Reorganisation and restructuring are not new to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA): since its establishment in 1927 it had continuously been adjusted to changing circumstances and perceptions about the best way to organise it.(21)  In summary, by the late 1980’s the DFA closely reflected South Africa’s unique position and the country’s perception thereof. It was basically organised along geographic lines and it was quite noticeable, therefore, that some regions of the world were hardly regarded as worth much concerted effort, that international organisations generally got rather limited attention, and that those who organised the Department did not think in terms of global issues. Of course, South Africa could not always choose to have relations with foreign countries, as it was actively isolated by many. The TBVC states (the "independent" homeland created by South Africa, but recognised by none except South Africa and each other) occupied a relatively large number of people in the Department.(22) 

Immediately after 1990, some changes began to occur in the Department, one of which was the "upgrading" of multilateral affairs from a directorate to a chief directorate (1991). However, it was still housed within the Branch: Overseas Countries and the range of issues reflected in its structure was not yet as extensive as it is today.(23)  By March 1992 there was a complete Multilateral Affairs division, separate from the Branch: Overseas Countries and gradually the range of issues provided for were being extended.(24)  Other changes were also being effected to provide for new ties being forged: Eastern Europe, which had previously been conspicuously absent from the organisational chart of the DFA, appeared early on and the Africa Branch had shown considerable growth.(25)  Other more subtle changes were that a greater awareness of the different countries in, for example, Asia was manifest from the structuring of the section responsible for relations with that part of the world, and the fact that, at that time, the Middle East was apparently increasingly seen as part of Africa.(26) 

After the political transition of 1994, the political map of South Africa changed and the TBVC "states" were "reincorporated" into South Africa and "disappeared" from the organisational chart of the DFA. The way in which the various sections of the Department were listed, also seemed to suggest a shift in emphasis: Branch: Africa was listed before Branch: Overseas Countries, the Multilateral section was listed before any bilateral sections and within branches where multilateral sections were also included, the latter were listed before the bilateral component.(27)  Perhaps one should not make too much of this; however, what other feasible explanation can one think of except a change of perception, albeit unconscious? Fact is that multilateral relations remained a growth area and the relevant section of the DFA was further expanded and diversified.(28)  By early 1996 the Multilateral Branch, taken together with the division of Branch: Africa and the Middle East which concerned itself with multilateral relations, almost balanced those sections of the DFA burdened with bilateral relations.(29) 

Reference has already been made to the fact that the new government did not follow a "zero-sum" foreign policy, but rather a "universal" one, which implied that ties with Western countries were not downgraded at the expense of the forging of new ties with countries which had distanced themselves entirely from the old South African regime. This approach was reflected in the fact that ample provision which was still made at head office for relations with North America and (Western) Europe, in spite of all the new additions, such as Africa, Asia and the Far East.(30) 

Towards the end of 1997 an organisational chart of the DFA listed five Branches (Bilateral Relations (Africa); Bilateral relations (Americas & Europe); Bilateral Relations (Asia & Middle East); Multilateral Relations; Administration. Also listed were two Chief Directorates (Legal Affairs and Corporate Liaison) and a Sub-Directorate (Work Study) independent of the branches.(31)  Effective from 1 December 1997, a Democratic Transformation section was also added.(32) 

The breakdown of these divisions, when looked at in detail, amply illustrates the extension of South Africa’s foreign relations to include all regions of the world, many functional aspects and a great intensity of interaction.(33)  However, this is not a static picture. Budgetary problems will probably prevent too much further extension, but will hopefully not cause shrinkage. The organisational chart of the Department is, as in the past, continuously changing in its detail. A prime example of this is the change which was effected in the Multilateral Branch in January 1998 and which entailed the scrapping of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) Sub-directorate as a subsection of the Directorate ASAS, NAM and the Commonwealth - which in turn had formed part of the Chief Directorate: Multilateral Political and Security Affairs - and replacing it with a separate Chief-Directorate of Branch: Multilateral Relations.(34)  This was, of course, directly due to the capacity required in South Africa to organise the NAM Summit in 1998 and also to support the Chairmanship of the Movement thereafter.

The DFA’s capacity to handle the many and varied challenges resulting from the extension of the country’s relations with the external world, has been sorely taxed. The Department has had to deal with the challenges of the process of integration of six different "diplomatic services" - those of South Africa, the four TBVC "states," and the ANC’s "foreign service" - all of which came with different levels of training and experience and, of course, with often divergent perceptions of the world and the role South Africa should play in it.(35)  All of this had to be dealt with at the same time as the DFA was subject to very serious budgetary constraints due to the great need for funds to get the Reconstruction and Development Programme off the ground. The DFA is also subject to constant criticism and is often in the news due to rumours and accusations about appointments, the ineffectiveness of the Minister and his possible replacement, and the stepping down of and successor for the Director-General, Mr. Rusty Evans - who had stayed on after 1994.(36)  After months of speculation about when Mr. Evans would vacate his post, where he would go and who would succeed him, the Director-General finally retired towards the end of 1997 and he has been temporarily replaced by one of the Deputy Directors General in the DFA, Ms. Thuthu Mazibuko.(37)  It is now rumoured that a permanent appointment may soon be under way in the person of Mr. Jackie Selebi, currently Ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

South Africa’s overseas missions grew quite spectacularly from 1990 onwards: in 1990 South Africa had representation in only thirty states and by 1997 this had grown to 160 states.(38)  This meant ninety-six missions, including a mission accredited to the Palestine National Authority and located at Ramallah on the West Bank, and five multilateral missions: New York (United Nations), Geneva (United Nations), Addis Ababa (OAU), Brussels (European Communities, including the European Union) and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency).(39)  The ninety bilateral missions were made up of twenty-four in Africa,(40)  forty-five in America and Europe,(41)  and twenty-one in Asia and the Middle East.(42)  Many of these bilateral missions are actually accredited to more than one country, which accounts for the 160 countries South Africa is represented in.(43)  This is in very many cases a cost saving practice and certainly not uncommon. The result is that South Africa has been able to establish representation (including diplomatic and consular representation) in all but twenty-two states in the world, "a number that includes some very small states and none of major significance to SA, except Iraq."(44)  This number also includes some potential trouble spots, such as North Korea and Haiti, several Pacific island states, three African countries (Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone), and some central American states, including El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.(45) 

South African representation abroad is a good illustration of the country’s "universal foreign policy" though it is clear that economic pragmatism weighs heavily in the allocation of missions abroad. According to the DFA, the expansion process has been slowing since 1995 and is now all but over.(46)  There is no doubt that financial considerations play an important role in this, though it is not necessarily the only consideration. South Africa is now facing some new dilemmas, including the problem that there is not full reciprocity in the country’s foreign representation: there are a number of countries maintaining a presence in South Africa despite the fact that South Africa has no representation in those countries, and there is also not full reciprocity as to the status of representation.(47)  In addition there is great disparity in residential and non-residential representation.(48)  Of course, reciprocity is not an absolute rule in diplomacy, but too great a disparity could well be cause for growing irritation in the long run. Only time will tell whether South Africa will address the problem by increasing its overseas representation or whether some other countries will in due course end their representation in South Africa due to the disparity.

In answer to budgetary pressures, it was reported in the press in early 1997, South Africa was keen to discuss sharing resources with other SADC countries, possibly by accrediting South African representatives to the embassies of other countries in exchange for allowing representatives of SADC countries to share South Africa’s resources.(49)  However, nothing has apparently as yet come of these plans of sharing missions as a moneysaving idea. The idea may be taken up again in future.