Barriers to Conflict Resolution in Africa: Mediating beyond Power and ethnicity in the EAC and SADC Countries through a Kenyan Case Study.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own original work.

Mr. Terry Remy Rose

30 December 2017, Pretoria, South Africa
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I would like to firstly extend my deepest gratitude to the Lord, the giver of life, who has remained by my side through every step of this journey.

And to my departed grandmothers Madeleine Valentin and Medelice Rose who were anchors in my upbringing. To my departed grandfathers. May your ancestral souls be glad.

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ABSTRACT

This paper assesses the relevance of ethnicity and power in conflicts occurring in the EAC and SADC regions through a case study of Kenya. It engages with elites’ power contestation and the manner in which power has historically caused violence and instability in Kenya. Further, an account of researches on ethnicity and its inducing of violence is made. Through this, one discovers the importance of ethnicity beyond that of being a channel for the upsurge of violence.

The piece argues for power as the cornerstone of Kenya’s and, through Kenya, Africa’s EAC and SADC conflicts. For, inasmuch as they are relevant, other conflict sources are accounted herewith as manifestations of power. The piece further details how ethnicity should be addressed as a secondary source of conflict.

In conclusion, one takes the findings to African mediation processes, and the EAC and SADC regions. The manner in which most countries of the latter regions share commonalities around these two sources of conflict are appreciated, alongside the call for addressing same in order to prevent other African conflicts from occurring or resurfacing.
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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Dataset</td>
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<td>EAA</td>
<td>East African Association</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>GEMA</td>
<td>Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Peoples</td>
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<td>KAMATUSA</td>
<td>Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana and Samburu Alliance</td>
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<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
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<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
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<td>SLDF</td>
<td>Sabaot Land Defence Force</td>
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<td>TJRC</td>
<td>Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and rationale

War, conflict, famine and dictatorships have become synonymous to Africa. Old conflicts keep rekindling and lives are continually lost as violence ravage states’ territories. Further, “political violence in Africa is rising and it is more complex than before” (Aucoin 2017) with the continent attributing for over a third of global conflicts in 2016 (Aucoin 2017).

Kenya sits on the equator at the Eastern part of the African continent in what is known as the “horn of Africa” (Switzerland around the world, 2016). She “borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania” (The World Bank, 2017), with a coastline facing the Indian Ocean. Her capital is Nairobi.

Kenya has over forty different ethnic groups. The Kikuyu is the largest tribe with 22% population as at 2009 (Roberts 2009, p. 6). The other four main tribes include the “Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin 12%, and Kamba (11%)” (Roberts 2009, p. 6).

Kenya runs a five-year cycle presidential republic system of governance with separation of powers. She gained independence on 12 December 1963 from the United Kingdom. The legislature consists of a bicameral parliament structure composed of the senate and the national assembly (after cia the world factbook, 2017). The highest court of the land is the Supreme Court. The country’s current president is Uhuru Kenyatta. His deputy president is William Ruto.
1.2 Thesis statement

Ethnicity and power are the core sources of conflict in the EAC and SADC Countries as depicted within the Kenyan case study.

1.3 Kenya as case study

Kenya was once hailed as the most stable state in an unstable region (Kiley 2017). The country is important for the EAC’s political and economic stability. This, for example, through “the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which Kenya joined in 2012” (Ahere 2017). Yet, this beacon of peace was “pushed to the precipice of civil conflict” (Mugo Mugo 2013) in 2007-2008 as a breakdown into violence took place following the elections of December 2007.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) report classified Kenya as “the seventh most violent country in the ACLED dataset with just over 3,500 recorded politically violent events between 1997 and September 2013… [and] the 12th highest rate of reported fatalities associated with political violence, at over 7,200” (Dowd and Raleigh 2013, p. 1). Moreover, “the conflicts in Kenya are multiple and overlapping” (Rohwerder 2015, p. 1) with a constant “wave of internal and cross-border conflicts” (Active Citizens 2011, p. 12). For this piece however, the focus is only on intra-state conflict.

Rohwerder denotes how “the Rift Valley, Nairobi, the peripheral pastoralist drylands, and the coast are among the areas most affected” (2015, p.1) by conflict. The ACLED report furthers that “Nairobi experiences the second highest absolute levels of violence in Kenya, after the Rift Valley, and highest levels of riots and protests” (Dowd and Raleigh 2013, p. 1).
To some extent, “present conflicts are often informed by past conflicts whose wounds have never been healed, which leads to cycles of revenge attacks “(Mbugua 2013 in Rohwerder 2015, p. 3). This resulted in an increase in the number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) which creates more conflicts as these add pressure over resources and administrations in areas of relocation. The IRIS report on IDPs in North-Eastern Kenya indicates that “The north-east regions account for over 95% of the overall 220,000 IDPs in Kenya” (2015, p. 16).

The above depict how Kenya also conforms to the conflict-prone setting of the EAC and SADC. The study therefore gains importance as it divulges the sources of underlying tensions and surface commonalities existing between the Kenyan case and states of the two regions. Through Kenya, one can question whether power and ethnicity are core sources of conflict.

### 1.4 Objective of the Study

The research will seek to undertake the following:

A) Discuss the relevance of ethnicity and power as core sources of conflict in Kenya;

B) Discuss and assess other presented sources of conflict in Kenya, more precisely Land, resources, economy and poverty;

C) Discuss and assess relevance of other mechanisms like governance, weakness of state’s institutions and impunity;

D) Analyze the overall importance of power and ethnicity as primordial sources of conflict in Kenya;

E) Discuss the extent that the research findings talk to EAC and SADC countries, and their conflict mediation processes.
1.5 Research Design

Secondary data are used for the construct of this dissertation. These include journal articles, previous researches undertaken in Kenya, Kenyan government-established Commissions’ reports, reports from leading research institutes like the Institute for Security Studies, and information from international media houses as BBC and Skynews, alongside local ones like the Daily Nation and other online articles.

The usage of existing materials permit the application of selected theories, gathering interpretations and discussions of historical trajectory and analysis emanating from existing researches on Kenya, and illustrations of themes through selected previously-undertaken Kenyan case studies. Additionally, such a design of work permits timely results and the ability to perform qualitative research analysis whilst ensuring the ethical, reliability, validity and overall credibility considerations of data sources (Hofstee 2006).

1.6 Research Methodology

The piece’s research methodology was embedded around the two core elements for analysis; power and ethnicity. The author engaged with the usage of qualitative research as it contains the “emerging world-view’s emphasis on understanding how people make meaning of phenomena in their environment” (Maree 2007, p. 56). Firstly, understanding power was guided through the critical theory lens (Maree 2007) which looks at the relations and interpretations of power structures. Within this perspective “the author critically analyses and maps the relations and interplay among the parts” (Maree 2007, p. 61) through previous researches. Data is used to map the historical layout of power conflicts and power relations within the Kenyan government structure and the interplays that exist as elites interact between themselves and with the populace.
The author is also guided by the post-positivist perspective which, as Seale indicates, “is a useful paradigm for researchers who maintain an interest in some aspects of positivism such as quantification, yet wish to incorporate interpretivist concerns around subjectivity and meaning … [with] … the pragmatic combination of qualitative and quantitative methods” (in Maree 2007, p. 4). The author engages in a number of previous researches undertaken through both the quantitative and qualitative methods when tackling the theme of ethnicity. These remain within the qualitative perspective however as the diverse sources are used to further strengthen and validate claims, and the extent of their relevance in a form of “crystallization” (Maree 2007, p. 3) analytic framework.

To this extent, data have also been gathered in chapters presenting other causal factors, alongside segments termed critical appreciation, so as to highlight opposing views which are also assessed in an effort to better validate and/or falsify the thesis statement. The limitation found within the post-positivist perspective’s need to balance between the quantitative and the qualitative methods of data collection and analysis (Maree 2007) convert into strength as it establishes concrete findings and also create room for researchers at both ends of the spectrum (quantitative and qualitative) to respond to the final analyses and conclusions. Used data and research perspectives represent views of various authors which are appreciated through the qualitative methodology within the framework of uncovering the validity of power and ethnicity as core sources of conflict in Kenya.

Overall, the author remains guided by the interpretivist perspective which retains “is roots in hermeneutics, the study of theory and practice of interpretation” (Maree 2007, p. 58). Interpretation of results from the study therefore will also include the parallel of finding how
selected theories find themselves relevant towards the thesis statement and the Kenyan case study.

1.7 Chapter Organization

The paper firstly presents a literature review on the extent to which power and ethnicity are documented as the core of conflict in Africa through chapter two. Chapter three defines concepts and presents theoretical perspectives around the subject matter. These establish perspectives to be applied in research analysis.

Chapter four provides the case study of Kenya covering aspects relative to power as a core source of conflict. This is followed by chapter five which continues the case study tackling ethnicity as a source of conflict.

Chapter six discusses other sources of conflict. These lead to chapter seven, where government obstacles are deliberated upon. Some chapters will be accompanied with relevant critical appreciations in an effort to uncover the conflict’s complexity.

The Final chapter 8 will witness an analysis of the research findings. This will also link results to some EAC and SADC countries in order to cement the piece’s credibility. An analysis of conflict mediation will also occur, followed by recommendations for future conflicts and the final conclusion.
Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1 Introduction

Olayode claims that “ethnicity does not per se explain conflict” (2016, p. 244). It is rather the manner in which political elites have used ethnic identity divides to spiral conflicts for their own benefits that is looked at. Ethnicity therefore, is seen as but one of the means and, more specifically, a tool for achieving the goals of a selected group, which occur at the expense of the building-up of conflict. Berman (1998 in Olayode 2016), explains how “identity became a political tool for contesting power and resources rather than a source of difference within the society” (p. 243).

The above is expanded upon, through the notion that “ethnicity is typically not the driving force of African conflicts but a lever used by politicians to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, and resources” (Aapengnuo 2010, p. 1). Aapengnuo argues that many countries exist peacefully-coexisting amongst a multiple number of other ethnic groups. He holds the view however, that power remains a core driving element of African conflicts; maintaining that it was rather the “political manipulation of [these] resource conflicts [that] led to the well-orchestrated 1994 genocide” (Aapengnuo 2010, p. 2) which occurred in Rwanda; showing how “people do not kill each other because of ethnic differences; they kill each other when these differences are promoted” (Aapengnuo 2010, p. 2). This depicts ethnicity as a mechanism used for the mobilization of differences towards conflict manifestation for the attainment and maintenance of power (Busumtwi-Sam 2002) by political leaders or selected groups.
2.2 Power

The view of power as a cornerstone cause of conflict can be further exemplified through the result of the review of six pieces which was undertaken by Fearon and Laitin in 2000. They noted that “if there is a dominant or most common narrative in the texts under review, it is that large-scale ethnic violence is provoked by elites seeking to gain, maintain, or increase their hold on political power” (p. 846). Brubaker and Laitin add that “ethnicity is not the ultimate, irreducible source of violent conflicts … rather, conflicts driven by struggles for power between challengers and incumbents are newly ethnicized, newly framed in ethnic terms” (1998, p.425). This depicts power as key for the creation and upsurge of conflict especially in cases where state institutions are weak (Bienen 1993).

2.3 Ethnic nepotism

Shibru presents a twist to the analogies in the above paragraphs however, noting that, of the many factors, “where power holders favour their own ethnic group and discriminate others, it is likely for ethnic conflict to arise” (no date, p. 20). He notes the importance of what he terms “ethnic nepotism which favours some ethnic groups while marginalizing others [that] can be a root cause for ethnic conflict” (no date, p. 20) and, in this vein, conflict in general. This therefore illustrates ethnicity as a potential core cause for protracted conflicts alongside power.

However, Deng claims that “it is not the mere differences of identities [therefore ethnic build-up] but rather the incompatibilities of their objectives or interests that generate conflict” (1996, p. 49). Here, the concept of incompatibilities of their objectives or interests relate to states’ resources, power and economic factors. This reverts one’s thinking to the fight over resources as a key source of conflict instead of ethnicity and ethnic nepotism.
2.4 Civil war

Research by Wimmer, Cederman and Min stress how in “accounting for underlying structural factors, they find that the outbreak of civil war is correlated with the proportion of the population excluded on the basis of their ethnic background” (in Roessler 2011, p. 301). In fact, Cederman, Wimmer and Min concluded that “ethnonationalist struggles over access to state power are an important part of the dynamics leading to the outbreak of civil war” (2010, p. 88) reinforcing the importance of ethnicity and power in the build-up of conflict. It further shows how ethnicity can be the trigger for conflict over dispensation and ownership of state resources. Olaosebikan denotes that it is in fact this “ethnicity [which] has bred the feelings of suspicion, hatred and distrust among members of various ethnic groups in Africa” (2010, p. 552), thereby becoming one of the cornerstone causes of protracted conflict.

Moreover, Lake and Rothchild (1996) have found that preferential policies, the favouring of a group towards survival by political elites, and the subsequent securing of resources which lead to competition over same, are not sufficient to explain the outbreak of conflict. They state that “observers too often fail to recognize this important theoretical point and misattribute violence to competition over scarce resources” (p. 45). This underlines potential flaws in the rhetoric depicting resource contestation as a primordial source of conflict.

Calhoun indicates that “ethnic solidarities and identities are claimed most often when groups do not seek national autonomy but rather a recognition internal to or cross-cutting state boundaries” (1993, p. 211). This implies a need for relevance in pockets found within geographical state boundaries rather than the contestation for prowess at central-national level only, by particular ethnic groups. It also talks to conflicts which occur between ethnic
groups located at the borders of African states. One should however appreciate that for countries as South Africa, it is still important to know which ethnic group or race has hold on power at national executive level (Ferree 2006).

2.5 Colonialism

Beyond the South African counter argument, should one analyze literature that look at the colonial construct of ethnic identity and its resultant ethnically-crafted class-based differences nurtured in African states towards their post-colonial existence, Wimmer notes that “ethnic conflict arise during the process of state formation, when a fight erupts over ‘which people’ the state should belong to” (Wimmer 1994 in Jinadu 2007, p. 11). This links Ethnicity to the fight for power with regards to the seeking of authority over other groups. Jinadu asserts how “[m]ore often than not, and precisely because of this lack of autonomy [by certain minority ethnic groups not having authority] or its limited autonomy from competing ethnic groups, the state becomes the core contested terrain” (2007, p. 11) for the rise of conflict over resources and power, with ethnicity at its base. One can also appreciate how the manifestation and maintenance of power had to be invested through a colonial construct of ethnic identity divides which therefore renders ethnicity as a subset of power when looking at the cause of African conflicts from a colonial imprints’ perspective.

However, Cocodia stresses how ethnic conflict was not purely based on the colonial construct of divisive ethnic identity from an African continent without any pre-colonial conflicts or clashes, but rather that:

“Facts abound on how the internal evolution of some African communities before colonialism had provided groups of people the opportunity to appropriate the labour of others and subjugate other
communities. This scenario definitely generated ethnic animosity and discrimination. It was these differences that were carefully and deliberately nurtured by the colonialists and later exploited by the local political bourgeoisie” (2008, p. 13).

Moreover, Fearon and Laitin question how and why “ethnic publics follow leaders down paths that seem to serve elite power interests most of all” (2000, p. 846); especially as the favouring of an ethnic group has not meant a synonymous engulfment of riches for that whole group at national level, but rather that of the elite and her close circle. Ndegwa illustrates Fearon and Laitin’s predicament as follows:

“Most research on ethnic politics, including more sophisticated analyses cognizant of the contextual and constructed nature of ethnicity, imply that ethnic mobilization and political action flow reflexively from identity. The moral and temporal underpinning of the process that lends authority and legitimacy to ethnicity, and hence undergirds ethnic action, is not explained. In short, present work does not explain why rational individuals respond to ethnic mobilization” (1997, p. 599).

This alludes to the proposition that ethnicity must carry within it certain core elements that would permit a call; sentiments and a trigger to conflict, rather than simply serving to mobilize propaganda for power.

In addition, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2001) joined scholars as Olayode to note how ethnicity is a secondary factor and not a root cause in explaining the source of conflicts in Africa. This, as “ethnicity and tribalism are only the lines along which wars in Africa are fought” (Olayode 2016, p. 245). Sadowski (1998 in Issifu 2016) furthers this thinking, specifying that a wide number of “intractable violent conflicts in Africa are along political
and ethnic lines” (p. 142). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office however acknowledges power as a core causal factor for conflict in Africa; noting how “unequal access to power perpetuated a similar lack of access to resources and revenue… [and]… where a society is divided into two predominant groups, growing inequality between them often leads to conflict” (2001, p. 13).

2.6 Other factors

A number of other factors are accounted for throughout the literature as core causes of African protracted conflict. For example, Issifu notes that most African conflicts “emanate from ethnic supremacy, power struggle, chieftaincy succession, justice, poverty, natural resources competition, politics and governance, groups marginalization, territory or boundary dispute” (2016, p. 142). Many authors (Beyene 2011; Moe 2009; Molemele 2015; Wangechi et al. No date) also indicate most of the above as other causes of African conflicts.

Rwantabagu dictates core structural and political factors influencing intra-African conflict. On the latter, he notes four causal factors, namely “discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics” (2001, p. 43), causing conflict. At first sight, these still talk to power and, to some extent, ethnic divide elements.

2.7 Heterogeneity

Eminue (2004) and Osaghae (1992) (both in Olaosebikan 2010) agree that “of all the factors, multi-ethnicity is the most frequently associated with conflict” (p. 552). This brings in the concept of the heterogeneous nature of most African states where it is believed that states composed of a high number of ethnic groups are more prone to conflict. McFerson’s research intensifies this view as he claims that:
“High-intensity violent conflict is invariably associated with ethnic pluralism. This view is part of a broad conventional wisdom that holds that social conflict is more severe in multi-ethnic societies than in culturally homogenous societies” (1996, p. 18).

The case of homogenous Somalia has been used to counter such claim however (McFerson 1996; Rwantabagu 2001), and it is seen to be somewhat infantile for one to directly view all multi-ethnic states and societies as being on the verge of high-intensity conflict as Aapengnuo suggests. Brubaker and Laitin warn against “the disaggregated analysis of the heterogenous phenomena we too casually lump together as ethnic violence” (1998, p. 423). What should be appreciated instead is that, of the many attributes that would lie at the foundation of these conflicts, ethnic pluralism remains one of the core common denominators.

Fearon and Laitin proceeded in 2003 to claim that this effect of ethnic pluralism as a core factor causing conflict “appears not to be true… [stating that]… the main factors determining both the secular trend and the cross-sectional variation in civil violence in this period are not ethnic or religious differences or broadly held grievances but, rather, conditions that favour insurgency” (p. 75), which again revert to the increased cases of African civil wars from the 20th century onwards.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) also speak of weak mismanaged political structures and institutions as another cause for conflict in line with Bienen (1993). Rwantabagu addresses weak leadership, yet in connection to ethnicity, stating how “ethnic nationalism predominates when
institutions collapse and satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available to fulfill people’s basic aspirations and needs” (2001, p. 44).

The arguments and contradictions in the literature present the need to enquire beyond the basic juxtapositions presented around the usage of ethnicity as a tool or a secondary factor. The importance of power must also be scrutinized.
Chapter 3: Defining concepts

3.1 Key concepts

3.1.1 Ethnicity

A number of scholars view ethnicity as “socially constructed” (Fearon and Laitin 2000, p. 847). Donald Horowitz describes same as “based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity” (1985 in Chandra 2005, p. 6).

Similarly, Harff and Gurr depict ethnic groups “as psychological communities whose members share a persisting sense of common interest and identity based on some combination of shared historical experience and valued cultural traits; beliefs, language, ways of life, or a common homeland” (2004 in Beyene 2011, p. 41). Gurr also looks at the nature of ethnic groups as he “classifies ethnic affiliations into three, namely; ethno-nationals, Indigenous Peoples and Communal Contenders” (1993 in Cocodia 2008, p. 11). From these one can view ethnicity as a social phenomenon for grouping individuals, which is also made up of certain traits deemed to be ascribed or innate.

To explain how groups function collectively as a community, the anthropologist Cashmore defined ethnicity as “a group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity composed of people who are, or at least latently, aware of having common origin and interests” (1993 in Majeed 2013, p. 98). Young’s perspective notes that “ethnic affiliation by human
communities... is a natural condition, and not a social pathology” (1996 in Ajulu 2002, p. 252), thereby making ethnic existence a given.

Some authors once shared the belief that an “ethnic group has not a concrete existence but is rather a figment of the human imagination” (Ake 1993, p. 1). Further, Hale summarizes core definitions of ethnicity as he asserts that:

“For some, it is an emotion-laden sense of belonging or attachment to a particular kind of group... for others, it is embeddedness in a web of significant symbols... still others see ethnicity as a social construct or a choice to be made... one recent view treats it above all as a cognitive process... Some even call ethnicity a biological survival instinct based on nepotism... A few consider it a mix of these notions” (2004, p. 458)

In what eventually became a failed attempt to garner a single definition of ethnicity, the author was led to an appreciation of the consolidation of all the above-mentioned definitions to the extent that they talk to core elements such as decent and traits which some would see as innate or a given through ascription, alongside the view of ethnicity as a socially constructed element from human interaction. The author further uses ethnicity and tribalism - ethnic groups and tribes, in a synonymous fashion without prejudice.

3.1.2 Identity

Beyene asserts that “ethnicity is one of the aspects of identity around which people organize themselves” (2011, p. 41) thereby making ethnicity part of this bigger parcel. The Cambridge online dictionary describes identity as “who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group
that make them different from others” (Cambridge University Press 2017) which then talks to a person holding a basket of qualities-some of which would be similar to the particular group.

3.1.3 Ethnic Identity

Majeed further elaborates on ethnic identity being “characterized in terms of multiplicity of attributes, which positively contribute in the process to develop a sense of oneness among different groups of individuals” (2013, p. 103). In essence, ethnic identity is the construct of a set of characteristics or qualities, seen as similar, which causes an internalized sense of solidarity and belonging towards a particular group. Majeed engages with commonly used characteristics which include “a collective name, a common myth of decent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory, a sense of solidarity, a shared language, a common religion [and] common profession” (2013, p. 103-104) in categorizing ethnic identity. Ndegwa furthers this definition, depicting how “ethnic identity rests on a socially, as opposed to a legally, constructed definition of belonging” (1997, p. 601), thereby distinguishing it from the concept of national citizenship.

3.1.4 Power

Authors have attempted defining the concept of power with a great degree of clashes amongst themselves. The piece shall however appreciate core definitions of, and principles around power in an effort to create a comprehensive platform for engagement.

Sociologist Max Weber defined power as “the ability of an actor or actors to realize his/her/their will in a social action, even against the will of others” (in Roscigno 2011, p. 350). This definition has come under scrutiny especially for its inability to appreciate the importance of human elements such as the existence of other actors and interests. This is as
Weber saw a higher importance in bureaucratically set structures as the cornerstone for his definition rather than fully appreciating the existing multiplicity of actors (Roscigno 2011). There is a further limitation of not acknowledging the ability of above-mentioned ascribed elements as generators of authority and power within groups (Roscigno 2011).

Robert Dahl denotes power as the circumstance whereby “A is said to have power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Pruitt in no Author 1959, p. 188). With this definition come five parameters which one should look at when assessing power differences between two agents. These include “differences in the basis of power; differences in the means of employing the basis; differences in the scope of power; differences in the number of comparable respondents influence, and; differences in the degree of influence (defined in terms of changes in the probability that B will do something)” (Pruitt in no name 1959, p. 188).

Dahl’s definition has met wide criticism such as its restriction to “no more than the idea of a causal relation between two (presumably human) agents” (Lukes 2015, p. 262) alongside the neglect that agent B might have other interests against that which is impinged upon it by agent A (Lukes 2015) which may affect whether or not it shall react to agent A. The definition has however (as with Weber’s) stood the test of time in providing a basis for understanding such a diverse concept.

Ahmad further elaborates how students of international relations’ definition of power allude to “a relationship between power and influence … [whereby] the latter is the carrier of power or means to use power in pursuit of one’s objectives” (2012, p. 83). In line with this, and the links between power, dictatorships and protracted conflict, Lord Acton’s connotation remains
relevant, as he maintains that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (in Onuoha 2011, p. 18).

Dahrendorf underlines the importance of power in defining and causing change as this “explains not only how change originates and what direction it takes, but also why it is necessary ... power always implies non-power and therefore resistance” (1968 in Onuoha 2011, p. 19).

3.1.5 National power

National power is defined as “a mix of strategic, military, economic, political and psychological strengths and weaknesses of a country or a state... the sum of all resources available to a nation in the pursuit of national objectives” (Ahmad 2012, p. 85). This national cumulating of resources is sometimes linked to intra-state protracted conflict.

3.1.6 Conflict

Conflict can be defined as “a form of tension arising from mutually exclusive or opposing actions, thoughts, opinions, or feelings” (Onuoha 2011) between two or more individuals or groups. Coser defines conflict “as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to injure or eliminate their rivals” (Olaosebikan 2010, p. 551).

Broadening these perspectives, Onuoha speaks of politically-induced conflicts being centralized around “the struggle for access to, control and management of political power” (2011, p. 12), relating same to what “Harold Lasswell saw as the essence of politics, which is who gets what, when, how” (1990 in Onuoha 2011, p. 12).
3.1.7 Internal conflict/Intra-state conflict

Eminue defines internal or intra-state conflict to be a form whereby “the governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that state seeking to overthrow those authorities with force of arms” (in Olaosebikan 2010, p. 551). David also elaborates how “internal conflict may also be seen as one in which armed violence occurs primarily within the borders of a single state” (1997 in Olaosebikan 2010, p. 551).

3.1.8 Protracted conflict

Nilson and Kreutz inform how the protracted conflict “concept usually labels conflicts that are particularly difficult to settle” (in New Routes 2010, p. 3). Edward Azar furthers this analogy with what he terms as protracted social conflict which occurs when “people are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity” (Demmers 2017, p. 90). This means that such conflicts endure over a long period of time, either through violence or, as in most cases, through the existence of underlying tensions which are easily triggered towards violence.

3.2 Theorizing Concepts

3.2.1 On ethnicity and ethnic conflict

3.2.1.1 Primordialism

Primordialists focus on the objective elements to ethnic conflict. Gertz contends that these objective elements or factors are “natural, innate, given, ineffable, immutable and non-manipulable” (1963 in Shibru no date, p. 17). Initially, the theory explained “ethnicity as a predominantly biological phenomenon having its roots in culture and history” (Majeed 2013,
p. 99); looking at objective genetic and cultural-descent factors resulting in ascribed ethnic identities.

It was thus understood that ethnic conflict “is inevitable because of unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these categories… [and that] … ethnic violence results from antipathies and antagonisms that are enduring properties of ethnic groups” (Fearon and Laitin 2000, p. 849). Gertz asserts that “threats to these primordial elements results in violent and intractable conflicts” (1967 in Shibru no date, p. 17).

Critics have pointed to the quasi fait accompli sense which the theory presents. It provides an idea that objective factors create an ever-lasting threat, with conflict between ethnic groups resorting to a “naturalistic view of ethnicity that reduces cultural and social behaviour to biological drives” (Eller and Coughlan 1993, and Ratecliffe 1994 in Shibru no date, p. 17). Thompson also notes how the theory neglected other socially constructed elements to human existence and interaction (in Shibru no date, p. 17).

The theory has been recalibrated through authors like Van Evera who claimed how “ethnic identities are not stamped on our genes: but once formed, groups tend strongly to endure” (2001 in Hale 2004, p. 460). Shils add that it is rather “the perception, not the reality, of the primodiality of ties [that matters] and … [that] … it is very clear that people vary ‘normally’ in the intensity of their attachments to their groups and that there are usually only a few hard-core believers” (1957 in Hale 2004, p. 460). Inevitably, it is understood that in primordialism, reference is made “primarily to group perceptions of the primordiality of their groups, not actual common blood histories and absolute cultural bonds, [with the] claim that these
perceptions have real implications for behaviour” (Hale 2004, p. 460), which better addresses ethnic conflict.

### 3.2.1.2 Instrumentalism

Theorists have explained how instrumentalism accounted for ethnic conflict as it related to the manipulation of ethnic identity by elites for the achievement of their personal goals (Shibru no date). This perspective originates from “utilitarian philosophy instrumentalists [who] talked about ethnicity as a product of political myths created and manipulated by cultural elite in their pursuit of advantages and power” (Barnard and Spencer 1996 in Majeed 2013, p. 99).

The construct of ethnic groups are therefore seen as a mechanism for the achievement of political ends, making them a form of “informal political organization” (Shibru no date) to start with. In view of this, Cohen depicts ethnic identity as “flexible and rooted in adaptation to social changes” (1974 in Shibru no date, p. 18). Usage of myths through elites using cultural propaganda to manipulate the masses trigger ethnic conflict as it summons ethnic identity sentiments.

This however depicts human identity as rigid, with an implication that a person will be automatically subservient to cultural myths; following elites solely on that basis (Ndewa 1997). It also limits understanding for ethnic groups which rebel against elite propaganda for other reasons which are also factor to intra-state conflict. There remains potential in the theory however, especially around the trigger of violent conflicts.

### 3.2.1.3 Constructivism
Constructivism looks at “the mere fact that boundaries are perceived and persist” (Hale 2004, pp. 460-461) between groups. The flexibility which exists within and between groups alongside the reality that identity and identification to a group may change over time, are herewith implied. The position that ethnic groups “are thus not holdovers from ancient times but very recent phenomena” (Hale 2004, p. 61) even if there is the understanding that these have the potential to endure commendably once created (Hale 2004), is maintained by constructivists.

By virtue of the social construction of identity and ethnic identity, one better appreciates how “the significance attached to a particular identity varies in situations” (Jenkins 1997 in Shibru no date, p. 18) since: “identities never become ‘locked in’ … people are always at least somewhat free to change them, subject to certain constraints (costs, skills, physical endowments, etc.)” (Hale 2004, p. 461). Barnar and Spencer therefore denote how ethnicity becomes an “ascription which classifies a person in terms of their most general and inclusive identity, presumptively determined by origin and background as well as form of social organization maintained by inter-group boundary mechanism, based on manipulation of identities and their situational character” (1996 in Majeed 2013, p. 100).

3.2.1.4 Marxism

The Marxist school of thought presents ethnicity as a historical construct which emerged from the exchanges between the Bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Stalin indicates how the former colonialists “conspiratorially created ethnic blocs out of Proletariat with the objective of undermining the revolutionary process” (1977 in Majeed 2013, p. 100) which would otherwise erupt should the latter revolt against them. It was the strong centralized power structure which ensured that indoctrination and resultant adherence to the status quo between
the lower class groups and the bourgeoisie upper class would be maintained (Majeed 2013). This however, saw that the “centre started to show weaknesses and ideological indoctrination was shrouded by oblivion, policies such as perestroika and glasnost ignited the dormant hatred, unacceptability and alienation, the suppressed forces were unleashed and nationalities demanded for independence” (Majeed 2013, p. 100). This also explains ethnicity as created for the survival of the oppressor at the expense of the felicity of the oppressed within the framework of a strong structure of governance that capacitates and injects indoctrination and disillusionment of the lower ethnic class. It talks to the colonial construct of ethnicity and ethnic divides in colonial Africa towards its post-colonial setting.

3.2.1.5 A consolidated perspective

Hale and Fearon note how “culture is Janus-faced, with both a constraining primordial element and a manipulable, flexible, constructed element” (in Hale 2004, p. 461) which provides a balance for understanding the background of ethnic groups functioning within a state through primordial terms, whilst gaining an apercu on potential changes in dynamics of interaction between them through the evolution of identities and its yielding potential conflicts, from a constructivist prospect.

This is further understood in Hale’s realization of the consolidation of the two main paradigms (primordialism and constructivism) which also bears influence on instrumentalism in the long run. He also echoes the importance of viewing ethnic conflict as a social construct, as he claims the following:

“Real-world primordialists and constructivists agree that identities are constructed (i.e., that beliefs about primordiality are formed) during some identifiable period in history, that their symbolic content can
vary to some degree over time, and that there is at least some variation in the intensity or nature of group identification across members” (2004, pp. 461-462).

This on the fence position, also talks to possible reasons why certain individuals would not blindly follow leaders or engage at the same intensity in a conflict than would other individuals originating from the same ethnic group. It is also useful in understanding how some people within a particular group may become more accepting of and identify themselves better to other ethnic groups over time.

One should also appreciate the work of Thomson who claims how “all individuals have ethnic allegiances irrespective of whether they are from the minority of a state’s population or the majority, with the result that ethnicity as a sentiment is expressed by both majority and minority populations. Obviously, this social pluralism will lead to differences of interests, and this is where the possibility of ethnic conflict starts to emerge” (2000 in Cocodia 2008, p. 12). This brings a constructivist reality to the Marxist perspective and the power-ethnicity conundrum within state boundaries.

3.2.2 On power and conflict

3.2.2.1 Realism

Realism deals primordially with power relations that exist between states in the international system. The realist’s cornerstone would be vested in the works of Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’ and Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ which depict power either as a means to achieve greater advantage over others, or as a central structured mechanism that answers to a security dilemma-yielding into the sovereignty of states (Sadan 2004), respectively.
In an effort to impose this theory’s relevance at the national level, neo-realist Hans Morganthau maintains that “All politics, domestic and international, reveal three basic patterns… a political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (in Ahmad 2012, p. 83). This implies that even within the national spectrum, the one holding the seat of power would ensure the occurrence of the three components either separately or conjointly.

Africa in this regard, has had the occurrence of leaders holding onto power for decades which talks to its elites engaging heartily in the first two aspects and using mechanisms within their reach to demonstrate power. It is thus important to note the concept of national power (Ahmad 2012), which Morganthau engages into, relating to the sum of resources and powers at national levels (which a state would possess relative to others). This is the actual resource pool over which elites and other groups compete.

The manipulation of groups and imparting of authority talk to the manifestation of elite power which, as Toffler dictates, occurs “in three main ways; that is, violence, wealth and knowledge” (in Ahmad 2012, p. 84). Ahmad claims that “power in society is often determined by the possession of these three elements” (2012, p. 84). The person holding power therefore holds all resource wealth which, when distributed discriminatively, cause tensions and feed on the perceived fears and interests of other groups; thereby injecting the seeds of conflict.

Political power links well with ethnicity in Africa as “political domination and a desire for persisting control of power; the non-participatory approach of political systems as well as the lack of democratization have further contributed to the insecurity of the [horn of Africa]
region” (Shibru no date, p. 20) for example. Lake and Rothchild further note how “politics matter because the state controls access to scarce resources... the farther apart the policy preferences of the [ethnic] groups are, the greater the violence necessary for one group to assert its will over the other” (1996, pp.45-46). This is in light of political elites amassing all wealth and entertaining exclusionary policies which only favour their ethnic or selected group whilst marginalizing others, as they manage state resources and institutions.

3.2.2.2 Elite Theory

Yamokoski and Dubrow define elites “as actors controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power networks” (2008 in López 2013, p. 3). Elite theory looks at minority elite groups who rule and govern over the pool of power in society. One therefore appreciates how “elite theory is based on the assumption that elite action has a causal effect on such a relationship... [existing] between state and society” (López 2013, p. 1). This means that the only driver of power is the elite minority with a broader view that “elites could only be substituted by another set of elites, meaning that the majority is necessarily ruled by a minority” (López 2013, p. 2).

Pareto therefore speaks of ‘elite circulation’ (in López 2013), referring to the form in which control of political power occurs, as a general principle or law which “holds that elites alternate in power as a result of either peaceful or violent competition” (in López 2013, p. 2) thereby linking to the ability to persuade the majority of the populace through propaganda and manipulation or inciting violence. Moreover, one notes how “elites were often (but not only) defined through capacity, personality and skill” (López 2013, p. 2), with Pareto making the distinction “between those who resembled the lion (domination by force) and those who resembled the fox (domination by persuasion and skill)” (1935 in López 2013, p. 2). This
speaks to a number of cases from the EAC and SADC regions where historically most modes of leadership resembled the lion.

The competition for power is therefore only between elites who can orchestrate resistance from the population through persuasion or force. López explains this stating that, “for instance, a workers strike, from elite theory’s perspective, would imply a conflict between union leaders (labor elites) and corporate elites” (2013, p. 3) rather than the majority population, even if the latter is used for the manifestation of the said conflict. This is appreciated as one asserts that African conflicts which have led to a change in leadership, mostly find that the majority which now support the new leader remain disadvantaged. This orchestration is re-used either by the same elite or by new, better-organized elites, who then eradicate the competition. Linking this to ethnicity within the Kenyan context, Ajulu denotes the concept of “political ethnicity... a tendency among political elites to mobilize ethnicity for political ends” (2002, pp. 251-252).

3.2.2.3 Pluralism

The pluralist school indicates how there would normally be a number of sectors in a state within which different groups and individuals would possess different levels of interest and power over others (Lukes 2015). This is further understood through an additional perspective that views “the political system as reasonably open to multiple interests if these interests feel strongly enough about an issue to mobilize pressure” (Manley 1983, p. 369). This means that a group which could be more powerful, interested and have the overall ability to sway action of agent B in economic terms for example, might be faced with another group, individuals, or agent B herself, who would have more power and ability than it to sway its action in another term or sector, like Culture.
A research undertaken in New Haven by Robert Dahl in 1961 sought to “determine the distribution of influence” (Baldwin 2015, p. 211) in that society. His final piece entitled ‘Who Governs’ deduced that “the influential people in one issue were different from those in other issue areas” (Baldwin 2015, p. 211) leading to the conception of pluralism.

Hence, one can further appreciate the notion that power is not equally shared nor accessed in the same manner. This leads to an understanding of elite pluralism which accounts for contestation at diverse levels by diverse minor elite groups (No Author, No date). Manley asserts that “political and economic power are by no means evenly distributed among the population, but inequality is non-cumulative” (1983, p. 369), making the case for the elite pluralism perspective. This analogy provides an understanding of conflict as something that occurs on different turfs-within different sectors, depending on the levels of interest and power dynamics between elites.

Realism, elitism and pluralism (with its elite pluralism addition) are three of many perspectives around power. The author however wishes to restrict the framework for this piece within the above realms as these collectively provide a core understanding of the gist around what he believes constitutes the dilemma for the African continent and regions selected. The power element will look at political elite power in the EAC and SADC conflicts through the Kenya case study.

3.2.3 On conflict

3.2.3.1 Human needs or basic needs theory
Human needs theory relates to that which triggers individuals to mobilize as groups in order to instigate conflicts towards other groups within society. The theory notes that people will identify with others whom are facing the same plight as them in effort to seek their basic human needs (Beneye 2011). In light of this, both Burton and Azar agree “that protracted social conflicts are caused when people are not able to acquire the means to meet their basic needs” (Beyene 2011, p. 41).

Burton presents four needs which are vital for groups to coexist peacefully and not engage in conflict which Marker details as follows:

“These needs are not hierarchical, but are sought all together: security or safety, meaning both stability and freedom from fear; identity, defined by needs theorists as a sense of self in relation to the outside world; recognition, including the recognition of one’s identity and recognition from others; family and community; and personal development, which includes a dimension of personal fulfillment, or in other words the need to reach one’s potential in all areas of life” (2013 in Olayode 2016, p. 243).

The perceived fears which are nurtured from the restriction of these basic human needs create insecurity to existence, especially when proven true via attacks on identity, either through marginalization, deprivation of access to state structures, selective discrimination and relatively low resource dispensation for other groups identifying themselves as a collective ethnic or class grouping. This leads to conflict outbreak and continuance.

Azar provides a similar set of what would constitute basic needs which “include security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation, in general referred to as developmental needs” (1990 in Beneye 2011, p. 41). This relates to
developmental needs from the viewpoint of achieving felicity of all communities within a state. Azar researched a number of protracted social conflicts which he asserts are “distinct from traditional disputes over territory, economic resources, or East-West rivalry… [and] revolves around questions of communal identity” (in Ramsbotham 2005, p. 114). The disfavour of particular communities within the state from that enjoyment of felicity will therefore result in the perception of fear to their development and survival, which chains down to trigger tensions and spiral conflicts. Ramsbotham explains this better as he reflects Azar’s analogy that “in many post-colonial multicommunal societies the state machinery comes to be dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society which strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict” (2005, p. 115).

3.2.3.2 Frustration-Aggression Theory

The frustration-aggression theory explains conflict through Miller et al.’ statement that “the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration, and … frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression” (1941 in Chase and Kneupper 1974, p. 60). This definition included two core aspects which are that “(a) frustration instigates behaviour that may or may not be hostile or aggressive. (b) Any hostile or aggressive behaviour that occurs is caused by frustration. In other words, frustration is not a sufficient, but a necessary, condition for hostility and aggression” (Zillmann 1979 in Dennen 2005, no page). A person’s or community’s frustration may therefore be existent without an initial outright aggression. Dollard et al. explain this, dormant and yet present, potential for aggression noting that “it is apparently held that aggressive drive resulting from frustrations is somehow maintained within the organism and adds up to a level at which an otherwise tolerable frustration evokes
aggression” (in Dennen 2005, no page) talking to frustration triggers that would cause aggression. They also claim that “a particular frustration instigates aggression primarily against the source of the frustration but also instigates aggression against targets that are to some degree related to that source” (in Dennen 2005, no page).
Chapter 4: Kenya case study: Power as a source of conflict

4.1 The colonial genesis

In his book *The Wretched of the Earth*, Franz Fanon “de-naturalizes imperial projects by not only demonstrating the violence underpinning them but also their social and political effect” (Sahle 2012, p. 46). This was in view of the fact that colonialism included the division of spaces to suit political and economic needs. Such conquest by the British colony “produced the territorial political-economic space known as Kenya... [and] ... was underpinned by violence and disdain for pre-existing socio-cultural geographies” (Sahle 2012, p. 48) in the process of their “establishment of a colonial agricultural economy in the White Highlands in the 1900s” (Kanogo 1987 and Van Zwanenberg 1975 in Kabiri 2014, p. 520). From the onset, “administrative and other forms of power became consolidated in a centralized state, which rested on force and the new imperial ideology of progress” (Sahle 2012, p. 49).

The anthropologist Peter Gutkind explains how, “when the British could not find ‘tribal identities’ for their system of indirect rule, they created them” (1970 in Little 1998, p. 448) thereby extending limited power to some favoured tribes at the expense of others. The British imposed “colonial control through indirect rule, uneven development of capitalism and, consequently, competition for resources merely accentuated rivalry and politicised ethnic consciousness” (Ajulu 2002, p. 253) between tribes.

The construct of the perception of an ethnic ‘other’ (Sahle 2012, p. 49) maintained the colonial power structure and became the trigger of conflict. Ajulu discusses how competition culminated in conflict between tribes who had access to resources and the power structure of
the colony versus those without (2002). For the latter tribes, “the Kalenkin, Masai, Turkana and Samburu alliance (KAMATUSA) remained largely on the periphery of capitalist penetration until very late in the 1950s” (Ajulu 2002, p. 254).

Use of force was a common format for engagement as the “British administration and its military forces cleared the Baringo region of many of the Il Chamus’ stronger rivals (Turkana and Pokot Maasai), which allowed them [the Il Chamus tribe] to establish their own cattle herds without the constant fear of raids” (Little 1998, p. 448). This was part of the colonial paradigm whereby “in the European model the Il Chamus were good natives who were unlikely to resist colonial rule” (Little 1998, p.448).

Conflicts therefore arose, not only because of spatial land dispensation, but more so because of the relative power manifested in terms of provision of security and, economic and resource endowment which the Il Chamus and other favoured tribes were accumulating relative to others. This “divide and rule [system], which seems to have institutionalized ethnic consciousness in Kenya” (Osamba 2001, p. 90) led to imminent conflict. It yielded the “first political organisation, the East African Association (EAA), formed in 1919” (Ajulu 2002, p. 255), whose members spearheaded the 1922 riots (Ajulu 2002). It should however be noted that the EAA initially had no ethnic plight as its core grievance. Yet, it opened doors for the creation of organisations which would be based on ethnic cleavages.

The colonial repression and its resistance culminated into colonial powers establishing “a battery of laws and ordinances ... to make political engagements very costly... banned the first African attempt at a countrywide group, the East African Association ... [and] ... The ban on countrywide political associations until close to the end of colonialism [which]
effectively cemented ethnic particularism after independence” (Mueller 2014, pp.4-5). This eventually transformed into a power and land-resource conflict as the colony met resistance from the marginalized locals who resisted under what would be called the “Mau Mau” (Ajulu 2002, p.254) movement.

BBC news depicts how this struggle for political and land rights which lasted for eight years under a colonial state of emergency, saw extensive loss of lives:

“Officially the number of Mau Mau and other rebels killed was 11,000, including 1,090 convicts hanged by the British administration. Just 32 white settlers were killed in the eight years of emergency ... The Kenyan Human Rights Commission has said 90,000 Kenyans were executed, tortured or maimed during the crackdown, and 160,000 were detained in appalling conditions” (BBC News a, 2011).

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission detailed atrocities which occurred under colonialism, indicating how:

“These violations included massacres, torture, arbitrary detention, and sexual violence, most of which were committed, initially, when the British government forced its authority on the local population, and later, when it violently sought to squash the Mau Mau rebellion. From 1952 onwards, the British administration established detention camps in which suspected members of Mau Mau and/or their sympathisers were tortured and ill-treated” (2013).
4.2 Independence

In the run-up to Kenya’s independence “two powerful contending parties emerged: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU)” (Kabiri 2014, p. 521). KANU was an alliance guided by the Kikuyu tribes whereas KADU was led by the Kalenjins. From independence onwards, contesting power took place primordially “around locally defined ethnic communities” (Posner 2007, p. 1317), especially the above-mentioned main tribes. To note, “both political parties were coalitions of ethnic groups or district-based political associations” (Osamba 2001, p. 90).

From before the birth of a post-colonial state, power in terms of governing structure, became an issue of contention where “KANU stood for a unitary state, while, KADU, a coalition of the small ethnic groups, advocated for regionalism allegedly for fear of domination by the big tribes in a unitary government” (Kabiri 2014, p. 521). It is also argued that “the reality underpinning these considerations was of course competition over resources” (Ajulu 2002, p. 258).

4.3 President Jomo Kenyatta

Jomo Kenyatta was the first President of post-independent Kenya. He ruled until his demise in 1978. With his new arrival at the pinnacle of power through the KANU party, Kenyatta ironically “made no substantial changes to the structure of the state … Instead ... [he] embarked on consolidating his power. Under his administration, any political dissent was met with quick rebuke and reprisals in effect forcing the populace into a silence of fear … Many fled into exile for fear of their lives and to avoid the heavy hand of the Kenyatta administration” (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013).
Under what became a “de facto one-party state” (Hansen 2009, p. 2) that took place “as early as 1964” (Barkan 2004, p. 88), Kenyatta implemented repressive measures like the “banning [of] attempts of creating an opposition party associated with the Luo ethnic group” (Hansen 2009, p. 2). Atieno-Odhiambo claims that through this move, “Kenyatta chose to exclude the Luo as a cultural ‘other’ in the regime of political dispensation” (in Osamba 2001, p. 92).

The latter years of Kenyatta’s rule were “marked by rising intolerance, corruption, high-level political assassinations, and widespread discontent [of the populace] over the dominance of Kikuyu in business and among senior political appointees” (Chege 2008, p. 127). Kisiangani lays out the gist of Kenyatta’s hunger for power:

“Parliament was relieved of any involvement in issues of national elections and presidential verdicts and any other say over Kenyatta’s conduct and use of power … At the heart of … political difference were questions of political power and the distribution of national resources” (2004, p.102).

These were the new bases for fear, frustrations and inter-tribal tensions. Conflicts between opposition and his regime were escalated at instances whereby “public figures such as Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya and J M Kariuki were mysteriously assassinated and others were detained without trial” (Kisiangani 2004, p. 103).

**4.4 President Daniel Arap Moi**

Daniel Arap Moi became President due to the demise of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. The hold of executive power therefore moved from the hands of Kikuyu towards a Kalenjin. Moi followed in the footsteps of repression against other ethnic groups “from gaining public
office or access to state resources” (Hansen 2009, p. 2). In light of this, the number and levels of opposition against the, now elite Kalenjin-led party, grew substantially.

Ironically, Ojwang highlights how, “right from the beginning, Moi’s pet topic was national unity. In 1981 for instance, he abolished all ethnic-based organisations, allegedly because they were reinforcing ethnicity” (in Kabiri 2014, p. 521). In reality, the move was undertaken in order for the political elite to “thwart off a plan by opposition leaders Odinga and George Anyona to launch a new socialist-oriented party” (Osamba 2001, p. 92). It was also in June 1981 that Moi “amended the constitution and made Kenya a one-party state. Later he passed other laws that increased his power personally and dismantled whatever checks and balances remained in the system” (Mueller 2014, p. 9). His stronghold on political and resource-based powers was cemented henceforth.

Cheeseman and Tendi concluded that “in the 1980s, the elite alliance that had served as the foundation of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) government was undermined by President Daniel Arap Moi’s use of divide-and-rule strategies which alienated rivals and heightened the salience of ethnic identities” (2010, p. 208) to show the extent of his regime’s authoritarianism. Osamba further portrays this in ethnic terms, asserting how Moi, “after consolidating his hold on power, dispensed with the Kikuyu political elite and adopted policies that tended to promote disproportionate privilege to the Kalenjin elite … [whereby] as Jean Bayart describes it, politics of the belly or the culture of eating became more pronounced” (2001, p. 92) nationally. In addition to the political realm, “he also filled the civil service, the military, parastatals, and banks with numerous unqualified Kalenjins. A free for all of grand and gross corruption ensued” (Mueller 2014, p. 10).
One instance of retaliation occurred “in August 1982 [when the] Kenyan Air Force officers attempted a coup d’état against Moi accusing his government of corruption and tyranny. The failure of the coup was followed by a crackdown on real and imagined dissidents” (Kisiangani 2004, p. 103). There was increased marginalization of the Luo ethnic groups in view of the fact that the coup “was said to have been mounted by Luo members of the air force” (Mueller 2014, p.9).

The extent of Moi’s power-hunger was experienced in one of his most arrogant addresses to the nation in 1984 where he dictated how:

“I call on all Ministers, Assistance Ministers and every other person to sing like parrots. During Mzee … Kenyatta’s period I persistently sang the Kenyatta tune until people said ‘This fellow has nothing except to sing for Kenyatta’. I say: I didn’t have any ideas of my own. Why was I to have my own ideas? I was in Kenyatta’s shoes and therefore, I had to sing whatever Kenyatta wanted. If I had sung another song, do you think Kenyatta would have left me alone? Therefore, you ought to sing the song I sing. If I put a full stop, you should also put a full stop” (Watch 1993 in Kabiri 2014, p. 521)

From national unity, the justification of measures and policies undertaken by the Moi administration transformed to that of securing the state, in the aftermath of the coup attempt (Kisiangani 2004). The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission details his authoritarian consolidation of power:

“Almost without exception, security operations entailed the following atrocities: torture and ill-treatment, rape and sexual violence, looting of property and burning of houses … The infamous Nyayo House torture
chambers were designed and built during this period specifically for the purpose of terrorizing those who were critical of, or perceived to be critical of, the established regime” (2013).

4.4.1 Moi’s power conflict with pluralism

National oppositions’ resistance to Moi’s rule grew in parallel to external global events; most notably the ending of the cold war which saw a victory for democracy. This also saw the push from international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to impose pressure towards a multiparty regime of governance on Moi’s administration (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013), which culminated into the suspension of “$250 million in aid to Kenya in November 1991” (Barkan 2004, p. 89).

Pro-pluralism pressures spiralled following the “assassination in January 1990 of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko” (Chege 2008, p. 128). Posed with threats to his hold to power, Moi regressed to the idea of majimboism as a better formula in disfavour of pluralism. Through this, he played on the fears instilled onto the populace from the experiences of the colonial and Kenyatta eras, with a “call for all outsiders in the Rift Valley to return to their ‘motherland’ (Wangechi et al. no date, no page). He was however forced to resort to pluralism by December 1991.

The campaign against democracy’s multipartism saw Moi’s alliance alluding to the ethnic fears of misrepresentation and frustrations over longstanding power abuses by bigger tribes; as the marginalized tribes would be restricted to voting along ethnic lineage instead of political ideologies (Kabiri 2014). Moi predicted that taking this route would yield in “a race for political power founded on tribal balkanisation that would breed tribal animosity and hence chaos” (‘The Rift valley’s deadly’ 2008 in Kabiri 2014, p. 522). He further dictated to
“those agitating for political party pluralism that he was going to ‘clash them like rats’” (Kabiri 2014, p. 522).

Measures undertaken included “increasingly repressive and exclusionary strategies, [which] resulted in growing divisions among the elite, with political leaders becoming progressively more willing to marshal their supporters, and occasionally militia groups, against their rivals” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, p. 208). The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights talks to the source of atrocities:

“Conflict started when opponents of ex-president Daniel Arap Moi claimed he exploited factional violence through competition over land and ethnic patronage to bolster his own power and to discredit a multiparty approach to politics” (2012 in Wangechi et al. no date, no page).

This was met with a limited level of counter attacks from the new opposition, the “Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)” (Osamba 2001, p. 100); itself another coalition of ethnic groups which were supported by the Kikuyus. At that point FORD was seen as having a “badly splintered opposition elite” (Kagwanja and Southall 2009,p. 261) grouping, however.

Osamba details how “within a few months following the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya, ethnopolitical conflict and violence erupted in the Rift Valley province” (2001, p. 93). The conflict took form of “ethnic cleansing … [exemplified in] the 1992 ethnic cleansing … [whereby] … killer bands, recruited mainly from the Kalenjin and Maasai supporters of the ruling party, had the encouragement of top officials of the ruling party, and the government … [for] the removal of what they called madoadoa (islands of non-Kalenjin
groups in the Rift Valley)” (Ajulu 2002, p. 264), especially the Kikuyus. Kimani accounts how “in 1993, fighting in the Rift valley between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu killed 1,500 people, [and] displaced around 300,000” (2009 in Wangechi et al. no date, no page).

Moi and his party “cynically manipulated extra-state violence to frustrate democracy, secure victory and retain power during the 1992 and 1997 multiparty elections” (Kagwanja and Southall 2009, p. 261). Wangechi et al. elaborate how “hundreds of people were killed and houses torched, schools were closed and clashes erupted in Njoro, Ndeffo, Mau Narok, Tipis and Likia in Molo constituency” (no date, no page) as a result of the conflict and violence surrounding the 1997 elections. This further entrenched the country along ethnic lines.

Moi appointed the son of Jomo Kenyatta; Uhuru Kenyatta, as KANU’s nominee for the 2002 presidential elections which caused a split within the party; leading to some members forming the “Rainbow Coalition with Raila Odinga as its leader” (Hansen 2009, p. 3). What followed was a growth of the said coalition. The addition of the “13-party coalition, the National Alliance Party of Kenya, joined fronts with the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] under the name of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)” (Hansen 2009, p. 3). At the head of the party was Mwai Kibaki, with Odinga as his running Prime Minister. NARC succeeded to take over the presidency and with this, begun the Mwai Kibaki administration.

4.5 President Mwai Kibaki

With the Kibaki regime the potency of conflict was engulfed within the pluralist framework of governance. It was noted how “for a while it seemed that Kenya’s repressive past had mostly evaporated, but it proved more resilient than expected” (Mueller 2014, p, 15).
From the onset “Kibaki refused to honour … [an established] … pre-election memorandum of understanding that the post of Prime Minister would be created for Odinga” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, p. 208). Chege stresses how this “failure to honour a power-sharing agreement with its coalition partners was to become its [Kibaki’s] greatest political liability” (2008, p. 129). This was because Odinga and his party perceived the move as a betrayal to his ethnic followers (Chege 2008).

Further, Kibaki’s rule saw a favouring of those close to him and his tribe. For example, “an informal clique of powerful individuals who were keen on promoting narrow and regional interests formed around the President” (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013). As did his predecessors before him, Kibaki “purged the public service of his predecessors nominees and filled it with people from his Kikuyu community and the larger GEMA community” (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013).

The biggest flaw of the Kibaki administration lay in the leniency towards impunity and the covering up of past and present corruption cases. One such case was the “Goldensberg scandal, a US$800 million Moi-era scam involving government rebates for fake diamond exports” (Chege 2008, p. 129). Inasmuch as there was a commission which investigated the case, no one has faced conviction to date. Mueller further dictates how “the real deal breaker for the new government … was a giant corruption scandal known as the Anglo Leasing uncovered by John Githongo. Kibaki and his inner circle hounded and threatened Githongo, forcing him to leave the country” (2014, p. 16) as the perpetrators were shielded by the presidency.
The 2002 NARC coalition, being the first coalition to successfully attain the highest seats of power only to have a Kikuyu leadership that marginalized the rest of the populace, somewhat reaffirmed fears which even Moi predicted, as he campaigned in against Kikuyu rule. Kagwanja and Southall inform of this conundrum:

“Since colonial days, political tribalism and inter-ethnic struggle for the control over the state have revolved around the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and the Kalenjin groups … the ability of the Kikuyu to tap a vote-rich coalition has transformed the group into a perceptual majority that has always been a target of fear and counter-mobilisation by other groups. An outcome has been that Kenya’s ethnic-based post-colonial politics has given impetus to a phenomenon of blaming the ills of society on the Kikuyu, which Kenyan historian Macharia Munene (1998) traces back to colonial invention and manipulation of political identity” (2009, p. 266).

Having won a seat from a coalition of tribes; betrayed the memorandum upon which the ticket to presidency was won; and marginalizing smaller tribes in favour of the Kikuyus and close elites did not bode well for Kenyatta. For example, it was noted how “Odinga’s supporters were united by a belief that they had been denied their ‘turn to eat’ as a result of Kikuyu domination of land, political power, and economic opportunity” (Cheesemand and Tendi 2010, p. 209). This reinstated fears and grievances surrounding Kikuyu domination especially in relations to the needs of other tribes deprived of national power.

Kibaki’s administration’s use of “autocratic tendencies and KANU-like tendencies” (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013) was imminent. Violence ensued firstly through “the emergence of increasing number of extra state militia for hire by politicians and others. The most powerful of these gangs was ‘Mungiki’ … the Kibaki government soon went after
Mungiki with a vengeance … government’s extra-judicial police squads … murdered members of Mungiki rather than just arresting them and taking them to trial” (Mueller 2014, p. 17). This met retaliation. Unsurprisingly therefore, “the period leading up to the 2007 General Election was characterised by intense violent activities by militia groups, especially Mungiki sect and Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF). The government responded to the violence with excessive force” (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013).

The greed for power pushed Kibaki to part from the coalition with NARC and propose “a two-party adversarial system based on the first-past-the-post electoral system that has brought so many African countries to grief … in the context of deep ethnic mistrust and ethnic-based parties” (Chege 2008, p. 130). This increased on the tribal frustrations and fears around Kikuyu power-centrism, as it now meant that the winner wins the entire power base (Chege 2008).

The 2005 referendum over a new constitution saw Kibaki’s KANU losing “to the LDP-KANU opposition alliance, which had now united as the ‘Orange Democratic Movement’ [based on the view that the proposed constitution] was depicted as a Trojan horse for continued Kikuyu dominance” (Chege 2008, p. 132). Githongo stressed how post-referendum “behaviour of Kibaki and his lieutenants seemed to confirm the worst stereotypes about the Kikuyu elite that already loomed large in the Kenyan political imagination” (2010, p. 5).

The Kikuyu hold to power and resource marginalization of other ethnic groups were countered under one umbrella-manufactured by the opposition in the campaign for the 2007 national elections. This catapulted from the failed 2005 referendum which had sent the
message of ethnic fears and resentment to the Kibaki regime. This was illustrated by Chege who maintained that:

“Building on the rhetoric of the 2005 referendum, the ODM grassroots campaign turned the election into a contest of ‘forty-one tribes against one’ and ‘Kenya against the Kikuyu. The campaign highlighted domination in banking, government, trade, out-migration, education, and commercial farming, and Kikuyu success was blamed for the marginalization suffered by other groups” (2008, p. 133).

And as history had placed a fearful, marginalized, conflict-prone environment at hand for Kibaki, the ground was set for the post-election violence which occurred around the said elections. The violence was of historical magnitude and lasted for two months. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission “estimated that 1,133 people were killed, thousands assaulted and raped, hundreds of thousands more displaced from their homes and property worth billions of shillings destroyed” (2013).

Cheeseman (2008) would later assert how “the political crisis that engulfed Kenya in 2008 was triggered by the apparent refusal of President Mwai Kibaki to relinquish power after Raila Odinga’s supporters had already begun celebrating victory, but its roots lay in the divisive politics of the 1980s and 1990s, which both increased opposition to the state and undermined its capacity to maintain order” (in Cheeseman and Tendi 2010).

The Waki report deduced that power centrism towards the elite remained one of the core reasons for the outbreak of conflict in 2007-2008. This was found present historically throughout Kenya’s leaderships whereby:
“Power has been personalized around the presidency and this has been increased by changes in the Constitution under each President since independence. Laws are routinely passed to increase executive authority, and those laws seen as being in the way are often changed or even ignored” (Kenyastokholm 2008, p. 28).

The violence was perpetrated by both government and the opposition. An example of such was the Eldoret County in the Rift Valley where conflict took “the form of ethnic-based clashes between Odinga’s supporters, especially from the Kalenjin group, and supporters of the Kibaki, mostly from the Kikuyu ethnic group” (Hansen 2009, p. 3).

The use of gangs became rampant with Mwelu reporting that “informal gangs and militia … [were] responsible for most of the estimated 1,000 dead in post-election violence, while attacks and threats have been used to deliberately drive away minority groups from their homes and workplaces” (2008). This affected the aftermath of the post-election violence environment especially for the elites and their power relations as Kibaki was re-pronounced incumbent.

4.6 Uhuru Kenyatta

Uhuru’s entrance into power from 2013 brought William Ruto, a Kalenjin, as his vice president (Kuoppamäki 2017); both having been in the group of Kenyans scheduled to appear in front of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity (News24 2017).

A number of “critics have accused Mr. Kenyatta of limiting freedom of expression” (BBC News b 2017) throughout his first mandate. Further, Corruption was seen as the main evil of
his administration. BBC news claims how “in its 2016 report in perceptions of corruption, Transparency International ranked Kenya at 145 of 176 countries” (b 2017). One of the measures undertaken by the president to redress this matter occurred in 2015 where “he suspended and eventually removed five ministers and other high-ranking officials over corruption allegations” (BBC News b 2017). Blogger Osiro points out how Kenyatta was unable to clear himself of corruption within his close circle however; from that of his vice president through to “the alleged misappropriation of KSh.5Billion ($50Million) intended for free maternity care in hospitals across the country … the individuals and private companies implicated in the scandal are respectively members of the president's immediate and extended family and companies associated with them” (no date).

Conflict spirals, especially around the 2017 elections, started since 2016 with a target at the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. It was believed that the said entity was “colluding the [Kenyatta’s] Jubilee government” (Noor and Alingo 2016). Withnall had predicted increased violence for the elections with the view that “the importance of the presidency has been diminished ... reducing the chance of clashes in the capital. But in doing so, it has created 47 potential flashpoints instead of just one” (2017) prompting potential violence throughout the country.

Violence did occur after the results of the August 2017 elections were released. These “erupted in Kisumu city, an opposition stronghold, and in Nairobi slums of Mathare and Kawangware” (skynws 2017). Duggan et al. detail how the violence left “at least 24 people dead nationwide … Beyond the deadly incidents in Kisumu and Nairobi, most of the nation remained calm” (2017). The Supreme Court annulled the election results and a second round
of elections took place in October 2017 (Nyabola 2017). Taking its toll along ethnic lines as predicted, Abdi notes how:

“the elections were marred by serious human rights violations by Kenyan security forces, who used excessive force to break up protests and carry out house-to-house operations particularly in opposition strongholds in Nairobi and western Kenya. At least 12 people were killed by police in western counties of Kisumu and Siaya alone and another 33 in Nairobi during the violence” (2017).

Abdi also informs how government undertook measures to destabilize civil society organizations as individuals were reporting acts of violence which they underwent in pre and post elections times (2017).

4.7 Conclusion

The high levels of power centrism and use of force, fear and propaganda are rampant mechanisms in Kenya. Authoritarianism has marked Kenya’s existence within a realist perspective, with elites engaging in contestation for national power only for the betterment of their tribes and close circles. The advent of pluralism was parallel to the advent of politicisation of ethnicity for elites to remain in power. These have fed fears and hatred within the population which, as with the cases of Moi’s 1992 and 1997 elections, and Kibaki’s 2005 referendum and 2007 post-election violence, led the country into chaos as frustrations led to aggression due to the inability for marginalized tribes to engage in their human developmental needs. Twenty-first century Kenya failed a first power-sharing agreement in 2002 and was forced into a second agreement by virtue of the fear of power-centrism and elite domination of certain tribes. The recent use of the presidency and the state fabric for the interest of elites has reinforced the fears of collusion for power-hold as seen in
the 2013 and 2017 election tensions and violence. Power therefore remained core for the continued protracted nature of conflict which eventually broke into violence.
Chapter 5: Kenya case study: Ethnicity as a source of conflict

5.1 Introduction

Wangechi et al. outline how “most of the studies carried out on causes of armed conflict have been outside Kenya … with little effort being made to specify ethnicity as a root cause of conflict” (no date, no page), thereby highlighting the complexity of claiming ethnicity as such. This is further explained by Osamba:

“Kenyan Africans do not speak of ethnicity in their office, on public platforms, or in whisper along the streets. They talk and think about tribalism as a regular experience of their everyday lives, in its many enabling capacities, its incapacitating impediments upon the hopes of individuals, and its blocking of opportunities for whole communities” (2001, p. 97).

Ethnicity is therefore lived as the epitome of relative deprivation and a compass on one’s relative tribal societal positioning in the Kenyan context. This compass relates to chances, closeness to resources and through this analogy; to the relative power which the particular person, and the person’s tribal community has, irrelevant of whether such is real or imagined.

One can also argue that ethnicity to some extent, cements the core of understanding and interpretation of Kenyan conflict as expressed by Kimenyi and Ndunng’u hereunder:

“the most commonly cited cause of the violence in Kenya is ethnic cleavage … Because violence has been organized along ethnic lines,
the inference is that ethnic clashes in Kenya have been purely the result of ‘ethnic hatred’. But this hatred must be qualified. It is linked to electoral politics and competition among new arrivals in a region, groups with large land ownership, and native groups who felt threatened by the others” (no date, pp. 126-127).

However, Kimenyi and Ndung’u’s research have imparted the importance of ethnicity to the outbreak of conflict in Kenya in terms of the heterogeneity of counties:

“Of the 13 most ethnically diverse districts in Kenya, 12 (or 92 percent) have had violent conflicts of one type or another. Additionally, of the 8 most ethnically homogenous districts, only one (Kisii) has experienced violent conflicts. Moreover, the violence in Kisii is confined to its border with Transmara. From this we can infer that conflicts do have an ethnic dimension” (no date, p. 127).

Further, Bratton and Kimenyi’s research undertaken in the weeks ahead of the 2007 elections depict that “Although Kenyans resist defining themselves in ethnic terms, their actions in making electoral choices show a country where voting patterns hew largely to ethnic lines” (2008, p. 287).

Stewart’s research highlights the importance of ethnicity as more than a channel for the manifestation of conflict. He claims that “conflict is seen as largely ethnic, with 46 per cent of participants believing that ‘violent’ conflict occur ‘often’ or ‘always’ among different groups’, suggesting that in politics ethnicity is perceived as important … this, or how far ethnicity drives political action, is what is relevant” (2010, pp. 136-138).
The medium of relating to “the other” (Sahle 2012) within the Kenyan context is through ethnicity. Inter-tribal relations have kept the elite class element into play (the Carter Centre 2013). This has built tribal frustration towards the “dominance of the Kikuyu and GEMA tribes” (the Carter Centre 2013, p.16) which accumulated more power since independence. Posner indicates how a multiparty “regime change affects the salience of alternative ethnic cleavages [and] hinges on an instrumentalist view of ethnicity in which individuals ‘vote their ethnic groups’ to maximize their access to resources” (2007, p. 1322).

Such fears around the dominance of certain tribes spiralled conflict. An example was the above-mentioned 2005 Wako-Bomas Draft constitution which “the opposition demonised ... as a Kikuyu constitution” (Rutten and Owuor 2009, p. 316). This failed the 2005 referendum as a sign of conflict based on inter-tribal power perceptions.

This tribal demonization could be found throughout Kenyan History. During the 2008 election violence it led to the analogy that “if people are killing Kikuyus because they are Kikuyus, then definitely it [violence] will spread elsewhere to other [ethnic] communities” (Abdullah Ahmed in Baldauf 2008). The anticipated spread of violence to genocide levels did not occur however.

5.2 The politicization of ethnicity

The Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights articulates how the “ politicisation of ethnicity has become the strongest single determinant in the domain of governance in Kenya” (2015, p. 9). Mutiga supports this within the context of the 2017 elections stressing how:

“Ultimately, at the heart of Kenya’s challenge lies a profoundly ethnicised form of politics on which the political class thrives. It is a
political culture with deep historical roots. When the British colonised Kenya, divide-and-rule tactics became a de facto policy aimed at preventing a broad-based nationalist movement … after independence, the Kenyan political elites found in this system – and its ethnic divisions – a convenient way to entrench their power” (2017).

Further, the Carter Centre’s report indicates that “politicized ethnicity usually served narrow groups of officeholders and elites receiving their patronage, while the people for whose ethnic interests they campaigned remained mired in poverty” (2013, p. 15). It was seen that not all Kikuyus enjoy the fruits of power. The Carter Centre also asserts that, “in the context of the rise of multiparty politics in the 1990s and national elections in 1992 and 1997, ethnic identity was used as a political instrument, which led to ethnic clashes throughout that decade” (2013, p. 16).

Khisa et al. show how this entrenched politicization of ethnicity was internalized within the Kenya psyche. They take from Lynch (2006) and illustrate how:

“Politics in Kenya is largely dominated by ethnic calculations and Kenyans see most government activity through an ethnic lens: ‘This simplification of political dynamics means that too many an anti-corruption crusade becomes an ethnic witch hunt; a policy to invest in marginal areas becomes an attempt to draw certain minorities into an ethnic coalition, whilst policies to invest in high capacity areas appear as food for the Kikuyu. In turn, for many, a lack of development and/or land is seen as being simply the result of marginalisation of their ‘community’” (2012, p. 36)
Due to this, Adeagbo maintains that “politicians in Kenya politicized the existing difference between the ethnic groups rather than emphasizing the areas of common interests as unifying factors between groups in Western, and other provinces” (2011, p. 176). Mutiga laments that, “that politicians still run on political platforms based mainly on ethnic identity doesn’t help” (2017).

In view of the politicisation of ethnicity, the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights concludes on what they believe has become the “ethnicisation of power” (Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights 2015, p. 16) which “undoubtedly contributes to communal conflicts” (Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights 2015, p. 16). The politicization of ethnicity has created a landscape whereby ethnically politicised tribes are viewed in terms of their relative power.

5.3 Cabinet representation

Part of the research undertaken by Steward (2010) looked at cabinet representation from independence. This found correlations between ethnicity, patronage, perceived resource allocation per ethnic groups within the population and power-centrism. His findings inform accordingly:

“We can identify three ‘danger’ points, where some groups’ representation is particularly low. Firstly Luhya representation at the end of the Kenyatta regime … but this was rapidly corrected by Moi. Secondly, the sharp loss of representation of Kikuyus under Moi from 1994-2001 … The third danger point was at the end of the Kibaki regime, when Luo relative representation was just 0.3 (and Kalenjin 0.5). Such inequalities [in cabinet representation] reflect not only a power imbalance but also lopsided possibilities of patronage and
shares in interest. Moreover, each group’s share of senior positions in
government and the civil service is important because they help
determine the group distribution of government expenditure” (pp.141-
142).

Marginalisation based on representation is therefore pertinent. It speaks to needs and fears of
tribes which are not represented and therefore more prone to engage in conflict against the
regimes.

5.4 Deception and mistrust

Kenya has a repetitive politico-ethnic history with sentiments of resentment, betrayal and
distrust built around, and channelled through, ethnicity. A first example is when Jomo
Kenyatta ousted Luo leader Jamarogi Oginga Odinga after independence (Kimenyi 2013).
Since then, “the two ethnic groups have remained suspicious of each other and their
relationship has been marked by mistrust and at times open animosity. Most of the recent
elections have mostly been a contest between Kikuyu candidates and the Odingas” (Kimenyi
2013). A repetition of this scenario occurred after the 2002 elections when “President Kibaki
opposed his former ally and [now] main rival Oginga Odinga” (The Carter Centre 2013, p.
15); rejecting the latter from power–sharing.

Steward further found that, in terms of Kenyan ethnic relationships, “only eight per cent trust
Kenyans from other ethnic groups, compared with 13 percent for those of their own
ethnicity” (2010, p. 136). Bratton and Kimenyi’s research note how “respondents also show a
high degree of mistrust of members of other ethnic groups and consider the behaviour of
these other groups to be influenced primarily by ethnicity” (2008, p. 287). Further Atta-
Asamoah’s research informs how until the advent of the 2010 constitution, “ethnic
affiliations and identities were franchised for merit during coalition formations, whilst negative ethnic divisions were emphasised for political gain. Political patronage became the primary basis for inclusion or exclusion from political participation … the idea of the state … [has therefore been] alienated in the minds of many citizens” (2015, p. 9). Distrust and disengagement towards the state has therefore become commonplace.

5.5 Stereotyping and hate speech

Osamba shows how ethnic stereotyping occurs especially between Kikuyus and Kalenjins. He mentions how “the Kikuyu felt that their people had gallantly fought in the 1950s against British colonial rule for Kenya’s independence. Yet, the Moi regime had marginalized them … the Kalenjin, on the other hand, recollected how in the past they lost their fertile land to the Kikuyu through state collusion” (2001, p. 102). In view of these perceptions, Osamba furthers that “the Kalenjin depicted the Kikuyus as exploiters, economic saboteurs, land grabbers, thieves, arrogant, and unscrupulous people. The Kikuyu, on the other hand stereotyped the Kalenjins as primitive, uneducated and a people suffering from a primordial cattle complex mentality” (2001, p. 102). This stereotyping became a mechanism of demonizing the other; cemented in past perceptions.

Scott-Villiers et al’ research further found that “when divisive speech escalates, neighbours stop talking to one another and people boycott each other’s businesses; they blame other ethnic groups and ethnic divisions harden … every person we met in Marsabit [county] described violence in terms of its ethnic effect.” (2014, p. 25). Sandner (2014) therefore showed how continued use of hate speech has kept tribal fears and hatred alive.
5.6 Marginalisation

Marginalisation refers to “status-based social attributes afforded to the elite relative to that of the impoverished. The determination of the existence of marginalisation has conventionally been distinguished by experiences that cause economic or political oppression/segregation of individuals or groups over an extended period of time” (Khisa et al 2012, p. 30). Khisa et al. further conceptualise marginalisation to Kenyan conflict:

“The most crucial point is the issue of marginalisation and agitation by the various ethnicities. Marginalisation breeds distrust, suspicion, heightens ethnic tension and may eventually lead to conflict over the sharing and allocation of power and national resources. It, therefore, has the potential to drive a people towards conflict” (2012, p. 34).

5.7 Critical appreciation: Collusion and fluidity

The 2013 elections depicted how the two core ethnic groups which had demonized each other to the detrimental effects of the 2007-2008 post-election violence, ended up joining forces. The Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights also elaborates how “a peaceful referendum was held in 2010 to usher in the new constitution. The two groups who were adversaries, Kikuyu and Kalenjin in 2007 conflict went to the 2013 elections united and won them” (2015, p. 9).

Cheeseman retraces this element of fluid ethnic elite engagement in what he terms “the politics of collusion [, noting that] the rival leaders knew each other well, having previously campaigned side-by-side to remove Daniel Arap Moi from power in 2002” (2011, p. 351). Kagwanja and Southall specify politics of elite collusion whereby:
“parties move in and out of alliances, and politicians shift parties without compunction according to calculations of advantage ... Kibaki had served as Moi’s vice-president from 1978 to 1988 before defeating the latter’s nominee in the 2002 elections; and Odinga had likewise served as secretary general of KANU and cabinet minister in Moi’s government towards the end of his long incumbency, before backing Kibaki for president and then serving in his government before breaking with him over the constitutional referendum in 2005. The lengths politicians are prepared to go to get their leader into the presidency and themselves into government predisposes them to use violence to achieve their ends” (2009, p. 272).

In the same vein that the above is used to discredit the hard lines of ethnic hatred, it also informs of the ability for the elite to sway the populace to the extent of inciting violence, which still occurs along ethnic lines.

The Commission of Enquiry on the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence submitted a confidential list of perpetrators at senior levels of both government and opposition to Kofi Annan. Cheeseman details the said extent that Kenyan elites colluded in order to save themselves:

“The threat that the list would be passed to an international actor immune to Kenyan political interference, the high distribution of violence and high levels of elite cohesion, encouraged leaders implicated in the post-election violence to broker anti-reform alliances that cut across party lines … By February 2009 a new coalition had formed between William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta … This marriage of convenience brought together the two most prominent politicians believed to be on Annan’s list … their communities (Ruto is a
Kalenjin while Kenyatta is a Kikuyu) had been involved in the worst ethnic violence” (2011, p. 352-353).

The new coalition covered up corruption cases in parliament in order to safeguard the two elites and their elite groups from national prosecution. It was within this context that Annan was forced to submit the list to the ICC in 2009 (Cheeseman 2011). It was also within this same context that the two elites managed to garner respective support for their election in 2013 and arguably, in 2017. This continued ability of leaders to create coalitions overlooking ethnic rivalries in respect of their personal agendas, with an anticipated automatic following of the masses, was met with the Odinga and Luo dissatisfaction.

5.7.1 Critical appreciation: Reality of tribal clashes

Inasmuch as ethnic perceptions have led to general hatred between tribes, the conflicts’ magnitude alludes to the fact that “the label ‘ethnic clashes’ is itself somewhat paradoxical because the clashes did not involve significant numbers of any ethnic community up in arms against another ethnic community … most reports give the numbers of raiders in the hundreds, sometimes in the dozens … while the victims are from specific ethnic communities, the aggressors hardly qualify as an ethnic group” (Kimenyi and Ndung’u no date, p. 126). This talks to orchestrated attacks by militias, gangs and other groups rather than a battlefield with all nationals from different ethnic groups going at each other with machetes.

5.8 Conclusion

Ethnicity is imperative in the Kenyan conflict scenario. Researches have underlined high levels of mistrust and attribution of conflict to ethnicity by Kenyans. Further, elites continuously abused existent tribal identities in order to fuel conflict. This talks to the Kenyan ethnic psyche and consciousness as tribes perceive each other in terms of their
perceived tribally divided and ruled mode; perceiving their survival in terms of their instrumental need to engage on their time to eat and politics of the belly and; within their constructivist and Marxist realities which find them following leadership for the sake of their survival and for elite gains. These realities when experienced in relative terms provided the ignition potential for aggression and conflict.
Chapter 6: Other causes of conflict

6.1 Land

Kimenyi and Ndung’u claimed how “there is a consensus that Kenya’s ‘land question’ is the primary source of the ethnic clashes” (no date, p. 138). This tracks from colonial spatial delineation as mentioned in chapter four. Lumumba maintains that “in Kenya, resistance against colonial rule was crystallised through struggles over land … The Girima, the Maasai, the Kikuyu, the Nandi and the Luhya and Pokot reacted violently to colonial land dispossession and the struggle over land continues to this day” (2005). It is also documented that “it was the landed and the landless that were to confront each other during the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s” (Ajulu 2002, p.254).

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission notes how “the colonial government was also responsible for massive displacement of thousands of people from their lands ... This displacement created the conflicts over land that remain the cause and driver of conflict and ethnic tension in Kenya today” (2013). The TJRC Report Volume 4 articulates a number of key points with regards to Kenya’s land injustices:

“There is a very close linkage between land injustices and ethnic violence in Kenya. More specifically, land related injustices are prominent factors that precipitate violence between and within ethnic tribes in Kenya … all post independence governments have failed to honestly and adequately address land-related injustices that started with colonialism” (2013, p. 54)

Criminal gangs claim that “land and continued marginalisation have been at the centre of their grievances” (Gatimu 2014) alongside unemployment. The Akiwumi report furthers that
“land-related grievance led to the emergence of militia groups in some parts of the country” (in Barasa 2013). Conflict over the rectification of past land injustices is articulated by Boone:

“Concerns about the affirmation of communal or ‘tribal’ land areas were also raised by sceptics who feared that provisions related to community holdings could balkanize the country and lead to discrimination against outsiders, or their nonrepresentation of their interests in local land decisions” (2012, p. 92).

Moi’s majimbo slogan resulted in violence “as a result of trouble between the Nandi and the Kikuyu farmers in a farm called Miteitei situated in Nandi district” (Syagga no date, p. 12), for example. This was because Moi’s majimboism called for ousting outsiders from the ancestral lands of the Kalenjins, Maasai and others. It entailed “the overt and covert pursuit of homogeneity … in land allocation and acquisition [which] … led to a type of ‘residential apartheid’” (Waki Report in Syagga no date, p. 13).

The Ndung’u report on land injustices of the 1980s and 1990s found that “land was no longer allocated for development purposes but as a political reward and for speculative purposes” (Southall 2005 in Boone 2012, p. 89). It also stressed how “illegal allocation of public land is one of the most pronounced manifestations of corruption and political patronage” (Africog 2009, p. 10-11) in Kenya.

6.1.1 Land, ethnicity and corruption

In the interplay between ethnicity, corruption and land triggering conflict, Obala and Mattingly found that the use of ethnic network to intimidate rival ethnic groups when it came to acquisition of land took place (2014). They document how “individuals paid bribes to agents and [government] officials to obtain rights to plots already sold. Buyers and sellers
executed transactions with more trust in one another by using tribal networks, which also maintained exclusive markets for them” (Obala and Mattingly 2014, p. 2745). In light of this, the perception of the ethnic “other” (Sahle 2012) within the land conflict spiralled as Obala and Mattingly’s research depict:

“there was consensus among respondents that corruption exacerbated land conflicts, probably because bitterness grew against both those who paid and those who received bribes and favours, especially when they could be associated with a rival tribe” (2014, p. 2746).

One will now have an overview of land as a cause of conflict through events surrounding the Kenyan Rift Valley province followed by the Maasai tribe’s plight.

6.1.2 The Rift Valley province

Post-independence witnessed how “ethnic tensions developed especially around the structure of access to economic opportunities and the redistribution of some of the land formerly owned by the white settlers. Most of the land in question was in the rift valley province and was historically settled by the Kalenjin and the Maasai” (Oyugi 2000, p. 6). The governments undertook to turn “foreign-funded settlement schemes into cartels for their own benefit, and bought land in the Rift Valley, among other parts of the white highlands” (Kenya Human Rights Commission no date, p. 5) thereby depriving the indigenous tribes who had been forcefully evicted.

The Jomo Kenyatta regime advanced the “policy of ‘willing buyer willing seller’ that the government assumed for land transfers after the initial political settlement on about one million acres” (Oyugi 2000, p. 7). The incumbent used “economic and political leverage
available to them [...] … the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu groups, but especially the Kikuyu … and formed many land-buying companies” (Oyugi 2000, p. 7). Eventually rebellion took the fore with examples such as that precipitating from the “Nandi Declaration” (Oyugi 2000, p. 7) which was a declaration by the Nandi tribes calling for outsiders to leave their ancestral lands (Oyugi 2000).

Moi’s leadership saw the setting up of “a mechanism that weakened the capacity of the Kikuyu to continue acquiring more land in the rift valley province” (Oyugi 2000, p. 7). The counter-pluralism campaign supported by his administration further endorsed the following:

“Peoples claiming to be indigenous to the Rift Valley-the Maasai and the Kalenjin coalition of smaller groups-were encouraged by ruling-party politicians to demand that ‘settlers’ be dispossessed of their land and expelled, politicians dangled the tantalizing prize of restoring land in the Rift Valley to the ‘original owners’ who had been twice denied-first by the colonial state … and then by the ruling party of Jomo Kenyatta” (Boone 2012, p. 86).

Cissac indicates how land grabbing and distribution by political elites became norm, as “similar to what [Jomo] Kenyatta did with the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley during his tenure … Moi … did with the Mau Forest … Given that the forest is government trust land, Moi used his position to grant executive permission for his tribal community, the Kalenjins, to settle there. Kibaki also using the same executive power, expelled the Kalenjins from the Mau Forest in 2003” (2008 in Roberts 2009, p. 10). Land therefore became politicised through the demonization of the ethnic intruders within the politics of ancestral land recognition and rights. Such caused the incitement of hate as Mwakikagile denotes:
“The violence [of the 1990s] was also sparked by pure hatred and xenophobic fear among some people, especially in the Coast and Rift Valley Provinces, who resented members of other tribes from other parts of Kenya who had moved into and settled in those regions … Many of the ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’ who were attacked had lived there for years … They [the indigenous people] saw them as ‘strangers’, foreigners’, ‘outsiders’ and as ‘invaders’ who had gone there to displace the ‘rightful’ owners of the land and were not welcome” (2007).

The Akiwumi report supports this, noting that “ethnic clashes related to the 1997 General Election vividly demonstrated how the skewed land allocation and ownership had fuelled ethnic tension and led to violent conflicts throughout Kenya and particularly in the Rift Valley” (in Barasa 2013).

6.1.3 The Maasai

Lyman and Kew explain how “in 1904 an Anglo-Maasai lease forcibly transferred over 500,000 acres of prime indigenous land to the British colonial administration” (2010, p. 37). The Maasai was moved into impoverished areas and formed part of the administration’s disfavoured ethnic group.

Subsequently, twenty first century Kenya saw government elites’ refraining the Maasai from regaining their territory which was under lease for about a hundred years period, claiming that “the Anglo-Maasai lease officially terminates after 999 years rather than 99” (Lyman and Kew 2010, p. 37). Lyman and Kew elaborate how the stripping of Maasai land by government worsened after independence, noting how “in the past twenty years alone, the government appropriated over 1 million acres of Maasai land through both legalized and highly irregular land-grabbing schemes” (2010, p. 38).
As a response to government’s block against the Maasai some members of the tribe moved onto the land around the Mau Forest. This incited conflict as government forces “arrested over one hundred Maasai in three separate clashes-shooting and killing several elders armed only with sticks-and later charged fifty herders with invading private property” (Lynman and Kew 2010, p. 38).

6.1.4 Critical appreciation: Against land

The kriegler and Waki Report (2009) noted how the Akiwumi report informs that land cannot be used as a core cause of violence that took place around elections and sporadically around the country:

“Other authorities such as the Akiwumi Report dismiss this [land as cause of conflict] explanation pointing out that individuals from different groups lived side by side for many years until the advent of multi party democracy … Hence, the report further argues that even though the promise of getting land from those who were displaced was used to entice youth into violence, the desire for political power and not land hunger was among the causal factors” (p. 51).

Research undertaken by Markussen and Mbuvi supports this claim. Their findings indicate how:

“although violence was on average much more intense in areas with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization, there were a number of areas where Kikuyus co-existed with other groups and fatalities did not occur [in 2007 post-election] ... in nine of these [17] districts,
no fatalities were reported as a result of post-election violence. Five of these nine districts border districts where killings did occur” (2011, p. 16).

6.2 Resource scarcity

The competition for the natural and governmental resource pool gains importance as one acknowledges that “a contributing factor to conflict is population growth through reproduction and in-migration of people from other areas of Kenya, resulting in a population overload” (Bond 2016, p.87). This also includes the in-migration in terms of IDPs. The dilemma reverts to land which permits agriculture and pasture, the participation in the government administrative systems, the impact of consumption on drought and vice versa, and the availability of water (Berger 2003); all of which spread increased insecurities with regards to the survival of pastoralists, tribes and other nationals (Berger 2003). The IRIS report’s research on conflict in North East Kenya states the following therefore:

“A predominant driver of conflict between the clans is access to resources, which is likely to intensify over increasing scarcity of water and pasture aggravated by population growth, land degradation, natural hazards and climate change. This has led to increased competition over already scarce resources, resulting in more violence in the regions” (2015, p. 8)

This is understood by the fact that Kenya is a “predominantly agricultural economy with a rapidly expanding population, [meaning that] the pressure on agricultural land resources in Kenya is severe” (Markussen and Mbuvi 2011, p. 8). This predicament escalates pastoralist and other communal sporadic resource-based conflicts as with the following case.

6.2.1 The Turkana-Pokot conflict
Ellis and Swift (1988) reported “frequent droughts in the South Turkana region, at least four of which were multi-year droughts in a 50-year period ... The distribution of resources is also spatially variable” (in Lind 2003, p. 326). Pastoralists fight over grazing ground because of pasture scarcity. Conflict is said to be rife in times of heavy drought in light of the competition for pastures for animal rearing (Lind 2003).

It is at the border of Turkana and Pokot counties where conflict occurs as was the case in 2005. Opiyo et al.’ research noted how “during long dry season (January to March), both the Turkana and Pokot move towards the dry season grazing areas at the shared border” (2012, p.446) where conflict arise. Harsher droughts further spiral this effect.

6.2.1.1 Critical appreciation: On resource

Opiyo et al. (2012) also note that there exist other studies which stipulate that times of resource and rainfall non-scarcity still see a high number of violent cattle raiding and conflict in Kenya however. For example, the studies of Witsenburg and Adano “correlated monthly rainfall data from 1960 to 2006 in the Marsabit district of Northern Kenya and found that wetter years had more than twice (50) as many people killed in violent raids as compared to drier years” (2009 in Opiyo et al. 2012, p. 448).

Witsenburg and Adano further explain different motives for the incitement of conflict by both sides indicating how “on the Turkana side, drought-related hunger, poverty and lack of pasture are the central conflict stimuli, while on the Pokot side the accumulation of wealth, payment of dowry and the expansion of territory are the main motives behind raiding” (in Opiyo et al. 2012, p. 449). More importantly, they note how the protracted nature of the
conflict relies rather on weakened institutions which cannot deliver territorial security (Opiyo et al. 2012).

Lind notes how the Pokot and Turkana initially had agreements on joint sharing of resources and territory; stressing that it was rather “the imposition of British colonial rule in northern Kenya and the involvement of colonial administrators in inter-tribal affairs … [that] resulted in the escalation of political tensions between Pokot and Turkana herders surrounding the use of resources” (2003, p. 326).

Moreover, the twenty first century pastoralist perception of pastoralist conflict as related directly to accumulation of land and resources is adversely debated. Bollig maintains that:

“Conflict between Pokot and Turkana pastoralists in the current day is not aimed at increasing territory (and thereby access to resources) … Instead raiding is used by younger Pokot age-sets to increase their holdings of livestock. Livestock … are scarce only in relation to the high consumption of livestock by younger men to pay as ‘brideprice’, or in initiation and promotion ceremonies” (in Lind 2003, pp. 328-329).

The above alludes to the potential that the current nature of pastoralist conflict relates to the acquisition of particular standings of power and status.

6.3 The economy and poverty

Kenya remains “East Africa’s largest economy… [that] holds the dubious distinction of having the region’s highest unemployment rate” (UNDP in Otuki 2017). A UNDP report maintains that “while Kenya has shown progress in promotion of human development …
several groups remain disadvantaged” (in Otuki 2017). Otuki notes how unemployment statistic highlights “the paradox of economic policies that have sustained growth without generating jobs-culminating to poor distribution of the benefits of growth” (2017).

The above-mentioned supremacy of Kikuyus and GEMA tribes led to them gaining access to “the political and economic resources of the country” (Adeagbo 2011, p. 176). To this end, the economic enjoyment versus economic marginalization of certain ethnic groups have led to perceived fears and increased frustrations, as grievances over economic dispensation incite tensions and conflict. This is as Adeagbo claims that “the Kalenjins believed that the Kikuyus have marginalized them for far too long by dominating the major sectors of the Kenyan economy at the expense of the Kalenjins” (Adeagbo 2011, p. 175). Gertzel further evidenced this analogy since the 1970s, asserting that:

“The antagonism expressed towards the Kikuyu was not merely or even primarily a tribal legacy rooted in divergent loyalties of the past … It was the contemporary issues and conflicts directly related to Kenya’s economic development that raised fears of dominance by one tribe in all aspects of Kenya’s life: in government, commerce and business” (in Rutten and Owuor 2009, pp. 316-317)

Steward furthers this, stating that “economic and political inequalities were some of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence … it was generally perceived that Kikuyu and Central Province had been enjoying more of the economic and political resources of Kenya before and after independence at the expense of other regions or tribes” (2008 in Adeagbo 2011, p. 176). Adeagbo links this analogy to class, indicating how the extreme difference in gini coefficient in Kenya created “situations of chaos and anarchy” (2011, p. 176).
Moreover, the participation of youths in gangs for the post-election violence of 2007-2008 “is a reflection of the harsh socio-economic conditions of many youths in Kenya” (Adeagbo 2011, p.176). The IRIS report claims that “the large youth bulge combined with limited economic opportunities creates a recruitment pool for clan militias, criminal gangs and terrorist groups” (2015, p. 10). Markussen and Mbuvi conclude their research indicating that it is the economic aspects leading to relative deprivation and especially increased poverty of young males which were cause and trigger for the post 2007 elections violence and therefore core causes of conflict in Kenya instead of land (2011).

**Conclusion**

Land is appreciated as an instrumental source of Kenya’s conflict. In addition, it is understood that resource scarcity, economic marginalization and poverty are sources of conflict which touch the lives of most deprived Kenyans. These are also appreciated in terms of being sub-sets of power rather than being core sources of conflict in the Kenyan case however.
Chapter 7: Government obstacles

7.1 The 2010 constitution: From majimbo to devolution

The 2010 constitution was approved through national referendum “with 67% in favour and 31% against” (Dagne 2010, p.1). Hon. Dr. Mutunga lectured on this “new modern transformative Constitution which replaced both the 1969 Constitution and the former colonial Constitution of 1963 … representing a second independence” (2015) for many optimistic Kenyans. This was as it contains a set of provisions which represent checks and balances created in order to ensure a decentralization of power from the presidency (Mutunga 2015). The culture of conflict remained important even through the Yes and No campaigns for the 2010 referendum however (Dange 2010).

On devolution, the National Council for Law Reporting, articulates how “the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 creates a decentralized system of government wherein two of the three arms of government; namely the Legislature and the Executive are devolved to the 47 Political and Administrative Counties … The primary objective of decentralization is to devolve power, resources and representation down to the local level” (2017). Devolution is, in many a ways, synonymous to majimboism. Osamba analysed the proposed majimboism in the advent of mutlipartism under Moi:

Kenya’s majimboism is not federalism. The central theme that its advocates have pursued is power at any cost. They are disinterested in democratic theory of federalism, which divides power between the centre and the region ... Indeed these advocates supported one Party rule and did not show interest in federalism until September 1991
when they realized that the impending pluralism threatened their hold on power” (2001, p. 93).

Cornell and D’Arcy found that the devolution mechanism pose potential for power contestation within the ethnic realms at national level in Kenya (2016). They further acknowledge the continued invisible hand of central government within the power and functional process of county-level engagements, as it is the centre that manages the pace of implementation of the devolution process on many counts. They denote the following concluding observations:

“while it has already had a significant effect on the balance of power by creating powerful new county governments, the central government’s ongoing reaction to these developments may continue to try to put the brakes on the process and reassert central control” (Cornell and D’Arcy 2016, p. 15)

The Kenya School of Government also caution how “contrary to common expectations that devolution will improve service delivery, governance factors ... often undermine expected performance and accountability gains from decentralization” (2015, p.1).

7.2 National Accord and Reconciliation Act

The aftermath of the 2007 elections saw negotiations for the restoration of peace in Kenya. This resulted in a power-sharing agreement under “The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008” (www.Peacemaker.un.org no date). The Accord detailed the establishment of “a Coalition Government … a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya and two Deputy Prime Ministers” (www.Peacemaker.un.org no date). For the latter two posts, “Kibaki’s pick was Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta. Musalia Mudavadi, the
opposition representative” (Rice 2008) became the second Deputy Prime Minister. Kagwanja and Southall outline a number of important elements surrounding the coalition government:

“The National Accord prevented Kenya from slipping into the category of failed states, and endured despite predictions of inherent instability… Although ethnically divided, the political class had many interests in common; although prepared to deploy violence to gain power, their intention was not to destroy the state … while the coalition has continued to hold, Kenya is still at risk, and its democracy trapped in limbo” (2009, p. 274).

7.3 Weakened state institutions

The Kenyan system of governing have purposefully sought the creation and maintenance of weak state institutions. These have enabled the elites and their tribes to pursue their agendas of staying in power (Mueller 2011) further to legitimizing the instigation and use of fear, repression and impunity, alongside increased corruption (Mueller 2011) and alienation of the masses from the centre of power. This continued to occur in the twenty-first century whereby, “over time the state outside the president developed the seemingly contradictory characteristics of being deliberately weak and simultaneously predatory” (Mueller 2011, p. 104). The Waki report further elaborates on this:

“The checks and balances normally associated with democracies are very weak in Kenya and are deliberately so. Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the civil service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. Hence, the State is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in power” (Kenyastokholm 2008, p. 28).
Magara echoes the 2013 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, indicating how the “weak or lack of institutions is not only the cause of state failure to prevent human rights violations but also the reason that state power is used to perpetrate injustices” (2016, p. 18). This makes remedial actions towards past injustices, which Magara terms as transitional justice (Magara 2016), lose credibility as the source of conflict and abuse remain the resented state institution. This increases fears, hatred and resentment by the deprived segment of the population.

7.4 Protectors turned perpetrators

The Kenyan case also shows how agencies which are supposed to safeguard the nation have been used to further commit atrocities against opposition parties and opposing ethnic groups. Hansen illustrates segments of the Waki report which “conclude that in many instances the use of lethal force by the police targeted individuals who were seemingly posing no immediate harm. In Kisumu, for example, the Waki report found that 30 out of 50 casualties of police shootings had been shot from the back” (2009, p. 6). In other cases, their inaction to unrest supported gang violence (Hansen 2009).

7.5 Conclusion

Government mechanisms and policies have become obstacles in Kenya in as far as they enhance the perpetuation of violence and the entrenchment of conflict by elites. Formulas built to restore peace and stability in the country in post 2008 carry the power dilemma at their core. These have therefore become sub-set mechanisms of the power conflict in Kenya.
Chapter 8: Analysis and conclusion

8.1 Relevance of power as a core source of conflict

Morganthau’s neo-realism has been experienced in Kenya from colonialism to date. In all instances elites have created regimes in which they sought to keep, aggrandize and manifest power. The colonial blueprint of divide and rule has been internalized as part of Kenyans’ psyches and Kenya’s ethnic consciousness. It placed tribes within boxes of importance and influence which demarcated their survival. This chained down to the different post-colonial governments; impacting on state’s power structure which laid on entrenchment of ethnicity. The managements of wealth and knowledge (Ahmad 2012) (through administrative dispensation) were in the hands of the Kikuyus or Kalenjins and their respective circles; depending on which tribes held presidency. Violence was used to impose authoritarianism on the populace as seen even in the twenty-first century rule of Kibaki.

From Jomo Kenyatta through to Mwai Kibaki, policies that ensured the centralization of power towards the presidency were created in order to block marginalized tribes from enjoying national power. The fears of the Kikuyu who, as the elite pluralist perspectives would see as imparting power and influence within diverse sectors of the state, increased over time. And the farther apart the policies, the more the demonization of the ‘other’ (Sahle 2012) ensued. This was further triggered by unjustly crafted resource and land policies.

Kenya further saw a small circle of elites fighting over national power with the Kenyattas, the Odingas; the Kikuyus, Kalenjins and Luos, at the forefront of the race, as appreciated through the elite theory. Elite circulation is experienced through Kenya’s ethnic lens as the Kikuyus
and Kalenjins would remain at the centre of government depending on who holds incumbency. At its worse, elite collusion under Uhuru Kenyatta has been purely to ensure power is retained and for the securing of elites’ personal interests. This reflects the extent that leaders have gone to use, hold and dispose their power in Kenya. One may also understand this in terms of tribal partisanship which is experienced in Kenyan’s voting mentality and violence as documented.

The purging of previous office holders under new presidencies as done by Moi and Kibaki further proved fears of elite nepotism and fuelled ethnic hatred from those deprived of their time to eat. Elite change meant that new incumbents would strip the executive and economic spaces from former tribes and fill these with their own. The fears of Kikuyu domination epitomised in Kibaki’s break away from the power-sharing agreement and eventual first-past-the-post system, fuelled the long-entrenched tensions which have rested on the growing powers of the Kikuyus. The opposition’s successful demonization of the 2005 proposed constitution was to therefore trigger the route to the 2007-2008 violence.

Further, atrocities undertaken to instil fear and frustration of the masses had colonialism as a blueprint. Assassination of individuals, blocking of other opposition parties, colonial detention centres translating into the Nyayo House torture chambers under Moi, and other forms of attacks by militias and gangs as the Mungiki remain part of Kenya’s conflict spiral fabric. Leadership modes were seen as that of the ‘lion’ (Pareto 1935 in López 2013) in the era of the first two presidents. Moi’s deliberate use of majimbo to instigate fears within the populace, government officials’ engagement with gangs for the planning of attacks on other ethnic groups, and the spread of propaganda through politicizing ethnicity (Ajulu 2002).
which occurred as Moi attacked pluralism, led to a continued spiral of clashes and conflict over national power in Kenya.

It was further the intrusion of external regimes and ideology upon Kenyans; pluralism and democracy; which elevated elite fears and their subsequent politicization of ethnicity. This, in order to stay in power as was seen under Moi’s presidency.

The twenty first century Kenyan democracy remains marred by imposed fears and use of force as seen in conflicts surrounding elections. Further, the culture of corruption and impunity, grafted onto the populace from the days of post-independence, became the format for power-holding by elites. This continued the demonization of elites’ tribes as it sustained affirmations of historical stereotypes. It brewed on the fears and needs of the rest of the populace, culminating in the failed 2005 referendum. Opposition was met with coercion, marginalization, violence, gang revenge attacks and human rights violations at the hands of Kikwete.

Ethnic alliances create the scope for survival and enjoyment of government resources or national power, that talk to the power of the holders; the tribes. Bourton’s human needs theory and Azar’s developmental needs account for the Kenyan conflict as marginalized tribes become conflict-prone due to their plight. The above policies, purging of offices, deprivation of certain tribes added to coercion and blocking of the latter from achieving their basic needs created the space for spirals of violence and the post-election conflicts.

The frustration-aggression theory is also relevant as the countless injustices caused to the deprived tribes who are coerced, oppressed and disillusioned by the status quo, and fed
propaganda whilst others enjoy national power, fuels the formers’ frustrations which, as in the case of the 2007 post-election violence and ongoing sporadic violence in Kenya, lead to aggression. Indeed, power tends to corrupt as Lord Acton dictates, with absolute power under the marriage of convenience around Uhuru Kenyatta leading to engagement in continued conflict, corruption and hold to power, absolutely.

8.2 Relevance of ethnicity as a core source of conflict

The Kenyan case for ethnicity gains its primordialist connotation from colonialism’s divide and rule ideology. Shils’ explanation of perception explains the extent that hatred is inculcated between different tribes as it separates ‘good natives’ (Little1998) from others. Osamba exemplifies this in the silent nature within which ethnic deprivation is lived. Further, relative tribal marginalization echoes the colonial injection of Kenya’s ethnic elite supremacy ideology.

With the Moi regime and the advent of democracy, instrumentalism became norm. Posner articulates the conundrum whereby multipartyism created a scenario where individuals voted along ethnic party lines in order attain national power. It was also a means for using ethnicity to demonize those who were in incumbency; those who had majority hold on land and those who continuously enjoyed the yields of national power (the Carter Centre 2013). This was worsened by the perceived reality that powerful alliances like Kikuyus and the GEMA tribes, remain stronger leading to a power - non power deadlock for marginalized tribes. Moi’s use of instrumentalism to inject hatred of the other won him two terms of presidency. Instrumentalism was therefore a fuel for the violence which ensued over the decade following the advent of Kenyan pluralism.
Moi’s demonization of the Kikuyus in the 1990s and the opposition’s demonization of same in the 2000s were undertaken by two somewhat different scenarios. The Moi regime and his majimbo was a clear fight for power through the use of politicization of ethnicity over the fears and hatred of Kikuyu power. Yet the 2005 demonization had the dilemma of a previous split within the main party. This therefore brought another additional element for the followers of Odinga and is further understood from a constructivist perspective. The politics of collusion also talks to constructivism as votes are aligned under an umbrella of two main tribes sharing a history of hatred for the sake of the elite and diverse interests.

This then talks better to the politicization of ethnicity and its ethnicization of power (Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights 2015) as Mutiga explains how the Kenyan case has witnessed the use of divide and rule by leaders of post independence in order to maintain power. The Marxist ideology elaborates the Kenyan elite circulation which has occurred along ethnic lines and culminated in increased tribal hatred. This has increasingly seen a disengagement from the state structure thereby weakening the state institution. It is the mix of enlightenment to the plights faced (whether real or imagined) and the hatred bred by elites, which has on many occasions caused sporadic communal conflicts and electoral violence in Kenya. This has added to the danger points in cabinet representation (Sewart 2010) and the increased deception, mistrust, stereotyping and hate speech which grew as a means of enticing feelings of hatred and frustration towards the ethnic ‘other’.

The counterarguments on the politics of collusion and the reality of tribal clashes are appreciated. Yet, a close analysis of the documentation does not allude to the fact that the Uhuru Kenyatta incumbency has meant that the Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribes are no longer holding tensions against each other. It is rather the articulation of the extents which elites go
to hold on to power and also to keep their tribes at the realms of national power which should be appreciated. This therefore gives impetus to power as a core conflict source. It also informs of the importance of ethnicity in both the processes of initiating conflict and suppressing same. On the latter part, such methods have kept Kenya in a state of silent tension and limbo to date.

In Kenya, identity is part of the human means of relating to one another. Ethnic identity which eventually chains down to ethnic groups, makes the use of ethnicity as a cause of conflict synonymous to the perception that one hates the other by virtue of the person’s ethnic or tribal existence. Mbuvi negated this in term of the 2007 electoral violence; falsifying this idea. The author therefore depicts that ethnicity becomes a vital source of conflict to the extent that the relevance of the ethnic grouping’s standing relative to others impacts on the humanity and the achievement of felicity of the latter.

Similarly, various researches have shown that the use of ethnicity as simply a medium through which Kenyan violence are perpetuated and conflict upheld is insufficient. The correlations between heterogeneity, ethnic rivalry and conflict – to the extent of violence – have also been articulated. This infers that ethnicity represents the hatred and a source of frustration for certain tribes, especially with the ethnicization of power. It is this connotation that adds to the fears which lie at the core of the Kenyan conflict dilemma.

Relative deprivation and power centrism have occurred to the extent that the politicization of ethnicity and the ethnicization of power created the dilemma whereby it was not just the fact that the Kikuyus were taking all resources and power bases that mattered; the Kikuyus and GEMA tribes were imminently impersonated as the source of other tribes’ afflictions. This
therefore establishes the vitality of the frustration-aggression theory as frustrations of deprived Kenyans were and are directed towards tribes which enjoy national power. This is used by leaders to entice violence.

The politicization of ethnicity has also meant that leaders have found that the only way to entice relative frustration nationally, has been through the manipulation of perceived and, to some extent real, identities. The reality that the Kikuyus and the GEMA have enjoyed relative power, added to the number of deception and corruption which have heightened, make a case for the threat of ethnicity in conflict. This is further appreciated in terms of government cabinet representation through which ethnic groups and their elites compete to keep hold to national power.

The use of stereotyping and hate speech is imperative as they are the actual triggers of real and fabricated realities. This can be seen in the manner that the internalized demonization and fears of the powerful tribes led to the outburst of violence, as these fears were cemented with a turn in election results in December 2007. It is to be understood that the oppressed saw these stereotypes as the seal of the higher demons; the Kikuyus and GEMA tribes, and that the country had been clawed in their hands, leaving them in eternal damnation under marginalization and oppression. It meant that the state mechanism was structured for the maintenance of this status quo which, as seen through the aftermath of the elections, could not be accepted in light of the belief that change had arrived. Additionally, the scenario gave precedence for the human needs theory in view of the fact that the marginalized tribes believed that their long-deprived human needs would be answered to. The election results tipped the frustrations over perceived deliverance from the Kikuyus and broke into conflict.
The above also talk to the entrenchment of mistrust which the Kenyans have towards each other’s tribes. Marginalization undertaken in selective development of places and tribes’ differential reach to resources and the economy, which translate to competition and the build-up of frustration, increases the potency of the silent ethnic hatred and xenophobia in Kenya. The author acknowledges the work of Kimemyi and Ndung’u indicating how there is no national, genocide-like clash which occurs in Kenya. Yet, in terms of targets, one can assert that it is not documented that Kikuyu gangs are clashing and purging Kikuyus. It is rather other ethnic minorities forming the gangs which would be attacking Kikuyus or other GEMA and Kikuyu fraternizers. This should also be acknowledged in the context that the violence which takes place is against one particular ethnic group or a set of ethnic groups, which then talk to frustration against that or those said group(s) under the frustration-aggression theory, leading to Kenyan conflicts.

Therefore, inasmuch as it is not substantial to call ethnicity a core source of conflict, the work of the Foreign Commonwealth Office, Olayode and others which place ethnicity as a secondary source of conflict should be taken at fore. The question which is then posed is reiterated by Steward (2010) surrounding the extent that ethnicity drives political action, and in so doing, underscoring the extent which it delegates the outburst of violence.

8.3 Assessing other presented sources of conflict

The piece acknowledges the presence of a number of factors which account for conflict in Kenya. The quest was however to locate which factor or factors can be accounted as the core; heart of conflict causation. The fight over land, resource scarcity, the economy and poverty are Kenyan realities that articulate causes of conflict therefore.
The eviction of tribes such as the Maasai from their native lands, and the case of the Rift Valley provides motivations for tribes to endeavour in violence. The resultant frustrations which ensued resulted in tensions especially as it was coupled with Kikuyu and GEMA enrichment over same. This therefore talks to the frustration-aggression theory as was the case over the conflicts for Maasai land.

Contestation over scarce resources is relevant as a source of conflict in Kenya. Azar’s and Burton’s human needs theory take route in explaining this source as relative deprivation, marginalization and the inability for ethnic groups to fulfill their basic needs of survival have led to cases of sporadic violence.

The frustration-aggression theory also accounts for the above-presented sources as the realities of non-enjoyment of the yields of national power by some tribes whilst others accumulate wealth, land and other resources, increase frustrations. This therefore explains the motivation for marginalized ethnic groups to partake in sporadic conflicts and in conflicts around elections.

Land is highly relevant especially in light of the value placed on it by Kenyans. The land predicament becomes a strong contender alongside power in view of the fact that its ownership somewhat dictates power. This was seen through the Rift Valley conflict which remains pertinent to this day.

However, the previous agreement between the Turkana and Pokot which was broken by the imposition of the colonial regime deflects land from being a core source of conflict. The author therefore, does not find land as a core cause of conflict also in view of the counter
arguments placed regarding the peaceful co-existence of ethnic communities from different tribes, irrelevant of land ownership, until the advent of politically ethnicized electoral violence. Indeed this analogy may also be stipulated for ethnicity, which therefore brings the author’s view of the two factors to not being core, causes of conflict.

Similarly, the economy and poverty are also appreciated as not being core causes of conflicts in view of the fact that the amassing of wealth meant the conundrum of power and non-power as elaborated upon by Darendorf. It is however appreciated that they represent sub-sets of power.

Moreover, colonization must be appreciated as a source of conflict within the perspective that the imposition of an external regime within Kenya’s psyche and territory, led to the marginalization and oppression of some natives and created frustrations and scars which registered as baseline for Kenyan conflicts to this day. Hence, colonialism as a source of conflict is understood as a format of power imposition and struggle. This could also be seen in the imposition of regimes as pluralism and democracy which have further instilled fear towards elites’ hold on power and therefore become another trigger for the fight in the maintenance of same, as seen since the Moi era. In this line, the author sees the imposition of external ideologies as substantive sources of conflict in Kenya, the EAC/SADC regions and on the African continent even if at a secondary or sub-set level.

The piece has also touched on resource scarcity, climate change effects, youth unemployment and poverty as causes of conflict in Kenya which are agreed to. However, these have been appreciated as the modes of manifestations of power disparities which therefore make them subsets of power.
This relational element is important for, even if one is to take the resources scarcity as a cause for example, it is the dispensation which matters on the national spectrum. When this dispensation is selectively undertaken through tribal affiliations, the favored tribes gain more resource and more power. This creates the feelings of fear, resentment and hatred-developing to the power dilemma’s push for the occurrence of frustration-aggression and the spiral of conflict due deprivation of human needs, as developmental needs theory stipulate. Same applies to land and other factors, which permits the giving a special role beyond that of a channel in Kenya’s conflict, to ethnicity.

8.4 Assessing other government obstacles

Government obstacles are presented as they talk to Kenyan conflict. The achievement of the 2010 constitution occurred under the veil of the 2007 post-election violence; as a formula which would answer to core institutional mishaps which had led to the centralization of power and violence in Kenya. Further, the majimbo is a reflection of the Kenyan power dilemma. This decentralization of power to county level - now termed devolution, and the power-sharing agreement termed Accord, were a means of addressing the power ethnic conflict which nearly brought Kenya to the status of a failed state as articulated by Kagwanja and Southall (2009). Moreover, the will to partake in the power-sharing agreement by the elites was more so for the securing of their interests and their hold to power rather for national unity.

Further is the fear over the implementation of the devolution process as the dispensation to counties occurs from central government. The culture of impunity and corruption therefore filters through the Kenyan system even with devolution. These impact on the levels of
counties’ development which all find their way back into the national grid and power structure. Essentially, even as one would try devolution, the power disparities which have been integrated and internalized within civil society remain anchor to the way in which they interact.

The 2008 Accord epitomizes Kenya’s elites’ fight for the central seat of power as parties involved did not wish to destroy the source of their enjoyment of national power. Politics of the belly therefore survived throughout Kenyan history with power at the centre, being seen as reflective of tribes’ access to their portion of that power.

Of importance is the manner in which the state has kept the weakened nature of its institutions which have permitted the continued use and abuse of power by elites. Further, the use of states’ security forces such as the police for the perpetuating of violence alludes to the use of government institutions for the purpose of entrenching fears within the population and imposing of elite powers’ regimes and policies over other tribes. These are at the core of state weakness and are important in order for elite actors to be able to gallivant in corruption and abuse as they engage within the state machinery. Elites at both incumbent and opposition levels use this as a channel for engagement in violence and oppression, and challenging governance from a power and ethnicity perspective. This further elaborates how power and ethnicity are co-factors when it comes to the Kenyan source of conflict. It therefore reverts to the frustration-aggression theory and the human needs theory presented as they account for the accumulation of power by elites and their tribes at expense of others.

This is further aggravated as the culture of impunity has bred the feeling of disengagement from the state structure by marginalized segments of the population. For example, a look at
governance, especially in the past seventeen years shows how it has been more about impunity, patronage, deception, gross corruption as seen from Kibaki through to Kenyatta. This speaks to civil society engagement which operates away from the centre as they now seek to be relevant in power at county level. The possibility of engaging in the politics of the belly by tribes which would otherwise never enjoy such powers at central government levels, give rise to the possibility for a weakened county-level politics as they now become the microcosm of the national blueprint for conflict.

8.5 Relevance of research findings for mediation processes

The piece notes the fact that the international community could only negotiate for a power-sharing agreement rather than the endorsement of procedural democracy following the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Further, the Waki Commission saw it better to provide names of alleged perpetrators to Kofi Annan who was forced to hand same to the ICC in light of the fact that the recommendations of the report were not fully implemented. This showed how much power the presidency still held in Kenya, even after the new constitution echoed the chime of devolution. It also sent message that impunity in Africa is not fallacy.

This has meant that power and ethnicity need to be relooked at as and when global leaders and organizations seek to mediate African conflicts. The preached ideology of democracy cannot be sold for the acceptance of a lesser evil as a power-sharing agreement which only leads to a fragmented state that operates within a democratic limbo and under continued fears of ethnic and power-related outburst of conflict, as is Kenya’s current predicament. This therefore opens door for further research as to the means of engaging with the Kenyan and other African states in the area of mediating power and ethnicity in conflict.
8.6 Contextualizing core sources of conflict in the EAC and SADC

From the above analysis, the relevance of power as the core source and ethnicity as a secondary source of conflict become vital in the understanding of same on the African continent, especially through the EAC and the SADC. These shall now be touched upon by looking at the two sources as key common denominators in countries’ conflict trajectories, even if the genesis for each country have their particular differences.

Firstly, the concept of power-sharing has become rife for every African conflict. This is because afflictions which are experienced provide differential levels of trust between opposing parties, leading to negotiations over incumbency reverting to power-sharing, as ethnic violence crumbles procedural democracy. Cheeseman found correlations between levels of violence and elite cohesion; showing how these have yielded power-sharing governments based on “politics of distrust … politics of collusion … politics of partisanship … [and] politics of pacting” (2011, p. 343). He shows how the Kenyan 2008 case was that of collusion, Angola’s 1994 power-sharing sprouting from politics of distrust, South Africa’s 1994 power-sharing format originating from politics of pacting and Zimbabwe’s 2008 power-sharing taking fruition under politics of partisanship (Cheeseman 2011). Cheeseman further note how “the majority of cases of power-sharing in Africa, including Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia, fall into the category of politics of distrust, reflecting the depth of intractable nature of many conflicts on the continent” (2011, p. 345)-with distrust and its effects being a core theme throughout the current piece.

Klopp and Zuern (2007) further look at Kenya and South Africa to depict how, inasmuch as the two differ in their history and rise of conflict, both have had the usage of militia and police force to instigate violence. Of more importance is the manner in which the hold to
power through power-sharing formulas saw how “incumbents reined in informal militias who they had paid and supported, effectively stopping massacres … [stressing how] once an agreement is reached, incentives to use violence decline among actors” (Klopp and Zuern 2007, p. 142). This explains the post violence environment and why coalitions and agreements for power-sharing are both supported amidst the ever-present potential for conflict.

Chavunduka and Bromley (no date) have outlined the Zimbabwean land conflict which dates back from the colonial era, with an inability of government to engage in land reform. This led to escalation of violence at the end of the twentieth century. It relates well to Kenya even if the parties implicated in the conflict, differ.

8.7 Future recommendations

Many other examples abound for baseline similarities between the sources of conflict in the EAC and SADC, with power and ethnicity as core and secondary sources respectively. These provide justification for further research in mediation mechanisms that will speak to preventive outbreak of violence and protracted conflict in Africa.

The importance of acknowledging the extent to which ethnicity is a secondary source of conflict that is easily used as a channel that legitimizes collective action through tribal identity, is imperative. The manner in which ethnic fraternity provides for the legitimizing of violent acts in light of power relations and afflictions of part of the masses, are elements of governance which must be taken into consideration as one sends monitoring teams to African elections, for example.
The process for election monitoring should be one that begins from campaigning; with advance warning systems in place that can talk to African governments on the incitement of violence. This means further research and more importantly, the need to dissipate the taboo around ethnicity, its proneness to induce conflict and power-related injustices and inequalities as faced by Kenya, the EAC and SADC, and Africa. Research and advocacy are therefore imperative if African countries are to become more progressive in the fields of good governance, and in national, regional and continental stability.

8.8 Conclusion

Conflict resolution in Africa remains a core concern as politicians constantly find themselves mediating highly perplexing cases. This has called for the current piece to view the extents to which power and ethnicity are core causes of conflict in the EAC and the SADC, through the above Kenyan case study.

The uncovering of power as a cornerstone source of conflict, and ethnicity as both a channel for the manifestation, and an important secondary source of conflict, has led to the call for increased work on mediation and research in the field to take place. Through these, it is anticipated that African nations can engage in more progressive effective governance over their territories, away from conflict.

The piece has also appreciated the importance of other factors which together manifest into power-play between parties, and fuel violent conflicts. It has illustrated the manner in which these factors are inter-linked to one another, and more so, with other government obstacles such as governance structures and weak state institutions. All of these, and the way they are integral parts of power politics of elites create the need for further engagement and research.
in the power and ethnicity dimensions of conflict in Kenya, the EAC and SADC regions, and
the African continent. The piece has therefore been able to assert power as a core source and
ethnicity as a secondary source and channel for conflict in Kenya and the EAC and SADC
regions.

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