterns of action in this field. Despite the larger number of women in senior positions in US foreign politics, no changes have occurred in the essential orientation of US foreign policy. This is particularly evident in the work of the State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, who is known for her tough and relentless stance and policy, what is not in line with the traditional efforts of female representatives for a peaceful resolving of disagreements, reduce armament, etc. The status of women and their representation in US foreign politics have improved in the recent two decades, but this has not affected the essential orientation of foreign policy. At the same time, this shows that dominant male criteria still exist in the determination of the content orientation in foreign policy and that the process of the dissociation of the male-centric organization of life in and out of the US is only beginning (Božović, 2004: 79).

246 The third female State Secretary, in the first Obama administration from 2008–2012, succeeding Condoleezza Rice from the second Bush Jr. administration.

Final thoughts

Taking into account the experience of countries so far, in which women's representation in diplomacy is already at a higher level, the following measures can contribute to the advancement of the status of women in this reputable activity around the world (Izhevska, 2004: 91–92):

- to point out gender issues to diplomatic networks, where men dominate, in order to encourage them to identify possible solutions to problems which derive from the differences between the genders. The stress should be on the discussion on how to fight stereotypes and on the formulation of the most effective strategies as possible for the achievement of gender equality;
- to represent female interests in politics by facilitating the accesses to diplomatic education for women;
- to form a network of female diplomats with the purpose of exchanging experience;
- to propose the organization of bilateral ministerial deliberations on gender equality in the diplomatic service;
- to strengthen the role of women in international organizations.

Considering these possible measures, it can be expected that the status of women will gradually improve also in diplomacy and that gender inequality will be reduced considering the changes in the wider social environment. The extent to which comprehensive and coordinated social efforts will be oriented towards moving the »woman's issues« from the edge to the centre of political activity at all levels so that the question of »shaping people« will not be less important than killing people and destroying the natural environment will correspond to the extent of gender equality in diplomatic activity.

It is important for the expectations regarding the future development that the staring point has already been surpassed despite all obstacles, that some innovations regarding women entering diplomacy have been proven based on research, and that several female role-models exists, to whom today's girls and young women can look up to.[247] The simple

247 The extensive study carried out by Christine Wolbrecht and David Campbell in 27 countries in 2005 confirmed the presence of "a pure role model effect of women" concerning women's participation in politics.

realization that »today's women can be tomorrows leaders« (Paxton in Hughes, 2007: 313) brings at least a bit optimism in view of the otherwise prevailing pessimistic prognosis (and prevailing practice) regarding the developmental possibilities in existing societies.

AUSTRALIA: WOMEN IN DIPLOMACY

Moreen Dee, Felicity Volk

Introduction

There are currently 28 women serving as Australia's ambassadors, high commissioners and consuls-general out of a total of ninety-five such positions around the world. A further eight women are serving as deputy head of mission in major posts, including Washington, Paris and New York. In total, 52.4 % of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade[248] staff are women, who also make up 25.8 % of the SES (Senior Executive System)– working in senior management at home and abroad.[249]

Trends in the employment of women—increased numbers of women entering and assuming leadership roles in the department—saw a progressive change in Australia's diplomatic service with regard to women heads of mission or post. The current profile of Australian women diplomats

248 *Note:* This case study is drawn from Dee and Felicity Volk (2007).
The Australian government department responsible for Australia's foreign service has held three titles: Department of External Affairs (1937–1970); Department of Foreign Affairs (1970–1987); and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1987–).

249 Figures presented are as at 31 March 2012.

is the culmination of more than six decades of incremental advances for women in Australia's Foreign Service, specifically, and also in the broader community. Australian women have been vocal advocates for equality of the sexes since the early days of nationhood.

On the international stage, too, Australia has played an important role in promoting non-discrimination on the basis of sex, in particular from the mid 1940s, with the negotiation of the UN Charter, through to the 1990s. Celebrated Australian women, such as Jessie Street and Elizabeth Evatt, contributed significantly to debate in the UN' Commission on the Status of Women and the Commission on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Their efforts enhanced Australia's reputation as an egalitarian, progressive society. Australia's international rhetoric of the time reflected a genuine mood in Australian society and commitments undertaken in the international arena were readily translated into national programmes and legislation. Improved conditions of service for female officers in the foreign service occurred hand in hand with advances across the Australian Public Service and the Australian workforce generally.

Background

History records that while women have acted as diplomats, officially and unofficially, since the 16th century,[250] it was not until the late 1920s – early 1930s, that a small number of the world's foreign services accepted that women too could be career diplomats.[251] But most foreign services retained their strong bias against the recruitment of women. This stance reflected deep-seated community attitudes to the role of women in society, as well as discrimination against the employment of women in the white-collar workforce.[252] The latter prejudice was particularly evident in the

250 See Foreign and Commonwealth Office - FCO, 1999, 2–3.

251 During that period, Chile, Spain, the United States, the Soviet Union, Norway, Bulgaria, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic all appointed women to senior diplomatic and consular positions.

252 At the time, many jobs were not legally open to women; in those that were available, formidable barriers effectively denied women equality with male colleagues in terms of general conditions of service and advancement into senior positions. Women's wages were significantly lower than their male counterparts—on the widespread presumption that women were not breadwinners and thus could be paid less.

foreign service, where a vivid mixture of illogical, chauvinistic and trivial arguments were advanced against the employment of women as diplomats.[253]

The debate surrounding women career diplomats, however, was not an issue in Australia in the first four decades of the 20th century. Until late 1935 Australia did not have an independent foreign service; its foreign relations abroad were handled through British legations.[254] Consequently, while Australian policies and attitudes towards women in the fledgling diplomatic service broadly reflected those evident in the foreign services of the Western countries with which Australia most identified, the newly-created Department of External Affairs was unhindered by the entrenched diplomatic practices of these more established services.

The winds of change for many foreign services came during the Second World War, when the shortage of men on the home front provided opportunities for women to serve successfully in the war bureaucracies of many countries.[255] When Australia's Department of External Affairs was establishing a Diplomatic Cadet Scheme in 1943, it was receptive to the urging of the women's rights lobbyist, Jessie Street, to include women in this cohort. To support the growing need for Australian representation overseas during wartime, preference was to be given to ex-servicemen but three of the twelve available places were allocated to women. The appointment of the three female cadets was heralded by Australian women's groups and created considerable interest overseas, particularly from the National Council of Women of Great Britain.

253 For examples, see FCO, *Women in Diplomacy*, pp. 7–8, 27–30.

254 Australia had established a mission in London in 1910, but this overseas post was administered by the Prime Minister's Department. The Department of External Affairs, as it was called 1935–1970, established its first overseas representation in Washington (1937), Ottawa, Tokyo and New Caledonia (1940), Portuguese Timor, Malaya and China (1941), the Netherlands Government in London (1942), USSR (1943), New Zealand (1943), and India (1944).

255 See FCO, *Women in Diplomacy*, p. 11, which notes that 'by 1945, at least 108 women graduates were known to have been appointed to temporary administrative posts in the [British] Foreign Service. Of these, 31 were [then] serving as temporary Assistant Principals … [in] the Foreign Office, while 16 had served abroad as First, Second and Third Secretaries, as Vice Consuls and as Press Attachés'.

Entrenched social perceptions

The Australian diplomatic cadet scheme was both innovative and popular, attracting 1500 applicants for the first twelve places.[256] At a time when women were excluded from other professions, it provided opportunities for intelligent young female graduates not available elsewhere, albeit constrained and potentially of limited duration. Australian women, like their counterparts in other Western foreign services, were confronted with lingering forms of discrimination that would take years to remove. The barriers included formal and informal quotas on the number of women who could be appointed; restricted employment opportunity; unequal pay; and discrimination in the promotions process and in access to senior appointments. But the most significant hurdle for career women diplomats was the marriage bar—the requirement to resign on marriage or, if married, being regarded as unsuitable for posting. For example, each of the three women selected in 1943 to join Australia's fledgling foreign service, had married by 1947 and were obliged to resign under the marriage bar, a requirement which overrode suitability and capability considerations.

The marriage bar reflected the prevailing societal views that a woman married should be supported by her husband, and that married women took men's jobs. Further, a resistance to posting married women rested on claims that there would be no place for a male spouse at an overseas mission and that it would be socially inappropriate—if not scandalous—to post a married woman without her husband. These restrictions not only limited women's opportunities as diplomats, they also compelled some women to take tough decisions about their personal lives.

The Australian Public Service Board maintained the view that, as women would ultimately marry and leave the service, funds spent on training women were expended needlessly.[257] Consequently, the Board was resistant to efforts to recruit women as career diplomats. In 1948, the all-male selection panel for the Department of External Affairs' diplomatic cadet intake, found the scheme was attracting a better calibre of women

256 This number of applications was not maintained, falling to 450 in 1944 and then declining to 100–200 in subsequent years.

257 A newspaper editorial at the time, titled 'Do Women Make Successful Diplomats?', reflected a similar attitude, questioning 'whether it [was] worth spending a lot of money on having women for a diplomatic career when many may change it for housekeeping in a year or two.'

than men. The panel vigorously recommended five women applicants; however, the Board would only agree to accept three of the five women for recruitment.[258] In the years from 1943 to 1950, 17 % of the cadets were women—15 of the 84 recruits. Several enterprising women circumvented the restriction on recruitment through the cadet scheme using other channels to join the service: as research officers or administrative assistants. They later transferred to diplomatic work, several achieving senior appointments, including two who would became career heads of mission.[259]

As in other Western foreign services, Australia's early efforts to engage women diplomats were followed by periods of limited or no recruitment.[260] Only three women were recruited in the period 1951–1959. To a significant degree this reflected self-selection out of recruitment processes: women themselves were reluctant to pursue a foreign service career where it appeared entrenched bias negated ability in relation to their male colleagues. By the end of the 1950s, on university campuses around Australia, Department of External Affairs' recruiters were confronted by women who expressed concerns about discrimination against women within the service.[261] These concerns were legitimate.

The women who were selected in the early years of Australia's diplomatic service entered a workplace that curtailed opportunities for advancement and postings on the basis of gender. Attitudes to women in the workforce were governed by prevailing notions of what were considered 'suitable' occupations for a woman. Australia's diplomatic officers, like their counterparts in other Western foreign services, found themselves relegated to administrative or consular work, or 'soft policy' areas such as human rights or cultural relations: issues then regarded as

258 A letter from the committee advised that of the applicants three women in particular 'were in ability and personality streets ahead of most of the men on the list', Burton to Public Service Board, 10 February 1948, National Archives of Australia (NAA) A1838, 1260/6/1.

259 Ruth Dobson, who was not selected in the 1943 cadet scheme and joined the department as a research officer, became Australia's first female career diplomat head of mission as Ambassador to Denmark in 1974 (later Ambassador to Ireland in 1978); and Maris King, who joined the department as a typist in 1942, became a senior research officer in 1956, and High Commissioner to Nauru in 1977 and Tonga in 1980.

260 In the United Kingdom, by the end of 1959, women formed only 2 % of the Administrative Grade (Foreign Service Officers). In the USA, although in 1957 women comprised 8.9 % of this group, in 1975 the figure had only risen to 9 % (FCO, 1999: 13).

261 Report on visits to universities, Harry, former Permanent Delegate, UN Mission and Consul-General, Geneva, and Commissioner, Singapore, 18 May 1959, NAA: A1838, 1260/1/4/1.

peripheral to Australia's core interests. They were denied postings to a wide range of countries considered unsuitable for women. Reluctant to highlight the discrimination and lobby for equal conditions of service for fear of the possible impact on their career, most female officers sought to gain recognition by performing better than their male colleagues.[262]

Social change

The discriminatory situation facing Australian women in diplomacy was one with which all women in the Australian Public Service had to contend. Influential women's groups lobbied extensively through the 1950s and into the 1960s to have the two principal barriers to women's progress—the marriage bar and equal pay—addressed. Continued discriminatory practice by the government was untenable. During the war, the Australian Government, like many others throughout the world, had acknowledged the importance of taking full advantage of the total range of abilities and skills available in a country's potential workforce. Yet by 1961, the marriage bar meant that only five of the nineteen Australian women diplomatic officers recruited since 1943 remained. This situation was repeated across other government departments: a state of affairs that affected the numbers of senior women in Australia's public service for decades to come

The catalyst for significant change came in 1966, when Australia became the first Western country to lift the marriage bar in its Public Service.[263] The introduction of equal pay in 1972, and flex-time[264] and paid maternity leave in 1973, removed further barriers to women employment. The outcome for the diplomatic service was an increase in the numbers of women recruits. (Some women, who had previously left on marriage but still wanted a diplomatic career, chose to return and went on to enjoy highly successful professional lives.) In the 1970s, more women were included in the larger numbers of young graduates being recruited to a

262 Women in Australia's diplomatic service did not resort to taking legal action, and elsewhere the experience proved unsatisfactory. For example, class action sex discrimination suits filed in the 1970s by female officers in the US District Court over policies, practices and customs in the State Department that had blocked their promotion were not finally decided in the officers' favour until some twenty years later in 1996. (See Fund for Peace, 2009).

263 The marriage bar was lifted in the USA in 1971, the UK in 1972 and South Africa in 1986.

264 Flex-time involves non-traditional work scheduling practices that allow employees to choose their individual starting and finishing times within certain limits defined by employers.

rapidly expanding foreign service. This set the trend for a considerable change in the 'face' of Australia's foreign service. From about one in six in the early years of the 1970s, the proportion of women in the cadet intakes rose until, in 1985, for the first time more women than men were recruited. For the next fourteen years the numbers were roughly 50 % each, with men generally in a slight majority. However, in 1999, the balance shifted significantly towards women, an outcome that, with the exception of the 2001 and 2011 intakes, has been maintained.[265]

The benefits flowing from the lifting of the marriage bar and the receipt of equal pay greatly advanced the progress of Australian female diplomatic officers in their chosen careers, but other hindrances remained. More difficult to overcome was the attitude that some posts were unsuitable for women diplomats. In keeping with broader social attitudes of the time, the department was reluctant to post women to countries where there was the potential for personal harm. In addition female career diplomats were not posted to countries where for religious, cultural or political reasons they would not have been able to fulfil their duties effectively. (The same caveats were not applied to the posting of women secretarial or communications staff to these missions.) In the 1970s, Australia had seven posts in the Middle East and five in Africa but during the decade only three women diplomats were sent to these missions and then only to fill junior positions. Although the numbers increased slightly in the 1980s, the first female head of a Middle East mission—Ambassador to Lebanon and Syria—was not appointed until 1990 and the second—Ambassador to Jordan—not until 1995. The first female head of an Australian mission in Africa—High Commissioner to Zambia—was appointed in 1988 and it was a further ten years before a second appointment—High Commissioner to Zimbabwe—was made.

Posting practices for women to regions other than the Middle East and Africa were very different. In 1975, of the fifty-one women diplomatic officers eligible for overseas service, thirty-eight had had at least one

265 Women represent 53.5 % of the total number of graduate trainees for the period 1994–2011. There were 13 men and 12 women in the 2001 intake and 31 men and 21 women in the 2011 intake.

posting.[266] However, the practice of assigning female officers to 'soft policy' areas—both in Australia and overseas—continued into the 1980s.

Nevertheless, the significant positive influences afoot for professional women in Australian society more widely during the 1970s–1980s, were also experienced by those who had decided to make Australia's foreign service their career. Important among these influences was the formation of informal networks among female colleagues, who otherwise felt isolated in policy areas where they were, more often than not, the only woman officer. The networks allowed women officers to compare experiences, offer support, and develop strategies to address issues affecting their professional development. Also significant was the support and encouragement that a number of male supervisors were now giving to women officers. These colleagues not only acted as mentors but were prepared to advocate for women to be given positions of greater responsibility and challenging work or assignments not usually available to women. While in the late 1970s the contingent of these male officers was modest, their actions were indicative of a gradual and more positive shift within Australian society towards the declared political imperatives of genuine equality. Australia's women diplomats responded with alacrity to these developments. But two particular milestones served to focus the attention of female officers on professional opportunities at senior levels of their profession. In 1974, Australia's first female career diplomat was appointed to a head of mission position: Australian Ambassador to Denmark. Then in 1977, the department appointed its first woman officer to the Second Division of the Australian Public Service, later the SES.[267]

Equal employment opportunity (EEO), institutional change and the diplomatic service

In Australia, the catalyst for real institutional change came in 1984

266 The figure of 51 does not include the 8 women trainees for 1975. Department of Foreign Affairs Statement of Service 1974–1975.

267 Under Section 35 of the Public Service Act 1999, the Australian Public Service (APS) Commission defines the SES as 'the leadership cadre of the APS. SES members not only provide high level support to their own Agency, but are required to cooperate with other Agencies and to promote APS Values and compliance with the Code of Conduct'. The SES replaced the Second Division of the APS under a 1984 amendment to the Public Service Act (See Australian Public Service Commision, 2009).

with the passage in the Australian Parliament of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act and the Public Service Reform Act. Under this legislation, the government committed the federal bureaucracy to implement (EEO) programmes and to identify and remove discriminatory employment practices. Although the passage of these two Acts removed most forms of overt discrimination in Australian society generally and in the Australian Public Service more particularly, informal barriers remained. Principal among these were the negative attitudes about their professionalism that women officers encountered from their male colleagues.

A strategy to develop gender-related analyses of the government's budgets was introduced through the *Women's Budget Programme*.[268] Under this programme, all government departments and agencies were required to review thoroughly every aspect of their activities that could be regarded as having implications for women. The Department of Foreign Affairs responded by conducting a major survey of its women staff which identified that female officers felt professionally constrained by a predominantly male culture and the preponderance of male executives. In work units where survey respondents were the only woman, most felt isolated at some time and under special scrutiny. Over half felt that being a woman had affected their career; and married women believed that institutional barriers to their promotion and postings continued, as well as negative assumptions about their ability to manage work and family commitments.[269] Reflecting a then prevalent view among many in Australia's professional strata (not only the diplomatic service) that women could not manage both responsibilities, some men remained adamantly opposed to women working on these grounds. One of Australia's most experienced female heads of mission recalls an occasion early in her career when, on leaving the office to collect her children from day care, she was told she needed to decide whether she was a mother or a diplomat (Wensley in Dee and Volk, 2007: 64).

Looking to respond to the results of its survey in a systematic and forward-looking way, in 1985, the Department of Foreign Affairs introduced an EEO programme. The aim of the programme was to achieve

268 For further discussion on gender budgets, see Sharp and Broomhill, 2002: 25–47.

269 Major Recommendations: 1984 EEO Survey, Attachment A, Discussion Paper: 'Women in Management: The DFAT Experience', 14 July 1994, DFAT, A9737, 93/02004.

progress in significant areas for all women officers, whether they were in the diplomatic stream or the administrative. The implementation of the programme took a zero-based approach to all aspects of women's service and within three years significant EEO outcomes had been achieved. These outcomes included a reduction in the number of posts deemed unsuitable for women officers;[270] a review of the status of women in delegations to international conferences, the purpose of which was to increase their inclusion and broaden their involvement from the usual social or 'soft' areas into mainstream issues; the strengthening of EEO within the department by appointing an officer as an ombudsman for women officers; providing support on issues affecting officers' family life (such as postings) through the appointment of family liaison officers; a full review of recruitment procedures to address gender imbalances; and introducing schemes to encourage mentoring for junior officers in all streams. The EEO programmes served to change—or at least moderate—discriminatory attitudes among male officers to their female colleagues. And, importantly, they increased awareness of the practices that were disadvantageous for women officers.

These outcomes significantly improved the professional life of women in Australia's diplomatic service; opportunities for female officers at the end of the 1980s were considerably brighter that those at the beginning of the decade. But, well into the 1990s, promotion processes remained an ongoing issue for women. Despite the forward-looking EEO programme, a merit-based promotion process still had not been implemented effectively. There remained a number of aspects of the process, such as an emphasis on seniority, or numbers of overseas postings undertaken, that were unrelated to merit and produced biases against women.[271]

The situation had implications for the Department of Foreign Affairs in meeting the Australian government's EEO policy target level of 15 % women in senior public service positions by 1995.[272] There was a gradual

270 At that time Tehran and Riyadh remained the only posts not available to women.

271 Stuart Harris (Departmental Secretary, 1984–88), 'Change in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: experience and observations', paper delivered to the National Organisation Change Conference, Royal Institute of Public Administration and the Public Service Commission, Canberra, 28–29 November 1988.

272 Under the Federal Government's EEO policy agenda for the APS, a target of 15 % of women

increase in the number of women entering the senior executive of the diplomatic service in the early 1990s. In 1994, women filled 9 % of these positions, up from 2.1 % in 1989. But this proportion fell well below the target, and compared even less favourably with the overall Australian Public Service average for women in senior positions which, at 17 %, exceeded the target. The statistics begged the question: why were Australian women diplomats falling behind the progress of their Public Service counterparts? In addition to the factors identified in the department's 1994 survey outlined above, the unique mix of local and overseas service presented particular complications for women in the foreign service vis-à-vis their bureaucratic colleagues in other agencies.[273] The limited number of women at senior management levels restricted the number of women eligible for most head of mission and post positions. But, of more concern, the dearth of high-profile women in the service had a dampening effect on the career aspirations of capable women at lower levels.

A number of other issues emerged from the 1994 survey that indeed applied to the promotion prospects for both men and women officers. These included: the continued culture of long hours—the perceived career advantage of being seen to work late, regardless of efficiency; and the need for greater departmental support for officers to fulfil family responsibilities. In acknowledging the findings of the survey, the secretary of the department at the time introduced focus group meetings with women at all levels to advise him of concerns.[274] These meetings provided a high-level imprimatur for initiatives that addressed the issues women had identified. An important procedural change that resulted from this process was the requirement for a female representative on any promotion committee. Another initiative, introduced in 1995, to improve the public profile of senior female officers and their role in policy-making saw a number of former female heads of mission and the department's first female deputy secretary, in 1996, address the Australian National Press

in the SES was set for 1995, to increase to 20 % by 2000.

273 The 1994 survey was conducted in early May, via a 'vertical slice' meeting of selected officers with the department's secretary and subsequent interviews. The findings were included in the Discussion Paper: 'Women in Management: The DFAT Experience'.

274 The secretary convened the initial focus group discussion with 21 female officers on 12 May 1994.

Club in Canberra. The department also supported annual activities at home and overseas to mark International Women's Day. These events continue to this day, celebrating the growing list of achievements by women in the diplomatic service, including those involved in dangerous assignments.

Perhaps the most significant reflection of the changes taking place in relation to women officers in the second half of the 1990s was their increased representation in the SES from the 9 % in 1994 noted above to 20.2 % in 2000. An important development that assisted them to achieve professional success commensurate with their abilities was the introduction of practical family-friendly initiatives. In 1996, the department established a childcare centre within its office space: one of the first work-based childcare centres in the Australian federal bureaucracy and a model for other such facilities. The department obtained a private ruling from the Australian Tax Office in 1998 which allowed it to offer salary packaging of childcare fees for staff using the centre.[275]

Other initiatives included: the establishment of a 'family room' for parents to care for non-contagious sick children, and a 'babycare room' for women officers to breastfeed in private; the introduction of approved employer-funded childcare for officers travelling on short-term overseas missions; encouraging managers to accommodate permanent part-time work and job-sharing arrangements for officers with family responsibilities; and the introduction of additional flexibilities in working hours and forms of carer's leave. Of course, these initiatives addressing so-called 'women's issues' applied equally to, and similarly assisted the balancing of work and family responsibilities for, male officers within the department. Another practical innovation to alleviate a particular difficulty facing a family posted abroad was the negotiation of reciprocal work agreements with many foreign governments that made it easier for diplomatic spouses to work overseas.

275 Salary packaging allows an employee to forego part of their salary in order to obtain a benefit—for example, a car, personal computer, etc, including childcare fees—that is provided by the employer from the employee's pre-tax salary. The concept reduces the employee's overall tax on their salary and is sometimes also called salary sacrifice.

Australian women Heads of Mission and Post

Just like the early recorded Spanish and French women diplomats, Dame Annabelle Rankin, Australia's first woman head of mission, appointed in 1971 as High Commissioner to New Zealand, was a political appointee and not a member of Australia's career diplomatic service. The appointment was well received in Australian society as fitting recognition of the long service and considerable achievements of a former senior cabinet minister of the Australian Government. The appointment was extensively covered by the Australian and New Zealand press and Dame Annabelle used this exposure to encourage broad acceptance of women in the role of head of mission, separating the notion of gender from the position itself. She refused to be drawn on questions about being a pathfinder for women. Her view was that 'it is important for a woman to remember that when taking up an executive position or any job with a big responsibility, she should do so as a citizen not only as a woman' (Brwone, 1981: 77).

The appointment of the first career female head of mission was made three years later with Ruth Dobson becoming Australia's Ambassador to Denmark in 1974. Dobson was the longest-serving female officer in the department, having joined the service as a research officer in 1943 and gone on to serve in a wide variety of positions overseas and in Canberra.[276] From Denmark, Ruth Dobson was appointed Ambassador to Ireland in 1978. At the end of these two appointments, however, Dobson believed that full acceptance of women diplomats by society, both overseas and at home, was still very much a work in progress. In a press interview shortly before leaving Ireland in 1981, she wryly reflected that being a female in the predominantly male diplomatic corps in a country at least gave her the advantage of always being remembered when she needed to deal with 'some tricky issue'; and as for the social responsibilities of the position, 'the trick [was] to be able to play an ambassador's role and that of the ambassador's wife at the same time'. As for her colleagues working their way through the Australian foreign service, she firmly believed after

276 Ruth Dobson had postings to London, Geneva (where she served on the Third Committee of the UN GA which drafted the Convention on the Status of Women), Wellington, Manila and Athens. In Canberra, she headed the department's Western Europe Section and was seconded to the Governor-General's staff as private secretary to the Governor-General's wife.

her long service that Australia's women diplomatic officers should be considered 'dedicated professionals … because, though many things have changed, a woman still has to be that bit better than a man to get each promotion'.[277]

Neither of Dobson's appointments nor those of others that followed, however, signalled a significant change in the approach towards the appointment of women heads of mission or post. Although by the end of the UN's International Decade for Women (1975–1985), the ratio of male to female diplomatic trainees recruited was approximately 50:50, figures for appointments of female heads of mission were less impressive. From 1974 to the end of 1992, only thirteen female officers were selected to head Australian missions and posts overseas.[278] In September 1992, there were two female heads of Australia's seventy-nine missions abroad at a time when women numbered around 6 % of SES officers from whom these appointments were made. Although the senior executive representation was on the increase, as discussed above, the numbers lagged behind the 13 % of women in the SES across the Public Service and the 12.5 % in the Federal Parliament at the time.

The situation was such that, during that year, a number of submissions were made on behalf of women diplomatic officers to the service hierarchy, government ministers and parliamentary committees. To redress the imbalance at head of mission level, it was argued that there was a need to promote more women into SES-level positions and that the foreign service should open all but the most senior overseas posts to merit selection from among officers in the levels immediately below the executive service, in which women were well represented. It was also suggested that a not 'unreasonable' target would be for women to head 15 % of Australia's overseas missions within the next two to three years.[279] Ministers noted

277 'How to Succeed Diplomatically', interview with Peter Smark, *The Age*, 9 May 1981. Ruth Dobson's posting as Ambassador to Ireland formally ended on 28 August 1981, and she retired in Canberra on 24 October 1981.

278 Nauru (1977); Cyprus (1982); Sweden, Vanuatu (1983); Bangladesh, Nepal, Hong Kong (1986); Nauru, Singapore, Zambia, Sri Lanka, (1988); Lebanon and Syria (1990); Solomon Islands, Bali (1992).

279 Letter, Di Johnstone, former Ambassador to Nepal (1986–1989) to Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 21 April 1992; Letters, Di Johnstone to the Minister for Trade and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 8 September 1992; DFAT: A9737, 89/010974 part 5. Johnstone met with the Chair and members of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign

their understanding of the problem and stressed the importance of female officers as well as their male counterparts in the immediate pre-SES levels considering themselves 'as qualified, serious candidates' for senior appointments. Nonetheless, they did not favour the government setting a target to be achieved within a specific timeframe, preferring that the issue be addressed in the context of the service's EEO programme.[280] The selection and appointment process, however, was not the only factor contributing to the low numbers of female Australian representatives. A telling survey of women officers in 1994 found that many women—especially those with spouses or families—were ambivalent (as were some men) regarding the personal or career advantage of becoming a head of mission or post.

The turning point came with a 1996 seminar on this topic, at which four female heads of mission and post spoke frankly to a large number of senior and middle-level women officers about the specific problems of taking up a representative posting. Some of these were difficulties of employment for their spouses, and the assumptions made in some societies that male spouses should work; the requirement for a woman head of mission to run a residence as well as a busy mission; and the intense scrutiny of women heads of mission, particularly if the sole female among all the diplomatic representatives in a country. Furthermore, certain societies found single women culturally puzzling; some Australian expatriates, isolated from contemporary Australian social attitudes, were critical of female head of mission appointments to the countries in which they operated; and there was pressure from local and Australian women's groups to take the women's view on any 'women's issues'. Although a number of posts included household support, women with children had the challenge of managing childcare without the traditional support systems available to them in Australia.[281]

The women also outlined a number of the advantages they believed they brought to their positions. As women they were seen to be more ethical and, because they were often more consultative, better managers of staff.

Affairs and Trade, on 18 December 1992.

280 Letters, Minister for Trade and Minister for Foreign Affairs to Johnstone, 19 October 1992 and 7 December 1992, DFAT: A9737, 89/010974 part 5.

281 Summary record, Seminar on Women HOMS/HOPS, 5 September 1996, held DFAT.

They had access to a broader range of contacts because they could talk to women, who in many societies might not be politically or economically visible, but who were influential. In developing countries their access to women gave them an advantage in dealing with projects for women which were often those at the forefront of development programmes. Where they were the only, or one of a few, female heads of mission in a particular counutury, they were role models raising the profiles of both Australia and women in the local community.[282]

The 1996 seminar and an invigorated EEO programme that sought achievable targets for numbers of women heads of mission by the year 2000, saw many more women begin to apply for these positions. This resulted in increased numbers of female heads of mission over the next four years. From seven such appointments in 1995, by February 1998 there were eleven and, in March 1999, fourteen women headed Australia's overseas missions and posts. This number included two missions in the Middle East and the prestigious post of Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN in New York.[283] As noted, in 2012, women comprise 25.8 % of the SES of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and head 28.4 % of Australian diplomatic missions abroad; figures that have been broadly constant since 2005.[284] The status of women in Australia's diplomatic service is in line with the foreign services of other Western societies such as the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada. Young women now enter Australia's foreign service as graduate trainees with every expectation that they too can work towards becoming the official representative of their country.

Side by side with recent changes in the representation of women in Australia's foreign service, there has been an evolution in the way gender equality is managed as an objective of foreign, trade and development policy. In July 2011, the Australian Government launched a new aid policy in which gender equality was identified as a critical cross-cutting

282 This, and the preceding, paragraph are quoted from Dee and Volk (2007: 18–19).

283 As of March 2012, there are only fourteen Australian diplomatic posts which have not had a female head of mission: Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Western Samoa.

284 The high-water mark was reached in 2009, when women represented 27.6 % of the SES and 30.3 % of Australian heads of mission overseas.

theme across the aid programme.[285] A further milestone in efforts to mainstream Australian international work on gender empowerment was achieved in September 2011 with the appointment of Australia's first Global Ambassador for Women and Girls, a female career diplomat.[286] Operating out of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the role of the ambassador is to advocate Australia's efforts to promote gender equality, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region.

The government intends that this role should ensure that the needs of women and girls are properly represented in Australia's overseas development programme and in foreign policy more broadly. Most recently, in March 2012, Australia launched its first *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012–2018*, fulfilling Australia's obligations (under UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions) to integrate a gender perspective into peace and security efforts—protecting women and girls in conflict situations and promoting their participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution.[287]

Conclusion

The social and institutional barriers that curtailed the role of women in the workforce of Western countries have come down slowly. For Australian women in diplomacy, there were three factors that, in the main, wrought the changes. The first of these came from within the Australian foreign service itself as women held fast to their belief that they could successfully manage a full and rewarding career in diplomacy. The second was imposed on the service as the Australian government legislated against the inequity of employment opportunities for women. The third and crucial factor was that the bureaucracy recognised the particular difficulties facing women in the diplomatic service and was progressive in implementing measures aimed at improved management practices.

As women have become better represented at all levels of Australia's

285 See *An Effective Aid Programme for Australia: Making a real difference – Delivering real results* (Australian Government, 2011).

286 The first appointment to the position of Australian Global Ambassador for Women and Girls was Penny Williams, previously High Commissioner to Malaysia (2007–2010).

287 `*Australian National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2012–2018,* http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/women/pubs/govtint/action_plan_women_peace.

foreign service, Australia itself has undoubtedly been more fully represented internationally. The question of whether 'femaleness' or 'maleness' informs the conduct of diplomacy, however, is the subject of some debate. The uniqueness of being a female ambassador can raise the profile of women diplomats and distinguish them from the sometimes amorphous body of their male counterparts, particularly in cultures where there is more firmly entrenched gender stereotyping. But the novelty factor brings with it other considerations: namely, to ensure that the reputation of a senior female diplomat is derived primarily from respect for her competence and professionalism, rather than issues of gender. As female head of mission appointments become more commonplace, these distinctions will disappear and it will be easier to look objectively at what role, if any, gender does play in diplomacy.

Current debate surrounding the impact of gender-specific attributes on the practice of diplomacy derives from two points of view in particular. One is that there are no intrinsically female or male traits that inform the work of a diplomat. The second is that there are distinctions, such as listening skills, approaches to consensus building, and intuitive capacities, qualities commonly regarded as particular strengths of women. But while gender may be manifest in the nuance of how diplomats perform their responsibilities, there is no evidence in the Australian experience to suggest that it has bearing on the overall outcomes achieved. Any gender-specific attributes which may exist do so in the margins of the conduct of diplomacy. The core skills required of a diplomat are evidenced equally in the performance of both sexes.

Debate on the value of inherently female or male perspectives lends weight to the need for equal representation by both sexes in the most influential quarters of diplomatic life. The foreign service of a country is the institutional face of that nation to the world at large. Australia is a remarkably diverse society and the essence of this can only be represented if its diplomatic service mirrors the demographics of the broad Australian community. This includes parity of representation by women and men at all levels of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade both in Australia and at its overseas missions. This has been a guiding principle in the recruitment and promotion practices of the department since the 1980s.

SOCIAL DEPENDENCY OF DIPLOMACY: THE PORTRAIT OF A DIPLOMAT

Diana Digol

Introduction

This article presents the results of a study, based on a survey, of the diplomatic elites in post-communist countries, in which socio-demographic characteristics of emerging diplomatic elites in post-communist Europe were explored. To a greater degree than in older works on political elites and diplomacy, the focus is on new comers into diplomacy, mainly at the entry-level diplomats. It is argued that a better understanding of the diplomatic elite formation process can be achieved by looking at these newcomers to the diplomatic corps.

The aim of this study is to make one more step in the process of exploring modern diplomatic elites.[288] Two criteria distinguish this study. First, there are space and time limitations. Geographically, the study is limited to post-

288 Up to date, very little has been learned about the diplomatic elites and their fundamental sociological characteristics. There are just few studies, which were carried at considerable intervals in the past. See for example: Harr, 1965; Bailey in Plische, 1979: 211–222; Jazbec, 2001; Digol, 2010.

communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The period of time examined is limited to the first decade and a half after the break-up of the old political regime, roughly after 1989. Second, the general sociological characteristics of these diplomats are explored in depth by examining their education, family background and social origins as well as their professional experience.

The study is based on the results of the survey conducted in 2002–2004 and subsequent numerous interviews conducted with diplomats from the focus region in the period from 2004–2012.

Socio-demographic characteristics of diplomats

A thorough examination of the characteristics of the modern diplomat in post-communist states, with a focus on educational background, family background, and social origins provided some interesting insights.

In terms of education, the majority of new comers to diplomacies in the post-communist countries differ from the general population by being uniformly better educated. To put this into perspective, the percentage of the population in these countries studying for an undergraduate university or higher degree does not exceed 24 %, while among newcomers to diplomacy everyone had at least a university or Bachelor's degree. [289] This fact is not surprising: having a university degree is a usual minimum recruitment requirement.

When it comes to the place of studies, future diplomats study in the capital city or abroad. Beginning with the period roughly corresponding to Gorbachev's ascension to power, there has been a new trend in the destination of students seeking to pursue higher education. This trend, which I call "direction west", is towards the established western universities in Germany, the UK, France and the US. Depending of the region, some other tendencies could also be discerned. Hence, some future diplomats attended a university in their "former" capital city; for example, future diplomats from the former national republics of the Soviet Union still pursued a degree from Moscow's universities, while future diplomats from the former constituent parts of Yugoslavia attended the university

289 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1980–2003.

in Belgrade, the trend I named “towards former metropole”. At the same time, young diplomats from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus attended universities in China, Syria, Korea, etc. This tendency, ‘direction Middle East/Asia’ likely developed after the proclamation of independence of these countries. At that moment, they began to redefine their geo-political place and position and thus probably became more interested in establishing ties with neighbouring or close countries, with which relations had been somewhat neglected in the past. This tendency of studying abroad is grounded in the process of opening the borders and the overall liberalisation of political and economical regimes which characterised these countries in the last two decades. Moreover, this tendency seems to be increasing. This is connected to the overall increase of the welfare for certain groups of population, which can now afford paying the tuition fees; the integration of post-communist countries into the “Bologna process,” which provides for an easier mutual recognition of degrees; as well as the increasing globalisation and the appearance of new centres of education excellence (China, Singapore, etc).

Unlike it could be expected by an outsider, future diplomats did not exclusively specialised in diplomacy and international relations during their university studies. Studying law would more likely make you a diplomat as studying foreign affairs. Only one in five future diplomats in the survey actually had a degree in a subject directly related to foreign affairs (that is diplomacy or international relations). In addition, there are many economists, political scientists, historians and philologists among further diplomats.

Arguably, it might be that not all future diplomats surveyed intended to become diplomats when starting their education. It could also be that, given the high status of their families (as shown later), and thus probably better access to information and an easier path to the prestigious educational disciplines but not necessarily to greater wealth (a special feature of the former communist societies), future diplomats did not have to make professional choices early in their lives. They could afford to stay longer in education, concentrate on following a prestigious specialization (such as law or economics) first and could then decide on the area of its applicability.

Or, alternatively, they may have considered international relations to be a subject which could be studied later (for an advanced degree) or in practice (directly on the job or in a training course), while language skills (e.g., the relatively high percentage of philologists) or knowledge of law and economics had to be acquired beforehand. Another explanation might be that, at the time the post-communist diplomatic services were established, the need for people with foreign language skills was high (especially in the new countries) and thus many people with a degree in philology were attracted to the diplomatic service. Or, it could be that an explicit policy to change the former, communist political elites led to a situation in which criteria other than a specialized education in foreign affairs took priority, and this might explain the presence of so many people with specializations only tenuously related to diplomacy.

It could also be that the diplomats today were initially not planning to work in diplomacy because, at that moment, the possibility was seen as remote. However, with the political transformations that took place in the 1990s, many previously provincial cities became capitals of the new states needing to set up their diplomatic services. Thus a remote possibility thereafter became a viable option. It might also have coincided with the period when recent school graduates were deciding upon their career paths and a new option seemed attractive. This could have motivated people with specializations such as philology to shift towards a specialization in foreign affairs.

Future diplomats are polyglots, speaking several languages. As a rule, those coming from break-away entities of the former metropolitan states would speak two languages as native, in addition to one to three foreign languages, most probably English, German, French, Italian or Russian. Thus, an expectation that is necessarily speculative - is that diplomats know more languages than the general population and possibly than other people with the same level (but with different specializations) of education.

Analysis of family status, ethnic origins and area of residence added several additional strokes to the picture of a modern diplomat in post-communist countries. Future diplomats come overwhelmingly from intact small families, with one or two children. The divorce rate among the parents of a future diplomat is significantly lower when compared to a divorce rate in the general populations in those countries. Why might this be important? It could suggest that a traditional intact family background serves as a good prerequisite for a future diplomat. It could also indicate that finding compromises is the innate feature, which future diplomat learns in the family.

There are still more men than women among diplomats. Moreover, it seems that women have to pay a price for their career aspirations, and this price is having their own family. While men tend to be married, women are often not, and this correlation holds, when controlled for age. The explanation for this pattern is not clear. There may possibly be a surplus of women in some of the societies under study which would explain why more women than men remain unmarried. However, it could also be that a (diplomatic) career has different effects on the personal life of female diplomats than it does on male diplomats, adding to the world wide evidence that women in high-powered demanding careers may still be less likely to be married than are men in the same careers.

Diplomats in their majority represent the titular nation and the dominant religion, although there are representatives of ethnic or religious minorities as well. However, the proportion of ethnic or religious minorities among diplomats seems to be lower than among the general population in those countries. Thus, one could conclude that the new diplomatic services are reserved for titular nations. And this is the field where national diplomacies might need to pay attention to assure that Foreign Service reflects better the democratic course of development in these countries and includes the representatives of all population in its variety.

Future diplomats are urban children. It is unusual for a future diplomat to come from a rural area: only at about one in ten diplomats would come from rural areas. If urban background could be somehow expected, the survey data showed that newcomers to the post-communist diplomacies had no relatives in the diplomatic service. This fact might be counterintuitive to the widely held belief that diplomats tend to form a club, society, class or caste that is self-recruiting (Craig, 1953), with strong hereditary traditions and closed to the entry of newcomers outside this circle. Surprising at first sight as it might be, this detail has logical explanation. The fact that the majority of diplomats did not have relatives in the diplomatic service might indicate at least two points. First, if the diplomatic dynasties existed in the communist times, they were destroyed. This is particularly relevant to the countries that inherited the MFAs from the previous regime and adopted a 'lustration' law (Poland, the Czech Republic). This would also imply that intergenerational exchange of skills, knowledge and experience was probably totally or partially lost. Second, it could also reflect a trend, familiar in the civil service in other modern states, according to which kinship relations play a decreasing role in public sphere careers (Putman, 1976: 23). However, none of these trends precludes the fact that in a decade or so there would appear anew the diplomatic dynasties, for good or bad.

Even if not working in diplomacy, the parents of future diplomats are very educated people themselves, with both parents having a university degree or higher. More fathers than mothers would have a PhD degree or higher. Thus, not only the diplomat him/herself but also his/her parents were educated people residing, as a rule, in an urban area. Thus, one can conclude that the future diplomats came generally came from families of urban intellectuals/ intelligentsia. This could also be indicative of the process of 'elite multiplication'.

The diplomatic careers of new comers to diplomacies were very different. There were at least two groups among newcomers to diplomacy: (1) young with no or only a brief previous professional experience; and (2) older with medium or long previous professional experience. While the first group would mainly be represented by recent university graduates, the second group would be much more diverse. A particular phenomenon with the newcomers to post-communist diplomacies in these countries was, what I call, a phenomenon of "one-term only" ambassadors. In many post-communist countries, among the first ambassadors named after the change of the political regimes, were many mature professionals in other walks of life, but total novices in the field of diplomacy. In the case of new countries, (discussed later) this is easily explainable by the lack of choice, in the case of old states, this was a rather conscious choice of changing the previous heads of mission, compromised by the links to old regime with new faces. Many of these “one-term only” ambassadors came from academia. Hence, some examples from Poland include Ryszard Żółtaniecki, a polish poet and sociologist, ambassador to Greece and Cypurs (1991–1996), Tadeusz Diem, an engineer, ambassador to Serbia (2001–2005), Henryk Lipszyc, a specialist in Japanese culture, became an ambassador to Japan (1991–1996). Raisu Grecu of Moldova, university professor, served as an ambassador to Austria (2000–2002).

With respect to recruitment channels into the diplomatic service, overall, an examination was the main recruitment channel by which the majority of future diplomats entered into national Foreign Service. Another successful path was by interning in the MFA. However, a personal invitation by one of the recruiters remained a significant channel through which aspiring candidates make their way into diplomacy. The need to take the recruitment examination in this case was obviated by virtue of the personal invitation or internship experience. The criteria used by the people who invited candidates into the Foreign Service - whether there were personal relationships between the recruiters and candidates, or whether the recruiters were looking for special credentials in the candidates or whether the criteria were altogether different – are unknown. Overall, the practice of issuing a personal invitation to join the Foreign Service is a good example of the cooptation of elites, which in periods of stability would serve as strong evidence of the reproduction of elites.

In addition to this, the job in diplomacy for many diplomats was not the only professional occupation. They were teaching at the university, providing consultancy or translating/ interpreting services, giving language tutorials, publishing articles or pursuing a higher education degree or other trainings, all involving the use of intellectual capital, etc.

Drop off rate at the early stage of post-communist diplomacies was high. Economic factor, unclear rules of promotion and internal structure, lack of meritocracy as well as channels of communication pushed out many talented diplomats, on one side. Diplomacies at this stage were also not immune to the people pursuing their personal goals, having little in common with serving the state, but rather acquiring benefits and opportunities which diplomatic statutes (passport) was providing. Although not a massive phenomenon, but present in practically every post-communist diplomacy were cases when national diplomats would leave the diplomatic service, and not return the country at their first trip or assignment abroad. However, there is no reliable statistical data to further quantify the drop-out rate in general or by country.

Emerging diplomatic elite in the new and old states

Diplomats in post-communist countries are a reflection of political process taking part in their countries. In this light, an interesting comparison is provided by analysing newcomers to diplomacy in new and old countries.[290] The underlying question is to find out whether the acquisition of statehood (and, as one of the consequences, the need to establish the Foreign Service) made the diplomatic elites in the new countries different from the diplomatic elites in the old countries. The result of the survey confirmed that the newcomers to diplomacy in the old and new countries were similar in many respects. They had a similar level of education (university or higher), they spoke the same number of foreign languages and they predominantly came from the capital cities. In both groups of countries there were diplomats who joined the Foreign Service immediately after graduation; there were also those who had tested other careers first.

Nevertheless, there were a number of differences. The entry-level diplomats in the new countries were younger that their counterparts in the old countries. Furthermore, women were better represented in the diplomatic services of the new countries than in those of the old countries. Although a recruitment examination was an important recruitment channel into the Foreign Service in both research groups, in the case of the new countries, personal invitation and internship were almost as important as the recruitment examination. This phenomenon was not observed in the group of old countries. The entry-level diplomats from the new countries were also more likely to hold an additional job while working for the Foreign

290 The term 'new countries' includes countries that faced an additional challenge of transition – the need to create a Foreign Service, usually from scratch, while the term "old countries" refers to those countries that have inherited the MFAs together with its staff from the previous regime.

Service of their country than their counterparts from the old countries. On the other hand, there was some indication of the existence of diplomatic legacies in the case of the old countries.

Emerging diplomatic elite in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) and former Soviet Union countries (FSU)

The division of diplomats into those coming from the CEE and FSU countries produced more differences than the division of diplomats into new and old countries. Furthermore, the CEE/FSU division produced more differences than similarities in general.

A diplomat from an FSU country was younger (average age 31–32 years), more likely to be a man than a woman, and just starting his/her professional career with the diplomatic service. S/he almost certainly had a Master's degree and perhaps even a PhD degree. S/he probably joined the Foreign Service after doing an internship with the MFA; otherwise, s/he either passed a recruitment examination for the Foreign Service or was personally invited by one of the recruiters of the MFA to join it. After joining the service, every second entry-level diplomat had additional jobs such as translating/ interpreting services, teaching at the university, or publishing articles (TTP).

A diplomat from a CEE country was more likely a mature woman or man who had already had professional experience prior to Foreign Service. In order to enter the Foreign Service, s/he took a recruitment examination. Only in exception cases was s/he personally invited by one of the recruiters of the MFA or hired after an announcement in the mass media without taking a recruitment examination. S/he spoke more foreign languages than his/her counterpart from an FSU country. Once in the Foreign Service, s/he rarely held any additional jobs; however, when s/he did, it was similar to those performed by FSU diplomats.

In both cases the diplomats came from urban areas and mainly from the capital cities. A rural background was atypical for both research groups. Overall, in the case of FSU diplomats, one may generally speak of *young* diplomats, while in case of CEE diplomats, it is often more accurate to speak of *new* diplomats.

Emerging diplomatic elite by smaller geographical regions

Division by smaller geographical regions helped to further reveal many differences that otherwise were obscured. The Baltic countries are unique in tree respects. First, there were more women than men among newcomers to the post-communist diplomacies in the Baltic countries[291]. Second, new comers to diplomacy in these countries were coming in equal share from the capital or other settlements. In other words, the type of residence does not seem to play an important role in the case of Baltic countries, unlike in all other groups. This might be exclaimed by the relative small size of these states and their capitals. Third, the newcomers to diplomacy did not have a PhD degree; moreover, they came almost in equal numbers from families in which parents had and did not have a university education. There could be a relationship between the type of residence of the parents and their level of education. In this case, a high percentage of parents living in rural areas might be connected to a high percentage of parents not having a university degree.

It could certainly prove useful to have a description of the diplomats from the Baltic countries previously in the Soviet diplomatic service and to compare it to the new situation. However, these data are not available. Thus, the following conclusion is made on a subjective perception of reality. The tentative conclusion is that the newly created diplomatic service in the Baltic states accurately represents the distribution of the population. The elite component in the newly created diplomatic service, at least at the beginning, is not very pronounced. This could be due to the fact that, in an effort to eliminate the former elite from power, the children of that elite were also affected. By contrast, people with no such connections enjoyed an advantage; this could explain the high percentage of diplomats in the survey with a rural residence type and with parents lacking a university degree. This particular combination could also explain why none of the diplomats in this group had a PhD degree. Alternatively, it could also be evidence of the implementation of democratic principles of recruitment, i.e., evidence of a meritocracy. Or it could be evidence of a quota system (including to women) applied either in the diplomatic service only or, more generally, in the civil service of the state.

291 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

The newcomers to diplomacy in the Balkan states[292], are the most polyglots of all. In addition, more often than not, many future diplomats came to the Foreign Service from other walks of life.

The newcomers to diplomacy in Caucasian[293] region were in 3 out of four cases a man, having a Master's or even a PhD degree, joining the diplomatic service straight after the university studies, with one of the parents having a PhD degree as well. A particularity of this group was that the percentage of people entering diplomacy via recruitment examination was the lowest; at the same time, the importance of an internship as a recruiting mechanism was the highest. In two thirds of the cases, his/her job in the Foreign Service was his/her first job. Unlike the Balkan group, the newcomers to Caucasian diplomacy spoke at most one foreign language. To cap it all, the main recruitment channel into the Foreign Service was not the recruitment examination, like in other countries, but an internship. A capital city background, an educated family and a Master's degree are the starting points in diplomacy for many diplomats from the Caucasian states.

Women were severely unrepresented in the diplomacies of Central Asian[294] countries, comparing to the representation of women in tertiary education. The percentage of diplomats having a PhD degree in this group was the largest among all groups. The importance of a personal invitation as a recruitment tool was also the highest; the second most important channel was an internship; and the least important was a recruitment examination – only one in ten diplomats had to take an examination to join the national diplomatic service. Although less than 10 % of the country's population lives in the capital city, all diplomats in the survey came from the capital city. One third of diplomats acknowledged having relatives in diplomacy, and another third abstained from specifying whether they had relatives or not. Recalling that the major recruitment channel into the Foreign Service in the Central Asia group is personal invitation by one of the recruiters (in 40 % of cases), it could be hypothesised that these two trends are interrelated. One additional feature is the education of the

292 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia Montenegro, Slovenia.
293 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia.
294 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

parents of diplomats. Every fourth parent had a PhD degree. Summing up, a diplomat from the Central Asia group was a male with a Master's or PhD degree. He had educated parents, lived in the capital city and had relatives in diplomacy. It could be speculated that one of his relatives (parents) invited him to join the national Foreign Service. The only weak point of the diplomat as compared to diplomats from other groups is that he spoke two or even only one foreign language.

Emerging diplomatic elite by the membership factor (EU)

This factor helped to elucidate a number of particularities about the research groups. Women were proportionally better represented in the EU member research group than in the non-EU member research group. One of the reasons for that might be a reflection of a trend of having more women in governmental structures characteristic of western countries, in particular Scandinavian countries (Putnam, 1976: 33); or it could reflect EU requirements (explicit or implicit) or an influence of political culture coming from the EU, or it could simply be a sign of higher activity of women in these countries.

Furthermore, the diplomats from the EU group appeared to speak more foreign languages. However, at the same time, the number of philologists was higher in that group. Consequently, there is a possibility that the higher incidence of philologists in the EU group may have influenced the average number of languages spoken by diplomats in that group compared to diplomats in the non-EU group.

A more pronounced difference was revealed by an analysis of the type of residence of diplomats. It was much more diversified in the EU group than it was in the non-EU group. The diplomats from the EU group more often came from other urban and rural areas than diplomats in the non-EU group.

Another distinction between research groups was revealed by an examination of professional careers. While in both groups diplomats typically took the recruitment examination, the weight of recruitment examination in the EU countries was 1.5 times greater than in non-EU countries. Furthermore, the groups differed significantly in the alternative channels of recruitment into the MFA. In case of the non-EU group, a previous internship was an important path into the diplomatic service, while in the EU group this pathway barely existed.

Yet another variation between groups occurred in the number of diplomats performing additional jobs while in the Foreign Service. Fewer diplomats from the EU group were involved in additional job activities than diplomats from the non-EU group. This difference might be explained by the heavier diplomatic workload in the then-EU candidate countries, or it could be explained simply by better remuneration in the EU member research group, or else it might result from a higher unemployment rate and thus greater difficulty in finding an additional job.

Picture of the newcomer to the post-communist diplomacy

A post-communist diplomat was a highly educated person. S/he studied at the university in the capital city of her/his country, and every second case earning a Master's degree, and in every tenth case already pursuing a PhD degree. Every fourth diplomat specialized in law, as a rule international law; every fifth in foreign affairs (diplomacy or international relations) and every tenth in international economics for his/her highest degree. Diplomats coming from formerly multinational states spoke two native languages. In addition, the young diplomats spoke two or more foreign languages, English usually being one of them.

Diplomat belongs to the titular nation of his/her country and also adhered to the mainstream religion of that country. S/he came from an intact family (her/his parents were not divorced) and s/he had one brother or sister. At the time s/he became a diplomat, her/his parents lived in the capital city. As a rule, both parents had at least a university degree. Very few diplomats have parents of modest social background (workers or farmers).

For the most part s/he was the first diplomat in the family line. The normal path to becoming a diplomat is taking a recruitment examination. However, there are important 'side' channels – personal invitation by one of the recruiters for the MFA or an internship with the MFA. If this is the case, there is usually no need to take the recruitment examination.

The position with the national Foreign Service could either mark the beginning of a professional career or a career change in the middle of the career. After joining the foreign service, diplomat as a rule continued either teaching at a university, TTP, be it in order to supplement their income and provide for ‘plan B’ in case the diplomatic career will become no longer satisfying.

Conclusion

This article presented the results of the survey of the diplomatic elites in the post-communist countries supplemented with the results of the personal interviews with diplomats from post-communist countries. Geographically, the research area was limited to the post-communist countries of CEE and the former USSR. Chronologically, the survey covered the period of a decade and a half after the change of the political regime (1989–2004) and interviews were conducted in the period from 2002 to 2012.

The analysis was based on a fairly large database derived from the survey. This survey provides detailed information on diplomats’ demographic characteristics, educational and family background, social origins, and professional experiences. This ultimately led to large-scale social patterns being revealed by the survey data.

The composition of the emerging diplomatic elites shows some striking similarities and some striking differences.

Similarities: Data describing the general background of diplomats show three areas of important similarities of the diplomatic elites across the relevant countries. These are: education, social background, and recruitment.

Education: Diplomats, regardless of their country, are drawn from the pool of people having at least a university education, and the diplomats across countries thus have comparatively the same level of education. The new diplomatic services comprise mainly humanistic intellectuals: diplomats from different countries tend to specialise predominantly in law, foreign affairs and international economics. Diplomats with a specialisation in technical areas are not prominently present. In addition, the diplomats speak two or more foreign languages, English being among them.

Social background: The social background of the new diplomatic elite indicates that entry-level diplomats were recruited from all social classes.

The new diplomatic elite consists of the son of bus driver from a remote village in one country, the son of a dissident in another country and the daughter of a minister in yet another country. However, the diplomats coming from relatively high-status families are significantly overrepresented. Considering both parents' education and occupation, it emerges that the members of the emerging diplomatic elite come predominantly from high-status families. Nearly 90 % come from urban, middle-class families. Another similarity is a very high percentage - up to 85 % - of those who were brought up in intact families. Occupationally, the parents do not have strong links to the communist *nomenklatura*: the overwhelming majority of parents did not hold prominent executive positions in the past. Rather they belonged to professional classes (intelligentsia) in the communist times. The rise to power of this social category seems to be typical of all countries under scrutiny in this survey: the children of highly educated professionals occupy a particularly important position in the new diplomatic elite. Moreover, a diplomat belongs to the titular nation and to the main religion (if s/he professes one). Thus, so far it can be summarized that a diplomat is a middle-class, urban-born intellectual, drawn almost exclusively from the titular nation. These very facts are important indicators of the social and cultural capital of entry-level diplomats that shaped their personalities.

Recruitment: It is argued that the new formula of diplomatic elite recruitment has been introduced, abandoning the class origin criteria, broadening the pool of eligible candidates to include people from different social classes and geographical origins and stressing the importance of educational skills. As a result of this, not paradoxically, the applicants with university education (and often higher) from urban high-status families are the most successful and thus form a majority among entry-level diplomats. Furthermore, while recruitment of diplomats was once virtually limited to men, among the members of the entry-level diplomatic elites, women are represented more often. However, it is impossible to say that the change in the gender structure of the diplomatic elites is impressive: women are still underrepresented, and diplomacy remains a job for man. A formalized recruitment channel via an official recruitment examination is a typical path in many countries. Two categories of people formed the core of the emerging diplomatic elites in the post-communist aftermath: (1) the recent graduates of universities who started their career with the national Foreign Service and who are thus also young; and (2) the mature professionals who started their career somewhere else and made their way into diplomacy later in life. As a rule, these diplomats are the first in their family to choose this career. On the one hand, this suggests that the intergenerational transmission of values (practices and experiences) was probably distorted or even lost. However, whether this also means that the previous networking element of the communist recruitment system has been eradicated is more doubtful.

Overall, the analysis of diplomats in post-communist Europe demonstrated that diplomats were not drawn proportionally from all segments of society. On the contrary, they were disproportionably drawn from a very exclusive segment of society: urban highly educated people, the urban intelligentsia.

Differences: The differences in background variables among diplomatic elites in various countries are also an important feature. The differences mainly occur in age, gender, recruitment channels, previous professional experience, residence type and additional jobs performed. However, not every division into groups of countries produced differences in connection with all these variables. Thus, a division of countries into new and old revealed that diplomats in new countries are younger than in the old countries. Moreover, there are more women in the diplomatic services of new countries than in those of old countries. Furthermore, in the new countries there are three equally important recruitment channels (internship, personal invitation, and recruitment examination), while in the old countries there is clearly only one favoured recruitment channel – the recruitment examination. In addition, more diplomats from new countries have had additional jobs than diplomats in the old countries. Why age? Establishing new diplomacies was only one of the tasks the new countries were facing as a result of their independence and as a result of regime change. Thus, professional personnel were in great shortage. Consequently, the new countries often had to look for recent university graduates to fill in the vacancies. Why gender, why more women? It could be a reflection of the effort of new countries to change (circulate) the elites. A prevalence of men in the previous elite and a general shortage of personnel for the reasons described above could suggest that new countries, in an effort to change the previous elite, may have turned their attention towards an under-represented group of the population, i.e., women. As a result, women may have been encouraged to apply and to join the political elite in general, or national diplomatic services in particular. However, it is also possible that more women than men work in diplomacy because of other reasons, including in particular financial reasons. The salary of diplomats in new countries may have been miserable, and men may not have been keen on joining the diplomatic service. If that were the case, then women would presumably have been taken in. The plurality of the channels of recruitment could reflect the fluctuations in rules of personnel policy; otherwise, it could also be explainable in terms of the establishment of new diplomatic services and new states, since the development of a good professional service is a long-term operation where the normal time-lag between the launch and the maturation of the service is measured in decades rather than in years.

A division of countries into the CEE and the FSU indicates that a diplomat from the FSU is younger and more likely to be a man than his/her CEE counterpart. In the FSU there are several recruitment channels into diplomatic service, while in the CEE the recruitment examination is almost the only present channel of recruitment. The diplomats from FSU countries start their professional experience with diplomacy while the diplomats from CEE countries join the diplomatic service after developing significant professional experience. One explanation could be statistical: in the CEE group there are more old countries, while in the FSU there are more new countries, and so findings from the above paragraph would explain these differences. However, in that case one should find more men in the diplomatic service in the FSU than in that of the CEE – which is not the case. This counter-finding indicates that there are true differences between these groups exceeding the one explainable only in the terms of the new/old state dichotomy. Thus, in the FSU a young man, freshly graduated from university, was accepted into the diplomatic service by means other than a recruitment examination, whereas in the CEE an older woman with significant professional experience was recruited into the diplomatic service following a recruitment examination. These results tend to suggest that the hypothesis that women joined diplomatic services because men did not want these positions should be rejected: the net income in all CEE countries was superior to that in the FSU countries. Nevertheless, the hypothesis is not rejected because it could be possible that, in comparative sectoral terms, the diplomatic service was a better paid sector in the FSU countries and a worse paid sector in CEE countries. The data are insufficient to further test this hypothesis. Yet another conclusion is that the CEE countries managed to work out operational strategies and tactics and establish organisational structures faster than FSU countries. The explanation might again be economic in nature. It can be a reflection of international support (both in economic and institutional terms), the so-called 'distance to Brussels', when the CEE countries benefited from more attention and help than the FSU countries. As a result, six countries (out of twelve) from the CEE and only three countries (out of fifteen) from the FSU managed to qualify for and secure EU membership. Twice as many diplomats in the FSU countries held an additional job than in the CEE countries. The economic explanation might be plausible here as well.

In an effort to clear some patterns already discovered with the use of the previous division, these two geographic regions were further divided into smaller geographical regions: Baltic, Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. Further to the finding that diplomats in the FSU are younger than in the CEE, there is a finding that a diplomat is youngest in Caucasus countries and oldest in Balkan countries. These groups of countries also differ in gender representation. The only group of countries where women are overrepresented (!) is the Baltic group of countries; in the Caucasus and Central Asia groups, women are strongly under-represented; balance is achieved in the Balkan group of countries. As concerns previous professional experience, the difference is greatest between the Baltic and Balkan countries: only one in four diplomats in the Baltic countries and every second person in the Balkan countries has previously had a career outside the MFA. This difference can be justified by age: the Baltic diplomat is the youngest, while the Balkan diplomat is the oldest. The Baltic group of countries is also the group where the weight of the capital city background is the smallest in the residence type. On the other hand, the weight of the capital city is greatest in the Central Asia group – *all* diplomats in the survey are from the capital city. The other two groups are somewhere in between. In terms of additional jobs performed, in the Baltic and Balkan countries less than 30 % performed additional jobs, while in the Central Asia group 45 % and in Caucasus almost 70 % of people had additional jobs. Thus, to conclude, there is a large difference between the diplomatic elites of the Baltic states and those in the Caucasus and Central Asia despite the fact that, until recently, these countries belonged to the same state unity. The factors (besides geographic area) that may account for these differences abound: the previous history of independence, the adoption of a lustration law, EU membership, religion, state size, 'distance to Brussels', etc.

Grouping countries by EU membership (2005) helps to reveal a number of differences. There are more women in EU-member diplomatic services than there are in the non-EU member group. The diplomats in the EU countries speak more foreign languages. Furthermore, in terms of their origins, diplomats in the EU countries better represent the country geographically, in particular other urban areas. Again, the channels of recruitment differ. In the EU countries, the recruitment examination accounts for every second entrant, while in the non-EU countries the diplomats are also personally invited or recruited after internships. This finding suggests that, in the non-EU countries more often than in the EU countries, some cases are dealt with on an individual basis, according to either the personal/ family status of a candidate or familiarity of the recruiter with a candidate. There is also an indication that, in the EU countries, fewer people have relatives already working in diplomacy than in the non-EU countries. Geographic origins in the EU countries are also broader than in the non-EU countries. What can be said is that the EU countries seem to have a better established diplomatic service in terms of organization, which assures the same procedure of entrance into diplomacy – via recruitment examination - and provides an opportunity for people from all over the country to have access. These findings, coupled with the fact that fewer people in the EU countries have relatives in diplomacy, suggest a high probability that the existent recruitment system is meritocratic in nature. Only one in five diplomats in the EU countries, and almost every second diplomat in non-EU countries, held an additional job. Does this mean that diplomats in the EU countries had a much heavier workload than in the non-EU countries? Or does it mean that diplomats in the non-EU countries, by virtue of having additional jobs, performed worse as diplomats and this is why they are still non-EU countries? Or was it the financial incentive salary of diplomats (and other rewards) that made the additional job unnecessary in the case of the EU countries and made it vital in case of the non-EU countries? These are rhetorical questions merely suggesting possible answers.

What does this tell us? The presence of these characteristics among the diplomats under study points to the conclusion that entry-level diplomats have the features of the established modern elite. The picture of a diplomat from a post-communist country is similar to the existing picture of a diplomat from any western country.

This leads to three further observations: First, it is politically reassuring for western communities that functional elite with a certain set of qualities similar to those in western countries is coming into being. Second, it is theoretically comforting for political elite scholars that the diplomatic elite, a part of political elite, is resistant to changes, maybe even particularly resistant to changes; even after a change of the political regime, diplomats continue to be recruited from a strata from which the diplomats would otherwise be recruited in a country experiencing a period of political stability. Third, a modern diplomat is a reflection of the society from which is drawn, on one side. At the same time, the diplomat, given the nature of the work, is also an agent of change.

Limitations of the study derive in the first place from the fact that the study treats the diplomatic service of each particular country as a statistically consistent body. The diplomatic elite of any country is of course not an undifferentiated group. Although they all have something in common, it is fairly reasonable to expect that within each country's diplomatic elite there are different groupings. However, by relaxing the assumption about their differences, it was possible to flesh out features characteristic to the countries with comparable historical legacies, from the same geographical regions, in the same political groupings or with similar cultural values based on a number of selected factors.

Further on, the study derives from the approach adopted – looking at the diplomats at the point of entry into the Foreign Service. Looking at just one generation of elites necessarily precluded an examination of the inter-generational aspects of the transformation.

Yet another limitation of the study is due to the novelty of the research. The inability to compare the results of this research with those of previous similar studies presented a serious impediment throughout the process. However, I will feel rewarded if this study serves as a reference point for other researchers in the field.

What can be stated with certainty, however, is that the diplomatic elite are composed of men and women of a similar level of education and homogeneous social origins. Those in diplomacy today are very likely to be the descendants of highly educated and professional mothers and fathers. The entry-level diplomatic elite are composed of 'second generation' professionals. High education is the central feature of diplomatic elite, but not the sole important one. Two other key structural characteristics of the diplomatic elites are social origins and residence type. Diplomats are disproportionately drawn from upper social strata. Diplomatic elites are predominantly residing in urban areas, often in the capital city. Moreover, this relative homogeneity extends beyond education, social status and residence type to include such traits as gender, ethnicity, religion, and occupation. The diplomatic elite remains dominated by men of titular nation and mainstream religion. Kinship has become a much less prominent credential for diplomatic elite recruitment. The presence of these characteristics among the diplomats under study points to the conclusion that entry-level diplomats have the features of the established modern elite.

Although interest in the research questions will probably not disappear even ten years from now, the answers might change considerably. Further research, but probably even more importantly, the constantly changing nature of diplomacy and hence of diplomats will contribute to this. The intention was however to lay a benchmark, a point of departure, a point of reference as regards the characteristics of diplomats in the post-communist countries in the first decade and a half after the change of the political regime.

WHERE HAVE ALL THE FLOWERS GONE?[295]
(Protocol and its Social Context)

Janja Rebić Avguštin

Introduction

History of diplomacy as well as history in general is full of examples signifying the importance of ceremony in international relations. Throne rooms were equipped with mechanical devices[296] to conjure magic shows for foreigners, entrances were added to halls where important meetings were to take place, duels were fought to secure a preferable hand-shaking order with the sovereign. Centuries are full of opportunities where the form was indeed as important as the content, or rather – even more important. Where the reputation and rhetorical skills of a person were the only prerequisites

295 Title of a 2008 documentary film, directed by Arturo Perez Jr., title a folk song originally written by Pete Seeger in 1955 and translated into more than 20 languages, and title of a Slovenian folk song originally composed by Dr. Gustav Ipavec. In all cases, the works use the loss of flowers as symbols of losing youth, naivety, love and young men to war. Often in Slovenian this phrase is also used in everyday language to signify a loss of and yearning for better times.

296 Mechanical lions which roared, golden birds singing, a mobile throne (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 16).

to becoming an envoy, where prestige was just as important as military might in upholding the order of things, where sitting orders were in fact determined by the actual state of animosity among nations and sovereigns.

Many things have changed, the science of international relations often marks 1648 as one of the bigger turning points in the shaping of the international community into what it is today. This article will argue that the process of determining who and what are the actors in the international arena as well as determining the ground rules for relations between them has unequivocally diminished the role of ceremony in international relations. Obviously, the article will be based on the understanding that diplomacy and its developments depend on what kind of society is shaping and implementing a particular diplomacy.[297] It is our belief that diplomacy reflects and resonates dimensions and features of a society and the circumstances this society exists in. Changes in societies signify changes in execution of diplomacy and ceremonial which will be demonstrated through various examples from history.

For the sake of clarity, the first part of the article will define ceremony and its roles in relation to foreign policy and hence international relations. Further, it will also put forward a short summary of developments in regards to codification, regulation and conduct of international relations. The article will then continue in more detail with a short presentation of codification of protocol rules and ceremony. Parallel to these, concrete examples will be provided to illustrate the changes and their significance. The basic assumption of this article lies in the understanding that more codification of diplomacy signifies less room for ceremony and its purposes. In fact, the main hypothesis is: with the codification of diplomatic and consular relations and bureaucratization of international relations, the varieties and differences in the ceremonies have become minimized or even significantly inexistent making the ceremonial part of protocol in fact irrelevant. It seems that what matters is only the existence of a particular ceremony and the equal and reciprocal execution of it, but no longer how shiny, how magnificent and how prestigious it is. Military honours are, for

297 In this respect, the society is understood in the terms of a nation-state as well as the so-called international society (groups of nations and states in international organisations).

example, executed with the same elements for every foreign state dignitary of the same level in a particular hosting country. Representatives of allied nations do not get more soldiers in the honorary guard than those of less friendly nations for the same occasion.

What does it all mean? If ceremony and protocol treat all the countries the same, how does a country signify the level of friendliness between two nations? If foreign policy is a reflection of interior policies and protocol is a reflection of traditions, historical developments and customs of a nation, what is replacing the significance of ceremony? Or has ceremony – the driving force of international relations for millennia, simply become obsolete? Has bureaucratization of international relations erased all opportunity for symbolism, ritual and prestige? Is the romantic notion of diplomacy as art finally giving into the prescribed rules of civil servants and state administration? Does this (international) standardisation implicitly exclude the impact a society through its culture and history has on the shaping of its diplomacy? The last part of the article will attempt to answer some of these questions. Since diplomacy as such has been touched very rarely by international relations theory, and protocol and ceremony even less so, these answers might turn out to be mere guesses and speculations. However, the final conclusions will also be based on concrete observations of current protocol events on the highest state level.

Protocol and ceremony – Phobos and Deimos[298]

There are as many definitions of protocol as there are authors of those definitions. Protocol can be seen and felt, yet not touched. It can be described, yet it remains a mystery. At this point it is fair to note that the word itself has many meanings – from usage in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) fields[299] to documents signed at the end of international conferences (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol).[300] It is also

298 The two moons of planet Mars, aptly named after Greek divinity figures representing fear and dread which their names also translate as; the two most common emotions evoked when encountering protocol and ceremony. Though such a statement might be dismissed as populist, anecdotal, urban legend even, my experience as a Protocol Officer more often than not confirmed such a point of view.

299 For instance, IP (internet protocol) determines sets of rules for sending and receiving data in a network, i.e. rules on how we access and use the internet.

300 *The Kyoto Protocol*, 1997, signed 11 December in Kyoto, entered into force 16 February

universally used as a "generic term for diplomatic etiquette and rules of procedure" (The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, 1998: 454). In its very essence however, protocol describes a set of procedures and rules on how certain things are to be done.[301] In this sense, protocols exist in our everyday lives as there is a list of procedures, i.e. ceremonies we follow to get even the most mundane things done – from creating to-do lists at the office to how we tie our shoes. Indeed, in its broadest sense a cooking recipe is in fact a protocol. Even though this article will focus on ceremony at the highest state level, we mention these notions to point out that ceremony and protocol as principles are much more present and significant in our societies than we might realize. In fact, the extent of embedment of protocol and ceremony in a society strongly indicates how these rituals are in fact a product of a society, its circumstances, organization and habits.

However, it is important to note that state ceremony (its organisation and execution) is only one part of state protocol as rules that govern relations between states most commonly also encompass order of precedence, diplomatic correspondence, and procedures regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities.[302] These services are in most countries – in fact the only exception to this rule known to this author is Slovenia,[303] rendered through a unit located within the country's ministry of foreign affairs (MFA), usually named 'diplomatic protocol'. This article shall focus on contacts between the highest representatives of states as we have observed some interesting and important developments in the conduct of international relations and we thus intend to show that the rise of modern states and bureaucratization of relations between them have led to a significant decrease in the meaning and symbolism of ceremony.

2005.

301 The word itself derives from old Greek 'protos' and 'kolla' meaning 'first' and 'glued'; it was the piece of paper that was attached at the beginning of a document which described how the contents of that document were to be executed.

302 "Protocol is the term given to the procedural rules of diplomacy, some but not all of which concern elaborate ceremonial" (Berridge, 2002: 107).

303 In the Republic of Slovenia the office of the diplomatic protocol is also organised within the foreign ministry, however protocol and ceremony at the highest levels is organised and executed by the Protocol of the Republic of Slovenia, a government office.

Begin at the beginning

The joke in the protocol world is that the profession of the protocol office is the second oldest in the world, importantly signifying its role between the first forms of society – from tribes and nations to later political entities. Though the science and theory of international relations in most cases acknowledges the institute of proper diplomacy to begin more or less with the beginning of 'authentic international relations' when international diplomatic communication becomes a constant and institutionalised practice,[304] there are numerous cases and examples of diplomatic activities from all over the world accompanied by protocol and ceremony millennia before the Congress of Westphalia in 1648 establishing an international community of equal sovereign states. Even the oldest of societies and tribes were in some form of contact with their neighbours using a particular code of communication (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 1), usually granting the safety (even sanctity) of the 'envoys'. Rules governing life and after-life of ancient Egyptians, envoys in Homer's Iliad, order of precedence at a court carved in walls in Cyprus 2,500 years ago, first documents – contracts drafted between Ramses II and Hattusili III,[305] Laws of Manu – traditional Hindu texts prescribing the ways to live for different classes in the Indian society, prescriptions of formalities of offering and declining gifts in Ancient China. During Renaissance with prospering Italian city states the development of diplomacy (and with it protocol and ceremony) enters a whole new level. First permanent missions and professional envoys are being used for communication between rulers, the first order of precedence is written,[306] European courts introduce a new profession of the grand

304 Although Hamilton and Langhorne for instance claim that the infrequency in fact ended already with the 15th century (1995: 24). The first permanent mission was in fact established in 1455 in Genoa by the Duke of Milan Francesco Sforza (Benedetti, 2009: 65). Dembinski (1988: 3) also writes that diplomatic and consular missions began taking form (which in general they have kept until now) already in the 16th century. Similarly, Jönsson and Hall (2005: 3) claim that diplomacy is a "timeless, existential phenomenon," an institution which "precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years."

305 In fact, the Treaty of Kadesh determining the borderline between the two kingdoms in 1258 BC is one of the oldest (preserved) treaties in history and still serves as a template – it follows a set pattern of preamble, historical introduction, provisions, deposition, list of divine witnesses, and, finally, curses and blessings (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 46).

306 Pope Julius II whose papacy among others resulted also in some famous decisions regarding Henry VIII's marriages adopted the famous order of precedence in 1504 as one of the tools

master of ceremonies, first diplomatic protocol handbook is written.[307] Despite all these efforts of codification – or sometimes exactly because of these attempts, quarrels, disputes and duels were occurring quite often due to questions of protocol (especially precedence). In 1659 the French and the Spanish ambassador carriages met in a narrow street. Neither wanted to yield and only with the arrival of the Dutch representatives on the scene a solution was possible: they brought down the fence at the edge of the road and the carriages were then able to proceed simultaneously (Benedetti, 2009: 67). There was much discussion on the old continent about which criteria to use to establish an order of precedence that would be applicable for all occasion and for all sovereigns, regardless of their relation with the Holy See.[308] The Congress of Westphalia contributed significantly to this discussion with the establishment of equality between all states, but this achievement gained importance only in later centuries when it comes to protocol matters.

Even though Napoleon was in fact the first to establish a protocol office similar to the ones we have today, it was the congress era after his defeat that brought about the first truly international codification of the order of precedence.[309] At the Vienna Congress in 1815 the four diplomatic ranks were established with hierarchy between them that in its principle still applies today:[310] 1. ambassadors, legates and nuncios, 2. envoys

to deal with rivalling Spain and France; composed of two parts *Ordo Regnum Christianorum* and *Ordo Ducum* and used as a template for future attempts to put down precedence among European rulers. Interestingly enough, he also officially founded the Swiss Guard as the permanent protection for popes.

307 De Verneuil, master of ceremonies at the French court in the mid 1700s, kept a detailed diary of rules of conduct and hence created what is now known as the first manual, which had been used already by his contemporaries as a handbook (Benedetti, 2009: 66). However, the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyogenius wrote a 'book of ceremonies' which served as a manual for his successors already some centuries before that and Renaissance Venice also kept a record (*Libro Ceremoniale*) of exact ceremonies performed (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 49).

308 Another clear example of how the shape and organisation of society in a particular point in time was a significant factor in prescribing diplomacy.

309 Interestingly enough, at that very congress additional doors had to be built in the Metternich hall where the signing of the document took place – to ensure that all five sovereigns entered the hall at the same time and with the same grandeur (Vukadinović, 1995: 129).

310 This codification is a major French victory as these rules importantly trump the order of precedence laid down by Pope Julius II (Berridge, 2002: 108). It is important to note that the *Rex Franciae* was put behind the *Imperator* and the *Rex Romanorum* while the new rules made them equal. Another achievement of this congress was to put an end to the aristocratic

extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, 3. ministers resident, 4. *chargés d'affaires* (The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, 1998: 454). At the Aachen Congress in 1818 further rules were adopted that also still apply today: order of precedence among diplomats of the same rank is established by the rule of the length of service (Ibid. and Berridge, 2002: 108) in a posting (determined by the hour of official notification of their arrival to the receiving country) (Benedetti, 2009: 68); they also agreed that only diplomats of the first order (ambassadors and nuncios) hold a representative position (Ibid. and Allott, 2002: 380) as well as that treaties would be signed by representatives plenipotentiary in an alphabetical order (Berridge, 2002: 108). Coincidentally, since then the historiography of diplomacy and protocol became much poorer with examples of disputes caused by ceremonial issues. At a general level, permanent diplomatic relations between monarchies on the one hand and republics on the other implied recognition of the respective systems (Mösslang and Riotte, 2008: 16). One notable case of a dispute over order of precedence remains however the unstable relationship of UK with Japan and China in the 19th century: in the former the British minister to Japan had to "make it clear that it saw the emperor as holding supreme authority and that, accordingly, it would treat the shogun as a chief minister but no more" (Best, 2008: 235) while Queen Victoria refused to engage in the practice of sharing family news with the Chinese emperor on the grounds that there was 'no personal connection between her and that court' as imperial audiences were granted very rarely and 'visits by European royalty to the court at Peking were not encouraged' (Best, 2008: 239). These examples also clearly demonstrate the differences in execution of diplomacy and ceremony as a function of society rules.

The twentieth century was remarkable in many aspects, in regards to the matter of this article it was the century that provided us with the universal regulation of diplomatic and consular relations between all states. In the decades when half of the world's population was gaining its own independence[311] and when theory and practice began to notice other actors

old order where there were no rules about who could participate and act in the international arena and ended what Wheatcroft (in Allott, 2002: 384) named the *Hofmafia*.

311 In fact, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 2) claim that it is exactly the appearance of these

in international relations, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,[312] adopted in 1961 and 1963 respectively, were enshrined by the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. Even though one could claim that these conventions are based on two fundamental points: sovereignty of states and the need to maintain the international order (Benedetti, 2009: 69), one can also observe that most of the Articles (53 in the first and 79 in the latter) are in fact dealing with codifying diplomatic privileges and immunities into norms of international law. Some of the breaches and violations of these documents have been made quite famous and even handled by the International Court of Justice – e.g. case concerning the staff at the US Embassy in Teheran in 1980 or the LaGrand case (Germany vs. USA). One could argue that disputes concerning diplomatic and consular matters have become less personal as now states fight it out in a court. But one also must notice that these disputes no longer concern protocol and ceremony.

Actually, recent history provides more examples of how ceremonial issues were ingeniously solved rather than allowed to escalate into disputes between states and sovereigns. For example: the funeral of the (West) German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1967 when it was made sure that presidents De Gaulle and Johnson entered the Bundestag at the same time, or Paris negotiations on Vietnam in 1968 when a special table was designed to ensure that participants would not feel a hierarchy among them,[313] or the first official meeting of Japanese and American delegations on the Mayflower in 1905 where it was very important who would be greeted first – in order to avoid complications it was decided that the delegation which will arrive to New York first, will also board the Mayflower first (Schattenberg, 2008: 177). On the other hand there are still some examples

new and numerous states who had no previous experience in the field of diplomacy and its 'old boys club' system which led to these agreements. Interestingly, Dembinski (1988: 8) claims that among other reasons, it was the homogeneity of the international society that led to the development and observance of the rules of diplomatic law.

312 The predecessor documents were the Convention on Diplomatic Officers (1928) and the Convention on Consular Agents (1928), both adopted at the Sixth International Conference of American States.

313 The participants were also wearing name badges without nationality/state symbols in order to ensure the equal and egalitarian status for all of them (Vukadinović, 1995: 129).

also of some consequences when the rules are not followed: Gorbachev was meeting with Reagan in Reykjavik in 1986, but was due to scheduling conflicts not met by the Iceland's president upon arrival which resulted in Soviet ambassador to Iceland being fired shortly thereafter. Amusingly enough, the Chinese ambassador to Slovenia also seems to be replaced after every Chinese official visit to Slovenia – as this correlation is indeed speculation, one could also honestly argue that these ambassadors were replaced due to the success of these visits.

Symbolism of ceremony

"The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived." (Walzer in Kertzer, 1988: 6) All organizations, even the political ones, exist through their symbolic representation – be it a flag,[314] rituals of anointing the ruler, national anthem or currency. It is through symbols that people perceive and understand these organisations, and even participate in the rituals[315] – ceremonial induces order in a society (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 70). And through these symbols the organisations maintain their identity and continuity (Kertzer, 1988: 18). Throughout history symbols and ceremony were used as rituals to demonstrate power; power and right over their own subjects as well as power in regards to other nations and their sovereigns. The Byzantines, for instance, always made sure to demonstrate physical symbols of their superiority,[316] and Charles IX toured his kingdom with the entire court to establish his authority. Louis XIV was outrageously successful in the personifying of the state ("*L'État c'est moi*!")[317] which was a "convenient generic conception, consistent with unlimited diversity of actual forms of internal social order, and consistent

314 Even the British actor and comedian Eddie Izzard has a whole sketch in his 1998 show *Dress to Kill* devoted to this maxim: "No flag – no country!"

315 We as well as Jönsson and Hall (2005) follow Kertzer's (1988: 9) definition of ritual: symbolic behaviour that is socially standardized and repetitive.

316 Evident already in the fact their offices were located in the St. Sophia, an architectural wonder, with events accompanied by ceremonial singing, wreaths of incense and young men floating above the visitors in candle-light (symbolising angels) emphasizing their unique superiority due to their 'direct link' to the heavens (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 15).

317 Or similarly, as Richard Nixon explained in the last of the famous interviews with David Frost: "When the President does it that means it is not illegal."

with extreme inequality in the capacity of individual nations to control or even influence the external conditions of their self-constituting" (Allott, 2002: 385–386).

Interestingly enough, rituals become more present when this authority is under attack: Henry VII indulged in an elaborate coronation to signal the rivals about who won in the times when Tudors were struggling for power in England (Kertzer, 1998: 25), and while Queen Victoria's coronation was a complete mess,[318] her successor Edward VII was crowned in a lavish ceremony in times when the monarchy and the empire were losing power and the domestic class conflict was on the rise.[319] According to Kertzer (1998: 17) in these situations, the major goal is to change the individual's definition of himself from his previous allegiances and roles to his new ones – the greater the transition, in general, the more elaborate the rites.

The article on 'Ceremonial, Etiquette' in the *Staats-Lexikon* edited by Rotteck and Welcker in 1836 introduced the concept of 'political ceremonial' for the first time (Steller, 2008: 196). The standards that were established for diplomatic ritual, including audiences with sovereigns, therefore contained within them assurances of equality - there was thus no room in such a system for a monarch to ask for special treatment without it leading either to demand for reciprocity or to a diplomatic incident (Best, 2008: 233). On a daily basis however, symbolic acts (in miniature, sort of speak) were a common tool for all ambassadors and their business. Ceremonial and the symbolic forms of action in which it was expressed were an integral part of politics and diplomacy (Steller, 2008: 195). Ceremonial was used to burnish a prince's prestige, flatter his allies, and solemnize agreements (Anderson in Berridge, 2002: 107).[320] However, the ceremonial aspect of a mission (which could be at least as important as the message itself as often signified with infinitely tedious ceremonial procedures) became of much less significance during the early 18th century

318 Clergymen lost their place, the Archbishop of Canterbury couldn't get the ring on the Queen's finger, trainbearers chattered away etc. (Kertzer, 1988: 176).

319 Allott (2002: 386) writes even that the great treaties (Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna) were a result of crises resulting from problems of the dialectic between internal and external politics and the manner in which they manifested – the aristocratic old order and its diplomacy.

320 Berridge (referring to Morgenthau) claims that was so because of the sensitivities of princes to their prestige, which is such a valuable currency in international relations (2002: 108).

and played its greatest role during the later Middle Ages (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 24). Some authors on the other hand claim that this loss of glitter and decline in the pomp of ceremonial and protocol came about only in the modern era, i.e. after the Second World War (Vukadinović, 1995: 128, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, 1998: 454; Mikolić, 2002: 13; Berković, 2006: 124; Benedetti, 2009: 105; Rana, 2011: 246).

Either way, the decline is quite obvious even to the general public – there have been less official and more working visits, arrival ceremonies at airports have been minimized and omitted in whole on departures, program memes have become shorter and more substantive. Generally speaking, there are several ideas on how to explain this observation. One focuses on the bureaucratization of diplomacy and diplomats, and standardization of protocol (and hence ceremony) diminishing the special effects that not so long ago made all the difference in international relations. Another derives from this aspect claiming that this is a normal consequence of a world which is becoming more and more integrated eventually making diplomacy disappear[321] (EU and relations between member states being a primary example). And the third one blames it all on the fact that diplomacy has received astonishingly minimal attention by political sciences, especially theoreticians.[322] There is of course also the anthropological idea about rituals having "at best a peripheral, if not irrelevant, role in political life" according to Western ideology (Kertzer, 1988: 12)[323] – long perceived merely as the outer trapping of power, or dismissed as pure mannerism, ceremonial did not appear to have any power or effectiveness in its own right (Steller, 2008: 196). Last, though least discussed, is also an idea that newest IT and communications technologies[324] as well as austerity

321 For more see Galtung and Holmboe Ruge (1965).

322 For more see Jönsson and Hall (2005).

323 For more also see Shattenberg (2008). There is also a general tendency to play down the importance of prestige factors and a tendency among policy makers and academic analysts (in the top-raking countries) to underrate the importance of such factors in low-ranking nations (Dore, 1975: 203). Even more so – the Cold War era, during which the threat of force flourished in theory and practice ensured that diplomacy was not seen as "the essential foundation of a viable foreign policy" (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 1).

324 The notion that diplomacy has become "technologically redundant" (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 2).

measures of recent years have brought about new patterns of behaviour in diplomacy – which of these deviations will in fact bring permanent changes remains to be seen. In any case, diplomatic practice and protocol need to be studied more because, in their "ability to shed light on how countries perceive and interact with each other, they go to the very heart of diplomacy" (Best, 2008: 253).

Quid pro quo

In international relations reciprocity is regarded as a fundamental premise of international law and international order: "...comparability and reciprocity are the necessary elements of establishing, maintaining and sustaining of international relations" (Rebić Avguštin, 2011: 162). The logic and practice of reciprocity has been an essential factor in the development of the international community, observance of international law and maintenance of international peace and security; it is even considered as a building block for international regimes and multilateralism, including the security field (The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, 1998: 468). If coexistence is a fundamental norm of diplomacy and immunity is an important procedural rule, then reciprocity is the perennial normative theme (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 39).

Reciprocity has been the cement of the institution of diplomacy (Gentili in Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte, 2001: 61). However, the Western world took a long time to adopt this principle – acknowledging equal rights to the 'outsiders' didn't exactly flourish nor develop in the Roman Empire (whereas it was a common practice in the Ancient Near East in those times),[325] medieval Europe or Renaissance Italy. Today, it is essential that ceremony is the same for every and any foreign guest with the same function (Benedetti, 2009: 111) and for the same occasion. Every country has ceremony which applies for foreign dignitaries prescribed in some form or another (and usually described with much detail). Ceremonies are also the same in their essence – upon arrival and/or departure of a foreign

325 From examples of (expected and granted) reciprocity in the exchange of gifts and treatment of messengers as well as other evidence of contact citing family or other kinship metaphors to acknowledge equal rights and hence the application of reciprocity (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 50–52).

head of state for a state visit military honours are usually performed. Elements of this particular ceremony (and the order in which they are performed) do not differ significantly between states (Rebić Avguštin, 2011: 158–161), though they do have some unique characteristics,[326] but most importantly the ceremony is executed in the same manner for the same guest and occasion. Regardless of how friendly the relations between two countries are. Reciprocity as the ground rule also applies to the technical aspects of a visit – provision of motorcades, covering of accommodation costs, interpretation regimes etc. Again, regardless of how important the visiting country is. Modern diplomatic language has no nuances, it is a set of "standardised phrases and guarded understatements" (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 46). Modern protocol seeks balance and strives towards a non-hierarchical approach (Benedetti, 2009: 57). Regardless of differences between cultures and customs of societies in contact.

Prestige and international affairs

As already mentioned, prestige (and ceremony as the means to display it) is not a very common subject of the international relations sciences. In fact it seems that only the realists take it into account when they (especially Hans Morgenthau) discuss the ways states display and perceive power. According to the realists, international politics is a constant fight for power and hence all relations between states are a reflection of this struggle. Morgenthau (1948/1995: 127–128) differentiates between states with status quo politics aiming towards the preservation of the current distribution of power, states with foreign policy oriented towards gaining more power (than they in fact possess), and states with foreign policy intended to preserve and demonstrate the power they already possess – these states are practicing the policy of prestige.[327] The goals of such a policy

326 E.g. the composition of the honour units (in Slovenia it is uniquely composed of armed forces and police members), or the way the anthems are performed (in Peru for instance, the honour guard also sings the lyrics). Honours displayed are similar in form, but vary in content (Trajkovski, 1990: 79).

327 Though one can see value in such displays also through constructivist lenses – a country is big only as the perception shows it to be; ceremony with all the pomp, lavishness and grandeur is a very useful tool for creating such perceptions (even if they were not based on 'real' power).

are for a state to leave impressions of power,[328] sometimes also purely for reasons of prestige itself. To achieve such goals a state has two means at its disposal: display of military power or diplomatic ceremonial (ibid., 176). For an example of the first, one must only remember the displays of military might during the Cold War, and to understand the second, one ought to only think of the Holy See and its elaborate ceremonials. A man becomes a king because he comes to be treated as a king – ritual is used to constitute power, not just reflect power that already exists (Kertzer, 1988: 25).

A very recent example: for five years, Nixon's every public appearance required a ceremonial entry, accompanied by the stirring chords of "Hail to the Chief" - political symbolism and the emotional quality provided an effective means for divesting Nixon of his authority (ibid., 28). A counter-effect recent example: Jimmy Carter attempted at the beginning of his presidency to remain "one of the people" by shedding a number of the rites that had developed around the presidency – he eschewed the cavalcade back to the White House after his inauguration, walking back instead, he removed the gold braids from epaulets of the White House guards, and he suppressed the flourishes that accompanied the president's every formal entrance; he soon learned, though, that the power of these rites and symbols, was not to be trifled with – he paid for it by being popularly perceived as lacking the charisma, the sacred aura, the presidents should have (ibid., 182–183).

In any case, ceremony always reflected the level, the importance and the friendliness[329] of relations between states and sovereigns – the complexity of ceremonial proceedings indicated the relevance and importance of a state and sovereign (through their representatives) to the host (Rebić Avguštin, 2004: 17). The political effects of ritual consist primarily of legitimating the existing system and the power holders in it (Kertzer, 1988: 37). The

328 In their study, Alcock and Newcombe (1970) attempt to ascertain the difference between 'real' and 'perceived' power, i.e. rank countries based on perception of prestige or importance; the results suggest that perceived national power is some function of GNP or military expenditure. However, nations that don't possess a military power impressive enough or economic reasons obvious enough are left with persuasion as their diplomatic technique (Galtung and Holmboe Ruge 1965: 104–105).

329 Whereas one might argue that the display of military power was/is rather a sign of superiority and hostility in relations between states.

lavishness of a ceremony, the quality of banquettes, uniqueness of gifts, the grandeur of halls, the variety and amounts of foods, glitter of carnival-like public processions, notoriousness of entertainers and musicians, linguistic nuances, even sitting orders (for meals or negotiations) and shapes of tables and sizes of chairs – it all seriously indicated the wealth and the power of the host as well as amity towards the guest.[330] To quote Richelieu (Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte, 2011: 75): "Prestige brought power; power brought prestige; and prestige, if skilfully exploited, could sometimes make it unnecessary to resort to arms." In other words, prestige is the way you gain advantages of having power[331] without actually having it or having to use it – prestige is in this sense a means in the use of power (Dore, 1975: 203).[332]

Institutionalization

Some institution was needed to stabilise the relationship and make it more predictable (Galtung and Holmboe Ruge, 1965: 102), practices and rules needed to be developed and codified, structure and patterns had to be labelled and rituals needed to be put into context. All discrepancies and deviations had to be either cut off or levelled. The international community needed standardisation and bureaucratisation, shaping homogeneity and order. Jönsson and Hall (2005: 40–41) differentiate three levels of institutionalisation:

330 In this respect, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 15) aptly name ceremonial as the 'non-conventional' weapon of the state and sovereign and their representative. It could be argued then that ceremony itself is a form of power.

331 John McNaughton (advisor of Robert S. McNamara, US Secretary of Defence under presidents Kennedy and Johnson) presumably once said that the reasons for going on in Vietnam were 10 % to save Vietnamese democracy, 20 per cent to preserve the power balance against China and 70 % prestige – to avoid the humiliation of defeat (Dore, 1975: 203).

332 Interesting is the case of the USA in the 19th century (Nickles, 2008) in this respect as Americans argued about the proper degree of formality in US foreign relations, over the proper course to follow when diplomatic practice clashed with American political culture - diplomatic protocol became an arena in which the US government worked out the tension between the received legacy of the American Revolution and the requirements of a nation assuming a greater role on the international stage. But then the United States could "afford to be solipsistic about matters of diplomatic etiquette during most of the 19th century because (with the exception of the early 1860s) foreign policy had relatively little effect on the lives of Americans" (Nickles, 2008: 315).

1. a set of shared symbols and references,
2. a set of mutual expectations, agree-upon rules, regulations and procedures, and
3. formal organisations.

In this context, the first level encompasses the standardisation of phrases in diplomatic language, practices surrounding the conclusion of treaties; the second level begins to include increasingly institutionalized rules of reciprocity, rules of precedence and emerging rules of diplomatic immunity; the third level entails the organisation and professionalization of diplomacy. These levels were developing through the centuries – not necessarily from one to another chronologically, but for quite some centuries also side by side and on different parts of the globe. Apart from the evolution from religious to secular terms of reference, we do not see any unilinear pattern of development (ibid., 66). Truly, only after the Second World War could we regard the developments of these elements as a mutual, but singular process.

In Conclusion: consuetudo pro lege servatur[333]

Protocol used to be a reflection of authority and power with the pomp of ceremony and strict etiquette – today, it has slowly been transformed into protocol devoted to good organization (of events) and relaxed communication (Benedetti, 2009: 57). While issues of precedence may still arise, they do not carry the same significance (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 57). Traditional glitter can only be seen in traces at particular protocol events accompanying royalty, otherwise globalisation has erased most of the "speck and shine" of ceremonies (Mikolić, 2002: 13). Prestige has disappeared, ceremony has been reduced to basics – barely enough to show dignified hospitality (Vukadinović, 1995: 128). Undoubtedly the most significant changes have occurred in regards to ceremony which has been extensively simplified (Berković, 2006: 124). New forms and standards are being developed, the number of government personnel stationed abroad who are not employed by the traditional foreign affairs offices is rising – especially evident in the USA and in the EU (Jönsson and Hall,

333 Latin for "custom is held as law".

2005: 65). Basics of the 21st century protocol are production, organisation and communications together with security (Benedetti, 2009: 57). What has the world come to?

In this article we have attempted to first briefly examine the meaning of protocol and ceremony, their development through history, their codification, symbolism through rituals and theory of prestige, their normativity through reciprocity and institutionalization. As diplomacy and protocol with it have become bureaucraticised and standardized universally the varieties and differences of rituals and ceremonies have become insignificant. When all actors were put on the same and equal ground of sovereignty, it was inevitable for communication between them to gradually become uniformed, prescribed and predictable. Prestige lost to reciprocity. Differences between cultures and societies no longer have an outlet to show their peculiarities and particularities as channels of contact and communication became standardized. It became irrelevant and even unwanted to display favour or contempt through tools of protocol and ceremony. However, on this road from *ad hoc* diplomacy to institutionalized, permanent and regular diplomacy, and from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy, some ways of making a difference have been preserved. Or simply re-invented. The personal touch, the mark of friendliness and importance between states and their leaders are conveyed in a different form. For instance, during the visit of the Swedish royal couple to Slovenia they had also brought specially made cookies for the dog of the Slovenian president. The then newly-elected American president was not seated at the back of the hall during the funeral of the Japanese emperor Hirohito. Croatia hangs the EU flag permanently on its official buildings on the honorary spot, even though they are not even a member state yet.

In fact, to conclude I would dare to argue that ceremony has in some sense actually become more important than ever. One has to know the rules on order to be able to bend them. And since diplomacy, protocol and ceremony are living in the world of tightly prescribed rules, it takes much ingenuity to make a guest feel special.

This article has attempted to look at protocol and ceremony through the lens of diplomacy which is always a reflection and function of a society – in the framework of a nation or the globalised international community. Diplomacy is a process, an institution, a method, a profession, a phenomenon, a science, and an activity, but in this article we have attempted to examine protocol and ceremony as tools of diplomacy in its functions and purposes throughout history. We have also set diplomacy and protocol as derivative from customs, traditions, circumstances and organisation of a society. Change seems to be the common denominator of our observances, though it would seem that the purpose of standardisation is to avoid change. We have come to realise that changes in society are no longer reflected in the presence and magnificence of the ceremony, but in the bending of the rules to the point of avoiding ceremony. Not the quality, but the quantity of relations. Rituals displayed with military pomp have been replaced by number of tweets between foreign ministers. In some sense, ceremony is simply shifting form, we might have to wait a bit longer to be able to label it (and study it far more), but it is most certainly not being erased from international relations. However, it is difficult to estimate how this shift will re-shape the relation between society and diplomacy in the long run, and it is also difficult to assess whether these changes might in fact also result in a backlash – whether society will lose some of its habits and notions due to them not being reflected in foreign policy any more.

In a way the friendliness between nations and their sovereigns is regaining a more personal note again. We need only remember statements by a former Italian prime minister about the 44th US president. Or the recent tweets of the Estonian president aimed at the renowned American economist. Or Queen Elizabeth II shaking hands with a former military enemy during a historic visit to Ireland. The flowers might be gone (even if only due to austerity measures), but without symbols there are no nations, and as long as the principle of sovereignty rules international relations, diplomacy will continue to develop and adjust to continue reflecting the state of a society it represents. Ceremony might never look the same, but protocol will never be out of fashion.

IN MEMORIAM

Vladimir Benko (1917–2011) — The Ljubljana School of International Relations

Milan Brglez

Dr. Vlado Benko, Professor Emeritus at the University of Ljubljana, is the founder and doyen of the science of international relations in Slovenia. He has left us an original theoretical and methodological conceptual apparatus of understanding international relations, which is still widely present in the research and study of international relations in Slovenia. Already at the beginning of his academic career, in the early 60s of the twentieth century, he created the fundamental framework of the approach to international relations from the perspective of the history of international relations, sociology, or rather, the structure of the international community, the theory of international relations, and analysis of foreign policy from the confrontation of his own in-depth understanding of Marxism as the emancipatory critique of political economy and from the thoughts of its liberal critic, Raymond Aron, on international policy. Later, his empiric study of non-alignement and the peaceful coexistence between states did not consent to simplifications offered by rational notions of political realism, but formed in the integration of the politically-economical and sociological perspective the beginnings of what is today understood as historical sociology of international relations. It is therefore a pity that his works were never translated, because they surpassed the then production of knowledge and today's in many aspects with their comprehensiveness, even on the international scale.

Such an evaluation can be made when taking into account the development of his holistic approach to the international phenomenon, which he developed into three separate books between the years 1997 and 2000: *The History of International Relations, The Sociology of International Relations,* and *The Science of International Relations*.

These works have to be judged and evaluated as the result of a long academic career that led to them. It was marked by a systematic search and formulation of the fundamental alphabet of international relations, as well as the conceptual and methodological autonomy of scientific approaches to the intertwining of direct international relations as social relations and indirect international relations, characterized by their political nature. In 1962, a year after he began his academic career at the College for Political Sciences, he wrote two sets of lecture notes, which he entitled Introduction to the *Theory of International Relations* and *An Outline of International Relations from the French Revolution to the East–West Polarization*. With them, he delineated the scope of his field, which he structured by preparing and successfully defending his doctoral thesis with the title *Socially–economical Foundation of Sweden's Foreign Policy and its Practical Viewpoints* at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana in 1965. The essential productive intellectual confrontation with Raymond Aron's *Peace and War between Nations*, which was originally published in French in 1962, is already evident in his doctoral thesis, and fully clear in his later textbook *International Relations I*, which he wrote in 1970 at the Faculty for Sociology, Political Science and Journalism of the University of Ljubljana. The link between Marx and Aron is unique in the development of the study of international relations known to Slovenians and therefore deserves additional explanation.

Prof. Benko adopted the basic levels of the study of international relations from Aron: levels of theory (defined by the schematics of concepts and systems), levels of sociology (concerning the search for general reasons for events), levels of history of international relations as the genesis of the contemporary international community, and levels of praxeology (whereby he spoke of foreign policy consistently since the beginnings of his studies). This link was certainly eased by his knowledge of French, but perhaps even more decisive was Aron's critical, yet profound knowledge of the works of Marx and Engels. Prof. Benko also studied their works, which influenced his dialectic and complex style of writing. The parts where Aron's conceptualization remained open were developed further by Benko by him confronting his views with other classical authors from the field of international relations. Among the more significant authors are Quincy Wright, Stanley Hoffman, John Burton and Morton Kaplan, as well as Yugoslavian theoreticists, among whom he was conceptualy close to Velibor Gavranov and Momir Stojković, and in relation to whom he defined the key problems of the science of international relations and published them in a topical article, published in the Slovenian journal *Theory and Practice* in 1974.

All of this led to his most profound work with the simple title *International Relations*, which was first published in 1977, and again in 1987 in a revised edition. In this book he established a connection between the politically–economical analysis of the development of the international community and international relations, a sociological analysis of the science of international relations and its theoretical approaches, the sociology of international relations as the conceptualization of the existence and structure of the international community, and the conceptual framework of foreign policy. The mentioned works have to be read and understood as the key synthesis of the Slovenian knowledge of international relations, from which many generations drew their vocabulary, and some even their viewpoint, especially the conceptualization of the characteristics of the contemporary international community, the elements of the structure of the international community, and the so-called triangle of international policy with the three directions of linking internal and foreign policy. This book still represents the conceptual framework for some of the most important classes of the international relations graduate programme at the Faculty for Social Sciences. At the same time, it is an outstanding scientific text, which can today be compared only with edited volumes written by several authors – specialists for a certain aspect of the complexity of the international phenomenon. Its main idea, which defines "the history of human society [especially after the French Revolution] as the history of emancipation", is perhaps even more topical today as when it was first written down.

Benko's understanding of the history of international relations is theoretically based, which is why he has persistently stressed since he started writing on this subject that it is not a history of events, but a study of the constellations, tendencies, or mechanisms, which he saw in the comparison of individual periods of the development of the contemporary international community. In his historical narrative he particularly stresses the significance of the breakthrough of the capitalist type of production, the international consequences of the French Revolution, industrial revolutions, and monopoly capitalism, colonisation and de-colonisation, collective security, and the events during the Cold War and after it. He is foremost interested in the longitudinal genesis of the international community, in which he places those changes that he sees as the most significant.

His understanding of the science of international relations emphasizes its autonomy and general nature. At the level of a definition he understands it as a social science, for which "political relations, or rather the translation of social processes and relations into relations of political nature, are most important in the totality and globality of the international phenomenon as the special manifestation of social relations and processes". He emphasizes three approaches to the study of international relations: politically-realist theories of international relations (among which he places also the historically - sociological school of Raymond Aron), sociological conceptualizations of international relations (which he then divides into the behavioural approach, communicative approach of Karl Deutsch, and functionalism), and the Marxist pattern of international relations. He is critical of all of them – the most important aspect is that the realist theories are not historical, the sociological theories neglect the socially-economical material basis of the development of international relations, and the Marxist theories are not sufficiently developed. But at the same time, his division of theories has not lost its significance over time. Quite the opposite, for example, most authors of social constructivism, who still use sociological comprehensions today, could be held accountable for the same shortcomings, while contemporary critical approaches more or less follow the Marxist critique. Furthermore, it should also be stressed that, aside from focusing on general theories of international relations, Prof. Benko devoted particular attention in his book The Science of International Relations to the theories of (European) integrations (and discussed federalism, functionalism, new functionalism, and Deutsch's conceptualisation of security communities), which he confronted also with the empirical findings on the West-European unification, as well as to the disputable fields of the theory of international regimes (as a way of international "governance"), and the relationship between the North and the South.

In this book he also included his discussion on foreign policy, which is foremost a conceptual scheme, which distinguishes between ideology or values, strategy and the means of foreign policy. Based on this text and his other publications, published before Slovenia gained independence, during that time and after it, it can be established that he was interested foremost in the foreign policy of small states and, more precisely, the application of such findings to an appropriately formulated foreign policy of the newly-emerged Slovenian state. He saw this as a strategic question of emancipation, survival, and always in an internal link with the strategy of the comprehensive development of a state and the well being of its citizens.

Lastly he wrote his *Sociology of International Relations*, though separately from the *History* and *the Science*, but still in connection with the evaluation of the contemporary theoretical approaches, particularly those, which lead to historical sociology through Marxism, Aron and Marcel Merl. In this book, he explains that the conceptualizations of the international community cannot be limited to the actions of individual states concerning foreign policy and synchronically brakes down the elements of the structure of the contemporary international community: the factors, subjects, processes, and relations, as well as norms. Their breakdown has an unarguable methodological significance for the study and teaching of international relations.

Aside from producing immense and insightful scientific work, Prof. Benko was also an outstanding professor, colleague, and scholar. With his passing on, the Slovenian science of international relations lost an exceptional teacher and person, who was open and broad-minded and therefore prepared to learn not only from his contemporaries, but also from his students and colleagues. He personified the scientific credo in its finest, most creative, and most systematic sense and had the humanist stance of a teacher and emancipated individual.

These are all reasons due to which it would be justified to talk of *The Ljubljana School of International Relations*, established by Vladimir Benko, Professor Emeritus, with his original work and outstanding autonomous scientific stance.

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ABSTRACTS

The Sociology of Diplomacy – A Theoretical Contemplation
Vladimir Benko

At the core of the necessity and possibility of constituting the sociology of diplomacy there is a continuity of diplomacy and its dependency on the changes in the structure of the international community. Diplomacy was first the object of a historical and later also of a legal reflection, while political science and sociology took part in this process much later. The main aim of this contribution is to detect why this "delay" occured, and take a look at where there is a place for sociology to enter the research endeavour of discovering the complexity of current international phenomena. It could be found in that part of the role and function of diplomacy, which spans its political dimension. The author focuses on the diplomatic function of observation and reporting, which targets the power structure of the subject of accreditation and establishes, with this, structural diplomacy. This adds to the sociological understanding of diplomacy, being part of a foreign policy creation and implementation process.

Defining Special Sociologies
Albin Igličar

General sociology has devoted itself to the research of common characteristics of social relations, forms of association and culture. A certain degree of its development and its presence in the cultural and scientific process is therefore a precondition for the origin and development of a certain special sociology. Sociology is sometimes seen as a queen of the social sciences, bringing together and extending the knowledge and insight of all other adjacent disciplines. The knowledge of a certain special sociology is oriented towards special social sub-systems. The system is seen as possessing an inherent tendency towards equilibrium and the analysis of systems is the analysis of the mechanisms, which maintain equilibrium, both internally and externally, in relation to other systems. The paper focuses on the conditions and specifics of establishing special sociologies.

Sociology and the Military: Increased interdependence
Uroš Svete, Jelena Juvan

Article offers presentation of the (historical) development of the military sociology as a special sociology. For two centuries, sociology as a discipline and armed forces as social institutions have paid minimal attention to each other. With a few notable exceptions such as Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, classical sociological theory had little to say about armed forces as organization, or war as a social process. Contemporary military sociology is actually primarily a result of the Second World War and Cold War eras. These events initiated the systematic study of military sociology. In the second part, article reflects on a use of military sociology in connection to contemporary armed conflicts and the HTS concept, which presents a novel concept for use of social sciences in order to gain advantage on the battlefield.

Diplomacy as a Vocation
Polona Mal

Vocation is one of the elements, which determine the status of an individual in a society. There are many institutions, which influence who will be a diplomat, in particularly politics. Senior diplomatic postings are attractive not only for career diplomats, but also for persons outside the profession, although they are not necessarily skilled enough for it. The author starts with the proposition that diplomacy is a profession, which would mean that diplomats should be educated for this vocation. Diplomacy, as it is the case with other professions, demands a certain know-how and skills, which are necessary for proficiency in the occupation. The main theoretical concepts of this contribution are therefore diplomacy, vocation and civil servants. As the main dilemma remains the question, should diplomats focus on absorbing general knowledge of the profession (generalists) or should they strive to achieve a narrower expertise and become specialist.

The European Union: a New Type of Diplomatic Actor?

Darja Gruban Ferlež

The EU is an area for intensive diplomatic engagement of the member states and the institutions of integration, but at the same time it also behaves as an independent diplomatic actor. This highly institutionalized legal frame is characterized by internal diplomatic interaction and intensive processes of socialization. The EU is a sui generis emerging political subject that is neither a state nor a typical international organization, yet it enters into the diplomatic system and is establishing diplomatic relations. The question is how the European political integration process influences diplomatic practice and whether it does bring a new pattern of diplomatic behaviour. The author focuses on theorizing and analyzing these aspects and questions. She shares the opinion that this practice is not yet revolutionizing the current nature of diplomacy and its practice, but still offers a new thought about diplomacy in the 21st century as well as about the nature of the EU as a political and diplomatic player.

Diplomat as an Individual and the Structure of the International Community

Tina Vončina

The contribution focuses on the structure of the international community, which itself offers a wide palette of opportunities for further research from the perspective of its actors. Such an example is certainly the discussion on the position of the individual within these actors, and the differentiation between the actors themselves also from the perspective of the centrality of the position of the state in this structure and consequently the differentiation between the representatives of actors themselves. The individual in the sense of actorship is changing from the state representative into the representative of non-governmental actors and individual ideas as well. This as a consequence forms new adjectives in the study of diplomacy (celebrity diplomacy, citizen diplomacy). It seems that, due to the historical development, the diplomat both as an actor and as an individual is best defined, but the definitions do not suffice social and historical changes in the environment, in which the diplomat operates.

The Dynamics and Dialectics of the Emergence of the Slovene State and its Diplomacy

France Bučar

Diplomacy is also understood as foreign policy, which is closely linked to the notion of a state. At the time of its emergence, Slovenia could not have its own formal diplomacy, since it was not a state yet. But it was absolutely necessary to have its own foreign policy as a set of impressions about relations with its closest environment as well as to develop the capacity to pursue relations with that environment. Yugoslavia was already at its origin a typical product of the Westphalian concept, which determines that the international order is provided by a power of individual states. The understanding that power, in particular a physical one, dictates relations of subordination also resulted in its collapse. Thus the decision for the international recognition of Slovenia arose as a result of new understanding of international cohabitation. It was not primarily the results of diplomatic negotiation, but of the understanding that Europe could only function on cooperation as the result of a new perception of survival and development.

Promotion to Ambassador: Characteristics, Trends and Backgrounds in Slovene Diplomacy

Milan Jazbec

The paper deals with the question of promotion to the position of an ambassador in the Slovene diplomatic organization, in the three points of its development: 1992/93, 1997/98 and 2009/10. It tries to uncover aspects, backgrounds and trends in Slovene diplomacy, having in mind as the starting point the personal origin of ambassadors from the following groups (and subgroups) at the zero hour: Yugoslav diplomacy (political and bureaucratic), Slovene public administration (experienced and inexperienced), newcomers (complete novices, politicians, university, business, others), emigration and reactivated diplomats. The following trends are noticeable: the increase of the professional cluster of the Slovene diplomatic organization, the decrease of recruitment from politically characterized subgroup origin and the continuation of the promotion to the ambassador's position with individual political support and connections, regardless of the personal origin of a concrete diplomat.

Diplomacy and Gender Inequality
Maca Jogan, Milena Stefanović - Kajzer, Maja Božović

Contemporary diplomacy is still considered as a typically »male domain«. This feature is in this contribution explained as a consequence of the historically persisting sexist social order with discrimination against women. The search for answers to the questions as to why the subordinated position of women and their exclusion from the public activity is still a world problem is possible by the installation of discrimination against women into the integral social organization of work and through the discovery of the reconciled activity of the important institutional agents reproducing gender inequality. Considering this starting point the authors represent the endeavours of various international organizations and the Strategy of the European Union for the realization of equal opportunities policy for women and men and their activities and lives. In the frame of these broader social circumstances, also the gradual changes of diplomatic activity are discussed (the case of the USA) that through the inclusion of women slowly loses its one-gendered image.

Australia: Women in Diplomacy
Moreen Dee, Felicity Volk

There are 28 women serving as Australia's ambassadors, high commissioners and consul-generals out of a total of 95 such positions around the world (as of the year 2007). In total, 50 % of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade staff are women, who also make up 25 % of the SES – working in senior management at home and abroad. Trends in the employment of women in the department will assure a greater percentage of female heads of mission or post in the future. A natural change is taking place with increased numbers of women entering, and assuming leadership roles in, Australia's diplomatic service. Australia is a remarkably diverse society and the essence of this can only be represented if its diplomatic service mirrors the demographics of its broad community. This includes parity of representation by women and men at all levels, which has been a guiding principle in the recruitment and promotion practices since the 1980s.

Social Dependency of Diplomacy: the Portrait of a Diplomat
Diana Digol

The article presents the results of a study of the process of diplomatic elite transformation in post-communist countries. It presents and contemplates on the portrait of a diplomat along several criteria. It searches to point out the social dependency of diplomacy and of a diplomat, product of diplomacy, as a reflection of concrete social and historical circumstances. The survey was supplemented with the results of the personal interviews. Geographically, the research area was the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Chronologically, it covered the period of a decade and a half after the change of the political regime (1989-2004) and interviews were conducted in the period from 2002 to 2012. Not unexpectedly, the composition of the diplomatic elite shows some similarities across countries; however, the study demonstrates some striking differences as well.

Where Have All the Flowers Gone? (Protocol and its Social Context)
Janja Rebić Avguštin

This article argues that the process of determining who and what are the actors in the international arena as well as determining the ground rules for relations between them has unequivocally diminished the role of ceremony in international relations. In fact, we argue that with the codification of diplomatic and consular relations and bureaucratization of international relations, the varieties and differences in the ceremonies have become minimized or even significantly inexistent making the ceremonial part of protocol in fact irrelevant. The research shows that protocol has over the centuries been transformed into ‘mere’ good organization and logistics (of events) while ceremony has been reduced to basics of dignified hospitality. It would seem that prestige lost to reciprocity. We can reasonably conclude that changes in society are no longer reflected in the presence and magnificence of the ceremony, but in the bending of the rules to the point of avoiding ceremony.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Janja Rebić Avguštin, MA, has been involved with international relations throughout her studies: she obtained her MA in diplomacy and military studies at Hawai'i Pacific University and is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Ljubljana, where she also obtained her BA in international relations. Her formal education has been intertwined and complemented with her professional experience; she was head coordinator of logistics at the Secretariat of the Slovenian Presidency of the EU Council (2006-2008), she served as the Head of the Minister's Office at the Ministry of Public Administration (2008-2011), and has been working at the Protocol of the Republic of Slovenia since 2001. For some time, she was also employed by the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana) as a Lecturer for diplomatic and consular relations. Her fields of interest are UN Security Council, conflict management, international law, diplomatic and consular relations, protocol and ceremony.

Dr Vladimir Benko, Professor Emeritus, University of Ljubljana (1917–2011), dean of the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism (1967 – 1974), and diplomat. The founder and pioneer of science on international relations in Slovenia, author of numerous books, articles and other publications from the field. He published a groundbreaking opus of monographs: *Mednarodni odnosi* (International Relations, 1977 and 1987), *Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih* (Science on International Relations, 1997), *Zgodovina mednarodnih odnosov* (History of International Relations, 1997) and *Sociologija mednarodnih odnosov* (Sociology of International Relations, 2000). His original and innovative thought and publications from this and other related fields have inspired generations of Slovene and other students as well as scholars and highly influenced research efforts and understanding of the broader field.

Maja Božović, MA, graduated from international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, where she also received her MA from American Studies. She was employed at the Slovene MFA and moved in 2003 to Brussels, where she served at the Slovene Mission to the EU, including the period of the Slovene Presidency of the EU Council in 2008. She was later seconded to the General Secretariat of the EU and moved afterwards to the EEAS, where since January 2011 she is chairing the Working Group for Northern Africa and Middle East.

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