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THE WANING
OF THE STATE AND THE WAXING OF CYBERWORLD - Richard Falk
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WORLD ORDER AS A MIND GAME
I. World order as a mind-game about the
nature of political reality on a global scale:
For several centuries the game has been played according to the rules of the state
system, juridical rules about the equality of states and geopolitical practices that focus
on the inequalities of states. The framework and deeper implications of this type of world
order have been best articulated by political philosophers, perhaps most persuasively by
Machiavelli and Hobbes, but there are many versions of these "realist" themes,
including in the thought of non-Western traditions. The state with its ability to mobilize
resources, impose order within its borders, and most of all, by its capacity to wage war,
sustain diplomacy, and establish temporary conditions of stability, has remained central
to these analyses. In recent years, Hedley Bull in The Anarchical Society and Robert
Gilpin, War and Change in International Society, have been the most successful
international relations specialists when it comes to theorizing this contemporary
condition of the state system. Kenneth Waltz has been influential in emphasizing the
structural side of statist geopolitics, especially by calling systematic attention to the
behavioral implications of bipolarity during the cold war era. The gatekeepers of this
Westphalian mind-game were very effective at marginalizing counter-traditions of political
thought: that is, variants of non-violent or warless worlds, visions of peaceful global
governance. Such images of alternatives to statism, have, perhaps, most vividly been
associated with Immanuel Kants Perpetual Peace and the diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson
after World War I that half-heartedly led to the problematic establishment of the League
of Nations. These alternative images have been marginalized by being labeled as
"utopian," "salvationist," and even "apocalyptic."
In this regard, the statist paradigm has dominated thought and practice throughout this
century:
The bitter ideological and geopolitical rivalries between liberal democracies
and fascism, and then communism, have been predominantly understood as struggles for
ascendancy between states and groups of states.
The great upheaval in the South associated with the process of decolonization
have proceeded on the basis of legitimating the imposed boundaries of the colonial era,
even if artificial and ethnically non-sustainable, given the identities that persisted in
these societies and their relationship to uneven distributions of public and private
goods.
Even the experiments in global institutions were carried out in a manner that
limited membership to sovereign states and adopted a constitutional language that was
reassuring about the retention of sovereign rights and the avoidance of supranationality.
But despite this apparent domination of the conceptual landscape, states have seemed
cumulatively and increasingly to be losing their grip over the dynamics of
"community" and "identity," and even of "security." New
mind-games are taking shape around the ideas of globalization, global civil society, and
the cyberworld. Will these claimants on the future also be marginalized as
"utopian" or "exotic"?
We cannot now be sure. The state has proved to be resourceful in appropriate new
technologies for its own purposes. It is now challenging unrestricted civil access to IT.
Can the state retain the advantages of IT while protecting itself from its disempowering
and subversive influences? What sort of balance will be struck between civil society and
state power? Will there emerge new governmental layers of authority at the regional and
global levels with the assigned task of regulating access to and applications of IT?
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