Relations between Cyprus and Germany
(1960 – 1968)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION..........................................................1

2. RELATIONS FROM AUGUST 1960 TO DECEMBER 1963..............12

3. THE 1964 CRISIS.........................................................37

4. THE PERIOD FROM 1965 TO 1968........................................62

5. OVERVIEW OF OTHER FIELDS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS:
   ECONOMY, TRADE, EDUCATION, CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY......85

6. CONCLUSION.............................................................91
1. INTRODUCTION

“The German interests consist on the first line of pacification in Cyprus. The Federal Republic of Germany examines with great concern the aggravation of the Cyprus crisis which swells between the NATO members Greece and Turkey. Germany’s security needs would be affected directly through a weakening of the Western defense readiness. Nevertheless, Germany should do everything to avoid implicating into the Cyprus problem. Repeatedly, Greece and Turkey demanded from Germany to take the part of the one or the other side. Taking into consideration the good political relations with both countries, this would disturb the balance on handling both allies of Germany. Through the financial support of the peace keeping troops of the United Nations [however], Germany appears to be impartial”.

The above fragment stems from a report dated April 7, 1967, signed by the German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and prepared to explain to the Federal Council of Ministers why Germany should continue to finance the United Nations Forces in Cyprus. It is a short but a most comprehensive description of the German approach to the Cyprus conflict, found in the German Archives of the Auswärtiges Amt for the period under examination. Indeed, the largest part of the bilateral relations concerned

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2 German Foreign Ministry
the political problem on the island, a problem that actually never ceased to exist, despite different stages in the twentieth century.

The report states additionally that the contribution of Germany through the United Nations, where the Federal Government was not a member yet\(^3\), strengthened the efforts for securing the right to represent the whole of Germany against the claim of the East German government and the Soviet Union who supported the regime. The existence of the German problem and the inevitable analogies to the political question in Cyprus, the question of the principle of self – determination, later the geographic division and the relations of Cyprus with East Germany, are also part of the spectrum, since they affected significantly the bilateral issue.

The report continues by stating that:

“The coverage of the costs on a voluntarily payment allows other significant countries, for example the Soviet Union and France to distance themselves from financing.”

Inevitably, the largest part of this work examines the German approach to the Cyprus issue. And consequently, any examination of the German role involves at the same time the examination of the role of other powers, especially the members of the United Nations Security Council, Soviet Union and, to some extent, France. Such parallel references, as demonstrated in the above quotation, point to the aim of this study. The

\(^3\) The Federal Republic of Germany, declared in 1949, after uniting the French, British and U.S. occupation zones in 1949, became a member of the U.N. only in 1971, after recognizing the independence of East Germany and its boarders
choice of the major Western allies to finance the U.N. action on the island (after their proposal to send peace troops under the N.A.T.O “flag”, which will be also discussed) and the choice of the Soviet Union and France not to do so, especially in the early stages of the crisis in 1964, is illustrative of the different viewpoints of each country. The U.S., Britain and Germany decided to contribute to the peace force, after considering their own interests in this matter. The key issue for Cyprus, which actually recycles in the foreign policy of the island up to the present, is whether during this procedure, there was enough space to align Cypriot interests with the interests of some of these power brokers. Judging by the results of the course since the sixties, it is legitimate to attempt a second reading, especially of the Archives, where so many striking similarities to situations that occurred in the decades that followed, are found. The lessons learned from the Second World War were the main guidance of Germany’s foreign policy. A stable democracy where the rule of law was the ultimate principle and the most decisive factor in any dispute, economic growth and securing of a high quality of life for all its citizens, a “social state”, were some of the characteristics of a country that was confronted at the same time with the problem of the division of its territory and of the danger of becoming the main theater of a third world war. The idea of a united Europe, born in the 50’s, could be seen not only as an effort of Germany to “export” its goods but also to export some of these values, in a way that differed from that of other countries.

The German decision not to involve more directly in the Cyprus problem was taken after considering all relevant factors. It was a decision that secured in the long term the
country’s credibility towards all sides. This fact never discouraged Germany from following the events closely and pointing out to both parts how to avoid the conflict. Being in a position to offer economic aid and exercise a “soft foreign policy” or a “multi-track diplomacy”, in a period where Cyprus was under development and in Germany the economic wonder was already conducted, Bonn tried to help the young Republic in terms of technical assistance, economic aid, scholarships, that usually had the form of bilateral agreements. The biggest contribution, however, was to try to persuade the leaders of the two communities, to avoid the constitutional conflict. Germany underwent this effort, already before the conflict of 1964, by inviting – and was the only country of the world that did so- with only some months in-between, Makarios⁴ and Kucuk⁵ to Bonn. Unfortunately, this effort, as well as the efforts that followed, to convince the two communities, co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, not to choose the “hard” way, in order to “secure” their communal or national interests, failed.

1.1. Nature of bilateral relations

According to one classification of the nature of relations between two countries, there are three categories: special, normal and peripheral⁶. One could say that the Cypriot-German relations fall in the normal (second) category. Early exchange of Ambassadors, the significant German assistance in the first years of the Republic of Cyprus as well as the role of other non-state actors (Chambers of commerce - businessmen, Academics

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⁴ Archbishop Makarios III (1913 – 1977), leader of the Greek Cypriot Community and first President of the Republic of Cyprus.
⁵ Fazil Kucuk, (1906 – 1984), leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and first Vice – President of the Republic of Cyprus
et.) and a series of bilateral agreements\(^7\) can easily support this classification. Any examination of the bilateral relations in this certain period involves naturally a large discussion of main political problems of both countries, namely the German question – result of the Second World War and the division of Germany and the Cyprus question, mainly as recurred after the 1964 crisis and the collapse of the bicomunal nature of the government. The cold – war background and the influences of East Germany and the Soviet Union are also given, as parameters of this study. Finally relevant and constantly under examination is the interaction between Germany and Cyprus and other countries, like Greece, Turkey and Britain but also the U.S. or the U.A.R.

It is often debated whether Cyprus should have joined NATO in 1960 or not. Makarios’s relation with the Non – Aligned Movement since 1955\(^8\), his disappointment due to the lack of support by NATO during the fifties and his conviction that Cyprus, being in the geographical neighborhood also of the United Arab Republic, could serve better its own interests by choosing not to become a member of the Western Alliance. This decision on its own was not wrong. Combined, however with some political estimation that proved to be wrong in the years and the decades that followed, proved in the long term to be problematic.

The fact that national security is a first priority in foreign relations is largely agreed by scholars. Seen from this point of view, the Turkish threat was a major concern for

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\(^7\) Already in 1961, the two countries signed three Agreements: on Trade, on Economic cooperation and Financing and on technical assistance

\(^8\) Makarios attended also in 1955 the Bandung Conference, despite the fact that Cyprus was not yet independent. The moral support from the Non – Align Movement was the main reason for his decision to join
Nicosia, whereas a less possible, by the sixties, Soviet threat was always a concern for Bonn. These two variables had probably the largest impact on bilateral relations. Germany discussed every development on Cyprus, mainly in the framework of NATO, where Greece and Turkey presented their positions but also in the framework of the Western European Union.

Additionally, both countries agreed on the important role of the United Nations. Germany because of its previous historical experience and Cyprus because of the hope that all former colonies – members of the General Assembly as well as certain members of the Security Council would support its positions unconditionally. This was another positive factor in bilateral relations, creating sometimes understanding for certain procedures.

1.2. Bibliography – Methodology

The present study is largely based on primary sources, mainly the Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. The main reasons that the specific Archive is not currently used for research on Cyprus – related issues could be attributed to the following: a) Germany was never considered as a direct stake holder in Cyprus b) the archives –as the usual case is- are only partly released every 30 years, considering always an obstacle c), many scholars are confronted with the language - barrier and d) most of the scholars from the German – speaking space lack any special interest. Personal knowledge on the realities of recent Cyprus history, acquired through the fact

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9 Germany, though for a long time not a member of the United Nations and up to the present not a member –despite the efforts in the framework of the U.N. Reform- of the Security Council, was for many years the third (following Britain and the U.S.) biggest contributor.
that I have spent –with the exception of five years in Germany- all my life in Cyprus, where I have also studied and have been since my early years interested in politics, history and diplomacy, combined with two – year studies and three year experience as a diplomat in Germany were the main guides, during my research in the German Archives. Reading the reports prepared by the German diplomats back in the sixties was often interrupted by the thought of what the reports sent nowadays from Nicosia could be like, since, as already mentioned, some of the issues just recycle. Preparing reports for the Cypriot Foreign Ministry and receiving instructions lead also constantly to the thought how the instructions in the sixties and the reports from Bonn also looked like. Unfortunately, for technical reasons, any research in the respective Cypriot Archives is currently impossible.

The conclusion, that the main catalyst still offering the chance for a comprehensive solution of the political problem of Cyprus, namely the accession process to the E.U., which in fact could have started in the 70’s, if the Turkish invasion did not occur, was very much owed to the German Foreign policy, encouraged this study in moments of doubting about the importance of the role of the German diplomacy on the island. Re-reading some of the reports and rethinking of the firm stance of Bonn and the fact that a) the German technocrats always possessed valuable knowledge of the Turkish intentions and concepts and b) were not discredited neither for their role on the island nor for their post – war role in world affairs allows to draw the conclusion that more interaction between Germany and Cyprus on the issue could only prove beneficial.
The special relation of Germany with Turkey, which goes back at least as early as 1878, the German mediation at the Berlin Conference and the onward cooperation of the Sultans and the Kaisers until 1918 in many fields (economy, infrastructure, military etc.), revived after the accession of both countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the fifties and the cooperation of the early sixties which led to the Turkish migration into the country and to the beginning of a new period of cooperation. The special relation of Germany and Turkey could be seen as a reason to doubt on the impartiality of Bonn. There is, however, not enough proof for that argument. Bonn did not ever accept during the discussions of the Cyprus problem in the framework of N.A.T.O or the Council of Europe that the arguments of Ankara on the Cyprus issue justified its policy of aggression and the permanent threat to land on the island. Alleged pro – Turkish attitude, seen as a “problematic” by the Cypriot officials, could be seen also as a chance and possibility for a larger German contribution or mediation during the crisis.

The current study does not aim at providing a detailed account of diplomatic history of the period. Most of the events that affected bilateral relations are however mentioned, at the beginning of each chapter, in order to provide the context. The chronological way was chosen, however in a way that allows codifying some of the bilateral issues.

The main material for the study was provided, as already mentioned, by the documents selected from the Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, compared
sometimes with the respective archives of the United States Department of State\textsuperscript{10}. For the historical facts the Keesing's Record of World Events\textsuperscript{11} are often cited. Apart from the work of Paris Varvaroussis \textit{“Deutschland und die Zypernfrage”}\textsuperscript{12} (Germany and the Cyprus issue) no other directly related literature could be traced. Thus, useful for the purposes of the current study were other secondary sources from the large bibliography of the Cyprus issue, even if they are only partly related with the issue under examination. Especially sources referring to the role of the U.N. and the role of foreign countries in the conflict have been very useful. Books, mainly written by non-Cypriots are less polemic, in comparison to Greek and Turkish bibliography. Memoirs and other books of Greek and Turkish officials, politicians, journalists etc. which had been directly or indirectly exposed to some of the events described here, were found, despite certain partiality also useful.

1.3. The relations with East Germany

The current study refers mainly to the relations of the Republic of Cyprus with the Federal Republic of Germany. Relations with East Germany, developed mainly after the crisis of 1964 and the close cooperation of the island with the Soviet Union, or even, as a result of this cooperation, were been included under the main chapters of the German Cypriot relations for practical reasons and mainly because of their impact on the whole issue. Close relations with the socialist block, developed after 1964 and the


\textsuperscript{11} Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives)

“lack of understanding” within NATO of the Greek Cypriot stance, affected directly not only the course of relations with Germany but the developments of the Cyprus question as well. In fact, these two points, were always interacting.

1.4. Structure

The first part of this study examines bilateral relations in the first three years of the Republic of Cyprus, considering the early constitutional problems[^13], the role of the German President of the Constitutional Court Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the main bilateral issues and the effort of Germany to build close relations with the young Republic on the basis of bilateral agreements and the visit to Germany of President Makarios and Vice President Kucuk to Bonn. The second part refers to the most crucial year of the conflict in Cyprus, the year 1964. The developments on the island had a direct impact, that reversed the good results in the bilateral relations of the early years. The third part examines the years 1965 to 1968. The stabilisation on the island –things were still far from being normal- offered the chance to the two countries for regaining some of the ground lost during the previous year. Still, the development of the Cypriot – East German relations, always in reverse analogy to the relations with the Federal Germany and mainly the different approach on the political problem of Cyprus were obstacles keeping the two countries far from each other. Minor issues, some of them like the press, however, very influential were dealt with in a smaller chapter. This small part deals also in brief with trade, education and culture. Finally the last pages

[^13]: Apart from the constitutional problems, that reached the Supreme Constitutional Court, bicomunal relations were from the beginning, also at the level of the Parliament in tension. Cf. Aimilianidēs, A. K. (2003). Ἡ κοινοβουλευτικὴ συνοπτικὴ Ἑλληνοκυπρίων καὶ Τουρκοκυπρίων 1960-1963. Λευκόσια, Εκδοσεις Επιφανιου.
provide a summary of the issue along with the main conclusions drawn from the research.
2. RELATIONS FROM AUGUST 1960 TO DECEMBER 1963

Building stable and close diplomatic relations was the initial target of both countries. This target was largely accomplished through a series of activities and the function of respective Missions in Nicosia and Bonn. Highlight of the period were the several bilateral Agreements signed and the visits paid in Bonn by Makarios and Kucuk. Germany was satisfied with the development of the relations, although at the same time concerned about the influence of the “East” and the first disputes between the two communities.

Still, referring to the main developments of the first period in a chronological sequence could provide a better overview. If any initial remark should be made, then this would be the following: in contrast to the case of the relations of Germany with many other European countries, the German – Cypriot relations were never burdened with the legacy of the Second World War. Cyprus was never occupied by German forces and never experienced the traumatic consequences that for example Greece had experienced between 1941 and 1944. Thousands of Cypriots fought, however, against the Germans, mainly as part of the Cyprus Regiment under British command. Cyprus won only in the fifties and the Konrad Adenauer - Era\(^\text{14}\) part of the German interest, as Germany returned to the international arena. Adenauer visited Greece and Turkey in 1954 and re-established the German interest in the region. A year later, just after the beginning of

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\(^{14}\) Konrad Adenauer was Chancellor since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and remained at the office until 1963.
the anti-colonial struggle on Cyprus\textsuperscript{15} Adenauer expressed clearly his views on the policy of Britain. According to Hans-Peter Schwarz,

\begin{quotation}
“The eastern Mediterranean had been a powder keg since the East Block had begun arms deliveries to Egypt. Adenauer saw in this a clear indication of Soviet world domination ambitions. In his view the British were to blame for this situation. During these months he regularly said that the British were pursuing arrogant and idiotic policies in Egypt, Cyprus and India”\textsuperscript{16}.
\end{quotation}

Indeed, the point of view that Britain’s policy of “divide et impera” would complicate the situation in Cyprus and the whole region is well presented in the German bibliography\textsuperscript{17}. It would be narrow – minded to attribute this criticism only to certain anti – British sentiments. Varvaroussis\textsuperscript{18} states that Adenauer realised as early as 1956 that the prolongation of the problem of Cyprus allowed the Soviet Union to exert its influence and constituted a risk of the “European” policy of Bonn, based also on peace and stability of the East Mediterranean.

The Agreements of Zurich and London in 1959 ended the struggle for union with Greece (also known as Enosis – policy, from the Greek word for union) and led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Tension between the Greek and Turkish

\textsuperscript{15} The struggle begun in April 1955 and continued until 1959 and the Zurich – London Agreements that lead to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus


Cypriot communities on the island as well as between Greece and Turkey were relieved. Germany would be one of the first countries to acknowledge the Agreements and congratulate all contracting parts. The German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer sent already on February 20, 1959 to the Prime Ministers of Britain, Turkey and Greece his messages of congratulation. In the telegrams addressed to Macmillan and Menderes, Adenauer gives emphasis to the important point of the NATO unity. The telegram addressed to the Greek Premier Karamanlis, though, did not include this point. One can only assume that Germany was well aware of the fact that the new state of affairs on the island actually forced the Greek Cypriot majority of over 80% to abandon the “dream” of union with Greece and accept a constitution providing veto rights and separate qualified decisions for both communities. In this context, any reference to the “bitter” compromise for the sake of NATO could not really fit in the message.

Immediately after the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus, on August 16, 1960, the German Government sent a telegram to the new Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, stating that Germany will soon proceed to establish diplomatic relations. This was a direct result of the German interest in the region and the necessity to support the fragile Turkish - Greek relations, widely affected by the Cyprus issue. At the same time, it was also a matter of reciprocity, since the Republic of Cyprus, a much smaller

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20 Adnan Menderes (1899 – 1961), Prime Minister of Turkey between 1950 – 1960
22 The right – wing Greek government was hardly attacked on signing the Agreements by the opposition in the Parliament. The Agreements were also criticized in Cyprus by left and right – wing politicians and a part of the fighters of the fighters of E.O.K.A. (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) which organized the struggle against the British between 1955 and 1959.
state, would operate –due to the London Agreements- an Embassy in Bonn, which
would also be accredited in the other West European countries\(^{24}\).

All that the German side had to do was to raise its Consulate General in Nicosia to an
Embassy. Being present on the island for years, during the colonial period, this should
not have been a hard task. Cyprus, on the contrary, had to establish an Embassy in
Bonn, starting from zero. Comparing however with the capacity of other countries’
Missions, the German Mission felt that it should “catch up”. In a report from Nicosia,
some months before the official declaration of independence, the German Consul-
General pointed out that the new Republic should be supplied, through the Consulate,
immediately with Germany - related material that could be sent from the German
Embassies in Athens and Ankara. He referred to the fact that the Americans already
provided for a large Press Department in their Embassy but noted that «the attempt to
provide the local press with German material in Greek and Turkish would be a modest
competition with the other countries that have much more political interests than
Germany»\(^{25}\). It is true that Germany always recognized that the interests of the Anglo –
Americans on the island were bigger. The German Mission on the island, however, also
took its functions very seriously and tried to fulfill them to the maximum\(^{26}\).

\(^{24}\) According to the Zurich – London Agreements, Cyprus should open at first five Embassies, three of
which in the guarantor powers Britain, Greece and Turkey, one in the U.S. and one in Bonn. In that way,
the new Republic seemed to recognize at least at the beginning, its pro – western orientation.
\(^{25}\) German Consulate Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, 24 July 1959, PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 116
\(^{26}\) According to Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the functions of a
Diplomatic Mission consist inter alia in a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State, b)
Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits
permitted by international law, c) Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State, d)
Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting
thereon to the Government of the sending State and e) Promoting friendly relations between the sending
State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.
The tasks of the German Mission proved, at least at the beginning, to be easier than those of the Cypriot Mission. Since Germany not only had already a pro-western policy but was also a vital member of N.A.T.O and as such it was located directly on the most sensitive Cold War border. It had already experienced the consequences of the East–West conflict during the Berlin Blockade of 1948–49 and realised that the space for manoeuvres in its foreign policy was limited. In Cyprus, the situation was more complicated, since its two communities had different approaches on the foreign course of the island. Despite the fact that Greece and Turkey were already members of NATO, Archbishop Makarios decided early against a membership to the Western Alliance and in favour of a membership to the Non Aligned Movement, a Movement linked to movement for decolonization, consisting of countries that were supportive in the near past to the Greek Cypriot anti–colonial struggle. The choice of Makarios as such, did not raise any concern at the beginning. The Turkish Cypriot Community had a veto right on decisions on foreign policy. Vice President Kucuk, however, only stated that he was not informed about the participation at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, in which Cyprus joined the Movement. Only later, during the new crisis in Cyprus, the participation and cooperation of the country with some of the Non–Aligned countries such as the U.A.R. would be considered as a threat against the stability and security of


27 Keesing's Record of World Events, Volume 8, March, 1962 Cyprus, p. 18623 a.f.
the West. For the time being, Germany would even be satisfied with this choice, especially in view of the supportive Makarios statements.

2.1 Makarios speech during the first Non–Aligned Conference

During the first Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, in September 1961, soon after the beginning of the construction of the Berlin Wall, Makarios made an impressive speech, in favour of the Cyprus – German Relations, in which he expressed his objection to the construction of the wall in Berlin and his support for the reunification of Germany. The speech described also his broader perception on foreign policy:

“... My country is small in size and population. It is the smallest country participating in this Conference. But this has not been a reason for overlooking it. Because this Conference is not being convened for the purpose of approaching world problems in terms of material force, but in order to bring a moral power in the service of peace and the progress of mankind; and moral Power does not depend on size or numbers [...] Our essential position and our common ground is that of non-alignment. Such non-alignment is the source of our freedom of judgement and independent approach to world problems, allowing our stand to be determined by what is right and just in each case. Our non commitment to any block becomes our commitment--and a strong commitment to moral principle...”

2.2. The communist “threat”

One of the early concerns of the German Embassy in Cyprus was the communist action. In a report, dated 13 December 1961, German Ambassador Koenig refers to the activities of the Soviet agents. Germany notes that communist activities are not widespread among Turkish Cypriots. According to the report, the German Embassy was respectively worried about the fact that the Soviet Embassy planned to employ from the beginning, 130 persons.

In April 1961 the German Embassy reports on the Congress of the Leftist Trade Unions, impressed by the number of its members. Similar worries were also expressed by the Americans. In the same way, it was also reported on a visit of a Cypriot delegation, headed by Glafkos Klerides to the Soviet Union, in August 1961. According to the report, Pravda, the newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party informed that the trip was organised on the occasion of the first anniversary of the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus. According to Pravda, any financial help by the British, the Americans or the Germans will be linked to the anticommunist campaign and that neither the Cypriots nor the Soviets should allow that. In other words the Soviet Union would offer to help the young Republic “unconditionally”.

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29 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, December 13, 1961, PolAAA, B 26 / 116
30 In fact, until 1958 Turkish Cypriots were also organised in the Communist Party. It was a result of that year’s clashes that they were forced to run off the party and its trade unions
31 First President of the Cypriot Parliament (1960 – 1976) and later President of the Republic (1993 – 2003), one of the key figures in the history of the island
32 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, August 19, 1961, PolAAA, B 26 / 116
During the period, President Makarios was seen by Germany as “neutral” or “Non-aligned” whereas Vice President Kucuk was seen as being in favour of a pro-western and thus anticommunist course. The course of Makarios was vastly supported by the pro-communist or pro-governmental Greek Cypriot powers (Press, Trade Unions, Communist Party etc.) whereas the Turkish Cypriot press attacked this policy and regarded it as unrealistic, since the Soviet Union would gradually seek to expand its influence, arguing that since on the island existed two large British Sovereign Bases, they could be used for the oppression of neighbouring countries. The strong Cyprus Communist Party AKEL could be the main organ of this campaign.

According to the German Foreign Ministry, the Turkish government had already warned the Government of Cyprus that allowing a Soviet Embassy to operate with such a large number of staff would only lead to the development of systematic communist campaign among the population. In order to reduce the communist influence and increase its own, the German Ambassador reminded that he suggested already to invite workers from Cyprus, where unemployment was still high, to Germany, perhaps over Greece. Since the idea of Cypriots “Gastarbeiter” was not accepted, though, he proposed to send to Germany groups of journalists, politicians or businessmen for ten days as guests. This early idea was partly realised.

2.3. Appointment of Professor Ernst Forsthoff, as President of the Cyprus Constitutional Court
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court should be a foreigner, helped by a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot judges respectively. The proposal of the right person for this post was very important, since in case of a different approach between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot, his vote would be decisive. On the other hand, his impartiality should also be expected. It seems that the proposal for the appointment of the German Law Professor Ernst Forsthoff\textsuperscript{33} came by the Greek Professor of Law, Mr. Themistocles Tsatsos, a former Cabinet minister in Greece and an expert in administrative law who represented the Greek Government in the Constitutional Commission in Nicosia and knew Forsthoff well. In should be mentioned, though, that the appointment of a foreigner at the head of the judicial power of a sovereign state, was never perceived by the Greek Cypriots as positive.

The first problems arose even before his arrival on the island. It was reported by the Cypriot press that \textit{Daily Express} in Britain published on July 27, 1960 the information that Forsthoff was a Nazi. Soon after that, Makarios requested the Greek Cypriot judge Michael Triantafyllides to search and provide him through the German Embassy in Nicosia with material that would prove that the allegations were false.

Actually, apart from some scientific texts written in the early thirties (especially his book \textit{“The total state”}, published in 1933, where he defends Hitler’s power) and despite the fact that he has been a member of Hitler’s party NSDAP since 1937 and supported its activities initially, there were many proofs that Forsthoff gradually turned

\textsuperscript{33} Prof. Dr. Ernst Forsthoff. (1902 - 1974). Well known German expert on Constitutional Law
against the Nazis during the War. He wrote legal opinions against SS activities and was prohibited to teach at the University of Vienna. He would only return to his teaching activities at the University of Heidelberg many years after the War. By that time, no more doubts about his disapproval of the Nazis existed. In fact, the local press in Cyprus even praised him, since his appointment was announced.

Surprisingly, the German Embassy in Nicosia also objected his appointment. After his first visit to Cyprus, where he assumed his duties, Forsthoff sent a letter to the German Foreign Ministry stating that since the German Ambassador expressed the opinion that he was a Nazi and therefore should not assume that post, he would refrain from visiting the German Embassy in Nicosia. The German Ambassador felt from the beginning that he should express his view on the matter for the sake of the German - Cypriot relations. According to this view, it would be better for the German Professor to reconsider his decision to come to Cyprus. Being already aware of the objections of AKEL but mostly of the very delicate relationship between the two communities and the way the post of the President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus was directly involved in that matter, Ambassador Koenig notes that “…I still have the opinion today, that his retreat would serve more the German reputation in this part of the world” 34. Obviously, as representative of his country he was not necessarily enthusiastic about the fact that a compatriot of him would be ranked according to the Protocol of Cyprus higher than him, thus gaining more influence not only in Cyprus but also in Germany. Still, that was not the right moment for Koenig’s ego. The German Foreign Ministry not only did

34 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, September 3, 1960, PolAAA, B 26 / 117
not share the worries of the Embassy but gave strict orders for reconciliation and support of his work.

Forsthoff was confronted from the very beginning with the constitutional disputes and especially the conflict around the municipal system. According to the Constitution, the five major cities of Cyprus should have separated municipal authorities, one for each sector, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot respectively. In April 1963, after the Constitutional Court rejected the proposal of the Greek Cypriots for unified municipalities, Makarios expressed his disapproval for the decision and repeated his proposal. A month later, Forsthoff announced his resignation and left Cyprus.

Actually, Forsthoff followed his own criteria in his decisions. There is no doubt that he was one of the best experts in administrative law, whose work was standard in Law Academies for decades. His impartiality was also given, since –always based on his own view and experience- on some occasions supported the Greek and on others the Turkish Judge, who were mainly representing the interests of their communities. According to Keesings35, he decided “(a) that the Government's decision to replace all existing municipalities by “improvement boards” was invalid, and (b) that the Turkish Communal Chamber's previous decision to maintain the Turkish municipalities was also invalid”. It was obvious, not only for Forsthoff as an expert but also for the German diplomacy, who would point later at the municipality issue, that for solving the dispute, political consensus from both communities was sine qua non. In this respect,

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35 Keesing's Record of World Events, Volume 10, June, 1964 Cyprus, Page 20113
his resignation was not in benefit of Cyprus, since it led soon after, both communities to assume more radical approaches.

After the collapse of the Constitution and the clashes between the two communities Forsthoff in many interviews blamed directly the Greek Cypriot leadership and especially Makarios for his plan to change the Constitution. He also went on to accuse the Greek Cypriot side for attacking everyone, even himself as a judge, allegedly for being pro – Turkish. The constitutional deadlock is definitely the main factor for the events of the end of 1963 and 1964 (they are described in the next chapter of the study). True, however, is that the responsibility for the violence erupted, belonged to both sides. Apparently, Forsthoff repeated his views in many other interviews given later. Even if the official German position, -at least on the constitutional issues was not much different from the one of Forsthoff-, the German Foreign Ministry using friendly channels, advised that the Professor should refrain from attacking the Cypriot Government openly. The views of Forsthoff, however, found a wide acknowledgement among the German public opinion.

2.4. Establishment of the Embassy of Cyprus in Bonn

According to the Zurich - London Agreements, the Cypriot Ambassador accredited to Germany should belong to the Turkish Cypriot community. A large number of the other diplomats, though, were Greek Cypriots. In January 1961, the Republic of Cyprus appointed the Turkish Cypriot Ahmet Zaim as first Ambassador to the Federal Republic
of Germany. Operating an Embassy in Bonn, being the fifth one, and the first (except for Athens and London) on the European continent, underlined the importance of Germany for the new state. The importance of the certain diplomatic mission is better understood if one takes into consideration the parallel accreditation from Bonn to France and BE-NE-LUX (and thus to five of the six European Economic Community countries).

The dispute between the two communities in Cyprus was soon to affect the operation of the Embassy directly. Ambassador Zaim formed the opinion that “the young Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou was not able to carry out his duties and he was discriminating against[?] the two Turkish Cypriot Ambassadors”. By expressing this view to the official German side, he could not be more instrumental about the different approach between the leadership of the Ministry (in Greek Cypriot hands) and his Community. Zaim also informed the German Foreign Ministry of the fact that paramilitary groups in both communities were (as early as in April 1961) ready to start fighting each other, at least in the three big cities. He added, though, that the role of the leadership in both communities was crucial in order to prohibit the conflict.

2.4. Visit of President Makarios to Germany

Since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus the German Embassy in Nicosia stressed the need for inviting Makarios and Kucuk officially to Bonn repeatedly. Actually, prior to their visits, Germany also hosted six non – communist Greek and
Turkish Cypriot politicians. Head of the group was the Speaker of the Parliament, Glafkos Klerides\footnote{Glafkos Klerides, (1919 - ), President of the Republic of Cyprus (1993 – 2003) and first Speaker of the Parliament (1960 – 1976).}

Bonn was informed by the German Embassy in Athens that Makarios wished to pay his first and second visit abroad in the U.S. and Germany respectively, in order to stress the importance of those two countries and their contribution for the development of the Cyprus economy\footnote{German Embassy Athens to the German Foreign Ministry, January 18, 1961, PolAAA, B 26 / 118}. Indeed, the German Foreign Ministry agreed to send a positive sign to the German President to invite Archbishop Makarios. In a message, send to the President’s office, the Ministry explained that Germany, being neutral during the anti-colonial struggle of Cyprus, was neither a problematic destination for the Cypriot President nor would be sending any wrong messages to anybody by inviting him\footnote{German Foreign Ministry to the Office of the German President, November 16, 1961, PolAAA, B 26 / 118}.

Germany considered as then main purposes of the visit the further strengthening of bilateral relations. Germany supported morally the anti–colonial struggle of the Greek Cypriots and actively the development of the island since the independence. The visit could offer Makarios a chance to demonstrate a pro–Western attitude and a chance for the German side to re-express appreciation for the speech in Belgrade that was mentioned above. It was important for Bonn to organise the visit as soon as possible, and before the Soviets invite Makarios to Moscow. At least as important as the other aims, if not more, Germany intended to stress during the visit the need to solve the
dispute on the main issues that arose between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and especially the issue of separate municipalities.

The talking points prepared by the German Foreign Ministry for the visit summarized the points mentioned before: a) appreciation for the solidarity expressed in September 1961 b) respect for Cyprus neutrality and non-aligned policy c) satisfaction for the appointment of a German President at the Supreme Court of Cyprus, who could help to find constitutional solutions for the disputes d) conviction that Makarios, being the Head of the State, would undertake every effort to settle the dispute between the two communities and e) concern for the communist activities on the island.

Makarios arrived in Bonn on May 21, 1962, escorted by the Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou and five more delegates. Since Makarios, being a Bishop, was not married, the other parts of the delegation also avoided to be escorted by their spouses. Reading the speeches of the two sides during the arrival and later during official events, it is interesting to observe that the German side avoided any reference to the anti-colonial struggle, since this was organised only by the Greek Cypriots, who were aiming towards union with Greece. In addition, any reference to the principle of self-determination could be misapprehended as support for amending the Treaties of 1959.

Makarios however, repeatedly referred to the moral support of the German press during the anti-colonial struggle. It is true that the German press supported the course of Cyprus that time. Being allies, since the end of the Second World War, Germany and

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39 PolAAA, B 26 / 200
Britain never had a totally “honest” relation. The collapse of the British Empire, as a result of new realities created after the end of the Second World War was seen as positive by the German Press. Furthermore, Makarios referred to the principle of self-determination, probably alluding to the application of the principle for both countries. At that point of time, it is known that Makarios had already developed the idea of pursuing an uncommitted independence for the Republic of Cyprus. Any relative point made by Makarios was already seen as provocative, by both, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. Typically speaking, however, Makarios’s speech referred in general to the support of these principles and their impact on solving the German problem. Still, anyone who can read between the lines will recognise his later positions on the Cyprus issue.

Only some months before the visit, in August 1961, East Germany, backed and encouraged, if not forced, by the Soviet Union started the construction of the Berlin Wall around the western part of the city, in order to stop the flow of refugees (the month before the construction almost 50,000 people fled to West Berlin and the Federal Republic). Since Makarios was one of the Non-Aligned leaders who expressed earlier concern about the Wall, it was suggested that he travels during the visit also to Berlin. His speech was not as “spectacular” as the speech of President Kennedy a year later would be; still the idea of moral support to the people of West Berlin, in their “enclave”

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40 The relationship of post-war Germany and Britain was also a “special” one, since, among other things, the British have been keeping forces in West Germany. That Britain was leading the alliance, who defeated Germany twice in the 20th century, is something never totally forgotten. The position of Britain to the question of the German reunification was also not so clear. Germany was in favour of the accession of Britain to the European Economic Community whereas Margaret Thatcher, was reported to be against the German reunification in 1990.
was important. During the stay of Makarios in Berlin, he visited a fifteen-year-old boy, shot on an attempt to escape from East Berlin by swimming the channel. The German press cleverly spread the rumour that the boy was actually trying to see the Cypriot President (and not to escape to freedom). The Germans were pleased because the picture of the boy at the hospital was the best possible way to present their positions in Cyprus through the press.

This visit was given attention by the press for many days\textsuperscript{41}, in Cyprus as well as in Germany. In Cyprus there were negative notions in the Greek Cypriot press on the expression of the German President that there are many ethnical groups and religions in Cyprus. The interpretation of the press that the Makarios reference to the self determination right in general was not exhausted in its implementation in Germany but alluded its implementation also for Cyprus, by amending the Agreements of Zurich and London was worrying the German side.

Substantial and perhaps the most practical part of the visit, was the discussion about the further development of the economical cooperation, already established by the three Agreements mentioned earlier. The German side was definitely interested among other things in promoting exports of cars by achieving reductions of import taxes in Cyprus, where the rules of the British Commonwealth was considered a serious hurdle.

An overall impression was again provided soon after the visit, by the German Ambassador in Nicosia, who evaluated the event positively. He noted at the same time\textsuperscript{41} Makarios: Mauer muss fallen Tagesspiegel, 24.5.1962
that the Greek Cypriot press was not happy about the neutral approach of Germany. He was, however, convinced that being “…friends of the Greek Cypriots means to support one colour. The disputes on the island are so large that even if the Cypriots declare their neutrality in their foreign policy, they do not want to accept the neutrality of the others towards their own problems”\textsuperscript{42}.

2.5. German observations on the Cypriot foreign policy - signs of the coming crisis

Following closely every development in the first years of the fragile Cypriot state, the German diplomacy drafted many reports reflecting the problems and the outstanding issues between the two communities. On the occasion of the accession of Cyprus to the United Nations Organization, the German Embassy in Nicosia sent a report, speculating about the foreign policy of the new state\textsuperscript{43}. Although referring to the close relation between Cyprus, under Makarios, and the Non Aligned Movement and to the high popularity of AKEL the report concluded that that Cyprus would maintain a pro-western orientation for the following reasons: the existence of two British Sovereign Bases on the island, the need for training of the still under formation Cypriot Army, the role of Greece and Turkey, the development aid from the U.S., Britain and Germany and the opening of Embassies (with the exception of Cairo) only in western countries. The German side understood and appreciated the idea of being neutralist as developed by Makarios but came to the conclusion that de facto Cyprus was to follow a pro-western foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{42} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, 2 June 1962, PolAAA, B26/200
\textsuperscript{43} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, October 10, 1960, PolAAA, B26 / 118
In a report of the German Embassy in Nicosia in February 1962\textsuperscript{44} on the history of Cyprus, and on the critical question whether the Turkish Cypriots would abandon the idea of the division of the island and the Greek Cypriots the idea of union with Greece, the Embassy could not give a concrete answer. They mentioned though that almost nobody on the island was willing to take arms for changing something. In view of the clashes that would soon erupt, this was fallacious. More precise were the other remarks, though, about the internal situation: the majority of the people of the two communities did not develop any feelings neither for the new state, nor for the constitution and it was only because of the efforts of Makarios and Kucuk that things hadn’t radicalised yet. According to the report, Kucuk faced the problem of being challenged by Rauf Denktas\textsuperscript{45}, who was more radical in his approach and could seek the confrontation. The report continued in a more pessimistic tone to state that the problem of filling 30\% of the posts in the public service with Turkish Cypriots and the formation of separate municipal administrations could not be solved easily, since the Turkish Cypriot community (18\% of the total population) simply did not have the right persons for all these posts. The report also mentioned the tax dispute\textsuperscript{46} to point out that Makarios expressed his determination to find solutions beyond the Constitution.

The German Embassy also reports that the Greek Cypriot Press would rather publish articles and speeches about the heroes of the anti-colonial struggle rather than the real

\textsuperscript{44} PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 200
\textsuperscript{45} Rauf Denktas, (1924 - ) First President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber in 1960 and for years the main Turkish Cypriot leader, who proclaimed in 1983 the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, only recognised by Turkey
\textsuperscript{46} Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume 8, March, 1962 Cyprus, Page 18623
constitutional problems of the period, the most important being the question of forming unified or separate municipal authorities and, consecutively also the question about tax collection. It admitted that the crimes committed during the clashes between the two communities in 1958 proved that enough weapons were still in possession of the two communities. It concluded that AKEL’s political power reaching 40%, the trade unions and the newspaper of the party could encourage further radicalisation of political life. The German anticommunist tone is common in many reports. In that first period, though, communist activities were still not necessarily an element of destabilisation. AKEL already supported Makarios in his policies but was far from being the most critical voice against the Turkish Cypriots.

On August 30, 1962 the Vice President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson visited Cyprus officially. The report of the German Embassy in Nicosia is very detailed. Once again, the Germans noticed that the Greek Cypriot side received Johnson in a rather cold way. An attempt to explain to him their objections to the 1960 Agreements was unsuccessful. To the contrary, the Turkish side, represented by Vice President Kucuk, who was, according to the protocol, the main person responsible to greet Johnson, at the airport being his counterpart, conveyed a memorandum with complaints on the constitutional questions. They also received Johnson in the Turkish neighbourhood of Nicosia the following day, where the American Vice President was offered the “key” of the city and expressed his gratitude for the visit47.

47 PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 202
In those early stages, it is known that Kucuk was advised by the Turkish Embassy to demonstrate his good will. At the same time, though, he appealed to the Supreme Court in order to secure his right to be informed about the foreign policy of the Government. Denktas, as later proved, would seek more radical reactions using the underground organisation TMT[^48], responsible for the provocative bombing of a mosque and later the murder of two of his Turkish Cypriot political rivals, Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan, who threatened to reveal the true perpetrators of the bombing.

In August 1963, the German Embassy experienced “first hand” the consequences of the mistrust between the two communities. After inviting the Greek and Turkish Cypriot directors of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation programmes to visit Germany, they were soon informed that the Greek Cypriot Director General turned down the invitation on the grounds that inviting one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot “does not reflect the true character of the island which is Greek”[^49]. He also accused the Embassy of getting involved in the internal affairs of Cyprus. The Embassy denied the accusations and stressed that the right to invite delegations to Germany from both communities was reserved. This incident gave another chance to report again in detail regarding the increasing political clouds in Cyprus. The role of the Church, the –still fresh- memories of the anti - colonial struggle and the educational system of the island were additional factors giving, according to the German Embassy, the impression to the Greek Cypriots that they alone should represent abroad institutions such as the state television and radio.


[^49]: German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, August 30, 1963, PolAAA, B26 / 201
2.6. Visit of Vice President Kucuk to Germany

Any invitation to Makarios for visiting Germany, always according to the German Embassy in Nicosia, should be followed by an invitation addressed to the Turkish Cypriot Vice President Fazil Kucuk. Due to the bicomunal structure of the Republic of Cyprus, any “protocol experiments” should be avoided. Going a step further and keeping in mind the German national interests the report states that “an invitation to the Turkish Vice President Dr. Kucuk is necessary, in view of the invitation of the Greek President of the Republic of Cyprus in order to avoid to upset the absolutely western oriented Turkish population part of Cyprus”\(^{50}\). The report ended by reminding of the need to prepare the visit of the Vice President as representing the Turkish Cypriots who, “were the community who supported without any reservations the Agreements of Zurich and London and the state created by them”. An invitation for Vice President Kucuk could also be interpreted as an example of the principle of equal distance to the communities in Cyprus. Actually, Germany was the only country who had the prudence to invite both leaders and schedule their visits with only some months’ distance. This had not only the purpose of giving Germany the chance to hear the positions of both communities but also to stress the German views on the issue to both communities and recommend compromising solutions always within a lawful spirit.

\(^{50}\) PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 118
In order to help the preparation of the visit, the German Embassy in Nicosia sent a report\textsuperscript{51} on the already critical internal situation. The report mentioned the efforts of Makarios for a solution on the municipality question by establishing unified municipalities which again resulted to an appeal of the Turkish Cypriots to the Supreme Court, in order to stop the initiative. The report prepared the German side on the issue of the Turkish Cypriot complains. It mentioned the problem of reaching the proportion of 30\% of the civil servants, Kucuk’s complaint of being excluded from the most important foreign policy decisions, such as the visits to Egypt and India and the participation to the Non Aligned conference in Belgrade. The report finally pointed out that during the visit of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, the German side should avoid mentioning the Ancient Greek past of Cyprus and the acute matters pending between the two communities in all scheduled speeches. Germany should also avoid to promise separate help to Turkish Cypriots for any matter. Such an action, according to the Embassy, would undermine the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and would not contribute to the understanding between the two communities, although any help to raise the living standard of the Turkish Cypriot Community, which was far below than that of the Greek Cypriots, could also have a positive effect. If the Turkish Cypriot delegation appeared sceptical towards the self determination right of Germany because of the fear that its exercise in Cyprus would result to the union with Greece, the German side could just point out that the official policy of Turkey and Greece was to support the self determination in Germany but not in Cyprus. In that case the Turkish Cypriot Community should align itself with the Turkish position.

\textsuperscript{51} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, February 14, 1962, PolAAA, B26 / 200
The Embassy suggested that in all the places to be visited, local authorities should be informed, in order to avoid misunderstandings such as those created during the earlier visit of the parliamentarian delegation in Bavaria, where the whole delegation, including the Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians, were addressed with the following words „Welcome, sons of the heroes of Greece!”. 

The visit took place between February 13 and 19, 1963. Kucuk was escorted by Denktas and a small delegation. Despite the fears of the German side, Kucuk stressed clearly that the principle of self determination would provide the solution to the German problem. The visit also included West Berlin and was again, at least as successful as the previous visit of Makarios. Judging by the developments at the end of the year, however, it could be said that the German message, for consensus and self – restraint was not passed.

2.7. Cyprus and East Germany

One of the main preoccupations, that would later turn into a serious negative factor in the German – Cypriot relations were the activities of East Germany on the island. On March 8, 1962 the Embassy reports received unofficial information by the Cypriot government that the Hungarian Trade Department on the island proposed an increase for Cypriot exports of wine and tobacco in order to send some quantities to East. 

52 By the end of 1963 and the collapse of the bicommunal structure of the Republic, Greek Cypriot police found plans probably prepared by Denktas, for escalation of the situation with the aim of concentrating the Turkish Cypriot population in one zone, which could be later declared as autonomous or independent. Cf. Yennaris, C. (2003). *From the East. Conflict and partition in Cyprus*. London, Elliot & Thompson.
Germany over Hungary. Striking in that early point of time is not so much the East German interest but the fact that the Cypriot government kept the German Government informed of the Eastern German initiatives. Cyprus had no intention of developing its relations with East Germany at that stage. Things, however, would change soon.

2.8. Summary

Establishing full diplomatic relations, two State visits and several other official and unofficial visits, three bilateral Agreements, full support of Cyprus to Germany towards finding a solution to the German problem and support of Germany to Cyprus through the presence of a German President of the Supreme Constitutional court towards finding constitutional solutions to the disputes on the island are some of the accomplishments of the first three years of bilateral relations. One could not have hoped for a better start. Unfortunately, the years that followed, would prove to be a hard contrast to the fruitful period between 1960 and 1963.
3. THE 1964 CRISIS

The years of peace and development on the island would soon come to an end with the 1964 crisis. Since then, and up to the present, the situation on the island would never be normal again.

3.1 Historical Events

It is not the objective of the current work to provide a detailed survey of all events that occurred in 1964, the most crucial year of the period, an overview, still, would be helpful to understand the approach of the different parts. After the constitutional deadlock on the issue of the municipalities, which led to the Turkish Cypriot decision to block the collection of taxes (the deadlock was also the reason of the resignation of Professor Forsthoft from his duties as President of the Constitutional Court) Makarios undertook the initiative for constitutional changes, in November 1963. His proposals on limiting the power of the Turkish Cypriot Veto (in the Government and the Parliament) were immediately rejected. In a very heavy political atmosphere, the eruption of violence was only a matter of time. It is not important any more, who fired the first shot. During December 1963 up to 100 casualties from both sides were recorded. The irregular paramilitary groups had never stopped to exist in both Communities. Violence proved to be faster in forming the events than the attempts of

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53 The so called “13 points”, the proposals of Makarios for amendment of the Constitution would practically result to the abolition of the Turkish Cypriot veto rights in the Government and the Parliament. As such, they were naturally rejected.

54 Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Volume 10, June, 1964 Cyprus, Page 20113
the politicians on the island or the foreign countries who tried to keep the situation under control.

By the end of that month, Britain offered to intervene between the fighting groups, in order to ensure a ceasefire. On January 15, 1964, Greece, Turkey, Britain and the two communities of Cyprus met in London to discuss possible future steps. During the Conference, Greek Cypriot views of the necessity of amendment of the 1959 Agreements and Turkey’s maximalistic approach and claim for a federal Cypriot state proved to be diametrically different and speeded up the subsequent failure. The only issue that could be agreed was the formation of an international force that would secure peace on the island temporarily. Britain, Greece and Turkey, being members of NATO, were in favor of NATO peace troops. Makarios, however, strongly opposed that option, stressing the necessity of keeping the issue within a United Nations framework.

Unfortunately whereas in December 1963 the main theater of the hostilities was Nicosia, in the months that followed violence also expanded in the other major cities, where Greek and Turkish sectors existed. At the same time, it was obvious that Turkey prepared to military intervene on the island and Greece was seeking ways to support the island’s defense by secretly sending officers and soldiers. Confronted with these developments, the U.N. Secretary General, U Thant appointed the Indian General Gyani as special representative and observer.
The issue proved to be more complicated than expected. The Cypriot Government also rejected the option of a more “neutral” NATO peace-keeping mission from countries like Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany. France was neither willing to participate nor willing to allow (within a NATO framework) an American – led peace force to deploy. French Anti Anglo - Americanism and post – colonial traumata would take Paris as far as to declare that the French government did not wish “to become involved in an operation based on the Zurich statute, in whose elaboration it did not participate, and which does not seem to be capable of lasting for ever”\(^{55}\). The French stance described, can help to provide a comparison with the German one as explained in the Introduction. The former was considered to be more “Greek Cypriot friendly” since with the time developed more understanding for the proposals to amend the Agreements of 1959. Obviously, however, France never considered the consequences of this development\(^{56}\).

On the contrary, the German approach, was much more pragmatic and practical. It could be summarized in one sentence as follows: the issue was not to recognize one’s rights or to take sides in the conflict. The issue was to avoid the conflict or to help find a way out of it.

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\(^{56}\) The difference of the French stance to the German was already mentioned. France, measuring its own national interests, chose not to contribute to the maintenance of the peace keeping troops in Cyprus but to profit, at least in the seventies, from selling arms to Greece and the eighties to the Republic of Cyprus. Obviously, France, regarding its own security, was less worried about the interests of NATO than Germany was. After all, Paris would choose to withdraw from the military structure of the Alliance in 1966 and follow its own policy with the East.
Whilst in February 1964 Makarios resisted the plans of a NATO force, the Turkish Cypriots, (probably trying to prove the necessity of the force), “launched a concerted attack from fortified positions in several parts of Limassol\(^57\)”. This was not the first time that Turkish Cypriot forces, despite being outnumbered, had provoked a Greek Cypriot counter – attack. In the meantime, according to the foreign press\(^58\), “over 40,000 weapons were thought to have been imported into Cyprus in the past two months; the Government had purchased large supplies from the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, former EOKA members were receiving arms smuggled in from Greece, and the Turkish Cypriots were receiving arms from Turkey”.

The British decided to strengthen, at the same time, their military presence on the island, in order to fulfill the peace - keeping duties they assumed since December 1963. Similarly, Greece, being aware of the fact that Turkey was already preparing to invade, decided to speed up the secret dispatch of military units to Cyprus.

The long discussions about the international force were officially terminated on March 4, 1964 with the Security Council Resolution 186\(^59\). Austria, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden decided to provide contingents for the force. British forces (along with Canada the only NATO forces to participate) would also be incorporated to the newly found United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Germany, although not yet a member of the U.N., since the question of its borders was still open, offered 500,000

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\(^57\) Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume 10, June, 1964 Cyprus, Page 20113
\(^58\) Daily Telegraph, 18.2.1964
\(^59\) U.N. Security Council Resolution 186/1964
USD from the beginning. The reasons for the German decision to participate in financing the peace operation were already mentioned in the introduction. It could be added, still, that Washington and London, being the other major sponsors of the operation, encouraged Bonn to contribute, since Germany reconsidered the idea to send soldiers, after the first cold reaction of Makarios to the idea of a N.A.T.O peace troop.

It is true that Turkey (and in less extend NATO and the West) were not satisfied with the Resolution. Plans for invasion, already partly prepared in February, were revived in Ankara. According to Keesing's again, “some 13,000 Turkish troops, equipped with tanks and anti-aircraft and field guns, were reported during the evening of March 13 to be embarking at Iskenderun” and a secret session of the Turkish Parliament “approved on March 16, with only four abstentions, a request by the Government for full power to make an armed intervention in Cyprus if necessary”.

There are many discussions about the reasons of containing a Turkish invasion during the first half of 1964. Some give emphasis on the American factor (the U.S. were not in favor of a Turkish unilateral operation), on a possible Soviet threat, on the clear position of Greece to defend the island with every means and on the lack of determination of the old Turkish leader and former military Ismet Inonu, who had enough experience of the tragic effects of any armed conflict. The last factor might be

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60 Keesing's Record of World Events, Volume 10, June, 1964 Cyprus, Page 20113
61 The reasons for any German reluctance to send troops abroad, apart from avoiding any complications with Turkey or Greece in this case, lie also in the German Constitution, the Federal System, the “pacifistic” approach of certain political forces of the country and the traumatic experience of the Second World War.
62 Keesing's Record of World Events, Volume 10, June, 1964 Cyprus, Page 20113
the most decisive, since any action to stop the Turkish invasion, once being launched, if even undertaken, could prove to be practically ineffective and its consequences for Turkey, as eventually happened in 1974 insignificant.

Soon after the Resolution, the United Nations Forces in Cyprus started deploying. Right after that, U Thant appointed Sakari Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat and politician, as mediator. His nomination was approved by all parties concerned.

Succession of the rightist Karamanlis government in Athens (who signed the Agreements of 1959) by the centrist Papandreou government reduced the pressure on Makarios. Papandreou would even soon place the more radical demand of self-determination for Cyprus, which would lead to the union of the island with Greece. If a union of Cyprus with Greece was the true aspiration of Makarios, then that is very unclear when consulting the Cyprus issue literature. His opponents had good reasons to believe that he was more interested in safeguarding his own office than in promoting union with Greece\(^{63}\). True, is nevertheless the fact that Turkey would immediately react against any development leading to the union of the island with Greece, and, Greece, being aware of that, preferred to negotiate possible trade-offs on the island directly with Turkey, regarding issues like a military basis or large autonomies for the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios’ role, every time Greece and Turkey approached each other on the

issue, was obstructive. Whether his ambition or a genuine objection to a problematic compromise were the real background for that it still remains disputable.  

The situation on the ground in April remained crucial, with several losses on both sides and a “battle” on the Kyrenia Mountains, in order to secure the passage leading to Nicosia. New Turkish threats for invasion and Makarios’s repeat of the renounce of the Treaty of Alliance of 1960 provided for more tension.

Dr. Galo Plaza from Ecuador assumed the duties of the special U.N. Representative in Cyprus in May. The same month, in an effort to control irregular armed groups but mostly to ensure the security of Cyprus, the Government proceeded with the organization of the “National Guard”, introduced obligatory military service for all Greek Cypriots and ordered heavy arms from various socialist countries. In both decisions, the Vice-President Kucuk’s vetoes were ignored by the Government on the argument that since Kutchuk had abandoned the Government in December 1963 employing himself in activities against the state, the exercise of his veto right became obsolete. Kutchuk went on to propose in early June a full meeting of the Council of Ministers, which would be attended also by him and the three Turkish Cypriot members asking at the same time Makarios to reconfirm that he respects the current Constitution. His proposal was linked with the discussion of the “unconstitutional acts and decisions taken by Greek Cypriot members of the government alone, directly relating to internal

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64 Many authors support that Makarios was indeed until the end of his life pro-unionist but since he realised that this was not a feasible aim he supported uncommitted independence. Cf. Paulides, A. (1981). *Makarios*. Leukósia, Ekdoseis Chr. Andreou
security, defense, and foreign affairs. It is open, whether this initiative of Kutchuk could have a positive outcome, if the Greek Cypriot side had responded positively. His aim at that stage was obviously to stop the organization of a Greek Cypriot regular army. Why would Turkey choose to make a proposal to return to the Constitution, while proposing at the same time a federal state and threatening to invade the island? Or was it an initiative of Kucuk and not of Turkey or an attempt to create a better climate in view of the efforts of the Americans to bring together the governments of Greece and Turkey in order to solve the problem? These are questions that will probably remain unanswered.

On June 10, 1964 the Cypriot General Georgios Grivas, the military leader of the anti-colonial struggle returned to the island to participate in its defence. His presence was welcomed by the Government, although circles around Makarios considered him as a possible rival for the Archbishop and an “instrument” of the Greek government.

On June 27 1964 the term of the United Nations Force in Cyprus was renewed for another three months and the Indian General Thimayya was nominated as new Commander, succeeding his countryman General Gyani. By the end of the month the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson invited the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey separately to Washington. Prior to that, Johnson had sent a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Inonu in order to stop a scheduled landing of Turkish troops on the island. Apparently, the main interest of the U.S. was to stop a possible Greek – Turkish war and to reduce the danger of a Soviet involvement to the least possible. During the

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65 Keesing's Record of World Events, Volume 10, June, 1964 Cyprus, Page 20113
negotiations, the Americans were very instrumental in trying to convince the Greek government to influence Makarios in order to abandon his plans for revising the Treaties66. A parallel effort to influence the situation was undertaken by the U.N. mediator Tuomioja in Geneva. As a result, Greece, Turkey and both Cypriot sides agreed to negotiate again in early July.

A judicial reform in Cyprus, on the basis of the “doctrine of necessity”, carried out by Makarios and which resulted to the foundation of a Supreme Court (as a result of the unification of the Supreme Constitutional and the High Court) and as for the case of lower courts to the abolition of the requirement a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot to be tried only by judges of his community or a mixed court in case of a mixed case. Turkey protested strongly against the reform and saw in it another breach of the Treaties67.

Realizing further how critical the situation was, the Americans attempted to influence the Geneva negotiations. The former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was sent for that purpose to Europe. Acheson had a radical plan namely the union of the island with Greece in exchange of a Turkish military base on the island and Turkish Cypriot self administration. The plan had been accepted for further discussion, at least by the Greek government, a position that would later change since Makarios rejected any discussion on that basis.

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66 Unconfirmed by the Greek or American Archives, but cited broadly is the instrumental way in which Lyndon Johnson tried to “convince” the Greek Ambassador about the need to cooperate: “Fuck your parliament and your constitution... If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament, and constitutions, he, his parliament, and his constitution may not last very long” Cf. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0103.thompson.html

67 Keesings, p. 20265
Some days later, on August 3, the Parliament of Cyprus, at the presence of the Greek Cypriot representatives only, approved the extension of the territorial waters of Cyprus from three to twelve miles. This decision was again perceived as provocative by Turkey. On August 6 violence erupted around the Tylleria area village of Kokkina, the only coastline village under Turkish Cypriot control. Turkish Cypriot students, who parallel to their studies, received military training in Turkey, and military personnel from Turkey often used this landing point. The Cypriot National Guard took action in order to seize positions on the hills around and therefore control the village. On August 8 and 9, Turkey carried out several air attacks against Greek Cypriot positions in the area. The Turkish Air Force also attacked Greek Cypriot villages in the area, causing a large number of casualties. A cease-fire was only achieved on the following day, after the intervention of the Security Council.

Soon after the tragic events in Tylleria a statement of the Cypriot High Commissioner in London, Antis Soteriades that Cyprus would not make any concessions “even if it means a third world war” created a negative impression in the western press and the western foreign ministries. Especially Germany (the German press and the Auswärtiges Amt), a country who fought and lost both world wars and feared that a third one, in its territories would mean a total disaster, expressed its disapproval.

By the end of the month, new negotiations started, despite the illness of the U.N. mediator, Tuomioja (who would die few weeks later). The U.N., represented by U
Thant himself, followed closely the new round. The Cypriot government, however, seemed to expect more from the forthcoming session of the General Assembly than the negotiations.

Still, that was not the only strategy of Nicosia. Right after the Turkish attack, Cyprus announced an appeal to Russia and Egypt for military aid, which resulted to a Soviet declaration on August 15: “if a foreign armed invasion of the Republic takes place, the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence… and is prepared to begin negotiations on this matter immediately”.

Nasser’s message, although was not as clear as that the Soviets. The communiqué after a visit of Makarios to Cairo on August 27, 1964 was rather giving emphasis on the “respective attitudes towards foreign bases,” seen as “a direct threat to world peace and to the security of the [Eastern Mediterranean] area” than on any practical support of Cyprus. Egypt was more worried about Israel and the support by the West, possibly through the large British bases on Cyprus and less interested in expressing explicitly any intention to involve in the Cyprus issue. Thus, Cyprus would also focus for a while on the status of the British Sovereign Bases on the island, a matter not necessarily on the priority list of the Government and certainly not helpful in securing the understanding of the West for the intentions of Makarios.

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68 Especially the government – friendly and communist press challenged several times the status the British Bases. In the year to follow, AKEL and the Trade Unions would even organize demonstrations for that
Makarios also announced his decision to send his Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou to Moscow for consultations. Indeed, Kyprianou went to Moscow in September, where he signed an Agreement for Military Aid. It is obvious that discussing the Cyprus issue in Geneva, under U.S. pressure, at that point of time and probably for that year, was not a high priority for Makarios any more. The death of UN mediator Sakari Tuomioja, the support of Papandreou’s government and reorganization of Cyprus’s defense with Greek troops and Soviet military aid convinced him to wait for a better moment or to renegotiate only on his own terms. The bitterness for the attack of the Turkish airforce would also serve this aim.

3.2 The effect of the crisis on the Cypriot – German relations

Obviously, during the crisis of 1963 – 1964 Germany did not remain indifferent. Close relations with Greece and Turkey, participation in NATO and an active role in the UN, even without being a member, were the main reasons or levels where Germany expressed its concern. Having the knowledge of that year’s developments as a background, we can examine their effect on the bilateral relations and shed some light on the German approach.

An immediate result of the crisis in Cyprus was the fact that the Cypriot Ambassador accredited in Bonn, Ahmet Zaim, obeying the decision of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, withdrew from his position. In fact, for over two years hereafter, there was not a Cypriot Ambassador accredited in Bonn. Bonn was also not willing to accept the accreditation of a Greek Cypriot in a post that according to the Constitution should be

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covered by a Turkish Cypriot. Bonn would prefer to wait to see the outcome of the crisis. It was now more up to the German Embassy in Nicosia to ensure the continuation of the bilateral relations.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that one Turkish Cypriot, appointed in the Trade Department of the Embassy, Ozdemir Ozgur, refused to leave his post at the Embassy. He was probably the only Turkish Cypriot who had done so. Such an attitude had been possible because, being in Germany he was not directly exposed to the violence or the threats of the leadership of his community that would not tolerate disobedience in its policies. His presence at the Embassy, until 1966 and his conviction that the dispute should be solved with the consensus of both sides could be less seen as disqualifying the radical Turkish Cypriot leadership or Ankara and more as an exception that only confirms the rule that the Turkish Cypriot officers could or would not return during the crisis back to any of the Government bodies.\(^{70}\)

Since the beginning of the crisis, the reports of the German Embassy in Nicosia were frequent and detailed. In December 23, 1963, the Embassy reports that new clashes were about to break out\(^ {71}\). Indeed, a few hours later, in Omorfita (a suburb of Nicosia) serious gunfire that would last for days started. The report, being absolutely neutral, pointed out that for every incident, there were two contradicting versions, one of each community, and summed up all the incidents of the month, including also how the car of the German Ambassador was also shot at on the road along the wall of the old part of Nicosia. The Embassy came to the conclusion that the aim of the Greek Cypriots was

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\(^{70}\) His memories from that time were published under: Özgür, O. A. (2001). Cyprus in my life testimony of a Turkish Cypriot diplomat. Mannheim [Germany], Bibliopolis.

\(^{71}\) PolAAA, B26, 295
possibly to prove that the Constitution was responsible for the conflict and thus should be amended in favor of the majority whereas the Turkish Cypriots could claim that the island should be partitioned so that peace could prevail.

At the same time, the German Mission was worried about the financial losses and destruction of a few German properties in Nicosia and certainly about the fact that the German Technical Help in the mountains north of Nicosia, consisting of experts in the fields of Mineralogy, Geology and Water Survey also interrupted its activities for security reasons. Thanks to the British troops that developed between the fire lines, the Embassy reestablished contact with Germans living in the Turkish Cypriot sector of the capital. To secure their welfare, the spouse of the German Ambassador visited the spouse of Vice President Kucuk.

Inevitably, the fact that the Turkish Cypriots suffered more losses and casualties was reflected in the reports of the Embassy. However, Germany was not willing to accept the Turkish view of the necessity to divide the island, as a permanent solution to the problem. In a meeting\textsuperscript{72} with his Turkish counterpart\textsuperscript{73} in Nicosia, Ambassador Koenig informed that for Germany the issue of separation was also an emotional one (pointing on the German division). Koenig went further to stress that removing the Cypriot Ambassador Ahmet Zaim from Bonn was also not proper, only to receive however the

\textsuperscript{72} PolAAA, B26
\textsuperscript{73} First Ambassador of Turkey on the island was appointed Emin Dirvana. It is assumed that he was replaced in 1962 because of a conflict with Rauf Denktas, then President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber. Dirvana was not in favour of Denktas policy of seeking confrontation with the Greek Cypriot Community.
answer that since the Cypriot foreign Ministry was in the “hands” of the Greek Cypriots, there was no point in keeping a Turkish Cypriot Ambassador in that post.

One of the early conclusions of the German diplomacy was the probability that the Greek Cypriots would turn to the Soviet Union, in order to find support, if Turkey continued its preparations for military intervention on the island. In fact, it was widely known that Makarios addressed a letter already in January 1964 to different foreign countries, seeking their support. The German President was also one of the recipients. In that letter, Makarios accused Turkey of acts of military aggression. An internal Memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry suggested that Germany should respond to the letter in a friendly way, although convinced that Makarios intentions to denounce the 1959 Treaties were controversial. Again, the fact that Makarios was supportive to the German Federal Government on issues like the construction of the Berlin Wall should be taken into account. Still, Germany should express explicitly its reservations in a unilateral denounce of the Treaties. Additionally, since the beginning of the conflict, loyal to its post – war principle, the German Government gave instructions to stop any proliferation of military – related material to the countries of the region.

Ambassador Koenig had always an almost personal relation to Makarios. In a report, after a meeting they had in January 1964 he declared that Makarios admitted part of the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots and promised to remove Polykarpos Yiorgadgis, the all – powerful Minster of Interior from his position. The fact that this never happened, made the German side to assume that Makarios was rather unable to control
the situation at that stage. The above information is very interesting, although not
confirmed by other sources. The relation between Makarios and Yiorgadgis was not
always harmonious and obviously, Makarios was also worried about the scale of
intercommunal violence. He was though, either unwilling or unable to remove the
powerful Minister from his position.

After the unsuccessful mission of George Ball on behalf of the U.S. and the failure of
the January Conference in London, the Germans technocrats drew the conclusion that
the Turkish side did not have concrete proposals but at the same time would never
accept the Greek Cypriot proposals for the amendments. They also alleged that Inonu
was not 100% determined to order a military operation on the island but Kucuk and
Denktas, the latter being even more radical, were cultivating the idea of partition,
though mentioning from time to time also a federal or a multi-cantonal system
solution.

In early February 1964 the German government examined the possibility of
participating in a NATO peace keeping force. It would soon come to the conclusion
that troops other than those of the three Guarantor powers would need (according to
international law) the consent of the Cypriot government. Responding positively to the
proposal to participate at the international force was not an easy task. As reasons for
their reluctance, the British count “legalistic minds, guilt complexes about the past, and
their general disinclination to contribute”, still, assume that “it was possible that

Yiorgadgis will plan unsuccessfully the assassination of Makarios in 1970. A week later he will be
assassinated under mysterious conditions
Germany and Italy would take a more positive line if Cyprus (in the shape of Makarios) welcomed a NATO-linked force”.  

According to the Germans, the Turkish government was also positive to a German participation in the peace keeping troops, since Germany enjoyed the trust of the Turkish public opinion as well. Such a development, according to the Turks, would also strengthen the Turkish government, currently under internal pressure because of the developments in Cyprus. Germany finally decided not to participate in the force, appealed however, several times during the conflict to its NATO allies Turkey and Greece to exercise restraint.

Just before the approval of U.N.S.C. Resolution 186 the German Embassy reported that the Turkish Cypriots were disappointed because Britain and the U.S. objected Turkish plans for landing on the island. The new gunfire in Limassol and the fact that the first Greek soldiers started to arrive on the island dressed in civil wear were additional reasons for the disappointment of that month.

The German Mission observed carefully the gradual militarization of Cyprus. Reports on the establishing of the Greek Cypriot National Guard as well as on the proliferation of arms from the Eastern block, usually over the Arab Countries had become a routine by spring 1964. Some reports, though, in relation to the role of some of the Cypriot leaders and to the composition of the troops that arrived from Greece in civil wear,

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77 PolAAA, B26, 296 25.2.1964
were not always precise. These inaccuracies could be attributed to the lack of intelligence information, again as a result of less interest in these matters, in contrast to their British or American counterparts.

Being exposed to the information and the approach of the Greek Cypriot community, the reports of the German Embassy in Nicosia reports differ from the Memoranda prepared directly at the Auswärtiges Amt or the reports sent by other German Missions on the issue. In a report drafted for the German State Secretary on March 25, 1964\textsuperscript{78}, Cyprus is directly compared to Cuba, Sri Lanka and Zanzibar, in means of Soviet influence and targeted conflict conservation in order to challenge the West. The mass of help and the experts sent to these countries, in compare to the rest of the developing countries, where the West was also sending financial aid, could support this conclusion.

Again, as in the years before, Germany is worried about Soviet influence on the island and its possible complications. This conclusion, would make Germany more positive to the Turkish interpretation, according to which, mainly the Greek Cypriots were responsible for the destabilization of the island. In a report of the German Embassy in Nicosia\textsuperscript{79}, on a speech delivered at the Security Council by Rauf Denktas was impressive, based on the arguments derived from the 1959 Treaties and much compatible to the positions expressed by Forsthoff, i.e. that the Cypriot Government did not give any chance for the Constitution to work.

\textsuperscript{78} German Foreign Ministry, Office of the State Secretary. PolAAA, B26 / 296

\textsuperscript{79} February 22, 1964. PolAAA, B26 / 296
The situation after the deployment of the United Nations Force in Cyprus in April and May, 1964, was partly stabilized, so the German reports from Nicosia did not include any information of particular interest. On June 18, 1964, however, the German Embassy reported a small demonstration outside its premises against the German policy. The conclusion drawn was that the demonstration had been organized by communist circles, nevertheless, in the report, the Embassy summarized again the reasons for the gradual worsening of the bilateral relations\(^{80}\): a) Germany was accused of supplying Turkey with weapons that might be used against Cyprus b) Germany and Turkey were NATO allies c) the German press was particularly hostile to Makarios d) Germany still had serious reservations as regards to the amendment of the 1959 Treaties, e) Germany was seeking its self – determination, refused however to express explicitly that it recognises the same right for Cyprus f) Cypriot exports to Germany, after the beginning of the crisis suffered because of the increase of cargo costs and g) the campaign of East Germany, through the local communist press.

Despite the above, according to the Embassy, a Cypriot officer who visited the same month both parts of Germany and rejected the request of the East German Airlines Interflug to convince both, him and the Cypriot travel agents who escorted him of the benefits of establishing a direct connection to East Berlin, told the German Embassy that “having visited your country and their country, we found the contrast very sad and striking. An unbelievable partition like this, the construction of the Berlin Wall, especially in view that this might happen in Cyprus, made us after returning from East

\(^{80}\) German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, August 24, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
Germany very sad and depressed”\(^81\). Makarios himself, according to another report\(^82\), repeated to the liberal newspaper *Alithia*, at the presence of representatives of the trade unions that he only recognized one Germany and that he is not willing to re-examine this position and establish relations with East Germany.

The events of August 1964, however, and particularly the number of casualties caused during the Turkish bombardment would soon lead to a general mistrust for the West (and Germany) and to certain gains for East Germany. The communist newspaper *Haravgi* reported on August 13, 1964, just four days after the attack, that “only East Germany volunteered to treat medically the victims” whereas “hitlerists in Bonn can be happy (after the attack) because they can expand their vital space through their marionettes”.

From that point on, the better the relations would be with East Germany, the worse they would become with the Federal Germany. The support offered after the attack of the Turkish Air force would be much appreciated by the government of Cyprus. At the same time, West German Posts refused to deliver letters from Cyprus, because of the fact that the Cyprus post issued stamps with the slogan “*Turkish bombs endanger global security*” to be put on every letter. The German post, probably without consulting the German Foreign Ministry, decided to send all letters coming from Cyprus back\(^83\). After being informed, the German Embassy in Nicosia expressed the view that if this practice continued, the Cyprus Post would respond with the same

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\(^81\) German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, June 25, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
\(^82\) German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, June 22, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
\(^83\) German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, October 2, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
measure, i.e. returning also back all letters from Germany to Cyprus and recommended to accept the stamp. Still, the Director of the German Posts would sent a letter on September 18, 1964 to his Cypriot colleague, pointing out that any political slogan on the envelopes was in violation of the World Post Convention of Ottawa. He warned that in the future any letters with this stamp would be sent back. Again, the German mission in Nicosia, being aware of the letter, pointed out that any decision of the German Post should be taken in consultation with the Federal Foreign Ministry, since other countries did obviously not protest about the stamp.

The Cypriot – Soviet “flirtation” of September 1964 was followed and probably connected with a Cypriot – East German “flirt”. Indeed, the sudden decision to start negotiations to establish an East German Mission, even under the pretext of Trade, is hard to explain, especially if we take into consideration the good relations with West Germany, up to that point. It could only be assumed, that the Soviet Union offered not only to help by providing arm supplies but also politically, through its East European “satellites” under the condition to establish this kind of relations with East Germany.

A delegation from East Germany visited the same month Nicosia and was received by President Makarios himself. The German Ambassador, loyal to the “Hallstein Doctrine” made subsequently a demarche\(^\text{84}\), explaining that the Federal Republic of Germany could go as far as interrupting its diplomatic relations with every country that would proceed to recognize East Germany. Makarios did not question the official German policy, pointed out, however, that he was attacked many times by the Western

\(^\text{84}\) German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, September 28, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
German Press. The German Ambassador responded that the most negative articles about the Cyprus Government were caused by the well known statements of the Cypriot Ambassador in London Soteriades (about a possible third world war), that shocked the German public opinion. On that meeting, Makarios admitted that Cyprus and East Germany already agreed during the visit of the delegation to establish trade relations, since this was already the case with East Germany and the other West European countries, including Greece\textsuperscript{85}. The German Ambassador stressed again that only Trade Chambers should sign such an Agreement and not the official state. In that point, he noted in his report, he did not receive a direct answer. It became more obvious, during the conversation, that the relations with East Germany were a trade off to the Soviet Union, when Makarios tried to explain that since no Western country was willing to supply him with arms, he had no option than to obtain them from the Soviet Union.

The Agreement between Cyprus and East Germany was signed in November 1964. The Cypriot side was represented not by the Chamber of Commerce but by the Minister of Commerce Andreas Araouzos himself. According again to the reports of the local German Embassy, the German diplomats were misguided as to the exact point of signing the Agreement and on the fact that part of it was the direct operation of a Trade Mission of East Germany which would be soon found to exercise duties other than those of a Trade Mission. The Mission of East Germany would soon start to use the flag of East Germany out of its premises and on its car, issue visas and operate like a normal

\textsuperscript{85} Stergiou, A. (2001). Im Spagat zwischen Solidarita\textcent t und Realpolitik die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Griechenland und das Verha\textcent tnis der SED zur KKE. Mannheim, Bibliopolis
Embassy, thus causing the reaction of the German Embassy, who appealed to the relevant provisions of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular relations.

Indicative of the approach of the Cypriot government was the answer of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry to the relevant German demarche (Germany considered the addition of the East German national coat of arms in its flag as an insulting misuse): the use of the flag and the symbols of East Germany were not against the law of the Republic of Cyprus. The Cypriot Foreign Ministry remained also indifferent to the complaint that the East German Trade Mission was immediately included in the diplomatic list issued by the Ministry.

Again, it can only be assumed that the government of Cyprus could avoid such a sudden upgrade in its relations with East Germany. The decision for a “state to state” agreement on trade and the opening of the East German Mission within weeks, could either be delayed or revised. A “chamber to chamber” agreement could be suggested as the first step, leaving everything open. In that case, the trade offices of East Germany would not be allowed to confuse their functions with the functions of a diplomatic mission. Would the size of Cyprus allow its government to treat the matter with the Soviet Union in that way? Or were the arm supplies dependent on the progress of the relation with East Germany? The answers can probably be found in the Cypriot or the Soviet Archives. Fact is that the official Germany deserved probably to be treated better during those months.
Ambassador Koenig, obviously disappointed with the direction in which the bilateral relations were moving, suggested\textsuperscript{86} to his Government his withdrawal. The fact that both, the Cypriot Mission in Bonn (after the departure of Ahmet Zaim) and the German Mission in Nicosia would be left without accredited Ambassadors could pass the right message to Makarios. Even in the case that the German Ministry would decide not to leave the post vacant for a while but to accredit a new Ambassador, Koenig pointed out that the benefit would be also visible: a new Ambassador would not be as “friendly” as he was to Makarios and he would not allow being deceived the way he was. Koenig was as radical as to suggest insisting in one point: in asking the Cypriot Government to deport those East Germans responsible for the “misuse” of their flag and the illegal exercise of consular duties at the East German Mission. Otherwise, he suggested, Germany should examine the possibility to terminate the Agreement on Technical and Financial Help and to freeze the contribution of Germany to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. Reporting again to Bonn, on his protest about the East German Trade he noted that he was told at a certain point that “the Republic of Cyprus was not aware of the objections of the Federal Republic of Germany and the consequences of such an issue on the bilateral relations”. Koenig notes that he had to reject such a claim as “absurd”\textsuperscript{87}.

Bonn considered and evaluated the developments and the suggestions of the Embassy. Being less emotional than the German diplomats on the island, had the wisdom not only not to withdraw its Ambassador but to avoid also taking any of the measures suggested. Indeed, neither the contribution to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus nor the bilateral

\textsuperscript{86} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, November 9, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
\textsuperscript{87} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, December 2, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
Agreements were reconsidered or terminated. In this way, Germany maintained its flexibility and avoided possible further long damage on a bilateral level.

It is, however, true, that by the end of 1964, bilateral relations were at the worst point ever. This was reflected in a Memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry in November 1964, describing that from being at the beginning one of the countries that Cyprus considered most friendly, now it was, probably with the exception of Britain (mostly due to the period and to the outcome of the anti-colonial struggle) “the most hated” country. The Ministry attributed this result to a certain extent to East German campaign combined with the activities of the Communist party AKEL. That was, according to the German diplomacy, the main reason to explain how such a negative image for a country officially neutral in the conflict could be cultivated on the island.

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88 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, November, 1964, PolAAA, B26 / 294
4. THE PERIOD FROM 1965 TO 1968

The wounds of 1964 on Cyprus, on the two communities and on the issue under examination, i.e. on the relations between Cyprus and Germany would be open for years. The choices of both communities, Turkey and to a certain grade Greece to leave behind the Agreements of 1959 proved to be a hard one for all. During the period, however, from 1965 to 1968 all the above stake holders started considering also other solutions beyond violence. By the end of the period (and this was not by coincidence), relations between the two countries improved again, as in the Cyprus problem the signs of a possible compromise through the dialogue that started between the two communities became slightly visible.

With the exception of the crisis of Kofinou (will be mentioned below) in November 1967, the three years that followed were much less turbulent than 1964. This was a result of the presence of the United Nations forces but also of the stabilization of the Greek forces sent to Cyprus and the improve of the discipline of the Cypriot National Guard, that replaced the smaller armed groups of the previous period. It is not wrong to suggest that the impact of these new circumstances, along with the fact that the German Embassy –from 1966 also under a new Head of Mission- “accustomed” to the coexistence with the East German Trade Mission, influenced positively the bilateral course.

4.1. Historical perspective
Through the years 1965 – 1968 the United Nations Forces in Cyprus mandate was always renewed, either for three or for six months. The U.N. Secretary General stressed continually in his reports that since the political problem of the island remained unsolved, the presence of the force was necessary. At the same time, with the exception mainly of the incidents of November 1967 in the village of Kofinou, the situation on the ground was stable. All these years, despite earlier suggestion of the German Embassy in Nicosia to examine the freeze of German contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus, the contribution continued unreduced. In fact, by June 1966 it would amount to a total of 4,500,000 USD, which was, after the contribution of Britain and the U.S. the third largest.

The beginning of 1965 was marked by the surprise caused by the statements of Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on the Cyprus issue:\footnote{Izvestia Jan. 20, 1965}

“... The people of Cyprus will be able to choose any form for their State which will make it possible to take into account the specific position of the national communities – the Greek and the Turkish – within the bounds of a single, sovereign, and united Cyprus. They may also choose the federal form. …”.

The statements were a direct result of the Turkish – Soviet rapprochement which started already during the previous year. Right after the visit of the Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou to the Soviet Union, in September 1964, the travel of the Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin to Moscow signalizing the beginning of a rapprochement, aiming also partly at “neutralizing” the results of Kyprianou’s visit. This visit was followed by a reciprocal visit of Gromyko to Ankara (May 1965) and a
visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Ali Urguplu to the Soviet Union in August. The reason of the activities was again obvious: Turkey had been disappointed by the objections of the U.S. on landing on Cyprus and upset by the Soviet – Cypriot Military Agreement. The Soviets, on the other hand, aimed to attract their big neighbor, either for strengthening their position or for destabilizing the West. Common ground was the rejection of any possibility for Union of Cyprus with Greece, which would mean for the Soviet Union, full control of NATO on the island.

Still, the main landmark of the year was the report of the UN Mediator Galo Plaza, in March. The main suggestion of the report was that the two Cypriot communities should be allowed to negotiate a way out of the crisis. Plaza stressed, though, the fact that the two communities had different conceptions of their status, i.e. the Greek Cypriots emphasize on the fact that they were the majority and the Turkish Cypriots on the fact that, since they were one of the contracting parts of the 1959 Treaties on the island, they are politically equal. What caused the most reaction by the Turkish side, which rejected the report in its total, were mainly the following observations:

“It is obvious that the Cyprus problem cannot any longer be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia Treaties and the Constitution governed by the Treaties.”

According to the Treaties, “the Turkish-Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich
and London Agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for it in the future”\textsuperscript{93}.

As regards the suggestion for a federal system with territorial separation he notes that “...the establishment of a federal regime requires a territorial basis, and this basis does not exist. I would think it essential for the Turkish Government and the Turkish - Cypriot leadership to reconsider their contention that nothing short of the geographical separation of the two communities can ensure adequate protection”\textsuperscript{94}. Finally, as regards to the Guarantee system, he would point out that “a different form of guarantee will have to be devised. In this regard I see an opportunity for the United Nations, to play an invaluable role, if it so agreed”\textsuperscript{95}.

As to the Greek Cypriot aspirations for self – determination and Union with Greece, even if he admitted that “…it is far from me, in any event, to dispute the principle that the people of an independent country possess the right to determine their own future”\textsuperscript{96}, he went on to suggest his advice and preference for “a fully independent state which would undertake to remain independent and to refrain from any action leading to union with any other State”\textsuperscript{97}.

So, being rejecting both, the union with Greece, frequently expressed as an ultimate goal of certain Greek and Greek Cypriot official circles and the division of the island,

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. par. 161
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. par. 156
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. par. 168
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. par. 143
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid. par. 147
as being propagated again by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot official circles, the report was finally suggesting to maintain the independence and to promote the demilitarization of the island. Enough guarantees could be given to the Turkish Cypriot community’s minority rights but not on a territorial basis as they were claiming.

The first reaction of both, the Greek and Cypriot governments to the report were positive. The only reservations they had, consisted on the suggestion not to exercise the right of self determination in the future. The Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected immediately the report. As a result, Galo Plaza resigned from the post of the U.N. Mediator. It is to a certain point true that instead of becoming a basis for some common ground for negotiations, the report proved to be a “tool” in the hands of the Cypriot government, totally unacceptable for the Turkish side, thus maintaining the deadlock.

Soon after the report was submitted, it was announced that Cyprus prepared to import long range missiles bought with the previous year’s agreements from the Soviet Union. The missiles have been sent to Egypt, where already Cypriot military personnel arrived and was instructed on their use. Additionally, 30 T - 34 tanks had been already imported. The missiles were never meant to land on Cyprus, though. This was probably the result of Turkish pressure, American and British influence and Soviet reluctance for another mini Cuba – crisis.
The Turkish side considered further as provocative the legal steps taken in July. Not so the fact that Makarios and the Parliament decided to extend their term for another one year but the fact that they voted to change the election law that allowed the Turkish Cypriots to be elected separately for the Parliament. Apart from Turkey, Britain, as a contracting part of the Agreements of 1959, also protested against the new changes.\textsuperscript{98}

In July 1965, the Greek Government, under Georgios Papandreou collapsed, since a number of members of the Parliament left the ruling Party and collaborated with other political forces. The collapse of Papandreou Government led to a political crisis, largely reflected also on Cyprus.

On the island, Makarios decided to apply measures meant to levy restrictions and controls on Turkish Cypriots’ movement on the island, despite the fact that they were still prohibiting the Greek Cypriots from entering the enclaves they had under their control. The direction, in which the Cypriot government would move, became evident in October 1965. Being encouraged by the Galo Plaza report, the government announced a declaration proposing “autonomy for minorities in education, religion, culture, personal status, and related matters, as well as participation in Parliament and local government in proportion to their numbers.”\textsuperscript{99} The declaration was naturally rejected, since the Turkish Cypriots saw in it a clear attempt of devaluing their

\textsuperscript{98} Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Volume 11, October, 1965 Cyprus, Page 20989
\textsuperscript{99} Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Volume 12, April, 1966 Cyprus, Page 21316
“community” status to a status of a minority and deprive them of their rights, according to the Constitution.

The main development during the following year, 1966, was the secret dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Government, ongoing for several months, on the basis of Union with Greece with territorial compensations for Turkey\textsuperscript{100}. The negotiations were never concluded, since the Greek Government under Stephanos Stephanopoulos resigned by the end of that year\textsuperscript{101}. It was obvious that the political instability in Greece reflected not only on the efforts to solve the problem on Cyprus but also on the relations between the Cypriot and Greek government.

In 1967, just before the general elections in Greece, on April 21, the Greek Army assumed the control of the state, dissolved the Parliament and the Government and appointed, with the King’s approval a military government. The Greek military regime would last until the first days of the Turkish invasion in July 1974 on Cyprus and would have severe consequences on the island during these seven years.

Some months after coming to power, the military government sought to settle the Cyprus problem by conducting direct negotiations between Turkey and Greece. The meeting was organized on September 9 and 10, 1967 at the boarder cities of Alexandroupoli and Kesan. The Greek delegation assumed that Turkey would accept to

\textsuperscript{100} The Greek Foreign Minister Admiral Toumbas describes the dialogue in his book: Toumbas, I. N. (1986). \textit{Apo to hēmerologion enos hypourgou. Athēna, Hoi Ekdoseis tôn Philōn.}
\textsuperscript{101} Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 12, August, 1966 Cyprus, Page 21540
resume the negotiations of the previous year on the basis of union of Cyprus with Greece and territorial compensation for Turkey, either on the island or on the Aegean. Turkey realized, though, that the profit of the crisis in Greece could be bigger. Presumably, demanded withdraw of all Greek forces from the island and talks on a federal solution. The American report is precise when it states that

“... we are disappointed learn that two parties were so far apart. We had felt earlier Toumbas - Caglayangil conversations were leading in direction compensated enosis and had believed GOG willingness offer GOT sovereign base area on Cyprus would be main ingredient in Turkish acceptance enosis. On other hand, Greek delegation probably went Kesan / Alexandropolis meeting with somewhat exaggerated expectations. One can speculate that becoming aware of Greek junta's desire achieve settlement for political reasons, GOT has somewhat raised its price for agreement.”

It is obvious that the Government of Cyprus felt during that period particularly insecure, since the presence of the Greek army and the commanding of the Cypriot National Guard by Greek Officers could enable to the Athens military regime to impose any solution.

In November 1967 Cyprus experienced the biggest crisis since August 1964. An attack of the Turkish Cypriots in the village of Kofinou against a Greek Cypriot police patrol, aiming to secure the control of the main Nicosia – Limassol road, led to the use of excess violence on behalf of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in order to control the
village, causing the death of 24 Turkish Cypriots\textsuperscript{102} who resisted with arms the operation. Turkey started again immediate preparations to land on Cyprus.

The U.S. intervened by sending Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, as a mediator, to the region, in order to prevent a possible war between two NATO allies. Indeed, his mission was successful, since Turkey agreed not to land on the island if Greece withdrew immediately all forces over the numbers allowed by the 1959 Treaties (presumably 8.000 to 10.000 soldiers, added to the 950 men regiment provided by the Treaty of Alliance which was part of the 1959 Agreements). Some days later, the Greek Navy started the transport back to Greece of all military forces, with the exception of the regiment allowed by the Treaties and the officers who commanded the Cypriot National Guard. The Cypriot General Grivas left also the island, relieving Makarios and his supporters, who considered him as a potential opponent.

It is probably true that the operation in Kofinou was planned in advance. Obviously, the Greek military regime had not realized the gravity of the situation or, according to a bolder theory the Cypriot Government was in favor of a mini – crisis with Turkey, in order to destabilize the regime in Athens.

Just before the end of 1967, probably encouraged by the determination of Ankara and the withdrawal of the Greek troops, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot Community proclaimed the “Transitional Administration” in the enclaves they controlled. Fazil

\textsuperscript{102} Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 13, December, 1967 Cyprus, Page 22435
Kucuk, the Cypriot Vice-President became the “President” of the Administration and Rauf Denktas the Vice-President.

Despite their different approaches, 1968 was the year in which the two Cypriot Communities signalized their willingness to find common ground and solve the constitutional problems through negotiations. Makarios denounced union with Greece as ultimate goal (which would mean union with a military regime), proclaimed new elections, which he won with a 96% majority, running against the pro-Enosis physician Takis Evdokas, agreed for the beginning of bicomunal negotiations, which started in June and introduced new measures easing the living conditions of the Turkish Cypriots. A circle of enmity came to an end, offering both communities the chance for a new start.

4.2. German-Cypriot relations

Under the impression of the earlier mentioned interview of Gromyko the German Embassy in Nicosia reported in early January 1965\textsuperscript{103} that the Cypriot government eventually failed to propagate the position of revision of the Treaties or of self determination and Union with Greece, even to the socialist countries, which appeared to be earlier positive. Such views are repeated also by another report, dated January 25, 1965\textsuperscript{104} describing what could be called as “the collapse of the Greek Cypriot policy of internationalizing the Cyprus issue” by informing the world public opinion about the views of the Cypriot government. The report assumes that the Turkish propaganda was

\textsuperscript{103} PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / \textsuperscript{104} January 25, 1965. PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 326
probably much more effective. It is remarkable that the Embassy examined in the same report possible future scenarios and anticipated that in case of changing the self-determination – union doctrine the Cypriot government would be confronted with a situation of an interior conflict between different Greek Cypriot political groups. Since this was indeed the case after 1971 it seems that the German diplomats were able to analyze and read correctly the internal political balances on the island. The report described also precisely the fact that both communities were gradually completing their military preparations.

Germany was well informed about the Turkish – Soviet rapprochement of 1965 mostly through the reports of its Embassy in Ankara. According to these reports, Turkey accused the U.S. of actually supporting the “secret” transport of regular Greek military units on the island. That the U.S. were at least informed about the transport of units in possession of American arms, it was obvious. Many scholars even come to the conclusion that the U.S. were convinced that in that way Greece ensured that the island would remain in the hands of NATO and could have the possibility to enforce its will to Makarios.

An annual report of the German Embassy in Nicosia\textsuperscript{105} described again in a neutral way the beginning of the crisis and the aims of both parts of the conflict, i.e. unrestricted independence and probable union with Greece, for the Greek Cypriots and partition of the island or a federal solution for the Turkish Cypriots, who were prepared to move to the northern part of the island (as they eventually did in 1974). The report referred also

\textsuperscript{105} February 8, 1965. PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 326
to Makarios’s Non-Aligned policy, confirmed, in his opinion by the stance of NATO during the operation of Turkish military airforce in August 1964 and the broad anti-Britain and anti-American feelings of the population, pointing out that unfortunately in Nicosia nobody recognized the fact that the plans for a Turkish invasion in 1964 were actually stopped by Johnson’s intervention. The report assumed also that the recent Turkish-Soviet rapprochement could force the Cypriots to reexamine their foreign policy and turn again to the West.

As regards to the bilateral relations, the report reminded the earlier obstacles (Germany being accused of supplying Turkey with arms, critical stance of the German Press on Makarios). Relative obstacle was also the decision of Lufthansa to exclude Nicosia from its flight destinations. The main obstacle was, however, the activities of East Germany and the credits won because of their immediate help after the operation of the Turkish Air Force in August 1964 with direct flights from Nicosia to East Berlin for medical treatment of the victims, whereas the Federal Government was even reluctant to condemn the attack.

The fact that some of the flights continued, caused however, temporarily, also damage to East Germany, since some of the Germans who flew to Cyprus were seeking asylum at the premises of the Embassy (presumably five persons). An even more interesting incident occurred in the summer of 1965. In the absence of Ambassador Koenig, the Counselor of the Embassy delivered a letter to the members of the Orchestra of Leipzig, performing for few days in Nicosia, containing the address of the Embassy of Germany.
and of the Embassies of the U.S., France and Britain as well as his private address and the private address of the Commercial Attaché. In his letter he explained that Cyprus was a free country and whoever did not want to go back to East Germany could find refuge in one of these addresses. Naturally, the letter was used against the Federal Government by the East German press. The Counselor tried to justify in his report his initiative and explained that the official Cypriot side did not react against it and in any case this was not made known. The instructions from Bonn were to avoid in the future any similar initiative and provide consular help only if asked to do so. For the records it should be mentioned that the attempt did not have any results, since the members of the Orchestra were probably carefully selected, escorted by agents of “Stasi”\textsuperscript{106} and perhaps warned that for any “act against their State”, their relatives back home would face the consequences.

It is again interesting to summarize another internal Memorandum\textsuperscript{107} of the German Foreign Ministry. The interest of Germany, according to the report, was to prevent a conflict between NATO allies Turkey and Greece, to reduce the communist influence on the island and to avoid being partial and misunderstood, because in that way they would only increase the gap between the two sides. Turkey should not be disappointed, since as a country was definitely more important for the defense of the West and any unilateral denounce of the 1959 Treaties should be rejected. The report could not give any answer to the puzzle, already discussed earlier, whether Makarios was still been an honest supporter of Enosis in 1965. His insistence to reject any form of “compensate

\textsuperscript{106} Stasi (Staatssicherheit): the famous East German secret police
\textsuperscript{107} German Foreign Ministry, March 1, 1965. PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 326
union” permitted different assumptions. According to the Memorandum, hostile towards the Federal Government was not only the Communist party but also Dr. Vasos Lyssarides, Makarios’s physician, advisor and social democrat politician. Indeed, Lyssarides, who had visited East Germany in the past, was accusing the Federal Government for supporting with arms and money the Turkish Cypriot community or even for sending officers to train the Turkish Cypriots, i.e. of interfering and violating the sovereignty of the Republic. Germany was seriously worried because Lyssarides views were even more radical: he suggested “uniting” Cyprus with the United Arab Republic, full recognition of East Germany and break off diplomatic relations with Bonn and he was one of the persons very closed to Makarios.

A clear German evaluation of the Cyprus problem is contained, however, in another Memorandum, dated March 4, 1965 (just before the publication of Galo Plaza report): the German Foreign Ministry acknowledged the fact that Turkey refused any revision of the 1959 Treaties whereas the Greek Cypriots insisted in revising the Treaties. The technocrats in Bonn put these two points again together, but reversed, i.e. in a chronological order so that the emphasis and the main responsibility for the situation created was on the Greek Cypriot aspirations to change the constitution and not on the Turkish reaction, which was seen as consecutive. Interesting here, is that, at least the German Embassy in Nicosia, always tried to blame both sides equally.

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108 These statements were made on February 20, 1965 in Lyssarides newspaper Telefites Ores (Last hours)
Taking into consideration the nadir point where the bilateral relations came by the end of 1964, the German Embassy in Nicosia suggested in May 1965 an upgrade of its operation through an increase of its employees and introduction of internships. Indeed, soon after the suggestion, Bonn approved the appointment of a Press Attaché in Nicosia. Later, in the same month, probably again after arrangements of the Embassy, the Federal Government invited the Permanent Secretary of the Cypriot Ministry of Interior and Defense Antonis Anastasiou, a well known West – oriented and anticomunist element, for a visit.

The visit took place at the end of May and was successful. The German Government was particularly pleased that Anastasiou refrained from visiting East Berlin. The German Embassy in Nicosia suggested, nevertheless, to keep low profile during the visit, not only for purposes of serving the official German policy of keeping equal distance from both parts of the conflict but also for avoiding any announcement especially regarding the supply of the Cypriot Police with some technical equipment, mostly insignificant and anyhow not suitable for military purposes.

During the same period, Germany has also invited the Director of the Chamber of Commerce and the well known journalist and photographer George Lanitis, who exhibited in Nicosia after his visit in Germany pictures mostly made in Berlin. Obviously, the pictures from Berlin did not only have an artistic value but showed clearly the situation created on the ground after the decision to build the Wall around the western part of the city.

109 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, June 2, 1965, PolAAA, B26 / 325
At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the German Embassy in Nicosia was often being provoked. According to a report\textsuperscript{110}, during a demonstration at the end of June 1965, probably inspired by AKEL, the demonstrators were shouting outside of the Embassy “Down with the Fascists”. On the same report, the Embassy describes, how, some days before, the same people attacked persons selling the newspaper of the Greek Cypriot pro – West opposition. The incident was described in detail, since post – war Germany was not only interested for the security of the “free world” but has been particularly sensitive in civil liberties and human rights\textsuperscript{111}.

In August 1965 the German diplomats agree in their reports with the British and Turkish positions that the new electoral law violated the Treaties and the Constitution of Cyprus, which provided the right of both communities for separate elections of their representatives\textsuperscript{112}. Interesting in this case is to compare the report of the German Embassy in Athens, according to which even the Greek Foreign Ministry criticized with harsh words, the decision of Makarios\textsuperscript{113}. Again, for the records, the U.N. Security Council expressed with Resolution 207, on August 10. (Par. 2) its disapproval by calling “upon the parties, in conformity with the above resolution, to avoid any action which is likely to worsen the situation”. The German report from New York pointed out that the failure of the Cypriot government to prevent a resolution mainly directed against that recent decision, should actually make the Cypriots rethink of the strategy to

\textsuperscript{110} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, June 29, 1965, PolAAA, B26 /325
\textsuperscript{111} The irregular political climate, also between the Greek – Cypriots is described in Papageõrgiou, S. (2002). Op.cit.
\textsuperscript{112} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, August 2, 1965, PolAAA, B26 /325
\textsuperscript{113} Different approaches between the two countries were very frequent. The Greek governments accused the Cypriots quite often of avoiding to inform Greece on de – facto decisions and actions on the island.
count on the Soviet Union, every time they tried to influence the international community.

During the summer of 1965, the government of Cyprus protested against an article of Dr. Christian Heinze\textsuperscript{114} reporting also the views of Forsthoff about the Cyprus problem. A report dated June 4th, 1965\textsuperscript{115} of the German Embassy in Nicosia criticized also the article as partly one-sided. The Cypriot Government protested officially on September 3, whereas the article was published in \textit{Europa Archiv} actually, long before, on October 10, 1964\textsuperscript{116}. It seems that the German Embassy was not aware of the fact that Heinze was working as a legal expert of the German Ministry of Finance, reported however to Bonn that such an attitude was damaging the bilateral relations, at this point of time, since it did not reflect the official German policy.

At the end of September, Germany decided to congratulate Cyprus on the national day of October 1, even if the Cypriot Government would not celebrate the “independence”, since the political aim at that point of time was the union with Greece. Ambassador Koenig congratulated the Cypriot State Secretary Patroclos Stavrou, carrying a very tactful message from the German Government for the destiny of the people of Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{114} A brief biography of Dr. Christian Heinze, could be found under http://www.crh.teamware.de/personalia.html. According it, Heinze obtained a Ph.D. in Law under the supervision of Professor Forsthoff in 1957 in Heidelberg and followed him in Cyprus in 1962. At the time wrote the article and until 1966, when he started working as a private lawyer, he was working as a legal staff member of the Ministry of Finance in Bonn. Through the time, Heinze remained always at the disposal of Turkey, providing legal expertises mostly aligned with the Turkish views. Cf. also http://crh-rechtsanwalt.de/Cyprus-EU-Legalopinion.html

\textsuperscript{115} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, June 4, 1965, PolAAA, B26/325

\textsuperscript{116} Heinz.C. Der Zypern-Konflikt, eine Bewährungsprobe westlicher Friedensordnung. In: 
\textit{Europa-Archiv}, (1964) 19, p. 717
The activities of the East German Trade mission on the island, had mainly two directions: trade (potatoes, wine and tobacco from Cyprus) and transport (transit over Nicosia to Arab and other Asian countries). The German Embassy that followed closely these activities suggested before the end of 1965 immediate action for two cases: to buy 400 tones of Cypriot potatoes that, despite promises, were not accepted by East Germany and to sign immediately an Aviation Agreement in order to ensure that Lufthansa will include again Nicosia to its destinations. The aim of both actions was to underline the lack of credibility of East Germany and the opportunistic character of its Trade Mission in matters like export or airline ticket price dumping. The Aviation Agreement could be concluded, however, under the term to exclude the East German Interflug from the companies flying to Cyprus.

As a respond to the Security Council Resolution 207, the Cypriot Government endorsed at the General Assembly a Resolution adopted on December 18, 1965\textsuperscript{117}. The resolution was largely based on the Galo Plaza Report and the Cypriot Declaration on minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots. The German observers at the U.N. noted in their report\textsuperscript{118} that the Resolution of the General Assembly included actually \textit{“one – sided Greek Cypriot points of view”}. Germany, being aware of the fact that any change of the status of the Turkish Cypriots to a “minority” and the nullification of the Treaty of Guarantee and thus of the interventional rights of Turkey, would never be accepted, was convinced that the Cypriot Government was moving with the Resolution again the wrong direction. The report analyzed the fact that mostly the African countries voted in

\textsuperscript{117} United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) 1965

\textsuperscript{118} PolAAA Berlin, B 26 / 327
favor of the Resolution, sending the message that they were not willing to accept the same “mistake” made in the case of Cyprus, namely to put on an equal level a minority and a majority. The fact that Germany, as well as the other West European countries abstained, was explained by their wish to remain impartial. The report mentioned, though that the Turkish side requested, at least for moral reasons, a negative vote from the West.

At the beginning of 1966, the German diplomacy appeared to be pessimistic, as regards to the efforts of solving the Cyprus problem. In a report from Nicosia, dated February 7, 1966, the Embassy described nationalism as the controlling factor of the public opinion of Cyprus and Greece, which condemned any attempt for direct talks between Ankara and Athens to a failure. The report stated further that the Cypriot press accused occasionally the U.N. forces on the island of cooperating with the Turkish Cypriots. In fact, there were cases of smuggling weapons for the Turkish Cypriots. Obtaining intelligence information however, through the U.N. forces, applied for both sides. Germany, who financed from the beginning the United Nations Force in Cyprus, consisting mostly of friendly to Bonn, country contingents, regarded such attacks by the Cypriot press with regret.

The German Embassy in Nicosia protested in early 1966 for the partnerships of East German cities Schwerin and Rostock with Nicosia and Famagusta. The Embassy suggested to Bonn as a counter-measure, to ask the city authorities of Karlsruhe,

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119 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, February 7, 1966, PolAAA B26 / 348

120 In a relevant case, British and Swedish military personnel were sentenced by Cypriot Courts

121 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, January 24, 1966, PolAAA, B26 / 325
already partner – city of Nicosia, to freeze their relations. The Embassy was merely not successful in that issue, was however, more effective on the issue of participation to the Cyprus International Fair, securing for years the exclusion of East Germany. The Federal Government through the famous German Archaeological Institute (DAI) intervened also to stop an East German archaeological excavation. The only activities not being prevented were in the fields of sport or culture or the help rendered by East Germany during the construction of the Municipal Theatre of Nicosia.

As already mentioned, despite the wish of Ambassador Koenig to be replaced already at the end of 1964, when bilateral relations worsened, the German Government did so only in mid 1966. The information in the Archives is not quite clear about the reasons, we could assume, however, that Bonn chose not to use the strong, in diplomatic language, signal of withdrawing an Ambassador during the 1964 crisis or right after, thus avoiding any further aggravation of the already bad relations. Anyhow, after the decision to send a new Ambassador, the German Foreign Ministry summarized in a Memorandum on May, 17, 1966 bilateral relations as follows:

“The development of the German - Cypriot relations give us reasons to worry. Until the eruption of violence in Cyprus at the end of 1963 they could be described as excellent. Since the German government, though, being careful about Turkey refrained from taking any position during the conflict, the Soviet Occupation Zone scored points in upgrading its relations. From that point on, our influence reduced gradually. Additionally, the strong attack of the German press against the Greek Cypriots and especially against President Makarios made the situation worse. Official policy of

122 German Foreign Ministry, May 17, 1966, PolAAA, B26 / 348
Makarios [to the German problem] is still principle of self determination. The various concessions made to the Soviet Zone is a reason to cool further our relations. The First Department proposes to take advantage of sending our new Ambassador Dr. Petersen to Cyprus in order to intensify the talks with the President”.

The Memorandum suggests improving the climate by handing out through the new Ambassador a personal letter of the German Federal President and the Chancellor to Makarios. Indeed, the letters were given to Makarios during the accreditation ceremony. The speeches made during the ceremony by Makarios and Ambassador Petersen reminded of the old good times. In his report, dated May, 23 1966\textsuperscript{123}, the newly appointed Ambassador noted that Makarios reminded him of the earlier support for Germany in the framework of the Non Aligned Movement and expressed the view that the U.N. would not approve the accession of East Germany.

The reports of the new Ambassador were written in a different tone, occasionally revealing a broader understanding for the positions of the Cypriot Government. Always avoiding to be partial, as much as possible, he forwarded on September 21, 1966\textsuperscript{124} a request by the U.N. for tends for the Turkish Cypriot families living in the enclave of Kokkina. He explained however, that the Turkish population that took shelter in Kokkina during the crisis of 1964 was discouraged by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to return to its old villages or move to the cities, not because of any danger from the Greek Cypriots but in order to be presented as refugees for propaganda reasons or in order to

\textsuperscript{123} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, May 23, 1966, PolAAA, B26 /348
\textsuperscript{124} German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, September 21, 1966, PolAAA, B26 /327
maintain in the enclave a necessary number of population justifying the formation of a
canton in case of a multi-cantonal federal solution. He went on to mention that the
Cypriot government would consider, for these very reasons, any action to supply the
population with tenders as unfriendly.

One of the issues still pending between the two countries concerned the Embassy of
Cyprus in Bonn. In November 1967 Makarios requested an Agreement for accreditation
of a new Ambassador, Christodoulos Fissentzidis, for the vacant since 1964 post. A
report prepared for internal use of the German Ministry explained that the decision not
to accredit an Ambassador the previous years, in order to avoid a strong protest from
the Turkish side, was for a long time accepted by Makarios. Being obliged to examine
the new request, the German Ministry came to the conclusion that it should be approved.
However, the accreditation could be postponed for several months, in order to give
some time to the two sides to negotiate. Indeed, the new Cypriot Ambassador presented
his letter of credence finally on July 12, 1968.

A clear evaluation of the events of 1967 is again given in the year report of the German
Embassy in Nicosia. The Embassy chose not to emphasize on the tragic events of
Kofinou but on the possible positive impact of the retreat of thousands of Greek and
Turkish military personnel, exceeding the numbers provided by the 1959 Treaties.
Underlining the fact that, since neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots managed to
impose their will on the other side, perhaps the time came to consider solving the
problem by a common effort. Towards this aim, other countries could provide valuable

125 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, March 20, 1968, PolAAA, B26 / 370
help, secure through the permanent settlement the interests of the West and keep the influence of communism back. The report pointed also that some of the Turkish Cypriot claims, i.e. to fulfil the provision of the 1959 Agreements and cover 30% of the posts of the civil service, being only 18% of the population, were overstressing and unnecessary. Clearly described is also the effect of the coup in Athens on Cyprus: a part of the Greek Cypriots was not sure anymore if the union with a military regime would be the best solution and on the opposite, another part would like to see a continuation of the coup also in Cyprus (as happened in 1974).

By the end of the period, bilateral relations did not merely return to the level of the first years, but surely were over the crisis of 1964. Both sides appointed new Ambassadors who managed to give new dynamics. After 1968, the suspicion of the German side that Cyprus could encourage the East German aspirations for recognition and the suspicion of Cyprus that Germany could form a pro–Turkish approach on the conflict was minor. In Cyprus the two communities would soon engage in a dialogue to solve the conflict and in Germany, in 1969, Willy Brandt would be elected and the Hallstein Doctrine would be revised. In the correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry one can detect again the hope that the worst was over and the dialogue could bring the results desired for Cyprus. Unfortunately, this hope was denied by the tragic events of 1974.
5. OVERVIEW OF OTHER FIELDS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS:
ECONOMY, TRADE, EDUCATION, CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

German economic and cultural influence in the world is significant. Germany has traditionally one of the highest export volumes. The German culture and language are dominant in the European continent and present in many foreign countries. In the case of Cyprus, however, as in the case of many other Commonwealth countries, the German role and influence cannot but follow the role of Britain. Nevertheless, an overview of the bilateral relations in the fields of economy, trade, education, culture and relations on the level of civil society would be very useful. The good results, especially of the first period confirm also the rule that good political relations enable good results in the above mentioned fields.

5.1 Economic Relations

Already in October 1961 the two countries signed a Trade Agreement. By 1963, the volume of bilateral trade reached the amount of 7,6 Mil. DM, which could be already compared to the volume with Britain, that reached the same year 15,7 Mil. DM. Germany was from the beginning a good destination for Cypriot Agricultural products, copper and sapphire. It is perhaps worth to mention that Germany could cover around 50% of its needs in copper from Cyprus. True, the exports to Germany were always less than the imports. This is also due to the nature of the products imported on the island, mainly machines, electronics, iron and cars. The deficit in trade between imports and exports was not, however, significant. Germany imported from Cyprus for example in
1963 goods in a volume of 3,6 Mil. DM and exported 3,8 Mil. DM. Still, this deficit would increase in the future and remain largely in favor of Germany. Germany was placed either second or third globally on the table with the trade partners of Cyprus. The only year with a serious setback was 1964 (due to the crisis )\textsuperscript{126}. Obviously, however, any compare of the German interests for exports to Cyprus with the interests of exports to Turkey would place Turkey far ahead.

The field, were Germany played an even more important role was that of economic assistance. In October 1961 the two countries signed another two Agreements: on Economic cooperation and financing and on Technical assistance. These Agreements were the basis for the significant flow of capital assistance to Cyprus. According to Keesings, already in November 1961 \textit{“the German Federal Republic had agreed to provide 12,000,000 DM. in capital aid and at least 20,000,000 DM. in long-term credits for the delivery of West German investment goods, and also to contribute as technical aid 1,300,000 DM. towards geological and water surveys in Cyprus.”}\textsuperscript{127}. Plans though, to promote in due time also an Agreement for Avoiding double taxation were delayed until the seventies.

In 1962, the German Foreign Ministry noted in a message to the German Embassy in Nicosia that for the time being, no financial help could be given to Cyprus since no concrete plans and proposals for its use were made. This information is instrumental, providing probably the context for the whole period: it seems that the internal problems,

\textsuperscript{126} Main source for the information are again the year reports of the German Embassy in Nicosia
\textsuperscript{127} Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Volume 7, November, 1961 Cyprus, Page 18460
especially the constitutional issues discussed already, were overshadowing the efforts to improve infrastructure and develop projects. Projects that were, however taken into consideration and realized with German participation were the electrification of the port of Limassol and for water and several irrigation projects.

The crisis on the island between 1964 and 1967 discouraged any large engagement in other projects. After 1968, however, and since Britain agreed also to join the European Economic Community in the early seventies, Cyprus was encouraged by Germany to conclude its own Association Agreement with the European Economic Community.

5.2. Press

The course of relations between Cyprus and Germany is also well reflected in the press. It can be said that the German press, during the whole period, was not simply reporting but also interpreting and criticizing the facts in Cyprus. An example is provided in an article of the German Sueddeutsche Zeitung on August 28, 1964. Next to an interview of Makarios, the newspaper published an article with the title “The island of the fanatic fighters”\textsuperscript{128}. The article was critical to both sides, expressing the disagreement of a country that was totally destroyed not long ago by war, with methods or policies that could have the same results in Cyprus. More criticism however, was exercised on the pro – Enosis stance of Makarios. In fact, criticism from the German press against the policy of the Cypriot Government and Makarios in person, was exercised ever since the beginning of the crisis, forcing the Consulate General of Cyprus in Hamburg, which was in “Greek Cypriot” hands, since Ambassador Zaim was still in Germany, to send a

\textsuperscript{128} Sueddeutsche Zeitung, “The island of the fanatic fighters”, 28.8.1964
Note Verbal, on April 4, 1964 in which the Cypriot government protested for the “anti-Cypriot” articles. Ironically, at the early stages of the conflict, in a meeting with the German Ambassador, the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia protested about the neutral way the German press reported about the incidents in Cyprus. It is obvious that Germany could always appeal to the freedom of expression, in order to distance from the attacks, according to the reports of the archives, seemed to understand the views of the press but at the same time to worry about the impact of this criticism.

Criticism was exercised, however also on Germany. The newspaper of the Cypriot Communist Party AKEL Haravghi, published on December 19, 1965 an article or actually a translation or reproduction of an article in a memorial edition of the East German National Council referring to the German Federal President. According to the article, the German President was a secret agent of Gestapo, responsible for the construction of the concentration camp of Buchenwald. The German Embassy in Nicosia reported on the article, suggesting prosecuting the director, editor and writer so as to discourage in the future such articles. It is true that the German press accused directly in some occasions Makarios for the bloodshed on the island. Still, the article of Haravghi could not be considered as “reciprocal”, since the facts that relied on, were not confirmed.

In contrast to the West German press, the controlled East German Press, for reasons that are well understood, occasionally praised Makarios. The journalist Konrad Schmidt
planed even to publish a biography of Makarios under the title “The Christ in the World”129.

Other Cypriot newspapers such as the liberal Eleftheria were seeing Germany with a much positive eye. An article published on August 10, 1965, compared directly the division of Germany and stressed the danger to be repeated in Cyprus. Since the article sympathized with the German people, and the newspaper was one of the most popular on the island, the German Embassy drew the conclusion that despite the activities of East Germany and the Soviet Union, the majority of the Cypriots were against the division of Germany130.

That same year, the German Embassy in Nicosia suggested, however unsuccessfully, increasing German influence by supporting a private radio station, financed by private German investors on the island in order to broadcast not only in Cyprus but also to the whole Middle East. The task should be combined with the newly founded German Trade Centre in Beirut. In order to strengthen this position, the Embassy reminded that the French had also similar plans for Cyprus, since they already operated broadcasting stations in Egypt and Lebanon.

5.3. Education, Culture, Civil Society

German influence in education and culture, though many Cypriots, some of them supported by scholarships, studied in Germany, was always less than the English or the

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129 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1965, PolAAA, B26 /325
130 German Embassy Nicosia to the German Foreign Ministry, 11 August 1965, PolAAA, B26 /325
French, despite the fact that the Cypriot Education Minister Konstantinos Spyridakis studied in Germany. The situation would change partly in the seventies and eighties. The German Embassy in Nicosia, pushed, since the early years, though, to increase the number of scholarships, thus also increasing the country’s influence. Different to the Greek Cypriot school system, the Turkish Cypriot School system promoted German as a second foreign language after English. Thus the percentage of German – speaking Turkish Cypriots was always higher than that of the Greek Cypriots.

The small numbers of Cypriots living in Germany or Germans living in Cyprus would not allow the civil society to play any significant role. There were many exchanges of visits, though. Again, proportionally, many visits in the period examined were paid in East Germany. Unions or individuals, many of them for medical treatment, visited East Germany. It was organized to meet also with the Greek refugees from the civil war of 1945 – 1948, that were still living in East Germany. Certain help by the large Greek community from “guest workers”, students and other members of the Greek community was rendered also in West Germany. The same, however, was done by the Turkish community, whose influence would later increase significantly.

An overall impression is that in all these fields, Germany could do much more for Cyprus, if only Cyprus could create the right channels for that. German sources, know – how, well established institutions and traditions would help Cyprus to develop faster and become prosperous. The choices in the political sphere, however, and mainly the political crisis on the island let other options unexploited.

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6. CONCLUSION

The examination of relations between Germany and Cyprus mainly through the Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry for the period between 1960 and 1968 was inevitably a Cyprus-centric one. This is not only due to the fact that the German Archives on Cyprus provide comments mainly on issues related to Cyprus (a parallel examination requires access to the Cypriot archives, which is, as already mentioned not yet possible) but also partly due to the fact that the German political scene in terms of internal policy and also foreign policy (under Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard from the Christian Democratic Union) remained in the period under examination mainly unchanged.

Germany developed the idea of a united Europe, even if it was itself divided or perhaps because of this very fact. Support and cooperation with its NATO allies not only in the military field was the only option to confront with the East. Cyprus chose to remain between the East and the West, had however, at the same time the ambition to revise the fragile Treaties on which its independence was based. This choice provided for tension between Greece and Turkey and for concern among the other members of the Western Alliance.

The game of Nicosia between the East the West, the “communist danger” on the island and the role of East Germany in Cyprus were puzzling the German diplomacy. Cypriot
policy was perceived sometimes as controversial or even provocative, Bonn however rejected any overreaction.

Thus, Germany maintained not only a good fame but also the possibility to express criticism from a friend to a friend. “Cypriot nationalists represented an ancient form that disappeared from Europe actually just only some years before”, was the comment of the German press on the article mentioned earlier\textsuperscript{132}. This concept, of trying to understand something that would prove later as anachronistic as the nationalism proved to be, understand but criticize and warn against it, was probably a source of patience in the bilateral course. And patience in diplomacy is one of the most valuable virtues.

The German policy, based in many occasions on a legalistic approach, as Germany was often accused of, tried not to miss the picture of the wood for the tree, even if that tree would seem to be temporarily part of its national interest. After all, long time German national interests, as defined many times in the course under examination favored only the permanent stabilization of the region. For Germany, and this is probably a lesson learned from the Second World War, it was always more important to preserve peace and stability rather than pursuing national interests or, as the case of Cyprus, to seek constitutional or conventional amendments that would cause the harsh reaction of the other side and thus setting any profitable outcome in dispute..

By examining the bilateral relations only in the given period, although the scheme used is obvious, i.e. the good beginning until 1963, the Nadir – point by the end of 1964 and

early 1965 and the “new” beginning marked by the accreditation of a new Ambassador in Bonn that coincided with the beginning of negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus in May 1968, the end of violence and the hope for a definite overcome of the crisis, we serve the aim of this work, up to a certain degree. We shed light to diplomacy, mainly to the German diplomacy and its perception in Cyprus which in our view differs from the diplomacy of other countries. Germany, though distanced partly from the evolution in Cyprus for reasons that were already explained, managed however to preserve its credibility and constructiveness and this, for both parts, the Greek and the Turkish and the respective communities in Cyprus. Following closely the issues through NATO and the United Nations decided to encourage only what was thought to reduce the gap on the island through various measures. In the years that followed 1968 encouraged again the bicommunal dialogue and a “step by step” approach and supported the conclusion of the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1972.

Germany encouraged democracy in Greece, especially after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the collapse of the military regime of Athens, in July 1974 by offering the chance for full accession to the European Economic Community. This was not only meant to stabilize democracy in Greece but also to send to Turkey a strong message, after becoming clear that the invasion in Cyprus was part of Ankara’s policy for partition of the island. During the period of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974 – 1982) and especially in his early years in power, Germany even offered to assume a

\[133\] Greece joined the European Economic Community in 1981
mediating role. The real “mediation”, however, which still continues, is the fact that the accession of Cyprus to the European Union and the accession negotiations of Turkey, tracked in the mid and late nineties respectively, can prove to be the only real catalyst for a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem. In this respective, the role of Germany from the early nineties was not just helpful but decisive. Since the last effort to solve the Cyprus problem failed, but the perspective is still alive, since Turkey continues to negotiate its accession, Germany’s role, with its excellent relations to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia remains decisive.

Through this perspective and seen in continuation, the policy of Bonn through the last decades proved to be more constructive and certainly more effective than the policy of many others, even more powerful stakeholders. An attempt, however, to describe this policy up to the present would require a form exceeding by far the one of the current study.
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