The changing phases of diplomacy in a Small Island Developing State:
A case study of the Kingdom of Tonga

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own original work.

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Dedication

In loving memory of my late father ‘Aloua Fetu’utolu Tupou,

Forever my guiding light and inspiration.
Abstract

Diplomacy is an integral tool of communication utilised by nations as a means to achieve their intended interest and goals. The foundations and mode of diplomacy practiced by nations differs according to their circumstances. For Small Island Developing States who differ in size, economy, location, resources, the use of diplomacy has become a vital tool for survival.

The aim of this study is to investigate and understand the changing phases of diplomacy that transpire within a Small Island Developing State and in this case, from the perspective of a Pacific Small Island Developing State such as the Kingdom of Tonga.

The study thoroughly evaluates the origins of diplomacy in Tongan society, its evolution throughout the 19th century to the 21st century (1900-1970/1970-2010/2010-2016) and the different elements of diplomacy utilised by Tonga. Additionally, the study highlights new aspects of diplomacy that had resulted from the constant evolution of Tonga’s statecraft.

The main line of argument traced throughout the study is the notion that diplomacy is a dynamic tool that evolves with time and that PSIDS like other nations, need to recognise this and capitalise on it. Furthermore, the study also highlights the fact that change is indeed an inherent part of Pacific history. However, as the wave of democratic change continues to flow into Tonga, determination of how such changes will affect Tonga’s future statecraft is still uncertain and proves a suitable area for further research.
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Abbreviations

ACP  Asian Caribbean, Pacific States Group
AIMS  Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea
CHOGM  Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CWL  Catholic Women’s League
EC  European Commission
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone
FP  Foreign Policy
GoT  Government of Tonga
MDG  Millennium development goals
MEIDECC  Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information & Communication, Disaster, Environment and Climate Change
MINOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFNP  Ministry of Finance and National Planning
ODA  Overseas Development Assistance
PIDF  Pacific Islands Development Forum
PIF  Pacific Islands Forum
PLG  Pacific Leader’s Group
PICL  Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders
PMO  Prime Minister’s Office
PRC  People’s Republic of China
PSA  Public Service Association
PSIDS  Pacific Small Islands Developing States
RAMSI  Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
SIDS  Small Island Developing States
SPC  South Pacific Commission
SPPKF  South Pacific Peace Keeping Forces
TA  Technical Assistance
TDS  Tonga Defence Services
TNLDP  Tonga National Leadership Development Programme
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UN  United Nations
UNGAA  United Nations General Assembly
WCC  Women’s Crisis Centre
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Diplomacy is one of the greatest forces for peace, prosperity and progress the world has ever seen.”
(Hillary Clinton, The Indian Express, 2017)

PART ONE: OVERVIEW

a. Outline

Diplomacy, as defined by Barston (2013), is the arena in which states conduct state-to-state relations and is also the foundation for the formulation of a nation’s foreign policy (FP). Post Cold War, diplomacy has taken centre stage and become an integral part of a nation’s states craft and at times, different variations of diplomacy are utilised either as a tool of coercion or persuasion.

For Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and even more so, Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDs) are faced with challenges such as remote locations; limited resources; economic capability; trade limitations and new threats such as rising sea levels and the effects of Climate Change (CC), the employment of diplomacy proves key to their very survival. It is through the conduct of diplomacy that PSIDs find suitable channels to pursue and achieve national interests and also, make their voices heard in the international arena.

This dissertation seeks to assess and evaluate how a PSIDs such as the Kingdom of Tonga (henceforth referred to as Tonga) has: (i) utilised various elements of diplomacy to pursue its domestic and foreign interests, despite the various challenges it faces by virtue of its size and lack of available resources and (ii) determine the development and transformation of diplomatic practices conducted in Tonga throughout the 19th to 21st century.
b. Research Aim

To investigate and understand the changing phases of diplomacy, from the perspective of a PSIDS with a key focus on Tonga as a case study.

c. Research Objectives

i. Determine the restrictions encountered by Tonga as a PSID and how it has utilised elements of diplomacy (soft power and protocol of culture) to overcome the aforementioned challenges.

ii. Trace how far diplomacy has evolved in Tonga since the 19th century until the 21st century.

iii. Identify how Tonga has employed diplomacy to pursue its national interests and combat global issues such as climate change, human rights, gender equality and peace & security.

iv. Identify and evaluate how external factors such as culture, religion and tradition influence the manner in which Tonga practices diplomacy.

d. Origins of Research

The growing nature of diplomacy is largely influenced by factors such as the fast-paced technological advancements of the 21st century, increase in international travel, and the effects of globalisation. Such factors have consequently altered the very nature of diplomacy; the actors; the methods and institutions involved (Moses & Knutsen, 2002; Heijmans & Melissen, 2006; Heijmans, 2010).

It can be inferred that similar changes have transpired in the South Pacific Region, particularly following the Decolonisation Period of the 1970s, when a majority of Pacific Island States emerged from under the umbrella of Colonial rule to claim Independence (Firth, 2003; Thaman, 2003). Thus, giving rise to a newfound mode of diplomacy known as ‘New Pacific Diplomacy’ (Fry & Tarte, 2015).

The New Pacific diplomacy is one that recognises the diverse cultures of Pacific Island States and calls for the Island States to form a united front, to become more vocal and proactive in the conduct of foreign relations with larger and developed nations.

It is important to note that for PSIDs, the need to maintain good relations with neighbouring Pacific Islands proves necessary primarily: (i) to ensure the security and stability of the region and (ii) to help
guarantee the progression of the region in today’s highly competitive and globalised world. For without such support the Pacific region may continue to remain isolated and lag behind in the global arena.

With this scenario in mind, the decision to focus on Tonga is founded on 3 key factors:

(i) As the sole surviving Constitutional Monarchy in the South Pacific Region, it is important to determine what and who were the key actors of influence on the nature of Tonga’s foreign relations;

(ii) Tonga does not hold any special attributes or natural resources for that reason, there is a need to understand how and what strategic methods have been utilised to achieve her national interests; and

(iii) There is a need to examine whether the 2010 Constitutional and Political Reform that had occurred in Tonga has affected Tonga’s statecraft, foreign policy or national goals.

e. Literature Review

The literature on SIDs has gradually increased over the past 20 years, focusing specifically on issues of climate change, sustainable development, security, renewable energy, economic and trade limitations (Commonwealth: 2014; Commonwealth: 2017). Many of these studies have been largely published by the Commonwealth Secretariat and focus on proposing new methods and solutions to ensure the survival of SIDS.

Additionally, literature on regional, Pacific diplomacy and other aspects of society, culture, tradition, and history of the South Pacific Islands has increased, as more and more Pacific Islanders have graduated in the academic field of Social Sciences. Nonetheless, specific literature focusing primarily on the diplomatic practice of Pacific Islands including Tonga is scarce.

Despite this limitation, the following literatures have proved as a guiding light and formed the basis for this dissertation such as:

Campbell’s (2001) ‘Island Kingdom: Tonga ancient & modern’ which provides an in-depth insight and overview of Tonga’s progression from the pre-missionary periods to the beginnings of the early 21st century. Nonetheless, readers must be weary as the evolution of Tongan society is traced through the
perspective of a historian and thus, rarely displays any elements of analytical or critical thinking. Moreover, the text does not contain any relevant reference or discussion of Tonga’s diplomacy or FP.

Nevertheless, a relevant introductory tool that provides concise summary and overview of Tonga as well as other Pacific Islands economic, political and foreign affairs is Hoadley’s (1992) ‘South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook’ during the 80s-90s. The brief information provided regarding Tonga’s foreign affairs and FP contains vital elements regarding the Head of State’s (HoS) role in determining the direction of Tonga’s FP and establishment of foreign relations. It must be noted that a portion of the information provided is outdated as many advancements had occurred in Tonga since the handbook was published.

Additionally, Lavaka’s (1981) study on ‘The limits of advice: Britain and the Kingdom of Tonga, 1900-1970’ provided a comprehensive and in depth analysis of Tonga’s first bilateral relationship with Britain during the Treaty of Friendship 1900-1970. Lavaka’s study highlights the tumultuous relationship between the two nations particularly, in terms of finding common grounds of understanding and a balance between the Great European power and the island nation. Despite this, much of the information contained in the study tends to comprise mainly of background information.

In contrast, the New Pacific Diplomacy (Fry & Tarte, 2015) consists of articles and commentaries from many of the Pacific region’s greatest thinkers and leaders addressing issues pertinent to the region such as CC, trade, fisheries and decolonisation. The fact that much of the commentaries are from the perspective of Pacific Islanders illustrates the collaborative efforts of the Pacific thinkers to obtain the collective goal of regional stability, progress and to make their unified voices heard in the global scene.

Despite this, the fact remains that as the Pacific region comprises of homogenous yet different and diverse Pacific Islands, the ability to obtain and balance each nation’s views in the global arena proves a difficult prospect.

To fully understand the basis of Tonga’s FP and conduct of diplomacy it is first necessary to understand the political and socio-hierarchy structure of the nation. Latukefu’s (1975) ‘The Tongan
Constitution: a brief history to celebrate its Centenary’, written from the perspective of a Tongan native explores the evolution and establishment of Tonga’s founding document ‘1875 Constitution’. The detailed account is based on relevant documents housed at the Tonga Traditions Archives which makes for both an interesting and reliable account of events.

Campbell’s (2011) ‘Tonga’s way to democracy’ highlights and traces Tonga’s democratic journey peaking in the first ever democratic general election of 2010. It must be noted that much of the information described is derived from the pro-democratic local newspaper ‘Taimi ‘o Tonga’ and the writings and commentary of other pro-democratic supporters. The non-inclusion of traditionalist views tends to tell only one side of Tonga’s journey to democracy and thus, creates an unbalanced version of history.

f. Methodology

Research was conducted in two folds- (a) historical research was undertaken to ensure that a comprehensive and thorough understanding of the topic was made, so that the conclusions and recommendations reached at the end the study was indeed, a true reflection of past events that had transpired; (b) content and qualitative analysis was undertaken to develop the arguments for this dissertation. Both forms of research employed the use of (i) desk research and (ii) personal interviews.

Desk research included the collection of data from primary sources obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINOFA) and other Government Ministries such as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Tonga Defence Services (TDS) and the Palace Office Archives.

Other sources included newspaper articles published at the relevant periods with regards to Tonga. Research also, extended to secondary sources (biographies, histories, commentaries) pertaining to the relevant periods (1900-2016) examining both the political and historical development of Tonga. Additionally, material pertaining to other PSIDS was also, collected and analysed to highlight any factors of commonality or differences with Tonga.

Personal interviews were also conducted with former and current diplomats, as well as service men and women who once served in Tonga’s Foreign Ministry. The personal anecdotes collected throughout
the interview stages proved invaluable, as they added an element of ‘reality’ to the actual events that occurred during a specific period of Tongan diplomacy.

g. Logistics
Majority of research and interviews were conducted in Tonga. Originally, a temporary three-week research attachment was proposed to be conducted to the MINOFA, as part of the fact-finding research. Furthermore, during a brief trip to the United Kingdom, secondary research was conducted at the British National Archives and Chatham House in London. The majority of communications and the retrieval of relevant secondary resources were accomplished via email communication and internet access.

h. Constraints Encountered
The greatest hindrance to my research was the lack of specific data or research in relation to the practice of diplomacy in Tonga. As the relevant documents, correspondences and research material are mostly available and located in Australia and New Zealand National Archives.

Despite the scarce and lack of relevant material in Tonga, I then had to utilise the necessary resources at my disposal primarily made available at the University of the South Pacific Library campus in Tongatapu.

i. Ethical Considerations
As a working civil servant, access to MINOFA files was limited as some of the files contained confidential data. However, as such information was directly relevant to the purpose of this study; best efforts of paraphrasing were made to ensure the confidential status of the data was maintained. Similar confidential information was also uncovered in government correspondences between Britain and Tonga and although, could not be directly cited in this study was paraphrased. Furthermore, some of the interviewees that participated in the study preferred to remain anonymous due to their personal opinions on certain issues.
j. Outline of chapters

Chapter 1 is divided into two parts. Part One provides an overview of the study, highlighting the aims and objectives of the study; outlining the literature review and methodology; addresses the ethical constraints and logistics encountered throughout the duration of the study. Part Two addresses the context in which Tonga is defined as a SIDs focussing primarily on geographical, historical and economical factors.

Chapter 2 examines the nature of the Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga during the period of 1900-1970 in which, Tonga was declared a British Protected State. The chapter also explores (i) Tonga’s struggle to maintain sovereignty and independence and (ii) assessment of how Treaty making soon became the norm for Tonga’s conduct of bilateral relations with foreign nations.

Chapter 3 provides a perspective on Tonga’s ‘re-entry into the Commodity of Nations’ as a newly independent state (1970–2010). The chapter also addresses: (i) challenges and opportunities encountered by Tonga during its first years of ‘independence’; (ii) elements of Tonga’s unique FP and (iii) highlights key influential actors involved in formulation and direction of Tonga’s FP during the aforementioned period.

Chapter 4 examines the Post-Constitutional and Political reform in Tonga (2010–2016) and seeks to determine how such factors may have affected how Tonga conducts diplomacy in the 21st century and as a global player in the international scene.

Chapter 5 highlights the findings of the study conducted; discusses the gaps uncovered in Tonga’s current conduct of diplomacy and proposes recommendations for further development of Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy.
PART TWO: BACKGROUND

Characteristics of Small Island Developing State (SIDS):

SIDS are officially recognised as a specific group of islands suffering common vulnerabilities such as social, economic and environmental challenges. To date, the total number of SIDs consists of 38 nations deriving from the Caribbean, Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea region (AIMS)(UN-OHRLLS, 2011).

It is important to note that SIDs covers both large and small nations. For instance, though Papua New Guinea and Jamaica are relatively larger in size and population they are still categorised as a SIDs because they face similar challenges of limited resources as smaller nations such as Mauritius. Similarly, although, Singapore is one of the most developed (economically, technically and socially) is still classified as a SIDs predominantly due to its size. Therefore, implying the characteristics of SIDs does not solely focus on size, population or economy of scale (WB, 2016) but may range on the following 7 common challenges:

- Dependence on narrow range of exports
- High transportation costs due to insularity and remoteness
- Dependence on strategic imports such as food and fuel
- Susceptibility to natural disasters and environment change
- Decline in global trade and investment
- Lack of readily available information for investors and trading partners
- Limited capacity to harness growth opportunities

(Source: Commonwealth, 2017)

For the purpose of this study, I would like to narrow the focus to Tonga due to the three factors: (a) size: geographical remoteness results in costly infrastructure, limited access to the global market and increased threat to CC effects; (b) resources: lack of resources and capacity ;(c) economy: due to the aforementioned factors, the focus of Tonga’s economy is limited therefore, resulting in limited trade, investment and export opportunities.

The following section provides relevant background information on Tonga’s (i) history; (ii) geography; (iii) economy, all of which are pertinent to understanding how Tonga conducts diplomacy and interacts with foreign nations.
i. **History**

Prior to the permeation of Western civilization, Tonga maintained its own style of socio-political order governed by Chieftainship system led by the Tu’i Tonga dynasty (Latukefu, 1975; Ahio, 2007) (Figure 1).

In 1845, Tonga transformed from chieftainship to a unified Kingdom governed by the newly installed Monarch His Late Majesty King George Tupou I. Efforts\(^1\) to establish civil order and law in Tongan society became a reality with the granting of the Act of Constitution 1875\(^2\), bringing forth a new era of law and order, one that signified the sovereign and independent status of Tonga and the guarantee of future stability.

To date, Tonga remains a Constitutional Monarchy governed by the Head of State King Tupou VI who is also; ‘the sovereign of all the Chiefs and all the people, the person of the King is sacred’ (Act of Constitution, 1988, Clause 41, p.17). Although, the Monarch reigns the country, the Executive branch of government is responsible for the daily administration of Government affairs.

ii. **Geography**

Tonga (a.k.a The Friendly Islands\(^3\)) is a remote Pacific Island situated in the South Pacific, located ‘about 1,800km north of New Zealand and about 800 km east of Fiji’ (Daly, p.xi, 1999).

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\(^{1}\) The first attempt to establish a set of codified laws was the Vava’u Code of 1839. Provisions of the Code focused on improving primarily the lifestyle of Tongan society, emphasising the importance of fidelity and observance of the sacredness of the Sabbath, and introducing the provision to limit the once endless power of chiefs over their people. In 1850, the Vava’u Code was further amended to incorporate the ‘new and powerful position of the Hau’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.27) and emphasised that ‘the King was the root of all government and that it was his prerogative to appoint those who should govern’ (Ibid).

\(^{2}\) The Constitution contains a total of 115 provisions governing (i) Declaration of Rights; (ii) Form of Government; (iii) The Land. For more information see: Act of Constitution (1988).

\(^{3}\) The name was bestowed by Captain James Cook during his visit to Tonga in 1777, after he had witnessed the ‘Inasi Ceremony’ during one of his voyages to Tonga. During the ‘Inasi Ceremony, it was compulsory for commoners to pay tribute in the form of presentation of fruits/harvest to their local chiefs especially, during the harvest months of July/October (Latukefu, 1975,p.8)
Tonga is comprised of 176 scattered islands (52 inhabited) grouped into three main island groups (Tongatapu, Vava’u, and Ha’apai). The main island Tongatapu and Ha’apai Group are of coral atoll formation, whereas, the Vava’u Group are of volcanic formation.

Tonga’s unique location has given the nation both benefits and drawbacks. On the positive side: (i) Tonga’s close proximity location to the International Dateline allows Tonga to be the first country in the world to see the dawn of every new day, being 13 hours ahead of Greenwich Meridian Time (GMT) (Daly, 1999); (ii) Tonga is also, home to the world’s second deepest trench ‘Tonga Trench.’

Nonetheless, given Tonga’s location in the centre of the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire’, Tonga is highly vulnerable to experiencing seismic volcanic activity (World Atlas, 2016). Furthermore, due to Tonga’s remote location, factors of transportation and infrastructure prove costly.

Additionally, Tonga’s low lying land formation makes the nation vulnerable to the effects of CC and rising sea levels particularly, the Ha’apai Group, who throughout the years has suffered rising sea levels, cyclone damage and extreme weather events (Dateline Pacific, 2014).

iii. Economy

Tonga’s economy is wholly dependent on agricultural and fishing exports. Given Tonga’s remote location and vulnerability to environmental and CC, dependency on the value of agricultural exports is uncertain (Commonwealth, 2017: ADB, 1996).

Efforts to diversify Tonga’s economy includes (i) infrastructural upgrading and extension of the island’s International Airport runway to accommodate larger flights from New Zealand; renovation of the
Queen Salote and Vuna Wharf to facilitate the arrival of International Ferries (Hoadley, 1992) and (ii) focusing on the tourism sector to boost Tonga’s reputation as a potential holiday destination (TTA, 2013).

With a population of 106,170 (2015) (WB, 2017) of which an estimated 100,000 Tongans live abroad in New Zealand, Australia, USA and other parts of the world, Tonga’s local economy is greatly assisted and maintained by remittances. Despite, being the most educated Pacific nation with the highest rate of PhDs per capita (Moala, 2013; Toetu’u-Tamihere, 2014) the lack of diversified job opportunities in Tonga has led to an increased brain-drain migration abroad.

Since 2014, the New Zealand Government Seasonal Employment Scheme has elevated the heavy dependence on remittances from Tongan Diaspora abroad and equally, contributed to ‘greater asset-building, investments and skill development’ (Gibson & McKenzie, no date, p.20) of Tongan locals.

Nonetheless, since the 1960s -1990s Tonga has become heavily dependent on the assistance and investment of overseas donor assistance primarily, New Zealand and Australia as well, as international organisations (Pyke et al, 2012: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2013).

**Review**

Discussions have established the primary premises for this paper, methodology utilised and the literature review of the relevant material available pertaining to the subject of SIDs. The second half of the chapter has provided a brief synopsis of Tonga’s background in terms of geography and history system.

**Chapter 2** will mainly focus on the origins and effects of the Treaty of Friendship and the beginning of Tonga’s bilateral relations with foreign nations. Discussions will also, focus on Tonga’s interaction with the dominant European powers of the 19th century and how Tonga utilised the art of diplomacy to maintain its sovereign status during the Colonisation era of 1900–1970 within the region.
Chapter 2: Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga (1900-1970)

“Verily wish to be the friend of Britain; in friendly alliance, with all fellowship, but it is not my mind, nor the mind of my people, that we should be subject to any other people or kingdom in the world. But it is our mind to sit down (that is, remain) an independent nation.” ~ King George Tupou I, 1850 (Joris de Boris, 1974).

1. Introduction

At the end of the 1900s, much of the Pacific Region had befallen either annexation or colonisation. Tonga remained the exception to this, for despite, formally becoming a British Protected State in 1900; Tonga still maintained complete independence and sovereignty.

This chapter will seek to examine: (i) the origins of the Treaty; (ii) determine whether Tonga was a Protectorate or British protected State; (iii) evaluate the effects of the Treaty and (iv) determine the factors that led to the end of the Treaty. However, before proceeding any further, a brief discussion on the use of Treaty making in the South Pacific during the 19th century proves necessary.

2. Nineteenth century Treaties:

The 19th century or the ‘Age of the Empire’ (Anghie, 1999) is idyllically known for the extension of colonial and imperial rule of European powers into the Pacific region. Such endeavours were led by the German and British Empire, France and the United States of America often through the use of written ‘Treaties,’ as a tool of influence and domination (Devere et al, 2011).

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4 It must be noted that colonial and imperial rule also extended to other parts of the world such as Asia, Africa. For detailed information see: Kitson PJ (2003) Nineteenth-century travels, explorations, and empires: writings from the era of imperial consolidation, 1835-1910.
At the same time, treaties were also employed to promote peace and cooperation amongst European and non-European nations therefore, creating a society in which two different cultures could co-exist. Despite this, the principal of inequality was ever still present because many of the Treaties formed in the 19th century between European and indigenous Pacific people resulted in many of the islanders forfeiting some aspect of their freedom in exchange for protection or other benefits (Devere et al, 2011).

Consecutively, treaties were also used as legal forms of law and order exclusively created by European powers to dominate and showcase the high level of supremacy and ‘interests of ‘peoples of European blood’ over those of the inhabitants of the territories they colonized’ (Westlake cited in Orakhelashvili, 2006, p.320).

Though I do agree with the aforementioned interpretations, I believe it tends to imply that Treaties were merely employed as a means to an end. I do not perceive this as the true essence of Treaties. On the contrary, Treaties should also be considered as playing an integral role in the formative years of developing a nation’s internal governance particularly, in the case of Tonga.

However, if a survey was conducted on the Pacific region in the 19th century, perhaps Westlake’s description would prove more prominent. This may have been caused by the fact that, many of the Pacific nations had still not yet formally established themselves into a set form of government, which by European standards were of an acceptable nature. At the time Pacific Islands were still largely ruled by chieftainship clans and thus, considered by the West as disorganised and primitive to a certain extent.

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6 This does not mean that Pacific societies did not have a coherent form of governance. Each Pacific society maintained their own traditions, cultures and way of living and surviving however, such practices did not fit into the Western perspective’s definition of a civilised society. For more information see: Campbell IC (1992). A history of the Pacific Islands.
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Chapter 2: Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga (1900-1970)

The exception to this trend was Tonga, for they had achieved the transition from chieftainship rule to a unified Kingdom ruled by Constitutional Monarch, King George Tupou I, whose goal was to emulate and adopt the practices of the British Monarch system to Tonga. With this in mind, one is drawn to believe that as a civilised nation, Tonga should have had more of an equal standing and balance of relations with European powers via the use of Treaties.

Nevertheless, the following passages will illustrate the imbalance of power and intentions for domination, still prevailed in Tonga’s interaction with European powers despite, achieving the proposed European standards of civilisation of the 19th century.\(^7\)

3. Treaty of Friendship between the British Empire and Tonga

The unification of Tonga in 1845 led to the dawn of a new beginning for the nation. The newly installed monarch King George Tupou I, a devout Christian sought to not only, reform the manner in which his people were governed but also, to gain international recognition for Tonga as an independent and sovereign state able to control their own state of affairs.

The first nation to have signed a Treaty of Friendship with Tonga was France in 1855. The reality of the Treaty was that it was largely based on political-religious interests’ rather than mutual interests (Latukefu, 1974: Grijp, 2014). In the years that followed, the decision to pursue the Treaty only further led to the growing disparity between the Roman Catholics and the Tongan Monarch.\(^8\) This became of great concern to Tupou I, as it impressed upon him that much work was still required to be done, to

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\(^7\) For more information please see: Orakhelashvili A (2006). *The Idea of European International Law.*

\(^8\) In 1858, the Tongan Governor of Ha’apai, Sosai Lausi stated permission for two Catholics missions to setup a missionary base in the village of Lifuka. In his defence, Lausi stated that he cannot grant them permission without the approval of His Majesty King George Tupou I as per accordance with the Law of the Land. This response was brought to the attention of Captain Le Bris of the French naval vessel Bayonnaise who immediately summoned the Monarch and the Governor and demanded the Monarch reprimand the Governor and grant the Catholic missionaries permission for if not, it would be in direct violation of the Treaty. In his defence, Tupou I stated that the Governor acted accordingly to the Laws of the Land and thus, believed no violation of the Treaty had occurred. In the end, Tupou I obliged and granted the Catholic priests permission and granted them land to build their missions (Latukefu, 1974, Grijp, 2014).
establish a more detailed and customary Code of Constitution; one which, would guarantee that no foreign powers should ever usurp the authority and legality of Tongan Municipal Law.  

After much deliberation and with the assistance of a newly junior British Missionary Rev Shirley W Baker, Tupou I moved to establish a more codified and constitutional code of law that proved more in favour with the European legal system which was ultimately, culminated and established as the Act of Constitution 1875. The 132 Article Constitution was passed by Parliament in 1875, as the Supreme Law of the Land and focuses on 3 main principles (1) Declaration of Rights; (2) Form of Government and (3) The Land.

The first nation to formally recognise Tonga as an independent nation following the establishment of the 1875 Constitution was the German Empire in 1876. Germany’s keen interest in Tonga can be said to be based on two key areas: (1) trade opportunities: many German traders immigrating to Tonga were interested in the rising Copra Production Enterprise. Additionally, the allowances for the leasing of land to Europeans now permitted by the 1875 Code was another key factor and resulted in an influx of traders looking to setup plantations and establish trading stations on the island; (2) maritime security: when the treaty was later ratified in 1877, Germany obtained trading rights and approval for establishment of a naval station on Tonga’s outer northern island of Vava’u (Latukefu, 1975, p.56).

Such a move was not welcomed by the British Empire, for they were reluctant to acknowledge Tonga’s independent status, specifically as they had no specific interest in the nation, other than the successful efforts of the British Missionaries in 1826.
At the time, British interests were predominantly directed onto developing their newest colony (the Fiji Islands)\(^\text{15}\) and the potential to establish rights in Samoa as a potential ‘refuelling stop for coal-fired shipping’ (NZ Government, no date). Despite this, Tupou I was still keen on gaining the recognition and approval of the British Empire. Previous attempts to establish foreign relations with the British Empire were led by Tupou I including a written request to establish a treaty between the two States; however, his requests fell on deaf ears (New Zealand Herald, 1879).

Tupou I’s non-wavering persistence to establish relations with the British illustrates the Monarch’s determination to validate Tonga’s sovereign and independent status and thus, was on equal par to the British Empire. After all, the very foundations of modern Tongan society were in fact emulated directly from the British Monarchical system itself.

Ironically, German interests in Tonga urged the British to show a sudden interest in Tonga and thus, led to the signing of the ‘Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Tonga’ in 1879 later ratified in 1881. The treaty guaranteed similar trading rights as to the Germans however, with the added twist that the British were named ‘the most favoured nation’ in Tongan foreign relations (Treaty of Friendship, 1880, Article II).

Although, Britain had been recognised by Tonga as the ‘most favoured nation’ (Ibid), legally Tonga was still free to conduct relations with other European powers. It is rather ironic to note that despite Britain’s initial reluctance to recognise Tonga’s independent status, they still craftily managed to get Tonga to agree that they were the ‘most favoured nation’ of all other nations. Agreement to such a clause may have been an oversight on the part of the Tupou I or maybe it was indeed the answer that he had previously sought, years before in his fight for recognition from the British Empire. One can only assume it may have been indeed a mixture of both the aforementioned reasons.

During the 1880’s, British interest increased in the internal affairs of Tonga particularly, when Tupou I appointed a former British missionary Rev. Shirley Baker as his most trusted advisor and Prime

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\(^{15}\) For more information see: Wilkinson D (1874), ‘The deed of cession of Fiji to Great Britain’.
During his premiership (1880-1890), Baker somewhat became, a thorn in the British Government’s side as he was considered to be pro-German and had persuaded Tupou I towards the same sentiments.

Eventually knowledge of Baker’s deceptions and misguided advice to the Monarch reached the British High Commissioner (Sir John Thurston), who immediately took action and ordered for his immediate deportation in 1890. In his absence, Tupou I found his nation in a state of turmoil, for Baker had single handedly operated the government (Latukefu, 1975). Additionally, much of the Government reports and administration papers were recorded in the English language, thus leaving the newly appointed Premier Siaosi Tuku’aho at a great disadvantage.

To resolve this, the British intervened with the immediate secondment of Basil Thomson to act as an advisor to Tuku’aho. One can only assume that the removal of Baker itself was solely done in the interests of the British Government, for it allowed the British High Commissioner to weave their way into Tongan politics (Lavaka, 1981, p.18).

Elsewhere in the Pacific, the battle for Colonial and political supremacy in the region raged on and came to a head in the mid-1880s. Efforts to resolve these disputes resulted in the Demarcation Declaration 1886 between the German and British, highlighting their respective spheres of influence in the Pacific region. The declaration only temporarily eased the tension; it was not until the Tripartite Convention of 1899 in Samoa was the disputes finally resolved.

Details of the outcome agreement stipulated that Great Britain ‘would renounce her treaty rights in Samoa in favour of German and the United States, and in return Germany would give up her treaty rights in Tonga in favour of Great Britain’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.69)

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16 For more information see Rutherford N (1996), ‘Shirley Baker & the King of Tonga.
17 For detailed account of the High Commissioner’s relationship with the Tonga Government see: Mitchell CBH (1887) Report by Sir C Mitchell, High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, in connection with the recent disturbances in and the affairs of Tonga.
18 For more information see: Declaration between Great Britain and Germany demarcating their spheres of influence between the Western Pacific, April 6, 1886.
Prior to the agreement of the Samoa Convention of 1899, the fight for dominance between Germany and the British was evident in Tonga in 1898 when the German Captain Mandt communicated to the British Consul in Samoa that

‘till your flag goes up or your Protectorate is declared, that it is still open to any nation to take Tonga’ (Private communication from Captain Mandt, commanding His Imperial German Majesty’s Ship ‘Bussard’ to Ernest G.B. Maxse, Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul and Deputy Commissioner at Samoa. (Maxse to Commander Sturdee, 18 October 1898, FOCP 7278, encl. In no.58) in Lavaka, 1981, p.19)

The decision to forfeit treaty rights in Samoa in exchange for Tonga was a difficult but necessary choice at the time and was predominantly, a strategic one based on the location of Tonga.

The risk of losing Tonga to a foreign power was too great for it would jeopardise the social and economic British interests in Fiji, given Tonga’s relatively close location to Fiji. Furthermore, the additional risks of the Vava’u Harbour ‘Port au Refuge’ becoming a central pacific naval base to any hostile powers was too great to ignore.

As a consequence, to secure their own interests and put a stop to any further intervention from Germany or any other European powers, the British had to move fast and therein was born the decision to formalise Tonga’s status as a British Protected State in 1899 (Campbell, 2001).

4. **Protectorate or British-Protected State?**

In 1893, Tonga said farewell to their visionary leader, King George Tupou I having passed away at the age of 97 with a reign of over 70 years\textsuperscript{19}. In line with Article 32 of the Constitution, Taufa’ahau the King’s great-grandson ascended to the throne at the young age of 19 as King George Tupou II (Eustis, 1997).

\textsuperscript{19} Tupou had outlived both his own son and grandson.
At the outset, Tupou II’s reign\textsuperscript{20} was riddled with obstacles: Government’s finances utilised during the Royal Funeral for the Late King caused a large deficit in Government expenses; the new King’s extravagant spending and the measles pandemic only caused further dents to the Government’s finances (Latukefu, 1975). Furthermore, civil unrest amongst the nobles of the nation had grown due to the new King’s choice of bride. The arrival of Basil Thomson with the proposal for Tonga to become an official British Protectorate State only further added to the list of problems for the new Monarch.

The draft treaty drawn up by Thomson contained similar propositions to that of the 1879 Treaty, with the exception of the two new articles which proposed that:

\textbf{Article I}: “His Majesty the King of Tonga agrees to place freely and unreservedly himself, his subjects, and his dominions under the protection of Her Britannic Majesty from the date of the signature of the present Treaty”;

\textbf{Article II}: “His Majesty the King of Tonga further understand and agrees that all his relations of any sort whatever with foreign Powers, shall be conducted under the sole advice and through the channel of Her Majesty’s Government” (Lavaka, 1981, p 6A-7A)

Initially, Tupou II contested the proposal of both Articles particularly, with the notion of Tonga becoming a ‘Protectorate.’ To Tupou II, the term ‘Protectorate’ was merely a substitution for ‘colony’, for it would mean that appointed British Consuls would preside and administer over the internal affairs of Tonga. This was unacceptable, as it would jeopardise and threaten Tonga’s independent and sovereign status.

Such concerns were raised by the Monarch in his correspondence to Thomson on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} May 1900 stating:

\textit{‘I write this letter in reply to the questions you put to me yesterday, which were as follows: (1) What is our mind towards the new Treaty? And our answer is, we agree to it, but the first section only is difficult to us where the word ‘protection’ is used. Do not be pained at this letter, Mr Thoms, for I agree to everything that is in the Treaty; it is only the first section that appears difficult to me; and if you will consent to alter the first section it would be easy for us to agree on the matter’}. (Tupou II to Thomson, 2 May 1900, FOCP 7504, encl.2 in no. 6. in Lavaka 1981, p.40).

Despite Tupou II’s pleas, Thomson continued to forcibly push for agreement from the Monarch and at times, resorted to threats stating that failure to sign the Treaty will inevitably result in Britain’s disregard.

\textsuperscript{20} For a detailed account of King George Tupou II see Fusitu’a, E (1976), \textit{King George Tupou II and the Government of Tonga}. 

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for Tupou II’s status as King. What's more, Thomson reassured the Monarch that despite, his delaying tactics, the Protectorate status of Tonga was predetermined and would inevitably happen (Latukefu, 1975).

The Monarch was at a crossroads, failure to sign the treaty may inevitably lead to the possible forcible annexation or colonisation of Tonga. However, if he did sign would that mean he had failed to live up to the expectations and hard work of his predecessor and great grandfather Tupou I for an independent and sovereign Tonga. To avert the all out domination of the British Empire on Tonga’s independence, Tupou II proposed the following amendments to the treaty:

i. Tonga would remain an independent and sovereign State able to govern and conduct their own internal affairs despite, agreeing to become a British Protected State;

ii. The advice and appointment of a British Consul was welcomed however, he ‘was not to interfere with internal matters in which foreigners were not concerned’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.70);

iii. The British Consul shall have jurisdiction over all foreigners charged with civil and criminal crimes however; they were to be tried in a Tongan court accordingly;

A further amendment proposed the suggested deletion of the Article I and II of the draft treaty stating that Tonga would become a Protectorate State and the proposal for Great Britain to be in charge for Tonga’s foreign relations and that the main channel of communication for foreign relations be conducted through the HM Government (Lavaka, 1981, p.39).

Upon closer examination of the signed Treaty of May 1900, it is apparent that the terms proposed by Tupou II were met and incorporated. Making it clear that Tonga was not merely a protectorate state but was in fact, a British Protected State responsible for the conduct and charge of their own internal affairs and international correspondence.

Conversely, the reality was when the Treaty was officially signed in Nuku’alofa on 18th May 1900²¹, Thomson intentionally implied that all previous terms and conditions of the original draft Treaty had been agreed to including the provision that the British conduct and are the main channel of communication for

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²¹ The treaty was later ratified on the 16th February 1901 and superseded the former Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga in 1879 (Latukefu, 1975).
Tonga’s external relations (Campbell, 2001). Thomson’s vindictive behaviour would cause great indifference from Tupou II and would taint relations with the British Government during the first years of the Treaty.

Despite the internal politics of the Treaty, the general public from both nations embraced the Treaty. To the British public, based on Thomson’s reports, Britain was considered as Tonga’s salvation and was ‘absolutely necessary to protect the Tongans against the attempt upon them that would undoubtedly have been made before long by on the Great Powers’ (Pall Mall Gazette, 1900). Perhaps, such a view may have largely been attributed to the dominant 19th century worldview of the time, of white supremacy and colonial rule was the be all and end all of smaller, non-European states.

On the other hand, the Tongan people embraced the Treaty based on the notion that: (i) Tonga’s independence and sovereignty remained untouched and Tupou II’s reign as Monarch and Head of State was maintained (Article I of 1900 Treaty); (ii) Tonga remained in charge of their external foreign relations. (Article I of 1900 Treaty); and lastly, (iii) Tonga would be shielded from any external hostile attacks with the protection of the British Government (Article II of the 1900 Treaty).

Obviously, each State had interpreted the terms and agreements of the Treaty to their own interest and cause. This gap in understanding between the two States somewhat marked the turbulent beginnings of relations between the British Consul and the Tonga Government in the coming years.

5. **Effects of the Treaty of Friendship**

   i. **Growing tensions**: relations between the two States were rather strained during 1900-1905. The political stability of the Tongan Government and the leadership of Tupou II came under enormous pressure from foreigners and locals alike. On the one hand, the Treaty empowered foreigners to vocalise their discontent with Tupou II’s administration and appealed for the annexation of Tonga to New Zealand.

   Moreover, the Monarch was reported to have violated terms of the treaty by failing to seek the advice of the British Consul (Hamilton Hunter) on local issues as agreed upon in the Treaty. However, one can
only assume that the Monarch’s behaviour may have stemmed directly from his great dissatisfaction with Thomson and the level of deception he utilised to gain his own interests.

Nonetheless, knowledge of the Tongan Government’s alleged ‘corruption and inefficiency’ (Campbell, 2001, p.135) were reported by the British Consul to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific in Suva and requested intervention as the sole solution.

Such a request was a direct violation of the 1900 Treaty, which clearly stated that the British government would avoid interference in Tonga’s internal affairs. However, growing pressure from the British Consul and foreign settlers led the British to move to intervene although; it would be in direct violation of Article III of the 1900 Treaty.

ii. **Interference:** The British can be said to have violated the Treaty of Friendship in two key instances. The **first occurred in 1904** with the visit of the British High Commissioner (Sir Everand Im Thurn) to evaluate the claims of mismanagement of funds and corruption as reported, by the British Consul earlier in 1902. Additional letters of instruction from the Colonial Office in Great Britain clearly stated that Im Thurn was to proceed with all necessary actions to ‘stabilise Tongan affairs, including deporting the King and Premier’ (Campbell, 2001, p.135) if needed.

In the end Im Thurn did proceed with the deportation of Tonga’s Prime Minister (Siosateki Veikune) and the Minister of Finance (Fotu) and further instructed the Monarch to appoint a new individual (selected by Im Thurn) to the post of Prime Minister, alongside, with the appointment of two New Zealand individuals to posts of Assistant Treasurer and Chief Justice (Campbell, 2001; Latukefu, 1975).

To legalise his rulings, Im Thurn further coerced Tupou II into signing the Supplement to the 1900 Treaty. The outline of the Supplement declared that the advice of the British Consul was required and should be sought with the appointment of individuals to high level positions and the public service. One can deduce that the creation of this supplement document was to justify the British’s own agenda and interests.

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22 For more information see: *Notes of points accepted by the King 1904.*
Some may hold the view that the Monarch should not have signed the supplement treaty granting extra powers for the British Consul; however, one can only think that again Tupou II was put in a tight spot just as he had been put by Thomson previously. Failure to comply would eventually result in the complete loss of independence and sovereignty of his nation. To avoid this, he did only what he was able to do and that was sign the supplementary document.

Despite this, Tupou II as he had previously done with the 1900 Treaty expressed his immense disappointment and resentment towards the actions of Im Thurn by appealing directly to His Majesty King Edward VII via correspondence through the Colonial Office in 1905 stating:

‘My present complaint is that the part referred to of Article III of 1900 has been flagrantly, openly and designedly broken by the High Commissioner with the consent and knowledge and active assistance of your Consul here’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.73).

Perchance, the greatest intervention conducted by Im Thurn was his admonishment of both the Monarch and his chiefs on the 28th December 1904, in which he highlighted the shortcomings of Tupou II as a leader and if he did not conform to the principles of the Constitution, he would face the same consequences as Veikune and his nation would be annexed immediately by the British Empire.

Tensions continued to elevate in 1909 with the arrival of the new British Consul (WT Campbell). Campbell had his own prejudicial perceptions of Tongan society and government. He saw Tongans ‘as a terribly swell-headed lot’ and the island ‘as the worst place in the Western Pacific and little can be done with it until it has been annexed’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.74).

Campbell’s personal narrow-mindedness was embodied in the way he prevailed over Tongan affairs in which he envisioned ‘himself as a governor of a colony, not as a discreet adviser to an ostensibly independent government’ (Campbell, 2001, p.138).

Campbell is noted as having interfered in Tongan affairs in two folds: the first occurred in 1912 when Tupou II sought to appoint eight individuals from the Parliament as his new nobles; however, Campbell intervened and obstructed the decision. Campbell justified his decision on the basis that nobles selected by
the Monarch are essential holders of Parliamentary membership and thus, considered government positions and therefore, he has the right to intervene.

Such a move continued to fuel the anger of Tupou II towards Campbell during his stay in office. However, Tupou II’s chance to fight back came in 1910 when Campbell began to meddle in the affairs of the ‘Tonga Ma’a Tonga Kautaha (Tonga for Tongans Company)\(^23\).

Tupou II was a keen supporter of the Kautaha primarily because of the Kautaha’s ability to revive a sense of patriotism and nationalism that seemed to have been missing from the nation since the loss of Tupou I. This newfound sense of nationalism was not welcomed by either the European traders or the Assistant Premier Roberts who considered it as ‘inspiring a spirit of patriotism and ousting the white traders’ and also for inflaming racial hatred between Tongans and Europeans’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.75).

There has been no concrete evidence to back up Roberts views, but one can only assume that Roberts own views grew from his dislike for the growing abilities given to Tongasen with the setup of entrepreneurial enterprises such as the Kautaha. This trend of dislike for the progressive attempts of locals was equally shared by Campbell who continued to find fault in the financial situation of the ‘Kautaha.’

In 1911, Campbell in cohorts with Mateialona (Premier) claimed and charged the Kautaha founder with fraud and embezzlement. Nonetheless, upon closer inspection it was found that such charges were unfounded and had been purely based on Campbell’s own prejudicial views against the success of the Kautaha\(^24\). Furthermore, interference continued with Campbell’s removal of Chief Justice Skeen from Cabinet in the same year. Once again, Tupou II found himself forced by the British High Commission to re-assign the powers of the Chief Justice to the British Government.

Tupou II’s battle against Campbell continued as they argued over the validity and applicability of the 1911 Privy Council Ordinances ‘purporting to make all co-operatives illegal unless Government approval was obtained’ (Latukefu, 1975, p.75). According to the Monarch, the Ordinances were backward looking

\(^{23}\) A co-operative trading society established in 1909 as a means to provide Tongan copra producers farmers with a direct channel of trade with foreigners. Thus, forgoing the need for involvement of a European middle man.

\(^{24}\) It was later uncovered that only a small portion of inconsistencies had appeared in the Kautaha Company records, no real evidence of fraud or embezzlement were discovered. For more information please see: Hempenstall & Rutherford (1984) Protest and dissent in the colonial Pacific.
and in direct conflict with the Constitution. This greatly angered Campbell who ‘threatened the King with deportation and called His Majesty a child’ (Fusitu'a, 1976, p.178).

Despite such insults, King Tupou II maintained his composure and persevered ‘defending the Kautaha, his own rights and Tongan rights against unjust foreign encroachment’ (Campbell, 2001, p.140). Ultimately, the unprofessional conduct and actions of Campbell reached the attention of the Colonial Office who in turn, reprimanded Campbell with his immediate removal from Office. Such actions signify that Campbell had indeed violated Article III of the 1900 Treaty and he was ordered to apologise to Tupou II at once.

Although, the British had clearly violated Article III of the Treaty, they were not reprimanded. This lack of repercussions for their actions, illustrates the elusive nature of treaties and how stronger nations can utilise it according to their own interpretations and interests.

Concurrently, intervention can be interpreted to have affected Tonga in a positive way: (i) it proved a wakeup call for Tupou II to pay closer attention to developing the welfare of his people and government. To achieve this he would need to step up and conduct certain internal developments to maintain stability and welfare of his people and thus, avoid further interference from the British; (ii) Campbell’s actions forced the British Government to pay more attention to the illegal actions of their representatives abroad and also, acknowledge the need to limit British intervention in Tonga’s affairs; (iii) brought Tongans closer together, brought the Monarch closer to his people and instilled a newfound sense of nationalism and patriotism within Tongan society which had been dormant for a while.

iii. Internal developments: Relations between the new British Consul (HEW Grant) and Tupou II eased throughout 1913-1918. The Government turned their attentions to the internal development of Tongan society particularly in areas of education, agriculture, infrastructure and parliament (Figure 5).
iv. Cultural preservation: In 1918, Queen Salote Tupou III\(^{25}\) ascended the throne at the age of 18 after the passing of King George Tupou II at the age of 43. During the early years of her reign, Salote’s authority and validity as a Head of State was often questioned by both the British High Commissioner in Suva, the Tongan Government and nobles. Salote’s relatively young age and inexperience may have played a major part in the formation of such doubts (Wood-Ellem, 1999).

Additional factors may have also stemmed from the fact that as a female monarch, the nobles and the British did not consider Salote to hold the ability to handle the male dominated world of politics, let alone reign as a Head of State.

As time went on, Salote surpassed both the British and nobles expectations for a female Monarch. With the guidance of her most trusted advisor, husband and Consort (Tungi Mailefihi), Salote was able to fulfil her duties as a Monarch to both her people and country accordingly.

Unlike her father (Tupou II), Salote was much more welcoming and nurturing towards the British. From the start, she had learnt that the best way to secure Tonga’s independence and sovereignty was to

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\(^{25}\) For more information of Queen Salote Tupou III achievements and reign please see: Wood-Ellem E (1999). Queen Salote of Tonga: The Story of an era 1900-1965
uphold peace and cooperation between Britain and this was evident with the renewal of the Treaty in 1928. Nonetheless, Salote did manage to stand her ground when it came to the advice offered by British Consul and the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.

At times, she ‘selected only what she wanted from the West, and embraced a mixture of Tongan and Christian values’ (Wood-Ellem, 1999, p.72). To Salote, it was important for Tongans to learn what is needed from Western cultures but not to have it solely dominate Tongan society and culture. Salote’s infusion of Western and Tongan culture led to a new form of development for the Tongan people.

In contrast to past Tongan Monarch’s, who had focused on Tonga’s external status as an independent and sovereign state, Salote took more of an inward looking approach predominantly focusing on developing and preserving Tonga’s unique culture and heritage.

As an avid poet, composer and orator, Salote’s attention centred on establishing a means to preserve Tongan culture identity and traditions. Her views were echoed in her speech conveyed at the Closing of Parliament in 1949, when she “motioned before the House recommending the codification of Tongan customs and traditions” (Wood-Ellem, 1999, p.272). In her view, ‘the preservation of the past in order to strengthen the future, not only of the chiefs, but also of all the people of her kingdom; and, above all, the perpetuation of Tongan identity’ (Ibid, p.284).

The motion was granted by the House and in 1954, the Tonga Traditions Committee (TTC) was established to mark the 50th birthday of Her Majesty and to fulfil her wishes to record and preserve Tongan customs.

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26 For further information please see Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga 1928
27 For more information see: Bott E (1982). Tongan society at the time of Captain Cook’s visits: discussions with Her Majesty Queen Salote Tupou.
28 With the post-war changes of the 1950s, the Queen realised many rapid western changes within the Tonga society had lead to a quick decline in the value and preservation of Tonga traditions and customs.
To date, Salote’s vision for the preservation of the Tongan arts is still maintained and practiced as it was during her time and continues to be passed down from generation to generation as a way for Tongans, to remember who their ancestors were and the events that passed in order to achieve the society that they live in today.

v. **Bilateral relations**: Salote’s efforts to maintain perpetual peace and cooperation between the two States were accomplished by stabilising the internal affairs and social development of Tongan society as a nation. The good relations maintained between Britain and Tonga during the 50’s is in direct contrast to those in the 1900’s during Tupou II’s reign. Gone were the days, when the British and Western Pacific enforced their views upon the Tongan Monarch and Government and out emerged Tonga’s first and longest standing bilateral relationship to date.

Salote’s exemplary achievements were thoroughly recognised and acknowledged by the British Empire when Salote was ‘made a DBE in 1932, promoted to GBE in 1945, given the GCVO in 1953 and finally the GCMG in 1965’ (Cannadine, 2001, p.98). The prestige of being awarded such high level British honours signifies a turn in the relationship between Britain and Tonga, for it illustrates that Tonga was finally being seen as an equal to the British Empire and only further advanced relations between the two states.

Bilateral ties were further strengthened in 1953, when Salote attended the Coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in the United Kingdom in which, many of the British public were intrigued by both the stature and elegance of the Tongan Queen.

Moreover, the British public were much more impressed as the smiling Monarch rode the procession unfazed by the pouring rain and continued to smile as she refused to raise the carriage for shelter. This showcase of reverence was unheard by anyone of such stature and only, further won the Queen and her nation praise by the British public and the international sphere.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{29}\) For details see: The Illustrated London News (1953). *Queen Salote of Tonga.*
What’s more, another pivotal point in relations between Britain and Tonga was the stop over official visit by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to Tonga during her Royal Tour of New Zealand (50s). The hospitality offered by Salote and her people illustrated the long standing history and the amount of respect and humility between the two nations and again, marked the high level of equal recognition and respect between the two Monarchs and their respective nations.

6. End of an era

Crown Prince Tungi immediately upon receiving his Bachelor Degree in Arts and Law in 1942, was appointed by Salote as Minister for Education in 1943 and Minister of Health in 1944. The Queen justified her choice by stating that it was time for the young prince (aged 24) to become aware and active in the proceedings of Government in preparation for his future role as Monarch; a task which the Queen herself had found daunting during her early years of reign.

During his years as Minister for Education, Tungi sought to modernise the Tonga Educational system with a strict focus on Government schools. His reforms included updating of the Tongan spelling; creation of Tongan-English dictionary and setup of a Teacher’s Training School to help battle the lack of experienced and qualified teachers in Tonga. Additionally, Tungi undertook the decision to establish Tonga College (old Government School) as an academic Institution instead of vocational one to allow for more learning opportunities for Tonga’s growing youths.

Tungi was also keen on transforming Tonga into a bilingual speaking State and thus, established Tonga’s first bilingual Matriculation School (later known as Tonga High School) in which students were prepared for the New Zealand University Entrance exams and further education opportunities abroad.

In 1949, Tungi was appointed to the post of Premier, a post which would take him beyond the borders of Tonga and also, gain further understanding of the world. Tungi utilised his external networks to seek business opportunities to build up the economic and social development of Tonga in areas of commerce, employment and even foreign relations.
Nonetheless, the rising dominance of Tungi and the rapid rate of implementation for his modernization policies were somewhat viewed by the British as an infringement on their advisory role and threatened the level of influence they had once held with Tupou II and Salote.

Tungi was well-educated and could converse freely with Europeans and Tongans alike, he had not needed nor had he heeded the advice of the British Consul since his appointment to Government. In his view, Tonga was capable of operating as an independent nation and had no need for protection from a European power such as Britain. Given the geographical distance between the two States, it was considered literally impossible for Britain to provide protection to Tonga in cases of imminent danger.

Instead Tungi anticipated much more effective protection could be provided by nations which are geographically closer and hold similar interests as Tonga such as New Zealand and Australia. (Eustis, 1997).

One can infer that Tungi saw Tonga’s economical and social growth as being restricted and limited by the current Treaty, for how can Tonga engage with nations in the international scene and pursue their interests whole heartedly, if they are required to go through a middle man, which in this case was the British Government. Just as King George Tupou I had tried to bring enlightenment, law and order to his people in the mid-1850s, Tungi wanted to bring his people and nation to a new level of modernisation in the 20th century.

Nevertheless, the aspirations of Tungi were kept at bay by provisions of the current revised Treaty of 1958 which incorporated the previously deleted Article II of the original treaty of 1900 stating outright...
that the British would conduct and be in charge of Tonga’s external relations. 30 As previously discussed, Article II was not agreed to by Tupou II nor was it included in the original signed treaty of 1900.

Perhaps, the inclusion of Article II in the revised 1958 Treaty was intentional and was indeed a direct means to ease the raising questions posed by Tungi. At the same time, the Treaty also gave the Tongan Government leeway by stating that the British were to consult the Government prior to engaging in any international agreements in relation to Tonga. The slow release of control and power by the British maybe interpreted as a changing of the tides, perhaps because as Tonga was beginning to show signs of stability, the need for tight control was no longer necessary.

Additionally, Britain’s reaction can somewhat be considered a sign of reality and the changing global environment of the 20th century. One only has to look around activities in neighbouring Pacific Islands, to see that the process of de-colonisation begin and the once strong British control was slowly loosening in the Pacific region and Tonga was no different.

Nevertheless, discussions of independence came to a halt with the passing of Queen Salote Tupou III in December 1965. As is customary, Tonga went into a one year period of mourning and the Coronation of King Taufa’ahau Tupou VI took place the following year, on 4th June 1967.

Simultaneously, 1967 also marked other monumental events in Tonga such as the launch of the Tongan currency and coins (Pa’anga and Seniti). This marked a hallmark in Tongan society, for economic and financial transactions up until this point mainly employed the British sterling/shilling currency. Additionally, the year also marked Taufa’ahau’s formal request to the Colonial Office for Tonga to become a completely independent and sovereign nation and no longer considered as a British Protected State.

Given the other events of decolonisation occurring throughout the Pacific region during the 1960s, the Colonial Office did consider Taufa’ahau’s request however, the British Government were still not yet prepared to relinquish full control of Tonga’s external relations and security. As a compromise, the 1968

30 For details see: Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga 1958
Treaty outlined certain concessions by the British such as (i) the requirement to consult the Tongan Government prior to the signing of any international agreements on behalf of Tonga (Article III); (ii) although Britain would continue to provide security and defence for Tonga however, if required, Tonga shall be allowed to seek assistance elsewhere (Article IV); (iii) approval for the King of Tonga to appoint a Consul or High Commissioner to represent the Government’s interests in the United Kingdom (Article VI); (vi) inclusion of the termination clause which clearly stated that all but Article I (to maintain perpetual peace and cooperation between the two States) of the original Treaty shall remain in force.

Ultimately, the revised Treaty was the last to be signed by Tonga as a British Protected State. On the 19th May 1970, Exchange of letters31 declaring termination of the United Kingdom’s responsibility for the external relations of Tonga was presented. On 4th June 1970, Tonga gained full independence and the responsibility for their external affairs, security and defence. As an independent nation, Tonga’s first action was to join the Commonwealth of Nations and thus, paved the way for Tonga’s re-entry into the Comity of Nations in the 20th century.

7. Discussion

At the outset, the British believed that the Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga proved as Tonga’s salvation. As illustrated in the aforementioned passages this was not the case. What began as a formal agreement of perpetual friendship and cooperation actually began as a very turbulent and explosive relationship between the two nations. This was largely due to the clash in personalities and ideals both from the British and Tongan side during the reign of Tupou II.

Given time, the two states learned to co-exist and work with each other instead of working against one another. Despite, Tonga’s relatively small size and lack of resources, they were still able to tackle the hardships the British Government threw at them during the Treaty of Friendship of 1900-1970. Tonga’s greatest weapon was in the form of the Tongan Act of Constitution 1875, which not only gained Tonga international recognition by the great European powers of the 19th century (Germany, France and United States). Although, such recognition may have only been at face value with the main intent for the Great

31 See: Exchange of Letters 1970
Powers to establish trade routes and harbours in Tonga, the fact of the matter still remains that Tonga did gain international recognition as an Independent and Sovereign state.

Moreover, the civilised state of society which the British found Tonga to be, during the beginning of the Treaty is one that was unheard of, in the Pacific region. One that had an established form of government, an established Constitution to govern their internal affairs and a population of converted Christians. Perhaps, one would think the British would be happy to have engaged in a Treaty with a ‘civilised nation’ however, their imperialist and white supremacy views tended to cloud their judgement and thus, resulted in mounting tensions between the two nations during the reign of Tupou II.

It is important to note that the British often resorted to coercive means throughout the course of the Treaty as a means to achieve their own interests; Tonga did not retaliate in the same manner. On the contrary, retaliation on the part of Tonga was conducted in the form of words and negotiations. In their view, such actions proved just how civilised Tonga was, a lesson which was later learned and appreciated by the British during the reign of Salote and Taufa’ahau.

One can also envision the Treaty years as being a necessary tool in the development of Tonga as a state and nation. In my view, the British protected years allowed the Tongan Government to focus inward and develop the social and economic welfare of Tongan society internally. The efforts of Salote helped to preserve the cultural identity of Tongan people. On the other hand, the preliminary modernisation policies of Taufa’ahau during his term as Prime Minister advanced the infrastructural systems and development of Tonga as a nation.

Despite, this PSIDs fight for independence and sovereignty from external powers influence continues to appear in the 21st century. The latest example is the Republic of Fiji’s conquest to isolate the major powers of the Pacific (New Zealand and Australia) from having a say in Pacific Island politics. The repeat actions of PSIDs continuous battle for complete independence and the ramifications of such conquests in the form of sanctions and bans by middle and bigger powers illustrate the dynamic and

32 For more information see: Dreaver B (2016) Opinion: Fiji PM’s boycott of the Pacific Islands forum was perfect timing; Callick R (2015) Fiji wants Australia out of Pacific Islands Forum.
unbalance nature of diplomacy. In order, to capitalise on this unbalanced relationship, PSIDs such as Fiji and Tonga need to learn to play the game of diplomacy wisely.

**Review**

The chapter has highlighted the transformations within the Tongan society during the 19th and early 20th century; assessed how the nation maintained sovereign status regardless of the colonisation of the South Pacific region and also, brought to light the events that laid the foundations for the Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga that had lasted for over a period of 70 years.

*Chapter 3* will focus on discussing Tonga’s re-entry into the Comity of nations as a newly ‘independent’ nation between the periods of 1970-2010. Discussions will also focus on the origins of the Foreign Ministry; formulation of Tonga’s FP; and assessment of the key actors of influence in Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy in the aforementioned period.
Chapter 3: Tonga’s re-entry into the Comity of Nations (1970-2010)

‘Since the country is now independent, I desire to see it become a nation’
King George Tupou I, 1875 (Cummins, 1972, p.177)

1. Introduction

The surrender of British responsibility for the conduct of the Tonga’s external affairs & defence systems in 1970 led to the end of Tonga’s status as a British Protected State. Simultaneously, it also marked the dawn of a new era, specifically Tonga’s re-entry into the Comity of nations as a truly ‘independent’ and sovereign nation.

This chapter will focus on examining Tonga’s performance in the global stage of diplomacy as an independent and sovereign nation during the periods of 1970-2010. Discussions will inspect (i) the setup and establishment of Tonga’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence; (ii) strategic forms of diplomatic practice utilised to achieve national interest (iii) Tonga’s FP and; (iv) key actors of influence in Tonga’s diplomatic arena. Nevertheless, before preceding any further a brief overview of the South Pacific region during the 1970s proves necessary.
2. The South Pacific in the 70s

As explored by Ward (2005), the foundations for many Pacific Island’s journey to self governance and independence can be traced as far back as the 1950-60s, when Colonial Governments began to withdraw their explicit role in the administration of indigenous Governments.

By the end of the 1960s, a range of local Governments had begun to take prime responsibility for the daily operations of their local Governments, as a range of information regarding local infrastructure, geography, population, agricultural & economical and social needs became available\(^\text{33}\).

Furthermore, ‘the formation of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, whose terms of reference implied decolonisation’ (Hoadley, 1992, p.19) also, proved a vital ingredient for ‘requests by island elites for a larger voice in their own affairs’ (ibid).

The first Pacific nation to attain full independence was Western Samoa in 1962, soon followed by Nauru (1968) and Fiji & Tonga in 1970 (Figure 8).

Nevertheless, after being in the shadows of colonial rule for an extended period of time, Pacific nations found their newfound independence brought along its own set of challenges and limitations. Now they had to formulate their own policies, run their own government administrations, defend their own borders and expand their horizons beyond their traditional boundaries to achieve their national interests and goals.

Despite, attaining sovereignty many Pacific nations were still ill equipped in terms of manpower, technical knowledge and resources to maintain economic and social development. Consequently, Pacific nations continued to turn to former colonial powers for assistance. At the same time, Pacific nations also

\(^{33}\) As more and more responsibility was given to local governments through the setup of Central Planning Offices and the injection of technical experts and expatriates helped educate locals on Government administration processes (Ward, 2005).
had additional choices for donor aid partners with the entrance of new super powers (People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Soviet Union) into the Pacific region.

As suggested by Fry (1982), decolonisation reshaped the manner by which Pacific Islands conducted international relations. Unlike, the colonial era when Pacific nations solely relied on the assistance and aid of colonial administrative Governments, they now had a range of channels for pursuing: (i) regional interests in the setting of a regional forum and (ii) national interests in the international sphere through relations with former colonial powers (France, Germany and Britain) as well as, relations with new Superpowers (Ibid, p.455-456).

The following passages will employ Fry’s threefold trends of international relations, to evaluate how Tonga as a developing island state in the 1970s with limited resources, manpower and expertise, utilised their history and culture as best they could to pursue and achieve national interests and goals.

3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Defence

Following the termination of the Treaty of Friendship, all responsibility for external affairs and security were completely surrendered to the Tongan Government on the 4th June 1970. Concurrently, Tonga was also accepted into the Commonwealth of Nations thus, signifying a newfound level of respect and ties with the British as equal sovereign states.

Though, it may seem that independence had only been established in 1970 with the Exchange of Notes on the Termination of the Treaty of Friendship, the actual groundwork had in fact been laid by the then Crown Prince Tungi during his Premiership in 1949-1966. It was during his time as Prime Minister that Tungi became the main driving force behind Tonga’s first development plan of 1965-1970, which proved important in directing the Government’s focus to vital sectors that required attention and development such as: (a) the economy; (b) communication and infrastructure; (c) education; (d) health; (e) Public Works; (f) development of local enforcement and (f) improvements of Government housing and facilities (GoT, 1976).
Moreover, as an avid traveler and thinker, Tungi was constantly seeking avenues of opportunity for Tonga, forging and establishing links with foreign nations with the main goal of improving Tonga’s economical and social status. So, when Tonga finally attained full independence status in 1970, His Majesty King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV was fully aware of what he wanted for his nation.

Following ascending to the throne in 1966, Taufa’ahau appointed his younger brother HRH Prince Fatafehi Tu’ipelehake to the post of Prime Minister with the added responsibility of holding the post for Minister of Agriculture; Foreign Affairs; Education and Works (Eustis, 1997). Even though, much of Taufa’ahau’s government responsibilities had passed to his younger brother, the reality was he was still very much an active driver and force behind Tonga’s political scene.

Taufa’ahau’s stern involvement in Tonga’s development, as a nation is of the utmost importance, for it was his vision and determination that finally attained Tonga’s status as a fully independent nation.

Additionally, Tonga’s independence called forth a need for changes in the current Government structure to reflect the newfound responsibilities of Tonga for her own security and foreign relations. Such change, led to the proposed setup of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (MINOFA) and the further development of the Tonga Defence Services (TDS), as announced by Taufa’ahau at the opening of the Legislative Assembly in 1970 (Eustis, 1997).

The announcement came at the most opportune moment, as it clearly signified the Government’s complete autonomous control over Tonga’s welfare as a whole. Furthermore, it illustrated the nation’s

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34 For more information see: Eustis, N (1997) ‘King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV: The King of Tonga.’
determination to prove to the international community, that they were prepared to tackle the daunting challenge of foreign relations and security head on.

3.1 Foreign Affairs: Due to limited resources and budget of the GoT, the origins of MINOFA began as a small scale division within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The core functions of the ministry was to deal with the predicted increase in volume of work and service demands of established and future posts, as well as, the increase in Tonga’s bilateral relations. Also, MINOFA was responsible for overseeing and administering overseas aid grants, schemes and programs offered by overseas governments. Though no separate Ministry was yet established to administer the foreign affairs of Tonga the name ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINOFA)’ was still utilised to avoid misunderstandings as to the proper channels of communication (PMO, 1970).

Although, Tonga had only one established mission abroad (Tonga High Commission, London, UK) the nation continued to formulate and establish bilateral relations. Particularly, at the Head of State level with the various State visits conducted by Their Majesties King Taufa’ahau and Queen Halaevalu Mata’aho, which continued to propel Tonga’s status in the international scene.

In its early days, MINOFA although headed by the Prime Minister, was under the charge and responsibility of the newly graduated Crown Prince Tupouto’a. Prior to his newfound role, Tupouto’a had completed the Oxford University Foreign Service Programme in the UK (1969) and military training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK the previous year. On the 20th March 1979, Tupouto’a was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence (MINOFA, 1979).

The appointment proved a significant development for (i) it marked the merger of two of Tonga’s key departments (foreign relations and defence) and (ii) was a prime opportunity for the young Prince to apply his knowledge and expertise in the field of diplomacy. Additionally, it was a chance to further develop

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36 Crown Prince Tupouto’a was the eldest son of His Majesty King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV and Her Majesty Queen Halaevalu Mata’aho. He was born HRH Prince Taufa’ahau and was later installed as Crown Prince Tupouto’a (1996-2006) before he ascended to the throne in 2008 as King George Tupou V.
Tonga’s foreign ministry and external relations as well, as Defence Services systems, for maritime security in light of Tonga’s expanding Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Tupouto’a was focused on building MINOFA’s reputation as an international Ministry beginning with establishing separate housing for the ministry in 1988.

The two storey building with glass panels and impressive interior designs was the first of its kind in Tonga and was architecturally designed by the Crown Prince himself (Bain, 1993). The decision to house the foreign ministry in an impressive looking glass house structure was to project an outward visually appealing first impression to foreign and visiting dignitaries.

Just as Tupouto’a was devoted to portraying a positive external image of the Foreign Ministry, he was equally, dedicated to developing the staff, work environment and their level of technical expertise and knowledge. Moreover, Tupouto’a continued to extend Tonga’s foreign relations through 5 key areas of focus (Figure 10):

a. **Bilateral relations:** at the time that MINOFA was established, only 3 Foreign Resident Missions had been setup in Tonga: New Zealand & United Kingdom: 1970 (MINOFA, 1982) and the Republic of China: 1972 (Harwit, 2000). The Australian High Commission was later setup in 1979, following...
Taufa’ahau’s State Visit to Australia (MINOFA, 1979).

During the years, Tonga’s bilateral relations have steadily increased and by the end of the 80s Tonga had established bilateral relations with over 25 nations (Figure 11).

Throughout the 90s-2000s, Tonga had lost some old friends in exchange for newer more powerful friends. Such was the case in 1998, when Tonga decided to cease diplomatic and bilateral relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in favour, for established formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Field, 1998).

In 2005, Tonga said goodbye to one of their closest and longest allies with the closure of the British Embassy in Nuku’alofa. Tonga still maintains bilateral relations with the UK as a non-resident mission.

Nonetheless, in 2009 Japan established a resident mission in Tonga. Setup of this mission further reinforced bilateral relations between the two nations.

It should be noted that Tonga’s bilateral relations is strengthened via diplomatic accreditation and also, economic, development and technical aid. Throughout the years, the proliferation of overseas development assistance (ODA) and technical assistance (TA) has contributed heavily to the development of Tonga’s agricultural, fishing, tourism industry as well as rural development (Figure 12).
Initially, Taufa‘ahau was against the notion of overseas development assistance for he believed that such assistance would infringe Tonga’s sovereign status as there would be certain conditions attached. Given Tonga’s lack of resources, technical expertise and manpower, the nation had no other choice but to accept and British overseas assistance was, the first form of development assistance received in 1965\(^{37}\) (GoT, 1976).

i. **Regional forums:** regionalism has long been a part of Pacific Island’s history particularly, as the region shares similar cultures, languages and traditions. More recently, formal efforts to establish regional forums to allow Pacific islands to share views and collectively address similar interest have been established.

   a. **South Pacific Commission (SPC):** in 1947 colonial powers (France, Australia, New Zealand, USA and the UK and Netherlands) founded the SPC as a means to strengthen international cooperation and develop the economic and social welfare of their territories and colonies (Agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission, 1947). Perhaps, the setup of the Commission may have been just another form of control enforced by colonial powers, for Pacific Islands still did not have a voice in the decision making process.

\(^{37}\) For more information see: Overseas Development Institute (1964) ‘British Aid-5: Colonial Development.’
Although, Tonga did not become a full member of the SPC until 1983, she continued to participate in the organisation’s work programs and annual South Pacific conference (MINOFA, 1979). Participation as an observer was indeed a tactful move because it allowed Tonga to retain a seat at the decision making table rather than watching idly from the sidelines.

Moreover, the growth of regional organisations in the region signified the gradual efforts of PSIDS to explore different avenues for regional integration. Thus, granting the nations ‘more efficient use of resources and a more powerful voice in dealing with the larger countries outside the region’ (Fairbairn et al, 1991, p.12)

b. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF): in 1970, newly independent states (Tonga, Fiji, Nauru, Cook Islands, and Samoa) with New Zealand and Australia collectively setup the exclusively Pacific regional group ‘South Pacific Forum’ later renamed the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

Unlike SPC, which was dominated by the voices and authority of ex-colonial powers, PIF would act as a safe space where Pacific leaders could freely share views and opinions. Moreover, the forum would prove as the region’s best form of defense against more powerful nations in the international scene as there is power in numbers primarily with regards to common issues such as regional security, economic and commercial interests.

To date, PIF remains the main channel of communication between Pacific Island leaders whom annually meet to discuss regional issues pertaining to the social, economical, and political and security development of the region (Fairbairn et al, 1991)

c. Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF): in 2014, a repeat of the PIF 1970 discussions came to light, with the proposed setup an exclusive ‘Pacific Islander’ forum excluding Australia and New Zealand known as PIDF.

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38 The name reflected the geographical relation each of the founding members had with each other, namely all members were located in the Southern region of the Pacific. The name was later changed to Pacific Islands Forum as membership expanded to include Pacific islands from the Eastern and Western side of the region. Members include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. For more information on the history of the PIF please see Hanover (2004) ‘Australia and the origins of the Pacific Islands Forum.

The proposal was spearheaded by the Fijian Bainimarama Government, who were of the view that Pacific Islands needed to take collective action on their own and avoid interference from the two biggest aid donors of the Pacific region (Australia and New Zealand).

The forum is currently dominated by Melanesian nations, however, validity and international recognition of the PIDF as an established regional cooperation group is still in infancy. Until now, Tonga has been the only Polynesian nation to support the PIDF forum. Fellow Polynesian States’ (Samoa, Cook Islands and Tahiti) refusal to support the PIDF originates from the view that the PIDF merely duplicates issues addressed by existing regional forums such as PICL and PLG. There has been much debate on whether the proposed establishment of the PIDF is merely a Fijian driven initiative as a means to establish more power within the region.

Tonga remains a major player in other regional groups through the Council of Regional Organizations as illustrated in Figure 15.

d. International Organisations: Tonga’s motivation for membership and participation in international organisations is vital to ensure Tonga’s status as a sovereign and independent nation recognised by larger nations. It is equally imperative that Tonga participate in global forums where rules are constructed directly relevant to their own interests.

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41 The Melanesian States have created their own sub group named the Melanesian Spearhead Group Secretariat including membership from Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia.
42 Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders is a US led initiative to foster and maintain close ties between the US and Pacific leaders.
43 Polynesian Leaders Group Pacific sub-regional group focuses on harnessing closer relations and cooperative efforts between Polynesian nations - Tonga, Maori, Huiarian, Easter Island, Tuvalu, Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, French Polynesia and Tokelau allows Pacific leaders to address common issues such as trade, tourism, climate and environment challenges.
i. **Commonwealth of Nations**: continues to provide TA to Tonga through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation particularly, through tertiary scholarships in the United Kingdom and also, at regional institutions;

ii. **ACP/EU**: In 1975, Tonga ascended to the *Lome I and later Lome II Agreement* and thus, became a member of the *Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States Group* (ACP). Through the ACP, Tonga was able to access the European Community’s (EC) development assistance directed towards social and commercial areas in Tonga. Much of the development aid received from the aforementioned agreements contributed to the rural developments of Tongan local communities and outer islands infrastructure (MINOFA, 1990);

iii. **UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCOLS)**: following the extension of Tonga’s EEZ with the acquisition of *Teleki Tonga/Teleki Tokelau* in 1972, Tonga’s participation in the UNCOLS was of the utmost importance particularly; to ensure Tonga fully capitalised on the bountiful marine life and natural resources within their extended EEZ. Moreover, as a PSIDS with insufficient resources; the need to have a say in the foundations of the Convention was of great significance⁴⁴ (PMO, 1975);

iv. **United Nations (UN)**: Originally, Tonga’s limited resources and manpower prohibited Tonga’s ability to establish and attain full membership status at the UN. Additionally, as much of Tonga’s interests (70s to 80s) primarily focused on the social and economic development of the nation, the need to become a full member of the UN was of little relevance. As a compromise, Tonga took the decision to

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⁴⁴ For more information on recommendations to improve Tonga’s maritime surveillance please see: Fifita CS (2015) *Enhancing Tonga’s maritime security.*
cooperate with selected UN agencies which catered to Tonga’s interests at the time (Bain, 1993) (Figure 16).

With time Tonga’s ability to satisfy UN requirements and fees was met and in 1999, Tonga became a fully fledged member of the UN and established a dedicated Permanent UN Mission in New York (MINOFA, 1995).

e. **Diplomatic outreach:** although, Tonga only had one established mission, the nation broadened their diplomatic outreach via the use of cross accreditation and the use of honorary consul and consular networks (MINOFA, 1982) (Figure 17/18).

Extension of Tonga’s diplomatic outreach within a short span of time, illustrates the determination of the island nation to achieve the visions of their forefathers particularly, Tupou I in boosting Tonga’s identity and reputation in the global arena as an independent and sovereign nation.

In the late 90s-2000s, Tonga’s diplomatic missions’ network increased into the Asia Pacific rim with the setup of the Tonga Embassy in Beijing, China.
The changing phases of diplomacy in a Small Island Developing State: a case study of the Kingdom of Tonga

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(2004); Tonga High Commission in Canberra, Australia (2008) and the Tonga Embassy in Tokyo, Japan (2012).

f. **Staff training capacity:** the disproportionate number of resources and manpower in comparison, to the Ministry’s growing bilateral and multilateral workload had always been the main challenge for the Foreign Ministry. To overcome such challenges, MINOFA encouraged staff career development through participation in a variety of training opportunities offered by bilateral partners ranging from specialised training courses in intelligence gathering in Tel Aviv and Washington; Foreign Service training courses in Australia, Germany and the UK; language training courses in Tokyo, Japan and international relations training courses at TUFTS Fletcher School, USA.

Furthermore, the Ministry was strategically structured into two main divisions: (1) *Home Side*- officers remained at Headquarters and are responsible for the overall, administrative and logistical operations of the Ministry and missions/consulates abroad; (2) *Away side*- was reserved for senior officers who were assigned to regional desks covering Africa, America, Asia, European, Middle East, Commonwealth, Lome Convention, Defence and Protocol. Officers were also responsible for maintaining contact with overseas missions pertaining directly to the aforementioned nations and would prove as the conduit of information between the Ministry and other Government agencies in Tonga (MINOFA, 1990).

3.2 **Defence Relations:** as stipulated by the Treaty of Friendship, Tonga’s external affairs and security was the responsibility of the British Government, however, since 1953 had been conducted by New Zealand. The termination of the Treaty in 1970 led to the handover of New Zealand control over the administration of Tonga’s security and defence forces.

In 1970, Tonga’s defence relations underwent a number of changes including the assignment of Crown Prince Tupouto’a as Secretary to the Defence Board; the transfer of administrative control for the TDS

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45 The agreement was formulated following the relocation of the British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific’s office from Suva, Fiji to Honiara, Solomon Islands. The shift meant further increase in funding if the British were to continue to administer security services for the Island Kingdom. As a result, to cut their costs, the British Government proposed that the New Zealand Government uptake the role providing security for the Kingdom of Tonga. The decision made sense because NZ was in a better geographical position to offer support and was finalised in 1954 and was granted by Her Majesty Queen Salote (HMAF, 2012).

46 The Tonga Defence Force began in the 1940s as a small contingent commanded and administered by NZ Commanding Officers to guard the airfield comprised mainly of the Royal Guards. In the 40s, when the American’s arrived in Tonga they initially took over the responsibility for defending Tonga’s borders while the maintenance and administrative control remained with the NZ Government (HMAF, 2012).
from the Minister of Police to the newly appointed post of Commander47 of the TDS (HMAF, 2012).

With the passing of the TDS Act 199248, the core role of the TDS was refocused to overseeing the security of the Tonga; surveillance of territorial boundaries and maintaining civil defence and conduct of ceremonial duties as required by the Monarch.

Tonga’s defence relations gradually increased through defence development assistance in the form of trainings, equipment and various joint defence cooperation and mutual assistance programs with traditional allies NZ, Australia and the USA (Figure 19).

Furthermore, Tonga played their role in maintaining regional security and stability by participating in the South Pacific Peace keeping Forces (SPPKF) deployed to diffuse the political crisis in Bougainville in 1994. The SPPKF included a combination of Australia, Tonga, Fijian and Vanuatu Armed Forces. Though, this was Tonga’s first participation in regional security, the 100 man contingent led by Commander of TDS49, was well prepared with the technical and military preparations of Australia and NZ (HMAF, 2012).

In 2003, TDS once again assumed their role of maintaining regional security and stability by participating in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) operations50. Similarly, to the 1994 Bougainville Crisis, RAMSI operations focused on restoring

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47 Due to the lack of inexperience military personnel, the NZ Government continued to provide experienced Military personnel to undertake the role of Commander of Defence until 1977. In 1977, the post of Commander of Defence was passed to the first Tongan Major Fetu’utolu Tupou (later promoted to Colonel).
48 For more information see: Tonga Defence Service Act 1992
49 The contingent was led by Tonga’s first national Commander of Defence Col. Fetu’utolu Tupou. Col. Tupou was also, assigned the task of Chief of Operations. The high level role undertaken by Col. Tupou signified the level of trust and faith the NZ and Australian Army had in the capabilities of the island nation’s Defence Forces.
50 Throughout the years more and more Pacific nations have contributed to RAMSI operations including Fiji, Samoa, Nauru, Cook Islands, FSM, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Niue, Palau, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. For more information please see: [http://www.ramsi.org/](http://www.ramsi.org/)
‘law and justice; the machinery of government; and economic governance’ (Howe & Kondoch, 2016, p.103) to the Solomon Islands.

4. Foreign policy

Tonga’s FP has remained a topical issue of debate primarily, as it remains largely unwritten. It is important to note that regardless of the unwritten status of Tonga’s FP, the strategic directive forming the basis for Tonga’s foreign relations stems directly from Clause 39 of the Act of Constitution which states:

“It shall be lawful for the King to make treaties with Foreign States provided that such treaties shall be in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom. It shall not be lawful for the King to alter the customs duties without the consent of the Legislative Assembly. The King may appoint his representatives to other nations according to the custom of nations” (Act of Constitution, 1988, Clause 39, p.16)

As illustrated above, it is apparent that the Monarch holds the authority to determine which nations may establish diplomatic relations with Tonga. Examples date as far back to Tonga’s Treaty days with the British Empire in the early 20th century during the reign of Tonga’s forefathers (Tupou I, II, III) and now Taufa’ahau.

Furthermore, treaty making has remained the basis for how Tonga forges diplomatic relations with foreign nations (RNZ, 1995). Tonga continues to utilise treaties as a means to enhance their one-to-one relationships with nations. By maintaining a more relaxed approach to policies, Tonga tends to be better equipped to adapt and face the challenges brought upon them by bigger, more powerful nations because Tonga has more options at their disposal.

The aforementioned initiative is the core focus for Tonga’s two most dominant FPs:

a. **Friends with everyone, enemies to no one:** the notion of maintaining friendly ties to all nations is rooted in Tonga’s history. From the time of Tupou I to the reign of Taufa’ahau, Tonga has always maintained an open mind to establishing relations with as many foreign nations as she could, with the main goal of enhancing recognition of Tonga’s status as an independent and sovereign nation. In the words of Taufa’ahau ‘it’s counterproductive to have enemies, but can’t have too many friends, the more you have the better!’ (RNZ, 1995).
Especially, for a small nation such as Tonga with limited capability and influence (regionally and internationally), the choice to explore and pursue their national interests is better made available by establishing a range of diplomatic relations with numerous nations.

b. **Look East policy:** Since the 70s, Taiwan had gained momentum over China in establishing bilateral relations with a range of Pacific Islands including Tonga. Throughout, the 70s-80s Tonga remained a close ally of Taiwan and even supported the nationalist state in achieving a voice in the South Pacific forum. Thus, allowing Taiwan to connect directly to various Pacific Islands. (Field, 1998; Wesley-Smith, 2007). Perhaps, Taiwan’s growing influence in the Pacific can be traced to the similar traits they held with Pacific Island nations as sovereign nations breaking away from the clutches of larger powerful nations.

Nevertheless, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to step up their bilateral campaigns with increases of development aid to a variety of islands within the region, loyalties and ties to Taiwan began to erode. Keeping in line with Tonga’s policy of maintaining friendly ties with all nations, Tonga continued to maintain ties with PRC while also, retaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Crocombe, 2007).

Eventually, China’s persuasive efforts won Tonga over and in 1998 under the leadership of the new Foreign Minister HRH Prince ‘Ulukalala Lavaka Ata (youngest son of Taufa’ahau), Tonga announced bilateral ties to Taiwan were to cease and a new chapter of bilateral relations with PRC were to begin of 2nd December 1998 (Crocombe, 2007).

Though, it was a difficult decision to cease ties with Taiwan especially as they had been one of Tonga’s longest bilateral partners (since 1972), one must take note of the changing tide of diplomatic influence and presence of China in the region in the late 90s. The influential role of China’s cheque book diplomacy in the form of technical, economic and infrastructural development, would of course be viewed by small island states as highly attractive.

Moreover, following the end of the Cold War, further trading and economic opportunities were opening up in the Asia-Pacific region. Tonga may have recognised this as a key opportunity to further
diversify aid efforts particularly, as the West was becoming more and more withdrawn from the Pacific region interests.

Additionally, in the 90s Tonga’s bilateral relations with traditional donors Australia and NZ became strained as much of the ODA provided was founded on certain political conditions and agendas such as ‘good governance, human rights and civil society development’ (Zhang, 2015, p.45). In contrast, aid provided by the Chinese government was free of both political conditions and agenda but rather focused on merely developing a nation’s infrastructure and ‘projects that can deliver immediate economic benefits for recipient countries’ (ibid, p.46).

5. **Key actors of influence**

As a Constitutional Monarchy, Tonga’s diplomatic practice has been very much driven by the visions of Taufa’ahau during his reign as Tonga’s Monarch (1965-2006). Such can be seen in the 70s-80s with Taufa’ahau’s decision to immediately setup a new ministry to house and cater for the foreign relations and defence of Tonga.

Moreover, the various State visits led by His Majesty very much laid the foundation for establishing of bilateral relations between Tonga and foreign nations. Through such visits Taufa’ahau continued to globally take the name of ‘Tonga’ to all four corners of the globe, thus, increasing further recognition of her status as an independent and sovereign nation. Additionally Taufa’ahau’s perusal of maintaining friendly ties with all nations illustrates his deep belief that as a SIDS, Tonga needs as many friends as she can get. One can assume that the Monarch’s visible presence on the diplomatic scene can be attributed to the fact, that during that specific period (70s-80s) the foreign ministry was still in infancy and underdeveloped.

However, as the foreign ministry became firmly established throughout the 80s-90s, Taufa’ahau’s control slowly retreated. The torch of responsibility and influence was now passed to the Tupouto’a who in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs & Defence had the chance to develop both departments under his guidance. Both aforementioned departments underwent great development in terms of training,
skills upgrading and equipment as well. The implementation of foreign, protocol and defence trainings in both departments helped to make the Ministry one of the best in the Tongan Government.

Nonetheless, following the passing of Taufa’ahau in 2006 (40 years of developing and leading Tonga as a nation) Tupouto’a ascended to the throne as King George Tupou V in 2008. Nevertheless, the Tonga to which Tupou V became Sovereign to was greatly different to that of his father. Tonga’s citizens were now more educated, highly skilled and much more conscious of the Western world.

Despite such benefits and societal developments, Tonga continued to face hard times particularly, with: (i) the general population’s rise against the traditional form of governance; (ii) vocalized opinions from expatriate Tongan communities against the Royal Family’s involvement in Government operations and businesses and (iii) the increasing call for a more open, transparent and democratic form of governance by bilateral donor partners and agencies (James, 2000: Campbell, 2011).

Tensions came to a head on the 16th November 2006, when riots broke out in Tonga’s capital (Nuku’alofa) resulting in the destruction of the nation’s Central Business District. Instigators of the riots had been the Pro-democracy group who had unveiled a new face of democracy, one that was more forceful, demanding and held no respect for tradition or culture.

The events of 16th November led to a dark day in Tongan history and the aftermath of the riots have forever tainted the nation’s friendly island reputation and history. Such brash actions forced the hand of the Tongan Government and new Monarch (Tupou V) to recognise the fact, that times had indeed changed, the mindset of the people have changed and the need to change was inevitable.

Just as his father Taufa’ahau and great grandfather Tupou I before him had led Tonga into a new era of enlightenment and progress; Tupou V would become the first Monarch to approve of the proposed Constitutional & Political Reform of 2010\textsuperscript{51}. Tupou V’s move proved revolutionary, for the Act of Constitution had remained untouched since its inception in 1875.

\textsuperscript{51} For more information please see: Powles G (2013) Political and constitutional reform opens the door: The Kingdom of Tonga’s path to democracy.
6. Discussion

As a PSIDS lacking in resources and manpower in the 70s, Tonga faced the challenge of tackling responsibility for their foreign relations and defence of her borders head on, with the establishment of the MINOFA and Tonga Defence Services. Perhaps, the positioning of MINOFA under the purview of the PMO was intentional by Taufa’ahau for two primary reasons: (i) the Monarch still maintained a keen interest in the external affairs of the island nation and could intervene easily as the PM was after all his own younger brother; (ii) the assignment of the Department to the young Crown Prince, perhaps, was somewhat of a test by Taufa’ahau for his heir, to give him the ability to develop his own ideas particularly, in relation to Tonga’s foreign and defence relations.

Furthermore, early establishment of bilateral relations with traditional allies New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain, illustrates Tonga’s historical links to such nations still ran deep. At the same time, the employment of honorary consuls and consular networks and increased setup of established missions abroad further assisted in diversifying the pursuit of Tonga’s national interests in the global arena.

Equally, Tonga capitalised on increasing bilateral relations with different nations both regionally and internationally. Additionally, Tonga’s presence and involvement in regional organisations solidified Tonga’s cooperation and alliances with her Pacific neighbours. Despite being a remote PSIDS, geographically isolated from the international arena, Tonga still managed to keep abreast of the events occurring in the global arena by participating in regional and international organisations pertaining directly to their economic and social interests of Tonga particularly, UNCOLS. Furthermore, it was much more important for Tonga to retain a presence at the decision making table and having a say rather than merely sitting on the sidelines watching bigger, more powerful nations dominate and make all the decisions.

Additionally, it can be said that during the 70s to 80s, Tonga capitalised on their greatest asset- their people by developing their manpower, technical capabilities and introduction of new roles such as the TDS’s expanding role of maritime security.
As Tonga’s interests began to shift towards more economic interests, so did their company of bilateral relations. In the early 20th century, much of the Western economy was dominated by European superpowers however, following the end of the Cold War (80s), the rising dominance and power of the Asia-Pacific Rim became evident. 1998 saw the loss of one of Tonga’s oldest bilateral partners (Taiwan) in exchange for a great Asia super power PRC. 1999 also, marked Tonga’s shift from being a mere UN observer to a fully fledged member of the United Nations with the setup of a permanent representation mission in New York and Tonga’s first resident mission to Washington, DC.

As Tonga entered the new millennium (2000), the foreign ministry itself underwent certain significant changes in terms of responsibility and although, still acts as the main channel of communication to foreign missions and foreign states has faced certain challenges which have only been further amplified with the Constitutional and Political reform of 2010.

On the other hand, the independent status Tonga’s FP holds. Unlike, most sovereign states in which FP is determined by government administrations, Tonga’s FP is one that is unwritten and is largely derived directly from the directions of the reigning Monarch. At times such directions have received criticism from the public however, has stood the test of time. Nonetheless, only time will tell how long such policies will remain.

**Review:**

The chapter has examined how Tonga as a newly independent nation dealt with the responsibility for the conduct of Tonga’s foreign & defence relations through the setup and development of the MINOFA and Tonga Defence Services. Discussions have also highlighted the strategic use of Tonga’s bilateral relations and participation in both regional and international organisations as a means to pursue and achieve Tonga’s national interests and also evaluated the unique foundations for Tonga’s foreign policy. Equally, discussions have highlighted the influential role played by Tonga’s Monarch throughout the 70s to 2010 and ends with the Constitutional and Political reform of 2010.
Chapter 4 will evaluate Tonga’s role as a Global player from 2010 to 2016, following the 2010 Political and Constitutional Reform. The chapter will also focus on evaluating the effects of the reform on Tonga’s practice of diplomacy and FP particularly, with the influence of Government administrations; rise of new players of diplomacy and evaluate Tonga’s stance on issues such as peace and security; Human rights, Gender equality and CC.
Chapter 4: Tonga as a global player (2010-2016)

“Do not forget that we are all Tongans and we are working for Tonga to build up our little country so that we and our descendants may possess Tonga forever. May each of you inscribe on your hearts- Tonga for Tongans.”

King George Tupou I, 1875 (Cummins, 1972, p.182)

1. Introduction

For over 135 years, Tonga has remained the sole politically stable nation in the Pacific region governed by the nation’s Constitutional Monarchies. However, with the rise of Tongans emigrating abroad, return of graduates and educated scholars with newfound ideas and experiences of the Western world, the push for a more democratic form of governance began to rise.

Tonga’s road to democracy had been a long and tumultuous one originating in the 1980s. The culmination of the democratic efforts became a reality on 25 November 2010 with, Tonga’s first democratic General Parliamentary Election in which, voters elected representatives who would, in turn formulate a ‘government chosen by electorates instead of by the Monarch’ (Powles, 2013, p.1).

This chapter will seek to examine how the democratic change of 2010 has (i) affected Tonga’s practice of diplomacy in the 21st century; (ii) rise of other practitioners of diplomacy in Tonga; (iii) assessment of how culture, religion and tradition may affect Tonga’s stance on global issues such as Peace & security, Human rights, Gender Equality, CC. Nonetheless, before proceeding any further a brief discussion on Tonga’s political system and the 2010 Constitutional and Political reform proves necessary.

2. Political and Constitutional Reform

Originally, the form of government was comprised of (i) The King in Privy Council and Cabinet; (ii) The Legislative Assembly; and (iii) The Judiciary (Act of Constitution, 1988).

In the early 80s, foundations of Tonga’s form of governance came under scrutiny particularly, with the actions and opposition, raised by one of Tonga’s prominent People’s Representative Mr ‘Akilisi Pohiva. Pohiva’s criticisms focused solely on the Monarchy’s abuse of power; the alleged illegal selling of Tongan passports abroad to foreign nationals; misuse of government funding and nepotism. Pohiva’s arguments called forth, for the removal of the Monarchy’s involvement in Government administration and promoted the notion of establishing a government for the people, by the people.

Concurrently, Pohiva advocated for reforms in the Legislative Assembly with a proposed increase in the number of People’s Representative and a call for the decrease and complete elimination of the Noble’s Representatives (Campbell, 2011).

In 2010, Tonga underwent Constitutional and Political reform in which the Sovereign’s Executive Powers were surrendered to the Executive branch now spearheaded by the new Head of Government, the Prime Minister (Figure 20).

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53 Pohiva was once a Government civil servant but had been previously dismissed from his role as a teacher. His involvement in Tongan politics expands over 30 years and has been one of the founders of the Pro-democracy movement. He continues to be a vocal and active advocator.
The aforementioned changes can be said to have paved the democratic path for Tonga particularly, and with the relinquishing of the Sovereign’s Executive control over, the administrative matters of the Government. Nonetheless, such change is only a small fraction of the Monarch’s Executive Authority (Figure 21).

Primary reasons, accounting for the retention of much of the Sovereign’s Executive Authority can be attributed to the fact that, majority of the Tongan public still retained their respect and loyalty to the Monarch as their King. Furthermore, as much of Tonga’s development can be largely attributed to the Royal family and their visionary leadership, the Tongan public believed the presence of the King and the Royal Household was very much needed as it is an integral part of Tongan history, tradition and heritage.

Even so, the introduction of democratic change into Tongan society 2010 has brought about, a range of changes both socially and traditionally-some for the better: as more and more Tongan emigrate abroad, improvements in technical and educational knowledge and skills; some for the worst: as crime, theft and other vices of the Western world have permeated the once traditional, isolated island nation.

3. 21st century diplomacy

i. Government administration: (a) Tu’ivakano Administration (2011-2014) In December 2010, Lord Tu’ivakano54 (a noble) became Tonga’s first democratically elected Prime Minister. Tu’ivakano’s

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54 Tu’ivakano previously held the Ministerial portfolio of Minister of Works and Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports and began working as a civil servant in the GoT since the 1970s. Tu’ivakano had also previously held a seat as a noble’s representative in the Legislative Assembly since 1996 and had held the role of Speaker of the Legislative Assembly from 2002-2004 (Palgrave Macmillan Staff, 2012).
The changing phases of diplomacy in a Small Island Developing State: a case study of the Kingdom of Tonga

Chapter 4: Tonga as a global player (2010-2016)

Cabinet was comprised of traditionalist and loyalist supporters and as such, they thoroughly retained their loyalty and respect for the wishes and vision of the Monarch (King George Tupou V).

At the outset, Tu’ivakano was well aware of the boundaries and limitation of the 2010 Reform and his authority as Head of Government. Nonetheless, this did not hinder any positive actions undertaken by the administration during their term in Office. In retrospect, the Tu’ivakano administration seized the opportunities brought forth by globalisation as a means to attain economic development for Tonga by focusing in areas of agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and youth and sports\(^5\) (MIC, 2012: McCully, 2014: AidData, no date: TTA, 2013: Tu’ivakano, 2014: ABC, 2012).

In terms of furthering Tonga’s foreign relations, Tu’ivakano continued to maintain the status quo and practiced Tonga’s FP of maintaining neutral ties with all nations as well as, continued support for Tonga’s bilateral relations with PRC.

(b) Pohiva Administration (2015-to date): In November 2014, Pro-democracy leader Mr ‘Akilisi Pohiva was elected as Prime Minister. In contrast, to the Tu’ivakano Cabinet, Pohiva’s Cabinet was comprised solely of Pro-democratic supporters. Such composition was very telling as it clearly, implied a significant change in GoT strategic direction and interest would occur. Unlike, the previous administration in which, the status quo had been respected and retained, a different perspective was voiced by the new Government, and one that made it clear that the remaining executive powers of the sovereign needed to be removed (PIR Editor, 2017).

Since day one, the Pohiva administration had made it clear that the government was ‘the people’s government’ and would focus on the promotion of ‘good governance... along with transparency, accountability, and a firm stand against all forms of corruption’ (Moala, 2014).

The actions and decisions undertaken by Pohiva during his first two years in office can be described as nothing short of unorthodox, unpredictable and unprecedented. Pohiva was a more vocal, opinionated and much more aggressive leader and was very driven to pursue and achieve whatever he put his mind

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too, even if it does not align with the national interests. Sticking true to his unpredictable and abrasive nature, Pohiva continues to openly discuss Tonga’s problems at every available opportunity and sometimes, utters random phrases which tend to paint a somewhat disorganised, aggressive and chaotic image of Tonga in the international arena.

A key example of such actions, are clearly illustrated in Pohiva’s violation of Tonga’s FP of ‘friends to all’ by getting thoroughly involved in the ‘Free West Papua’ movement. As illustrated, in his first ever statement delivered at the UNGA (2015) which, he highlighted the atrocities of West Papua and criticised the UN for their lack of action. The content of the speech had two key effects: (i) the view of Tonga as the once neutral nation had been tainted and (ii) Pohiva’s vocal opinions was directly inferred as a violation of diplomacy’s number 1 rule- non-interference in a nation’s internal affairs. Despite, the criticisms from the public and Parliament, Pohiva continued to justify his actions by stating it was his inherent right to stand up for the human rights of Tonga’s Melanesian neighbours.

At the outset, perhaps the Constitutional and Political reform of 2010 could have led to a period of instability and tension within Tonga primarily, as majority of the Sovereign’s executive authority had remained untouched. As illustrated, through Tu’ivakano’s administration, the status quo was adequately maintained and the Government was able to continue to pursue and achieve Tongan interests without any inherent problems.

It is evident that during the Tu’ivakano administration, Tonga continued to pursue FP as it once had before, by forging relations with foreign nations, traditional donors, and international organisations; including fostering partnerships with civil societies and the private sector. Naturally, one can assume that, the path of leadership undertaken by Tu’ivakano tended to be outward looking and focused on seeking further means to increase Tonga’s opportunity and progress in the global arena.

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56 For more information see: Mou F (2015) Tongan PM disappointed with declining exam results; Nuku’alofa Times (2016) PM and team defend raw marks and system; TBC (2016) Piveni Piukala and Siaosi Pohiva’s contract questioned in Parliament- while Prime Minister denies allocation of TOP $25,000 as their salary, Tonga Broadcasting Commission; RNZ (2015) Tonga to review scaling of exam results, Radio New Zealand
57 For more information see: Morrah M (2016) Tonga PM: corrupt passport ‘ninjas’ still a challenge
58 Pohiva against the advice of MINOFA and Legislative Assembly continued to attend International Parliamentarians for West Papua meeting in London in May 2016. Pohiva used his own views to confirm Tonga’s full support in seeking to stop the inhumane treatment in West Papua (PMC Editor, 2016)
In comparison, Pohiva took more of an inward looking approach and reforms can be described as a going back to basics. Though, much of his reforms have been met with criticism from both the home and overseas audiences, one can say, perhaps there is a certain ‘method to the madness’ of the reforms that have transpired in the Tongan Government in the past 3 years.

Pohiva tends to focus more on improving the foundations of the Tongan government, cutting back on costs and helping to build the strength of the Tongan people. Moreover, Pohiva made it clear that his strategic vision for Tonga was to refocus on developing and maintaining Pacific engagement rather than extending Tonga’s outreach to the Western world.

ii. *Rise of other players in Tonga’s diplomacy:* Right through the 70s to early 2000s, engagement in diplomacy had mainly been covered solely by MINOFA. Nevertheless, in the late 2000s, the players of diplomacy in Tonga began to evolve. Attributing factors include the increased number of Government Ministries; responsibilities and also, the changing global environment with the rise of multilateralism, advancements in technology and international travel.

The following institutions give a brief insight into the entrance of new actors into the field of diplomacy, aside from the once dominant Foreign Ministry:

a. *Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP):* In 2009, the role of OAD assistance was reassigned from the MINOFA to the MoFNP. It was assumed that the need to go directly to the source (aid donors) was necessary and to do so, MoFNP needed to hold a direct line of communication with donor and development partners. By doing so, MoFNP would be better equipped to manage and monitor the completion and outcomes of intended projects.

b. *United Nations Development Program (UNDP):* In 2011, the UN officiated the opening of the UNDP local office in Tonga. The launch of the Office further solidified the UN’s commitment and on the ground presence in Tonga. Projects continue in areas of “*poverty reduction & millennium development goals (MDGS); good governance & human rights; crisis prevention & recovery and fourthly, environment and sustainable management*” (MIC, 2011).
c. **PMO:** for the duration of the Pohiva administration, PMO has undertaken certain aspects of the MINOFA role such as the coordination, facilitation and drafting of briefs, for the PM for regional leaders meetings (PIF, PIDF, and PLG) to international meetings such as CHOGM.

d. **Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information and Communication, Disaster, Environment and Climate Change (MEIDECC):** with the rise of technical issues such as CC and renewable energy, the need for the involvement of technical experts and consultants in international discussions is thoroughly required. MEIDECC has brought together local experts in the field of CC, energy, disaster management and cyber crime (UNCC, 2015: TBC, 2017).

e. **Public:** the growth of social media networks\(^{59}\) and the use of radio talkback shows have allowed the Tongan public to become more vocal and involved in the discussion of Tonga’s global and domestic affairs. Such discussions have pushed the GoT to focus more on producing more cost effective, transparent and accountable actions.

f. **NGO/CSOs:** the growth and recognition of NGOs in Tonga including the involvement of religious groups such as CWL and CSOs such as WCC\(^{60}\), PSA\(^{61}\), and TNLDP\(^{62}\) by international organisations such as UN bodies proves the growing scope of actors in diplomacy.

4. **Tonga as a global player**

Just as Tonga experiences benefits of international travel, easier access to information and improvements in communication standards, they also encounter global issues such as gender equality, human rights, and sustainable development. Simultaneously, Tonga stands vulnerable to global threats of – terrorism and CC. The manner in how Tonga tackles the aforementioned issues is largely governed by three main factors- religion, tradition and culture.

a. **Peace and security:** Tonga is committed to playing their part in maintaining international and regional security. In support of the global fight against terrorism, Tonga sent troops to Iraq from 2003 till

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\(^{59}\) Facebook has made it much easier for expatriate Tongan communities and locals to communicate at a much faster rate. Furthermore, the ease of creating exclusive groups allows Tongans to connect and discuss common issues. Dominant political groups include ‘Kingdom politics, Tonganow, Kaniva News etc’.

\(^{60}\) For more information please see: [http://www.tongawcc.org](http://www.tongawcc.org)

\(^{61}\) For more information please see: Braddock J (2005) Public servants’ strike deepens Tonga’s political crisis.

\(^{62}\) Tonga National Leaders Development Program is an AusAid funded program which brings together and develop capacity of the future leaders of Tonga.
2008. Yet again in 2011 to 2014, Tonga supported NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan (Dateline Pacific, 2014: Malkin, 2010). Tonga also, contributes to upholding regional stability by participating in Peacekeeping operations such as SPPKF (Bougainville) and RAMSI (Solomon Islands).

b. **Human rights:** In 2015, the Tongan public were in upheaval after the GoT made the commitment to ratify the CEDAW Convention. As a devout Christian society, public protests were led by religious leaders and groups particularly, the WCL and Catholic Church to stop the pursuit of the CEDAW Convention as a response to their strict rejection of the abortion and same sex marriage concepts of CEDAW (WUNRN, 2016).

Eventually, the voice of the public reached the Privy Council and the Sovereign himself. As a result, the GoT was advised to re-evaluate the situation and possibly withdraw any firm commitment to the CEDAW Convention. Consequently, the GoT deferred the decision to ratify the Convention until further assessment be made.

c. **Gender equality:** another emerging group advocating for Gender equality is that of the Leitis (Lady’s) Association. Members of the association include gays, lesbians and bi-sexual individuals who are fighting for reforms of Tonga legislation to formally recognise the role of gays, lesbians and bi-sexuals in society. Traditionally, Tonga is quite open and accepting of ‘fakaleitis’ (gay men openly dressed as women) however, their involvement in politics and government is often disregarded.

In 2015, the first ever ‘Pacific Human Rights on sexual orientation and gender identity conference’ was held in Tonga. The gathering of gay and lesbians participants from the Pacific region was met with small protests from certain religious groups who believed the hosting of the Conference in Tonga was against Tonga’s Christian beliefs and values as well, as the Constitution (Oceania TV News, 2015).

d. **Climate change:** Tonga is vulnerable to the threat of CC and rising sea levels. In recent years, Tonga has shown their commitment to battle the effects of climate change by committing to the Paris COP 21 agreement.
For a nation such as Tonga deeply rooted in tradition and culture, the need to preserve their land is of the utmost importance especially, for Tonga’s Outer Islands, who heavily rely on fishing and farming for survival. Learning to adapt to the effects of CC such as diverse weather patterns has not been an easy task, given the limited resources available at the GoT’s disposal. Moreover, proposed suggestions for selected communities residing on the lower lying Outer Islands to relocate to the main island or other neighbouring islands are not a likely choice, as they have become accustomed to their own way of life.

Moreover, Tonga currently receives a vast amount of ODA and TA from development and donor aid countries focusing on the development of rural development as well, as building the capacity of specific groups such as women and the youth. Although, Tongans are keen and quick learners, the main problem after such capacity building training, workshops and programs is the fact of the lack of continued maintenance.

Alternatively, it can be presumed that the GoT is not doing enough to encourage Tongan communities to become more active and vocal in their battle against CC. Though, the GoT and donor and development nations fund projects to increase capacity and technical skills, it may seem that such trainings only tend to increase awareness but do not provoke any real sense of action.

The everyday Tongan man/woman still does not know what and how to escape or adapt to the effects of CC. Unlike, Western nations which focus on results and thrives on individual achievements, Tonga like many other Pacific Islands are very communal and family oriented (Rhodes, 2014: Hage & Harary, 1996) and thus, focus more on the collective outcome rather than individual input.

Furthermore, (i) religion and (ii) social networks also, play an integral role in the genetic makeup of Tongan society. For majority of the grass root Tongan communities, the concept of CC does not hold much significance in their view. As a devout Christian society, many Tongans still stick to the belief that the solution to CC will purely depend on the divine will of God and despite, the GoT efforts of man to curb such effects if it is the will of the Gods, then nothing will stop such effects.
5. Discussion

As illustrated in the aforementioned passages, the political and democratic change of 2010 tended to focus mainly on giving the people more of a voice in the Legislative Assembly and saw the relinquishment of the Sovereign’s authority on the daily administration of the GoT.

Having said this, much of the Sovereign’s authority is still in force and thus, maintains a great influence on Tonga’s foreign relations. Perhaps retention of such vital authority, is required to ensure that Tonga’s political stability is still maintained and continued until a time, when society and the Government leaders are able to fully govern the operations of Tonga as a nation. As much of the Sovereign’s Executive Authority remains untouched, the question then arises can the two co-exist? Will it lead to clashes between the Sovereign and the Government administration of the day?

As derived from the Tu’ivakano administration, Tonga’s global image of a soft spoken, neutral and friendly nation was maintained. Tu’ivakano continued the conservative, forward thinking and outward looking approach previously, projected by Tonga’s forefathers.

In contrast, the current Pohiva administration tends to take a less conservative role but a more confronting and advocate role getting involved in controversial issues which would never have occurred in previous years. Moreover, Pohiva tends to engage and perusal of regional partnerships in contrast, to forging more international connections. This retreat to regionalism tends to raise questions of whether Tonga will continue to play the game of internationalism and extend their diplomatic outreach or would they return to nationalism/regionalism and limit their options of achieving their national interests?

What’s more Pohiva still endeavours to prove to the global world that Tonga is a sovereign and independent nation, free to pursue and formulate her own opinions. This strict adherence to maintaining Tonga’s independent and sovereign voice in the global arena is clearly identical to Tonga’s position during the Treaty of Friendship with Great Britain in the 1900s.

The difference is that at the time of Tupou I’s reign he was well aware that despite, being a sovereign nation, it was always important to keep Tonga’s options open by maintaining a neutral stance, for Tonga
cannot solely survive on her own without the aid of foreign powers. Fast forward a century later, to the current Government administration, their interpretation of sovereignty is in a completely different context, for they are of the view that Tonga can conduct whatever actions she pleases without any consequence.

Personally, I do not believe this is correct because it will only further affect Tonga in the long run. As a small nation, Tonga cannot afford to make any enemies primarily, as she does not have the resources or the manpower to survive on her own.

On another note, the late 2000s saw the decentralisation of diplomacy in Tonga, as more Government Ministries were established, the civil service and the number of graduates gradually increased. Moreover, as global issues in the international arena became much more technical and specialised, the knowledge, manpower and capacity of MINOFa proved limited.

Rather, as more technical Line Ministries stepped in and took up the role of technical expertises and communicated directly with donor and development partners, the role of the Foreign Ministry soon became strictly limited to protocol advisement and issues. This decentralised nature of diplomacy then begs the question, is MINOFa still required in the 21st century or should they learn to adapt to the evolving environment and issues of diplomacy and upgrade their level of knowledge and utilise new technologies of communication?

Furthermore, the growing scope of practitioners of diplomacy in Tonga can be attributed to Tonga’s growing and evolving agenda of diplomacy. Additional to the pursuit of economic interests, the nation has also, now become much more focused on UN agenda issues such as Human rights, gender equality and CC. Focus on such issues have awakened certain tensions within Tongan society particularly; as such issues tend to conflict with Tonga’s traditional and cultural way of life.

Despite such conflicts Tonga does continue to try to evolve and adapt to the changing environment of the global scene. The manner in which, they address such issues differs from the Western world and tends to focus on more on the ground factors such as religion, tradition and culture. This mixture of Western and Tongan perspective closely echoes the teachings of Her Late Majesty Queen Salote Tupou III in the 60s
which then begs the question is Tonga taking a step forward in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century or are they being held back by their strict adherence to culture and traditions?

\textbf{Review}

The chapter has explored the Constitutional and Political reform undergone by Tonga in 2010 and examine whether it has affected the manner in which Tonga conducts diplomacy. Discussions have also highlighted: (i) the influencing role different Government administrations may hold in determining a nation’s pursuit of foreign and national interests; (ii) the increasing scope of actors in Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy and (iii) assessed how factors of tradition and culture influence’s Tonga’s actions in certain global issues.

\textit{Chapter 5} will seek to draw conclusions to this study, highlight the findings traced throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} century to 21\textsuperscript{st} century diplomacy; identify gaps of the type of diplomacy practiced by Tonga and provide suggestions on a probable way forward for diplomatic relations of PSIDs from the perspective of Tonga.
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion

a. Findings:

The key findings of this study are summarised below:

i. Foundations and new aspects of Tonga’s diplomacy:

At the outset, origins of Tonga’s statecraft were predominantly guided and rooted in Tupou I’s endeavours to gain international recognition for Tonga as an independent and sovereign state. Such endeavours were slightly overshadowed during 1900-1970 when Tonga became a British Protected State. Despite this, the fact remains that Tupou I’s vision continued to be the guiding light for his successors Tupou II and Tupou III.

In 1970 under the reign of King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV, Tupou I’s vision was finally fulfilled as an independent and sovereign Tonga entered the Comity of nations (1970-2010). Under the leadership of Taufa’ahau, new driving factors of economic and social interests now became the focus of Tonga’s statecrafts. This led to the development and setup of MINOFA and defence relations, growth of bilateral and multilateral relations and international organisations.

Following Tonga’s Political and Constitutional Reform of 2010, the foundations for Tonga’s statecrafts have yet again changed particularly, with the effects of globalisation and the technological and communication revolution. Tonga has come to recognise that to ensure survival in the 21st century, their contribution as a global player in the international scene is thoroughly required. Additionally, the players in Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy have also, increased in scope, knowledge and expertise.
Given the democratic changes of 2010 another component of influence to Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy is the Government administration (elected every 4 years). As derived from the examples of Tonga’s two polar opposite Government administrations, (Tu’ivakano/Pohiva), the former continued the pursuit of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy whereas, the latter/current Government administration driven solely by the interests of the Pro-democracy movement and to an extent, has tainted some of Tonga’s once neutral and friendly image in the international arena. This implies the significant role personality plays in determining a nation’s statecrafts and conduct of diplomacy (Kegley & Raymond, 2010).

As Tonga will continue to develop democratically, the future of Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy remains uncertain and only time will tell whether it should take a step in the right direction or would it merely damage the reputation and works of Tonga’s forefathers in previous years.

**ii. Elements of Tonga’s diplomacy:**

The aforementioned discussions have highlighted Tonga’s employment of various elements of diplomacy to achieve national interests, extend their global outreach and also, make their mark in the international arena.

*i) Soft power:* right through Tonga’s history, traces of soft power are evident and have helped to maintain peace and stability in Tonga throughout the centuries. If we recall during the Treaty years with the British, Tonga was constantly threatened with gunboat and hard diplomacy tactics by the British, however, Tonga’s leaders continued to rely on communication and display of soft power as the best means of defence. Such reliance on peaceful means of action can be said to have been rooted in Tonga’s religious beliefs of Christianity and their own traditions and culture of respect.

Further examples, includes Tonga’s relaxed FP approach of maintaining friendly ties with all nations and being considered a neutral nation. This tactful approach allows Tonga to avoid external threats while at the same time, giving Tonga the freedom to pursue bilateral and multilateral relations without being considered as discriminating against others.
(ii) Nation branding: The reign of Queen Salote Tupou III and King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV clearly illustrate, this new element of Tonga’s diplomacy in the 20th century. Salote’s unforgettable attendance of HM Queen Elizabeth’s Coronation in 1953 is still imprinted on many foreigners’ minds and contributes to Tonga’s history and global image as a friendly nation.

   Examples can be found in Taufa’ahau’s worldwide travels in which he not only, sought to promote the name of Tonga but also, establish economic and social networks and links to further develop Tongan society and economy.

(iii) Track two diplomacy: Tonga has employed track two diplomacy throughout various instances in history to resolve both internal and international conflicts. Examples can be found during to Tupou I’s reign, when he often called upon the support of his people and nobleman to support his visions and aspirations for Tonga to be internationally recognised as an independent and sovereign nation.

   Similarly, Tupou II used the same tactic when explaining to his people the purpose of the Treaty of Friendship. Furthermore, Salote utilised the same task of calling upon the support of her nation when she called forth the people of Tonga to unite and formulate a means to preserve the nation’s culture and traditions, to combat the effects of the Western world. Moreover, the practice of summitry diplomacy at the Head of State level by Taufa’ahau and his successor King George Tupou V continue to propel Tonga’s international status.

   Furthermore, the 21st century, has also introduced a new type of two track diplomacy, one where normal citizens are becoming more involved in the Government’s decisions and policies. Examples include Tonga’s retraction from the CEDAW Convention as discussed in Chapter 4.

(iv) Cultivation of tradition and culture: is clearly evident throughout the reign of Tonga’s forefathers and well into the new era of Democracy that Tonga has entered since 2010. To date, traditions and culture still remain an integral part of Tongan society and continue to drive how the nation makes decisions (politically and socially).
Such guidance has to date, has helped Tonga avoid any major conflicts or revolutionary changes. However, such traditions and cultures come under immense threat with the continuing wave of democratic changes occurring in Tonga. Although, democracy in theory may prove a liberating and well founded concept, the reality to achieve this is quite difficult. For a nation such as Tonga deeply rooted in tradition and culture, the concept of democracy may erode such roots and possibly lead to a period of instability and uncertainty for the nation.

Nonetheless, as illustrated in the aforementioned chapters, Tonga continues to cultivate links with traditional allies and partners such as New Zealand, Australia, the USA and Britain. Concurrently, Tonga has also broadened their focus to include the Asia-Pacific region. Even so, the current administration has embraced a return to pursuit of Pacific diplomacy stemming directly from common interest and challenges faced such as CC and sustainable development.

b. Gaps:

The study reveals the following gaps with Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy:

iii. Mode of diplomacy- Tonga primarily conducts traditional diplomacy. Although, elements of two track and public diplomacy are visible, they are not formally recognised as vital to Tonga’s pursuit of national interests. The lack of coherent coordination between MINOFA and other Line Ministries in the conduct of diplomacy is highly visible.

iv. MINOFA: throughout the 70s to 2000s MINOFA was the key actor in Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy. It is understandable that the 21st century has brought a new wave of technical issues that require technical knowledge and expertise. However, I do not believe this should mean a decrease in MINOFA’s role as the primary actor of diplomacy.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of MINOFA and TDS was essential to the conduct of Tonga’s foreign and defence relations. Despite, the emergence of new actors in the field of diplomacy, MINOFA should not remain on the sidelines but rather take a more proactive role and engage with such actors accordingly.
v. **Use of ICT**: the ICT revolution has greatly improved Tonga’s ICT infrastructure and allowed for Tonga’s instantaneous connection to the outside world. In this day in age, digital diplomacy is becoming an integral tool of diplomacy particularly for PSIDS. Tonga is yet to recognise and utilise this to their advantage.

c. **Recommendations:**

Although, Tonga’s conduct of diplomacy has clearly evolved throughout the 19th to 21st century, room for development and improvement is still available particularly, in the following areas:

- **Pursuit of different aspects of diplomacy** - in addition to pursuing bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomacy, Tonga needs to recognise and utilise other forms of diplomacy such as public and two track diplomacy, as a means, to further enhance their international standing and national image and reputation. Furthermore, Tonga needs to directly engage her citizens in her conduct of diplomacy to ensure the goals and interests of the nation are well understood at home as they are abroad.

- **Revitalize MINOFA** - it is important that MINOFA embrace the effects and changes brought about by globalisation rather than reject them. There is a need to upgrade the technical skills and expertise of current employees of MINOFA, as Tupouto’a once did. It is inevitable that other actors will emerge in the field of diplomacy; however, I strongly believe MINOFA should still retain the central status as they once did in the 80s.

- **Pursue digital diplomacy**: with appropriate ICT infrastructure in place, Tonga would greatly benefit from the pursuit of digital diplomacy as it is cost effective, instantaneous and will extend Tonga’s diplomatic outreach beyond traditional barriers.

d. **Conclusion**

The aim of this study was to investigate and understand the changing phases of diplomacy from the perspective of a PSIDs focusing on Tonga as a case study.

For Tonga, a small, remote nation, the practice of diplomacy has contributed greatly to their development as a nation, regionally and internationally. It is evident, that diplomacy has in fact been a
long standing part of Tongan society and has helped maintain law and order and bring stability to the nation. Moreover, Tonga’s socio-hierarchical society has its own version of diplomacy—one which history; tradition and culture play an integral part.

Throughout the different periods discussed in this study; elements of Tonga’s diplomacy have continuously evolved. Such evolution has largely occurred to accommodate the changing social and economic interests of the nation. Moreover, change has also been to reflect the rapid changes occurring in the international environment brought forth by globalisation, the communication and technological revolution. Furthermore, for PSIDS survival is vital and thus, it has become a necessity to continually evolve and adapt to the changing global environment.

Nonetheless, as democratic change continues to take place in Tonga and more liberation and power is given to the people, the foundations of Tonga’s diplomacy (culture and tradition) may or may not come under threat. Particularly, as a nation whose traditions define the very nature and essence of who they are. The exact fruition of such democratic changes is yet to be determined and will require further study.

In conclusion, the lessons unveiled for a PSIDS from the perspective of Tonga are that (i) diplomacy is vital to a nation’s survival and equally, contributes to its development both internally and externally; (ii) nations must learn to adapt and evolve in response, to the changing times and trends or they will be left behind and (iii) change is inevitable and can be employed for the good; however, too much change can have detrimental effects for PSIDS especially one closely tied to history, tradition and culture.
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Appendix I:

Interviewees

Mr Viliami Va'inga Tone is the current Secretary for Foreign Affairs for Tonga’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to holding the post of SecFO, Mr Tone served in the Tonga Defence Services as a Commissioned Officer until the late 1990s when he was transferred to MINOFA as a Principal Assistant Secretary.

In 2005-2010, he took up the role of SecFo and represented Tonga on a variety of meetings in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and Asia. In 2010-2013, he was appointed as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and was responsible for the newly installed division of the Palace Office ‘Office of the Lord Privy Seal.’ Since 2013-to date, Mr Tone has again taken up the role of SecFO.

Mrs Viela Kinahoi Tupou is amongst the pioneer Officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She entered the civil service in 1973 and began employment in the newly established Foreign Ministry Division under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office and continued employment at MINOFA until 2000.

In 2000-2004, she was posted as Counsellor to Tonga’s High Commission Mission in London. In 2005, she was appointed as Tonga’s High Commissioner to the Court of St. James in London with cross accreditation credentials to Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Russian Federation, Swiss Confederacy and Israel.

During her 30 year career at the Foreign Ministry, Mrs Tupou has represented Tonga at various regional and international forums, partook in the Ministry’s Foreign Service and Intelligence courses. She is also an alumni member of DiploFoundation having completed IT and Diplomacy 1997 and Postgraduate Diploma Course in IT and Diplomacy in 2000.

Since 2008 to date, Mrs Tupou has taken up the post of Lord Chamberlain at the Palace Office.

Mr Viliami Malolo is the current Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal under the auspices of the Palace Office. Before that, Mr Malolo had begun employment in the Tongan civil service as Assistant Senior Crown Counsel (1994-1999), at the Crown Law Department under Tonga’s Ministry of Justice.

In 1999, Mr Malolo was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was posted as Counsellor/Deputy Permanent Representative to Tonga’s UN Permanent Representative Mission in New York from 1999-2013. Upon his return to Tonga, Mr Malolo took up the role of Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs before being appointed as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in 2013.
Appendix II:

Interview of Jiosateki Tonga Veikune, Premier of Tonga by the British High Commissioner 13th December 1904

Source: British Agency, 1904

At the British Agency, 13th December 1904

Present: Mr H Hunter CMG, HM Agent and Consul, Mr M. King, Secretary to Western Pacific High Commission, Commander HD Wilkin DSO RN, HMS ‘Clio’, Jioaji Fatafehi, Minister of Lands, Jiosateki Toga Veikune, Prime Minister, Messrs. TV Roberts and PS Bloomfield, Interpreters

High Commissioner: Sateki, I must remind you that in your presence the King promised you would give me every possible help. You know as well as I do that there are great troubles in Tonga just now. Do you not?
Sateke: If you know of any great difficulties connected with Tonga, then there are.
High Commissioner: And you know the fault is practically yours, or at all events partially yours. And the best way to free yourself from blame is to tell me frankly everything.
Sateke: Anything you wish to ask, I am prepared to tell.
High Commissioner: Do you publish the estimates every year in the Gazette?
Sateke: Yes
High Commissioner: What amount of revenue do you expect this year?
Sateke: I do not remember
High Commissioner: The estimated revenue was $109,000. Is that right? The estimated expenditure was $107,000, so that should leave a balance of $2,000. Your son is Treasurer, and you Sateke, know all that goes on in the Treasury. I have reason to believe that up to the 25th September the revenue paid into the Treasury was $126,000. Do you know that?
Sateke: I do not know; but if you found that in the examination of the books, then that is it.
High Commissioner: So that up to that date, you had already received $17,000 more than you expected to receive. Yet I am told at that time the salaries were very much in arrears. Is that so?
Sateke: It is all in the books you examined, and I know nothing of it.
High Commissioner: I ask you if you know that the Treasury received the revenue they expected and more. I do not want to press you as to figures, but merely as to whether the revenue exceeded the expenditure and the estimate.
Sateke: The books who where the money went.
High Commissioner: That is not an answer to my question. What is the exact state of the Revenue?
Sateke: I do not know.
High Commissioner: But you must know whether you got the revenue you expected, or not. You received $126,000?
Sateke: Yes, we did get it.
High Commissioner: You got what was expected, and more?
Sateke: If that is what the books say.
High Commissioner: I am not asking what the books say. Do you know if more money was received than was expected?
Sateke: I do not know whether the estimate was reached or not.
High Commissioner: Have all the salaries been paid?
Sateke: Not yet. There is very little money in Tonga just now.
High Commissioner: That is nonsense; you have already received more than was expected. Do you ever talk over the Treasury affairs with your son?
Sateke: I instruct him in his work.
High Commissioner: You know what goes on in the Treasury?
Sateke: The work there is to pay out money. I am not familiar with their business. I sign vouchers, when required, and send them to the Treasury where they are paid.

High Commissioner: But if your son has too much money, or too little, does he speak to you about it?

Sateke: Yes

High Commissioner: Therefore you always know the state of the Treasury?

Sateke: The department is in charge of the Minister of Finance. When they want my signature they get it.

High Commissioner: You came here to speak freely, and tell me all you know.

Sateke: Anything you wish to ask I shall answer.

High Commissioner: You are not answering my questions. It is only fair that I should give you a chance. If you wish to tell me the reasons of this state of affairs in the Treasury, I am prepared to listen.

Sateke: The rule of that department is that on Mondays the revenue is paid in; and payments out are made on vouchers signed by me.

High Commissioner: You are Premiere, and as Premier it is your business to know of all the money in the Treasury. Then how is it you cannot tell me now? It is your last chance of telling me the actual state of the treasury, why the money is not there.

Sateke: You know, as you examined the books.

High Commissioner: Where is the money; why is there none in the Treasury?

Sateke: Look at the books; it is there.

High Commissioner: You came here promising to tell me all I want to know. All you tell me is to look at the books. That is not keeping your promise.

Sateke: I do not remember anything. It was you who examined the books.

High Commissioner: You have admitted you received more revenue than you expected.

Sateke: If that is what your audit says, then it is so.

High Commissioner: Though on the 4th September you had already received more money than you expected, you published a Gazette notifying that His Majesty, with the advice of the Privy Council, had granted $14,000 to carry on the work (make up the deficit) of the previous year. Where did that $14,000 come from?

Sateke: It is only an estimate.

(The Gazette, notifying King’s grant of $14,000, was then read)

High Commissioner: Let me remind you that you had already received more money than you expected, as you just now admitted. Well, where did you expected to get the $14,000 from?

Sateke: Everything ought to be found in the books.

High Commissioner: You have said that over and over again. Has everything that has been paid out been entered in the books; that is, have payments been made other than those which will be found entered in the books?

Sateke: I think so. The auditor knows that.

High Commissioner: Suppose I find that more has been received than paid out, how will that be accounted for?

Sateke: If there is no money left it will be through the dishonesty of cashiers.

High Commissioner: What would these errors amount to?

Sateke: I do not say there are errors. You have the looking into the books?

High Commissioner: Have you ever looked into the books yourself?

Sateke: That is the Auditor’s work. I do not audit.

High Commissioner: Do you know whether the books are kept satisfactorily, so that a stranger could tell the exact state of the finances?

Sateke: The Auditor examines them.

High Commissioner: Do you, As Premier, know from your own knowledge that the books are satisfactorily kept?

Sateke: I do.

High Commissioner: Very well: you think they are. You say the Treasurer is your son. Who is the Auditor-General?

Sateke: A man named Lavaki.

High Commissioner: Any relation of yours?
Sateke: His father and mine were related.
High Commissioner: And what about your mothers?
Sateke: Only fathers.
High Commissioner: Is he not a brother of yours?
Sateke: Adopted brother.
High Commissioner: So the Premier is Sateke; the Treasure is Sateke’s son; the Auditor, Sateke’s brother. Do you think the three financial officers should be so closely related?
Sateke: The King makes the appointments, not me.
High Commissioner: Are the Tongan Financial Statements published at the end of the year?
Sateke: No; only communicated to the Assembly; except in Tubo’s time.
High Commissioner: How long ago; a month or a year ago?
Sateke: A long time ago; and Tubo is now a prisoner.
High Commissioner: Was it this year?
Sateke: No; before the treasurer was appointed.
High Commissioner: How long has your son been Minister of Finance?
Sateke: He has been in two Assemblies (six years).
High Commissioner: Therefore no accounts have been published for six years?
Sateke: Except the communication to the Assembly.
High Commissioner: Parliament only meets every third year. Is it then told the expenditure for the past year, or past three years?
Sateke: Since the last Assembly.
High Commissioner: Is it written or merely told; if written, where are the documents? Ought they be in the Treasury?
Sateke: It is not published; the papers should be with the Minister of Finance.
High Commissioner: Who explains to Parliament? You or your son?
Sateke: The Minister of Finance, according to the Constitution.
High Commissioner: Are these accounts audited before presentation?
Sateke: Yes
High Commissioner: As far as we have gone, instead of giving all the information I want, you have given me none.
Sateke: I do not wish to hide anything; but it is difficult for me to answer, as my figures might clash with those in the books.
High Commissioner: I can quite understand your not remembering details of figures; but you must know the general condition of what I ask about.
Sateke: It is in the books which were audited.
High Commissioner: Well, I will now ask about something which is not in the books. What are the exact relations between the King, the Government, and yourself, and the Hutters?
Sateke: I know of no connection. I have given no written agreement or appointment for them to represent the Government.
High Commissioner: You have not? Then what do the Hutters do for you, for the King, or for the Government?
Sateke: The Jews have no connection with the Government to my knowledge, except when we want any supplies from New Zealand we write to them.
High Commissioner: The Jews have nothing else to do with the Government?
Sateke: No
High Commissioner: The Jew have been seen to fetch money from the Treasury in sufficient quantities to require a cart to remove it. What was that for?
Sateke: The money was to pay our foreign debts.
High Commissioner: Then Hutters are your agents?
Sateke: Whenever we want anything from New Zealand they send it.
High Commissioner: I ask you if the Hutters are the agents for the Tongan government?
Sateke: They have no written agreement.
High Commissioner: They were never gazette as agents?
Sateke: No

High Commissioner: Are you quite sure they were never appointed, or gazette, as agents?

Sateke: Yes. A long time ago they were appointed representatives, and were afterwards dismissed.

High Commissioner: When were they dismissed?

Sateke: A long time ago.

High Commissioner: Why were they dismissed?

Sateke: There was something objectionable connected with them.

High Commissioner: The Hutters are appointed and afterward dismissed, and still you carry on business with them, and they hold their post?

Sateke: They have no written appointment.

High Commissioner: You do business, in fact a great deal of business, with them.

Sateke: That is so.

High Commissioner: Is that fair and honourable conduct, to openly dismiss men for complaints against them, and then secretly to carry on business with them?

Sateke: We knew them here, and when they returned to New Zealand we wrote to them.

High Commissioner: But, still, though you pretend to dismiss them, you kept them on secretly. They ceased to be agents, and yet were agents?

Sateke: That is so.

High Commissioner: you still business with them; so much so that a cart is needed to take their money away from the Treasury, leaving it so nearly empty that you cannot pay officers’ salaries. You have enough to pay the Hutters, whereas you have not enough to pay the officers?

Sateke: Some are paid, and some are unpaid. We try to pay the debts outside the Kingdom first.

High Commissioner: Suppose someone else outside the Kingdom want to be paid, would they pay him?

Sateke: Yes

High Commissioner: The Hutters have no other hold over the Government? No concession of land or any other concession?

Sateke: I know of no land connected with Hutters except what they have bought or leased.

High Commissioner: And they hold absolutely no rights over any land here?

Sateke: No, they do not.

High Commissioner: Is there anything owing to the Hutters now?

Sateke: Only for supplies.

High Commissioner: Anything for lumber?

Sateke: There is no lumber on its way to be paid for

High Commissioner: No?

Sateke: Yes, there is some timber for the store-house.

High Commissioner: How much is it cost? Very much, or only a little?

Sateke: I think $5,000.

High Commissioner: Well, as there is no money in the Treasury, how do you propose to pay this?

Sateke: We hope to get money in.

High Commissioner: Which will you pay first, the Hutters or the salaries?

Sateke: If there is any money left, we will pay the Hutters.

High Commissioner: Then you still insist the Hutters have no means of enforcing payment? Any correspondence with them: who send it-the Premier?

Sateke: It is sent through his house. I would send the order there.

High Commissioner: Outside of business relations, are the Hutters friends of yours?

Sateke: They are. We are very friendly.

High Commissioner: Are you expecting one of them soon?

Sateke: I do not know.

High Commissioner: Supposing you have money of your own, would you invest it through the Hutters?

Sateke: I have not thought of that.

High Commissioner: You have not invested any money with them?

Sateke: No; none

High Commissioner: Why do the Chief of Tonga distrust you so?
Sateke: I do not know
High Commissioner: Can you guess?
Sateke: I have never injured a chief; but perhaps they are jealous of my position
High Commissioner: Supposing the King has any business, who does he consult about it?
Sateke: He consults me.
High Commissioner: Who else?
Sateke: Myself, Kubu, Fotu, Lavaki, and the Governors.
High Commissioner: Does he always consult these, or does he sometimes only consult Sateke?
Sateke: Sometimes he sends for me alone, at other he consults the Privy Council.
High Commissioner: Do you know the other Chiefs say they are never consulted, or not as a rule?
Sateke: Only the Nobles, as they are not in the Privy Council.
High Commissioner: But some of the Privy Council say they are not consulted. Are you a Noble?
Sateke: Yes
High Commissioner: When were you made a Noble?
Sateke: Last June, or therabouts. I am not sure whether it was this year or last.
High Commissioner: Was it this year?
Sateke: Yes; I think so.
High Commissioner: When you were appointed, did you get anything else besides your nobility? Did you get land?
Sateke: Yes
High Commissioner: Where?
Sateke: Here in Tonga, and also in Vava’u
High Commissioner: Do all Nobles get land when appointed?
Sateke: That is so.
High Commissioner: How long do you expect to be Premier?
Sateke: The King is head of affairs, and (the duration of) of my appointment rests with him.
High Commissioner: What right has the King over land; can he do what he likes with it?
Sateke: Yes, according to the Constitution.
High Commissioner: All land?
Sateke: That is so.
High Commissioner: Expect what has already been granted?
Sateke: Except land granted as an inheritance.
High Commissioner: Has the King the power to grant land to others besides chiefs; can he give away land to anyone?
Sateke: I do not know of his having done so.
High Commissioner: Has he the power?
Sateke: Only on leases.
High Commissioner: But is it in the Constitution that he can mortgage or sell lands?
Sateke: He cannot sell, and leases are the business of the Minister of Lands.
High Commissioner: All business connected with lands must be done through the Minister of Lands, and no transactions, leasing or anything else, can be done except through the Minister of Lands?
Sateke: That is so.
High Commissioner: Can the King put land in trust?
Sateke: It rests with the King whether he can or not.
High Commissioner: He can do it without putting it through the Minister of Lands?
Sateke: No.
High Commissioner: It must go through the hands of the Minister of Lands?
Sateke: No; none at all.
High Commissioner: Sateke; I have spent over an hour asking you questions, and have received no answer from you. It is very foolish of you. I have been talking a great deal, and will be glad, Sateke, if you will come back here at 9.30 am tomorrow.

INTERVIEW TERMINATED.
INTERVIEW OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WITH JIOSATEKI TOGA VEIKUNE AND OSAIAKI FOTU VEIKUNE

At the British Agency, 14th December, 1904.
Present: Mr H Hunter CMG, HM Agent and Consul, Mr M. King, Secretary to Western Pacific High Commission, Commander HD Wilkin DSO RN, HMS ‘Clio’, Jioaji Fatafehi, Messrs. TV Roberts and PS Bloomfield, Interpreters

Sateke: I wish to apologise for my speaking so rudely yesterday to Your Excellency Will you please forgive me?
High Commissioner: I am glad you have apologised. Sateke and Fotu: I wish to speak to you two first. You know I have come to put the affairs of Tonga right, and from what I have seen and heard you, Sateke and Fotu, are chiefly responsible for the present state of affairs. But now that you have got your country and yourselves into this trouble, I had hoped you would be anxious to help put things right, which your King promised you would do. However, you have not done so, but, on the contrary; you have taken every possible opportunity of holding information from me, and obstructing the work. I cannot be stopped by these obstructions; therefore I shall remove you from Tonga. You will go straight from this room on board the yacht ‘Ranadi’ to start in two hours for Suva. There you be in charge of the Deputy Governor, who will take care of your, giving you suitable house, and the necessary means of living. You can send messenger to your houses to get what you want; but you must understand this must be done quickly, as the ‘Ranadi’ starts in two hours. It is with regret I have to do this; but it is for the good of Tonga. That is all I have to say to you. Now, Fatafehi, you have heard what was said to Sateke and Fotu. I shall be obliged if you will go down to the wharf, and see them on the ‘Ranadi’. Then go and tell the King all that I have done this morning. Tell him again that I am sorry, but that what I have done is the best for him and for Tonga. Tell him also that I hope he will consult me through you as to (before) the appointment of the new Premier. Please also tell all the Chiefs what I have done. That is all I have to say to you.
Sateke: Nothing will alter your ruling; but what I wish to ask is, why are we sent away?
High Commissioner: For the harm you have done, and the obstructions you are causing.

(Sateke and Fotu were then removed to the ‘Ranadi’ under an escort of Marines from H.M.S. ‘Clio’ and High Commissioner on the return of Fatafehi continued his conversation.)