Diplomatic Mistranslation Bernard Lewis mentions a late 16th century correspondence between the Sultan of Turkey and Queen Elizabeth of England. The sultan does not consider their relationship to be one of equals: "In the documents, the sultan, addressing the queen, uses language indicating that he expects her to be: '...loyal and firm-footed in the path of vassalage and obedience...and to manifest loyalty and subservience' to the Ottoman throne. The contemporary translation into Italian, which served as the medium of communication between Turks and Englishmen, simply renders this as sincera amicizia. This kind of diplomatic mistranslation was for centuries the norm." (What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 22.) Contribution by: Hannah Slavik Date entered: 9/15/2002 6:56:18 PM
1994 Cairo Conference on Population, clause on abortion Louise Lassonde (Coping with Population Challenges, London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 1996, 7) provides the following example: "In the Cairo Programme, various formulations which were contradictory a priori were worded in such a way as to satisfy all parties. This is what happened in the controversy over abortion, which was circumvented by means of a wording that satisfied all groups. It reads as follows: "In those circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe". In other words, safety (and therefore the possibility of an abortion) is not relevant where a government regards abortion as unthinkable.Safety is recommended, however, where abortion is not unthinkable. Consequently, since all positions on abortion are given equal weight, the wording agreed upon satisfies both those who wish abortion to be safe and those who do not want to acknowledge their legitimacy except in specific circumstances spelt out in their domestic legislation. Although these wordings are sometimes convoluted and disconcerting for those not participating in the negotiations, they are of vital importance. This is becase they express a concept which is particularly effective since it is deliberately charged with a multiplicity of meanings, and so makes it possible to break a deadlock in negotiations." Contribution by: Jovan Kurbalija Date entered: 10/8/2002 1:45:27 AM
Croesus at Delphi - Referential Ambiguity Croesus, an ancient king of Lydia, asked the oracle at Delphi to foresee the outcome of his attempt to conquer the Persian Empire. The oracle, as clever as always, issued the following prophesy: "If you attack the Persians, you will destroy a mighty empire." In this sentence, the expression "mighty empire" was used in an ambiguous way. The way Croesus understood the expression was not even close to the way the oracle of Delphi intended it. What the oracle meant by "mighty empire" was the empire of Lydia whose king was Croesus himself, not the empire of Persia, as Croesus understood. So, Croesus, acting on his mistaken understanding of the expression "a mighty empire", did destroy a mighty empire, but it was his own. I also believe that Croesus understood the term "destroy" from the prophetic message too narrowly, because the oracle intended it to mean both "destroy" and "self-destroy". Source: The History of Herodotus (Chicago/London/Toronto: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952), 11. Contribution by: Drazen Pehar Date entered: 4/16/2002 8:28:49 PM
Delphi Oracle - Syntactic Ambiguity A famous Latin translation of one of the prophecies of the oracle at Delphi reads "Ibis, redibis numquam peribis in bello." Two different translations and interpretations may be provided for this sentence. 1. "You'll leave, and you shall never return as you will perish in the war." 2. "You'll leave and return, and you shall not perish in the war." "Numquam" here specifies in too many directions; prima facie it can specify both "redibis" and "peribis", but it cannot specify both simultaneously. However, nothing in the sentence indicates to which verbal phrase the "numquam" qualifier should be allocated. Contribution by: Drazen Pehar Date entered: 4/5/2002 2:16:01 AM
Rambouillet Agreement Rambouillet mediators started with the premise that interests of Serb and Kosovar-Albanian delegations to the Rambouillet negotiations contradicted one another. The Serb delegation, for instance, wanted to maintain the status of Kosovo as a province with very little, or no, competence in foreign relations, among other things. The Kosovar-Albanian delegation had different interests; to turn Kosovo into at least a fully-fledged republic on equal footing with the other two republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro. This status, of course, entails the capacity to run certain aspects of foreign relations independently from the central federal authority. Secondly, the Serb delegation wanted the Rambouillet draft agreement, such as it was presented in Rambouillet, to remain binding in the foreseeable future. The Kosovar delegation had an opposing interest which was not envisaged by the Rambouillet draft: to turn Kosovo one day into a fully independent entity. They therefore wanted to see a revision of the agreement as soon as possible as well as to organise a referendum to check the will of the people of Kosovo vis-ŕ-vis the status of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Mediators to the Rambouillet process decided to use an ambiguous wording to bridge the gap between the aforementioned interests. The constitution, as the key part of the Rambouillet Draft agreement, stipulated that "Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign relations within its areas of responsibility equivalent to the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." So, the mediators made use of a referentially ambiguous adjective "equivalent", which is not the same as equal, but could be. As to the interim character of the agreement, the mediators used both referential and cross-textual ambiguities to meet the demands of both delegations. First, the draft agreement itself was called "Interim-agreement", to the liking of the Albanian delegation. However, Chapter 8, Article I, 1-3, stipulated that amendments to this agreement should be adopted by agreement of all parties. That meant that without Serb consent the interim agreement could not be changed; and that thereby it would turn into a permanent arrangement. However, in Article I, 3, mediators emphasised that "three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo" which seemed to tilt the balance of the wording again in favor of the Albanian demands…
To remind readers, the Serb delegation did not accept the Rambouillet draft agreement, whereas the Albanian delegation accepted it in such an ambiguous fashion that its acceptance was just a bit better than the Serb refusal. Contribution by: Drazen Pehar Date entered: 4/6/2002 1:12:46 AM