In search of the most sustainable and coherent diplomatic approaches to addressing the fundamental challenges Small States (including Small Island States or SIDS) perennially face in an uncertain world of hegemonic giants.

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A dissertation presented to the Faculty of Arts in the University of Malta for the degree of Master in Contemporary Diplomacy

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Declaration:

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own original work.

Philip J. Perinchief

Bermuda, June 30, 2016
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Dedication:

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Deborah Hendrickson-Perinchief, for her unstinting patience, understanding, love, technical and other support throughout the duration of this demanding project.
Abstract:

Small states, in every sphere of natural and human activity, are negatively and disproportionately impacted by crises, when compared to their hegemonic, larger and stronger counterparts.

This dissertation is a study not only of small states vis-a-vis larger states; but also of how strong, not as strong and failing small states, approach the fundamental challenges, including globalization, they face daily.

The key argument of this dissertation however is, “given the individual circumstances of the 'targeted' small states; whether it is at all possible, or desirable, to construct the most optimal, sustainable, and coherent ‘diplomatic toolset,’ to assist these small states in successfully overcoming these challenges”.

In this regard, this study proposes identifying and extracting the ‘common or core’ factors that transformed selected small states from ‘weak’ states into ‘stronger’ states. These ‘common or core factors’ would then, as far as that is feasible and acceptable, be adapted to the circumstances of the ‘targeted’ small states. Subsequently, for progress, these small states’ ‘diplomatic architecture’ would be aligned, or correlated, as perfectly as is possible, with their domestic and foreign policies.

These small states would then be encouraged to apply informed hard work, training, patience, discipline, vision; and to join ‘low-risk’ alliances.
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Chapter 1

1. Introduction:

Small states, including small island developing states (SIDS), are oft-times placed in the invidious position of having to align themselves with groups or nations, controversial or otherwise, in order to achieve their diplomatic goals or objectives. Alliances, as with many relationships, are not static, ideal, or ‘written in stone,’ and as such, come together and fall apart overtime for one reason or another. This dynamic feature, in my view, impacts smaller states harder than they do their larger counterparts, which, again in my view, have wider interests and deeper capacities to ‘absorb or soften’ the consequences of failed or severed alliances.

Small states as well, perennially face almost insurmountable barriers and challenges, man-made and natural; that threaten, particularly in the case of micro-states, their very existence. Climate change, rising sea levels, economic convergence (e.g. small states’ economies' perennial and frantic efforts to ‘catch-up’ with the advanced economies of developed nations) and globalization loom large amongst these threats. Added to these pressures is the ever changing ‘ebb and flow’ of the ‘balance of power’ amongst the hegemonic superpowers or alliances, such as the U.S.A., China, Europe (the European Union), Asia (ASEAN), and their influences in international institutions (e.g. the UN, the WTO) and organizations, etc. These small states as a consequence, are rooted in a constant and seemingly endless ‘loop of creativity and flux’ in order to ‘stay afloat’.

As a direct consequence of this relentless onslaught of challenges and threats to their fundamental existence; small states are forced to constantly ‘perfect’ the art of negotiation and persuasion of larger and more influential nations and international organizations, to see the world through their eyes. This is no small feat.

1.1 What criteria define a small state?
There is a myriad of ways, unfortunately, by which one may define or describe a small state (or small island state or SID). I will examine a few in relatively tangential terms.

Small states, in the literature, continue to be described in both subjective and objective terms, and against numerous criteria. This fact of course, does not assist in making easy or precise, comparisons between or across small states, particularly when one is searching for a solution to, or resolution of, their challenges. It is not simply a matter of “one size fits all situations,” or indeed, for all times.

For example, from a population size perspective, defined small states in the literature, generally range from a few thousand people (e.g. Tuvalu and Niue) to five (5) million persons (e.g. Papua New Guinea).

With respect to small Island states in particular, the physical land mass ought not necessarily be the determinative factor when determining ‘size’. Jurisdictional or juridical control of maritime zone boundaries (E.E.Z. etc.), in my view, expands the size and prospects of a SID, and would be just as relevant, or more so, as ‘land-mass’ since these zones are potential ‘income-producing’ areas which could redound to the economic and commercial benefit of small states if the ‘treasures’ of the ‘Blue Economy’¹ are realized. Are such state’s truly small? I emphatically say, “not so”. I shall revisit this issue later when I particularly, in chapter four (4), discuss individual small states.

In other cases, natural or man-made resources in nations that have large or small land-masses, but also small populations; make defining such countries problematic. For example, if there are vast mineral resources, or lucrative offshore banking and insurance or reinsurance companies etc., giving rise to extremely high per capita incomes (but unfortunately in many cases, poor or inequitable distribution of wealth); it is far more

¹ ‘Blue Economy’ is the term that is assigned to the exploitation of the maritime zones (EEZs and to the Continental shelves) of coastal nations and SIDS (archipelagoes included). In my view, this expression ought to be extended to include the exploitation of the skies as well, for those nations, particularly SIDS, that have been allocated satellite slots and spectrum by the I.T.U.
challenging from an analytical point of view to define such countries as “small” (e.g.: Qatar, Oman, Bermuda, Luxembourg, etc.). Should small populations always equate to, “poor country”? I think not. Moreover, some countries have been considered as “small” because of unique or specific vulnerabilities. Typically, such countries, based on an “objective assessment”, experience such deficiencies as low political development, limited resources (material and/or human) poor governmental and/or physical infrastructure, conflicts with neighbours, etc.; though I caution that, “on their own”, these are not determinative criteria of their definition as small states. These afflictions, individually or collectively, carry through to these small states ‘misfortunes and lackluster achievements’ at the global level.

Other scholars suggest that ‘if a country considers itself “as small,” then it is; indeed, small. However, I do not find favour with that subjective view, and in fact, consider such an approach as entirely unhelpful analytically. Without some objective criteria, or some more precise degree of empirical inquiry; it would be quite impossible to design approaches (diplomatically, economically, politically, etc.) to resolving any challenges such states may have.

Further, it is important to distinguish between structural factors that “define” smallness of states, and “factors” which are the ‘result’ of “smallness” (Camilleri, 2016).

Faced with these realities, there is no surprise that the behavior (which I will examine later) of small states is, and has to be, far more cautious and measured, and manifestly different, to the very same challenges or problems that large states face. Not having a universally accepted definition of what a small state is, presents, sometimes, insuperable barriers. Small states need assistance in many areas and from many sources. However, if there isn’t a universally accepted definition or understanding of what a small state is, how then do these small states ‘qualify’ for, or gain access to, the assistance they need?

This definitional uncertainty is exacerbated when seen across and in the context of different disciplines for example, development economics, international economics, international
politics, international relations or affairs, international trade, or international security. Each one of these named categories have potential organizations or programs which may be in a position to ‘assist’ small states. However, a small state, given the variety of definitions, is confronted with yet another challenge or hurdle as to whether or not it ‘qualifies’ for such assistance. A given state may, for example, qualify in the international ‘trade’ category but not in the international security sector. [Please examine relevant ‘Lists’ in the Annexures to this paper in this regard].

In short, manageable categories of definitions, or a particular definition of what a small state is or is not, is fundamental to any serious discussion or analysis of what challenges such states face and have to overcome.

Multiple, or arbitrary definitions tend only to ‘obscure rather than edify’ issues such as these. This point is extremely apropos in the quantitative approach, whose otherwise advantage is of course the existence and use of visible quantifiable criteria. The distinct disadvantage of such an approach, however, is that it fails to address in the detail required, the “complexity of small state size in international relations” (Martinez, 2014).

Measuring small states from a realist or liberalist approach in international or foreign relations terms, will only measure that particular states ‘power’ or “ability to influence outcome” (Martinez, 2014). This limited quantifiable measure is specifically designed to examine a given state’s ‘military and economic power’ in terms of its ‘arsenal of guns, planes, ships, soldiers or the magnitude of its G.D.P. This simply isn’t enough.

1.2 The International Relations perspective: The ‘Liberalist’ viewpoint:

This view of matters leads me quite naturally to the ‘Liberalist’ international relations perspective. The liberalists view is basically that “questions of smallness and greatness are often issue specific: i.e. a small state in one sphere may be a great power possessing considerable influence in a different context” (Martinez, 2014). Switzerland (in global finance), Saudi Arabia (in oil) and Bermuda (presently billed as the captive or catastrophe
insurance and re-insurance capital of the world) are examples of such influences which these small states may capitalize on in their individual approaches, diplomatically and commercially, to establish ‘niche diplomacy’ and ‘nation branding’ to good effect (more on these topics later in this paper). From a ‘militarist’s’ point of view, these countries are really quite “weak”.

Of course, this perception of the behaviour of small states generally, casts them into the light of ‘price-takers’ as opposed to ‘price-makers’. To a very large degree that perception is accurate; until of course one or more of those small states obtain military (Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Grenada, Israel etc.) and /or economic (Switzerland, Luxemburg, etc.) advantage, ‘parity’, or they ‘group together’ and form alliances, e.g. AOSIS, CARICOM, ASEAN, the E.U., etc.). Some relatively small states tend to involve themselves far more in international or global matters well outside of their domestic interests (e.g. Cuba, Israel, Iran etc.) which, to some unfortunate extent, are often neglected or deferred for far too long to the detriment of their respective populations.

1.3 Fundamental challenges of small states:

Equally as important as defining a small state, is knowing the fundamental (some moveable, others seemingly not) challenges or ‘barriers to progress’ facing small states. I enumerate a few below with an admitted reliance primarily on challenges facing S.I.D.S; in a United Nations document entitled, “Small Island Developing States”. The document lists the following challenges:

“1. Narrow resource base and accordingly no, or little, economies of scale, etc.;
2. External and remote markets;
3. High costs for energy, infrastructure, transportation, communication and servicing, long distances from export markets and import resources;
4. Low and irregular international traffic volumes;
5. Little, if any, resilience to natural disasters;
6. Growing populations;
7. High volatility of economic growth, limited opportunities for the private sector and a proportionately large reliance of their economies on their public sector;
8. Highly disadvantaged in their development process and require special support from the international community.”

Affected small states must at some point, turn their attention to discussing the need for a better methodology, diplomatically and otherwise, of addressing the articulated challenges of small states. For example, questions like, “how do I forge or amass a set of ‘tools’, cache of resources, body of knowledge and expertise ‘tailor-made’ to firstly mitigate, and subsequently overcome, the afflictions small states suffer”? “How do I fashion a set of ‘magic or silver bullets’ to move these small states back from the brink of disaster, barely eking out a daily living; to a position of stabilized and measured growth”? “What are the primary drivers in this direction”? “Are they economic, security, political, etc. in nature and/or a deft or guileful combination of all three (or more) approaches”? “How do I devise the most sustainable and coherent diplomatic approaches to addressing the fundamental challenges small states perennially face in an uncertain world of hegemonic giants who dominate almost every sphere of these states existence”? To assist me in this quest, I will examine in some detail later, and primarily from a diplomatic perspective, some examples of “successful”, or ‘strong’, ‘not as strong’, ‘weak’ and potentially ‘failing’ small states (SIDS included).
Chapter 2

2. “In search of the most sustainable and coherent diplomatic approaches for small states.”

2.1 Diplomatic Methodology:

This opening boldly claims, or implies, that the current “diplomacy” or diplomatic approaches, in an effort to address the challenges facing small states, are not sustainable nor sufficiently coherent. Indeed, for many states these approaches are seemingly haphazard, or wanting, or simply absent altogether in almost every aspect. Other small states, however, appear to fare better, domestically and globally. When human lives are at stake, this uncertainty in statecraft is plainly unacceptable. There must be a better way, particularly in these heady days of burgeoning globalization, to more successfully, consistently, and uniformly, address small state “afflictions”. Small states must be resourceful, resilient, must appreciate the inevitable ‘evolutionary changes’ of the world and adapt accordingly, in order to at best, survive or continue to thrive. Compiling, and deftly deploying, the ‘optimal assemblage’ of ‘diplomatic tools’ will, in my view, begin to sustain, and even improve, small states positions in a world very much dominated by stronger and larger, even at times economically hostile and generally hegemonic, powers.

Alan K. Henrikson put the inequitable juxtaposition between small and larger states in clear terms, couched, in my view, in a “power and law” scenario. He states, amongst other insights, that:

“For the big states of the world, the surest, if not perhaps the ideal, means of self-preservation is the use of power.”

Henrikson went on to opine that:

“…small states…can hardly rely on power at all, their own or that of others, because they do not have enough of it to contribute to the game……. they can, sometimes,
hold positional advantages. But they have limited range, and can rarely enter into large, complicated, and strategic international power plays.” (Emphasis added).

Moreover, in my view, Henrikson unequivocally set the ‘benchmark’ for small states to strike out for, when he articulated that:

“The greatest chance of safety and survival for small states lies, I submit, in law, institutions, and especially, in diplomacy.” (Emphasis added).

I would add to these observations one caveat and this is, “‘small states must choose in appropriate and relevant measure(s), the law, the institutions and the diplomatic methodology etc. to achieve their ends’. They must choose, and adapt ‘these formulae’ in precise proportions to suit and balance their own unique set of circumstances domestically, regionally and internationally. These states must not ‘cut back’ too far, nor over-indulge, on the issue of the correct and balanced set of ‘diplomatic tools’ or methodologies that they must compile to prepare them to successfully confront their collective and individual challenges. ‘Pareto-optimality’ in the choice and deployment of these diplomatic methodologies, must therefore be the ‘order of the day,’ post haste, perennially.

Let’s face it. If a given state, large or small, is unable, or fails, to diplomatically persuade others to see things their way, then frankly they fail, or fall far short of their stated goals. In the case of small states with ‘little or no physical power, or which lack sufficient bargaining power’; these states would simply have not achieved Insanally’s maxim, put crudely, of “letting others have the small state’s way.”

Henrikson again provided some insightful and supportive remarks in this regard. In speaking about ‘diplomacy’ being the first, rather than the last, as some critics maintain, resort or refuge of the state; Henrikson took the view that:

“Particularly for small states, effective engagement in the international diplomatic system is simply crucial. Active participation in the diplomatic
Henrikson’s insights, coupled with an experienced and well trained, very active, diplomatic corp and staff, a supportive ‘capital’, an informed, socially cohesive domestic public or civil society (in respect of appreciating the nature and magnitude of the ‘challenges’ facing the small state); will go an exceedingly long distance in successfully confronting such challenges, and indeed, even turning them back.

Let me for a brief moment explore what I consider to be the best diplomatic approach(s) towards that end. My view is that a robust and sustained ‘economic diplomacy’ initiative, in concert with a minimum domestic ‘crime tolerance threshold’, a corruption-free, efficient, fair internal governance program; is ‘key’ to unlocking a country from the ‘shackles’ that confine or bind them to mediocrity, or worse, near obscurity.

In my view, it is even more important today to search for the ‘holy grail’ of the ‘diplomatic toolset’ that will serve as the ‘standard-bearer’ or beacon for those small states that continue to ‘wander, and sometimes even flounder,’ in their efforts to extricate themselves from a ‘plethora’ of national and global challenges. With the passing of the ‘Cold War’, rampant globalization, and the acquisition by more countries of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; larger nations too, have followed the ‘lead’ of small states and are consequently exhibiting a preference for ‘economic negotiations’ in lieu of ‘military talks’ about peace or war. Small states have already made their mark in this regard. Henrikson refers to this ‘new’ turn of events as the “trade-diplomacy agenda”. I, prefer, the self-coined “economic and ‘niche’ diplomacy approach or agenda”, which, in my view, is broader and deeper in scope, particularly for small states.

2.2 Economic and ‘niche’ Diplomacy:

I am keenly aware, that the 21st Century, particularly since World War II and, more particularly, with the demise of the ‘Cold War’; that a ‘new economy’ or trend has been ushered in. With this ‘entry’, has also come ‘new opportunities’ and, of course, ‘new
challenges'. However, on balance, it appears in these relatively early days that the ‘balance’ decidedly ‘tips’ in favour of ‘small states’ when compared with their larger, even in some instances, more "resource-rich" counterparts. Much of this advantage, I shall argue, is due to ‘the small factor’, in that small states, when well-organised, tend to be more ‘nimble and dexterous’ on their feet. Further, small states tend to cohere more quickly, be less ‘bureaucracy bound’, and colloquially, are better able to make swift decisions and ‘spin on a dime’.

Of course, as expected, these ‘new winds of change and optimisms’, have both their benefits and their costs: The reader will appreciate this fact more sharply when I address our topic later in the context of the effects and impact of globalization on small states in general. For the moment, I will focus on economic diplomacy in general, and the fact or possibility of, ‘niche diplomacy’ in particular; in examining and explaining small states’ efforts to ‘extricate’ themselves from their present conditions. All of these efforts is in preparation for a ‘launch’ to better ‘climes’ in the future.

2.2.1 Economic Diplomacy:

Many small states fall into the following category of ‘economic comparators’ or characteristics (and of course, a significant number of small states do not as I shall attempt to illustrate later in this paper). These “characteristics” or comparators were amongst those outlined by Dr. Jacqueline Martinez (Martinez, 2014), but not conclusively so, as follows:

“Economic characteristics

- Limited domestic opportunities leading to openness and susceptibility to adverse developments elsewhere:
- a narrow resource base leading to specialization in a few products with associated export concentration and dependence on a few markets;
- shortage of certain skills and high per capita costs in providing government services;
• greater **vulnerability** to natural disasters; and
• greater reliance on overseas aid and various **preferential agreements**”

I would personally add the following:

• Geographically and/or geopolitically or geo-strategically remote from larger state economies and markets;
• an almost total reliance on seasonal tourism revenue;
• failure to diversify the economy and develop a few ‘niche’ export products;
• Colonial-structured state economies with revenues based on regressive tax structures, custom tariffs, levies and duties.
• failure to attract sufficient foreign inward and outward investment.

Against those somber statistics, it is imperative that the ‘impacted’ small states, amongst other matters, focus their ‘national’ minds on designing a ‘corrective’ economic diplomatic offensive.  Ambassador Victor Camilleri (DiploFoundation-Diplomacy of Small States, Lecture 1, 2016) aptly put the issue this way:

“The promotion of a country’s **economic interests** abroad is a major responsibility that the diplomat undertakes in conjunction with a number of other parties.  These other parties include… representatives from sectoral entities, such as various ministries (trade, industry, agriculture, development cooperation, or tourism) and other bodies (chambers of commerce, federations of industry, or trade unions).” (Emphasis added).

In this regard Ambassador Camilleri has raised a number of telling points, writ both large and small.  In summary, he highlights (writ large) that ‘**diplomacy’s greatest contribution**’ in the context of a collective or collaborative effort, is to provide for the best possible, and amicable, domestic and international environment; in order to pursue a given small states’ economic interests in these fora.  On a personal level (writ less large) the good ambassador appears to place a great deal of the responsibility for ‘driving’ this promotion of the country’s interests forward; upon an experienced, knowledgeable, and well trained diplomat.
Camilleri (2016) seemingly advances this perspective primarily on the premise that any state’s efforts must result in:

“…positioning the country so that it can best profit through participation in relevant multilateral or regional negotiations or processes, as well as through the creation and maintenance of the necessary legal and institutional infrastructures for the unfolding of bilateral relations.”

(Emphasis added).

What stands out in these observations is the idea that ‘all hands must be on deck pulling in one direction – upward and forward, simultaneously’. What is also taken as a given, is that ‘all components’ responsible for this progress must be working at ‘optimal’ levels of input and output i.e. at all human and non-human or material capacity. To accomplish the ‘benchmarks’ needed to move the small state forward and ‘upward’, everyone involved must ideally be well-trained, experienced and knowledgeable in a ‘variety of subjects, roles and disciplines’. This must be so in order to accomplish a myriad of highly technical and very important, essential tasks. ‘Tight’ budgets allocated to such small state ‘missions’ necessitate that ‘more from less’ be expected, and demanded.

The major problem that stands out here, however, is that with a scarce budget, how does a given small state amass the financial capital to build “a well-trained, knowledgeable and experienced, diplomatic corps who can adequately do ‘more for less’?” This corps has to build and maintain a ‘presence’ in important ‘trading and investment centres’, as well as be a part of the international arena and important ‘organs’ of the U.N., and the U.N. itself. It is probably true to say that in the absence of at least an ‘adequate’ diplomatic corp; the chances of a given small state ‘progressing’, and doing so on a sustainable basis, is all the more ‘at high risk’ of failing in this objective.

Some small states have moved to ameliorate some of the challenges of a lack of capacity, financial and human, by forming honorary consul, etc., and alliances, regionally, sub-regionally, bilaterally, multilaterally and globally.
However, as with much in this world, procuring appropriate honorary consul, and joining ‘alliances,’ is not without its own set of ‘risks and challenges’ even when these ‘allies’ are ‘friends’ or diasporic countrymen. In the case of honorary consuls, who may be ‘non-nationals’, ethnically, culturally or linguistically different, their ‘assistance’ may be quite limited. These consuls simply may not ‘resonate’ or identify enough with the country that procures their services, and/or, for one reason or the other, ‘capital’ cannot entrust them with ‘highly sensitive state secrets’ on key issues. Alliances, as this paper will later reveal, are at times transitory, issue-specific (i.e. for security, politics, economics, etc.) or just simply ‘risky’. Accordingly, this writer takes the view that, broadly speaking, these two factors of a given small state having to engage the services of honorary consuls, and having to form ‘strategic and economic (and therefore political, even militaristic)’ alliances; has the residual, but very real potential or consequence, of diluting the strength of that given small state’s “negotiating capacity” (Camilleri, 2016).

I now turn my attention to the subject of ‘niche’ diplomacy in small states’ quest to ‘compete,’ and distinguish themselves, at the very highest levels, and, of course, to attract foreign inward investment capital and tourism dollars into their economy and society. Small states, in this regard, seek to ‘stand out’ from the crowd, i.e., ‘head and shoulders over everyone else’, in not only ‘show-casing’ their natural and man-made attributes, but also in establishing an ‘identity’ (as opposed to an ‘image’, which may be relatively fleeting) that will stay forever. Bermuda, for example, and unfortunately, despite its very best efforts to the contrary; ‘identifies’ with the negative moniker of “The Bermuda Triangle”, or the “Devil Isles”, as opposed to the more flattering terminology it seeks as, “The Insurance and Reinsurance Capital of the World”. ‘Bad news’ truly sells, and for all the wrong reasons, swiftly travels far and wide.

2.2.2 ‘Niche’ Diplomacy:
Arguably, “the prosperity of small states is a direct consequence of globalization”, (Kay, 2008) a topic I will spend some considerable time with later in this paper where I hope to demonstrate that Kay’s sentiments are not universally shared.
However, it is also arguable that such ‘successful’ small states owe their “prosperity” more to an efficient and well connected ‘domestic-oriented,’ socio-economic administration in ‘sync’ with an equally as efficient and well-connected “diplomatic networks” machine; than to solely the alleged ‘vagaries of globalization’. In fact, very often the manner in which a given small state has to ‘sharpen and hone’ its diplomatic machinery, is a direct result of the ‘vagaries of globalization’.

This conclusion is best exemplified in how a given small state sets about designing, developing and disseminating its “uniqueness” through a well-coordinated and assertive ‘niche diplomacy’ policy and practice, home and abroad, and in the face of globalization and economic convergence.

‘Niche’ diplomacy is a specialized stratagem to ‘set one’s country’ apart from other similar countries in order to gain a ‘competitive advantage’ by attracting more people and/or business to one’s country, and of course, away from one’s competitors for those very same products and/or ‘unique’ experiences. This, continues even within alliances, e.g. in the Caribbean Islands, one island distinguishes itself from a neighbouring island, simply on the basis of geography or twin or multiple cultures (one island may have a mountain, another a famous lake, or one’s inhabitants may speak French in one part of an Island and speak Dutch or Spanish etc. in another part).

Accordingly, it is the obligation of the government administration of each small state to search for and locate, its natural or man-made (could be gambling, late night clubbing, etc.) ‘assets’, as long as it attracts the attention, and has the support of both locals and non-locals alike.

Various countries have developed and deployed ‘niche diplomacy’ to good effect. Counted amongst these are Malta, Switzerland and Libya for example. Kishan Rana (Rana, 2016) states that:

"Malta found its niche in the Law of the Sea…Norway in its role as a mediator of complex conflicts…Switzerland…. offers itself to Western and other countries to run their…”interests sections” when countries break bilateral ties."
However, Cuba, Northern Korea, Grenada at one point, Zimbabwe and Libya, as a direct result of the ‘uniqueness’ of their political and economic systems, or ideology, also attracted ‘negative’ attention, mainly from western countries which often held hostile and diametrically opposed or opposite viewpoints to these named relatively small states. This ‘negative’ attention, of course, added tremendously to the list of ‘risks’ these countries faced (e.g. economic sanctions, trade embargoes and the like) otherwise. Under these circumstances, the “risk-gain calculation” Rana (Rana, 2016) speaks of, increases exponentially. Other small states that do not face such ‘challenges,’ nevertheless have to ‘weigh-up’ the ‘risk of progressing,’ against the ‘risk of remaining where they are’. Anything short of a visionary, feasible and robust assessment could be the difference between ‘success’ and ‘failure’. In practical terms, any small state planning (after discovering a ‘niche’) to ‘launch out’ from where it is ‘economically’ by exploiting its ‘niche’ (or niches), must first calculate whether such launch retards, does nothing to, or progresses, its overall present position and for how long. Such countries must have in place a ‘recovery’ plan in the event there is a ‘failure to launch,’ or there was a successful ‘launch’ that subsequently ‘heads back towards earth’. Under such circumstances, one can easily envisage the physical and psychological ‘impact’ of such a disastrous consequence, and its traumatizing ‘aftermath’. In later, and much more economically advantageous times, there may still be a ‘residual feeling’ in the nation that “we should not try another launch, although such a launch could conceivably progress us”.

Viewed from the last perspective, to launch or not to launch a ‘niche diplomacy’ initiative; is a matter of whether such a small state has the financial wherewithal at its disposal, the knowledge base, experience and expertise levels needed, the domestic diasporic and/or foreign support behind this initiative, and of course, the sub-regional, regional and global interests and support in ensuring the initiative’s success. Viewed this way, ‘niche diplomacy’ is a highly specialized undertaking which has far-reaching and deep ramifications for all concerned. Singapore, with its extremely ‘savvy’ ‘niche diplomacy corps’ is a quintessential
example of both a ‘successful’ domestic economy but also a forceful, precise, ‘no-nonsense’
diplomatic style and methodology in furtherance and pursuit of, its policy goals and initiatives
domestically and internationally. That approach, and ostensibly attractive result, in and of
itself, is a draw for many visitors to Singapore’s shores, if only to see for oneself a ‘Sparta’ of
the 21st century.

2.3 Security (defence and the environment) Diplomacy

For the purposes of this paper, I have taken the view that it would serve the issue of ‘security
for small states’ if I took the broader approach of looking at their security through the lens of
military (fundamentally political) security, and environmental or ‘climate-change’ security.
This approach, however, is not to negate, nor disregard, nor in any manner minimize, the
extremely important subject of ‘economic security’. I have, in fact above, addressed this
subject on its own merits, and will throughout this paper, readily and often repair or refer to it.
Economics are as I stated earlier, at the ‘very core’ of why states, both large and small,
survive, succeed or fail. Economic prosperity factors into a given country’s ‘functioning’ in
very much the same manner in which a heart pumps blood through the vital organs of the
human body. Without a ‘successful’ economy, a given country’s ‘core networks’ domestically
and globally, are forever on ‘life-support’ waiting to have ‘the plug pulled’. However, one
might be forgiven for taking a different, or another view of the matter, when looking at North
Korea, Israel, and at one time, Cuba. Those countries notwithstanding, economic prosperity,
or lack thereof, directly impacts how or if, particularly a given small state, can prepare itself
militarily, by securing arms etc. (to protect its economy or borders), or simply having no
armed forces whatsoever (neutrality); again, in order to protect or safeguard its economy and
borders ultimately. The decision either way, I argue, is a function of what the overall policy
goals and objectives are, short and long-term, of that given state, domestically and
internationally. The common denominator, I hold, is the choice, voluntarily or involuntarily,
that a given small state in particular is obliged to make, as to whether or not, and to what
degree, and for how long, it joins another (or other) countries for its defence(s). This ‘reality'
holds true despite the political system, economic prosperity (or not), religious persuasion or
ideology in place, in that small state. It certainly holds true in the cases of Iceland, St. Kitts and Nevis, Mauritius, Fiji and, of course, the earlier named countries of North Korea, Israel and Cuba – a subject that I will expand upon in this paper when I discuss the alliances small states enter into. Again, the close correlation between, and the ‘unwritten’ sub-text involved in these ostensibly ‘economic alliances’ is palpable. There is, in my opinion, a clear connection, overtone, or ‘unspoken’ expectation, that an ‘economic alliance’ translates, and is understood as well to mean, that there is also a ‘military alliance’ in place, explicitly or implicitly.

2.3.1: Military Defence

Given what has been said earlier, it should come as no surprise that ‘international behaviour’, especially of small states, is largely shaped ironically, very much by those nations which could simultaneously (or subsequently), and quite paradoxically, help or harm them. For example, on occasions when a call is made upon a particular small state for ‘military participation’ with the larger, stronger bilateral partner, and this call is not answered satisfactorily or at all; that ‘refusing’ small nation immediately places itself in the very difficult position of subsequently being severely damaged in its economic or trade relations with that stronger ally. In situations such as these, the ‘full measure’ of the diplomatic network and toolset of the smaller state is pressed into service. The ‘success or failure’ of that process is a function of the strength, the ‘mettle’, the quality, the integrity, and the breadth of the diplomacy and ‘reserve compensation,’ that given small state can utilize to assuage the ‘disappointment’ of its larger ‘defender’ or alliance partner. That possible outcome is one of the attendant ‘risks’ that will be canvassed a little closer under the ‘alliance treatment’ in this paper. Suffice it to say, in the crudest of the vernacular, “that there are no ‘free’ lunches, anywhere, anytime”. The real problem here, for small states particularly, is that with limited material, financial, and human resources; there are little, if any, “reserve compensations” for refusing a demand or request for ‘military participation’ in concert with that state’s more powerful ‘friend’. Sometimes it is a ‘risk’, and a ‘cost,’ small states simply cannot avoid, or afford, no matter how ‘astute’ and competent their negotiators are.
It is on occasions such as those just outlined, that Rana’s (Rana, 2014) words could not be truer. He adroitly remarks that:

“…. small states have specific (unique) concerns that shape their diplomacy”.

Rana identifies some generic factors:

- “The need for adroit relationship management…does not hinge on size, but some observers insist that small states have greater need to use diplomacy as a shield, since they lack hard power”. (Emphasis added).

This observation is exactly right. This situation, in the case of S.I.D.S, and in many cases unlike land-based or land-locked small states, is to a greater extent, amplified and exacerbated, as SIDS are even more exposed, and therefore more likely to be vulnerable to being quickly surrounded, and open to immediate invasion, by any hostile nation intent on deploying a stratagem of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ against them (Grenada in the Caribbean seas when invaded by the USA essentially, is a prime example. Cuba’s ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion is yet another).

2.3.2: Environmental Protection:

Far too many small states, island or land-based; are severely challenged by environmental; and for a great number, climate changes in particular. Low-lying SIDS are particularly susceptible to not only the ‘rising-tides’ caused by the ‘green-house effect and global warming’ generally; but also to landslides, flooding and the violent weather patterns, particularly tsunamis and tornadoes etc., that occur with alarming frequency and devastation currently. Whole communities have been ‘wiped out’ as a direct consequence of these phenomena. I am a strong believer in, and an ardent proponent of, the “theories (and reality) of climate changes” and their impacts on the earth’s environment, ‘climate patterns’ and human behavior as a result. It troubles me much, that an economic and technological ‘giant nation’ such as the U.S.A. is; would deign to ‘scoff’ at signing the ‘Kyoto Protocol’, not in my view because of its ‘disbelief’ in the ‘science’ of ‘global warming, etc., but rather more so as a result of not wishing to disturb its ‘economic and trade advantages’ by having to discontinue or reduce its industrial production levels, and thus its massive contribution to the overall
deleterious ‘drivers’ of that ‘green-house effect’. The U.S.A., and other hegemonic powers (the U.K., European nations, China, India, etc.) have chosen ‘economic profits’ over quality or the survival of human lives. This mindset alone, places one more concern, psychologically and diplomatically, on small nation states. They are tasked with finding a route through, around, above or below, this most troubling threat to several of these states very existence. With their severely limited capacity in every area, what do these states have to ‘barter’ or to ‘trade-off’ against? Experience, knowledge, guile and stealth, etc. though laudable, are simply not enough. Because at the end of the day in today’s predominantly capitalistic or materialistic world, if you have nothing more to ‘barter away’, including your dignity or self-worth, then you really in truth and in fact have nothing to advance or protect yourself. A small state in this position or level of desperation, is in reality left to the ‘whims and fancies’ of those who will ultimately, “have their way” in every dimension imaginable. Diplomacy, in all of its known (and yet unknown) forms will be tested to its limits, and beyond; because, small states are usually not in a position ultimately to exert ‘hard power’ nor cajole, cede or conquer, the lands, etc. of larger, stronger nations. Their only recourse, in this writer’s view, is to adopt “the myriad of forms of ‘accommodationist’ and opportunistic diplomacy” if they wish to have a ‘ghost’ of a chance in surviving at all. Such is the reality, of a huge number of small states which find themselves precisely in this position. To be candid, if there was ever a time for creativity, ingenuity, assertiveness and clarity in sustainable diplomatic approaches by small states, and their associations (e.g. AOSIS, Foss, CARICOM, etc.), to ‘at fault’ carbon-dioxide ‘gas producing’ nations; it is now. The best ‘defence’ is often ‘a timely offence’, and small states (and their allies) ought to relentlessly come up with solutions (that perhaps even they themselves cannot fund) to climate change etc., and to forcefully ‘lobby and press’ larger nations and non-governmental agencies etc., to assist them in having new programs implemented. The current programs are depleting our non-renewable and fossil resources etc. This stratagem, of course, is in addition to placing these states’ diplomatic corp and missions on the ‘cutting edge’ of science and technological knowledge. Small states, must be active partners in their own ‘salvation’, because after all,
they have everything to lose; including their very country in many cases. Iceland, a ‘successful’ small state, has an educative approach in this regard, and generally. A paper, ‘Iceland Abroad’ (Navigation), generated by the Permanent Mission of Iceland to the UN, New York entitled, “The Challenges and Opportunities of Small States: Economic Development, Climate Change and New Security Issues”, spoke of Iceland in glowing terms:

“Iceland can in many ways serve as a laboratory for global solutions. A small society can find ways to figure out what kind of expertise is most useful to solve a given problem”. (Emphasis added).

This writer concurs with many of these sentiments. Why ‘reinvent the wheel’ when several challenges are common to other small states? Why spend unnecessary money and resources to research knowledge that perhaps with ‘the click of a mouse’ could be at a given nation’s finger tips? Why not enlist and adopt much of the experience, expertise, knowledge and technological ‘know-how’ of those who have been along certain of these routes before? It seems to me that that time, energy and expense could be better spent in ‘reaching out’ to those who ‘know the ropes’, with the focused view to engaging this outside expertise etc., to ‘leverage’ a given small state out of its predicament. Diplomacy, particularly environmental and economic diplomacy, ought to be ‘honed’ to ‘seek and secure’ funding from and for similarly affected small nations. Monies could be ‘lobbied for’ as well, from these states’ various alliances bilaterally, multilaterally, regionally and globally. This ‘funding’ etc. could be deployed to underwrite whatever programs are needed to remediate or at least assuage the challenges of such states. A focused, public-supported, energetic, well-organised and knowledgeable domestic administration, coupled with an equally focused Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic mission personnel with the same goals in mind, should be well placed to accomplish the stated goals; however formidable in their appearance they may appear to be. The earlier cited, ‘Iceland Abroad’ article put the matter in modern historical perspective in an attempt to demonstrate that small states have lead the “larger world” on many issues, and on many occasions, over an appreciable period of time. That article took the view that:
“History shows that small states can serve as a creative forum for democracy, law and legal order. A small country is well placed to become a fascinating political laboratory, a fertile ground for democratic initiative, a bearer of new proposals, and initiator of new thinking….” (Emphasis added)

Further, this paper takes the position that larger, more powerful nations ought to be able to ‘put egos aside’ and be more receptive to these “small state laboratories and their thinking” largely because such small states are, “no threat to the power structure….”

I substantially agree with ‘Iceland Abroad’s’ conclusion, but respectfully pause to make the following observations by way of a caveat. I do not so much believe that the reluctance, or resistance, of the ‘larger states’ is necessarily grounded in their lack of fear or apprehension of a ‘physical threat’ against them by smaller states. The ‘trepidation’ from these larger states in my view, is more of a ‘reaction’ to new ideas or ways of doing things that might fundamentally ‘threaten’ their hegemony in certain key areas or competitive positions (in commercial and/or trade relations in particular). That is, the ‘perceived threat’ is to their ‘economic dominance’ not their ‘military superiority’; the latter of which is clearly waning for even the last remaining superpower, the U.S.A.

Accordingly, it is primarily for these last stated observations that I part company somewhat from ‘Iceland Abroad’s’ comment that small states ought to be ‘political’ laboratories only. My position would extend that view to include economic and environmental laboratories as well; as these are the crucial areas and bases for the ‘life-altering’ challenges that small states face and must overcome. This focus too, moves the emphasis of ‘security’ from ‘political’, which ultimately translates into ‘military defence’, or aggression; to ‘larger nations’ responsibility and obligations to be ‘good stewards’ of the environment which in fact provides the real basis for all human existence, economic in particular. After all, many of these small states are undeserving and often hapless victims of unfairness and injustice, inflicted both by man and nature, and as such, are the ‘best judges’ of what is fair and what is not. By force of the same argument; and on the other hand, these small states are the most deserving candidates of the requisite ‘aid’ (in all of its forms) needed to permit them to ‘work their way
out of’ their afflictions and challenges Appropriate regional, multilateral diplomacy, and alliances etc., should put these small states in a good position to make such a conclusion a realizable, and realistic, possibility.
Chapter 3:

3. Globalization and its effects on the prospects of small states:

I am eminently aware of the deleterious effects of ‘official corruption’ and the activities of terrorists, narcotic and otherwise, and transnational, international, and even domestic criminality, on the ‘local reserves’ of a given small state. My focus in this paper, however, is mainly in respect of the ‘position’ that other states, large and small, take, or are put, in the face of ‘globalizing influences’; and how states, large, but particularly small, behave diplomatically as a result of this singular, unpredictable and coercive phenomenon.

With respect to how small states react to ‘globalization’, I shall primarily examine and discuss this behavior from an economic and security (defence and environment in particular) point of view, notwithstanding that ‘globalization’ is an ‘all-encompassing’ process which affects particularly small states, in a fundamentally profound and pervasive way (e.g. Puerto Rico and Hawaii today). In my view, and for the purposes of this paper; the ‘hegemonic giants’ that are the major ‘drivers’ of ‘global change’ are individually, and collectively, embodied in large countries like China, U.S.A., the Eurozone, multi-national and transnational companies (‘mnc’s’), and international organizations (‘io’s’).

The above countries and entities are largely responsible for shaping the political and economic ‘pace,’ face, and boundaries of the world, and as President Barroso of the European Commission stated at the time, “in a world of giants, size matters.”

3.1 The Reaction or Behaviour of small states:

In the light of President’s Barroso’s comments, how should small states react? Will all, or most of them react in much the same way? How will small states behave, or react, in response to such ‘global’ influences?

Clearly, the fundamental answer to those questions is that small states will react according to how sturdy and advanced (or developed) their individual economies and ‘internal governance models’ and relevant alliances are, when the ‘full impact or effects’ of ‘globalizing influences’ hit them. Some will, as with the consequences of any ‘storm’, internally absorb this external shock much better than others depending on each individual small nation’s ‘state or stage of
development and preparedness’ at the time of the initial impact. This is why, as is happening in rapid pace within the European Union (‘the EU’) in its reaction to globalization; that there is a tightening or convergence of ‘economies’ and the creation of alliances of various kinds chiefly in the areas of economics, defence, environment (climate change and weather patterns, etc.) and human rights (for the EU in particular, and the world in general; the recent ‘Brexit’ may accelerate these convergences and tightening of economies). Small states, nevertheless, can readily benefit from the apparent overall expansion and opening of ‘world markets’ (and the usually concomitant ‘economies of scale’) and the ‘absence’ of major wars in the international system which tend to transform and constrict economies to producing ‘wasteful swords’ instead of ‘lucrative plough-shares’. Globalization too, has on the other hand, brought the advantage of ‘exporting and importing’ a ‘rules-based, norm-setting regime’ domestically and internationally. Many small states are ardent advocates and champions of ‘rules, norms, human rights, etc. (e.g. Malta, with the Law of the Sea regime extension etc.)

3.2 Threats, Risks and Dangers to small states:

Overall, the attendant dangers I see for small states from the ‘effects of globalization’ are the potential threats of disassembling or breaking down bilateral, regional, sub-regional or even multilateral partnerships or groupings. Members of such groupings may find it more advantageous to them to additionally make separate, more favourable arrangements solely in their ‘national’ interest, directly with major economic nations if that is feasible and prudent. However, in the long run, in my view, the regional and multilateral groupings provide ‘a larger, safer economy and fraternity’ and act as a collective international ‘lobbyist’ for individual members. These relationships should be strengthened in lieu of any bilateral arrangements if possible. Accordingly, ‘economies of scale’ should be occasioned and should also outweigh ‘short-term’ gains made under individual (bilateral) arrangements. An article entitled ‘Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century’, “In Praise of Small States”, echoed the same point of view in these sentiments below:
“Still, for most small countries, the advantages of scale can be adequately achieved through participation in regional groupings (and alliances) – all the while retaining local policy autonomy on other issues…consider the small countries in Europe continuing to line up for Euro membership “, (Emphasis added).

These comments are important. They suggest that in exchange for giving up (or sharing) to some extent, at least some degree of ‘national economic decision-making’ (or autonomy) by joining other regions or alliances; a given small state on the other hand gains access and exposure to wider, even international, political affiliations, trade and economic markets. These are the ‘net calculations’ small states must make before they launch a ‘trajectory of progress’, or indeed, consider “striking out on their own”.

But what of the extremely vulnerable economies of some small states? Small states that quite frankly are finding that their ‘import bills’ are exponentially higher than their ‘export revenues”? In my view, even for whatever ‘one cash’ crop’ or staple product they have; it is far better for such states to widen the market for that ‘one crop’ by joining sub-regional, regional and international groupings (WTO, ASEAN, CARICOM, EU, etc.) then ‘going it alone’. These last named economic or trade associations are the ‘only real refuge’ that makes sense for these economic ‘minnows’ in a raging sea of ‘predatory sharks’. ‘Global Brief’ too, saw matters this way:

“*The global economy is more difficult to navigate – particularly for small countries – but there is no return to protectionism.*”

What small states need to do is ‘to club’ with others similarly placed, so that they are better positioned to ‘stand up to, and work with, globalization’. Yes, there is ‘strength in unity of numbers’.

Mzukisi Qobo noted this trend in a Paper (ISS Paper 145, June 7, 2007) entitled, “The Challenges of regional integration in Africa: In the context of globalization and the prospects for a United States of Africa;” when he wrote:
“It is widely acknowledged that Africa’s integration efforts have thus far failed to bear satisfactory fruit. While other regions have successfully used their integration mechanisms to improve their economic welfare, Africa lags behind with respect to GDP growth, per capita income, capital inflows, and general living standards”. (Emphasis added).

In my view, much of what Qobo has articulated here equally applies to quite a few small states, indeed some regional groupings as well. And the problem may not necessarily lie in the fact of the ‘grouping’ in and of itself. It may be that there is a ‘lack of political will’, or economic wherewithal to make both the ‘non-performing’ individual small state, and by extension, the ‘grouping as a whole’, work to achieve its intended objectives. After all, a ‘grouping’ is only as strong as its weakest link.

It thus readily can be seen that, if the ‘whole’ (the ‘grouping’) is truly a sum of its individual parts, then in order to achieve a ‘balanced and acceptable’ accommodation or integration into the ‘global economy,’ especially with the exigencies of globalization; there cannot be any ‘incomplete,’ weak, or substandard ‘parts’. If there are, then much needed capacity or resources, which may be crucially needed elsewhere, will have to be redirected or commandeered to repair or ‘shore up’ that ‘impaired’ or sub-optimal part or state.

3.3 The Paradox and Complexity of Globalization:

At this point of the paper it should be clear that ‘globalization’ is both a complex and paradoxical ‘work-in-progress’. It is still unfolding, and very much like a ‘giant sea-anemone’ it both favourably beckons and threatens, simultaneously, to envelope its observers and hapless participants as well, within its questionable environs. On the one hand, globalization beneficially offers ‘open international market-places’. On the other hand, the vagaries of ‘supply and demand’ may put smaller, more economically vulnerable economies (particularly undiversified, or ‘single crop’ ones) at competitive disadvantages, largely because these economies have not achieved acceptable levels of economic convergence. This outcome is highly probable particularly in the cases of those small states that have heretofore enjoyed ‘special treatment’, trade preferences, or ‘tariff protections’ of one kind or the other (from
bodies like WHO, the WTO etc.,) and now must, or may have to, relinquish same. Michael Mann (Mann 2013:11) commented on this phenomenon thusly:

“*What is generally called globalization involved the extension of distinct relations of ideological, economic, military, and political power across the world*”. (Emphasis added).

In this writer’s view, that aspect of globalization is the greatest worry, i.e. could quite possibly devolve to the ‘de-localization of the ‘core’ ideas, culture, economy etc. of not only a given state, small or large, but also of various bilateral, sub-regional, regional and even multilateral groupings. This would be the result, if ‘globalization’ continues unchecked at its current feverish and voracious pace. This trend was not lost on Manuel Castells (1996) who remarked that:

“*Productivity and competitiveness are, by and large, a function of knowledge generation and information processing;… the core economic activities are global – that is, they have the capacity to work as a unit in real time, or chosen time, on a planetary scale.*” (Castells 2001:52) (Emphasis added).

Such a ‘specter’ makes it incumbent upon every small state, to re-evaluate its ‘national’ condition, discern what ‘deficiencies’ it may have, and choose the most advantageous groupings, alliances, or alignments (or not) it ought to join, with a view to ‘stave off’ ‘shelter from,’ or strategically engage in, this all-encompassing ‘life-altering’ tsunami of globalization. New diplomatic methods or approaches are required now more than ever; particularly for small states that are struggling to survive or even find their footing in this ‘new’ milieu of swirling uncertainty.

3.4: Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Diplomacy

3.4.1 Bilateral Diplomacy or Relations

It’s probably accurate to say that states, particularly small states, enter into relationships, bilateral or multilateral, primarily for reasons of ‘security or protection’ in some form or the other. These ‘forms’ of security and protection usually have as their driver’s, military defence, socio-economic sustainability, overall advancement
domestically, and environmental protection against natural elements such as climate change, sea-level rises, flooding, etc. and, of course, the effects of ‘global warming’ generally.

Small states, for the most part, select larger, stronger countries for their economic and definitely their military defence or sustenance. Sometimes these small states have these “arrangements” even for ‘civil defence’ in case of domestic upheaval. Bilateral relations or arrangements between small states and more powerful states are usually the preferred route chosen to effect ‘military security’. The Fijian Islands and Australia arrangement is a case in point. However, as I shall attempt to point out, these bilateral relationships are not without their obligations and ‘risks’ to small countries generally, and their foreign policies in particular. Bilateral relationships of a ‘defence’ nature are rarely consummated without some feature of ‘reciprocity’ or mutual compensation attached. Some observers refer to such situations as ‘entrapments’ in that, often small states can ill-afford to reciprocate sufficiently in having to contribute ‘human, material or financial’ capacity to what is essentially a ‘military’ pact. A pact in which there may be ‘unequal bargaining clout’ or power. What if, one might ask, the given small state is aggressed by a stronger more powerful neighbor or enemy, and the ‘pact partner’ chooses not to come to that small states defence, aid or protection for reasons best known to it? Could, in all seriousness, that small state realistically expect or exact recompense or compensation from that ‘reneging’ stronger ‘pact partner’? I think not. Certainly it could not contemplate, without an adverse reaction from the stronger state, any revenge or retaliation to any appreciable degree, if at all. Which is why small states have a tendency to join a regional or even a multilateral grouping such as CARICOM, the E.U., etc. whose member states through the ‘composite’ grouping are members of a larger defence organization (e.g. N.A.T.O., and before its demise, the Warsaw Pact, etc.) However, joining such larger groupings, as opposed to signing ‘risky’ or tenuous bilateral pacts with larger nations, tends to serve a dual purpose. A small state gets
the ‘wider market’ for its trading products and investments economically, as well as the military protection afforded by reason of ‘membership’ in the regional grouping, which itself may be attached or aligned with an even larger grouping such as the U.N., W.T.O. or N.A.T.O., etc. Regional, and arguably, multilateral membership for small states, should at least in the long term prove more ‘cost effective’ and less ‘risky’ than attempting to ‘go it alone’ by making bilateral arrangements with another state for that small state’s economic sustenance and military defence. In any event, and as discussed earlier, it is this writer’s point of view that, for the most part, the ‘world states’ at large are moving, in diplomatic terms, away from bilateral diplomacy to regional and multiparty or multilateral diplomacy. This trend is afoot primarily as a result of the exigencies and pressures of ‘globalization,’ and because of states’, both large and small, attempts to achieve economic convergence and future sustainable prosperity almost at any cost. Bilateralism, generally speaking, and in the economic and military defence arenas, is in my view waning, outmoded, stultifying and ‘highly’ risky. Under such arrangements, ‘pact partners’, under certain circumstances; could become unintended ‘frenemies’ if not, outright enemies. No small state should wish to be put in such a ‘dangerous’ and uncertain position.

Despite the fact that I have stated that ‘bilateralism’ in military defence or protections is ‘outmoded’ and ‘risky’; that may however be the only ‘security architecture’ a given small state has at its disposal or option (again, the Fiji, Solomon Islands, Nauru relationships in this regard with Australia are apropos). I do strongly believe, however, that in the event of ‘bilateral arrangements’ in respect of ‘military defence or protection’; that that small state attempt to nevertheless incorporate, to the extent that that is feasible or possible; such ‘arrangements’ in a ‘wider’ regional, or even international, security ‘infrastructure’ or architecture. Singapore apparently has constructed this genre of ‘security approach’ in its “defence arrangements”. A Singaporean government document entitled, “Defence Policy and Diplomacy”, in part, explains the issue as follows:
“Singapore’s approach to defence is shaped by both the unique circumstances surrounding our country’s independence and the enduring geostrategic limitations we face. With an open and globalized economy, our survival and development are greatly dependent on a peaceful and stable regional environment…” (Emphasis added).

This document went on to outline the twin pillars upon which Singapore’s defence policy is premised. These pillars are “deterrence and diplomacy”.

The “deterrence” pillar is provided by a “strong and capable SAF” (Singapore Air Force). The “diplomacy” pillar was explained, partially, in these words:

“The second pillar of defence diplomacy is built by establishing strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world. We also play our part as a responsible member of the international community in helping to uphold and shape a regional and international system in which all countries abide by international rules and norms” (Emphasis added).

In this regard, Singapore in our view ostensibly exemplifies the quintessential ‘prototype’ of a ‘successful’ small state.

On the issue of bilateral relations or diplomacy, Singapore’s government document, in part, speaks in the following terms:

“We have sought to build a strong network of bilateral relationships within our region and around the world”, (Emphasis added).

Singapore has clearly ‘integrated and coordinated’ its bilateral relations or arrangements into wider regional and international (global) arenas by adroitly adapting its various diplomatic methods and networks to achieve, in the most ‘friendliest’ manner it can muster; maximum security ‘worldwide’ for itself. A diplomatic feat of Olympic proportions, I say.
3.4.2 Regional Diplomacy:

Regional diplomacy, particularly in modern form, has increased as a reaction to the spread of globalization. At base, it is founded, nonetheless, on time-honoured principles of “peace and security” as Ambassador Victor Camilleri noted. The good Ambassador further, when differentiating between regional and multilateral diplomacy, states that “regional diplomacy takes on a dual direction.” I concur now, as I did in my response to this issue in DiploFoundation’s “Diplomacy of Small States Lecture 7,” on June 23, 2015 at 12:27 p.m. In using the example of the tiny Caribbean SID St. Kitts & Nevis (a population of approximately 53,000 people), I remarked that:

“Many of the Caribbean SIDS find themselves in this position, for example, St. Kitt’s and Nevis (SKN), a country with approximately 53,000 people and yearly challenged environmentally and economically, has been forced to enter into a host of alliances of one sort or the other to advance its national agenda apart from joining the regional grouping of CARICOM countries, and the sub-regional groupings comprised by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean states (OECS) and association of Caribbean states, the Caribbean Single Market and Economy etc., SKN has at the global level secured diplomatic and trade relations with geographically far-flung countries such as the EU, Indonesia and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) to name a few”. (Emphasis added).

This trend, and pattern to ‘meld’ regional and global ‘outreach,’ albeit with the ultimate goals and objectives of securing economic and military security amongst and for the ‘grouping’; as a whole, was seen earlier in the case of Singapore. Moreover, and in my view, if the proper or ‘pareto-optimal mix and balance’ of positive bilateral relations, regional and ‘global’ diplomatic initiatives, or diplomacy generally, is assembled particularly for small states; then this just might provide the ‘measuring rod’ or ‘benchmark’ against or towards which, other small states that are struggling to survive, might strive to attain, improve or ‘evaluate’ their current positions.
This observation, however, is not to in any way suggest that this ‘measuring rod,’ this ‘benchmark’ of admirable characteristics, provides a “one size fits all”; situation. It is my view that these ‘evaluations’ must be applied only where they enhance, rather than retard or diminish, the overall goals, objectives or aspirations of a given small state. However, “regional arrangements” in and off themselves are not open-ended. They are, as Ambassador Camilleri cautioned in the last stated reference, circumscribed by:

“The UN Charter (1945), which has a whole chapter (Chapter VIII) dealing with 
regional arrangements…The UN Charter clearly subordinates regional arrangements to the global process” (Emphasis added).

Rana (Rana, 2016) speaks less cautiously, and is of the view that, ‘regionalism’ is:

“…an easy and productive conduit for active diplomacy, within the comfort zone of one’s regional group. It is a low-risk option, and…offers a number of tangible advantages, including political security” (Emphasis added).

To this end, the sixteen Caribbean member states forming CARICOM have been able to through this vehicle, consolidate and advance their individual and “collective interests” by way of a single ‘joint negotiator’ at the WTO and the E.U. etc.

This ‘artifice,’ of course, serves a dual purpose. On the one hand it permits the Caribbean countries, particularly for trade and commerce reasons, to speak with ‘one voice’ and thus with more force than if they attempted unilaterally as individual states, or bilaterally, to negotiate a favourable position. On the other hand, and favourably, the ‘collective’ as a body prevents countries that CARICOM members are dealing with individually, from ‘playing one-member state off against the other’ in an attempt to gain overall ‘competitive advantage.’

My further view on regional groupings such as CARICOM, the E.U., ASEAN, etc., is that although the member states are represented ‘through a collective’ internationally; proactive members within this collective may nevertheless still manage to garner ‘individual
recognition.’ For example, Cuba in the OAS, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago in CARICOM, Iceland in AOSIS, etc., all make their individual marks.

There are those who will argue, of course, that ‘multilateralism’ is simply a natural progression as states mature and become more confident in and about their own economic, political and security achievements regionally and at home. The thinking seems to be, “we, as small, safe, and economically strong states, are now ready for the open world. We are now ready to find our ‘niche’ and take our rightful places in global affairs.”

On the other hand, there are also those who believe that multilateralism encompasses even more. I look at some of those views on multilateralism in the immediate, next following, subject heading.

3.4.3 Multilateral Diplomacy:

Ambassador Camilleri (Camilleri, DiploFoundation– lecture 6) views this process, or progress, from regionalism to multilateralism in special, dual and perceptive perspectives. He shares that:

“Historically, two separate processes have been at the root of multilateral diplomacy. One is the regional process, with geographical proximity as the primary motivating factor for the origin and development of multi-state consultation and cooperation. The other is a broader multilateral process resulting from a perception of the commonality of interests and concerns, and the value of collective action in achieving common objectives” (Emphasis added).

However, all states, large and small have different views on the ‘multilateral process.’ These different, even differing viewpoints in my opinion, set the stage for inherent tensions and potential conflicts within the multilateral process. Ambassador Camilleri’s position is that the “multilateral process provides a forum permitting states to air their views and lay out their positions on common issues, interests and concerns.” Camilleri ascribes three sets of tasks to the multilateral process:
Camilleri’s task number one (1) comes into immediate ‘tension’ and is exacerbated in my view, through his observation of how the small and large states view the ‘multilateral process.’ He observes that:

“For large and powerful states, one important feature of multilateral diplomacy is its subordinate relationship to bilateral diplomacy.” (Emphasis added).

Camilleri went on to conclude essentially that large countries appreciate the “multilateral approach as useful and necessary” when they wish to discuss and resolve issues that could not be resolved without the presence of “more than two parties.”

Smaller states, it seems, have a fundamentally different, and differing, view of the ‘multilateral diplomacy and process approach.’ Camilleri states that:

“For smaller states, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is more organic; they see the multilateral approach as a broader and more encompassing aspect of their diplomacy (Petrovsky, 1998). The different approaches reflect the different importance placed on the three tasks of multilateral diplomacy, and a different perception of the nature and purpose of each of these tasks” (Emphasis added).

Cast in this light, it is difficult to see, when there is abject intransigence and obstinacy between the ‘larger and smaller states,’ how a ‘resolution’ could ultimately go in favour of the small states. After all, when juxtaposed against the ‘juggernauts’ or more powerful states, and ‘the chips are down;” outside of clever diplomacy, what is the real leverage or options at
the disposal of smaller, weaker states? Is there really or realistically, room for Insanally’s (Insanally, 2013) art of, paraphrased, “letting others have your way”? Ultimately, it is my view that the Melian phrase, crudely translated, will hold sway. The larger nations will “have their way, with threats and conditions attached,” and the smaller nations will accommodate themselves with what is left, and to the best of their abilities share the “scraps,” or learn the lessons taught, sometimes ruthlessly so. Norms, rules, international law aside; at the end of the day, ‘might is right,’ rightly or wrongly. This was precisely the position in my view, when the USA invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983, and Cuba twenty-two years earlier at the ‘Bay of Pigs’ on April 17, 1961. In the case of Grenada, ‘regionalism’, in my view, was in fact subordinated, even wholly co-opted overtly and covertly, by the U.S.A. and other super-powers, when they unilaterally, and multilaterally, persuaded Grenada’s Caribbean neighbours, chiefly Barbados, to assist in this purported ‘invasion’. In summary, and in the cases cited, both multilateralism and regionalism, were ruthlessly subordinated to the ultimate ‘universalism’ of the powerful U.S.A. There was a ‘clear and fundamental breach,’ as I see it, of the (Rana’s) “organic nature of small states’ view” of the relationship that exists between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

That conclusion notwithstanding, I think it only fair that I put His Excellency Rudy Insanally in proper context (Insanally, 2013) as his insights and conclusions on the ‘state of the world’ are educative. He astutely notes, and appreciates, that:

“With the prevalence of change and conflict, the world around us has become a brutish and dangerous place. Reform and revitalization are now the buzz words of the day as we look to our salvation” (Emphasis added).

Insanally attributes the ‘lack of progress’ to make the world around us ‘a better place’ to six reasons, four of which I will cite and adopt as a propos to this paper. Insanally holds that:

“1) The great diversity of views among states...renders agreement on solutions elusive...Consensus if not quickly perceived, promptly disappears,
2) *The reluctance of the big powers to relinquish their dominance in international affairs...they would prefer to see the status quo remain. They will yield only if coerced.*

3) *The great disparity in the negotiating strength of the parties – the developed and developing countries, which invariably results in unbalanced and inequitable outcomes.*

4) *The ideological differences between the positions of the two sides on such fundamental questions as the role of Governments versus those of markets, the value of external assistance – which the developing countries consider essential but is deemed wasteful by the donor community etc". (Emphasis added).*

If Insanally is correct, and there is nothing to suggest, or support, that he isn’t; then the ‘way ahead’ for smaller states is paved in difficulty. Again, the examples of Grenada and Cuba poignantly exemplify much of Insanally’s four reasons above.

To be clear, the “great diversity of views" I can reasonably accept. That’s the whole point of ‘nations’ having to assemble multilaterally to attempt to sort matters out. But if the larger, stronger, and intransigent nations, in the face of much needed and long overdue “reform and revitalization,” wish to maintain the status quo, then what do smaller, weaker states do? Do they adopt the ‘stance’ of North Korea, Zimbabwe and Grenada for a while, or do they simply accept the inevitable position of the earlier cited ‘Melian’ result? Do the ‘hardened’ positions of some larger, stronger nations, drive small states to head the route of Cuba etc.? Small states figuratively, or literally, cannot be “islands" unto themselves, adrift in a ‘sea of globalization’ and general turbulence. Sooner or later, for better or for worse, they will, rather than ‘fold-up'; take a position, make an alliance etc., and/or follow a certain course that is thrust upon them. That course may not be palatable to many.

3.5 **Alliances, Alignment, Non-Alignment and Neutrality – benefits and costs**
3.5.1 Alliances

In my view, alliances are only as good as the ‘net gains’ to be derived from them, and the purposes they serve. In a few words, alliances are not without their ‘risks and costs,’ despite the ‘benefits’ they for the most part obviously offer. Again, and colloquially, “there are no free lunches.” A theme Kishan Rana (Rana, 2016) picked up on when he wrote that:

“In the Solomon Islands Taiwan has been involved in supporting local politicians in elections, which led to civil strife in 2005-6; there are allegations of vote-buying among small countries by other states, in keenly contested UN and other international agency elections” (Emphasis added).

If there is any merit in these very serious allegations, then it makes a complete mockery of the ‘fairness’ in the operation of the UN generally, and the subject international agencies or organs in particular. Moreover, the inevitable suspicions, and dire implications for the Solomon Islands, and indeed Taiwan must be troubling. That there may be the presence of undemocratic practices, and even corruption or bribery or fraud, at work in both these countries must give pause, and cause, for alarm. In my view, and if this is the case in fact, both countries, and particularly the small state Solomon Islands; will most assuredly suffer international reputational damage, and ultimately, negative economic, trade and political relations globally. For the Solomon Islands, the donor community in general, and the potentially affected international agencies, may in future look askance at, or even pull back from, this seemingly desperate ‘small state’. It would be a pity for its inhabitants if those consequences were actually realized. Accordingly, alliances must be carefully looked at, prior to, and throughout the duration of, such relationships. Such arrangements may bear “risks” that a small state in particular, may wish to avoid or can ill-afford, particularly in the long run.

I return now to the matter of the ‘costs’ of alliances for small states. Although the ‘actual financial costs or economic costs’ of being in an alliance are hugely important; I have nevertheless directed my focus as well on the equally as important ‘intangible’ costs and
risks of a small state being in an alliance. Of course, there are also costs, tangible and intangible, of not being in an alliance, however, I shall deal with such positions under the subheadings of this chapter when I direct attention to the issues of alignments, non-alignments and neutrality.

Many questions are raised, of course, as to why small states would need to be in alliances, military or ‘economic and trade’ ones in the first place. To be frank, the answer for the latter alliance appears to me to be more readily explainable. Other questions arise too, such as, “how will these states go about joining alliances they believe will benefit them?” The answer to which is usually resolved by asking, “how much will it in net terms cost financially?” The really cogent and very intrusive (of sovereignty of course) question is, “under what precise terms is a given small state joining an alliance”, i.e. what does it have to ‘give up’?

In my view, each and every one of these questions must be carefully thought through before any small state commits to any alliance to, or with, another or other nations, or indeed a regional grouping for that matter. At the end, that small state must factor into its ‘socio-economic and political-arithmetic’, answers to such questions as, “Do we have a net-gain of benefits over costs (tangible and intangible)”? Is the anticipated threat, or risk, worth ‘the cost’? If a ‘partner’ in the alliance faces a ‘military challenge' by an external force, can my state afford, in any manner, to assist, or not assist, that member? What if the ‘aggressor’ (non-member) of one of the members of the alliance, has a favourable ‘economic or trade’ bilateral agreement and/or relations with my small state – how do I address this problem? What, as a small state, do I do if the alliance doesn’t come to my aid in the time of a crisis? What recourse do I have? These questions, in the language associated with such matters, essentially ask, “how do I deal with ‘abandonment or entrapment’ as a small state?” These are sobering questions with equally ‘mind-focusing’ answers demanded. In considering the “anxieties” brought on by having to consider the above questions; Heinz Gaertner, “Small States and Alliances,” queried whether small states’ fears about being drawn into big states’ affairs were “reasonable” or unequivocally well grounded. He shared that:
“The results of empirical research are mixed. On the one hand, data show that the onset of war is unrelated to alliance formation and configuration. On the other hand, the magnitude, duration, and severity of war are substantively connected to alliance configuration, for the reason that war spreads through alliances. Alliances turn small wars into big wars. Are small states dragged into the wars of big powers or are they protected by big powers?” (Emphasis added).

And on the ‘risk’ of small states joining ‘big states’ alliances, Gaertner concluded that:

“The greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment.” (Emphasis added).

3.5.1.1 Friends or ‘Frenemies’

Another question under these circumstances that swiftly comes to mind is, “at what point does, or can, a ‘friend’ become a ‘frenemy’ or even worse, a ‘potential enemy’?” The answer surely must be, “that big state alliance ‘friend’ becomes a ‘frenemy’ or ‘potential enemy’ depending on how far along the alliance’s ‘relationship spectrum’ that alliance partner travels before becoming a direct threat, militarily and/or economically, to that affected small state’s ‘core reasons’ for joining the alliance in the first place”. At this juncture in the ‘alliance relationship,’ the affected small state will conclusively realize both the tangible and intangible ‘total net benefit, cost or risk’ involved, by or in, being a member of that particular ‘alliance’.

Interestingly, Gaertner raises an extremely crucial point as well about the intangible ‘risk’ of possible diplomatic and foreign policy restraints or losses a small state (or ‘minor-power’, as he and others refer to such states as) may face. Gaertner laments that:

“Additionally, alliance ties may reduce ‘minor powers’ diplomatic flexibility to prevent foreign policy crises from escalating to all-out warfare while leaving it uncertain whether allies will honor their pledges of military support in the event of armed conflict or war”. (Emphasis added).
The ‘loss’ or qualification of a small state’s flexibility in charting its foreign policy initiative, and its diplomatic manoeuvrability in pursuing these initiatives, is of course worrisome. The given state at that point has to determine the ‘trade-off’, i.e. do I, for these purposes, desire ‘protection or security’ over unilaterally and un-restrictively pursuing, and securing, the state’s interests internationally?

Gaertner, however, may have provided at least a partial answer to this very conundrum when he made a compelling revelation in my view. Gaertner no longer sees ‘military’ threats as the main problem. He now believes that ‘military threats’ have largely been supplanted by “new threats”. He argues that:

“The threats are no longer primarily military in nature, but are more concerned with international crime, terrorism, the risk of sabotage on essential infrastructure, illegal immigration, environmental damage, shortcomings with respect to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, etc. The new threats call for new concepts and new security policy instruments. These are to be found in those areas generally known as “soft security” or “civic security”.

(Emphasis added).

In short, it may well be, that small states may not have to give up as much of their ‘domestic autonomy’ as they once had to under the “old threat regime” of a profoundly military nature when joining alliances. Particularly, if they are joining with the express purpose of overcoming the challenges posed by the stated “new threats” of international crime, corruption, terrorism, etc. Further, in my view, and as a direct result of this ‘new approach’; small states would not have to jettison as much of their ‘diplomatic or foreign policy flexibility’ as well, as they had to under the ‘former military-based’ alliance commitments. Moreover, this ‘new concept’ approach may decrease any tensions arising between an alliance partner, large state or small, noted in Camilleri’s earlier “task one” of the purposes concerning the need for multilateral diplomacy.

3.5.2 Alignment
My clear intent in this sub-topic is to point out that I subscribe to the scholars and academics view that there is a fundamental difference between a state ‘aligning’ itself to another state, or other states, and entering into bilateral relations or alliances with that other or other states. An ‘alignment’ and an ‘alliance’ are two fundamentally distinct ‘animals’. It is my view, that with the discernible shift away from “formal military alliances such as NATO”, there is a consensus that more flexible and less binding allied arrangements are possible, and may soon become, the favoured ‘tools of statecraft’. For example, I believe that this is happening in the case of small states and their relationship with the EU, if Iceland is a case in point. I support the view that this encouraging turn of events represents a supreme opportunity for small states to seek to engage in these less restrictive arrangements than the present usage of alliances discussed earlier, which carry in my opinion, far too high a ‘risk’ and restriction on their autonomy in very important respects.

In many instances, this ‘evolving’ approach, at a minimum, may render the present adoption by many small states of a policy of non-alignment or neutrality quite superfluous or even obsolete. Alignments may now be a ‘natural fit’ for small states which need the ability to adjust quickly to new changes, new challenges, new concepts, new ways of doing things, and still feel secure economically and defensively.

Krause, Volker and, Sinner, David J., in a paper entitled, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns,” interpreted the definitional distinctions between ‘alignments’ and ‘alliances’ thusly:

“An alignment is usually understood as any general commitment to cooperation or collaboration. By implication, its objectives tend to be broad and vague rather than narrow and explicit. An example of an alignment is any voting bloc within the General Assembly of the United Nations”.

(Emphasis added).

These authors, however, took the view that:
“An alliance is based on a written, mostly voluntary, formal agreement, treaty, or convention among states pledging to coordinate their behaviour and policies in the contingency of military conflict…… Unlike either alignments or coalitions, alliances are concerned primarily with issues limited to military security affairs.” (Emphasis added).

Dr. Thomas S. Wilkins of the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney, in a study entitled, “Alignment, not Alliance: The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation”, held the following distinction between alliances and alignments, he posited that:

“An alliance is merely one, albeit prominent, form of alignment.”

Wilkins, in quoting Menon (2008) further writes that an:

“……alignment is a supple and creative mode of statecraft; alliances, by contrast, can become rigid – and limiting as a result.” (Emphasis added).

Wilkins, in response to these comments noted that:

“We should not be surprised to witness this (i.e. the quote by Menon (2008)), since ‘alignments constantly change with changing patterns of power, interests, and issue priorities’ (Snyder:7) …Not only are new forms of alignment such as the ‘strategic partnership’ model emerging, but the very nature of ‘alliance’ itself is undergoing metamorphosis…” (Emphasis added).

Particularly with regard to the last sentiment, small states ought to scrutinize, and frequently monitor, any existing and/or anticipated ‘alliances’ very closely, and determine whether or not it would be far more advantageous, or efficacious, to enter into an ‘alignment’ arrangement instead, in pursuit of their desired goals and objectives.

3. 5.3 Non-Alignment
The remarks made above in respect of the "shifting paradigm of international security cooperation and alignments and alliances"; apply with equal force and relevance in the context of 'non-alignments,' in my view. Are such 'disengagement' policies or practices as relevant now, as they were when they were first perceived and implemented? Do the same conditions that spawned the birth of the Non-alignment movement, or NAM, still prevail? Are the original purposes of, and for NAM, still cogent or necessary in today's circumstances?

There are conflicting views on the topic, and 'more modern adjustments and accommodations' as well.

Born out of the 'Cold War', NAM was to signal to both of the then superpowers, the USSR and the USA, that its membership did not necessarily 'align themselves with the interests, policies, directions, etc. of either superpower'. NAM's members wanted to 'strike out' in pursuit of their own interests and agenda. However, with the changing nature of N.A.T.O. and the extinction of the Warsaw Pact; the U.S.A. as the only world superpower, and the concomitant world shift to more pressing issues such as globalization, trade, climate changes and national and international security matters etc.; the question arose, "what way forward from here NAM'?

Some, like Shashi Tharoor, in an article entitled, "Viewpoint: Is the Non-aligned Movement relevant today", have noted a decided 'anti-western' tone of NAM against particularly the U.S.A., and speculates that this may well be the result of Iran and Venezuela's memberships. Shashi writes:

"More seriously, this perception (anti-western) is compounded by the increasing visibility within NAM of countries like Iran, the current Chair of the movement, and Venezuela, its designated successor – both nations whose strident hostility to the US, underscores NAM's anti-Western image."

(Emphasis added).

This sentiment, if true, might give pause to some small states joining NAM, a political organization in nature, however, if it's any consolation or consideration at all, one of the
BRIC’s (Brazil, Russia, India and China) number, India, is not only a member of NAM and of the Community of Democracies, but simultaneously has numerous close ties and agreements with the U.S.A. Accordingly, each small state must make its own individual determination as to whether or not it joins the NAM. If it does, or does not, it must do so upon its own merits, its own judgment, and at its own behest. But remember, India is a very large, nuclear or atomic, state. And that fact too, must count for something.

3.5.4 Neutrality

Neutrality, usually refers to military, and therefore political, and quite often, economic neutrality, particularly for small states. Quite candidly, can any country, in the face of the ‘onslaught and impact’ of globalization and economic convergence, survive under a ‘policy of strict neutrality’? Is ‘neutrality’ a luxury any country, large or small, can comfortably afford? Let us take Finland as a brief example. Finland, a small state that borders Russia, in 1948 signed the “Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” which essentially meant that Finland could not enter into any alliances with any other country, and accordingly had to be ‘militarily neutral’, which diplomatically meant, of course, that Finland’s foreign policy options were for all intents and purposes, severely curtailed. Finland was prohibited, for example, from joining the Council of Europe, the EU or the OECD. It goes without question that Finland could not join N.A.T.O., a position that has substantially been reversed today. Time indeed marches on.
Chapter 4:

4. Some ‘strong’, ‘not as strong’, ‘weak’ or potentially ‘failing’, small states

As with the literature on defining a small state itself; the literature in respect of what constitutes or precisely defines, in a specified time period or at a particular instance, a strong, weak or failing state, large or small; is not an exact science nor static either. Accordingly, I have chosen the above sub-title to reflect that ambivalence or equivocation.

Happily, there are some ‘official’, and generally accepted indicia of what constitutes ‘development’ which permits one to meaningfully measure, for our purposes, whether a given small state is relatively strong, not as strong, weak, or failing. My remit at this juncture is to set out those ‘indicia’ (or indices) and later discuss several small states in the context of those indicia, in order to determine, along a ‘notional’ development spectrum, where those ‘subject’ small states may fall.

But first I would like to strike a note of caution here. I do not, as you may have discerned in other parts of this paper, subscribe to the view that geographical size, or even ‘remoteness’ from international markets are necessarily the significant determinants that some academics seem to ‘push’ as deciding whether a subject small state is strong, weak or failing, or indeed has failed. Or even whether that state is ‘successful’ or not. Size or remoteness apart; I subscribe more to the notion that one is better positioned to determine whether or not a state, large or small, is strong, weak or failing, when one looks closely at the state or stage of its ‘internal development’ and ‘external relations’. In this day of ICT (Information, Communications and Technology), swift air, sea and land transport, ‘size’ matters less, and ‘remoteness’ all but disappears. To be truthful, I am far more a proponent of the ‘qualitative indicia’ involved in determining ‘state development’; particularly such matters as ‘political will’, discipline, hard work, vision and the ‘outreach’ that a given state, large or small, is prepared in a sustained and sustainable way; to invest in in the effort to propel or transform that given state along the ‘development spectrum’ of a failing state, to a strong or stronger one.
In short for me, the determinative data are comprised more from human effort than by stacking ‘physical data’. Favourable ‘physical data’, unless marshaled robustly and by experienced hands and minds; will not in and of themselves necessarily transform a small state, from a failing one into a strong or ‘successful’ one.

But, unless I be misunderstood, let me say categorically that I do not in any way discount or decry the value of ‘favourable physical data’ (fertile land, closeness to markets, natural resources, etc.). What I am stressing is that in ordering the ‘qualitative or intangible data’ (discipline, vision, expertise, hard work, corruption-free governance, etc.) and the ‘physical data’; I put far more ‘stock’ in placing the qualitative data at the top, with the physical data in subordination to, or at the service of, the set of qualitative data.

Rosa Brooks, in a paper entitled, “Failed States, or the State as Failure”, provided the following comments in respect of whether a small state was, in her words, “successful”, (my ‘strong’), “weak or failing” or “failed”. She adopted the position that:

> “Successful states control defined territories and populations, conduct diplomatic relations with other states, monopolize legitimate violence within their territories, and succeed in providing adequate social goods to their populations.” (Emphasis added).

Brooks (2005) went on to describe “failed states” in the following terms:

> “Failed states……… lose control over the means of violence, and cannot create peace or stability for their populations or control their territories. They cannot ensure economic growth or any reasonable distribution of social goods. They are often characterized by massive economic inequities, warlordism, and violent competition for resources.” (Emphasis added).

Brooks (2005) described “weak” or “failing” states as being “one notch up the food chain from failed states.” She described such states in the following unflattering terms:
“These states are tremendously varied, and may in some cases combine fragile governance structures with substantial regional influence and wealth...but they all teeter in common on the precipice, at seemingly perpetual risk of collapse in to devastating civil war or simply anarchy.” (Emphasis added)

If even remotely true, this characterization, especially of “weak” or “failing” or “failed” states, is disturbing, and does not bode well for many SIDS, particularly in some parts of the Caribbean and the Asian Pacific areas.

Small states designated as “failures” because they no longer are, or were ever, in a position to provide adequate, if at all, health services, education, civil protection, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order, and a judicial system to administer it; should trouble the ‘moral and national consciences’ of everyone, everywhere. Even more troubling, should be the ‘missing’ necessary requirements for a fundamental democratic governance infrastructure for these afflicted states’ people. What real hope for improvement is there then, if these essentials are missing?

One can only imagine the devastating impact this must have on the present, and future aspirations, of the population of such a state. The examination of a ‘failed’ state, in my view, is equally as important, if not more so, as is the study of a ‘strong’ or ‘successful’ state. That view is all the more reason why it is imperative that the ‘government of the day’, in particularly ‘weak’ or failing states, be fully cognizant of what constitutes a ‘strong or successful’ small state and what causes or constitutes a ‘failed’ small state. Such a ‘study’ in my opinion, would give those in governmental positions a surer ‘guideline’ of where they are, where they need to be, and where they don’t wish their country to further slide.

I will now look at a few small states and determine as to whether or not each state is ‘successful or strong’, weak or not as strong or potentially failing at least by Brooks’s characterizations or definitions.
Before that, however, exists a concern that I could not readily appreciate from Brooks (who mentioned it tangentially), and that is the role that diplomacy, in all of its forms, could play in the overall scheme of things i.e. whether a state could be strong, weak or even failing but nevertheless have a robust diplomacy ‘machine’ at work. Or, in the absence of ‘diplomacy’ altogether, be ‘strong’ regardless. In short, what, if any, effect does ‘diplomacy’, or its absence, have in the internal development of a country, particularly, a small state. I believe such an apparent ‘omission’ is worthy of further comment, which I will attempt to do further in this paper in the context of some of the small states under study.

4.1: Strong small states:

4.1.1 Mauritius

Ali Zafar (Zafar, 2011) summed up Mauritius’s achievements when he noted that:

“In spite of its small economic size, low endowment of natural resources, and remoteness from world markets, Mauritius has transformed itself from a poor sugar economy into one of the most successful economies in Africa…. largely through reliance on trade-led development”.(Emphasis added).

It is clear from these words that the underpinnings of the ‘Mauritius miracle’ were grounded in, and coupled with, a well-organized domestic governmental infrastructure and a strong economic diplomatic initiative with a “pro-trade orientation and a liberal trade regime”. Additionally, there appears to have been a powerful, but fluid, ‘give and take’ relationship and rapport between the public sector and the private sector. It is inconceivable that so much could have been accomplished, in such a relatively short period, by relatively so few, without the assistance and acceptance of a large proportion of civil society domestically and abroad.

In that regard, and I believe it to be true, that Mauritius is not only an ‘economic’ miracle – it is a ‘socio-economic’ and diplomatic one as well. Given the ethnic and cultural diversity of that society, if there wasn’t the level or degree of ‘social’ harmony or cohesion in Mauritius that there apparently is (or was); I truly believe that such a ‘miracle of transformation’ that that society achieved, would not have been realized today. Such a ‘feat’, would in fact, still be in the making. I’m led to this conclusion largely because of the “significant improvements in key human development indicators” referred to earlier. I shall look at some of these
“indicators” shortly, which will include some of Rotberg’s (Rotberg, 2002) “positive political goods” of security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it.

It is my position, that with the achievement of each and every one of those “indicators” or political goods; diplomacy administered at its optimal best is, and was, at the heart and centre, and will inevitably have to be suitably credited for, Mauritius’s success. The ‘key’ to the Mauritius ‘miracle’ was the near total involvement of all of its diverse people in the sustainable development and diversification of its economy. No one, it seems, was excluded, to any appreciable degree at least, in the participation of the ‘upward mobility’ of this country.

In respect of some of the indicators of progress in Mauritius’ economy and society, Joseph Stiglitz had an insightful observation when comparing Mauritius with the U.S.A. In an article in “The Guardian” (Monday, March 7, 2001) entitled, “The Mauritius Miracle, or how to make a big success of a small economy”, Stiglitz shares the following:

“First, the question is not whether we can afford to provide healthcare or education for all, or ensure widespread home ownership. If Mauritius can afford these things, America and Europe – which are several orders of magnitude richer – can too”.

And on the issue of ‘military defence or security, Stiglitz mused that:

“Unlike many small countries, Mauritius has decided that most military spending is a waste”.

Stiglitz took the view, and I agree, that such monies spent on ‘defence’ could in fact be transferred to providing “healthcare and education to those who could not afford them” as Mauritius has done.

And with respect to Stigliz’s position on ‘investing in its people’, he had the impression that:
“Mauritius recognized that without natural resources, its people were its only asset... education for all was crucial to social unity. So was a strong commitment to democratic institutions and co-operation between workers, government, and employees – precisely the opposite of the kind of dissension and division ... in the U.S. today”. (Emphasis added).

Given that Mauritius is a country of some 1.3 million people made up of Mauritian Creoles, Franco-Mauritians, Indo-Mauritians and Afro-Mauritians; what that society has accomplished is truly a remarkable achievement by any measurement.

It is this author’s view, that Mauritius’s success has at its base, the affiliations and affinities that the “mother-lands” of the various ethnic components that make up that society, have with the diaspora’s of those ethnicities in Mauritius. Diplomatic relations have not only been established for trade and other purposes with India and Africa, but also with China, the U.S.A. and other major markets which ‘fuel’ the tourism and investment sectors of the Mauritian economy.

Accordingly, apart from the perennial and characteristic challenges of climate change, imported food and energy inflations, a loss of exchange-rate competitiveness due largely because of globalization; Mauritius is nevertheless reasonably well placed to endure these anomalies for some time yet to come, in my view.

4.1.2: Iceland

Iceland, or its national name of Lydveldid Island, in addition to what we have said earlier in this paper, has a multilingual population of approximately 350,000 people who speak Icelandic, Nordic languages, and German. For the most part, their ethnic mix is relatively homogeneous with 94% of Norse/Celtic descendants, and a foreign population of 6%. There is a relatively high degree of social cohesion, forged and cemented no doubt, as a result of the many ‘national’ challenges with larger countries and political entities Iceland was obliged to overcome in order to defend its interests. Iceland has, in this regard, a huge Economic Fisheries Zone (EFZ). In ‘partnership’ with the U.K. and Ireland, Iceland is locked into a
dispute with Denmark which is laying a claim that the “Faroe Islands’” continental shelf, extends beyond the usual 200 nm (nautical miles).

As if that wasn’t enough, the European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority has taken Iceland to court on a claim that Iceland violated the “European Economic Area” agreement in that it did not honour its “minimum compensation payments” to “iresave depositors”.

These international disputes alone are clear indicators that Iceland’s ‘diplomatic architecture' and machinery is active and in ‘full deployment’. I shall return to this aspect of matters later in this paper.

Notable, as well, is Iceland’s extremely high literacy rate of 99% (2003 est.) and other favourable social statistics or ‘political data’.

For example, Iceland’s ICT facilities are outstanding with ‘nation-wide' coverage. In 2012 there were close to 200,000 main line telephones in use, 346,000 cellular phones, satellite and cable TV producers were numerous, 300,000 plus internet users, and a larger number of internet hosts, well integrated and accessible road systems, ports, harbours and airports.

From an economic point of view, Iceland had (2013 est.) a GDP/PPP statistic of $13.11 billion; a per capita income of $40,700.00, inflation of 3.9%, unemployment of 4.5% and a real growth rate of 1.9%. Iceland's export revenues exceeded its import bill and its major trading partners in a diversified economy [including agriculture, fishing and fish processing, light industry (e.g. geothermal power, tourism, etc.)] were in 2013; the U.K., Germany, Netherlands, U.S., China, Denmark, Norway, France and other entities, all of whom Iceland has diplomatic relations of varying degrees.

Notwithstanding our last comment about diplomatic relations with ‘other entities’, it is notable that Iceland appears to have a ‘tentative’ relationship with the E.U. which involves the issue of ‘fish’ quotas. Accordingly, although Iceland is not a member of the E.U., it nevertheless enjoys extremely close ties with Europe. It is, for example, a member of “the European Free
Trade Association (the EFTA) as noted earlier, and the European Economic Area which allows Iceland access through to the E.U. ‘internal market’ through the back door, so to speak.

Iceland, in selectively deploying its impressive economic, security and defence, and multilateral diplomacy ‘toolset’, has managed to become a member of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the OECD, N.A.T.O., and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Iceland is also a member of the Arctic Council, an extremely important and influential regional grouping, that has huge international and scientific implications in its remit.

Iceland too, has not been slow in forging bilateral relations with strategic partners, even those with whom it is currently arguing.

For example, though there is a ‘whaling’ dispute with Australia; Iceland nevertheless established diplomatic relations with that country on April 17, 1984. Having left the International Whaling Commission in 1992; Iceland rejoined it ten years later (2002) to protect its national interests.

Further, as recent as August 2008, Iceland, Australia and the U.S.A. signed an M.O.U. “on cooperation in geothermal technology”. It is noteworthy at this juncture to report that a pilot project using Icelandic technical expertise in geothermal technology, was launched as well in China in 2006. Further, in 2014-2015, a two-way merchandise trade agreement with Australia, where a small Icelandic diaspora of approximately 1000 persons resides, amounted to approximately $25 million (Aus.). It is clear that Iceland doesn’t allow a dispute in one area, to preclude completing an agreement with the same country in another. As a small state, it is far ‘bigger’ than many larger states in this regard it seems.

This resort to a ‘diplomatic’ resolution or accommodation of disputes, as opposed to adopting an adversarial or aggressive approach, was again seen in Iceland’s “mackerel” war with the EU, Norway, the Faroe Islands, Scotland and Ireland. Iceland adopted, in its ‘resolution’ initiative, the stance of “cooperation and diplomacy” with a view to a ‘win-win’ situation for all
by adopting a ‘science-based’ solution. It seems to be a diplomatic strategy whereby Iceland finds common ground somewhere and then ‘isolates’, or immunizes, or ‘fire-walls’ one dispute from the other. In short, Iceland seems to treat each dispute, often with the same country or entity, as mutually exclusive to each other, not allowing one to get in the way of resolving or accommodating the other, or progressing another.

Iceland’s Minister of Foreign Relations, Sigurour Ingi Johannsson in 2013 understood, and utilized, this strategy extremely well, and was in this regard quoted in an article in the Wall Street Journal Europe (8/9/2013) entitled, “Cooperation and diplomacy, not illegal sanctions, are needed to manage the mackerel stock” as saying that:

“Our position is clear and unchanged: We want to sit down and reach a fair, lasting solution for all of Europe’s coastal states. Given the lack of action from other countries, Iceland’s new government decided to take bold action to restart negotiations with the offer to host multilateral talks. We are pleased that the E.U., Norway and the Faroe Islands have confirmed they will attend these new talks. We hope it shows that negotiations; not nasty rhetoric blaming Iceland and threatening sanctions, are the right approach. Such an extreme measure would represent a failure in diplomacy.”

(Emphasis added).

Iceland’s Minister went on further to note that “such sanctions”, the Wall Street Journal quotes,

“… would be in breach of World Trade Organization and European Economic Area agreements. They would also be harmful to both the British and Icelandic economies, and would further block a diplomatic resolution.”

(Emphasis added).

By these words, it is clear that Iceland is bringing into ‘play’ its full panoply of bilateral and multilateral ‘diplomatic architecture’. In those few words, Iceland ‘threw down the gauntlet’ to the others by boldly, confidently, and invitingly, saying in effect, “There is an easier, more mature, and diplomatic solution to this dispute, and accordingly there is no need to ‘get nasty’ and fight about it in public.”

Iceland, with all of its array of ‘diplomatic levers and political goods’ in place, i.e. a strong economy, an informed and supportive civil society, a well-connected and fluid system of
bilateral, multilateral and international relations; was well placed to take the stance it took, particularly when it invoked rules, norms and international law in its ‘offensive’ and in the simultaneous ‘defence and advancement’, of its national interests. Its actions in this regard are quite informative as to how other small states might just approach similar challenges facing them; all other things being in place of course.

From this perspective, and what is striking in the situation of both Iceland and Mauritius; is the presence of a relatively high level of internal and external cohesion and foreign relations, sound and diversified economic policies, military and environmental security, high levels of expertise, education and training, inward and outward investment, and bold diplomatic initiatives in service of each nation’s foreign policy goals and objectives. The ‘commonality’ and presence of these ‘key factors’ are quite evident, and educative, for those who will take the time to examine.

4.2: The ‘not as strong’ small states:

4.2.1: St. Kitts & Nevis (SKN)

SKN, with a population of approximately 50,000 persons and a population density of 167 persons per square kilometer; is probably by whatever measure, a micro or very small state.

Racially, SKN has approximately 90% black or Afro Kittitians, with the remaining 10% comprising a small group of whites who disproportionately make up the merchant, banking and professional rungs of society, together with a small percentage of mulattoes. However, according to a report from the U.S. Library of Congress:

“Notwithstanding this apparent racial division, socioeconomic stratification on St. Kitts and Nevis was defined mostly by occupational status rather than by color.” (Emphasis added).

As innocuous as these statements on the surface may appear; there is a sounder, profounder and deep underlying revelation or truth lurking here.
If around 10% of a given society, who happen to be white or mulatto, occupy the larger percentage of the merchant, business, banking or professional class, then any “socioeconomic stratification” is likely to be taken, particularly by the majority population, as being so as a result of ‘racial’ preference or privilege. This socioeconomic stratification; as with many post-colonial societies, seems to follow this trend, including in the crucial areas of education and training. Education and training does not, however, automatically translate into a ‘fairer’ economic or commercial balance amongst the races, or classes (sometimes one and the same thing) in their overall impact on the existing “socioeconomic stratification” in a society. More is needed.

The literacy rate in SKN, is and has been for a very long time, approximately 98%, which compares favourably with Iceland and surpasses many, many larger, stronger states.

With respect to education and training, the U.S. Library of Congress had the following to say:

“Since independence in 1983, the education system of St. Kitts and Nevis has emphasized meeting the needs of a developing country..... Broad policy objectives included producing trained and educated citizens capable of managing social and economic progress and unifying the populations of the two islands. At the same time, the government was dedicated to recognizing cultural, ethnic, and religious differences and providing skills and knowledge needed to survive in an international environment known for disruptive domestic, social and economic conditions.” (Emphasis added).

Considering these words alone, it is patently clear, that as early as post-Independence in 1983, SKN understood that in order for it to survive, and possibly thrive, it would need to ‘educate and train its people’ for socioeconomic advancement. With virtually a mono-crop or ‘sugar economy’, a population of only 50,000, and relatively little foreign direct investment, inwardly or outwardly, what were the realistic prospects of ‘advancement’ or transformation of SKN’s socioeconomic position in this regard? How were/are ‘economies of scale’ to be realized under such circumstances?” SKN had, essentially, and apart from a potentially domestic dilemma; to construct and deploy a comprehensive ‘diplomatic policy, outreach and methodology’ to ‘lift it’ out of this precarious impasse in my view.
And to be frank, the government attempted just that, however before I describe just how it attempted to do ‘just that’, I thought a ‘word’ about the economy would be educative, and supportive of my further or subsequent comments.

There is no doubt that the SKN government saw the need to move away from a ‘one crop (sugar) economy’ and to diversity throughout to the extent it could.

Accordingly, the government transformed the economy around 1985 to such an extent that, according to the U.S. Library of Congress, that:

“In About 67 per cent of GDP was accounted for by wholesale and retail trade, communications, and financial and government services. Agriculture and manufacturing each accounted for about 13 per cent of GDP; the other economic sectors accounted for the remaining 7 per cent.” (Emphasis added).

Those statistics notwithstanding, the unemployment rate was extremely high at “20 to 25 per cent” which was attributable to an unwillingness (though I could not reliably discern for what reason) of the “labour force to attempt non-sugar agriculture” and a lack of re-training and training for the necessary transition from a reliance on ‘sugarcane production’ to ‘tourism and hospitality’ services. It was thought by the ‘Library of Congress’ that:

“Unemployment was not expected to decrease in the immediate future, unless the government became more successful at coordinating education and technical training with the demands of the labor market.” (Emphasis added).

Accordingly, it can easily be gleaned from the last two quoted sections above; that more has to be done by the government, to train or re-train more of SKN’s people to enter into and drive the ‘diversification’ of the economy. Given the already stretched human and financial capacity of the country, one wonders, without more assistance externally; how this transition is to, or can, be accomplished any time soon or at all. That query leads me to now look at SKN’s diplomatic efforts in its attempt to extricate itself from this apparent ‘catch 22’ position.
This use of ‘diplomacy’ in fulfilling ‘national developmental agendas’ was not lost on Solange Cross Mike when she observed that:

“Diplomacy is seen as a means by which states try to secure their foreign policy goals and objectives in the wider international system in order to advance and fulfill their national developmental agendas, mainly through negotiation.” (Emphasis added).

Of course, included within the reference to a “wider international system”, is the narrower phenomenon of ‘regional and sub-regional grouping’ or regionalism, which the SKN has fully explored and added to its “diplomatic toolkit”.

The earlier cited author Cross-Mike, was, as is this author, inspired by writer Neville Linton who made some impactful and extremely insightful remarks when, amongst other matters, he said:

“…there are many areas…that cry out for a common approach…there is a need for common work on environmental control, pollution, the uses of the sea.”(Emphasis added).

In Linton’s view, the time had long passed when, particularly SIDS, should attempt to “go it alone”. It was clear that a need for a “united diplomatic front intra and extra the Caribbean”, had arrived, was even past due. Linton in fact widened this call for CARICOM countries to come together in a “common approach” and to diplomatically achieve ‘economies of scale’ etc. in the realms of economics, social, political and security matters.

As noted by this author in a small class paper dated June 24, 2015 in ‘Diplomacy of Small States’, lecture 7, in the Masters of Contemporary Diplomacy program (DiploFoundation, 2015); the SKN government heeded Linton’s call for CARICOM members to direct ‘regional diplomacy’ in a wider context. This author stated that:
“SKN’s ‘regional diplomacy’ is directed towards not only trade, investment and tourism through bilateral, regional and international agreements; but also peace, climate change, safety and security.” (Emphasis added).

This author went on to explain in practical terms that:

“SKN achieves its goals through, apart from CARICOM, regional, sub-regional and international bodies such as the WTO, the UN (and its organs), the OAS, the Commonwealth, the Caricom Single Market Economy (CSME), ECLAC, CELAC, OECS, FTAA, CDEMA, CCRIF, ACS, ECRSS (RSS)…maintaining strong links with the Diaspora…. (and)…Through various bilateral agreements and memberships in the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific), and with Russia, Canada, the Middle East, the European Union and Australia, etc., SKN has been able to ‘cast its diplomatic net’ widely.” (Emphasis added).

I wondered when I wrote that paper, and I wonder to some extent now, that with such a ‘wide diplomatic net’, and with such limited human and financial capacity, is money really being well spent for the ‘benefits or returns’ that SKN receives? Is there such a thing as “doing too much” becoming, in the law of diminishing returns, a bad or counter-productive thing? Could more be achieved with less, more efficient, effort? And if so, just how much less?

In any event, being ‘small’ may also be an advantage and further mean that one may not have to do a great deal; particularly if, as SKN is, that small state qualifies for loan funds, special or preferential treatment, or aid from multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Of course, the former financial institution is always in a position to declare SKN “ineligible” for concessionary development funds or loans through IDA because of any ‘high per capita’ incomes, i.e. small states must avoid becoming “too successful” in managing their economies as they may ‘auto-disqualify themselves’ as a result of that success. Some small states, of course, may be tempted to seek to work on “the very margins of eligibility” (or ineligibility) being careful at all times not to disqualify themselves for aid etc.
Accordingly, each small state, in order to avoid, or allow for, such disqualification, would have to ‘assess its prospects for long-term economic sustainability’. These states would have to ascertain if they can survive in the absence of such IDA – like assistance or subsidy. Such states should never ‘retire’ their ‘diplomatic machinery’, and should always keep an eye out for alternatives. Perhaps that is precisely what the SKN government is doing in its ‘apparent’ diplomatic ‘overkill’ approach.

4.2.2: Grenada

The few years immediately preceding 1983, when The People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) was in power, and immediately post- 1983 when the Blaize government took control, is an interesting, and from a socio-economic, political and diplomatic and foreign relations point of view, hugely transformational period for this small nation of approximately 90,000 persons, Grenada. In 1986, despite the high birth rate, net population in Grenada increased by only 0.3 per cent, largely because of massive emigration to other parts of the Caribbean, the U.K., the U.S.A. and Canada.

As far as homogeneity in the population is concerned, there is a majority of 91 per cent Afro-Grenadians with East Indians and whites making up the remaining 9%. Although there may be in general terms a lack of disharmony between the races in Grenada, the effects of “the social, political and economic stratification based on color and education” (U.S. Library of Congress); closely mirrors the colonial structure even today. Despite, the ‘diversification’ of the economy and the political reformations and transformations achieved under the Peoples’ Revolutionary Government (PRG) during the Maurice Bishop administration (more later); 5% of the population largely made up of whites and light coloured Grenadians, continue to dominate, particularly, the economic and entrepreneurial resources of the country. This, of course, gives this sector a huge influence over the political direction Grenada takes, locally and abroad.

It is generally accepted that Grenada’s education system, despite a literacy rate of approximately 90%, did not support, nor achieve, the basic needs of the professional,
vocational, technical and administrative skills required of a developing economy. An economy that would stabilize and subsequently form the bedrock and platform for any future growth and prosperity of Grenadians as a whole; rather than for only a few elite. This dire statistic persists in the presence of high unemployment which peaked to 28% in 1984.

The correlation between education and across-the-board training (with reference to the economy in Grenada) and any serious consideration of the future prospects of success and improvement of that nation’s socioeconomic conditions; is for all intents and purposes zero or even negatively skewed. Without a closer correlation between education (in all its forms including vocational and technical training) and the ‘needs’ of the economy, Grenada’s future prospects for advancement are frankly not bright. This condition will in my view continue, despite the laudable and strenuous efforts immediately pre-1983 and since, to reform the society socioeconomically. The effects of Grenada’s colonial and recent history (which I shall revisit below) continue to constitute ‘barriers or impediments to growth’, though in varying degrees, domestically and internationally.

To be fair, a great deal of the initial ‘retardation’ in economic recovery and progress generally, was as a direct result of the structural re-adjustment and general reforms attributable to the ‘change-over’ of successive administration strategies emanating from two diametrically opposed ideologies. Bishop was a socialist and Blaize was a capitalist. Grenada’s domestic orientation, foreign relations and diplomatic methodology, largely reflected these two positions or ‘ideologies’.

In this regard, under the Maurice Bishop administration the fundamental PRG economic philosophy was to build a diversified agricultural sector and include Grenadians in cooperative management and nationalization of the economy. Externally, foreign relations were built with Cuba and the ‘Soviet Union’ as staunch ideological, political and economic partners.

After the PRG Bishop administration collapsed following the U.S. lead invasion of 1983; the Blaize administration returned fairly much to the pre-Bishop, traditional economic philosophy
and orientation, but this time highlighting “tourism and agriculture as the leading economic sectors.” The U.S. Library of Congress (USLOC) report on the issue explained it as follows:

“Grenada’s economy was naturally linked to the import markets of the United States, Britain, and the Caribbean Community and Common Market…countries.” (Emphasis added).

It is this author’s opinion that these two widely different (and differing) economic and foreign policy perspectives continue, in varying degrees, to plague the overall ‘progress’ of Grenadian society today. I will now look at Grenada in the context of this ‘dual perception’ of some members of Grenadian society (and others) as far as foreign relations during the 1980’s under the Bishop administration, and post 1983 during the Blaize administration, and even today are concerned.

Suffice it to say, in broad terms, that despite the fact that the Bishop New Jewel Movement administration:

“…… departed from the economic formulas of the Soviets and the Cubans to focus on a multiclass alliance and a mixed economy.” (Emphasis added).

The PRG nevertheless and otherwise, had extremely close bilateral relations with both Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Cuba, in particular, according to Sheyla Hirshon again, assisted Grenada greatly. She effused in the following terms that:

“No nation contributed more to the Grenada revolution than Cuba. Cuba contributed about 500 Cuban airport workers, advisors on every respect of society, culture and technology: doctors who treated about half of the Grenadian population and trained Grenadians to become doctors….and (gave) over 200 scholarships to Grenadians to study in Cuba. The legacies of that relationship endure in the fabric of everyday life even today.” (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, it is quite understandable that many Grenadians might look at Grenada's recent experiences from a dual perspective. A perspective I might add that should be viewed favourably in that, despite the 'changes' that have happened both in the former U.S.S.R. and Cuba; and indeed in this globalized world at large; Grenadians may yet benefit from gaining the 'best of all worlds' by deploying its 'diplomatic machinery and networks' in the most optimal manner, and with the widest reach that is practically feasible.

Pre-independence, Grenada's focus was primarily a 'regional' one with a foreign policy very much pro-Western. As the U.S. Library of Congress (USLOC) reports:

“Grenada looked to the Western powers, primarily the United States, and Britain as its political models, its economic market-places, and its sources of foreign aid and investment.”

That again, is essentially Grenada’s position today.

There was a fundamental change in this ‘usual’ orientation with the coming of the PRG Bishop administration.

Under the PRG, Grenada supported the Cuban and Soviet positions in multilateral organizations such as the U.N., the NAM and the Socialist International.

Indeed, for security purposes, Grenada received sophisticated weaponry and elite training from the Soviets. According to the U.S. LOC, the military equipment build-up in Grenada in 1983 was sufficient to equip a force of 10,000 personnel. In 1979, Grenada had a police force of just over 100 persons. The U.S. LOC further reported that this military build-up:

“was a matter of concern not only for the United States but also and more importantly for the neighbouring states of the Eastern Caribbean.” (Emphasis added).
This ‘concern’ no doubt led to the early pre-intervention formation of ‘diplomatic’ forces between the U.S. and those very same “concerned” Eastern Caribbean neighbouring states (chief of which was Barbados).

Grenada too, under the Bishop administration, established strong economic and diplomatic ties with North Korea, Vietnam and the then German Democratic Republic of East Germany. Libya, provided economic aid of one kind or the other, during the PRG administration.

That said, largely because of geography, the likely wide international and regional implications, and political constraints, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Grenada’s other ‘new’ allies, were unwilling to intervene in an overt or major way to defend Grenada against the U.S. led invasion. Those “allies” had to make the ‘political and military’ calculation whether, “at the end of the day will it be worth it”? Is intervention likely to lead to another world-shaking “October 1962” confrontation”?

It is therefore no small wonder that the Blaize administration, after the invasion, eagerly grasped and openly courted primarily U.S. assistance to the extent that it surpassed the pre-independence levels of western support. According to an article by the USLOC (United States Library of Congress) entitled, “Grenada Government – Relations with the United States”:

“By September 1986, post-intervention United States aid to Grenada had totaled approximately US$85 million.”

However, although eager to do so, the U.S. administration’s aid in particular could not continue at such a rapacious high level not only because of a number of factors such as “budget constraints,” but also reportedly as a result of the many demands on the U.S. to accord equal and fair treatment to other Caribbean nations reaching out for American aid etc.

Today, from a safety and security point of view, Grenada participates in United States sponsored military exercises such as the one in 1986 dubbed, “Ocean Venture 86”. The U.S. also trains Grenada’s special services unit (the SSU) of its police force.
Grenada, is well and truly back into the Caribbean fold and is, apart from being an integral member of CARICOM, a member of that areas Regional Security System (RSS). Interestingly too, Grenada continues to enjoy bilateral relations with Cuba and now, the Russian Federation. It has replaced, not surprisingly, South Korean relations, for North Korean relations. Grenada enjoys today, bilateral relations with the Peoples Republic of China, switching from the Republic of China (Taiwan) which it withdrew from in 2005.

Accordingly, Grenada is an interesting work-in-progress, particularly with its economy, security and foreign relations largely back within the pro-Western sphere of influence, albeit with ‘revolutionary ambers’ still flickering in the regional organizations of CARICOM, the OECS, the Bolivarian ALBA-TCP (Alliance for the Peoples of our America – Peoples Trade Agreement) and the OAS.

Diplomacy, no doubt, in pursuit of the further growth and progress of Grenadian society is in high relief and optimal premium, it seems. But with the obvious “shortcomings or identified deficiencies” in particularly the socio-economic fibre and fabric of this society, one is forced to ask the crucial question; “is this enough”? This author, despite all that he has read thus far on and surrounding the topic, thinks not. Nothing less than a fundamental ‘root and branch’ re-ordering of the socioeconomic undergirdings, and a fairer re-distribution of the wealth of Grenadian society, will suffice.

4.3: The ‘weak’ or potentially failing small states

The Pacific Island nations in general, and the Solomon and Nauru small island states (SIDS) in particular, make an interesting study.

Interesting for the author largely because of both their relative simplicity in lifestyle, but complexity of challenges, they must overcome to sustain a primarily ‘modern’ life. It is an interesting study to see how it will at all be possible, or even feasible, to employ largely western ideas of ‘progress’ to rather more ‘traditional’ modes of life and expectations. Are these SIDS weak or ‘failing’ simply because they do not comply or conform with western ideas and standards of ‘success’? Or are they ‘failing’ because they over the short, and
foreseeable long-term, are not, and cannot, objectively provide the necessaries or ‘political goods’ of life (good governance, economic prosperity, social harmony, the rule of law and order, etc.)? Have these SIDS descended into lawlessness, or a state where the basics of life are not provided, or the political institutions are absent any form of democracy and therefore legitimacy? Though the Solomon Islands and Nauru have significant challenges naturally and man-made, I do not think they can honestly be classified as ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states. Despite the fact they in my view, as world participants (or to some extent domestic leaders), fall somewhat short of many of the ‘benchmark indicators or comparators’ outlined earlier in this paper in the cases of Iceland, Mauritius and certainly SKN; I do not believe they are ‘failing’ or failed states in the way one thinks of Somalia, or Iraq, or Afghanistan. My view, however, is that, as a polity, the Solomon Islands and Nauru exhibit ‘weak’ and suspect performance indexes; economically, socially, diplomatically, governmentally, and from a safety and security perspective.

4.3.1: The Solomon Islands

The archipelago comprising the Solomon Islands (SI) extends out over 1000 islands with nine main Island groups. It is approximately 2000 kms to the north of Australia. The capital, Honiara, is located in Guadalcanal, the largest island in the SI.

The SI had deep and abiding bilateral relations with Australia but which are less strong in certain areas today. Notwithstanding this position, the SI, Australia and New Zealand all entered into an agreement to assist and support SI’s economy. This agreement called RAMSI (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands) was welcomed by the UN Security Council and supported by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. RAMSI has a long term commitment to restore stability, peace and a growing economy to SI, as well as to train SI’s defence capabilities. In fact, according to the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Brief on the SI:

“Australian development assistance to Solomon Islands, through the Solomon Islands –Australia Partnership for Development focuses on improving health.
education, water and sanitation, transport, telecommunications, law and justice, rural livelihoods and effective governance”. (Emphasis added).

Laudable enough, but how are all of these “political goods” to be delivered and coordinated evenly and fairly over the vast distances, the different ethnicities etc. and numerous Islands of SI? To be candid, how are these lofty ideals, etc. to be communicated to a population comprising SI through an intelligible medium when there exists 120 vernacular dialects and 63 distinct languages fluidly spoken? Will Solomon Pijin language be enough? The SI are made up of diverse cultures, languages, and customs. Ninety-three per cent are Melanesian, 4% Polynesian and about 1.5% Micronesian. In addition, there are relatively small numbers of Europeans and Chinese residing in SI. The total population is approximately 550,000.

With all of the above dynamics, the political stability of SI is unsurprisingly tenuous. All too often, SI governments and the ‘body politic’, have been comprised of successive coalitions of weak political parties, numerous votes of no confidence, and disruptive government leadership changes. RAMSI, as mentioned earlier, had to intervene in 2003, to restore order throughout a very violent and hostile SI nation.

Economically, SI has more than 75% of its labour force engaged in subsistence farming and fishing. A U.S. Department of State Background Note stated that:

“The Solomon Islands Government was insolvent in 2002… Much work needs to be done. Ongoing political instability continues to negatively impact economic development. Principal aid donors are Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Japan, and the Republic of China.” (Emphasis added).

The SI continues to fundamentally address these challenges today, fourteen years later.

Diplomatically speaking, and apart from the bilateral relations outlined in the ‘quotations’ immediately above; the SI is a member of the UN, the Commonwealth, Pacific Community, Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), International Monetary
Fund, the European Economic Community, and the African, Caribbean, Pacific Group (EEC/ACP) and Lome Convention.

Moreover, the SI, under the *US-Pacific Islands Multilateral Tuna Fisheries Treaty*; receives a proportion of a grant of $18 million per annum provided to Pacific Island parties in exchange for access to their waters by US fishing vessels.

Overall, it is fair to say that apart from political and ethnic challenges, SI has a deeply flawed economy exacerbated by the severe flooding that struck the capital in April 2014; and the closing of the Japanese owned Gold Ridge Mine. Economic growth as a result purportedly fell from 4% to 0% by the end of 2014. The earlier mentioned U.S. “Brief” summed up the position this way:

> “But the Solomon Islands remains relatively poor and continues to face serious economic challenges. The majority of the population (growing at about three per cent per annum) is involved in subsistence/cash crop agriculture, with less than a quarter involved in paid work” (Emphasis added).

If true, this doesn’t make for sustained ‘progress’ or growth in the economy, and of course, neither does this bode well for the future prospects of a better life for Solomon Islanders.

### 4.3.2: Nauru

Nauru is another Pacific Ocean SID approximately 4000 kms northeast of Sydney, Australia. It is 8 square miles in area.

With only 10,000 people, Nauru is one of the world’s smallest states made up of Nauruans of Micronesian origin (the majority) and other “Pacific Islanders, Chinese, Australian and Filipino.”

There are no political parties in Nauru, Its MPs are elected every three years by Nauruan citizens 20 years and older.

The economy is tenuous, as the mining reserves of phosphate (used in fertilizers) have for all practical intents and purposes been depleted, and have in an extensive dimension,
destroyed Nauru’s ecology transforming its once luxurious forestry etc. into an industrial and environmental “wasteland”.

As a result of phosphate mining declining, Nauru now derives its revenues from payments for fishing rights by international fishing nations fishing in Nauru’s EEZ. Nauru also derives revenues directly from Australia, its major aid donor and protector, for providing ‘housing and facilities’ for asylum seekers heading for Australia. Nauru too, is a party to the US-Pacific Islands Multilateral Tuna Fisheries Treaty together with the SI and derives revenues from this source as well.

Today, Nauru has precious little other resources or assets, nor any manufacturing of any note, and accordingly is obliged to import most of its consumables, primarily from Australia. Other fairly major trading partners are South Africa and South Korea.

Nauru’s darkest moments are recorded in the Infoplease Encyclopedia when it wrote that:

“Nauru became an unregulated offshore banking center, gaining notoriety for money laundering. It abandoned the industry in Mar. 2003 under the threat of crippling economic sanctions by the United States, which regarded Nauru banks as potential havens for terrorist financing. By mid-2004 Nauru faced bankruptcy, and the remaining assets of the trust, mostly Australian property, were seized to pay off its debts. In July 2004, Australian officials took charge of the country’s (Nauru’s) finances.” (Emphasis added).

Given the depth and breadth of Australia’s involvement in Nauru’s economic and social fabric today (there are no tertiary schools in Nauru and most students accordingly go to Australia for such study); Nauru is practically a client-state or appendage of Australia in my view.

Despite this point of view, and from a purely diplomatic perspective, Nauru retains membership in International organizations (e.g. the UN on September 14, 1999). This application to the UN was however ‘questioned’ by the Peoples Republic of China as a result of the very close diplomatic and trade ties Nauru had at the time with Taiwan, of the Republic of China (ROC). Today Nauru maintains diplomatic relations with both nations.
Nauru is also a member of AOSIS, the ADB, ESCAP, FAO, ICAO, IOC, ITU, NAM and WTO. Although, SI it is not a member, despite being a SID, of the IMO or IBRD, IMF, IDA, IFC, INTERPOL or the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO).

Regionally, Nauru is a member of PIF, the Pacific Regional Environment Program and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.

Moreover, Nauru does, in addition to the ‘two Chinas’ and Australia, maintain bilateral relations with the U.S.A., U.K., Cuba, Russia. The last mentioned ‘tie’ was also given to breakaway republics called South Ossetia and Abkhazia, reportedly in return for Russia giving $50 million in humanitarian aid.

Frankly, by looking at the trajectory, chronology and methodology of Nauru’s diplomatic activity; I got the impression, rightly or wrongly, that it lacked coherency and smacked of crass opportunism, particularly in its ‘flip-flop’ between the recognition of the ‘two Chinas’. I don’t know whether this bodes well for a future and sustained growth path for Nauru’s economic prospects, and unfortunately, for Nauruans’ progress generally. Only time will tell.
Chapter 5:

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 The Future of Small States

Definitional difficulties aside; what researching this paper has clearly demonstrated is this: that life for small states, the strong, the not as strong, and the ‘weak’ or failing ones; will go on regardless (the resilience of human nature). The ‘life’ of these nations will ‘go on’ whether at the ‘level or pace’ of Iceland and Mauritius, or the ‘level or pace’ of Nauru and the Solomon Islands, or worse.

But, is “life going on” enough? Particularly when one considers that in all cases, small states notwithstanding; we are speaking of the ‘quality of life,’ the privacy of life, independent living and the future of human beings? And particularly when one is considering the future and longevity of a culture, an ethnicity, a nation of people who, at a minimum, deserve the basics of life’s bounty i.e. food, clothing, shelter, security, an adequate education, human rights and freedom; both home and abroad; is “life going on” enough? I strongly think not. Lessons from Mauritius, Malta, Iceland, St. Kitts & Nevis, Switzerland and many other small states clearly say, “no, “life going on” is plainly not enough.” More can and should be done to improve on this condition. It will require, however, moving away from domestic insularity and reaching out, diplomatically of course, strategically, regionally, globally and multilaterally for assistance amongst friends, and sometimes, even complete strangers.

And what has also clearly stood out from this study, was not so much the disparities in ‘development’ (or lack thereof) between the small states under scrutiny (and these disparities were many), but also how the ‘common elements ‘necessary for growth (when they were present in the requisite numbers and degree) and improvement were marshalled,
administered, and distributed (or not) throughout the given state. On the issue of whether a given country “progressed” or not, this observation was instructive.

And what, you may ask, was the role and function of ‘diplomacy’ in mitigating the afflictions or challenges facing these small states? In the case of Iceland, did this small state, for instance, have a more efficient, superior or robust ‘diplomatic toolset’ than say, St. Kitts and Nevis, or Mauritius, or Nauru? Was there sufficient correlation between the ‘success’ of Iceland’s economy etc. and the activities of its ‘diplomatic networks’ etc. to conclude that Iceland’s ‘networks’ offered the ‘holy grail’ of diplomatic approaches or methodology for progress? Though, to be candid, I cannot decisively conclude with any scientific precision that Iceland offers the ‘holy grail’ of diplomatic methodology etc. for all small states; I nevertheless believe that, geographies and land-size etc. aside, there is much to be learned from the Icelandic experience. Iceland, as with Mauritius, and indeed ST. Kitts & Nevis, demonstrated quite clearly that with a relatively sound, politically stable and diversified domestic economy secured, fed and driven by intelligent, focused, and efficient diplomatic initiatives, and a foreign policy involving appropriate bilateral relations, alliances, sub-regional, regional and multilateral arrangements etc.; much progress, and success, was achieved in their respective societies. That much, in our view, is indisputable. In that regard, these “successes” are educative and encouraging to those small states which enjoy very much less, or, suffer more.

And if I was asked for my impression as a result of this study, of the prospects for improvement of the undiversified, narrow based (virtually dissipated) one-product phosphate economy of Nauru, if that state was to adopt with appropriate adaptation Iceland’s diplomatic agenda and networks to overcome its fundamental challenges both home and abroad; I would emphatically answer, “Nauru couldn’t have made a better initial
move”. But would such an adoption and adaptation provide not just for Nauru, but for all other small states in similar positions (SIDS and landlocked small states included) the ‘panacea’ for all of their problems? Probably not, I would say. Each small state, I accept, has its very own set of idiosyncrasies, i.e. “one size does not exactly fit all circumstances”.

However, what unquestionably stands out in this paper is that no state, large or small, can afford to ‘stand-alone’ either. Striking as well, particularly in the face of the characteristic challenges facing small states (hegemonic nations and international organizations, globalization, convergence etc.), were the ‘commonalities’ in diplomatic approaches, processes and networks etc., in and across several “successful” small states. Those ‘commonalities’ quite frankly appear from this study to permit these small states to weather the earlier stated deleterious ‘effects’ much better than some other “less successful” small states where these ‘commonalities’ are absent. Analogously, and in the context of the production of concrete or steel, there are some ingredients or properties that one simply cannot leave out if the intent is to have a ‘strong, reliable, finished product’ (i.e. “the most sustainable and coherent diplomatic approaches to addressing the fundamental challenges of small states”) that will remain substantively durable over time. With one caveat in the case of small states, the various ‘stages’ or platforms in the development of the ‘concrete or steel’ hypothetical, must have built-in ‘levers or elevators’ between the stated stages or platforms to allow for sufficient ‘flexibility’ to adjust to ‘globalization’ and all other manner of unexpected or unavoidable ‘external shocks’ to the existing economic and diplomatic systems. This was an uncontestable pedagogical revelation in this study in my view.

In the result, the literature on the topic seems to suggest that, coupled with and premised upon, a creative and appropriate diplomatic methodology and foreign policy, a socially cohesive, supportive, and well-ordered, domestic and foreign market-oriented economy, a
secure (defensively and environmentally) democratic and juridical society; and an intelligent and informed civil society etc.; there is every possible chance that even “failing small states” can launch themselves along a step-by-step gradual ‘growth path’ of neutralization, or even reversal, of their current misfortunes.

5.1.1 The ‘Way’ ahead

Moreover, on the issue of even ‘similar small states’ having to adapt or adopt nevertheless ‘different diplomatic and/or foreign policy approaches’; I am assisted in the above conclusion by Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Ph.D. students Yvonne Guo and Woo Jun Jie, who whilst discussing the “secrets of small state survival,” revealed amongst other things that:

“…. former permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bilahair Kausikan stated that although Singapore “has modelled itself on Switzerland as a metaphor,” in the area of foreign policy, the Swiss example was “utterly and totally irrelevant” to Singapore because of their different geographical locations” (Emphasis added).

To be fair, Guo and Jie disagreed with the above Minister of Foreign Affairs’ point of view, but nevertheless unmistakably linked diplomacy, trade, and the security of both Switzerland and Singapore in the following way:

“At their cores, the foreign policies of Singapore and Switzerland have been driven by the same concerns of survival and vulnerability...Their objectives are similar; to safeguard independence, autonomy and sovereignty
in a world dominated by larger powers.” (Emphasis added).

Interestingly, the extent and nature of the “risky” or equivocal alliances etc. to which these relatively small states were prepared to align themselves in order to achieve their goals or objectives, were clearly laid out by Guo and Jie when they noted that:

“As early as 1965, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew had pointed out Singapore’s pragmatic willingness to “trade with the devil if necessary,” ... In 1978, then Swiss Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert, spoke of how neutrality “was adapted to the needs of Swiss trade diplomacy,” and expressed solidarity with both the winners and the losers of World War II” because both were needed as trading partners.” Trade remains integral to the survival and success of both small states, and their actions in Defense and foreign policy ...

like other small states ... both Singapore and Switzerland must continue to rely on adroit diplomacy for their survival. Despite their differences, perhaps the greatest lesson they offer to other small states is their embodiment of what Prof. Chan described as the “inextricable link” between domestic achievements and a successful foreign policy.”

(Emphasis added).
Guo and Jie went on to explain that, notwithstanding Singapore’s and Switzerland’s “similarities,” they nevertheless were “driven by diametrically opposing underlying foreign policy beliefs.”

Accordingly, every small state should, as it subjectively sees it, diplomatically strive to achieve, or to maintain and improve upon, all feasible and cost effective links sub-regionally, regionally and internationally (or multi-laterally). Further, these small states should directly link these “resources” or sources, to the educational, vocational, economic or trade institutions and ministries etc., domestically. If there is no or very little, ‘synergy’ between relevant ministries, departments of government, civil society, and the private sector both domestically and abroad; the ‘Mauritius miracle’ will not be realized.

Additionally, the study reveals that experienced, knowledgeable, well-trained and savvy diplomats, together with trusted consular agents (honorary and otherwise), ought to be able to negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements specifically germane to, and sufficiently correlative with, the pertinent needs of the domestic socioeconomic circumstances of that given small state.

Pragmatically, each small state should ensure that its population is well-read, informed, and highly educated. ‘High-flyers’ ought to be early identified and placed into an apprenticeship and succession plan in the service, amongst other relevant ministries, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with promises of appropriately lucrative appointments upon the conclusion of extensive training etc. This approach would greatly help stem the tide of the ‘extensive brain-drain’ to other far-flung and often competing countries. Specifically, this training ought to include relevant courses in the art of negotiation, economics, comparative foreign policy and international law.
In the result, it appears axiomatic from this study of small states that in order to achieve their goals and objectives, i.e. achieving the most ‘optimal, sustainable and coherent diplomatic methodology and processes’; each small state must fully comprehend and ‘hone in on’ the cogent lessons learned in and from this paper. Anything less, quite frankly, lacks resilience and meaningful hope for success. Further, and in my respectful opinion, anything less will undoubtedly and inevitably, fail.

That much, on the facts, is clear.

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<td>Caribbean Region</td>
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### Table 1

Performance of various groups of "structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies" (SWVSEs) under the United Nations' main indices of exposure and external shocks (Base 100 = non-SWVSE developing countries)

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<th>Homelessness index</th>
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Source: All calculations by the UNCTAD secretariat, based on economic vulnerability data from the Committee for Development Policy (2006)
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</table>

× = Full membership; ×* = Member of IBRD only, not member of IDA. O = Observer status.
×e = Member in association with New Zealand.

Table 6

THE FIVE GROUPS OF COUNTRIES REFERRED TO IN PARA. 33 OF THE SÃO PAULO CONSENSUS

All countries in red are deemed to be “structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies”

LAND-LOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Least developed countries

Small island developing states

Notes:
1. All countries informally identified on the basis of the following two criteria:
   - "Structurally weak" defined as having a gross national product per capita of less than $1,000 in 2005
   - "Vulnerable" defined as having a GDP growth rate of less than 2% in 2005

Paragraph 33 of the São Paulo Consensus:
"UNCAU should enhance its work on the special problems of LDCs, small island developing States, and of landlocked developing countries and the related special problems and challenges faced by troop-sending countries as well as structurally weak, vulnerable, and small economies."

"Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies" not pertaining to any UN-recognized special category (20 countries):

[List of countries]

[Image of a diagram showing the five groups of countries and their relationships]
Table 7

Annex 3

Selected Economic and Social Indicators

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<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Surface Area (km²)</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (constant 1990)</th>
<th>PPP (as % of OECD)</th>
<th>Earnings as % of GDP</th>
<th>Population (as % of OECD)</th>
<th>Life Expectancy (years)</th>
<th>Literacy Rate</th>
<th>Marriage</th>
<th>Female Illiteracy Rate</th>
<th>Fertility Rate</th>
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<td>Small states average</td>
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Source: World Bank Database
Table 9: Economic, Social and Environmental Features of Caribbean SIDS

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<tr>
<th>Economic Features</th>
<th>Social Features</th>
<th>Environmental Features</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>small population size</td>
<td>underdeveloped public and private sectors;</td>
<td>increased vulnerability to extreme natural and man-made disasters such as Climate Change, and extreme weather events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extreme economic openness</td>
<td>high population densities</td>
<td>thin freshwater lenses that are easily contaminated</td>
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<tr>
<td>narrow resource base</td>
<td>limited human resource capacity</td>
<td>susceptibility to water stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low mineral endowment</td>
<td>limited institutional capacity due to limited HR base</td>
<td>susceptibility to land degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>low domestic savings and investment capacity</td>
<td>susceptibility to brain drain</td>
<td>small variability in climate and soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limitations in the volume and range of production factors</td>
<td>susceptibility to HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases</td>
<td>fragility of ecosystems to pests, disease and human activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>inability to benefit from economies of scale</td>
<td>increased consumption rates due to growing populations</td>
<td>limited financial, technical and administrative capacity to cope with the consequences of Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>low per capita incomes</td>
<td>high rates of unemployment and under-employment</td>
<td>extensive interface between land and sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>small size of domestic markets, lack of an indigenous technological base</td>
<td>vulnerability to energy shocks</td>
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<tr>
<td>tendency in the export sector towards product and market concentration</td>
<td>high dependency ratios</td>
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<tr>
<td>high per capita cost of installing and maintaining infrastructure</td>
<td>high rates of poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>high dependence on external trade</td>
<td>geographically dispersed rural settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>excessive transit, transport and trans-shipment cost especially for landlocked small states.</td>
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<tr>
<td>lack of ready access to international capital markets.</td>
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<td>low aggregate GDP</td>
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<td>high income volatility</td>
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<tr>
<td>low capacity for risk absorption</td>
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</table>
UNCTAD’s response to the needs of “structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies” (SWVSEs)

**Paramount development goal of SWVSEs**

**Tangible (intermediate) objectives of SWVSEs**

**Areas of relevant UNCTAD action**

- Development of investment policy-related capacities
- Support on technology transfers and intellectual property
- Removing supply capacity constraints
- Development of trade policy-related capacities
- Special support to LDCs on productive capacity issues
- Integrated framework of trade-related technical assistance to LDCs
- Customs modernization
- Trade facilitation
- Special support to land-locked developing countries on transit-related issues
- Special support to small island developing States on economic vulnerability issues
- Human resource development (Trainfortrade, Virtual Institute)
- Information and communication technology and e-business

**Reduce structural disadvantages**

**Build economic resilience**

**Enhance economic specialization**

- Supporting farmers’ supply
- Commodity-related information, knowledge management, and risk management
- Organic agriculture, environmental goods and services
- Sanitary and phytosanitary compliance
- BioTrade initiative
- Biofuels initiative
- Mineral resources
- Enhancing enterprise competitiveness and promoting entrepreneurship
- Trade in services (negotiating capacities)
- E-tourism initiative
- Support to creative industries
- Strengthening participation in dynamic and new sectors of world trade